ב"ה

PLEASE NOTE:
This is an incomplete draft and does not yet have full rabbinical approval.

TORAH

AND THE

TALIBAN



OPIUM POPPY GROWING IN AFGHANISTAN

IN THE SUPPOSED "FAILED AND PUPPET STATE" OF THE TALIBAN

SHOWING 99% REDUCTION, SPRING 2000, LEFT, SPRING 2001, RIGHT [SEE PAGE 12]

LEADING EXPERTS AND READERS SAID

כָּל הַכָּבוֹד [A.]

EXTREMELY ENCOURAGING [B.]

I WOULD LIKE TO SALUTE HIM…

VERY DEEP AND EMPATHETIC UNDERSTANDING [C.]

THIS BOOK WILL HELP TO END THE WAR SOONER [D.]

GRATEFUL FOR THIS IMPORTANT INFORMATION [E.]

A GREAT WORK, WELL RESEARCHED AND WELL WRITTEN [F.]

ABSOLUTELY FASCINATING [G.]

VERY INTERESTING [H.]

YOUR BOOK REMOVED THE SCALES FROM MY EYES [I.]

A. SPOZHMAI MAIWANDI, VOICE OF AMERICA **B.** BERNARD FRAHI, UN, **C.** PROF. BARNETT RUBIN, LEADING U. S. EXPERT **D.** A WELL RESPECTED RABBI **E.** REV. PROF. HARVEY COX, HARVARD THEOLOGIAN **F.** ABID ULLA JAN, AUTHOR **G.** H.U. STUDENT **H.** NOBELIST **I.** WORLD RENOWNED RABBI-SCHOLAR-PROFESSOR

FOR DETAILED SOURCES FOR THESE QUOTES, & OTHER RESPONSES COVERING THE RANGE FROM EXTREMELY POSITIVE TO THE OPPOSITE, SEE CH. 30 & 31 & APPEND. 1

BY

A.S. Adler

SEE ABOUT THE AUTHOR BACK PAGE

SPEAKING OUT IN UNION SQUARE, NEAR 14TH ST. NYC, SUMMER '05

5781

EXPANDED FROM CHAPTER 7 OF

ובלכתך בדרך

'AS THOU GOEST BY THE WAY'

THE AUTHOR CAN BE CONTACTED AT

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A. ENEMIES OF THE TALIBAN CONTROLLED THIS PROVINCE -BADAKHSHAN- & INCREASED OPIUM POPPY GROWING BY 158% FROM 2000 to 2001-- BECOMING ALLIES OF THE US AFTER 9/11/01. **B.** OPIUM WAS STORED ON THIS PROVINCE'S BORDER – ENOUGH TO SUPPLY US & EUROPE FOR ~3 YRS. SEE P. 38. **C.** IF THE SCALE HADN'T BEEN CHANGED BY THE UN MAPPERS BETWEEN THE 2000 & 2001 REPORTS, THERE WOULD HAVE BEEN 3 LARGE RED DOTS IN THIS PROVINCE, INSTEAD OF THE 2 SHOWN. SEE FIGURES 1 & 2 ON P. 12 & DISTRICT DATA, P. 104 & 111. **D.** THESE ARE OFFICIAL UNITED NATIONS [UNDCP] MAPS WITH NOTES ADDED BY THE AUTHOR, A.S. ADLER. SEE P. 12, FOR LINKS TO THE ORIGINAL UN PUBLICATIONS. **E.** DOSTOM'S FORMER 'KINGDOM' WHEN HE WAS SOVIET/RUSSIAN ALLY; VANQUISHED BY TALIBAN IN '98; FROM 10/'01, ALLY OF THE US & ENEMY OF THE TALIBAN. **F.** POPPY GROWING RELOCATIONS. SEE NOTE C, PAGE 14. **G.** TALIBAN CONTROLLED FROM 1995: 100% DROP IN POPPY GROWING. **H.** THIS AREA, INCLUDING NANGARHAR & 6 OTHER PROVINCES, SHOWED A 98.4% DROP -- BUT, AS A RESULT OF THE CHANGE OF SCALE USED BY THE UN MAPPERS, IT LOOKS LIKE THE TALIBAN LEFT A LOT GROWING HERE. [SEE FIG. 1 & 2 ON P. 12 & FOOTNOTE 30B, P. 13] **I.** THESE TWO SPOTS HAVE ONE HECTARE EACH.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CONTENTS PAGE 1 OF 3

INTERNAL PAGE, CHAPTER AND FOOTNOTE CROSS REFERENCES HAVE NOT BEEN FULLY UPDATED.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR — BACK PAGE

PREFACE: THE CONNECTION BETWEEN THE TORAH AND THE TALIBAN 5

INTRODUCTION: HOW THE AUTHOR CAME TO WRITE THIS BOOK: 7

A: THE LAST TWO JEWS OF KABUL –RESPECTED BY THE TALIBAN? 7

B: THE "FAILED STATE" THAT WIPED OUT OPIUM? 8

C: INTENSE MEDIA CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE "MADRASSES" 9

PART ONE: DETERMINING THE REALITY 10

CHAPTER 1: CHECKING OUT THE CONTRADICTIONS 11

CHAPTER 2: OPPRESSION OF WOMEN UNDER THE TALIBAN 18

CHAPTER 3: EXECUTIONS FOR ADULTERY UNDER THE TALIBAN 20

CHAPTER 4: EXECUTIONS FOR SODOMY 23

CHAPTER 5: WHY THE TALIBAN DIDN'T TURN OVER BIN LADEN 26

CHAPTER 6: THE 9/11 COMMISSION 28

CHAPTER 7: PERSECUTION OF MISSIONARIES BY THE TALIBAN 33

CHAPTER 8: BUDDHIST STATUES AND OTHER PRE-ISLAMIC ART 35

CHAPTER 9: DISCRIMINATION AGAINST MINORITIES – 51

a. Shiites 52

b. Hazaras 54

c. Why didn't the Taliban just stick to the Pashtun areas? 57

CHAPTER 10: KEY SHIITE-HAZARA LEADER, SHEIKH ABDUL ALI MAZARI:
DID THE TALIBAN TORTURE HIM & THROW HIM TO HIS DEATH FROM A HELICOPTER? 58

The reports of two scholars 68

CHAPTER 11: DID THE TALIBAN CASTRATE SOVIET AFGHAN LEADER NAJIBULLAH? 70

CHAPTER 12: NORTHERN ALLIANCE SUPPORT OF THE SOVIETS AT THE SALANG PASS 80

PART TWO: WHERE DID THE TALIBAN & THEIR ENEMIES GET THEIR MONEY 85

CHAPTER 13: WHAT WERE THE TALIBAN'S ENEMIES FIGHTING FOR?: Giant Checkpoints 86

CHAPTER 14 a: MASSOUD & CO. : PRINTING MONEY IN RUSSIA 89

b: BANKING SHENANIGANS? 97

c: THE PHYSICAL INTEGRITY OF THE KABUL MONEY MARKET AS A SOCIAL CLIMATE BAROMETER UNDER MASSOUD & THE TALIBAN 98

d: THE IMF COMES TO HELP AND TO EXPLAIN 99

CHAPTER 15: PLANELOADS & TRAINLOADS OF WEAPONS FROM RUSSIA & IRAN 100

CHAPTER 16: MASSOUD CAUGHT LYING ABOUT OPIUM? 102

CHAPTER 17: WITH MASSOUD, IT WASN'T JUST MONEY 114

CHAPTER 18: THE TALIBAN: WHERE DID THEY GET THEIR MONEY? 118

CHAPTER 19: CRYSTALS OF ISLAM 120

CHAPTER 20: RAISING MONEY—AND SPENDING IT 122

PART THREE: MAJOR DEFAMATIONS & SINS OF OMISSION 137

CHAPTER 21: MAIMING WOMEN FOR WEARING NAIL POLISH? 139

CHAPTER 22a: MURDERING SCHOOL TEACHERS FOR TEACHING GIRLS? 141

CHAPTER 22b: MURDERING SCHOOL TEACHERS -- WITH HOLLYWOOD AMPLIFICATION 146

CHAPTER 22c: MURDERING SCHOOL TEACHERS - THE STORY TELLERS' TALE 148

CHAPTER 23: EXECUTING PEOPLE FOR PLAYING MUSIC? 158

CHAPTER 24: THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE CIA 159

CHAPTER 25: SINS OF OMISSION BY MAJOR AMERICAN MEDIA ORGANIZATIONS 160

a: N.Y.T. ARTICLE ON THE TALIBAN AMBASSADOR TO THE U.S.-- THE FRESHMAN 160

b: CBS/ 60 MINUTES PIECE ON THE OPIUM PROBLEM IN AFGHANISTAN 160

c: PRESS RESPONSE TO THE RECORD BREAKING OPIUM CROPS OF 2013 & '14 160

d: MALALA YOUSAFZAI'S NOBEL PEACE PRIZE & THE PESHAWAR ARMY PUBLIC SCHOOL ATTACK. [work in progress] 161

e: BOWE BERGDAHL- GUANTANAMO TALIBAN PRISONER EXCHANGE [work in progress] 167

CHAPTER 26: PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE 170

CONTENTS CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CONTENTS PAGE 2 OF 3

SOME INTERNAL PAGE, CHAPTER AND FOOTNOTE CROSS REFERENCES HAVE NOT BEEN UPDATED.

PART FOUR: SUMMARY, TOOLS FOR DETECTING PROPAGANDA, CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS & REACTIONS TO THESE FINDINGS 172

CHAPTER 27: SUMMARY 173
CHAPTER 28: TOOLS FOR DETECTING ANTI-TALIBAN PROPAGANDA 175
CHAPTER 29: CONCLUSIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS 177
CONCLUSION FROM THE TORAH 180
WHAT DID THE U.S. GAIN AND LOSE BY ATTACKING THE TALIBAN? 182
CHAPTER 30: REACTIONS OF PEOPLE IN THE PUBLIC EYE 183
CHAPTER 31: PRIVATE REACTION TO THESE FINDINGS 187

APPENDICES

1: RADIO PROGRAM FEATURING THE AUTHOR & PROF. BARNETT RUBIN, (for some years, Pres. Obama's key expert on Afghanistan) Transcript, with link & comment by the author. 195
2: COMMUNICATIONS WITH JAMES CALLAHAN, leading U.S. State Dept. expert on opium in Afghanistan in 2000-01 197
3: COMMUNICATIONS FROM BARRY ZULAUF, U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, 2001-2004 200
4: MULLAH OMAR - IN HIS OWN WORDS: text of suppressed interview with Voice of America, 9/'01 202
5: ACADEMIC RESPONSE TO THE TALIBAN BAN ON OPIUM POPPY CULTIVATION, including errors of the Congressional Research Service 204
6: REPORTS ON THE EDUCATION OF WOMAN AND GIRLS IN KABUL in the first half of '98 – and related matter 209
7: LETTER FROM PROF. BARNETT RUBIN ON THE MURDER OF A SCHOOL TEACHER in Kabul, fingernail polish,acid throwing and relations with Hazaras 211
8: LETTER TO ZOHRA RASEKH REQUESTING CLARIFICATION on some problematic points in her work 212
9: OTHER TOPICS TO BE COVERED, time and resources permitting, 215
10: AHMED RASHID NOT RELIABLE ON PRE 9/11/01 TALIBAN: An exchange of letters with Prof. Barnett Rubin, at the time, President Obama's lead consultant on Afghanistan 216
11: WHY RELIGIOUS JEWS HAVE A SPECIAL PLACE IN THIS SITUATION. From a letter to Ashley Bommer, Chief of Staff of Ambassador Richard Holbrooke[10/16/'09] 229
12: VIRULENT HATE SPEECH HIDDEN IN PLAIN SIGHT, letters concerning the Time cover story showing a woman with her nose cut off by "the Taliban" 229
13: TWO LETTERS TO ARYEH NEIER, PRESIDENT, OPEN SOCIETY INSTITUTE, and his colleague, Anthony Richter, Associate Director, Open Society Foundations 231
14: AN EXCHANGE WITH GEORGE SOROS on Human Rights and the Taliban 235
15: VIDEOS OF THE AUTHOR SPEAKING ABOUT AFGHANISTAN 237
16: SAYED RAHMATULLAH HASHIMI, Taliban Ambassador in the US, Transcript of Talk, Mar. 10, 2001. 239
17: PUNISHMENTS FOR SODOMY & RELATED ACTS UNDER THE TALIBAN: Table: 249
18: FORMAL PUNISHMENTS IN KABUL UNDER THE TALIBAN IN THEIR 1ST YR IN THE CITY: Table: 250
19: EXECUTIONS FOR ALL CAUSES UNDER THE TALIBAN JAN 1-DEC. 31, 2000: Table: 252
20: SAMPLE PAGE FROM THE TALIBAN MONTHLY MAGAZINE "THE ISLAMIC EMIRATE" –and comment 253
21: TALIBAN RULES – 3 SETS, OFFICIAL DOCUMENT 254
22: WHAT THE SOVIETS COULD SHIP THRU' THE SALANG PASS IN 450 DAY TRUCE WITH MASSOUD 256
23: THE NUMBER OF CASUALTIES IN THE SOVIET AFGHAN WAR 257
ENDNOTES SOME LONGER FOOTNOTES CONTINUE IN THIS SECTION 258
24: APPENDIX: WAR RELATED KILLING IN AFGHANISTAN DURING THE TALIBAN PERIOD 268
INDEX 272
TIMELINE -- TIME INDEX OF EVENTS NOTED IN THE BOOK 284
LETTER TO REWARDS FOR JUSTICE, WITH COPY TO FBI, APRIL, 7, 2005 286
LETTER TO REWARDS FOR JUSTICE CLAIMING $10M REWARD FOR JUSTICE FOR MULLAH OMAR 8/24/15 287

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CONTENTS PAGE 3 OF 3

LIST OF TABLES, CHARTS AND FIGURES

THE AUTHOR speaking out in Union Square, near 14th St. NYC summer '05, Color Photo 1
FLOWER STREET SHUL, KABUL, AFGHANISTAN, 2 color photos 10
TALIBAN OFFICIAL ANNOUNCEMENT CONCERNING PALESTINIANS AND ISRAELIS 12
OPIUM GROWING IN AFGHANISTAN , spring 2000, Map [copies of these maps 12
OPIUM GROWING IN AFGHANISTAN , spring 2001, Map appear on the front cover] 12
OPIUM PRODUCTION IN AFGHANISTAN, 1980-2016, metric tons, Bar chart 13
OPIUM POPPY CULTIVATION IN AFGHANISTAN by prov. & governance: 1994-2016, ha, Table 14
JUDICIAL EXECUTIONS BY JURISDICTION: TALIBAN AFGHANISTAN, SAUDI ARABIA & TEXAS 15
OPIUM FARMGATE PRICES IN AFGHANISTAN , 1986 to 2016, Chart
noting egregious errors of leading expert Ahmed Rashid 17
OPIUM FARMGATE PRICES IN AFGH., Jul. '99 - May. '02, $/kg, monthly - weekly, Table 17
BOMBING OF THE FEDERAL BUILDING IN OKLAHOMA CITY 27
MULLAH OMAR AS AN ~18 YEAR OLD MADRASSA STUDENT 32
HEAD & NECK REGION OF EASTERN BUDDHA, WITH "MISSING FACE", 1965, 1972-6?, 2 PHOTOS, 35
SAME AS ABOVE, AFTER MOST OF THE FACELESS HEAD WAS BLOWN OFF ~1998 PHOTO, 35
" " " SHOWING DAMAGE TO BODY 'CLOTHING' & VAULT FRESCOES, 2 COLOR PHOTOS, 1998 37
OPIUM GROWING IN TAKHAR PROV. by district, spring 2000 & 2001, Map & Tables 38
CARLA GRISSMANN & STATUE In Kabul Museum That Set-Off Taliban Anti-Statue Campaign [2 PHOTOS] 48
MONGOLIAN 'Y' CHROMOSOME MARKERS among the Hazaras of Afghanistan 49
AFGHAN./TALIBAN PEACE CONF. /AUSPICES OF PROF. MASANORI NAITO, DOSHISHA U. KYOTO, JAPAN 50
SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT IN ISLAM : AFGHANISTAN AND THE MUSLIM WORLD 51
ETHNOLINGUISTIC DISTRIBUTION IN AFGHANISTAN 51
SHEIKH ABDUL ALI MAZARI – IN THE HANDS OF THE TALIBAN, REUTERS PHOTOS [?] 58
NAJIBULLAH AND HIS BROTHER –"JEEP DRAGGED?", 2 AFP PHOTOS 74
SALANG HIGHWAY, TUNNEL AND ROUTE FROM SOVIET BORDER TO KANDAHAR [2 Google maps] 80
DEPOPULATED VILLAGES, DESTROYED HOME, & DESTROYED BRIDGE, PACTIA PROVINCE [3 photos] 84
MASSOUD – & HYPERINFLATION OR: PRINTING MONEY IN RUSSIA TO GET RICH & WIN ALLIES [Chart] 89
MASSOUD – & HYPERINFLATION: KABUL MARKET RATE DETAIL 90
MARKET EXCHANGE RATES IN KABUL, 1999-2003 –INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND REPORT 92
DUNE BUGGY/ FAST ATTACK VEHICLE [FAV] EQUIPPED WITH ANTITANK MISSILE, US MILITARY 99
OPIUM GROWING IN MASSOUD CONTROLLED BADAKHSHAN PROV. 2000-02, ISMAILI & NON ISMAILI 104
NORTHERN ALLIANCE CONTROL & POCKETS OF N.A. INFLUENCE, 9/01 111
ARABLE LAND IN MAIN OPIUM GROWING AREAS OF BADKHSHAN PROVINCE 111
ISMAILI & NON-ISMAILI TAJIK TERRITORIES & DISTRICTS IN THE BADAKHSHAN PROVINCE AREA 111
JURM DISTRICT DEVELOPMENT ASSEMBLY – SHOWING WOMEN IN BURKAS, ETC. 115
CEREALS PRODUCTION IN AFGHANISTAN SHOWING PROFOUND EFFECTS OF DROUGHT, 1999-2001 123
NATIVE PASHTUN AREAS OF AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN 135
ZOHRA RASEKH, anti-Taliban propagandist: Photo and comparison with Hazara 141
OMAR SAMAD, anti-Taliban propagandist, partner of Z. Rasekh, Photo 145
BURKA MESH PATCH Feminist Majority Foundation Store – Wayback Machine Capture – Screen Shot 146
ZIEBA SHORISH-SHAMLEY, Ph.D. Feminist and anti-Taliban propagandist, Photo 147
CREDITS FOR "BENEATH THE VEIL" SHOWING AHMED RASHID IN # 3 SPOT – AS CONSULTANT 148
HOME SCHOOL PROJECT , KHOST 157
SUFI MOHAMMAD, Senior Leader Of The Taliban In Pakistan 164
PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE LEAFLETS DROPPED ON AFGHANISTAN BY THE U.S.
WHO REALLY RUNS THE TALIBAN 170
EXPEL THE FOREIGN RULERS AND LIVE IN PEACE 170
"GET WEALTH AND POWER BEYOND YOUR DREAMS." 171
INFORMATION MEDIA AREA MAP showing the relationship of schools to other media 177
ELEPHANT AND THE BLIND MEN – drawing, based on a story from several Asian Traditions 180
WHAT DID THE U.S. GAIN & LOSE BY ATTACKING THE TALIBAN? table 182
SECRET AFGHANISTAN STRATEGY MEMO OF DOUGLAS FEITH – declassified 184
AFGHAN OPIUM PRODUCTION:METRIC TONS, US. DEA 1996-2001 201
THE AUTHOR SPEAKING OUT ON AFGHANISTAN IN 12/14/'12 AT THE INTERNATIONAL PEACE INST. 237
SAYED RAHMATULLAH HASHIMI, Taliban Ambassador in the US, Picture , March 10, 2001 239
STATUE In Kabul Museum That Set-Off Taliban Anti-Statue Campaign & 2 similar [1 poster + 3 photos] 245
DEATHS BY YEAR AND ASSOCIATED EVENTS IN THE SOVIET-AFGHAN WAR 257

PREFACE

THE CONNECTION BETWEEN THE TORAH AND THE TALIBAN

This is a history of a case of false accusation and mass murder of scores of thousands[1-A,B,C]. This time it's not Nazis murdering Jews, while 'Good People' remain silent. It's 'Good People' murdering innocent Muslims while Human Rights Groups are mum![1-D] This is the case of the U.S.A. leading the charge of the 'Civilized World' to murder the Taliban.

How can we say that these Muslims – the Taliban – are innocent? Weren't the Taliban, in their time, the pariah government of the World? Isn't it true that nearly every other government refused to recognize them? Even after gaining control of provinces that included over 90% of the in-country population of Afghanistan, they were kept out of the UN by the other governments. The UN even put the Taliban under sanctions and had their ambassadors expelled everywhere. On top of this – and maybe explaining why they were so rejected by the community of nations - they were widely and loudly accused of many horrible crimes.

But there's a big difference between accusation and conviction. At the foundation of any just society is a basic Torah principal: We don't punish people on the basis of mere accusation. We adjudicate the case. If the accusations hold up in a court of justice, suitable sentencing follows.[2] This should be obvious to any thoughtful reader of this book.

LARGE, MULTI-PART FOOTNOTES LIKE THE ONE BELOW REFLECT WORK IN PROGRESS. OFTEN, NEW MATERIAL IS ADDED AFTER OLDER MATERIAL AS NEW INFO BECOMES AVAILABLE. OLD MATERIAL IS LEFT IN PLACE.

[1] **A.** Marc Herold documented 3–3.4k civilian deaths in U.S. air war in Afgh.[Oct.7/'01–Mar/'02].A Dossier on Civilian Victims of United States' Aerial Bombing of Afghanistan: A Comprehensive Accounting [revised] ____ **B.1.**'Civilian Death and Injury in Afghanistan,2001-2011' ,9/'11 _____**2.**"Human Costs of War: Direct War Death in Afghanistan, Iraq and Pakistan 2001-4/'14_____Both:Neta C.Crawford/ costsofwar.org This gives 21-24K civilians &15-25K opposition forces as total of direct violent war related deaths in Afghan., with a majority of civil'n deaths attrib. by UN/US data sources to "opposition forces". However, same source gives 169-183K as tot. civil'n & opposition forces killed in Iraq- based primarily on Iraq Body Count[IBC] data. **3a.i** This compares with 601K (426K–794K,95%conf.) excess violent deaths from 3/18/03 to 6/06 in Johns Hopkins School of Public Health study: 'Mortality after the 2003 invasion of Iraq: a cross-sectional cluster sample survey' Gilbert Burnham,et al,The Lancet,Oct/11/06_____. This study has a far better overall methodology than others. If mean [Burnham]:[Crawford--IBC] death ratio holds for Afgh, total killed in Afgh. alone would incr. 3.4X; 3.4X[(15+21)to(24+25)]=122-167K. **3a.ii** 220K Afg. & 80K Pak. deaths, est. p 15 : Body Count – Casualty Figures after 10 Years of the "War on Terror" – Iraq Afghanistan Pakistan" (PDF), by IPPNW, PGS & PSR, 1st internat. Edit.(3/'15)_____**3a.iii** [122/220=.555]; [167/220= .759]X80=44-61k;∑excess violent deaths,Afg+Pak=(122+44)to(167+61)= 168k-228k. **3a.iv** New Crawford study has 173k total killed in Afg+Pak to mid 2016 *"Update on the Human Costs of War for Afghanistan and Pakistan, 2001 to mid-2016"* _____*Based on Crawford methodology & their est. of 149K killed thru end of 2014, "War-related Death, Injury, and Displacement in Afghanistan and Pakistan 2001-2014" est. thru mid 2018 would be over 200K killed in Afg.+Pak.* _____ *"The Geneva Declaration Secretariat, which closely examined data from armed conflicts occurring in the period of 2004-2007, suggests that, "a reasonable average estimate would be a ratio of four indirect deaths to one direct death in contemporary conflicts." From p 20 , par 2 of "2001-2014" rept. supra.citing "Geneva Declaration Secretariat. (2008). Global Burden of Armed Conflict. Geneva: Geneva Declaration Secretariat, p. 32." http://www.genevadeclaration.org/fileadmin/docs/Global-Burden-of-Armed-Violence-full-report.pdf*

3b.[It's interesting to consider the death of Sayyid Abdul Majid al-Khoei, 41 yr old son of Grand Ayatollah Al-Udhma Sayyid Abul Qasim al-Khoei. After 12 yrs escaping Sadaam Hussein by living in Lond., on Apr. 3/'03, just after Sad'm Hussein's fall, the British escorted him to his home town, the Shias' holy city of Najaf, where the US provided him with non-Moslem bodyguards. On Apr/10 -- the day after the formal occupation of Baghdad by US led forces- he chose to seek reconciliation with one of Najaf's most widely hated senior clerics, Haidar al-Rufaie al-Killidar, a close associate of Sad'm Hussein & the custodian of the Mosque of Ali - holiest Shiite site in the city. At the same time, he refused to meet with the very popular, Najaf born, Muqtada Sadr, 29yr old son & son in law of 2 highly revered Shiite religious leaders who'd been martyred by Saddam.

Inside the Mosque, where al-Khoei's non-Moslem guards weren't allowed to enter or approach, the crowd of Shiites—many of them supporters of the seemingly rebuffed Sadr -- became incensed at the presence of the hated Saddamite, al-Killidar. Al-Khoei's efforts to defend al-Killidar further aggravated the people. When the crowd appeared to getting out of hand, a shot was fired into the air by one of al Khoei's Moslem associates from the US, Maher al-Yasseri. The crowd responded with even greater violence — murdering al-Killidar, al-Khoei & al-Yasseri. [Contemporaneous news reports & Chap. 10 "Murder in the Shrine" in: Muktada, Patrick Cockburn, 226 p, '08, Scribner] Al Khoei had publicly sided with attack on Taliban in Oct. '01.]

4. Figure at **3a.iii** is also more consistent with the number of US & Allied troops killed in these two areas [3.4K in Afg., 4.8K in Iraq, [ref 2, above]] **5.** It doesn't incl. deaths in the mostly Pashtun border areas of neighboring Pakistan where the war has spread. Estim. war deaths in Federally Admin. Tribal Areas [pop.~3E6] & Khyber Pakhtunkh. [pop ~21E6] are, resp. 18.4K, [incl.1.4K Security Forces] ['09-2/23/'14] & 13K [incl. 1.7K S.F.['05-2/16/'14] 18+13=31K _____ _____see also **3a.ii**, **supra**

6. Violent deaths reported for Vietnam [1.70M (1.02M to 2.55M, 95%, '65-'74-period of major US involvement)] & Bangladesh: .27M (.13M- .50M, 95%), almost all 1971 war of indep. from Pakistan. [Table 2, World health survey estimates of violent war deaths ...,This is 4.6X # from press reports. "Fifty years of violent war deaths from Vietnam to Bosnia:..." Z. Obermeyer, et al, *BMJ* 2008;336:1482 _____ Bangladesh is particularly relevant -- a largely rural Moslem country, where the dead are buried quickly & attack was by a western oriented military. **C.** To prevent others from using Ikonos satellite imagery to count the bodies on the ground, US bought exclusive rights to the only non-Russian civilian satellite imagery system that could be used for such purposes. US military's own satellites are said to have 7-10X the linear resolution of Ikonos.**1.** 10/17/01, The Guardian Lond., "US buys up all satellite war images", Duncan Campbell. Pg. 1; **2.** 10/15/01, AP, "Military buys exclusive rights to commercial satellite's pictures of war zone" J. J. Lumpkin, Dateline: Wash. **D.** E. g., in 'Nail Yale' campaign, where Yale Alumni accused the Taliban of maiming hands of women & girls for wearing nail polish – an accusation the human rights community knew was false – they kept their council. In some instances, the human rights community correctly pointed out that the enemies of the Taliban "also" commited atrocities – but did not deny the false stories of Taliban horrors – like finger-maiming. See chapter 21

[2-A] It's one of the **Seven Laws of Noah:**

1. Don't murder. Gen. 9:6; 2. Don't steal. 3. Don't commit incest – or anything that could lead to incest – such as promiscuity. With promiscuity, children won't know who their father is & might then

Yet, the Taliban have been presumed guilty and sentenced to death without such a judicial process. The leaders of the Government of the U. S. – and the leaders of governments of much of what is usually thought of as the Civilized World-- have launched a war on the Taliban and killed them. This act of extrajudicial mass murder – with about a fifth of a million now dead [2-B] -- has been going on – in front of the whole world -- for over fifteen years.

With all this, how can we say the Taliban are innocent? This book will show that nearly all the terrible accusations made against the Taliban are not only false but easily demonstrated to be false. In some cases, the accusations are so absurd and contrary to what was once common and accurate knowledge, that the accusers should've been laughed off the stage. Instead they're praised and their absurdities are promoted to good – but deeply ignorant -- people across the world[3].

How did this happen in a world with so many relatively decent people, free speech and the ready availability of quality information? Our basic decency, free speech and concern for others[4] are particularly challenged when we're dealing with 'foreigners' – people like the Taliban –who are very different from what we're used to. The challenge becomes that much greater when our political leaders accuse these 'foreigners' of heinous crimes[5].

When our governments – the organizations of these political leaders[6] -- attack the accused and begin to kill them, the challenge for most of us could easily become too great to bear. If, on top of this, those who defend the victims can be ostracized or even accused of supporting 'terrorism', our noble concerns can easily be stifled into silence[7].

This is what's happened between the "Civilized World" and the Taliban -- particularly since the kamikaze[8] attacks of 9/11/01 and the subsequent 'war on terror'.

Here we'll try to discern what the Taliban are actually about and what our response should be to them. It may seem a nearly impossible task for a single individual with very limited resources to penetrate the fog of war and propaganda to see the underlying truth. It turns out that it's not so difficult. First we have to care. Then we have to ask questions. The key to success is asking good questions and taking the time to answer them.

---

marry a half sibling without knowing it. 4. Don't curse God. 5. Don't' worship the work of your hands. (Don't worship idols). 6. Don't eat a limb of a living creature. This includes not drinking blood & not eating whole live creatures. If a Non-Jew wants to eat frog's legs, they have to kill the frog first. 7. Establish Courts Of Justice. **NON-JEWS WHO KEEP THESE 7 LAWS ARE CONSIDERED TSADIKIM – RIGHTEOUS PEOPLE -- IN THE EYES OF GOD.**

[2-B] See calc., footnote 1-B.3a.iii. True 95% conf. range is wider, as it should include the +/- ~30% range in G. Birnham's study.

[3] See, for example:

1. **Appendix 10:** Ahmed Rashid Not Reliable On Pre 9/11/01 Taliban: An exchange of letters with Prof. Barnett Rubin, at the time, President Obama's lead expert on Afghanistan
2. **Ch. 22:** Murdering School Teachers: a. For Teaching Girls; b. With Hollywood Amplificat'n; c. The Story Tellers' Tale

[4] The value of Free Speech as a defense of Kindness & Truth is discussed in: **A.** "Free Speech: Communications Technology And Torah Antecedents To The First Amendment" in the author's sefer [book]: ובלכתך בדרך **'As Thou Goest By The Way'** [This phrase is part of the Shema [Deut.6:4-9], a prayer that Jews say twice a day, every day.] Torah And The Taliban is expanded from what was the 7th chapter of that work. This 'Chapter 7' is catalogued at the Afghanistan Centre, Kabul U..–ACKU _____ & **B.** The Migdol Bavel or 'Tower of Babylon', The Seventy Languages and a Possible "Hidden Mitzvah" to Create a "Censorship Resistant" Information Environ-ment. Gateway to Languages, Communication Systems and "Freedom of Speech", p. 16-17, in the author's sefer [book] אומרים שבעים **"They Say Seventy"**

[5] The author saw attacks on people as heinous crimes. Many others, including a large part of Academia, also saw the destruction of the Buddhist statues as such. That difference was significant in the creation of this book. See Ch. 8: Buddhist Statues… & see footnote 177-F

[6] We also have religious, moral & intellectual leaders who lead more by example & teaching rather than by force, threats & duplicity.

[7] Laili Helms, a married, non-religious woman from Afghanistan who had worked with Afghan refugees in Peshawar, Pakistan, was a key Taliban advisor in the U.S.. For 3 months after 9/11 she lived under siege – from threats and abuse. ['She Spoke for Taliban And Now Pays a Price'. Alessandra Stanley, S.B; C.1, p. 6, NYT,11/27/01 Final.] Before this, she appeared in the American media, advocating & explaining their cause. [for a recording, see, WBUR Radio, The Connection, with Judy Swallow, Apr. 5/01.] _____

See also: 'A Cause Unveiled; Hollywood Women Have Made the Plight of Afghan Women Their Own' by Sharon Waxman, 3/30/99, p. C01, Fin. Ed. Wash. Post. For more from this source, see footnote 679]

[8] Japanese for *divine wind* -- from the great storms in 1274 & 1281 that destroyed the invading Mongol fleets of Kublai Khan. Later, in WWII, name of ~4,000 Japanese suicide pilots.

INTRODUCTION

HOW THE AUTHOR CAME TO WRITE THIS BOOK

Shortly after the events of 9/11/01, the author noticed several apparent contradictions[9] in the basic story of what the Taliban were about. These contradictions weren't trivial. They involved key points that were inconsistent with the generally negative view of the Taliban given in the US media[10]. It seemed that the Taliban might be just what they claimed to be -- genuine religious Moslems of very high integrity with no significant interest in attacking Jews, Israel or the USA.

There were three contradictions that really stood out:

A. THE LAST 2 JEWS OF KABUL

The Taliban were not anti-Jewish – but just like bin Laden?

Shortly before the 9/11 attacks, an article appeared in the secular media about the last two Jews of Kabul. It was primarily a human interest story[11]. The two Jews were living in an old but sturdy synagogue complex – with a courtyard and iron gate[12]. They'd stopped talking to each other and had each gone to the local Taliban officials to accuse the other of stealing. After arresting each, in turn, on the other's charges, the Taliban returned them both to the synagogue and left them alone. The story also noted that the local children called the older of the two Jews -- a man in his 60's with a white beard -- 'Mullah Isaak'[13]. They addressed him with respect.

The problem with this story was that the Taliban were being portrayed in the media as "extremists" and similar to the accused attackers in their hatred of Jews. In this report, however, the Taliban didn't appear to be anti-Jewish.

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[9] The most universally loved & respected rabbi of the last 200 yrs – the Chofetz Chaim - taught: seeing & explaining such contradictions/סתירות is, with kindness, key to Torah Life. See p. 224, #1-2

[10] There was a 4th apparent contradiction involving the Taliban's destruction of the Buddhist Statues that the author didn't recognize as such until years later. See CHAPTER 8: BUDDHIST STATUES AND OTHER PRE-ISLAMIC ART & in particular, see footnote 177-H

[11] Forward, Featherman, Sept 7/01, & other sources:

[12] See photos of Flower Street Shul on page 10.

[13] **A.** He died in Afghan. in '05; buried 2/2/'05, with great honor on the Mt. of Olives, Jerusalem, Steven Gutkin, Jerusalem Post, 3/'05, p. 4.[The unusual spelling 'Isaak' makes it possible to find sites on the internet that quote this passage without the title, eg: 2009-01-16 12:07 AM, post by Hashimi

B. The shul's Sefer Torah apparently vanished during the time these 2 Jews occupied the buildings. A Religious Muslim Pashtun Scholar, N.M., [ask about publishing full name, etc] with first hand contact with senior Taliban at the time, wrote:

> "Reliable sources says: Sefer Torah were there in Kabul during the Taliban time, as you know Muslim accepting Four original holy books, Zaboor,[The Biblical book of Psalms] Torah [The five Biblbical books of Moses], Angile (Bible)[The Christian Gospels] and Quran, and in the beginning and source of the Ahl e Ketab and Islam is Ibrahimi religion, so Taliban don't had any problem with Jews and Christians, to keep and be safe that Torah was transferred to MoI (Ministry of Interior), Deputy Minister Mullah Khaksar (Security Affairs) had his own interest to take that Torah, he taken, after that, we don't know what happen, but it is clear it was take to be in secure place. When the Taliban regime fall down, Mullah Khaksar joined with North alliance and was in Kabul, he went to Kandahr, and killed by unknown"
> [Words in brackets in black added for explanation by ASA.]

Personal communication by email Jan/3/14 428PM, avshadler@yahoo.com [get permission to improve English]

C. This is consistent with 2news reports: **a.** "...the Taliban...confiscated the...scroll...and now the Torah is in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs." "Most of the 70 or 80 Jewish families left after the Soviet invasion in 1979...The last half-dozen Jewish families left during the [mujahidin] guerrilla clashes...] Calgary Herald,Ca., Jan/4/00, "Home Alone With the Taliban: Yitzhak Levi the last Jewish Rabbi, Tasgola Karla Bruner, The Jerusalem Post,pA3, **b.**"...the Torah holy scrolls...were confiscated by the Taleban last year." "[The last remaining Jew, Isaac Levi,] came to Kabul 30 years ago from ...Herat" Toronto Star, 2/23/00, "Up Front Mullah Isaac Of Kabul, A Rabbi...", Martin Regg Cohn. However, a third report **c.** says " *[the] Torah was no longer in the ministry and was last seen in the hands of Taliban Interior Minister Mullah Khirullah Khairkhwa, who has since vanished.*" [He was arrested & held w/o charges in Guant. Bay until 2014, See footnote 765 [4]]

This was even more remarkable because the people in Kabul were in real distress. Tens of thousands of religious Moslems were desperate just to have a roof over their head[14]. It would've been easy for the Taliban to, God forbid, throw the Jews out on the street (or worse), and use the synagogue complex for their own purposes -- to house Moslems, for example.

That they didn't do this suggested that they might not only be lawful, traditional Moslems -- who would recognize that the synagogue belonged to the Jews. They appeared to be people who didn't look for loopholes in Muslim Law that would still allow them to take the Jews' property with a claim of 'special circumstances' – or, as they put it in the US, "eminent domain". This suggested that they were trying to be genuinely and visibly kind. They understood that traditional Jews are not a threat to traditional Moslems[15, 16].

B. HOW COULD A "FAILED STATE" WIPE OUT OPIUM POPPY GROWING FROM ONE YEAR TO THE NEXT?

There were stories in the media that the Taliban had successfully wiped out opium growing in the parts of Afghanistan that they controlled[17]. Yet, post 9/11, they were called a "Failed State"[18]. If they really did wipe out opium poppy growing, it indicated that the Taliban might be qualitatively different from the political leadership in almost every other country -- that they had an exceptionally

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[14] "The United Nations says there are about 15,000 refugees … [in the] the former Soviet embassy [in Kabul] …[where] … [p]lastic sheeting covers holes…in the rocket-shattered, four-storey buildings" Letter From Afghanistan: Capital Punishment For Refugees, Kathy Gannon, Birmingham Post. p. 10, Feb. 3, '00

[15] **A.** Jews lived in Afghanistan from Biblical times &, as witnessed by, among other things, thousand year old documents in the recently discovered Afghan Geniza, played a significant role in trade that went along the Silk Road. "Muslim-Jewish relations were mostly tolerant and peaceful."[*From a published interview with Sara Y. Aharon, author of, 'From Kabul to Queens: The Jews of Afghanistan and Their Move to the United States' 2011* _____ "As a result of the destruction wrought [in Afghanistan] by Genghis Khan and his army [in 1221], we have almost no documentation of the Persian and Arabic culture and language of the region – until [Afghan archives– with records of Jewish & Non-Jewish culture in the 11-13th centuries was found in 2011] National Library of Israel "From Afghan Cave to Jerusalem, a Treasure Trove of Silk Road Jews Reaches Israelis" Nir Hasson, Haaretz, 9/15/'16 & Natioanl Library of Israel 9/25/'16 _____

B. Jewish refugees from persecutions in Iran in the early 19th century rebuilt or strengthened many of these communities. According to the Jewish Encycl, (1906), there were then ~40K Jews in Afghan. –not incl. Afghans who believe they're descendants of the Ten Lost Tribes but who've been practicing Muslims for centuries.

C.1 In 1186 Gazan/Goreed tribeal war, 'Jews were compelled to convert to Islam; & became the Pushto tribes...dispersed throughout Pakistan and Afghanistan.' p. 169, Afghan Jews: from H'orasan and Afghanistan to New York, Abe Mor, 2011 [see footnote 947G]

C.2 "Abda-Rahman …[Amir/king] of Afghanistan, 1880-1901] wrote in…"Afghanistan Tarikhi" [Chronicle] *["Taarikhe Afghan", Teheran, Persian, 1321, Heg,[~1903] says pt.2, p. 141 "…the royal Afghan dynasty is [descended] from Jews."]*"the Afghans are of Jewish origin and that they accepted Islam only in the Abassid times in Iraq and Persia."[the Abassid Caliphate was from 750-1258, the latter year being the time of the sack of Baghdad by the Mongols. After this yr, it moved to Cairo & took on a different form] from testimony of Abraham ben Agagan Hakohen.1951, Israel, head of the Herat [Jewish?] community. p. 83, *& in italics, Shmuel Shabatai, p. 88*, in "The Pathans" p. 65-130 of The Tribes of Israel, Rabbi Eliyahu Avichail, AMISHAV, 5750/1990 transl. from Hebrew by Michael Gross. This chapter has multiple references from Afghan Jews, that among Pashtoons there are many groups whose men grow peyos/sidelocks, whose old women light ritual lamps before the Sabbath - distinctly Jewish customs, marry only among themselves & say they're descendents of Jews who, long ago, were forced or otherwise persuaded to convert to Islam.

[16] We have a mitzvah: הכרת הטוב *-HaKaras HaTov* -- "recognizing good" – the gratitude to God and to others for their help. It's from:

'…לֹא-תְתַעֵב מִצְרִי כִּי-גֵר הָיִיתָ בְאַרְצוֹ'

"…do not despise an Egyptian, because you were a stranger in his land." **[Dev. 23:8].**

This is because, despite all else that they did to us, they "hosted you in time of dire need" [Rashi]

Had the Jews of Afghanistan not been treated so hospitably by the Muslims of that region over the centuries, the Taliban's attitude toward "the last two Jews" would have likely been very different. I would not have caught the message that they were – perhaps consciously – delivering to the Jews of the world: "We are your friends – not like bin Laden. Please remember us…"

See footnotes 950-951: acting Taliban Ambassador to the US on Afghanistan's last Jew.

[17] Heard on the radio – WNYC -- in midsummer of '01. Exact time and date not noted.

[18] Dem. US Senator Carl Levin, Chair, Senate Armed Services Committee, told Fox News Sunday he considers the Taliban "more of a cult than a government" and said international participation is needed to "restore a state" in Afghanistan. "It's not the military function to build a nation, but it is surely important to the world that we restore a state where there's a failed state in Afghanistan -- and, now, a state which very openly harbors terrorism, espouses it, promotes it (and) condones it," Levin said. AFP, Oct.1/'01 [Emphasis added]

high level of integrity and were far more resistant to the usual temptations that prevail in the opium business. This was also consistent with the view that the Taliban were traditional Muslims -- who are well known to be against the use of intoxicating drinks. It was easy to imagine that Muslim Law extended the ban on such drinks to a ban on the use of opium as an intoxicant[19].

C. CAMPAIGN IN THE MEDIA AGAINST THE "MADRASSAS"

There was an intense campaign in the media against the "madrassas" where the Taliban studied -- to the effect that nothing but antisocial brainwashing (God forbid) could come from such places.

These madrassas, however, looked like traditional Moslem schools. They also resembled the traditional Jewish Bes Midrash -- House of Searching Study -- where religious Jews learn classic religious texts and commentaries, much as we have studied and learned for so many centuries.

It's very common for people not familiar with the culture of the Bes Midrash to ridicule it. Those who know it from the inside have a very different impression. They see that it's a source of active kindness, of clear and precise thinking -- a wellspring of God's Peace in the World. It wasn't difficult for a religious Jew to imagine that the much maligned madrassas of the Taliban might also be well-springs of Godliness in a world that often looks like it's running in the opposite direction.

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[19] **A.** "In Q 16:69, wine is praised as one of the delights of Paradise (cf. Q 37:45–7, 47:15), but in Q 2:219…[wine] is linked with gambling, idol worship, … and in Q 5:90 it is labeled an abomination. …Q 4:43 forbids approaching prayers … "with the mind befogged". The prohibition of wine was extended to any intoxicating substance, including drugs." , Dietary law, Francesca, Ersilia, Ency. of Islam, THREE, BrillOnline

B. Torah is clearly not opposed to the use of intoxicants – including wine and strong drink. Opium is not specifically banned by Torah Law. Restriction in the absence of general public law would be based on not doing things that are known to be harmful: [Deut. 4:15]

וְנִשְׁמַרְתֶּם מְאֹד לְנַפְשֹׁתֵיכֶם

On this basis, we shouldn't start smoking tobacco – because it causes disease, etc. while also being strongly addictive to some. [The Chofetz Chaim, probably the most universally loved Rabbi of the last 200 yrs, added: it wastes an enormous amount of time & money that could be devoted to learning Torah & doing mitzvahs (Zecher L'Miriam, ch. 23, 1925 & L'kutei Amorim, ch. 13) R. Moshe Feinstein, one of the greatest authorities on Torah Law in the last 50y'rs, added: we should stay away from smoking because it increases our attachment to materialism. (Teshuvos Igros Moshe, Choshen Mishpat 2:76).]

C. There is also the issue of deliberately depriving oneself of permitted pleasures: At the expression "…מֵאֲשֶׁר חָטָא עַל-הַנֶּפֶשׁ *…as he sinned against the soul…"*[Num.6:11], R. Eleazar ha-Kappar [Tanna, colleague: R. Yehudah HaNasi – Israel ~1800 yrs ago] explains that, because Nazirites deprived themselves of the products of the grape-vine – including wine and strong drink, they sinned against their own souls and must bring sin offerings to atone for these sins. [Talmud: Nazir 19a, etc.] Going even further we have: "A person will have to answer for everything that his eye beheld and he did not consume." (Jer. Talmud, Kiddushin 4:12). So, if somehow it's well understood that opium wouldn't be harmful to a particular person, and opium is readily available, according to this view, they 'will have to answer' for deliberately depriving themselves of its use. As a matter of actual practice, religious Jews avoid the use of any intoxicants except in specific religious contexts – like Purim. Outside of these contexts, drunkenness of any kind is very rare.

D. For those who've seen seemingly sane people huddled with their cigarettes in snowy sidewalk doorways in their office clothes, it may be interesting to read the words of King James 1st , of England:

> "Have you not reason then to bee ashamed, and to forbeare this filthie noveltie…? In your abuse thereof sinning against God, harming your selves… and [bringing]… the markes …of vanitie upon you. A custome lothsome to the eye, hatefull to the Nose, harmefull to the braine, dangerous to the Lungs, and in the blacke stinking fume thereof, neerest resembling the horrible Stigian smoke of the pit that is bottomelesse."

A Counterblaste to Tobacco, 15 pages, 1604. He then imposed an import tax of 80 p/lb tobacco, with wages 6-12 p/day & ~500 cigarettes/lb, 50/day [smoking ~2-6hrs/day] ≈1 days wages.

E. We may also compare the global burdens of disease due to the use of Tobacco & All Illegal Drugs, including illegal opiates: In 2010: 6.30E6 Deaths & 156.8E6 DALY's due to Tobacco; 0.16E6[D & 23.8E6 DALY's to AID– the last, up from 0.07E6D & 15.2E6 DALY's in '90 – [perhaps a result of the expansion of the drug trade following the suppression of the Taliban Government.] [p 2238 & 2241, The Lancet, V. 380 Dec. 15/22/29, 2012] [DALY=Disability Life Adjusted Years, includes both premature death and illness while living.] "A comparative risk assessment of burden of disease and injury attributable to 67 risk factors and risk factor clusters in 21 regions, 1990–2010: a systematic analysis for the Global Burden of Disease Study 2010". Stephen S Lim, et al, Lancet, 2012; 380: 2224–60, corrected: *Apr. 12, 2013* , See also: "Global burden of disease attributable to illicit drug use and dependence: findings from the Global Burden of Disease Study 2010" L. Degenhardt, et al, Lancet, 382, p1564–74, 9 Nov. 2013/Pub. Online: 8/29/'13. There are notable discrepancies between these 2 studies. [ON FLASH DRIVE]

PART ONE:

DETERMINING THE REALITY

I did not start out with the idea of a major research project. I just had a few questions and began to try to answer them – not knowing that I was almost completely alone in my efforts – or what I might find.



FLOWER STREET SHUL, KABUL, AFGHANISTAN.
[LEFT] Main front of shul buidling on Flower St. [Right] Part of inner courtyard with well and ornate shul buiding on far side of courtyard. The courtyard is surrounded on three sides by two story shul buidlings.

These 2 photos are adopted & modified from the following 2 websites, resp., [Check on permissions]
_____ & _____

CHAPTER ONE

CHECKING OUT THE CONTRADICTIONS

A. Are the Taliban more like traditional Afghan Moslems – who don't attack Jews – or allies of Osama bin Laden who called for such attacks?

A quick way to check on the Taliban -- to see if they were just traditional Moslems -- would be to see what they had to say for themselves on their websites[20]. However, the Taliban websites listed in a current bibliography obtained from the reference desk of Yeshiva University were all down. Perhaps the work of overzealous hackers upset over the attacks? No! According to Harun Amin, then first secretary of the "Northern Alliance" mission to the United Nations, the US State Department took down the Taliban websites in April of 2001 -- almost half a year before the attacks.[21]

Though confirmed by two other sources[22], no mention of this has yet been found in any publication or on the internet. The State Department would not answer questions about this when asked[23].

There are two major Jewish organizations that are famous for monitoring the world for anti-Jewish and anti-Israel sentiments: The Anti-Defamation League (ADL) and the Wiesenthal Center. Their websites at the time showed nothing from the Taliban against Jews or against Israel[24]. When contacted by phone, their research departments confirmed what had been found from their websites -- that they had nothing at all on the Taliban against Jews or against Israel -- though both had large files on the activities of Osama Bin Laden (OBL)[25].

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[20] **A.** I had, some years before, checked out the website of the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) -- to see what they had to say for themselves. I was particularly interested in what the PNA had to say about the Temple Mount and the Wailing Wall – after hearing from some Jews who had taken a tour of the Temple Mount. They had a PNA affiliated tour guide and had not been told anything about the Jewish connection to the site. I found that, on the official website of the PNA, in the section dealing with holy sites in Jerusalem, the PNA couldn't identify any holy sites associated with Jews. They claimed that ~" there is no historical or archeological evidence that the 'Al Buraq Wall' (the traditional Moslem name for the Wailing Wall) had any connection to the Temple.

B. I then checked with the Virginia based Institute of Islamic and Arabic Science – a division of the University of Riyadh in Saudi Arabia. The scholar that I spoke with there said that all Moslem scholars who write about the Temple of Solomon say that it was a real Temple and that it was located in the area that is now known – by Jews – as the Temple Mount. He added that anyone who denies this – that the Temple was real and located on the Temple Mount -- is as one who denies Islam.

C. After the 9/11 attacks, I met with Imam Abu-Namous, the leading Moslem religious scholar of the largest Mosque in the NE United States – on East 96th St., iManhattan. Sitting with him in his office, he reiterated what the previous scholar had said but added that those who deny the reality or location of Solomon's Temple would not be considered deniers of Islam. He was from that part of the world.

[21] **A.** Conversation with Harun Amin, 1st Secretary of the Islamic State of Afghanistan to the UN, Oct/11/'01, tel. # 212-972-1212 [p. 34, notebook D]. 2nd Secretary, Enayat Nuristani, confirmed this, 1/23/02, p150, notebook D. **B.** This take-down of Taliban websites was probably done persuant to the UN Security Council 1267 Sanctions regime – directed against the Taliban – as clarified in subsequent UN SEC res. 1904(20090 par 4. ____ This probably also accounts for the unavailability of most Taliban publications. [see Appendix 20: Sample page from The Islamic Emirate & see footnote 973. See also: The U.N. Security Council's *1267 Regime* and the Rule of Law in Canada, Carmen K. Cheung, BC Civil Liberties Assoc., 2010, 68 p.

[22] give refs to two corroborating sources

[23] give refs to contacts with State Dept. But see : Does Official Taliban Site Exist? Patrick Di Justo, *10/30/'01.* Nothing here on Taliban websites taken down in Apr., but: "Irfan Shahid, manager of operations for Brain.net, [in Pakist.] handled the Taliban's domain setup last April." He said sites [www.afghanistan-ie.com & its cognate, www.afghan-ie.com] were taken down after 9/11 because they had too much traffic. _____

I have not checked this in some years. 11/'15.

[24] In contrast , there is this comment on the Taliban from Shiite Iran when the Taliban took over Kabul 5 yrs before. The Taliban had already controlled city of Herat – with a large Shiite minority- for a yr.

"Well, is it possible to see Muslims, who claim to be seeking Islam, but are not pursuing the ... anti-Israeli objective? ...And you are supposed to be highly religious and holy; what about the issue of occupation of Jerusalem? ...you must officially de-clare your stance against Israel..." Senior Ayatollah Jannati says Afghan Taleban are a disgrace to Islam, Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 4 Oct '96.

[25] **A.1** ADL info noted Mar.7,'02, p 18 notebook E. with names & tel. #'s. Subsequent research by the author turned up the two statements below: the first on a reconstructed official Taliban Website and the 2nd – more authoritative and about a year earlier by Mullah Omar concerning Israelis vis-à-vis Palestinians:

A.2 "Press Release, May 11/01 2. The situation in Palestine where daily the oppressed people of Palestine come under cruel attacks of Israel, their land and property is confiscated and their honor and dignity is trampled down and there are harassment of Palestinian by Israel, is of great concern. The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan strongly condemns this similar types of oppressive incidents and

OBL had put out a "Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders" in February of '98. Though it was cosigned by several people, and Bin Laden was in Afghanistan at the time, none of the known leaders of the Taliban had signed it.[26] This, again, strongly suggested that the Taliban were traditional Afghan Moslems -- long on good terms with traditional Afghan Jews -- and not puppets of foreign hate mongers like OBL.

B. Did the Taliban really wipe out opium poppy growing from one year to the next – something that a "failed state" or "puppet" would not be able to do?

The opium question was checked using both US and UN official websites. I found that they had independent study teams and two different methodologies -- aerial reconnaissance and on-the-ground surveys,[27] respectively. Both confirmed that the Taliban had almost completely eradicated opium growing in the areas that they controlled. At the same time, opium growing in the home province of President Rabbani of the "Northern Alliance" -- the group with the seat in the UN – nearly tripled.



FIG 1


NOTE: THE DIAMETERS OF DOTS IN THE LEGENDS HAVE BEEN INCREASED BY ~2.5X FOR VISIBILITY
Districts with 0.01 to 9.99 ha. poppy
Districts with 10 to 19.99 ha. poppy
Districts with 20 to 99.99 ha. poppy
Districts with 100 to 999.99 ha. poppy
Districts with above 1000 ha. poppy

FIG 2

The maps above[28], the chart on the next page and the data table and charts on the following pages show very clearly what the Taliban accomplished. They also show what the people with the seat in the United Nations were doing at the same time.

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considers it as a cruel crime of bruetality done by Israelis on Palestinian Moslem people. By causing embarrassment to the Palestinian, Israel is dishonoring the Moslem world. And the recent attacks on the Palestinians would tantamount to an irony for the Moslems of the world if they do not join hands together to deal a smashing blow at the Israel to prevent them from carrying out such oppressive acts and free the oppressed people of Palestine for ever from this burden." Found 7/17/'15 at: http://www.lchr.org/a/30/1i/

ANNOUNCMENT
Office of His Excellency Amir –Ul-Momenin
On Current Situation in Palestine
Kandahar – Afghanistan
Rajab –ul – Murajab 10th , 1421 (October 7,2000)

It is now for years that the supprssion of the oppressed and defenseless people of Palestine at the hand of Isrealis has been continuing. But recently they have taken a severe form and openly resorted to the killing and wounding of Palestinians.

We believe the Isrealis are not willing to stop the oppressions because the Americans are siding with them. Therefore, it is required of the Arab nations to get this oppression by he Isrealis ended or seek assistance from other Moslem countries in this respect.

Wassalam,

Servant of Islam
Mullah Mohammad Omar (Mujahid)
Amir – ul – Momenin

A.3 [Typos in original] Found at: _____ click on Mission Activities, then click on announcements & scroll ~half way down the page. [**A.4** Ariel Sharon had visited the Temple Mount, Thurs., 9/28/00 [Elul 28, 5760,Rosh HaShana began Fri. PM][but also see footnote 718 B on Mullah Dadullah – demoted Taliban commander & strong OBL supporter.]

B. pub. 4/4/'15 "He has always defended the issue of Al-Aqsa Mosque (the first Qibla or prayer direction of early Muslims) and the vindicated claim of Palestinian Muslims. He has taken a clear stance and supported all issues of Muslims in all parts of the world. He considers it the duty and obligation of every Muslim to liberate the Al-Aqsa Mosque from the occupation of Zionist Jews." [This was the only issue outside of Afgh. noted in this official bio. For more from this source,see footnote 572b

[26] OBL 2/23/98 Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders:Engl._____Arab _____. Jason Burke writes that this "particularly annoyed Mullah Omar" p 186, Al-Qaeda: The True Story of Radical Islam. 2003/4. Abdullah Y. Azzam, ['41-'89], OBL's mentor, was a refugee from Jenin in '67 war, key theologian:International Islamic Jihad, Israel hater, assassinated in Afghan.

[27] "In 2001, 10,030 villages in 160 districts in 23 provinces were surveyed [by 210 survey staff] compared [with]…7,541 villages in 125 districts in 22 provinces. [in '00]. From p iii & p4 of 2001 Survey, see b. below.

[28] **a.** "Annual Opium Poppy Survey 2000", 51 pp, UNDCP. (map on pdf p 2) 1.28MB http://www.unodc.org/pdf/afg/report_2000-12-31_1.pdf

b. "Annual Opium Poppy Survey 2001", 30 pp UNDCP color coded map ,pdf p. 25 -- note difference in scale from report for 2000) 838KB http://www.unodc.org/pdf/afg/report_2001-10-16_1.pdf

The supposed failed and puppet state of the Taliban reduced opium poppy growing in their domain by 98.7% from one year to the next – even as the people with the seat in the UN in-creased it ~160% in the same time frame. Almost all the remaining opium grown in the country –was grown in the area controlled by the Northern Alliance.[29] [See Fig's 1-6, p. 12-14 &17]

The Taliban – which controlled provinces with 93% of the in-country population[30] wiped out opium poppy growing across ethnic religious and geographic lines.[31] In Balkh Province in North-

FIG 3



OPIUM GROWING IN AFGHANISTAN, METRIC TONNES

1980-1993 FROM P. 12 OF "OPIUM SURVEY 2006 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY" 9/'06, 5 MB [A.] 1994-2016 P 42, "AFGHANISTAN OPIUM SURVEY 2017 CULTIVATION AND PRODUCTION" [B]; 2017-18 P 42 "AFGHANISTAN OPIUM SURVEY 2018 CULTIVATION AND PRODUCTION" [C]

DROP BETWEEN '14 & '15 CAME MOSTLY FROM A 36% DROP IN YIELD --FROM A LACK OF WATER

A. http://www.unodc.org/pdf/execsummaryafg.pdf B. https://www.unodc.org/documents/crop-monitoring/Afghanistan/Afghan_opium_survey_2017_cult_prod_web.pdf C. https://www.unodc.org/documents/crop-monitoring/Afghanistan/Afghanistan_opium_survey_2018.pdf

Central Afghanistan, the Taliban reduced opium poppy growing by 99.9%.[32] This province was mostly Tajik and had been a home base of the Taliban's enemy and former Soviet collaborator, General Abdul Rashid Dostum.

Balkh had also been the site of reported mas-sacres in its largest city, Mazar-i-Sharif, the 4th largest city in the country. First the Taliban were massacred after being double-crossed and ambushed. Then, some months later, the Taliban returned and, after capturing the city, massacred a large number of local inhabitants.[33]

While this almost miraculous success in eradicating opium poppy growing[34] meant that the Taliban were very effective – that they were not a failed or puppet state -- the usual image would have it that they must have murdered a lot of people to accomplish something like this.

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[29] **A.** When data came out for '13 on 11/13/13,Kathy Gannnon of AP, in 1,175 word piece, quotes Jean-Luc Lemahieu, departing leader of UNODC's Afghan office: "Everybody who is powerful" benefits from the opium industry," Then she adds "Ironically, Taliban leader Mullah Mohammed Omar successfully banned poppy planting in 2000 when the group ruled Afghanistan, according to the UN at the time. Poppy production went from more than 4,000 tons to barely a few pounds, the UN said." She makes no mention of how he managed to do this. She also notes: "More than 1 million Afghans are addicts …[f]ifteen percent…are women…or children." She doesn't say there were almost no opium addicts in Afgh. under the Taliban.

B. "Heroin addiction levels in Afghanistan have also risen sharply. From almost nothing under the 1996-2001 Taliban regime, to more than one million heroin addicts today, according to UN figures."11/13/'14, Daily The Pak Banker, "Record opium poppy cultivation this year in Afghanistan: UN, Dateline: Karachi. **See CH. 25: MAJOR DEFAMATIONS AND SINS OF OMISSION BY MAJOR MEDIA ORGANIZATIONS** where topic CONTINUES

[30] **A.** Only 2 provinces in NE of Afg. weren't controlled by Taliban: Badhakshan - controlled by Northern Alliance – the people with the seat in the U.N.; adjacent Takhar, just to the west, was contested by the Taliban at the time the opium poppy ban took place.[see note C at Fig 4, next page]

B. 7 E Afghan. Prov. with 98.4% drop in poppy area were, Nangarhar, Kunar Lagman, Logar, Kabul, Kapisa & Paktia –drop= 21,730 to 351 Ha.

[31] For more detail on the contrast between the Taliban and the "Northern Alliance" in the area of opium, see: CH. 8: Buddhist Statues & Other Pre-Islamic Art. It's shown here, that the destruction of the Buddhist statues was precipitated by a UN diplomatic faux pas laid on top of the combination of failure to recognize the opium poppy ban & unilateral UN sanctions. These sanctions would benefit the enemies of the Taliban – who stockpiled opium…"adequate to supply Europe and the U.S. for up to three years. In addition to opium, the Northern Alliance's leader, Massoud, reportedly derived much of his organizations income, $60E6 in '99, by taxing the extraction and export of lapis lazuli from southern Badakhshan & emeralds from the Panjshir Valley, his home territory. "Des Mines D'émeraude Pour Financer La Resistance Du Commandant Massoud" 'Des centaines de petites exploitations rapportent 60 millions de dollars par an au "gouvernement" du Panshir.' Françoise Chipaux, Le Monde,18-19/7/99._____For detailed analysis of where the Taliban & their enemies got there money, see PART TWO: WHERE DID THEY GET THEIR MONEY?

[32] ~1/5th of opium grown in Balkh Prov. in '00 seems to have 'leaked' across SE border of Balkh to neighboring Samangan Prov. See Fig 4 on next page for details.

[33] In mid '97 ~3K Taliban prisoners were reportedly killed in city of 3-400K. In 9/'97 Taliban bombed city & in mid '98, captured it & killed ~3K of the city's inhabitants.

[34] Chair of Johns Hopkins' Central Asia Inst., Frederick Starr, said…"The reduction is probably the most dramatic event in the history of illegal drug markets, not only in scale, but also in the fact that it was done domestically, without international assistance…"NYT,6/13/01, 'Taliban's Eradication of Poppies Is Convulsing Opium Market', Barbara Crossette,pA15,c1,Datel.:UN,6/12.

FIG. 4

HECTARES OF OPIUM POPPY CULTIVATION IN AFGHANISTAN BY PROVINCE & GOVERNANCE: 1994-2018,

Data from United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime[A]

ROW	REGION	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	'01/'00	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
A	BADAKHSHAN B	1,714	2,966	3,230	2,902	2,817	2,684	2,458	6,342	2.580	8,250	12,756	15,607	7,370	13,056	3,642	200	### 557	1,100	1,705	1,927	2,374	4,204	4,056	6,298	8,311	7,703
A.1	*OF WHICH FAYZABAD* B	*77*	*2,344*	*1,592*	*1.634*	*1,282*	*906*	*1,073*	*868*	*0.809*	*2,370*	*3,109*	*2,362*	*3,111*	*7,154*	*83*	*64*	*11*	*10*	*64*	*7*	*48*	*65*	*4*	*1*	*10*	*1*
B	TAKHAR B	0	0	0	0	0	201	647	211	0.326	788	380	762	1,364	2,178	1,211	##	##	##	##	##	70##	##	##	##	47##	251
C	A+B=NORTHERN ALLIANCE, '01**	1,714	2,966	3,230	2,902	2,817	2,885	3,105	6,553	2.110	9,038	13,136	16,369	8,734	15,254	4,853	200 ##	567 ##	1,100 ##	1,705 ##	1,927 ##	2,444 ##	4,204 ##	4,056 ##	6,298 ##	8,358 ##	8,954 ##
D.1	BALKH	0	0	1,065	710	1,044	4,057	2,669	4	0.001	217	1,108	2,495	10,837	7,100	##	##	##	##	##	##	410	##	204	2,085	12,116	8,532
D.2	SAMANGAN C	0	0	0	0	0	0	54	614	11.37	100	101	1,151	3,874	1,960	##	##	##	##	##	##	##	##	##	##	243	238
E	JAWZJAN D	0	0	0	0	0	2,593	600	0	0.0	137	888	1,673	1,748	2,024	1,085	##	##	##	##	##	##	##	##	409	3,237	338
F	D+E=TALIBAN NORTH IN '01	0	0	1,065	710	1,044	6,650	3,269	4	0.001	354	1,996	4,168	12,585	9,124	1,085##	##	##	##	##	##	410	##	204	2,494	15,596	9,108
G	KUNAR D	115	152	18	0	75	288	786	82	0.104	972	2,025	4,366	1,059	932	446	290	164	154	578	1,279	1,127	754	987	1,276	1,634	1,732
H	NANGARHAR	29,081	15,724	15,645	14,567	17,821	22,990	19,747	218	0.011	19,780	18,904	28,213	1,093	4,872	18,739	##	### 294	719	2,700	3,151	15,719	18,227	10,016	14,344	18,976	17,177
H.1	*OF WHICH JALALABAD*	*458*	*31*	*51*	*123*	*397*	*979*	*1,021*	*0*	*0.0*	*90*	*4*	*1,656*	*77*	*0*	*0*	*0*	*0*	*0*	*0*	*0*	*0*	*0*	*0*	*0*	*0*	*0*
I	G+H=TALIBAN EAST IN 2001	29,196	15,876	15,663	14,567	17,896	23,278	20,533	300	0.015	20,752	20,929	32,579	2,152	5,804	19,185	290 ##	458 ##	873 ##	3,278 ##	4,430 ##	16,846 ##	18,981 ##	11,003 ##	15,620 ##	20,610 ##	18,909 ##
J	HELMAND	29,579	29,754	24,910	29,400	30,672	44,552	42,853	0	0.0	29,950	15,371	29,353	26,500	69,324	102,770	103,590	69,833	65,045	63,307	75,176	100,693	103,240	86,443	80,273	144,018	136,798
K	KANDAHAR	3,624	2,127	3,057	4,122	5,229	5,522	3,034	0	0.0	3,970	3,055	4,959	12,989	12,619	16,615	14,623	19,811	25,835	27,213	24,341	28,335	33,713	21,020	20,475	28,010	23,410
L	URUZGAN D	6,254	2,908	7,880	4,986	4,661	4,989	4,725	1	0.000	5,100	7,143	11,080	4,605	#16,817	#12,550	#12,212	#12,226	#8,884	#11,623	#11,566	#11,416	#9,864	#11,658	#15,877	#23,049	#19,409
M	J+K+L=TALIBAN SOUTH IN '01	39,457	34,789	35,847	38,508	40,562	55,063	50,612	1	0.000	39,020	25,569	45,392	44,094	98,760	131,935	130,425	101,870	99,764	102,143	111,083	140,444	146,817	119,121	116,625	195,077	179,617
N	HERAT (TALIBAN '96-'01)	0	0	0	38	0	0	184	0	0.000	50	134	2,531	1,924	2,287	1,525	266	556	360	366	1080	952	738	285	208	1,104	595
O	F+I+M+N= MAIN TALIBAN IMPACT IN '01	68,653	50,665	52,575	53,785	59,502	84,991	74,598	305	0.004	60,176	48,628	84,670	60,755	115,975	153,730 ##	130,981 ##	102,884 ##	100,997 ##	105,787 ##	116,593 ##	158,654 ##	166,536 ##	130,613 ##	134,947 ##	232,387 ##	208,229 ##
P	Q-C=TOTAL TALIBAN IN '01	69,702	50,793	53,579	55,515	60,810	88,024	78,928	1,053	0.013	65,007	67,346	114,631	95,266	149,746	188,147 ##	156,800 ##	122,433 ##	121,900 ##	129,295 ##	152,073 ##	206,556 ##	219,796 ##	178,944 ##	194,782 ##	319,642 ##	254,046 ##
Q	TOTAL AFGHANISTAN	71,416	53,759	56,827	58,417	63,627	90,909	82,033	7,606	0.093	74,045	80,482	131,000 ROUNDED IN	104,000 ORIGINAL	165,000	193,000 ##	157,000 ##	123,000 ##	123,000 ##	131,000 ##	154,000 ##	209,000 ##	224,000 ##	183,000 ##	201,000 ##	328,000 ##	263,000 E ##
R	OF WHICH KABUL	0	0	0	0	0	132	340	29	0.085	58	237	282	0	80	500	310	132	152	220	120	298	233	321	398	435	484

A. Afghanistan Opium Surveys for '03 &' 06 http://www.unodc.org/pdf/afg/afghanistan_opium_survey_2003.pdf p. pdf 87-91, & "Afghanistan Opium Survey 2007, Executive Summary" pdf page 14, 8/27/07 http://www.unodc.org/pdf/execsummaryafg.pdf http://www.unodc.org/pdf/research/AFG07_ExSum_web.pdf "Afghanistan Opium Survey 2008, Executive Summary" pdf p. 18 8/26/08 http://www.unodc.org/documents/publications/Afghanistan_Opium_Survey_2008.pdf "Afghanistan Opium Survey 2009, Summary Findings" pdf page 12, 9/02/09, http://www.unodc.org/documents/afghanistan//Executive_Summary_2009.pdf "Afghanistan Opium Survey 2010, Summary Findings" pdf p6, 9/30/'10 http://www.unodc.org/documents/crop-monitoring/Afghanistan/Afg_opium_survey_2010_exsum_web.pdf "Afghanistan Opium Survey 2011, Summary Findings"pdf p6 of 30, Oct 2011, http://info.publicintelligence.net/AfghanOpiumSurvey2011.pdf "Afghanistan Opium Survey 2012, Summary Findings"pdf p15 of 28, Nov. 2012, http://www.unodc.org/documents/crop-monitoring/Afghanistan/Summary_Findings_FINAL.pdf "Afghanistan Opium Survey 2013, Summary Findings"pdf p7 of 26, Nov. 2013 http://www.unodc.org/documents/crop-monitoring/Afghanistan/Afghan_report_Summary_Findings_2013.pdf ; Afghanistan Opium Survey 2014 http://www.unodc.org/documents/crop-monitoring/Afghanistan/Afghan-opium-survey-2014.pdf Afghanistan Opium Survey 2017 Cultivation and Production https://www.unodc.org/documents/crop-monitoring/Afghanistan/Afghan_opium_survey_2017_cult_prod_web.pdf Afghanistan Opium Survey 2018 Cultivation and Production https://www.unodc.org/documents/crop-monitoring/Afghanistan/Afghanistan_opium_survey_2018.pdf **B.** Badakshan & Takhar provinces had pop. in '00 of 0.923 & 0.845 E6, resp., giving the Northern Alliance Territory in that year a total of 1.768 E6, or only 6.85% of an in-country population of 25.810 E6. Part of Takhar was reportedly taken by the Taliban in '00-'01. Data from the Oak Ridge National Lab, LandScan Global Population 2000 Database. Found at http://www.fao.org/afghanistan/ Some other sources exclude the nomadic population, which may =10%+ in some areas. **C.1** Samangan Prov, E of Balk, with 0.595 E6 people incr. from 54 to 614 ha. -all in one, mostly Uzbek district, Darae Souf (Dara-i-Suf), which is surrounded with Tajik & Hazara districts. _____ area 4.5E5 ha., 1-2 E5 people, hadn't been surveyed before & was understood to have no opium poppy growing in '00. 2 other districts in this prov. that had a total of 54 ha in '00 were 0 in '01 – suggesting some poppy farming migrated to this sparsely populated area from surrounding areas -- perhaps from Uzbek Gen. Dostom's home prov. of Balk. Curiously, this particular district was singled out for a shipment of 400 tons of food: AP/8/21/00, Amir Zia, Islamabad, "The United Nations distributed… 400 tons … of food to people in Dara-i-Suf district in Samangan province, Thousands of people are stranded in Dara-i-Suf because of the fighting in nearby regions, Mansour said, adding that children are the main victims… In June, the U.N. air-dropped a ton of food in Dara-i-Suf after reports of several people starved to death." **C.2** Similarly, 100% Tajik, Andarab [valley] Dist. in Baghlan Prov.[not controlled by Taliban: AFP, Jun 11/01 "Afghan opposition claims success in fresh battles"] formerly governed by Nadiri & feeding into the Salang Pass, had 81ha in '01, 0 in '00 – while other dist. in that prov. dropped to ~0;~1E5, pop. _____ [On Nadiri See CH. 12 THE NORTHERN ALLIANCE & THE SALANG PASS. On opium & Massoud, headed of Northern Alliance at this time, see CH. 16 MASSOUD CAUGHT LYING ABOUT OPIUM?] **D.** & **#** Starting with data in '06 rept, Uruzgan was split into 2 prov., Uruzgan & Daykundi. The #s shown here for Uruzgan for '06 thru '18 are the sum of the 2 new districts. Similarly, Sare Pol & Nurestan have been split off from Jawzjan & Kunar, respectively, starting with the '02 & '03 rep'ts, resp.. The following amounts for these districts must be added to the table: 146, 0, 57, 1,428, 1,974, 3,227, 2,252, 260, (0,0,0,0,0,0##),195, 331,1686, 3550, 660 must be added to Jawzjan for the y'rs '00-'18; 648, 764, 1554, 1516, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,0, 121, 0 must be added to Kunar, for 2003-18. From pdf p. 139 of_____ **##** In the '08 to '18 reports, "Poppy-free provinces are those estimated to have less than 100 hectares of opium cultivation." & shown as a 0 in provincial but not in district tables [note 7 pdf p8 in '17 rept.*"In 2007, provinces with no poppy were considered poppy-free" note p 68 '18 rept.*] In '09, &'10 this meant 20 prov. could be producing 5+ tons of opium ea. – 100 tons of opium combined, with a street value of ~$1 billion – & still be called "poppy free." In '09 Afghan poppies yielded a record 56 kg/ha, 15% more than '08. In '10 it was 29kg/ha. In 2015 it was only 18.3kg/ha. Tons =6,900 in '09, 3,600 in '10 – [result of crop disease & much lower yields], 5,800 in '11 & 3,700 (2,800 – 4,200) in '12 ["There have been reports from the Eastern, Western & Southern regions that a significant area was affected by disease and/or adverse weather conditions" note 3, p 3 on the low yield of 23.7kg/ha] -- compared to peaks of 4,565 & 3,278 in '99 & '00 under the Taliban. There were 15 "poppy free " provinces in '14 & 14 "poppy free" in '15. Kabul, the capital prov., hasn't been 'poppy free' during the whole period '02-'15 [tho' 2017 rept has 0 in 2005 & 80Ha in 2006 – all opium in Kabul prof. is grown in Surubi[pdf p 69 of 73 in 2017 rept. **###** "…last year poppy cultivation had been eliminated in … Badakhshan Prov. but this year it …[was back]…Some $13E6 were allocated for that province under the Good Performance Initiative [funded primarily by US & UK _____] last year but no …[govt official] spent that money there," "Last year, [in] Nangahar …poppy cultivation was eliminated but unfortunately, this year, ..[it was back]…because last year $11E6 were given to this province under the Good Performance Initiative but unfortunately the money has not been spent there yet." Quoting "Afghan counter-narcotics minister-designate, Gen Khodadad" BBC Monit. S. Asia 12/29/09, 'Afghan minister-designate says counter-narcotics efforts in hands of foreigners'.

E. *"Opium poppy cultivation decreased by some 24,000ha (-56%) in the Northern region, by 23,200ha (-43%) in the Western region and by 15,000ha (-8%) in the Southern region. The strong decreases in the Northern and parts of the Western regions were mainly attributed to the adverse effects of a drought."[pdf p 6, also see fig 4 & 5 of rept. For examples of sharply reduced rainfall & crop failure even in some irrigated areas – the latter, as a result of reduced mountain snowfall.* "Afghanistan Opium Survey, *2018 "]*

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JURISDICTION	A. # EXECUTED IN 2000	B. POPULATION MILLIONS*	B/A X10^6
TALIBAN AFGHANISTAN	15+	24.9**	1.660
IRAN	≥75	65.6	.875
TEXAS	40	20.8	.520
SAUDI ARABIA	≥123	22.0***	.154

* POP. OF AFGH. BASED ON LANDSAT DATA – SEE FOOTNOTE B. p 14; SAUDI ARABIA & IRAN POP. FROM CIA WORLD FACT BOOK, 2000, ESTIM. FOR JUL. 1, 2000.

**EXCLUDING BADAKHSHAN PROVINCE –CONTROLLED BY ENEMIES OF THE TALIBAN.

*** INCLUDING 5.36 NON-NATIONALS (JULY. 2000 EST.)

The Amnesty International (AI) website was then checked -- to see if there was any mention of large numbers of executions or other severe punishments associated with the opium eradication program. The A.I. publications for the last full year for which such data were available -- the year 2000 (by the common reckoning -- the corresponding Jewish Year is 5760) -- did not mention any severe punishments associated with eradicating opium. As shown above, the actual number of judicial executions for that year, given by A.I. as 15+ , was only ~1/3 of the rate of judicial executions/capita in Texas under then Gov. Geo. W. Bush and ~1/10 of the rate in Saudi Arabia[35].

This is particularly remarkable considering the situations in these three areas: In Afghanistan there had been nearly two decades of social chaos, two years of terrible drought[36], widespread hunger, long standing ethnic tensions, war on several fronts and the condemnation of the community of nations. In Texas and Saudi Arabia the people were relatively well off -- at least as far as money is concerned. The Texas Governor became President of the United States and the majority of the 9/11 attackers came from Saudi Arabia -- none of them were Taliban.

The US had sent a small team to Afghanistan in the early months of '01 -- when it was already known by both aerial reconnaissance and a preliminary on-the-ground survey that the Taliban had achieved a tremendous success in eradicating opium growing. The US team – one man from the State Dept. and one from the FBI -- worked with emissaries from Canada UK, Belgium, Germany, Netherlands nd the European Commission. The group was to determine, among other things, how the Taliban had accomplished this remarkable -- almost miraculous -- transformation.

On his return, the State Dept. representative, Mr. James Callahan[37], was interviewed by Barbara Crossette, veteran foreign correspondent of the New York Times. He said then and in subsequent communications, that they did it by consensus of the elders connected with the mosques in almost every town and village[38].

I contacted the State Department to get a copy of Callahan's report. They couldn't give it to me and claimed not to even know of its existence. They -- the Afghanistan Desk of the State Department – said that Mr. Callahan was no longer working at the Department – after two decades – and they did not know where he could be reached.[39] I found him working as an anti-narcotics expert for the UN – stationed in Uzbekistan.

I wrote him a detailed letter and received a substantive 800 word reply[40]. He reiterated and confirmed what had been reported in the article by Barbara Crossette – and added a few important details. He noted that though most farmers cooperated with the ban voluntarily,

> "…the Taliban had to employ heavy shows of force - including tanks - in some of the northeastern tribal areas where affinity for the Taliban was not high and where there was the strongest resistance to the ban, including killings of Taliban officials.

He also wrote:

> My impression was that some of the Taliban officials genuinely believed in the ban and

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[35] Data on executions for Taliban Af., Saudi Arabia & Iran: A.I. Annual '01. "At least 139 executions were carried out in Iran in 2001, most behind prison walls. That was up from 75 in 2000, although the figures are based on documented cases only, London-based rights group Amnesty International has said. The death sentence is usually reserved for murder, rape, armed robbery and drug trafficking."9/30/02, The Globe and Mail (Can),'Iran hangs rapists publicly; Crowd watches sunrise execution of gang members for notorious crimes", Paul Hughes, Reuters Pg. A10, 569 words, Dateline: TehranBut see App. 19, with 25 for Afg., incl. 4 war related. Texas data: The Death Penalty In 2000: Year End Report. Death Penalty Information Center

[36] "Central and Southwest Asia represents the largest region of persistent drought over the past three years anywhere in the world. From a regional perspective, the ongoing drought is the most severe in the past several decades. Significant shortfalls in precipitation have led to widespread social and economic impacts particularly in Iran, Afghanistan, Western Pakistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. Agriculture, animal husbandry, water resources, and public health have been particularly stressed throughout the region." The drought and humanitarian crisis in Central and Southwest Asia: A climate perspective, International Res. Inst. for Climate Prediction, 30/11/01, See also note 202.&p. 56.

[37] "the State Department's director of Asian and African narcotics programs" NYT, 4/25/01, 'U.S. Sends 2 To Assess Drug Program For Afghans' Barbara Crossette, s. A; c. 1; p 5, Dateline:UN, 4/24

[38] "Taliban's Ban On Poppy A Success, U.S. Aides Say" Barbara Crossette, DATELINE: UNITED NATIONS, May 18, NYT, 5/20/01

[39] Give dates of phone calls and phone numbers

[40] See letter from Mr. Callahan to the author, outlining his observations, APPEND 2. See footnote 46 for Callahan's report. He was reachable for years at the UN (james.Callahan@unodc.org). (Now retired , 4/10) APPEND 3 has communications with US DEA on this..

supported it for religious reasons, and possibly as an olive branch to the international community. I think others, however, continued to profit from the sales of stocks…Whether or not the Taliban used the ban to drive up prices is a major point of contention…"*[emph. added]*

The question of how much the Taliban used the ban to drive up prices turns out to be very important. They knew that once the ban went into effect – even once it was publicly announced – the price of stocks would go up dramatically. In fact, in the period of just over a year -- from the time the ban was announced in the summer of 2000, to the 9/11 attacks -- the farm-gate price rose more than 20 fold.[41]

They also knew that most farmers were holding opium stocks from record crops of previous years. This meant that, though a switch from opium to another crop would have ordinarily meant some loss of income to the opium farmers, this would've been offset by the large increase in the price of the opium stocks they held.

If they had banned opium to drive up the prices for themselves – to profit from the ban – we would expect that they would have attempted to hoard opium prior to the ban's announcement. This would've meant that a significant part of the 10% [42] in-kind tax on the opium farmers wouldn't have been sold in the market in the months before the ban was announced. If this had happened it would have reduced the supply in the market and driven up prices before the ban.

It would have also signaled the buyers who ordinarily purchased opium from the Taliban that something was up. They would see that the Taliban were taxing at the usual rate but not selling the in-kind opium tax receipts in the market. This would have signaled the cognoscenti in the market that the Taliban might be about to announce a ban to drive up prices[43]. These people would themselves have begun to hoard in anticipation of such a ban. The result would be a further shortage in the market and a further increase in prices – before the ban was announced.

We have data on farm-gate prices of opium in this period. The data – shown in both chart and table form in Fig. 5 & 6, on the next page – show that the price was low and flat prior to the ban.

This shows that there was no significant antici-patory hoarding by the Taliban & no significant leaks of the news of the impending ban. The low, flat prices also show that the taxation program was uniform & farmers were not suffering from unpredictable predations – such as banditry – or excessive taxation or gouging on the part of local officials or the Taliban

This data not only shows the Taliban didn't ban opium growing to raise the price for them-selves. It also shows that the leading expert on the Taliban – Ahmed Rashid - is making things up – deliberately showing the Taliban in a bad light. However, I'm jumping the gun here. I didn't see what Mr. Rashid was up to until 8 years later.[44]

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[41] See Fig 5 & 6 , next page. The total value of the Afghan opium crop to Afghan farmers in the year 2000 was $30/kg X 3.3 million kg , or ~$100 million. This compares with a world street value of Afghan sourced narcotics of about $60 billion -- according to "The Opium Heroin Market", page 45 of the UN's World Drug Report.

As data shown in this report for the period 2000 -2009 show retail prices relatively steady for a major portion of the global market [table 14 , page 81] This is probably a good estimate of the global market for Afghan opium at the time the Taliban banned opium poppy growing in 2000-2001 .

This means that literally tens of millions of people throughout the world, including many police, military, intelligence operatives and public officials, were mak-ing good part of their livelihood from Afghan opiates.

We should note here what the basic costs are for producing opium in Afghanistan. "Under normal conditions, three people can harvest 1 jerib (0.2 ha) of opium poppy in 21 days." The daily wage rate for lancing/gum collection was$7.7 in '06, $9.3 in '08, $8.7 in '09, $9.3 in '10 and $12.6 in '11. Thus 21x3x5= 315 person days are needed just to harvest one hectare – at a cost of about $3,150. This wage rate was ~2x the rate for road construction, poppy weeding or wheat harvesting in those years. From p. 102 of 2008 Survey and p. 59 Table 28 of 2011 Survey Yield in '11 was 44.5kg/ha & dry opium farm gate price avg. $241/Kg or $10, 724.5/ha. ~ 3 X the cost of harvesting. In 2000, the yield was 40kg/ha & the price $30/kg or $1200/ha. If, as cited below, cultivation required 350 man-days/ha,$3.43/day for labor would yield no 'profit' to farmer.

"…estimates suggest that approximately 350 person days are required to cultivate one hectare of opium poppy in Afghanistan, compared to approximately 41 person days per hectare for wheat and 135 person days per hectare for black cumin. Harvesting alone is reported to require as much as 200 person days per hectare." Strategic Study #4: Final Report, June 1999. Access to Labour: The Role of Opium in the Livelihood Strategies of Itinerant Harvesters Working in Helmand Province, Afghanistan. David Mansfield, Note apparent contradiction between 200 person days cited here(on p. 2 of 18) & 315 calculated from the UN data, above. The latter may be a national figure & the former a more local, southern figure.

[42] This was the standard "ushr' rate of taxation – noted by Callahan in his letter. Zakat is a form of ushr tax in Hanafi Islam 10% on rain fed, 5% on water drawn from a well or artificial canals. http://muslimcanada.org/fiqhch4.html . Zakat for distribution to war widows and orphans was decreed by Taliban. NYT, Oct 9/96, Burns, Kabul

[43] The Taliban had already effectively banned hashish –an intra-Afghan issue [Times, May 6,/97, C.Thomas/Kandahar] so opium ban might also be effective. In Khost Prov. the Taliban imposed zakat on shopkeepers who don't serve in the army. [MIDDLE EAST NEWS ITEMS, Nov. 9/98, 'Imposition Of Heavy Taxes Angers Shopkeepers'

[44] As I discuss in Append 10: Ahmed Rashid Not Reliable On Pre- 9/11/01 Taliban.

FIG. 5 DRY OPIUM FARMGATE PRICES IN AFGHANISTAN $/kg 1986 to 2018 [A]

"...it later became clear that the ban had been the result of overproduction and a slump in opium prices, which had collapsed from $600 to just $30 a kilogram."

Ahmed Rashid. 2008, in: Descent Into Chaos: How The War Against Islamic Extremism Is Being Lost In Pakistan, Afghanistan And Central Asia, p. 320

http://books.google.com/books?id=vLzcHaEqumUC&printsec=frontcover&dq=Descent+into+chaos&cd=1#v=onepage&q=&f=false

OPIUM FARMGATE PRICES [B] 1986-1996 CONSTANT US$ -1996, /KG.

SAME PRICE SCALE AS CHART ON RIGHT WITH DATA THROUGH 2012



Ahmed Rashid might've consulted his own, extremely successful book, "Taliban", [Yale Univ. Press, 2nd Eng. ed. 2011] His chapter: "HIGH ON HEROIN: DRUGS AND THE TALIBAN ECONOMY", provides an interview with a Kandahari opium poppy farmer "in the spring of 1997" -- the year before the 3 yrs of "bumper crops". He says of the farmer: "...Wali Jan produces 45 kilograms of raw opium every year and earns about US $1,300 – a small fortune for Afghan farmers. Wali Jan knows that refined heroin fetches 50 times that price in London or New York, but he is more than happy with what he gets." The 2nd, revised ed. went to press more than 9 years later – well after "Descent Into Chaos..." and contains no changes in the above quoted text. $1,300/45kg=$28.89/kg.


Price in (US$/kg)
700
600
500
400
300
200
100
0
9 MONTHS OF LOW, FLAT PRICES PRIOR TO OPIUM POPPY BAN
HEAVY, UNSEASONAL RAINS IN THE SPRING OF '98 & RESULTING DISEASE, CAUSED CROP DAMAGE & PRICE INCREASES – TO $60/KG IN AUG.'98. [E]
OPIUM POPPY BAN ANNOUNCED, JULY 28, 2000
2010 & 2012 CROP DISEASE &/OR DROUGHT #b
2004 CROP DISEASE #b
$143 AUG. 2017 p.45
$100 JUL. 2018 p.46
"THE HIGHER UNDERLYING PRICE STRUCTURE AT PRESENT MAY ALSO REFLECT INCREASING EXTORTION FROM FARMERS BY AUTHORITIES AND PAYMENTS OF "PROTECTION MONEY" ON A REGULARIZED BASIS, WHEREAS DURING THE TALIBAN PERIOD THERE APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN A RELATIVELY LOW AND FAIRLY REGULARIZED LEVY ON OPIUM." [F]
Nangarhar (Eastern region)
Kandahar (Southern region)
Simple average

FIG. 6 DETAILS OF FARM GATE PRICE DATA BY MONTH AND WEEK IN THE PERIOD LEADING UP TO THE BAN IN JUL. 2000 AND CONTINUING THRU THE SEPT. 11, 2001 ATTACKS, TO MAR. OF 2002 [C]

SHOWING PRICE SPIKE IN AUG. 2001 –SEPT. 10, 2001,WHEN POPPY GROWING BAN WAS RENEWED AND COLLAPSE OF OPIUM PRICES IMMEDIATELY AFTER 9/11/01, SHOWN IN SEPT. 15-OCT. 15 '01.

DATE	Jan-97	Feb-97	Mar-97	Apr-97	May-97	Jun-97	Aug-97	Sep-97	Oct-97	Nov-97	Dec-97	Jan-98	Feb-98	Mar-98	Apr-98	May-98	Jul-98	Aug-98	Sep-98	Oct-98	Nov-98	Dec-98	Jan-99	Feb-99	Mar-99	Apr-99	Jun-99	Jul-99	Aug-99	Sep-99	Oct-99	Nov-99	Dec-99	Jan-00	Feb-00	Mar-00	May-00	Jun-00	Jul-00	Aug-00	Sep-00	Oct-00	Nov-00	Dec-00	Jan-01	Feb-01	Apr-01	May-01	Jun-01	Jul-01	Aug-01	10-Sep	15-Sep	24-Sep	10-Oct	15-Oct	01-Nov	05-Nov	19-Nov	15-Dec	Jan-02	Feb-02	Mar-02
NANGARHAR			93	102	108	114	97	97	86	83	66	67	76	95	70	65	54	55	63	78	96	101	116	100	100	80	86	82	62	61	40	38	39	41	43	46	42	38	44	87	76	124	107	159	173	214	383	398	368	424	657	700	194	95	134	190	327	330	343	316	423	409	416
KANDAHAR							34	33	33	30	34	46	53	41	38	38	49	67	54	59	54	56	59	60	50	45	41	37	39	36	33	31	32	31	30	29	30	31	35	78	43	70	61	101	128	162	260	270	250	288	446	650	180	90	150	327	340	350	364	275	407	395	343
AVERAGE			63	68	71	74	65	65	60	57	50	57	65	68	54	52	51	61	59	69	75	79	87	80	75	62	63	59	51	49	37	34	35	36	37	38	36	35	39	82	60	97	84	130	150	188	322	334	309	356	551	675	187	93	142	259	334	340	354	296	415	402	379

A. 3/97–2017 from: a. "Afghanistan Opium Survey 2011, Summary Findings" pdf p6, 10/11 _____ ; b. "Afghanistan Opium Survey 2013, Summary Findings", p 21, 11/2013 _____ ; c. Afghanistan Opium Survey 2014, p.45, 11/'14 _____;d.Afghanistan Opium Survey 2017, Cultivation and Production _____ Afghanistan Opium Survey 2018 Cultivation and Production ____ This has chart on p 46 like the one above , from Mar 1997 to Jul 2018.

B. Price data from '86-96 from: "Statistics And Analysis On Supply Of And Trafficking In Narcotic Drugs And Psychotropic Substances" pdf p 38, 1996. _____ C. Afghanistan Opium Poppy Survey 2002, pdf p 52 _____ D. Corrected from original machine read text which showed 2 instead of 24 & 3 instead of 32. E. From "The Economic Superiority of Illicit Drug Production: Myth and Reality / Opium Poppy Cultivation In Afghanistan" David Mansfield, 8/01, p 6, ____ F. p.125 "Prices and Market Interactions in the Opium Economy", *William A. Byrd & Olivier Jonglez*, ch.5 , of: 'Afghanistan's Drug Industry: Structure, Functioning, Dynamics & Implications for Counter-Narcotics Policy'. p. 117-154, Publ.:28/11/06. UN Office on Drugs and Crime & The World Bank. This report doesn't appear to analyze the price data to see if the Taliban banned opium to raise the price. [See p 13 of this sefer for such an analysis. _____ _____ "Prices in the south also tended to follow the agricultural cycle, with relatively high prices in the months prior to harvest (January/February) when stocks begin to deplete, followed by low prices at harvest time (April/May) and price increases again in subsequent months." Pdf p. 59 _____

As long as we have moved so far ahead in time – for the moment -- more than 8 years after the full report of Mr. Callahan and his fellow emissaries was written, it has been formally cited by the UN but not released to the public in a way that can be accessed on line[45]. However, an informal draft was posted by its author on his own website some years ago. [46]

All in all, the opium poppy ban was a sign visible from Heaven.-- and the Taliban knew it.[47]

On opium eradication, the following insight, published 9/20/'01, is particularly noteworthy:

"It's really quite remarkable," says Bernard Frahi, director of the UN Drug Control Program in Islamabad, speaking last March, when UN teams of monitors confirmed that the Taliban poppy ban was total. "If this had happened in Colombia, where the US is spending billions of dollars and reducing drug cultivation by maybe 5 %, this would have gotten the Nobel Prize. But because it's the Taliban, there's a different reaction."[48]

CHAPTER 2:

OPPRESSION OF WOMEN UNDER THE TALIBAN?

It was clear then that the Taliban were not interested in attacking Jews or Israel and that they weren't a failed or puppet state – but were they any good otherwise? Weren't they terrible misogynists? Isn't it true that they deprived women and girls of education and health care; that they deprived women of the opportunity to work -- and that they forced women to wear a burka in the street?[49]

To check this out, I went to the website of what I thought were the biggest detractors of the Taliban in the area of how they treated – or mistreated – women. This was RAWA -- The Revolutionary Association of

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[45] Addiction, Crime And Insurgency: The transna-ional threat of Afghan opium,UNODC,'09,n.83, p77 _____

[46] A. See:The Impact of the Taliban Prohibition on Opium Poppy Cultivation in Afghanistan, 5/25/01, fin. Draft, David Mansfield, _____ Retr. & saved 3/05/10.

B. According to a 6/19/'07 email from Bernard Frahi, [then Chief, Partnership, in Dev. Branch, UNODC, Vienna], David Mansfield was a UK member of the "Donors Assessment Mission To Afghanistan', together with: Michael Ryder, James Tucker, Ann Freckleton, UK; Jim Callahan, Tom Schrettner, USA; Michel Adam, Belgium; Rita Gebert, Hans-Christian Winkler, Germany; Gary Halverson, Canada; Jean-François Cautain, EC.

C. David Mansfield subsequently wrote "A State Built on Sand: How Opium Undermined Afghanistan" Hurst, 2015, 315 pages, Oxford University Press, 2016, 382+pages[?]. It includes an 18 page chapter "Repositioning A Pariah Regime: The Taliban Ban of 2000/1"_____[p121-138] This chapter downplays the drought -- mentioned once in the chapter - & cites Rashid's book "Taliban…", 2001, 6 times. Rashid's book "Descent into Chaos"[see p 17] is not cited at all and Rashid contradicting himself or serving as consultant on the anti-Taliban propaganda film, "Beneath the Veil"[see Chapter 22C], is not mentioned. The 2001 report is referred to as an "unpublished paper prepared for the donor mission to Afghanistan 23 April – 4 May 2001". [For the book as a whole, drought is mentioned on 15 pages & Rashid is mentioned on 8.]

D. See "Counter-Narcotics in Afghanistan Failure of Success?" David Mansfield & Adam Pain, Afghanistan Research And Evaluation Unit, Briefing Paper Series, Dec. ' 08. p. 7, "The result was limited eradication with reports suggesting as few as 230 ha of opium poppy destroyed and around 350 people arrested countrywide." Citing, supra, The Impact… retr 3/23/'10, p.7 _____

E. An entire issue of the peer-reviewed International Journal of Drug Policy v.16, #2, '05, is dedicated to the "The Taliban and Opium Cultivation in Afghanistan" See APPENDIX 5, for a review of the academic response to the Taliban ban, incl. failure of the Congressional Research Service, at 5b.6.

[47] '[The Taliban's unofficial envoy to the UN in NY] Mr. Mujahid claims he can prove that the Taliban are firmly in charge. Afghanistan had been, …the main supplier of poppy …in the illicit opium trade, he said. Now, his government was able to stop the [its] cultivation … "with no cooperation of the U.S. … or the U.N. Drug Control program, with no support of other Asian countries, in spite of economic hardship, in spite of drought.'" [Feds Shut Queens H.Q. of Feared Taliban. By Benny Avni, Forward 2/16/01]

[48] Christian Science Monitor, 9/20/01, "Life under Taliban cuts two ways", Scott Baldauf, KABUL, _____

[49] It's interesting in retrospect that the accusa-tions made against the Taliban when they entered Kabul never included rape and looting – two things that one would expect from a supposedly predatory army of conflicting ethnicity operating primarily with foreign support.

Women of Afghanistan. The worst atrocity RAWA had on its website was the execution of a woman, Zarmina, who was shot in the head in Kabul stadium in front of thousands of people.

If you ask almost anyone in the USA what they think the first woman executed in Kabul after the Taliban came to power was punished for, they'd probably answer "blasphemy or adultery".

If you ask how long the judicial procedure was -- from the time of the apprehension for the crime to the time of the execution, they would probably answer "a few hours to a few weeks".

If you asked how long after the Taliban came to power in Kabul was this woman executed – the first woman executed by them after they took over governance of the city-- they would probably answer "a few days to a few months. And what is the reality - as reported by the wire services?

> **The woman, Zarmina, was executed for "beating her husband to death with a hammer as he slept."[50]**

RAWA did not ask if there was any exculpatory evidence. They claimed the Taliban were at fault for not heeding the plea of a relative of the husband who called for financial compensation in lieu of the death penalty -- as the woman was about to be executed. [51] [52]

- The woman was executed after judicial procedures that took between five months and two years-- from the time of the murder to the time of the execution. There were reportedly three levels of judicial review.[53]

- The execution took place more than three years after the Taliban came to power in Kabul.

The discrepancy between the reality and the media generated expectation in this case is suggestive of what we might actually find if we were in a position to investigate the other points in detail.

Would we imagine from what we 'knew' about the Taliban that they opened several centers to train women to be doctors? They did![54]

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[50] **A**. AFP—English, 11/16/99 13:32 GMT, Internat news, "Taliban publicly execute woman murderer." KABUL: "A mother of seven accused of murdering her husband two years ago was publicly executed ,,, at the Kabul sports stadium." **B.** The Observer 11/21/99 p. 26, "… Jason Burke in Kabul witnessed…[mullah saying at execution]…' She is a mother of seven children and has confessed to killing her husband Alauddin with a heavy hammer five months ago." [EMPHASIS ADDED].

Note AFP: 2 yrs & Burke: 5 mon. Accusation could have been 2yrs; confession 5 months; actual murder could have been more than 2 yrs before.

[51] 1 min. video of execution from RAWA website: We will see much more of this video. See Chapter 10c

[52] Under the version of Muslim Law actually practiced by the Taliban, the victim's family can practice Qisas - retaliation in kind- 'an eye for an eye'- or may pardon the convicted murderer even immediately before the execution. The Muslim scholars present at the execution publicly give this opportunity for pardon to the family. According to Jason Burke, who witnessed and reported on the execution: "The family of her victims have refused to forgive her…" see footnote 700 , see page 152 -- and see also e.g, # 2 & 7, Append. 19..

[53] See footnote 50, supra where source **B** says five months and source **A** says 2 years..

[54] See, eg, references on Taliban providing and maintaining centers to train women to be doctors and other health care providers at: pdf p. 7-9, ll. Background of "Women's Health and Human Rights in Afghanistan: A Population-Based Assessment "A Report by Physicians for Human Rights, Boston & Wash. DC, '01, [This is a is a strongly anti-Taliban report, well worth reading as an example of the sloppy work put out by otherwise reputable and well intentioned groups.][The original link is dead – the reptort with the same name now has a different pagination. See p 23 on healthcare.]

For more primary sources see Endnotes 20 to 20.5 in the endnotes section- [before index] See page 265-7

As for the burkas, it appears that, outside of areas like Kabul, where a substantial percentage of women had gotten used to dressing in western fashions, women went on dressing the way they had dressed for decades, if not centuries -- with their bodies, hair and faces more or less covered depending on their ethno-religious background and on where they were. In and around the home in the countryside, they most wore a simple headscarf. In towns, they were more covered up[55].

The English speaking, college educated women in Kabul -- who were often not only anti-Taliban but anti-religious -- were the people who were most adversely affected by the Taliban and were the most able to communicate their troubles to the Western Media. These women and their Russian speaking counterparts were not, in so many cases, innocent beleaguered secularists caught in a web of religious oppression. They were, quite often, the very people who had been doing their best for over a decade to undermine the cultural foundations of Islam in Afghanistan. It would have been remarkable, in this light, if the Taliban had just left them all alone.

While the educated women – including so many who had been collaborators[56] with the Russians -- were very adept at manipulating the media, the very traditional women -- who are the over-whelming majority of the women of Afghanistan -- were almost completely ignored.[57]

CHAPTER 3:

EXECUTIONS FOR ADULTERY UNDER THE TALIBAN

A very important byproduct of this initial investigation of the mistreatment of women was what I found about the executions of men and women convicted of adultery.

The usual image presented by the media and almost never contradicted is:

"Under the Taliban, who ruled Afghanistan from 1996 to 2001, women accused of adultery were stoned to death."[58]

The plain sense of this is that it was only necessary to accuse a woman of adultery and she would be stoned to death; that there was no judicial procedure to speak of; and, that the men involved in adultery were not punished. It's also assumed that this was very common - a Friday afternoon public entertainment for the religious fanatics who don't have TV or movie theaters.

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[55] One of the more well-known sources in Muslim society of the tradition of women covering their faces in public is from the reports collected by Abu Dawood [817-18 – 889CE] Book 10, Hadith # 1829. [some editions have different numbering]

Narrated Aisha [א]: "The riders would pass us while we were with the Messenger of Allah [ב] [in ihrām] [ג] When they got close to us, we would draw our outer cloak from our heads over our faces. When they passed by, we would uncover our faces. ____

א A wife of Muhammad & daughter of the first Caliph, Abu Bakr. ב an expression for Muhammad. ג A state of ritual purity in Islam. This expression doesn't appear in all sources – but is implied by some.

Still, there are cutural differences among the rural people as well:

"In UNDCP field work in eastern and northern Afghanistan, both women and children were seen actively involved in opium poppy cultivation in 1999 and subsequent years. This, however, was not the case in southern Afghanistan [where] women were rarely seen working outside the confines of the home due to the conservatism of the tribes in the area. Nonetheless, women there also contributed actively to the success of the harvest. Three good quality meals and tea are a standard part of the payment of itinerant harvesters. This is entirely in the hands of women and a major task given the size of the hired workforce at harvest time." UNDCP, *Afghanistan, Strategic Study #5, An Analysis of the Process of Expansion of Opium Poppy to New Districts in Afghanistan*, Nov. 1999, p. 14., cited in "the opium Economy 2003, pdf p 103, p 99

[56] Among the notable women who collaborated with the Russians was Two Star General, Sohaila Siddiq, MD. She studied medicine in Moscow, was fluent in Russian, became an Afghan Army General under Pres. Najibullah and chief surgeon of 400 bed Afghan Army Hospital. The Taliban sent her home. Women Wait To Lift Veil Of Silence; Suzanne Goldenberg meets formerly high-flying female workers from Kabul, forced out of their jobs by edicts of the ruling Taliban, The Guardian [Lond.] 12/ 27/96, p. 12.

The Taliban invited her to return to her job by early April '98. Barbara Crossette, p1 col 5, NYT, Apr 6, '98, & A Coalition Of Hope, J.Brown, et al. *Ms;* Spring '02; 12, 2; p 70. She became Min. of Pub. Health under Karzai. [US State Dpt., Oct. 8/02]

[57] SEE PART THREE: MAJOR DEFAMATIONS & SINS OF OMISSION

[58] Aug. 9/10 Time Magazine – See: APPENDIX 12. VIRULENT HATE SPEECH HIDDEN IN PLAIN SIGHT

What I found in the course of looking into the accusations of misogyny showed that this impression of the Taliban was plain nonsense. It also provided a very important insight into why the Taliban did not turn over Osama bin Laden.

The most attention getting case of execution for adultery under the Taliban was partly responsible for the reporter, John F. Burns of the New York Times, getting a Pulitzer Prize.[59-A] It involved the execution in Kandahar of a 40 year old woman with her 38 year old married stepson in late August of '96.[59-B] This story, which included notices of several other executions for adultery in Kandahar and elsewhere in Taliban controlled Afghanistan,[60-A] was published two months after the event and about a month after Kabul came under Taliban control.

It was followed 6 weeks later (12/14/'96)[60-B] by an AFP story that cited 3 males stoned to death in Kandahar and 4 males stoned to death in other Taliban controlled areas – all for adultery -- in the prior six weeks. No other wire services report mentioned any of these executions in this 6-week time frame.

It is likely that this AFP story is a garbled version of the Burns report, where people became men, men became "males" and 6 months became 6 weeks.

Another garbled story, by veteran AP Afghanistan reporter Kathy Gannon, dated 3/07/01, mentions two women hanged for adultery in Kandahar two weeks before[61]. Other wire service stories covering the same event – such as an AP report on 2/23/01-- say that the two women were executed for prostitution and "corrupting the society"[62]. The combination of attention getting and garbled reports may account for the widespread belief that the Taliban executed many people for adultery in Kabul[63].

Thus far, based on a LexisNexis wire service and NYT search, I found:

- No reported executions for adultery in Kandahar after '96; [but see prostitution cases]
- No executions for adultery by Taliban in Afghanistan after 10/02/00,

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59-A 1997, International Reporting, "for his courageous and insightful coverage of the harrowing regime imposed on Afghanistan by the Taliban." 10 Burns works:2/5-12/31/96; 8th is: Stoning of Afghan Adulterers: Some Go to Take Part, Others Just to Watch, NYT, N/3'96, Sun., Late Ed. – Finl,S1; p.18; C1 Kandahar, Afg., 10/30. _____

59-B When I first saw this story, I wondered why it was described as adultery – since the woman was called a widow and her husband was not mentioned. I thought that it was really some kind of incest – even though the man was not a biological son—and that in Islam this kind of relationship is called adultery. I had a sense that this was somewhat unjust – but I did not check it out. Nearly 15 years later, I received additional information--though I did not ask for it: A reputable scholar from the area of Afgh. wrote [8/'16] that the couple had admitted killing the woman's husband – who was also the stepson's father.[Req for permission to quote sent Jun/12/'17]

However, this is seemingly contradicted by the following excerpted Reuter story] [Excerpts] Afghan Stepmother, Son Stoned To Death For Incest July 11, 1996 PESHAWAR, Pakistan (Reuter) - An Afghan woman and her stepson were stoned to death for incest in the rebel- held southern Afghan town of Kandahar Thursday on the orders of an Islamic court, an Afghan official said. A spokesman for the official Information Center at Kandahar told Reuters by telephone the two convicts died shortly after spectators started throwing stones at them at central Eidgah, where Muslims hold prayer meetings. [...] The two were caught engaged in sexual intercourse several days ago and confessed their crime before Islamic judge Maulvi Said Mohammad, who issued the death sentence, the spokesman said" [End of Excerpts]Found at_____ [get Urdu version/needs further study.]

It's difficult to imagine how such an experienced, Pulitzer Prize winning reporter & the Reuter reporter could both have confused a confessed murder with adultery. However, we'll see other examples in this time frame of remarkable omissions & commissions by wire services, Burns - & his colleague J. Steele: incl. 1. False reports of the castration of former president, Najibullah & 2. Failure to report the primary source of funding of the Northern Alliance- unredeemable money printed in Russia. [See **Chapter 11**: Was The Former President Of Soviet Occupied Afghanistan Tortured, Castrated & Jeep-Dragged By The Talib.?; **Chapter 14a** Massoud & Co. Printing Money In Russia; **Part Three**: Major Defamations And Sins Of Omission]

60-A "The Muslim cleric who led the investigation that resulted in the stoning…[in Aug '96], Mohammed Wali, says the incident was at least the third stoning for adultery in the Kandahar Province, …, since the Taliban took power. Others have been reported in several of the 20 other provinces under Taliban control, …" [emph. added]

60-B AFP, "Seven Afghans stoned to death for adultery in six weeks", 350 words, Dateline: Karachi . This is the first story found in a LexisNexus search for Mullah Khaksar -a very questionable Taliban Minister & the source of the story. See footnote 177.D7-8

61 Austin American-Statesman,Tex. Mar/7/01, A Three-Day Holiday From Misery, Kathy Gannon, Amer.-Statsm'n. Int'n't'l Staff, p.A2,

62 AP Online, 2/23/01, "Taliban Hang Convicted Prostitutes", Internat. news, 215 words, KABUL. 2 other women & 10 men were publicly lashed for adultery in the same place and time – presumably at least some of these men were clients of those hanged and the flogged women did not have the required four witnesses to their act -- or "the act" was not "complete" to allow for their execution – together with their male partners.

63 This was written before I saw the systematic, TV based, anti-Taliban propaganda intended to make them look like terrible misogynyists. As an Orthodox Jew, I almost never watch TV – because it is full of immodesty, gratuitious violence & nonsense. See Ch.22a-c "MURDERING SCHOOL TEACHERS FOR TEACHING GIRLS"

• A total of 4-6 executions for adultery 1/01/97-9/11/01 by Taliban in all of Afghanistan – with equal numbers of men & women. [RECHECK]

The most important finding in this field was:

No reported executions for adultery in Kabul – a city of ~ million[64] - or Herat – a city of ~1/2 million -- during the entire Taliban Period.

The Taliban governed these two cities for five and six years, respectively. This gives a total of roughly eight million person-years under the Taliban. Both of these cities were relatively cosmopolitan – particularly Kabul. Hundreds of thousands of people in these cities had been strongly influenced by the Soviets and other Western – non–Moslem value systems. It is likely that adultery wasn't very rare.

The reason that there were no executions for adultery in these communities is not that there were no adulterers. It's also not because the Taliban were afraid to execute people for sex crimes – they hanged two women for prostitu-tion. It's because of the extremely high standard of evidence that was needed in their system of law to hand down a sentence of death.

They needed a trial in which four reliable male witnesses testified in court that they saw the two who've been accused, physically going at it – without breaking into their home.[65]

When the sophisticated 'big-city' adulterers of Kabul heard what happened in Kandahar, all they had to do to protect themselves was 'close the curtains'.[66]

This is very important. It shows the Taliban were real sticklers for Moslem Law -- not bloodthirsty killers[67] out to murder women-- or anyone else. It also gives us insight into why the Taliban didn't turn over Osama bin Laden.

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[64] Estimates of Kabul popul. = .75E6 -2E6, uncertain because of unknown numbers of refugees fleeing to and from the city. A door to door census carried out by Central Statistics Office of the Taliban in 1999-2000 showed 1.78E6 people.pdf p 94, par 3 & pdf p 85 "Kabul City Population Survey, Aug 2000. _____

[65] Based mostly on New York Times reporter John F. Burns Pulitzer prize winning article, cited above. If there were 3 or fewer witnesses, the witnesses were subject to flogging. From Quran , Sura 24. An–Nur _____

[66] Some say that executing anybody for adultery is bloodthirsty. They say that it's just wrong to execute adults for consensual relations – in this case relations between a man and a woman that are an expression of affection. Those who say this generally come from a sophisticated modern urban background – not the largely poor, agrarian society of Afghanistan.

In any family oriented society, adulterers are robbing the husband of his work -- work which is aimed in large measure to support the mother of the children. They are making the husband a slave to both adulterers. They're also undermining the confidence that non-adulterous spouses have in each other and they reduce the viability of the family and the society in general to support children. They're also creating a potential for incest – as a result of children not knowing who their father is. It's not a simple act of passion.

See Append 17-19 for cases of formal Taliban punishments.

[67] Some might say that any judicial death penalty for any crime in our day is not acceptable – particularly considering that Jewish courts in a sovereign Jewish community today are not allowed to hand down death penalties.

Nonetheless, - Rabbi Moshe ben Maimon , (1135-1204CE), one of our greatest post Talmudic authorities on Torah Law, writes:

> "A gentile who transgresses these seven commands [the 7 Laws of Noah] shall be executed by decapitation. For this reason, all the inhabitants of Shechem were obligated to die. Shechem kidnapped. They observed and were aware of his deeds, but did not judge him. [The story of Shechem is from Gen. 34:1-31]
>
> A gentile is executed on the basis of the testimony of one witness and the verdict of a single judge. No warning is required. Relatives may serve as witnesses. However, a woman may not serve as a witness or a judge for them."

From: Mishneh Torah, Sefer Shoftim, Melachim uMilchamot, Chapter 9 , Halacha 14. English translation at _____

CHAPTER 4:

EXECUTIONS FOR SODOMY[68]

See APPENDIX 17, for a table of reports of Taliban punishments for sodomy, etc

Up to this point the author's efforts here had been very informal – just following up on some of the more notable apparent contradictions in the media -- without any effort to do a thorough research job.[69] Still, the results were brought to the attention of one of the leaders of a local Ethical Culture Group in a very well-to-do part of NYC. This had been suggested by two women -- active members of the group. They were sure that their Leader would be very interested in these unusual findings.

As soon as this Leader heard "Taliban", however, he didn't want to hear anymore. He said they'd executed people for sodomy -- something that the author's informal research – not going back to much before the mid 2000 opium ban – had missed.[70]

The author then checked the Amnesty International Reports -- their annual books covering the human rights situations in nearly every country in the world -- going back to the Report for '96. A.I. reported that 5 men had been executed by the Taliban for sodomy in '98[71]. No executions for sodomy were mentioned by AI for other years

When these five cases were examined in detail, it revealed that the A.I. Report had omitted a very important fact in describing the first three to be executed: A.I.'s own detailed case report—published separately-- stated that they'd been accused of sodomy "with young boys" [72]

A more careful investigation --using the LexisNexis data base for wire service reports -- showed that, beginning with these first three, a total of at most ten people were executed after having been convicted by the Taliban of sodomy. All were subjected to the same form of execution – having a stone wall collapsed on top of them.

At least two -- including one from the first trio -- were reported to have survived their executions long enough to give statements proclaiming that their survival showed their innocence. All of these reports of executions took place within a 17 month period – from 2/98 to 6/99. There were no reports of executions or other punishments being meted out by the Taliban for sodomy after the 6/99 case.

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[68] For additional details of all stories of punishments for sodomy under the Taliban, see Appendix 17 & email to Prof. Barbara Crossette, Wed., September 15, 2004 12:56 AM, from vantran613@yahoo.com.

[69] This was written before most the research on adultery was carried out.

[70] Conversation with Curt Collier, Leader, Riverdale Yonkers Society for Ethical Culture, Bronx, NY 718-548-4445 __ Mr. Collier was described as "openly gay" by members of his Ethical Culture Society group.

[71] "At least 10 public executions were reported. They included five men convicted of "sodomy" and sentenced to death by being crushed by a wall."

[72] see Amnesty International." Execution by felling walls on the victims" at paragraph #3, part of a document of ~19kat this address:

What was particularly disconcerting was the way three of the four wire service reports on the execution of the first trio treated the story. UPI, AFP and AP all left out any mention of "young boys". Only the Australian Associated Press, citing Reuters, mentioned this detail[73].

With the exception of a single-source, AFP story for an execution in remote Jauzjan Province in June '99, there was only one story of a Taliban punishment for sodomy that clearly involved relations between consenting adults. It reported that the convicts had been beaten and embarrassed in public, with no reported maiming or execution.[74]

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[73] **A.** [Australian AP] copyright AAP Info. Serv. Pty. Ltd. AAP NEWSFEED, 2/26/98, Overseas News, 209 words, Headline: Asia: Afghans Survive Being Buried Alive For Sodomy, Islamabad, 2/25 Reuters - Three Afghan men convicted of sodomy survived an attempted execution in which they were buried alive for 30 minutes, a news agency reported today. The Afghan Islamic Press (AIP) said the head of the Taliban Islamic militia was among thousands of people who witnessed the punishment outside the southern town of Kandahar. Taliban supreme leader Mullah Mohammad Omar ordered the three to be left for half an hour under the rubble of a stone wall which was felled on top of them by a battle tank. Their lives would be spared if they survived.

Pakistan-based AIP said the men were found alive when the pile of stones was removed, and were taken to hospital to be treated for their injuries. Fazalur Rehman, Ahmad Shah and Abdul Qahir had all been convicted by an Islamic court of committing sodomy with young boys. [Emphasis added] Orthodox Afghan Islamic scholars believe a sodomite must be executed either by being pushed from a hill or by having a wall felled on top of him, Afghan sources in Pakistan said. The execution ceremony at Kotal Morcha, just north of Kandahar, may have been the first of its kind since the Taliban, which rules two-thirds of war-shattered Afghanistan, took power in 1996. REUTERS jnb [EMPHASIS ADDED]

B. Co. '98 Agence France Presse , 2/26/98 17:35 GMT,: International news, 347 words, HEADLINE: One survives Taliban death sentence for sodomy, KABUL, 2/26 (AFP) - A man sentenced to death for sodomy has survived an attempt to execute him by Afghanistan's Taliban militia, an official said late Thursday. The man was found alive under the rubble of a mud wall which had been pushed on top of him and two others sentenced to death on the same offense, the Taliban official at the militia's headquarters in southwestern Kandahar. The trio had remained buried under the debris of mud and brick wall for almost half an hour after which they were taken to a hospital in Kandahar where two of them died earlier Thursday, he said.

The accused were shifted to the hospital on the order of Taliban supreme leader Mullah Mohammad Omar who had witnessed the executions, the official added. Earlier the militia's Anis daily newspaper said: "Abdul Qadir from Sangin district of Helmand, Mohammad Shah and Fazelrahman who had committed the obscene act of buggery were publicly put under a wall after a verdict of the Shariat court and the Shariat punishment was thus applied to them." [Boldface added – no mention of "with young boys"] Under strict Islamic laws imposed in the two-thirds of Afghanistan held by the Taliban, the homosexual act of buggery is a crime punishable by death. "His eminence the Amirul-Mohimeen attended the function to give Shariat punishment to the three buggerers in Dasht-e Sufi area of Kandahar," the paper said…….[article truncated]……sas/sz/bl

[74] Co. '98 AAP Info. Serv. Pty. Ltd. ,AAP NEWSFEED, 4/30/98, Overseas News, 254 words, Headline: Asia: Taliban Publicly Beat Two Militia Homosexuals, Body:, Kabul, 4/29 AFP -

Two Taliban soldiers caught indulging in a homosexual act were publicly beaten and humiliated in the streets of the Afghan capital by fellow militia members, AFP witnessed today. The two culprits were spotted in a military unit in the north of the city indulging in homosexual intercourse earlier in the day and had to endure several hours of humiliating beatings, a Taliban soldier said. The accused were first tied up and driven around the city in the back of a pickup truck with their faces blackened by engine oil. … The badly-bruised alleged homosexuals were then driven to a Taliban base, pushed out of the car and thrown into a fountain for "a purifying bath" in front of tens of enthusiastic militiamen who joined in the beating.

[Article Truncated -- report further states that these two would probably be executed in the manner of the first three in the AFP story [see footnote 73 **B**, supra] but no reports of such executions appeared subsequently.]

This is consistent with an earlier report on how the Taliban would deal with sodomy. In a '97 interview with veteran foreign correspondent Jonathan Steele, the Governor of Kandahar stated that there were three types of punishment for sodomy under Sharia law and the Taliban preferred the most lenient. This involved blackening the convicts face with no execution or maiming[75].

It is also consistent with the situation in Saudi Arabia, where a LexisNexis search failed to turn up any executions for sodomy between consenting adults in a period from 1995 to 2004. Of 33 cases of execution for sodomy found during this period, all involved sodomy with boys or predatory sodomy of some kind. [LexisNexis wire service reports have been found by the author to be incomplete in this field. 8/22/05]

A possible explanation of the 17-month period of executions is that it centered upon a story of Mullah Omar, the head of the Taliban, trying to rid the Taliban army of young boys being used for sodomy[76].[77]

A report from AFP & AAP/Reuters, in Kabul, citing Radio Sharia, says 2 men, ages 22 & 18, were executed for sodomy in Herat on 3/23/98. The report cites the 3 executed for sodomy the previous month in Kandahar without noting "with young boys". Both groups were subject to the identical type of execution. Part of the radio broadcast was "indistinct" and perhaps obscuring ref. to predation.

It may be that when the BBC uses the term "buggery" it means sodomy with underage boys – as this is a common legal use of the term in the UK.

[75] **"Time Fails To Temper Taliban Zeal, Jonathan Steele in Kandahar looks at views on gay men" by: Jonathan Steele The Guardian (London), January 6, 1997, pg. 11, 1734 words, [Truncated]**

"We have a dilemma on this," admitted Mohammed Hassan, the governor of Kandahar, and one of the top Taliban mullahs … "…One group of scholars believes you should take these people to the top of the highest building in the city, and hurl them to their deaths," "…the other school of thought {is that}. "… you dig a pit near a wall somewhere, put these people in it, then topple the wall so that they are buried alive." The mullah …said a third group of scholars argued that homosexuals should merely be put on public display for a few hours with blackened faces. This was the Taliban's favoured solution. [boldface added] "We have punished people in this way in Kandahar," he said."Homosexuality is a very big crime… [truncated]…" Kabul Diary, page 13.

In contrast to this, those convicted of predatory sodomy in Saudi Arabia – the 33 men mentioned above -- all had their heads cut off. This suggests that the legal/traditional sources for the interpretation of Sharia Law under the Taliban were not coming from that area.

[76] **Co. '98 AP Worldstream, 10/29/98; 02:56 ET, Internat, news, 435 words, "Taliban leader wants young boys off the battlefield," Kathy Gannon.**

[77] **There was a subsequent accusation that the Taliban were using children as young as 14 on the battle field. "In an annual report of the war-ravaged country, Annan … cited the religious schools in Pakistan as the source for new Taliban fighters some as young as 14." AP, 11/29/99, "War, drugs and massive rights violations conspire on Afghan civilians",Nicole Winfield, UN.**

This was followed by a UN investigation and repudiation of the child soldiers claim "UN and relief workers say the child-warrior issue is a prime example of what the Taliban sees as …outsiders too eager to believe sensational reports. "There was a high level of anger and frustration from the authorities here," says Erick de Mul, the UN humanitarian coordinator for Afghanistan, who toured front-line Taliban positions north of Kabul to see for himself last week. He says he found no evidence of combatants younger than 21 years of age. Taliban leader Mullah Mohammed Omar issued an edict almost a year ago against the use of child soldiers, saying it was un-Islamic. Observers with long Afghanistan experience say they rarely see Taliban combatants under 17, and the movement has set up commissions to punish commanders who recruit youths.

CHAPTER 5.

WHY DIDN'T THE TALIBAN TURN OVER BIN LADEN?

So why didn't the Taliban turn over bin Laden -- either in connection with the embassy bombings in '98 or the attacks of '01?

> If much of their strength --- in reality and in the eyes of the people -- came from their careful adherence to Moslem traditional law, they could not turn over popular (and well-armed) people like OBL and his close associates without a public judicial proceeding that satisfied both the letter and spirit of the law that they lived by. [78]

The situation was even more difficult: OBL and his associates had been a real help to the Afghan people in their years of struggle against the Russians and their associates.

It may be that the US had no evidence against OBL that would stand up in a court -- Moslem or US. Witnesses might be afraid to testify, etc. This sometimes occurs in the US in the case of organized criminals. It might be well known that certain leading criminals are responsible for ordering murders but nobody is available to testify against them. So, the government looks for some other type of crime -- such as tax evasion -- where the case can be proven with a less stringent standard of evidence. Many leading organized criminals have been jailed on such relatively light charges where the heavier charges -- such as murder -- could not be proven in court[79] [80].

There is also something very important to understand about the Taliban's view of their court system. They believe that there are two systems of courts in the world: The Court in Heaven and the human courts.

In a Muslim country, the human courts must abide by the rules of evidence established by Muslim scholars based on their religious beliefs. This means that the courts of Human Beings will often not be able to determine who is guilty of a crime and they will have to let the guilty party go free.[81] However, it's their belief that the Court in Heaven always finds those who are actually guilty and punishes them – while exonerating the innocent. This is a basic religious belief and supersedes what often appears to be the case in "reality". Sometimes, in"reality" as far as we can see, the guilty are "getting away with murder". It is a very basic Muslim belief that regardless of appearances, the guilty will be fully punished for their offenses – in Heaven by the Heavenly Court[82].

The result of this belief system is that the Taliban would not bend the rules to get rid of OBL. If they gave him up to the US without an actual trial under Muslim Law[83], they'd have

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[78] **A.** This was also the view of Taliban advisor, Ms. L. Helms, on WBUR radio program, Apr 5/'01 p174-5 2/05/02 _____

B. As of 8/28/06, bin Laden had not been indicted for anything in connection with the 9/11 attacks –but was wanted and indicted for his part in the bombing of the US embassies ibn Kenya and Tanzania. "Bin Laden, Most Wanted For Embassy Bombings?" Dan Eggen, Wash. Post, 8/28/06

[79] "Testimony must be from at least two witnesses, and preferably free Muslim male witnesses, who are not related parties and who are of sound mind and reliable character; testimony to establish the crime of adultery, or zina must be from four direct witnesses." The Conflict Within Islam: Expressing Religion Through Politics, Israr Hasan, 2011
[Get better reference on this]

[80] The case of Al Capone— a notorious gangster who ordered murders but was jailed for tax evasion -- is given here: _____

[81] It's instructive to note that under Texas Law at least 2 demonstrably innocent men were convicted & executed in recent years:

a. Carlos DeLuna, was executed 8 Dec/89, for a brutal knife murder of a woman, while the guilty man, a police informant, wasn't even interviewed.

"The wrong Carlos: how Texas sent an innocent man to his death" E. Pilkington, The Guardian, 15/5/12. _____

Los Tocayos Carlos, J. S. Liebman, et al, Columbia Human Rights Law Rev., #3,v.43, spring '12, 451 pp _____

b. Cameron Todd Willingham was wrongfully convicted & executed on 2/17/04 for arson murder of his 3 children, though it was known before his execution that there was no evidence of arson. 'Cameron Todd Willingham: Wrongfully Convicted and Executed in Texas' _____

c. "4.1%... is a conservative estimate of the proportion of false conviction among death sentences in the United States." Samuel R. Gross, et al. 'Rate of false conviction of criminal defendants who are sentenced to death' Proc. Nat. Acad. of Sci.,USA, PNAS 5/20/14,. ____

[82] "Court of Law" comp with "Just and Supreme Court of Allah" citing:"Sahih Al-Bukhari Hadith 9.281 Narrated by Um Salama" ____

[83] As late as the report of the Secretary General of the UN for 8/17/01 "…on the position of the Taliban regarding the surrender of Osama bin Laden …the Taliban continue to insist that any trial should take place in Afghanistan or be under sharia law…" par 57, p 10, A/55/1028–S/2001/789 The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, _____

RESULTS OF THE BOMBING OF THE ALFRED P. MURRAH FEDERAL BUILDING IN OKLAHOMA CITY – EXACTLY TWO YEARS AFTER THE END OF THE U.S.FED. GOV. WACO, TEXAS/ DAVID KORESH SIEGE.

PHOTO BY: STAFF SERGEANT PRES-TON CHASTEEN

looked like they're breaking God's law. It would also have been clear they had done it in response to bullying and bribery[84].

For the Taliban leaders it would've been like being bullied or bribed into going into a public square and eating a pig's nose – a desecration of God before the entire world. They wouldn't do it.

Perhaps, if the US leadership had been more patient in this case -- more respectful of traditional Moslem Law and the special situation of the Taliban -- they could have come up with an effective way of preventing OBL and his crew from doing more harm.[85] [86]

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[84] It was suggested by someone attending my first book talk, that just as the Taliban:

a. "brought up tanks" in their anti-opium effort, [see App. 2] &,

b. hung Najibullah straight from his sanctuary in the UN compound without a trial [see APP. 18 & CHAPTER 11: Was The Former President Of Soviet Occupied Afghanistan Tortured, Castrated & Jeep-Dragged By The Taliban?], so they could've been "practical" with OBL & just made him 'disappear'.

However, in

a. Taliban staff had been killed by those at whom the tanks were aimed – & the tanks weren't fired; in
b. Najibullah was a well-known mass murderer – beyond question – not based on a video confession.
c. OBL had hundreds of heavily armed, jihadi supporters.

It would've taken a major, highly visible operation to get him – perhaps reminiscent of the Waco/David Koresh raid.

[In this, Feb –Apr. '93 US Gov. initiated action taken on the basis of a local Sherriff's office report of apparently illegal/suspicious possession of a large number hand-grenade casings, explosive materials that might be used to fill them, & sounds of machinegun fire in conjunction with accounts of serious child abuse, ~82 people – incl. 16 children under 10 yrs-- were killed. It was followed, 2 yrs to the day from the end of the deadly siege assault, by the Oklahoma City Federal Bldg bombing that left 168 dead, 600+ injured & ≥$1E 9[2015$] damages] [see, e.g. 7/19/'95 Congr. Testimony, Waco Investigation Day 1 Part 2, Mclellan Cnty [Waco area] Sherriff's Dept., Lt. Gene Barber, bomb technician, on grenade casings & explosive materials 1:51 [1:54-6 & 3:05-6]; ATF agent David Aguilera on rept of machinegun fire [3:51-6] ; 14 yr. old Kiri Jewell & father, David Jewell, on child abuse, 1:15-2:55 [of 4:25:00 video]____ _____] "Activities Of Federal law Enforcement Agencies Toward The Branch Davidians, pt 1 hearings, July 19, 20, 21, & 24, 1995, 1052 p., 48 MB _____ & pt 2 JULY 25, 26, & 27, 1995, 620 p, 30MB, _____ US. GPO, '96 [see also: The Ashes of Waco: An Investigation, Dick J. Reavis, '95 & '98 __]

Any such action to get OBL would've likely resulted in scores of deaths -- all outside of Sharia Law. It wasn't the Taliban way. It would've been seen by Muslims as 'eating a pig's nose in public'.

[85] The Taliban ambassador to Pakistan, Abdul Salam Zaeef, reiterated three possible solutions in early November, 2000:

Q: A Taliban official was on Sunday [5 Nov.] quoted as saying that Afghanistan would not expel Osama bin Laden, even if evidence linked him to the 1998 bombings of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. Can you confirm your movement's position on this?

A: We offered three solutions to solve the Osama question.

Firstly, if the Americans produce evidence and proof, they should hand that evidence over to the Supreme Court of Afghanistan and Osama will be tried by the Court. Secondly, religious scholars from Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia and from a third or fourth country could come together as a combined group and decide the solution to the Osama question. They should serve this decision collectively. The third option would be for the OIC [the Organisation of the Islamic Conferen.] to monitor and oversee these activities.

Furthermore, we also said that if there was no evidence and these scholars did not reach a solution to this question, we would contain and supervise Osama's activities within Afghanistan, safeguarding his promise that he would not use the territory of Afghanistan for activities against any third country.

In addition, if there were a fourth solution that did not violate our rules, Islamic rules, we would be ready to solve the issue through this means. Maybe there are some people who do not know the official position of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, or do not know this issue properly. That being the case, their assertions and their views are not credible and have no validity." AFGHANISTAN: Interview with Taliban Ambassador Abdul Salam Zaeef, ISLAMABAD, 8 November 2000 (IRIN), humanitarian news and analysis, a service of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. _____

[86] There are two interesting contrasts that can be made here:

A. the UN sanctions for the not turning over OBL vs. the UN giving sanction to Najibullah;

B. Torah Law when a city is asked to turn over one specific man or suffer annihilation of the whole city.

We will discuss these, in turn below:

A Najibullah & his immediate associates were wanted for mass murder of Muslims but were given sanctuary by the UN in its Kabul compound from 4/17/92-9/27/96 –~41/2 years.

The night the Taliban entered Kabul in 9/96, they arrested Najibullah -taking him from the UN compound without permission. They executed him & his brother in the manner reserved for notorious criminals - hanging in a public place for days. The UN cried foul—that their inviolate territory had been entered without permission.

The UN sanctions themselves [resolutions 1267 (1999) & 1333 (2000)] are in effect an extra-legal, Kafkaesque, power based system for declaring a person guilty & punishing them without ordinary means of proof of guilt or of redress.

"[T]he [UN] 1267 Committee regime [is] a denial of basic legal remedies and [is] untenable under the principles of international human rights. There is nothing in the listing or de-listing procedure that recognizes the principles of natural justice or that provides for basic procedural fairness....The accuser is also the judge." Justice Zinn, in Abousfian Abdelrazik vs. The Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Attorney General of Canada, Ottawa, Ont., Jun/4/09, pdf p 22. The accused was returned to his home in Canada and removed from the UN Sanctions list after a 7 year ordeal. http://decisions.fct-cf.gc.ca/fc-cf/decisions/en/item/56734/index.do

B Cases in Jewish Tradition –

Rabbi Moshe ben Maimon – משה בן מימון RaMBaM -[Moses Maimonides 1135-1204] discusses this in his מִשְׁנֶה תּוֹרָה Mishneh Torah / ספר יד החזקה -- "Book of the Strong Hand", Sefer HaMada [The Book of Knowledge] , sect. Hilchos Yisodei HaTorah [The Laws [which are] the Foundations of the Torah], Ch. 5, Halacha 5: [It should be clear that there are some differences of opinion & nuances on what follows & a competent Torah authority should be consulted – if time permits. [Try to deterimine applicable Moslem Law.]

"If gentiles tell [a group of] women: "Give us one of you to defile. If not, we will defile all of you," they should allow themselves all to be defiled rather than give over a single Jewish soul to [the gentiles].

Similarly, if gentiles told [a group of Jews]: "Give us one of you to kill. If not, we will kill all of you," they should allow themselves all to be killed rather than give over a single soul to [the gentiles].

However, if [the gentiles] single out [a specific individual] and say: "Give us so and so or we will kill all of you," [different rules apply]: If the person is obligated to die like Sheva ben Bichri [1], they may give him over to them. Initially, however, this instruction is not conveyed to them. If he is not obligated to die, they should allow themselves all to be killed rather than give over a single soul to [the gentiles]." [copied from the English translation of Eliyahu Touger _____

1. Where Serach bas Asher councils a small city to turn over a man, Sheva ben Bichri, who is wanted by King David for leading an insurrection against the King. It is clear to everyone that the man is guilty – and the city in which he is hiding does not support him. The city follows the council of Serach bas Asher and the man is turned over and executed. [Midrash Rabbah, Genesis, Vayigash XCIV-9 Soncino 3rd ed p877-9 1983]

2. Yehoshua ben Levi & Ullah ben Kisher [give details…] -- and the comment of Eliyahu HaNavi [give sources]

3. Yoachim and Nebuchadnezzar -- where Yoachim had rebelled against the Nebuchadnezzar [give details and sources.]

A key element in these stories appears to be that the person requested is known to be guilty by the community and other people who may not be guilty are not killed in the process of getting the one requested person.

In the case of OBL, it was not clear that he was actually guilty – at least in the case of the East African Embassy bombings-- and getting him would almost certainly have involved killing large numbers of others. Further he was only the first person on a list of people who were to be turned over.

CHAPTER 6.

THE 9/11 COMMISSION

On 3/23/04, the staff of the 9/11 Commission made a public presentation that included a statement that Mullah Omar of the Taliban is "an illiterate leader who was unconcerned about commerce with the outside world."[87]

The author checked by phone with a leading US government expert on the languages and cultures of Afghanistan -- Spozhmai Maiwandi, then head of the Pashtu language service of Voice of America [88]. She had been on the job there for over two decades and had had more than one interview with Mullah Omar. She made it clear that, as far as she understood, the Taliban leader was certainly not illiterate in his

[87] **pdf page 10,** par. 4 of: http://www.911commission.gov/hearings/hearing8/staff_statement_5.pdf

[88] Her comment when, early in this investigation she heard my analysis of the Taliban, was

כָּל הַכָּבוֹד

[Cited on the cover.]

She is also apparently the anonymous translator/and verifier in the conversation with a State Department official in August of 1998 [see footnote 94] and the interviewer in "MULLAH OMAR IN HIS OWN WORDS" -- given in Appendix 4

native language and that he had a very clear, brief and direct writing style.[89]

The same sentence of that above mentioned 9/11 Commission staff document also states that Mullah Omar was "unconcerned about commerce with the outside world." Are we to suppose then that the well-known efforts of the Taliban to get Unocal and Bridas to build a pipeline were done without the approval of Mullah Omar?[90] Are we also to

[89] **A**. "[A}ccording to an Iranian journalist who met him … [in 1996]"… " he claims to have learnt the Koran by heart. Although Mullah Omar is a Pashtun from south-west Afghanistan, he spoke Farsi (the Persian language spoken by educated Afghans in Kabul and other cities) very well and with an Iranian accent, and appeared well-read." Jan. 4, '97 The Guardian, London, Taliban's Moderate Fundamentalist; Jonathan Steele in Kandahar , Pg. 14, 1494 words.

B. A 5,400 word official biography of Mullah Omar [His Excellency, the Amir-ul-Momineen, Mullah Mohammad Umar 'Mujahid' (may Allah safeguard him)] was pub. Sat., 4/4/15 in commem. of the 19th anniversary of the historical gathering and selection of Ameer-ul-Momineen on 16th Aries 1375 AH (solar) i.e. 4/4/96 in Kandahar. _____

C. A new book on the last years of Mullah Omar, "Op Zoek Naar De Vijand (Searching for an Enemy)" by Bette Dam,[Reuters, Kabul, Mar.11'19]_____ an independent journalist covering Afghanistan, [pub.in Dutch 2/21/'19], has some interesting- but usually as yet unverified- details on this period. In an English summary of her book, entitled, "The Secret Life of Mullah Omar" _____ pub. in the same time frame, she writes:

> "In December 2018, after two years of trying, I was able to meet a man with glasses and a long grey beard named Abdul Jabbar Omari. Jabbar Omari was Mullah Omar's bodyguard from the moment he vanished in Kandahar until his death in 2013, and has been in N.D.S. [National Directorate of Security primary intelligence agency of Afghanistan A.S.A.] "protective" custody since 2017.[p7]… Since he spent most of his time reading or reciting the Quran, Mullah Omar started speaking classical Arabic to his companion, who normally spoke Pashto with him. Jabbar Omari believed that Mullah Omar had reached the status of wali—in the local Sufi tradition, someone who has special spiritual access to God and receives messages from Him. "Mullah Omar tried to write these revelations down," Jabbar Omari recalled. "But, he told me, they are special, and they are not easy to write." According to Jabbar Omari's description, it seems that Mullah Omar created his own language, one that was difficult to decipher. (A more mundane explanation might be that Mullah Omar simply wasn't able to write well; before 9/11, he mostly signed paperwork others had written for him.) Either way, according to Jabbar Omari, he now filled four thick note-books in this language, which Omari only discovered after his death and gave to his son Mullah Yaqub."[p15].

Jabbar Omari was so close to Mullah Omar but only discovered these 4 volumes after his death?! I hope someone is in a position to publish them – unless Mullah Omar specified that they were not to be published.

[90] Ismail Khan– who fled to Iran when his base in Herat was taken by the Taliban, said: "The oil companies gambled badly when they backed the Taliban. If they send the pipeline through Herat they will have to build a checkpoint at every metre, otherwise we will blow it up" The Independent,Lond. 4/26/97, Warriors muster to fight the Taliban, James Fergusson, p 14. This suggests how much Iran and its supporters were opposed to the Taliban to prevent a pipeline from going through Afghanistan.

a. In Drawing a Route, Bad Blood Flows; Varying Agendas Bear on Routes Series: PIPE DREAMS: The Struggle for Caspian Oil Series Number: 2/3:[FINAL Edition] David B. Ottaway, Dan Morgan. Wash. Post Wash., D.C.:Oct 5/'98. p. A0;

b. Pipeline Dreams: How Two Firms' Fight For Turkmenistan Gas Landed in Texas Court --- Cultures Clash When Rivals Woo Leaders Unfamiliar With the Art of the Deal --- Frisbees and Mullah Beards , By Hugh Pope. Wall Street Journal (Eastern Edition). New York, N.Y.:Jan 19, 1998. p. A1

c. The TAPI Natural Gas Pipeline: Status & Source of Potential Delays, R. G. Palau, NATO Civil-Military Fusion Centre, 2/ 12, ___

This last report cites Afghanistan, the TAPI Pipeline, and Energy Geopolitics Tues., 23 March 2010 00:00, John Foster , *IAGS Journal of Energy Security* _____

"The US has promoted the TAPI pipeline since the 1990s. When the Taliban was governing Afghanistan, two consortia vied for the right to take on the project, one led by Unocal (an American firm) and the other by Bridas (an Argentinean firm). The US government supported the Unocal consortium. US negotiators participated in the Six-plus-Two conferences (the six countries bordering Afghanistan plus the US and Russia) from 1997 to 2001. The aim was to convince the Taliban to form a government of national unity.

At the time, the Taliban controlled 90 percent of Afghanistan but not the area held by the Afghan Northern Alliance. Unocal testified to Congress that the pipeline "cannot begin construction until an internationally recognized Afghanistan government is in place. For the project to advance, it must have international financing, government-to-government agreements and government-to-consortium agree-ments." The Bush Administration urged the Taliban regime to form a government

suppose that former Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, was mistaken when she stated in her presentation "the only thing the Taliban desperately wanted [was] international recognition."? [91] They wanted the international recognition so that, among other things, the pipeline contractor could more easily get insurance. Without such insurance, the contractor -- whoever it was – wouldn't build.

This section was first drafted, August 4. '04, 4 months after the 9/11 staff report and about a week after the 9/11 Commission's Final Report.[92] That Final Report did not appear to contain any suggestion that Mullah Omar is an illiterate. He's described as being "reclusive" – though the only evidence of this is that he refused to meet with some non-Moslems. He did meet in person with the Ambassador of China to Pakistan and Assistant Secretary General Francesc Vendrell, special representative of UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan[93]. He also spoke by telephone with US officials[94]. On p. 251 of the Report, he and the Taliban leadership are described as being opposed to attacking the US.

> Despite 288 mentions of the Taliban in the report, there is also apparently no mention of their success in eradicating opium growing, let alone how they did it. This might have made it clear that Afghanistan under their governance was certainly not a "failed state".

The idea of what a state should look like – modeled on the states that make up the UN -- is, however, far different from the Islamic Program of the Taliban. The result was that even after their phenomenal opium poppy eradication program, many were so strongly attached to such conventional thinking that they still failed to recognize the Taliban's very effective system of governance.

The following is an example of such a failure within the UN itself – 6 weeks after the UN's preliminary results of the Taliban opium poppy ban were published.

"Because of the many years of fighting, almost all institutions of governance

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of national unity that would include the northern tribes. Bridas took a different approach—they negotiated separately with different tribes. The president of Bridas spent eight months visiting tribes along the pipeline route and reportedly had secured their cooperation for the venture. Negotiations with the Taliban broke down in July 2001, just before the attacks of September 11."

[EMPHASIS ADDED]. This report makes no mention of the negotiations being shelved as a result of the sanctions imposed on the Taliban in connection with the bin Laden affair. It also doesn't give the name of Bridas' President & Chair., Carlos Bulgheroni, who personally handled the negotiations with the Taliban. He told Ahmed Rashid in interviews before 2000:

> "I met with all the leaders, Ismael Khan in Herat, Burhanuddin Rabbani and Masud in Kabul, Dostum in Mazar and the Taliban in Kandahar. I was very well received everywhere because the Afghans understood they needed to rebuild the country and they needed foreign investment"

p 159, Taliban: Islam, Oil And The New Great Game In Central Asia I.B.Tauris, 2002 - 276 pages First published in 2000. Updated after 9/11/ 2001.]

[91] par 5, pdf p. 8 of _____ The Taliban, represented by Mola Mohammad Rabbani, president of the caretaker council of the Islamic State of Afghanistan, had appealed for international recognition directly to Kofi Annan when he was elected Sec. Gen of the UN in Dec. '96. He asked that Kofi Annan "resolve the question of Afghanistan's seat in the UN on the basis of the realities in Afghan society and on the basis of accepted international norms, and to hand it over to the newly established Islamic State of Afghanistan which is the true heir [as heard] and the real embodiment of the will of the people."

BBC Summary of World Broadcasts1/1/97, Taleban leader asks UN Secretary-General to resolve UN membership issue,: Source: Radio Voice of Shari'ah, Kabul, in Pashto 1500 gmt 30/12/96,FE/D2806/A,

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[92] http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf. The report was issued in late July.

[93] See footnote 137-D

[94] The officials were US State Department, Director for Pakistan, Afghanistan, & Bangladesh, South Asian Bureau(97-98), Michael E. Malinowski, & Spozmai Maiwandi, Chief of the Pashto Service, of the Voice of America, both, 8/22/'98. http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB134/Doc%202.pdf

have been destroyed. Afghanistan does not have an effective government, constitution, rule of law or independent judiciary. The Islamic courts and religious police enforce Taliban's interpretation of Islamic law and punishment. Civil institutions are largely non-existent[95] and policies and laws vary, depending on the region and the local commanders. Taliban's edicts are not evenly enforced throughout the areas under its control. …The absence of a central government capable of developing policies and guidelines for the social and economic development of the country has had devastating effects on its population. The governance environment in Afghanistan today is defined by continuing war. As a result, virtually no domestic resources are marshalled *[sic]* for the purpose of organized relief, rehabilitation or reconstruction. *The annual budget, at $70.9 million, is equivalent to approximately 0.9 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP). This means that Afghanistan allocates a smaller percentage of its national income to central government expenditure than any other country reporting in the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Human Development Report."* [emphasis added][96] Words in italics from Semple, UN Dec. 2000, p16 _____

The assassination of Masoud prior to the 9/11 attacks -- usually seen as bin Laden's gift to the Taliban – can also be seen as payback by bin Laden for Massoud's involvement in US attempts to kidnap or kill him. [97]

"In February 1999,[CIA Dir. George] Tenet sought President Clinton's authorization to enlist Massoud and his forces as partners…thePresident…[agreed] expressing a preference for capture but accepting the possibility that Bin Ladin could not be brought out alive.[98] [pdf p. 157]

"Massoud appeared committed to helping the United States collect intelligence on Bin Ladin's activities and whereabouts and agreed to try to capture him if the opportunity arose."[pdf p 160]

"[I]n December 1999…Massoud had offered to stage a rocket attack against Bin Ladin's Derunta training complex [99]. In the spring of 2000, …discussions took

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[95] By this account, the mosques that play such an important role in Muslim society are not counted as civil institutions. Local business /market organizations also don't count.

For a more accurate account of Afgan Society in general, see Afghanistan: The Mirage of Peace, Chris Johnson, Jolyon Leslie, 2004 , p73-75. This has an important discussion of the differences in perspective between traditional Afghans with family and community based sense of obligations and "rights" with the Western, individualist Human Rights.

[96] p4 , par 18 of "The situation of women and girls in Afghanistan, Addendum to: Follow-up to and implementation of the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, Report of the Secretary-General, Commission on the Status of Women", Forty-fifth session, Economic and Social Council, UN, 25 January 2001, E/CN.6/2001/2/Add.1, _____

[97] This is also noted in AN ENEMY WE CREATED 2012 p 208, "Bin Laden, however, regarded Massoud as his own natural enemy. It was well known, for example, that Massoud was running sophisticated intelligence operations throughout Afghanistan and that the CIA had tasked him with gathering information about bin Laden and his activities, as well as the activities of Arabs and other foreigners in Afghanistan."

[98] Footnote 172 in book. Richard interview (12/12/'03).

[99] Footnote 100 in book."A good account of the episode is found in Steve Coll, *GhostWars:The Secret History of the CIA,Afghanistan, and bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001* (Penguin, 2004),pp. 487–491; see also ibid.,pp. 495–496, 502–503, 517–519; Richard interview (Dec. 11, 2003). "Richard" told us the attack had already occurred when CIA headquarters heard about it;"within this building, they were breathless," he remarked.The CIA concern was apparently over possible casualties and whether, by sharing intelligence with Massoud on Bin Ladin's possible location, the CIA might have violated the assassination ban.Tenet did not recall the incident, saying it was no doubt just "a blip" on his screen within the context of the millennium alerts. George Tenet interview (Jan. 22, 2004).The incident was, however, noticed by the NSC counterterrorism staff, which pointedly asked to be kept in the loop in the future.NSC memo,"Review of Terrorism Alert and Lessons Learned," Jan. 3, 2000 (draft)."

place in Washington between U.S. officials and delegates sent by Massoud.[[100]101]

The Americans agreed that Massoud should get some modest technical help so he could work on U.S. priorities—collecting intelligence on and possibly acting against al Qaeda. But Massoud wanted the United States both to become his ally in trying to overthrow theTaliban and to recognize that they were fighting common enemies. Clarke and Cofer Black, the head of the Counterterrorist Center, wanted to take this next step. [[101]102]

In the meantime, the CIA continued to work with its tribal assets [see *TRODPINT program*] in southern Afghanistan. In early August,[10, 2000] the tribals reported an attempt to ambush Bin Ladin's convoy as he traveled on the road between Kabul and Kandahar city—their first such reported interdiction attempt in more than a year and a half. But it was not a success. According to the tribals' own account, when they approached one of the vehicles, they quickly determined that women and children were inside and called off the ambush. Conveying this information to the NSC staff, the CIA noted that they had no independent corroboration for this incident, but that the tribals had acted within the terms of the CIA's authorities in Afghanistan.[[102]105] [pdf p 206]
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-911REPORT/pdf/GPO-911REPORT.pdf

On pdf page 267 of the 9/11 "Final Report", the Commission shows the clear link in the mind of the OBL between Israeli politician, Ariel Sharon, going on the Temple Mount and the timing of the attack. Ultimately it came almost exactly one year on the Moslem and Jewish calendars from the day Sharon went on the Temple Mount with about 1,000 policemen – ignoring the standing warnings of our leading rabbis that going on the Temple Mount without ritual purification is a violation of its sanctity[103].



"The Afghan Taliban have released a striking new picture of late founder Mullah Omar from his days as a religious student, the only known image of the reclusive leader before he lost his right eye in battle. The picture was taken while Mullah Omar was a student at a madrassa in Kandahar, an official said. Photo: Islamic Emirate Of Afghanistan A senior Taliban official who sent AFP the picture said it was originally a black-and- white image that was later colourised." Rare new picture surfaces of Taliban founder Mullah Omar, AFP , Oct 12/'15The Express Tribune World
https://tribune.com.pk/story/971589/rare-new-picture-surfaces-of-taliban-founder-mullah-omar/

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[100] **Footnote 101 in book "…Massoud's representatives also met with Clarke, the State Department's Michael Sheehan, and CIA senior managers in Washington. CIA briefing materials,"DDO Update,"May 22, 2000."**

[101] **Footnote 102 in book. "On Black and Clarke's positions, see Cofer Black interview (Dec. 9, 2003);Roger Cressey interview (Dec. 15, 2003). On reasons for caution, see, e.g., Strobe Talbott interview (Jan. 15, 2004)."**

[102] **Footnote 105 in book "The alleged attempt was reported on August 10, 2000; see CIA memo, Bonk to McCarthy and Clarke, "Attempted Interdiction of Suspect Bin Ladin's Convoy,"Aug. 11,2000. For doubts as to whether the tribals made this attempt, see Cofer Black interview(Dec.9/'03);Richard interview(Dec. 11/'03)."**

[103] **Ariel Sharon went on the Temple Mt 9/28/00. Jewish Calendar +Elul 28, 5760. , 9/11/01 Jewish Calendar = Elul 23, 5761.**

CHAPTER 7:

PERSECUTION OF MISSIONARIES UNDER THE TALIBAN[104]

THIS CHAPTER IS IN THE PROCESS OF BEING RESEARCHED.

The Taliban targeted missionaries and put several Christian Missionaries on trial[105]. If found guilty under their version of Sharia law, they could have been executed.[106] None were. For example:

> "The Taliban accused [Mary] MacMakin of spying and trying to convert Muslims to Christianity" After a brief detention, the 71 year old woman who had worked as an aid worker for years, was forced out of the country, leaving on a Red Cross plane for Pakistan. [107]

At first pass – and before detailed research has been carried out - it appears that these persecutions by the Taliban were aimed at frightening missionaries away from Afghanistan rather than actually harming them.

The term 'Missionaries', both under the Taliban and in the world at large, covers a broad range. There are those who promote traditional religions -- like Christianity and Islam[108]. There are also those who try to spread secular 'godless' social programs – like nationalism, democracy and communism[109]. Most have one tactic in common: they enter communities with an eye to gaining converts by offering a variety of free or heavily subsidized services to people who are often desperately poor. Among the most common of these is schools for young children. They're not so much arguing their cause as they're bribing the people and stealing the children from the traditions of their parents.

> "In the early days of the great burgeoning of the aid industry in the 1970s, many American evangelical groups, who became known as the Rice Christians, would only give out cereals in Asia to those who would agree to enter Bible schools." [110]

Close to a century before, in Jerusalem, wealthy Jewish mission-aries targeted the children of very poor religious Jewish families. They offered free school and free food at the school – but the schools did not teach the religious values that the parents wanted. They were often financed by non-religious Jews and aimed at steering and stealing the children away from their parents[111].

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[104] I recognized the need to include this chapter after participating in two events with Prof. Dr. H. Bielfeldt, UN Special Rapporteur On Freedom Of Religion Or Belief, Oct. 2012.

[105] 'Aid agency evangelists walk a fine line' Christopher Kremmer Sydney Morning Herald Austral., Aug. 7/'01, Late Ed., International News; p. 8. About the arrest of 24 people – including 8 foreign aid/missionary worker of Shelter Now International – for spreading Christianity in Afghanistan.

[106] "Under the Taliban's strict view of Islam a maximum penalty of death is imposed on Afghan Muslims who convert to another religion and on anyone who encourages them to do so" Fed: Diplomats still await visas to visit arrested Aussies, by Karen Polglaze, AAP NEWSFEED, Aug. 9, '01.[There's no death penalty for converts if conversion is seen by the courts to have been under duress.] The fall of the Taliban resulted in the release of the 8 foreigners -- unharmed. International Aid Workers Finally Free After Months Under Taliban Control. Christiane Amanpour,et al.11/15/01, CNN Live At Daybreak 06:00.

[107] 'Taliban Agree to Let Women Return to Work' AP,NYT, 7/13/00, Late Ed., Final, s. A; p 5; c.1; Foreign Desk , ISLAMABAD, 7/12

[108] Jews don't proselytize except to other Jews & teach about the 7 Laws of Noah to non-Jews. See footnote 2.

[109] Some call these secular programs 'Civil Idolatry'.

[110] 'Missionaries Must Stop Preaching, Three diplomats hoping to speak to the Chief Justice at Kabul's; Supreme Court about the aid workers' trial are turned away by a Taliban guard'. Saeed Khan/AFP P Vallely, The Independent, Lond. Sept 6/01, Comment; Pg. 5

[111] E.g. The Alliance Israélite Universelle, which was "critical of traditional Jewish society" had, in 1913, 43k young Jewish students in 183 schools in Moslem lands –including Israel. From : Encyclopedia of Jews in the Islamic World.

"In Afghanistan there were two attempts by the Alliance (*Alliance Israelite Universelle,* a French-based group that tried to spread modernity -- including its ills -- among Jews around the world) to infiltrate our way of life, but the rabbonim stood in the breach and prevented them from gaining a foothold in the country."

The result was: ""There was not even one nonobservant Jew amongst the whole of Afghan Jewry," declares the rov.

In the United States, 'free', compulsory public education was established with the seemingly benevolent purpose of teaching the 3 R's to poor immigrant children. They were also intended – often from their inception -- to steal Roman Catholic children away from their parents[112]. In NYC, such 'free' public schools succeeded in taking nearly two whole generations of Jewish children from the Torah -- the way of life of their ancestors for thousands of years.

The Taliban had seen the adverse effects of such schools under the various secular regimes that prevailed in the previous decades[113]. They were intent on preventing more damage.[114]

Even up to very recent times?

"Yes! Maybe there were some who were victims of ignorance, but there was nobody who was lacking the basics of faith, *ahavas haTorah*, putting on *tefillin* and even praying three times a day. The town of Her'at had four packed synagogues. If one person was absent for even one *tefilloh* during the week people went to him to be *mevaker cholim*, assuming that he must surely not be feeling well."

Which period are you referring to?

"Until thirty years ago."

As related by R. Gargi, the son of Rav Mattisyo Gargi, of Herat, in

"Judaism in the Land of the Taliban: "There Was Not Even One Nonobservant Jew Amongst The Whole Of Afghan Jewry" *by Refoel Berlzonf, 21 Cheshvan 5762 – Nov. 7, '01, Mordecai Plaut, director, Dei'ah veDibur - Information & Insight - In-Depth Features*

[112] **See, eg, 'Historical Origins of Non-Sectarian Public Schools: The Birth of a Tradition' L. P. Jorgenson, The Phi Delta Kappan, v 44, # 9 (6/1963), pp. 407-14; & Dumbing Us Down: The Hidden Curriculum of Compulsory Schooling, John Taylor Gatto, 2005**

[113] **A. See footnotes 822 & 823 B. See also: 1. "A" Is for Allah, "J" Is for Jihad, Craig Davis, World Policy Journal, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Spring, 2002), pp. 90-94. This includes analysis and graphics of children's textbooks in Afghanistan under both the previous King – intended to inculcate nationalistic militarism and under the Mujahadeen – intended to inculcate anti-Soviet militarism with an Islamic veneer. Illustrated examples are given – by no specific bibliographic data for these examples – autor , place of publication , page numbers, etc.**

2. Evaluation of Afghanistan Education Sector Support Project 114 pages; for Office of AID Representative for Afghanistan Affairs Islamabad, Pakistan December, 1990 by: Gary Theisen (team leader) Director of International Research & Planning Academy for Educational Development Richard L. Betz Program Officer Academy for Educational Development, Victor J. Cieutat Education Consultant. pdf p.27-8:"The revisions were ECA- and ECSPA controlled and consisted of updating topics such as current political conditions within Afghanistan, the enhancement of cultural themes, and information relevant to the Jihad. This revision process avoided any association of U.S. advisers with the educational content of the textbooks. A full set of 62 primary school textbooks for Grades 1-6 has been prepared in both Dari and Pushtu. The series has the endorsement of the ECSPA, the ECA, and the AIG and, in addition, has recently been approved by the GoP Commissioner of Education for Afghan Refugees to be used for all of the UNHCR supported commissionerate schools. The books have been disseminated widely- 2,094,201 having been distributed during Fiscal Year 1990. These included 464,482 to ECA schools in Afghanistan, 979,587 to non-ECA schools in Afghanistan, and 650,132 to refugee schools in Pakistan.

3. The Education Center For Afghanistan (Its Past Accomplishments, Its Current Status And Its Potential) by the University Of Nebraska At Omaha Education Sector Support Project, , MAY 25 -JUNE 17, 1993 Peshawar, Pakistan, 29 pages. Pdf p. 20:

(OCTOBER 1986 THRU APRIL 1992 -CONTINUED)

C. TEXTBOOKS	PREPARED	PRINTED
GR. 1-6	56	8.1 MILLION
GR. 7-9	93	1.2 MILLION
GR. 18-12	15	37 THOUSAND

4. PROJECT ASSISTANCE COMPLETION REPORT EDUCATION SECTOR SUPPORT PROJECT (ESSP) (306-0202) June, 1994 "The initial 153 textbooks designed and. developed by the project" "The 15 million textbooks produced and delivered by the project to primary schools inside Afghanistan" both quotes from pdf p 6 "The project printed and distributed approximately 15 million textbooks to primary schools in all 29 provinces of Afghanistan and in limited numbers to schools in the refugee camps in Pakistan. Over 1,600 primary schools and 446,000 students received ESSP textbooks in Afghanistan, and 1,031 primary schools and 167,022 students received ESSP textbooks in the refugee camps in Pakistan." Pdf p 10. [Why were 15E6 books needed for just over 6E5 students?]

5. A widely quoted example from one of hese books is "A fourth-grade mathematics text noted that 'the speed of a Kalashnikov bullet is 800 metres per second', and then asked students, 'If a Russian is at a distance of 3,200 metres from a Mujahid and that Mujahid aims at the Russian's head, calculate how many seconds it will take for the bullet to strike the Russian in the forehead'.

Exact source is not given. Nor is it clear how common this sort of material was in the text books

[see Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: America, the Cold War, and the Roots of Terror By Mahmood Mamdani 2004]

[114] **Their efforts to close schools were not aimed at preventing children from learning the 3 R's, but curtailing the activities of the missionaries of all kinds – who aimed at taking the children away from their traditional Moslem parents. See, in this sefer: APPEND 6 Reports on the Educ. of Women & Girls In Kabul In the 1st Half of '98 & CHAPT. 14. Conclusions & Recommend. -- on the importance of diverse, privately funded schools.**

CHAPTER 8:

BUDDHIST STATUES AND OTHER PRE-ISLAMIC ART

In March of 2001, the Taliban blew up the giant Buddhist statues that had been carved and created[115] in the sandstone cliffs of Bamyan Province close to 14 centuries before[116]. Though the statues had already suffered from weathering and major deliberate acts of destruction [117], most of their bulk stone forms and some of their superficial decoration had endured. The colossal relics had survived Islam in Afghanistan-with its strong iconoclastic tradition -- for over a 1,000 years[118].

HEAD OF SMALLER, EASTERN BUDDHA



U. LEFT, 1965, WITH 'MISSING FACE'; L. LEFT, NECK REGION, 1972-6?; PHOTOS, FIGS 35-6, P.32, BLÄNSDORF; RIGHT, 1999, HEAD BLOWN OFF. P. 42 ICOMOS,2000.
SEE FOOTNOTES 115, 117, 118, 126 & 128-C

This act of destruction drew the attention of much of the cultured world. It also made the Taliban odious in the eyes of many who'd not yet fallen in line against them. Why did the Taliban do this? Isn't it a clear sign they'd fallen under the control of Arab Wahabiists – OBL – and associates?[119]

When the Taliban entered Kabul more than four years before, their behavior was completely different. The Kabul Art Museum was full of pre-Islamic art – and the Taliban were in a position to destroy it – consistent with the long-standing iconoclasm of Arab Islam. They not only didn't destroy it – they issued directives that the pre-Islamic art should be protected.

They explained that the statues and other art that may once have been associated with idol worship should be considered 'just art' – as there was nobody in Afghanistan in our day who actually worshiped these things. The Taliban also said there were people in other countries that had special connections with this art and those people were watching to see what the Taliban would do. Some of these countries also had Mosques and Muslims. The Taliban made it clear that if the directives to protect the pre-Islamic art weren't carefully

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[115] The statues were made by first carving their basic shape into the inhomogeneous sandstone-like cliff & then over-laying most of it with painted stucco, anchored to the stone with imbedded rope & wooden pegs driven into holes still visible in the above photos. The faces were apparently made of wooden frames anchored to the rock & covered with a skin whose "*golden hues sparkle on every side...made of metallic stone (teou-shih)*...[golden copper-zink brass] *cast in different parts and joined together*" . [quote from: Si-yu-ki: Buddhist Records of the Western World By Xuanzang, Buddhist Monk who visited Bamiyan ~630CE.] Blänsdorf & Melzl "Technique of Modeling the Buddha Statues", p201-14 "The Giant Buddhist Statues of Bamiyan: Safeguarding The Remains" edit. Michael Petzet, XIX, '09. 282 pgs.

[116] C^{14} dating of parts of the statues found in the rubble. "Dating of the Buddha statues..." C.Blänsdorf, et al. p231-6 see footnote 215

[117] **A.** The faces of both statues had been missing since before 1886, [appearing as shown [upper & lower left photos, above, corrected dates: 1965 [from internal ASI [Archeological Survey of India] precondition report (plate XI, fig. 22) & 1972-6, from C. Blänsdorf, personal com. 7/29/16] leaving a relatively flat vertical surface ~2m back from & above the chin. [The faces on the frames that had been fixed in this space left enough room for one or more people – perhaps to control the eyes or maintain fires to illuminate them. A.S.A.][Blänsdorf & Melzl "Technique of Modeling the Buddha Statues", see footnote 115, at p. 211-13. The faces might've been removed 1100+ yrs before. Such defacement was standard practice in some forms of Islamic iconoclasm. Finbarr Barry Flood "Between cult and culture: Bamiyan, Islamic iconoclasm, and the museum", *The Art Bulletin* 84 (12/02), p. 641–59. Partic. p. 648-9. **B.** "[S]ince the ninth century, the caves [including the two niches in which the two giant statues stood] and hundreds of smaller caves in the area] have been the target of intentional desecration. Islamic elements have inflicted much damage, especially through the mutilation of the faces of Buddhist images in almost all the murals. ...[W]hen Genghis Khan attacked Bamiyan...some of the] murals were demolished and [some of] the actual caves themselves were destroyed. In the seventeenth century, Aurangzeb, the future Mughal Emperor of India, campaigned in Kandahar and Balkh before he ascended the throne in 1646; while he was in Bamiyan, a cannon was directed at the West Grand Buddha sculpture and the shot damaged the section from the knees down"p.299-300 "Bamiyan: Buddhist Cave Temples in Afghanistan" Takayasu Higuchi & Gina Barnes, p. 282-302, World Archaeology , V.. 27, # 2, 10/1995 **C.** There's also a rept. "the legs of the larger one [West. Buddha] have been partly knocked away, it is said by canon-shot fired at it by Nadir Shah [Shah of Iran, incl Afghanistan (1736–47)]" P.J. Maitland, 1886, p.348, "The Rock-Cut Caves and Statues Of Bamian" J. Royal Asiatic Soc. of Gt. Brit. & Ireland

[118] **A.** Even so, by 9/18/98 "...Taliban fighters dynamited the head of the small Buddha colossus, blowing its face away." p76 "Taliban..." Ahmed Rashid, rev. reprint, pub. in '01; also in 2002 ed. updated after 9/11/01. I.B. Tauris. As noted above, the faces were gone over a century before – but most of the rest of the head was blown off in '98—as shown above right. Still, his "blowing its face away" rept. is quoted in a rev. of Yale U. Press ed. of his book:12/16/00 The Vancouver Sun "The tragedy in Central Asia: Afghanistan's miltant Taliban rulers not only aren't up to the job of governing - they don't even know what the job is." B. MacKenzie see footnote 325-**B.** **B.** This report is even more remarkable as, 17 months before, a Taliban commander, Abdul Wahid, leading troops toward these statues, said that he wanted to blow them up – but would first ask his leader, Mullah Omar, the head of the Taliban, for permission. [4/17/97, AFP, "Taliban threaten to blow up massive Afghan Buddha", Stefan Smith, 1027 words, Dateline: Ghorband Valley, Afg., 4/17/97] Permission was denied before the Taliban actually reached the site. [4/28/97, AFP, "Taliban top leadership say Buddha statues will not be razed" 387 words, Dateline: Islamabad, 4/28]. "[A s]pokesman to Taliban chief Mullah Umer...pointed out that the Buddha statues in Hadda..., are safe even though the Taliban have been in control of the province [Nangarhar, under control of Taliban from 9/96] for more than a year."[Oct, 9/97, IPS, Afghanistan: War Taking Its Toll On Cultural Treasures, Zafar Malik, Dateline: Islamabad]. **C.** 4 days before Rashid's reported dynamiting: 9/14/98, AFP, "Taliban say Bamiyan's residents, Buddhist relics will be protected", Mohammad Bashir, Kabul. **D.** 2 months later, we find the report on which Rashid built his "dynamiting" story: 11/14/98, AFP," Islamic Taliban deploy guards to protect Bamiyan Buddha statues", Dateline: Kabul, "The Taliban...deployed guards to protect two giant Buddha statues...of Bamiyan, after one was damaged by rocket fire, independent sources said Saturday. 'The smaller Buddha statue ...was hit by a rocket, which partly destroyed its face. It was also shot in the belly with automatic rifles,' one source added. ...Taliban authorities had arrested a zealous militia solider who attacked the statue ..." 'Apparently it seems it was an individual act,' one source said." **E.** Nearly 22 months later still, the situation was further clarified: "Bamiyan was put under the direct protection of the president of the Academy of Sciences of Afghanistan, and the military were instructed that the site, and all others, were to be evacuated of troops. Despite this, late last year a local Taleban commander packed explosives behind the head of the larger Buddha...in an effort to decapitate it...[This is probably the method used to succesfully decapitate the smaller statue in 1998 A.S.A] The explosion was prevented, but recently two burning tyres placed on a rock shelf where part of the Buddha's face has been destroyed have blackened a large area of the head. According to the Society for Preservation of Afghanistan's Cultural Heritage, the local commander has been arrested.[Sep.1/'00, The Times, Lond. "Afghanistan fights to save its ancient monuments" Norman Hammond, Archaeology Correspondent. *The actual damage to the smaller Buddha shows that in '98 some Taliban affiliates in Bamyan —perhaps Wahabiist/"Arabs"-- weren't heeding the rules of Taliban central leadership. - similar problem with OBL oriented Mullah Dadullah in Bamyan.* see footnotes 718-B, 765-[1]

[119] Kathy Gannon, in I is for Infidel, p 80-1, suggests just this -- possibly following the opinion of Nancy Hatch-Dupree – a leading expert on Afghan Art & Culture. But even after the Taliban destroyed the Buddhist art, they continued to treat Jews with respect & didn't put out venom against Israel. OBL was just the opposite in these areas.

followed, there might be retaliation against Muslims and mosques in such countries.[120]

The theft and destruction of this pre-Islamic art began before the Taliban Government existed. According to Nancy Hatch-Dupree – a leading American scholar on the culture of Afghanistan --

> "As unstable conditions intensified after the departure of the Soviets in 1989, the museum staff[121] packed the bulk of the objects and placed them in the storerooms. An unspecified number of these boxes were later secreted at other locations around Kabul. By 1993 [note: under Massoud] the remaining boxes had been thoroughly ransacked by guards assigned for their protection, working in collusion with dealers who used the numerous pictorial publications extolling the splendour of the collections as convenient order catalogues."[122]
>
> In 1995, with the Northern Alliance in control of Kabul, the Kabul Art Museum was looted by the Northern Alliance's own soldiers.[123]

In contrast, Dr. Hatch-Dupree, wrote:

> …looting at the museum ceased after the Taliban takeover of Kabul in 1996. … Taliban authorities have issued ten decrees mandating the protection of cultural relics representing `thousands of years of artistic creation'.[124] They threaten dire punishment for those possessing museum or plundered artefacts. Government departments have been issued directives detailing their responsibilities for the protection of cultural property.[125]

In 1998 when the Taliban captured Bamyan valley, Taliban commander, Abdul Wahed, reported-

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[120] **A.** Based on p 78-81 of "I Is for Infidel", Kathy Gannon, Public Affairs Books, 2005. She was an AP reporter in Afghan. for ~18 years. [get more direct citations.]

B. Another example of the Taliban specifically guarding an ancient Buddhist statue is: Afghan Relics Turn To Dust Amid War And Neglect, Luke Hunt, Sept. 02, 1999, 708 words, GHAZNI, Afghanistan, "On a hill-top on the outskirts of town [Ghazni, on the silk road] a mutilated giant female Buddha -- unearthed just 40 years ago -- lies on her back …Taliban-appointed [Fazl] Uddin has manned the hill as its protector for more than a year as part of the ruling militia's efforts to safeguard the nation's ancient relics."

[121] of the National Museum of Afghanistan, aka: the Kabul Art Museum

[122] 'Mystery Veils the Kabul Museum Collections' Nancy H.-Dupree, 2/01 _____

[123] **A.**UPI,10/25/95, Soldiers Plunder Afghan Art Museum, Peter Deneufville, 526 words, Dateline: Kabul,. 'The Kabul Museum, once known internationally for its collection of Central Asian art, is another casualty of Afghanistan's ongoing civil conflict, observers said Wednesday. Since the fall of the communist regime in April 1992, the museum has been repeatedly plundered during battles between various factions struggling for control of the capital. It happened again last week as fighting between Afghan government troops and Islamic fundamentalist rebels [the Taliban] raged within 875 yards (800 m) of the facility. In the heat of the battle, soldiers loyal to the government came to the museum and warned the guards the building was about to be overrun by the Taliban opposition fighters. The guards fled in a panic, and the government soldiers promptly blasted open several of the museum vaults and began carting off various art objects. "It was really quite smart," a U.N. official in Kabul said. "The soldiers came in and told the guards, "Run for your lives -- the Taliban are coming."

Armando Cuomo, a University of London archeologist, witnessed last week's robbery. "Three vaults filled with statues, stupas and pottery were completely opened," Cuomo told United Press International. "It was really amazing. The soldiers were just walking in and out, and a couple of them really looked like they knew what they were doing. …. However, he said most valuable items appear to have been taken from the museum and hidden elsewhere in the city. "Museum officials themselves probably don't know what was stolen," he said.' [EMPH. ADDED –this rept fits pattern Kabul Money market under Massoud vs.Taliban. see ch. 14-C]

B.1 "Work in the basement storerooms [of the Kabul Museum] was carried out by the light of kerosene lamps, as the generator donated by UNHCS had been stolen by the museum security guards a few weeks earlier. The rooms were without air, thick with dust, dimly lit, and crowded with [museum workers]…. [In the]…days awaiting the approach of the Taliban, the second generator donated by SPACH was stolen." [EMPH. ADDED] **B.2** The Kabul Hotel [where much of the museum objects were stored] premises were locked 9/28/'96 by the Taliban ..and no museum staff was allowed to go to [main Museum building in] Darulaman. Underlining the great difference in the security situation from previous years, there was not a single guard at the Kabul Hotel and only one at Darulaman…" p 7 & 8, 'The Recent History of the Kabul Museum', Carla Grissmann, Kabul 6/'00 p 5-8, SPACH Newsletter, #7, 7/'01. Both thefts occurred spring–early fall, '96, when the city was under Massoud, leader of the enemies of the Taliban.

[124] **A.** The priceless collection of ~20,000 of pieces of Bactrian gold was sequestered in storage vaults of the presidential palace in 1989 on the orders of President Najibullah… In late 1996, "Taliban leaders" assured senior museum staff "that the entire collection was still safe, in the vaults, and would remain there." Kabul's Museum,The Past Ruined by the Present John F. Burns ,11/30/96, NYT [Pulitzer Prize winning article] ____ In '03, the treasure was found in place, unharmed "Afghan Gold Stash Found Intact" BBC News, 8/29/03 [If Taliban wanted to steal before they fled Kabul in '01, this - or ~$90E6 in gold bullion in same vault ['Rebuilding the Kabul museum & hunting for Bactrian gold' Sunday Times, Lond. 10/26/'03] would've been a better target than the Kabul money market. They could've cut each safe open with a steel cutting power-saw – at 15 min/safe -- just as was done when the safes were cut open in '03 [see footnote 177 B.0.i.2] . That they didn't do this suggests they didn't commit other major thefts either –i.e., at the Kabul Money Market in the wake of their 11/'01 departure.See footnote 456]

B. In contrast to this, when the US entered Baghdad in Apr, 03 in the 2nd Gulf War: "The National Library in Baghdad suffered two fires – on April 10 and 12 … About one quarter of the total book collection was looted or burned, including rare books and newspapers. …Virtually all the entire maps and photographs collection was destroyed. " "Looters struck the [Iraq] Museum …between April 10 and 12, totally unhindered. Thieves took 14-15,000 objects of every kind, (sculpture, ceramics, pottery shards, jewelry, metalwork, architectural fragments, cuneiform tablets and a large percentage of the Museum's collection of valuable Sumerian cylindrical seals." The Impact Of War On Iraq's Cultural Heritage, US CENTCOM Historical Cultural Advisory Group _____

C. The libraries of Kabul were also destroyed – but not under the Taliban: "Not only have all of Kabul's mosques, museums and libraries been smashed" The Independent (Lond.)3/31/96, "While war rages, a 10-year-old genius sticks at his books; Tim McGirk meets the prodigy who picks his way through Kabul's front line to pre-medical school", Tim McGirk, P. 14, 652 w.; "Many fear that the Taleban will get carried away in its drive to stamp out recorded images…[including] a treasure trove of imagery stored in the basement vaults of the Radio and Television Building…[but] the Taleban … government's policy has been to keep the historic pictures under lock and key - and present-day imagery under wraps." The Toronto Star, Mar/12/'00, "Telephones Good, TV Still Evil", Martin Regg Cohn, S: BOD, 1584 w.; "Kabul University reopened this month… Amir Hassanyar, university chancellor, said:…'We have lost everything. Our preliminary estimate is more than Dollars 50 million,' he said.…The destruction of the university library was described as a 'huge cultural loss'. The Times Higher Educ. Sup., 4/21/95, "War-torn campus reopens; Kabul University; Afghanistan" Sam Faulkner, Kabul, # 1172, P.8, 655 w.[see footnote 229-B for more from this]; "…many books from the library were looted for sale or simply to burn for heat." Washington Post, 6/17/01, "War-Torn College Struggles to Rebuild; Once Open to Western Ideas, Kabul U… Now Answers to Taliban Rulers", Jack Redden, Reuters, P. A17, 900 w., Dateline: Kabul

[125] Nancy Hatch-Dupree, op cit.- adding, with prescience: Getting these messages down to foot-soldiers in the militia who are mostly ignorant of early history and are taught in their madrassas to be blindly prejudiced against anything pre-Islamic is another matter. The attitudes held by high-ranking officials who express an extreme aversion to positive undertakings by their colleagues" are most disturbing. Their periodic attempts to negate protection policies are dangerous and cast a shadow over the future."

ly "had holes drilled around the head of the small Buddha ready for the placing of explosives."[126] However, when the situation was brought to the attention of the Taliban's top leadership – including Mullah Omar -- they ordered that the statues should be protected, not destroyed. [127]

Even in the year before the destruction of the statues was decreed, the Taliban were actively involved in trying to protect prelslamic art from wanton destruction and theft. Barbara Crossette of the New York Times wrote:

> "The Taliban sent Qudratullah Jamal, its culture minister, and Jalil Ahmad, an adviser to the movement's supreme leader, the Emir Mohammed Omar" to Switzerland to press for the temporary display and sheltering of Afghanistan's art treasures in a special museum that would be developed for that purpose. The effort was blocked by UNESCO and western archeologists who believed that such art should not be removed from its native land. [128]

EASTERN BUDDHA, BEF. & AFT. HEAD BLOWN OFF: SHOWING DAMAGE TO 'STUCCO' CLOTHING [THAT HAD BEEN RESTORED BY ASI IN 1970'S] & VAULT FRESCOES. SMALL HOLES WERE IN ORIGINAL STONE FOR ANCHORING STUCCO. PHOTOS: PAUL BUCHERER-DIETSCHI, REC. FROM HIM 7/31/16. SEE FOOTNOTES 115, 117 & 128C

So what triggered the change in policy? The most likely explanation is the reaction of the UN

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[126] **A.** [*But there already were holes around the neck – as can be seen in the photos on p. 35* & *see footnote 118 A & B which shows the Taliban tried to protect the statues starting in '97, in story involving same Abdul Wahed. Still, photos,p. 35, & above,L, show that by 10/'98, thead was blown off. From: [Phot p. 35 R, from: Heritage at Risk ICOMOS World Report 2000 On Monuments And Sites In Danger. Pdf p. 42]*

B. Why The Buddhas Of Bamian Were Destroyed, Michael Semple, at time leading up *to* destruction of statues, U. N. Regional Coordin. , with respons. incl. Bamyan. In '12, fellow, Carr Cntr. for Hum Rts Pol., Harv. Ken. Schl; says nothing of poppy eradic. prog. or M. Dadulah, relieved of his command by Mullah Omar after his massacre of Bamyan Hazaras; has a generally negative attitude toward Taliban & says bribing local comman-ders with ~$100k would 've saved the Bamyan statues. He doesn't say that the edict to destroy statues applied across the country. found at: _____ [Semple is Irish by birth & a Muslim working in Afghan. & Pak. ~25 yrs – by '08 [A Rope and a Prayer, David Rhode & Kristen Mulvihill['10]]

[127] **A.** Taliban top leadership say Buddha statues will not be razed '"The Supreme Council has refused the destruction of the sculptures because there is no worship of these," [the Taliban's Amb. to Pak., Moh. Masoom] Afghani said …. International concern over…the Buddha relics was triggered after a Taliban frontline commander earlier this month said the statues would be destroyed if the militia …entered Bamian.' 28/4/97, AFP . [see footnote *118 A & B* & 718 A.3]

B. "Mullah Omar…decree[d] that Buddhist sites and specifically Bamyan, were under equal protection with Islamic monuments. [See footnote 118 E ,for the rest of this note & source .]

[128] **A.** U.N., in Shift, Moves to Save Art for Afghans. NYT,3/31/01, Late Ed. - Final, S.. A; C. 5; The Arts/Cultural Desk; p. 1, 1907 words

B. Important first hand info. on this issue, confirming & supplementing rpt of B. Crossette, from Paul Bucherer-Dietschi [PBD] who was the Dir. of the Afghanistan Museum-in-Exile & Stiftung Bibliotheca Afghanica, Afghanistan-Institut und Archiv, Bubendorf, Switz: [Email rec. by ASA 12/23/'15] "When I was in Kandahar and Kabul in summer 1998 some high-ranking Taliban asked me to help to safeguard Afghan archaeological artifacts from destruction [by] their "Arab friends". They suggested to bring the most impor tant items from Kabul Museum to Switzerland and the project of an "Afghanistan Museum in Exile" was developed together with some of my friends from the Northern Alliance - among them Ahamd Shah Massud. In late 1998 President Rabbani came to Switzerland to ask the Swiss government to support this idea, and some weeks later Qodratullah Jamal, the Taliban Minister of Culture did the same (incognito, with a fake passport). The Museum in Exile was installed, but UNESCO red-taped the transfer of the objects to Switzerland - as they could not allow to take them out of the country of origin…. Similar problems happened with Bamiyan. UNESCO claimed, that they could not do anything in Bamiyan, as it was not in the hands of the Taliban.* Fortunately the Swiss Government was ready to provide the means to restore the drainage on top of the niches to seal the ground against intruding water. This work was done in summer 1998 under my direction by Afghan engineers and craftsmen. "[*PBD:.ref. to drainage proj., Sum/'97- Sum/98; Taliban took area late Jul '98; email: Aug. 2/'16] ___ **C.** See also "Already…[10/'98] the head of the little Buddha in Bamiyan was blown up… [In 7/'98 & 10/'98] I had taken photographs of the Buddha, one with the head intact, and the later one with part of the head missing. I sent these photographs everywhere; they were published in the International Art Newspaper but nobody did anything." Nermeen Shaikh, How Can Afghanistan's Cultural Heritage be Preserved?, a. Fergana News & b. Asia Society & Fergana News, 4/20/02_____ _____[PBD], on 12/'00 trip]…to Kandahar with [Mullah] Omar's assistant Jalil Ahmad..."went…to take photographs – I had written permission from the Taliban…[&]… al-Qaeda people…made us leave… [T]he Taliban were no longer masters in their own house."p.22, The Race to Save Afghan Culture, Kristin M. Romey, Archaeology, M/J/'02, p. 18-25._____ **D.1** Museum-in-Exile: Swiss Foundation safeguards 1,400+ Afghan artefacts, Laurent Lévi-Strauss. "In the summer of 1998, [PBD], Director of the Foundation Bibliotheca Afghanica, received a request from both the Taliban and the Northern Alliance…to establish a safe depository in Switzerland for the protection of Afghan cultural artefacts…On [16/4/'99] …[the] proposal was presented by the Swiss Ambassador to UNESCO…[and] the Museum-in-Exile was established in an existing building in Bubendorf beginning in May 1999. …The Afghanistan Museum-in-Exile was officially inaugurated…[7/Oct/'00]. This official UNESCO article doesn't mention UNESCO delayed transferring objects from Afgh. to mus'm. -until after Bam. statues were destroyed._____ **D.2.a** "The Afghanistan Museum in Exile was officially inaugurated on 7 October, 2000", p160. P. 159 "[When the Taliban]… occupied Bamiyan[,… o]ne of the[ir] field commanders took his tank and shot several shells at the giant buddha' …But worse, agents of antique dealers from Peshawer came to Bamiyan and removed the 1,700 years old plaster with decorative frescoe paintings from walls and cieling in all the niches." P.161 "[In 11/'00]" I got a call from my Afghan friends in the southern part of the country to come immediately and to rescue the pre-Islamic artefacts from destructions. Up to now they had managed to move the objects from one place to another to hide them. On 6th December, 2000, I arrived at Kandahar for discussions and went on to Kabul where I remained to the 17th December. My friends asked me despairingly to get the things out of danger, but I had to refuse. The Swiss Government had not yet received green signal from UNESCO and UNESCO asked constantly for an official declaration from the Taliban side—to give its agreement. **D.2.b** But such a declaration couldn't be provided anymore after the Museum had become a point of discussion in the *Shura*. … the legal problems to remove its cultural heritage from its country of origin could not be resolved in time … In late July we received the official agreement of UNESCO and even the promise of …$10,000 for our efforts" **D.3** That 'western archeologists' blocked the transfer to Switz. may refer to an ealier effort by PBD in ~July 1991 where Najib & the Swiss Gov. agreed to transfer but it was blocked by other Afghan authorities. p158 'Protection and Restitution of Afghan Cultural Heritage in the Framework of the Afghanistan – Museum in Exile', PBD, p. 156-63 in Bamiyan: Challenge to World Heritage , Ed. K. Warikoo, '02, Himalyan Research and Cultural Foundation based on conf.,New Delhi 9/17-18/'01 **E.** UNESCO budget, 2000-2001 "Main line of action 4. Restoration of heritage damaged by conflicts" Regular budget Activities: $ 665,000; Extrabudgetary: $11,000,000 "Background. For several years now, UNESCO has been asserting its role as coordinator of complex operations to safeguard heritage damaged by conflicts…as in the case of Angkor (Cambodia), Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Palestine. [NOTE; ASA: Curiously, tho' the word Jerusalem appears in the 242 page budget, the word Israel does not.] The experience thus gained has highlighted the central role of the cultural heritage in the construction of a culture of peace, following civil strife and armed conflict…to restart dialogue and reconstruct a common identity and a shared future." _____ p. 41, par 177, "UNESCO, in cooperation with the Organization of the Islamic Conference, ISESCO and ALECSO, held a conference of specialists in Islamic law and religion on the cultural heritage, at Doha, Qatar, in December 2000 [sic, typo. conf was held in 12/'01], and a first expert mission has been sent to Afghanistan, to Bamiyan and to the museum of Kabul. Operational projects valued at $10 million were prepared in the framework of the United Nations consolidated joint appeal."; P. 113: UNESCO International Team for Afghanistan $1.5E6 _____ pdf 93 Total UNESCO Budget for 2000-2001 $847E6 _____ **F** For mat'l from & comment on DOHA conference, see footnote 947-J

& much of the world community to their almost miraculously successful opium poppy ban.

In early November, there was a promising sign, picked up by a reliable chronology of Afghan and Middle Eastern events:

> UN Secretary General Kofi Annan's special envoy for Afghanistan, Franscesc Vendrell, said in an interview that the Taliban and opposition forces had agreed to begin talks aimed at ending the country's civil war. It marked the first time both sides had signed in writing their commitment to engage in peace talks[129] [emphasis added]

In early December, the following item is not noted in this chronology:

> "Pino Arlacchi, the leader of the United Nations Drug Control Program, said in an interview that initial surveys of Afghanistan in the midst of the annual opium-planting season show that a July edict against its cultivation seems to be taking effect across the country, the world's largest producer of opium.
>
> At the same time, Mr. Arlacchi said, his agency has now amassed strong evidence that local drug lords along the northern border with Tajikistan[130] have stockpiled a supply of opium-- and its derivatives, morphine and heroin -- adequate to supply Europe and the United States for up to three years."[131] [emphasis added]

	2000	2001	2001/ 2000
Chal	17	20	1.176
Farkhar	6	26	4.333
Ishkamish	10	19	1.900
Warsaj	9	10	1.111
TOTAL	42	75	1.786

The remaining districts, all in the center & N of the Prov., saw a substantial decrease in opium growing:

	2000	2001	2001/ 2000
Bangi	8	0	-100%
Chah Ab	45	19	0.422
Darqad	ND	ND	
Kalafgan	93	27	0.290
Khwaja Ghar	57	32	0.561
Rustaq	151	24	0.159
Taluqan	97	16	0.165
Yangi Qala	154	20	0.130
TOTAL	605	138	0.228



en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Takhar_districts.png

The rest of the Tajikistan:Afghanistan border was in Konduz & Balkh provinces – under the control of the Taliban. These two both saw ≥99% reductions in land devoted to opium poppies. In Konduz, it went from 489 ha in 2000 to zero in 2001. In Balkh, the former capital province of the Taliban's enemy, Dostom, it went from 2,669 to 4.

No Data was available for Darqad district. The detailed district data shown here is from pdf p, 90 of http://www.unodc.org/pdf/afg/afghanistan_opium_survey_2003.pdf The clear distinction between Zero Opium found and No Data available is given for '00 & '01 in The Opium Economy in Afghanistan-2003, UNODC, p41, pdf p 45 maps 9 &10. In '02 – map 11, the two categories are combined into "Considered poppy free"

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[129] Nov. 3: [11/4 NYT, FT, WP] This was found at "Chronology October 16, 2000-January 15, 2001", Middle East Journal, V. 55, # 2 (Spr., '01), p. 298-318, Pub. by: Middle East Institute. This is a chronol. of events considered historically important by the editor.

[130] 66% of the ~1278 km border of Afghanistan and Tajikistan is in Badakhshan Prov. – entirely controlled by the enemies of the Taliban: "The Northern Alliance" (NA) The area devoted to opium poppy growing in this province went from 2,458 to 6,342 hectares (ha), from Spring '00 to Spring '01. This is an increase of 158%. Another ~11% is in Takhar Prov., which was controlled by the NA at the time the opium poppy ban was announced in Jul., '00.

Much of Takhar Prov., including its capital city Taloqan, subsequently came under the control of the Taliban or was being contested at the time of Pino Arlacchi's statement. As shown in the table & map, this prov. saw a decline in opium poppy growing from 647 to 211 ha. However, 4 contiguous districts in the south of this province, the two largest of which share a long border with Badakhshan, saw a substantial increase in opium growing.

There's nothing about such stockpiles in the UNDCP's 30 p., ~10,000 word, 2001 report on opium in Afghanistan.

[131] **A.** NYT, Dec.10/00, Sun., Late Ed., Fin., "A U.N. Aide Says Taliban Is Reducing Poppy Crop", Barbara Crossette, S.1; p.15; c.1; UN, 12/8. [Note how headline grossly understates text: UN Aide is actually "The United Nations' top antinarcotics official". "Reducing poppy crop" is actually "edict against its cultivation seems to be taking effect across the country, the world's largest producer of opium." Even this is an understatement: it doesn't say that edict was a complete ban – so a complete ban is taking effect – while the headline merely says 'reducing'. Roughly half the article is about massive stockpiles in hands of the Taliban's.[see footnote 475 for more on these stockpiles] There's nothing about stockpiles in the title & nothing about Taliban's enemies in text. Article was publ. 2 days after interview.

B. ' "We remain extremely concerned about Afghanistan, although there are some positive signs," INCB President Hamid Ghodse told a press conference. He notably cited figures suggesting the existence of drug stockpiles equivalent to 3-4 years of illicit exports in Afghanistan. "We are looking for seizures in Afghanistan, by the authorities there," said Ghodse. "The stocks are there. They can be seized," he said.' No hint at all in this article that the stockpiles are in areas not controlled by the Taliban. AFP, 2/21/2001, "Signs of progress in Asia's drug blackspots", Michael Thurston, , Vienna, 2/21. Also, see footnotes 588 & 890 for more on this & next INCB report, resp.

In response to my query [132], Barbara Crossette, the author of those words, wrote [133]:

> I think it was well known that the area[…] in question was dominated, if not actually controlled, by Northern Alliance groups. [134]

The expectation that immanent sanctions would lead the Taliban to attack UN staff, led to their evacuation.[135] When the sanctions were voted in on 12/19, UN Secretary General Annan expressed his disapproval with the decision[136]. The Security Council vote was 13 in favor, with two abstentions[137].

The nearly 7,000 word record of the Security Council's 65 minute discussion of the resolution makes no mention of the success the Taliban had achieved with their opium poppy ban.[138] The French Ambassador, Yves Doutriaux, called on the Taliban "to implement their decree of 28 July 2000 totally prohibiting the cultivation of opium poppy." – without noting that, according to the UN's own preliminary survey and press reports, they had already done so.

The ~3000 word resolution itself made no mention of the Taliban opium poppy eradication program at all. It also failed to note the stockpiles of opium in the Northern Alliance's Badakhshan Province--those who'd benefit most directly from the suppression of the Taliban[139]

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[132] Tue, Sep 20, 2011 10:59 pm

[133] Wednesday, September 21, 2011 6:46 AM

[134] Text contained a typo with 'areas' instead of area. Her comment continued: *Arlacchi made a trip to Tajikistan later to look at its counter-narcotics efforts. I went with him, and what we saw was pretty much a staged show.*

There were plenty of reports and/or rumors at the time that Northern Alliance people were engaged not only in the drug trade but also in smuggling antiquities. bc

[135] 12/18: UN Spokeswoman Marie Okabe said that the UN had begun withdrawing its foreign staff from Afghanistan, fearing attacks on them in response to impending UN sanctions on the ruling Taliban. [12/19 NYT, WSJ, WP]

[136] "It is not going to facilitate our peace efforts, nor is it going to facilitate our humanitarian work," Mr. Annan said of the Security Council action. "I think we had given adequate indications of that to the Council." The resolution was "also opposed by his special envoy trying to start peace negotiations between the Taliban and the remnants of an opposition army fighting in a corner of the country. United Nations relief officials working in Afghanistan have been unusually public in their criticism." "Tough Sanctions Imposed on Taliban Government Split U.N." B. Crossette, NYT, 12/20/00. [But see footnote 944 for comment of acting Taliban Ambas. to US on this & see footnote 137 on abstention of China.]

[137] **A.** Membership of Sec. Coun. in '00: Arg., Bangl., Canada, China, France, Jamaica, Malaysia, Mali, Namibia, Neth., Russ. Fed., Tunisia, Ukraine, UK, USA. China & Malaysia abstained.

B. The abstention of China was probably the result of successful diplomatic relations between China & the Taliban- as shown in the following report by the Taliban Ambassador to Pakistan:

C. "The ambassador of China was the only one to maintain a good relationship with the embassy [of the Taliban in Pakistan] and with Afghanistan. He asked to …meet with *Amir ul-Mu'mineen* and …flew to Kabul where he was welcomed warmly before he… [went] to Kandahar to meet *Mullah* Mohammad Omar. The ambassador …was concerned about rumours that the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan was allegedly assisting the Muslims in Xinxiang,...

D. *Mullah* Mohammad Omar assured him that Afghanistan never had any interest or wish to interfere in China's domestic issues and affairs, nor would Afghanistan allow any group to use its territory to conduct any such operations or support one to that end. The ambassador seemed to be satisfied following his visit. He was the first foreign non-Islamic ambassador ever to see *Mullah* Mohammad Omar *Saheb*. After the ambassador of China had visited, Francesc Vendrell also met *Mullah* Mohammad Omar."

E. Abdul Salam Zaeef, "My Life With The Taliban", p 135, *Edited by* Alex Strick van Linschoten & Felix Kuehn, Columbia U. Press, 2010, Foreword Copyright Barnett R. Rubin, 2010]

F. This mtg between a 3-man team headed by Lu Shulin, China's amb. to Pakistan, & Mullah Omar was reported at the time: a. 12/12/00, "Chinese diplomats to call on Taliban supreme leader" Dateline: Kabul, 12/12; b. 12/13/00, Deutsche Presse-Agentur, "Senior Chinese diplomat visits Taliban chief in Afghanistan" Dateline: Islamabad; c. China's Taliban Connection, Harvinder Sahota, Bharat Rakshak Monitor –V.4(3) 11-12/01

G. An important English interv. with Mullah Zaeef & former senior CIA official, Robert Grenier, who had major responsibility for CIA Afghan ops in 2001-2, is Think2013, Nov. 9/'13, 3:45PM "An Afghan Date: The CIA Talks to the Taliban", mod. by: Shoma Chaudhury, 58:24min video.

[138] S-PV-4251 2000-12-19 16:30-17:35 "The situation in Afghanistan."[Note that, according to the record, they started 30 minutes late. The Russian ambassador, Sergey Viktorovich Lavrov, was president of the Council – subsequently foreign minister of Russia. There was no spokesperson for the Taliban present. None of the 3 countries that recognized the Taliban were present either.

[139] Here are the 4 paragraphs concerning opium in the resolution – without a hint of the Taliban's opium eradication program:

p. 33, pdf p. 41: Noting also that the Taliban benefits directly from the cultivation of illicit opium by imposing a tax on its production and indirectly benefits from the processing and trafficking of such opium, and recognizing that these substantial resources strengthen the capacity of the Taliban to harbour terrorists,

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Reiterating its deep concern over the continuing violations of international humanitarian law and of human rights, particularly discrimination against women and girls, and over the significant rise in the illicit production of opium,

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PAGE 35, PDF PAGE 43, PAR. 9. Demands that the Taliban, as well as others, halt all illegal drug activities and work to virtually eliminate the illicit cultivation of opium poppy, the proceeds of which finance Taliban terrorist activities;

PAR. 10. Decides that all states shall prevent the sale, supply or transfer, by their nationals or from their territories, of the chemical acetic anhydride to any person in the territory of Afghanistan under Taliban control as designated by the Committee, or to any person for the purpose of any activity carried on in, or operated from, the territory under Taliban control as designated by the Committee;

11. Decides also that all States are required to deny any aircraft permission to take off from, land in or over-fly their territories if that aircraft has taken off from, or is destined to land at, a place in the territory of Afghanistan designated by the Committee as being under Taliban control, unless the particular flight has been approved in advance by the Committee on the grounds of humanitarian need, including religious obligations such as the performance of the Hajj, or on the grounds that the flight promotes discussion of a peaceful resolution of the conflict in Afghanistan, or is likely to promote Taliban compliance with the present resolution or with resolution 1267 (1999); [This par. doesn't relate to opium but to the statues issue. It seems to mean the UNSC would've had to approve the special airlift to Swtizerland of vulnerable pre-islamic art – discussed below at]

PAR. 22, P 37, PDF P 45, SAYS "the measures imposed by paragraphs 5, 8, 10 and 11 above shall come into force at 0001 hours, eastern standard time, one month after the adoption of the present resolution

The Malaysian Ambassador, in his eloquent explanation of his country's abstention, noted that paragraph 10 of the resolution 'would imply that the "sale, supply or transfer" of the chemical [acetic anhydride – used in the production of heroin from opium] to non Taliban-controlled areas are tolerated.' [140] Even so, neither he nor his fellow abstainer, China's Ambassador Wang Yingfan, even mentioned the opium poppy ban.

Contrary to expectations, the Taliban did not respond with violence against any offices or people. They withdrew from UN-mediated talks aimed at ending the civil war in Afghanistan and renewed their refusal to hand over to US authorities Saudi dissident Usama bin Laden. They also ordered an immediate boycott of all US- and Russian-made products.[141]

In early February, '01, the UN confirmed in detail in a public news conference what The New York Times had reported earlier[142]. This presentation was based on an "on the ground" pre-assessment survey carried out by 17 surveyors from 1/31/01 to 2/10/01. 2,770 villages were studied -- a 10% random sample of all the villages in 56 districts of 9 provinces. The districts surveyed accounted for 86% of the total poppy area under cultivation the previous spring. The amount of poppy observed in all villages surveyed was 27ha compared with ~7kha in these same areas the previous spring – a 99.6% reduction.

"The preliminary estimate was that there would be a reduction of 70,000 Ha in total poppy area for Afghanistan".[143]

This shows that the estimated reduction was based only on the districts surveyed and that Badakhshan Province was not included in this assessment.

The Head of the Afghanistan branch of the United Nations Drugs Control Programme (UNDCP) Bernard Frahi, noted "there is [a] need for international step[s] to check opium smuggling to Tajikistan via Badakhshan." This was the only channel of opium smuggling that he mentioned.[144] Curiously, of the 46 reports on this that turned up in a LexisNexis[145] search for Feb. 2001, none mentioned this detail and none included any mention of Tajikistan[146].

Par. 8a requires member states. "To close immediately and completely all Taliban offices in their territories;

Par 14 p36 Urges States to take steps to restrict the entry into or transit through their territory of all senior officials of the rank of Deputy Minister or higher in the Taliban, the equivalent rank of armed personnel under the control of the Taliban, and other senior advisers and dignitaries of the Taliban, …

Text Res. 1333 (2000)/12/19/00, p32-7, United Nations, Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council, 2000, Security Council, Official Records, Fifty-fifth Year,

[140] Par 6 of "Statement By H.E. Ambassador Hasmy Agam, Permanent Representative Of Malaysia To The United Nations On The Situation In Afghanistan", Tuesday, 19 December 2000 _____

[141] [12/21 NYT, WSJ, WP] http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/4329653.pdf

[142] The 1st report on LexisNexis was Feb. 7, '01, Taliban Seem to Be Making Good on Opium Ban, U.N. Says , Barbara Crossette , Section A; Column 1; Pg. 3, 588 words, DATELINE: UNITED NATIONS, Feb. 6 . "Initial results from a survey of opium-growing areas of Afghanistan in recent days indicate that the Taliban may have succeeded in sharply reducing the annual poppy crop, astonished United Nations narcotics-control officials say....On Monday, the United Nations Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention's regional office for Afghanistan and Pakistan said that surveys in the northern provinces of Nangarhar, Laghman and Kunar, which together contain more than 25 percent of the total land that had been devoted to the poppy crop, found no significant signs of cultivation this year. Similar reports are beginning to come in from Helmand, …Bernard Frahi, …wrote to his headquarters in Vienna, where the United Nations drug program is based, "No poppy field has been identified in the area." …he was accompanied on his inspection tour by drug officers from Canada and Norway and one Pakistani agricultural expert attached to the narcotics affairs section of the American Embassy in Islamabad."

[143] Data Are From "Annex 2: Pre-Assessment Survey" , p 21 -22 of Afghanistan Annual Opium Poppy Survey 2001, UNDCP. The figure of ~7,000 was calculated by the author by taking 82,152 Ha for national poppy area & multiplying this by 0.86 X 0.10 _____

[144] Found on FACTIVA™: "UNDCP Acknowledges Taliban Efforts For Eradication Of Poppy Cultivation." 12/F/'01, Kabul, 645 Wds, Pakistan Press Internat'l. See also "Opium runners find passages along Tajik-Afghan border" Egamberdy Kabulov 19/7/'02,_____ & see footnote 488 – on drug crossing at Ishkashim from Afgh, to Tajikestan.

[145] LexisNexis is a news and information data base that competes with FACTIVA. There was also no mention of Tajikistan in the final report, noted above, published more than ten months later Afghanistan Annual Opium Poppy Survey 2001.

[146] **A.** The search terms were: opium AND Afghanistan AND Frahi, There were 27 in Newswires & Press Releases; 15 in Newspapers; 4 in News Transcripts & none in other categories, -- such as magazines. Adding AND Tajikistan resulted in no articles found. Replacing Tajikistan with Badakhshan resulted in only 2 articles , which only mentioned that the Taliban did not control this province and said nothing about opium being grown or stockpiled there. These two reports appeared in Iran News web site, Tehran, in English 20 Feb 01, as monitored by the BBC. [search duplicated Mon. 8/27/2012 at 7:51PM, NYC]

B. The Far Eastern Economic Review isn't covered by LexisNexis [?}. It had this remarkable piece of disinformation to contribute to the story. On p 10, in the "Intelligence" sect. of the 12/28/00-1/4/01 issue, they had: "TALIBAN STOCKPILE HEROIN FOR EUROPE: "Despite their commitment to curb opium production this year, Afghanistan's ruling Taliban and the country's drug lords have stockpiled more than 220 tons of heroin in the north for dispatch to Europe. It is being stored in and around the Taliban-controlled city of Faizabad, close to the border with Tajikistan, according to Western diplomats who attended a December 13-15 United Nations anti-crime and drugs conference in Palermo, Sicily."[EMPH. ADDED] But, anyone familiar with Afghanistan would have known that Faizabad is the capital of Badakhshan Prov., which was wholly controlled by the enemies of the Taliban. Ahmed Rashid was FEER'a key source for info on Afghanistan – with 156 reports in this periodical with his name and Afghanistan before Sept 10/01 – 153 of them authored by him and another 120 authored by 'anonymous' -- tho' this report may've originated with another reporter covering the Palermo mtg .

The response of "western diplomats" to the phenomenal elimination of opium poppy growing in Taliban controlled areas was :

> *"…the Taliban is simply trying to drive up the price of opium they have stockpiled. The State Department official also said Afghanistan could do more by destroying drug stockpiles and heroin labs and arresting producers and traffickers."*
>
> **Frahi dismissed that as "nonsense" and said it is drug traffickers and shopkeepers who have stockpiles."**[147] [148]

On March 1st, the US State Department issued a report on the "certification" of countries that were involved in the unofficial production of drugs like opium and cocaine. Colombia was "certified" although by the State Department's own estimate, cocaine production in that country had increased by 11%.[149] There was no mention in the 578 page report of stockpiles of opium and its derivatives on the Tajikistan border or in Badakhshan Province.[150] Afghanistan was again "decertified" though the State Dept. noted:

> **"Earlier this year, we received credible reports of decreased poppy cultivation in Taliban-controlled areas. Enforcement of a poppy ban is welcome news, but this development did not distract the international community's attention from the presence of large opiate stockpiles in the country and unabated drug trafficking from Afghanistan.**

Nether Tajikistan nor Badakhshan were mentioned in the briefing[151] or in the Senate hearing that took place on the subject the same day – a hearing with a transcript of 18,532 words. [152]

Just days before these Senate Hearings and State Department Reports came the edict to destroy the pre-Islamic art.[153] The decree read:

> **Edict issued by the Islamic State of Afghanistan, in Kandahar on the 12th of Rabiul-Awwal 1421 (February 26, 2001): On the basis of consultations between the religious leaders of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, religious judgments of the ulema and rulings of the Supreme Court of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, all statues and non-Islamic shrines located in different parts of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan must be destroyed. These statues have been and remain shrines of unbelievers and these unbelievers continue to worship and respect them. God Almighty is the only real shrine [taghit][154] and all fake idols should be destroyed. Therefore, the supreme leader of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan has ordered all the representatives of the Ministry of Promotion of Virtue and Suppression of Vice and the Ministries of Information to destroy all the statues. As ordered by the ulema and the Supreme Court of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan all the statues must be destroyed so that no one can worship or respect them in the future.[155]**

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[147] U.N.: Taliban Virtually Wipes Out Opium Production In Afghanistan, Kathy Gannon, AP. Dateline: Jalalabad, Afg., 2/15/01

[148] A subsequent IMF report, commenting on opium stocks , noted: "In the complete absence of a working financial system, opium has also played a significant role in rural areas as a store of value. In remote locations it was often considered more liquid than any other assets, including foreign currency. There were strong incentives therefore, even for individuals normally not involved in the trade, to hold opium." p38, Islamic State of Afghanistan: Rebuilding a Macroeconomic Framework for Reconstruction and Growth Rept. No. 03/299, 9/03, _____

[149] 2000 INCSR (issued March 1, 2001) _____

[150] There is, however a statement that *"An estimated 80 percent of the narcotics produced in Afghanistan are smuggled across the border into Tajikistan's Shurobod, Moskovski, and Panj districts, according to government [of Tajikistan] figures."*

All of Shurobod & part of Moskovski border on Badakhshan Prov. of Afghanistan. The remaining part of Moskovski district borders on Takhar Prov.. Panj district borders on the nearby Konduz Prov. – just west of Takhar. It is likely that this data was out of date by the time it was published as Konduz had come under Taliban & saw opium growing drop from 489 ha. to 0 from spring of '00 & spring of '01. In contested Takhar Prov., opium growing went down by ~2/3rds. 2000 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), p 328, Pub. Mar. 1/'01 _____

[151] Fed News Serv: Special State Dept. Briefing On Drug Certifications. Briefers: Rand Beers, International Narcotics & Law Enforcement Affairs, Robert Brown, ONDCP Office Of Supply Reduction. Moderator: Richard Boucher, State Dpt. Spokesman. Loc.: State Dept. Briefing Rm, Wash. , D.C. 6323 words

[152] Hearing: Senate Foreign Rel. Commit. Subj.: Anti-Drug Certification Process. Chaired by: Sen. Lincoln Chafee (R-Ri). 419 Dirksen Sen. Office Bldg, Wash., D.C. Federal News Serv.. Mar. 1, 2001, Thurs.

[153] A. 2/26: Taliban supreme leader Mullah Muhammad 'Umar issued a decree calling for the destruction of all statues, claiming that due to their use as "idols and deities by the nonbelievers before," they were a threat to Islam. [2/27 NYT, WSJ,WP] B. Mar.1: In Kabul, Taliban Information and Culture Minister Qudratullah Jamal said that Taliban fighters had begun the destruction of statues. Preparations were made for the destruction of two 1,600-year-old Buddhas, located in Bamiyan Province, 100 miles west of Kabul. [3/2 NYT, FT, WSJ, WP] C. Mar. 3: In Kabul, Taliban Information and Culture Minister Jamal announced that in Bamiyan Province, Taliban forces had begun destroying two Buddha statues.[3/4 NYT, WP]

[154] "Tighut, a Qur'anic term, can refer to either idols or idol shrines; Hawting, 55. Since the term recurs in the edict, both are presumably intended here." Copied from footnote 155 of Finbarr Barry Flood, supra.

[155] Copied from: Finbarr Barry Flood, supra, at page 655. Concerning this text, he writes: "This is an unofficial translation of the edict concerning the destruction of religious images, prepared by the United Nations staff in Kabul, which was compiled by the Afghanistan Research Group (ARG) and circulated in an electronic newsletter as "News from Afghanistan" on March 2, 2001. The edict was published in Pushtu by the state-run Bakhtar News Agency and broadcast on Radio Sharia on February 27, 2001. It has not proved possible to obtain a

It is particularly noteworthy that nothing in the text of this edict suggests why the Taliban chose this particularly time to destroy the statues. The edict also makes no mention of the Taliban's previous policy of protecting the statues from theft and damage.

Independent of any subsequent explanations by the Taliban of their change in policy[156], we can say, from the timing alone that the edict was in response to the events listed below :

1. **The failure of the US – and most other countries -- to recognize the Taliban's eradication of opium poppy growing;[157]**
2. **The continued unilateral sanctions that cited them for drug dealing;**
3. **The continued recognition of the Badakhshan based "Northern Alliance" as the legitimate government of Afghanistan – despite the facts that:**
   - **a: the "Northern Alliance" held provinces with under 10% of Afghanistan's in-country population and,**
   - **b: the UN's own findings that they – not the Taliban-- were prime actors for stockpiling & smuggling drugs;**
4. **The US's closure of the office of the Taliban's rep. to the UN in NY –[158] even as the reality of their opium eradication program was being revealed & over the objections of the leading UN peace negotiator.[159]**
5. **The expulsion of all senior Taliban diplomats from all countries– pursuant to the UN's tighter sanctions.**
6. **The suppression of the Taliban monthly magazine "The Islamic Emirate" which was being published from the time the opium ban was announced, through the Buddhist statues issue and on to the 9/11 attacks[160]**

Rather than attacking UN or NGO staff -- people who had little if anything to do with the Great

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transcript of the original text; the sole transliterated Arabic term was garnered from among the partial translations given in other sources."

156 SEE FOOTNOTES 176 & 178 & APPENDIX 16 SEE FOOTNOTE 946, etc. – where the Taliban ambassador in the US gives his explanation of the order to destroy the statues. He notes, among other things that they had been in a position to destroy the statues for three years – but didn't.

What the Taliban expected from their opium poppy ban and what they saw as their reward were stated very clearly by the director of the Taliban's High Commission for Drug Control, Abdol Hamid Akhondzadeh."We have done what needed to be done, putting our people and our farmers through immense difficulties….

We expected to be rewarded for our actions, but instead were punished with additional sanctions."

The Australian, 5/31/01, Taliban bans poppies, but stockpiles opium, Source:The Times, Stephen Farrell, WORLD; Pg. 8

The same article also noted "in its report to the UN Security Council"… "a [5-member UN panel monitor the Taliban arms embargo] has accused the regime of [banning opium poppy growing]…only to keep prices up." '…the proceeds from the sale of stockpiled opium were being used to buy arms and "finance the training of terrorists and support the operations of extremists in neighbouring countries and beyond", the panel reported.' The article also claims "the ban was ruthlessly enforced."

The report title, not mentioned in any of the News articles found in Lexis Nexis, was: Report of the Committee of Experts regarding monitoring of the arms embargo against the Taliban and the closure of terrorist training camps in the Taliban-held areas of Afghanistan S/2001/511 (NY: UN, '01), The experts were: Amb. Haile Menkerios (Eritrea, Chair.), Reynaldo O. Arcilla (Philip.), Michael E. G. Chandler (UK), Mahmoud Kassem (Egypt) & Atilio N. Molteni (Argent.) "On 21 May 2001, the Secretary-General forwarded the report of the Committee of Experts (S/2001/511) to the President of the Security Council for the attention of the Council members. The Security Council considered the report on 5 June 2001 at its 4325th meeting (see S/PV.4325)"

At Daily Press Briefing by the Office of the Spokesman for the Secretary-General, 25/05/'01, Fred Eckhard, spokesman for the Sec.Gen. said "The Committee said it considered it essential to look into the illicit drugs trade by the Taliban, and while noting that the Taliban had banned opium production, it also pointed to a sizeable stock of opium and heroin. The report says, "If Taliban officials were sincere in stopping the production of opium and heroin, then one would expect them to order the destruction of all stocks existing in areas under their control." [also in pdf p 11-12 in full rept.] None of the other anti-Taliban points mentioned in the news articles appeared in the briefing – nor was there any mention of trafficking or stockpiles in the non-Taliban controlled areas in the region. Full, 19 p. rept at: There's no mention in this of stockpiles on Tajikistan brdr or opium grown in N. Alliance areas. See footnotes 130-131.

157 The attack on the Buddhist statues of Ghazni [See footnote 947-G, K Gannon] & attack on the statues in the Kabul museum [see footnote 177-B1, C2, E2, Carla Grissmann, Nancy H-D & News rept] appear to have begun after official data of 10% survey was pub. in NYT, Feb 6/'01[see footnote 142, Barbara Crossette]

158 US Orders Taliban To Close New York Office, 09 Feb/'01, 20:55 GMT, AP. Wash.: "The State Department spurned an appeal by a representative of Afghanistan's Taliban …for an improvement in bilateral ties and ordered him to shut down the group's office in New York, in keeping with a U.N. Security Council resolution. The Taliban official, Abdul Hakeem Mujahid, met at the State Department with a senior South Asian affairs expert, Alan Eastham, in hopes of launching a fresh start with the Bush administration after getting the brush-off by the Clinton administration."

159 Politics: U.N. Regrets U.S. Move To Close Taliban Office In NY, Thalif Deen, 12 Feb/01, UN, 2/12 (IPS) "The…[UN] has expressed reservations over a U.S. decision to close down the New York liaison office of the …Taliban…"I would hope it would be possible to keep it open, in terms of the…[UN],"…[F.] Vendrell, the U.N.'s Special Representative to Afghan-istan, told reporters today. The office, based in…[NYC] has not only acted as a liaison between the Taliban…& UN], but is also responsible for providing visas to U.N. officials travelling to Afghanistan."

160 Even the Library of Congress couldn't say which issues were published. They sent me copies of whatever they had. All were from B&W photocopies of originals in a library in the region of Afgh. Only 1 issue was complete. See APP. 20 SAMPLE PAGE FROM THE TALIBAN MONTHLY MAGAZINE The Islamic Emirate. This gap likely resulted from the UN Sec. Coun. sanctions, stipulating:

"…[starting] on 14 November 1999 all States shall

…Freeze funds and other financial resources, including funds derived or generated from property owned or controlled directly or indirectly by the Taliban, or by any undertaking owned or controlled by the Taliban, as designated by the Committee established by paragraph 6 below, and ensure that neither they nor any other funds or financial resources so designated are made available, by their nationals or by any persons within their territory, to or for the benefit of the Taliban or any undertaking owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by the Taliban, except as may be authorized by the Committee on a case-by-case basis on the grounds of humanitarian need"

[UN Sec. Council Resol 1267, 10/15/1999. Par. 4b]

And: "Reminds all States of their obligation to implement strictly the measures imposed by paragraph 4 of resolution 1267 (1999)"

[Par. 4, UN Security Council resol. 1333, adopted 19/12/2000]

Power Games – the Taliban took it out on the statues – reducing much of the massive stone figures to dust and rubble [161].

It was reminiscent of the destruction of the Temple in Jerusalem. We say that God destroyed the Temple – built of wood and stone – and spared the people .[162]

The usually astute Nancy Hatch-Dupree in her 1000 word commentary on the state of Afghan Art in Dec. 2001 appears to agree with Kathy Gannon[163] on the reason for the destruction of the statues. She writes:

"The willful destruction of cultural property as a political instrument wielded by non-Afghan influences through their Afghan agents was a perfidious act of singular gravity… Arab extremist members of Al-Qaeda… had exerted control on key decision makers in the Taliban,… It was their undue influence which prompted the issue of an edict for the destruction of all non-Islamic statues on 26 February. [164] "

She doesn't mention: the UN's failure to recognize the poppy ban; unilateral sanctions; lack of venomous anti-Israel propaganda and continued good treatment of the last two Jews.

A more astute observer of the overall scene did make the connection. Luke Harding, the first British journalist to visit Bamyan after the statues were destroyed, wrote :

"The Taliban's leader, Mullah Mohammed Omar, took a pragmatic view [of the statues issue] until the United Nations imposed a fresh round of sanctions in January. The sanctions came despite the fact that Afghanistan was suffering its worst drought in 30 years, and the Taliban had virtually wiped out the country's lucrative opium crop and were expecting a few modest concessions."[165]

Mullah Omar…agreed…to end opium production. He had hoped for some concessions in return, including diplomatic recognition. Instead, the… [U.N.] imposed more punitive sanctions on Afghanistan in January because of the country's refusal to extradite the alleged Saudi terrorist Osama bin Laden. …Mullah Omar responded by destroying Afghanistan's two giant Buddhas…"[166]

A leading academic expert on the area made a similar comment:

"The failure of the world community to react to the opium ban may have fed the fury that led to the destruction of ancient Buddhist statues earlier this year[167]

A more well-known commentator, Ahmed Rashid, took the opportunity of the destruction of the statues to attack the Taliban and promote the cause of the Northern Alliance. It's curious that he noted the earlier effort of some Taliban to destroy the statues of Bamiyan – without also pointing out that, at the time – four years before --the Taliban leaders had publicly and effectively protected the statues from harm[168]. Instead, he describes this attack on statues as an attack on the Hazara minority – centered in Bamiyan. He even says that they're *"the only Shia Muslim minority in Afghanistan"* – failing to notice that the western province of Herat – and its capital city of the same name –have a large Shiite population and had been governed by the Taliban at that time for over five years.[169]

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[161] ICOMOS, 2009, p47 see footnote 115.

[162] Noting that Psalm 79 -- which says "alien nations have entered Your estate, they have defiled Your Holy Temple, they have laid Jerusalem in ruins" -- carries the caption "A song to Asaf," the Midrash asks: Shouldn't the verse have said "A weeping, A wail or A lament to Asaf"? Why "A song to Asaf"? But this is analogous to a king who built a nuptial home for his son, & had it beautifully plastered, inlaid and decorated. Then this son strayed off to an evil life. So the king came to the nuptial canopy, tore down the tapestries and broke the rails. Upon which the prince's tutor took a flute and began to play. Those who saw him asked: "The king is overturning the nuptial canopy of his son, and you sit and sing?" Said he to them: "I am singing because the king overturned his son's nuptial canopy, and did not vent his wrath upon his son." So, too, it was asked of Asaf: "God destroyed the Temple and Sanctuary, and you sit and sing?" Replied he: "I am singing because G-d vented His wrath upon wood and stone, and did not vent his wrath upon Israel"(Midrash Rabbah, Lament. 4:15). The destruction of the Temple, then, was a constructive deed. Our sins had threatened our relationship with the Almighty; by "venting His wrath" upon the wood & stone of the Temple, G-d deflected the damage to the physical "nuptial home" of the relationship, preserving the integrity of the relationship itself. Found at: _____

In addition to the attack on the statues, the Taliban "attacked" the BBC for biased reporting on the statues question. They closed down the Kabul office of the BBC and expelled its correspondents from the country. "The Taliban also complained that BBC coverage of the demolition of two towering statues of Buddha was hostile and misleading." BBC Correspondent Leaves Kabul After Taliban Closes Office, Amir Shah, AP Worldstream, 3/15, '01; Thur., KABUL, Afghan. 259 words; "A report on BBC radio Tuesday said it was difficult to find Afghans who agreed with the Taliban's iconoclasm." AFP, 3/14/'01, Wed., British "extremely concerned" at expulsion of BBC reporter, 388 wds, LONDON.

[163] See footnotes 119 & 947-H. for Kathy Gannon's views.

[164] Commentary: Threats to Afghan Cultural Heritage Continue. Nancy Hatch Dupree (12/'01). It is likely that Kathy Gannon was repeating what Dr. Hatch-Dupree had published, rather than the other way around. _____

[165] Debris of the past; …The Taliban Have Reduced The Buddhas Of Bamiyan To Rubble. Luke Harding…" The Guardian,Lond. 3/27/01, p.12.

[166] "World's opium source destroyed: Luke Harding in Hadda sees dramatic evidence of the war being waged on the drugs trade by the hardline Taliban", The Observer, Apr. 1/01 Pg. 3, 1190 words _____

[167] S. Frederick Starr, founding chairman of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute [1996] & Silk Road Studies Program [2002], a research and policy center affiliated with the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies and the Institute for Security and Development Policy in Stockholm.," 6/21/01, The Scotsman, "Taleban Wipe Out Drugs Production In Afganistan" Tim Cornwell , Pg. 10,

The same article also included the following two comments – along similar lines: A."Arif Ayub, Pakistan's ambassador to Afghanistan, said recently that Mullah Omar was enraged by the West slapping more sanctions on the Taleban after the terrorist attack on the US navy ship Cole, which was blamed on Bin Laden's network, instead of rewarding it for eradicating poppies. B."The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan has honoured its responsibility to the world," said Amir Mohammed Hakaune, the top anti-drug official in eastern Afghanistan."

[168] See footnote 126, Semple, & 127 AFP

[169] Herat Pr'v., pop ~1.7E6, borders Iran, has ~ as many Shiites as Bamiyan Pr'v. – pop. 0.3E6. Pdf p.1 SEE CH 9 PERSECUT'N OF HAZARAS & SHIITES UNDER TALIBAN

He suggests that, in response to these "acts of vandalism against statues"… "America and the EU are likely to give the nod to Russia if it wants to step up military aid to Massoud." [170] He also says nothing here about the opium poppy ban. We'll see more work of this type from Ahmed Rashid in this book. [171]

It must've appeared remarkable to the Taliban to see the great effort to save the statues – with the whole international diplomatic corps and the global media mobilized in the defense of stone – while almost none of these same people spoke up about the almost miraculous opium poppy ban.

Philippe de Montebello, director of New York's Metropolitan Museum of Art, said he was:

> "horrified at the very notion that some of the great cultural monuments of the world are being deliberately hacked away".[172]

It apparently didn't occur to Count de Montebello that even greater 'cultural monuments of the world' had been 'deliberately hacked away'. The damage had been done by 'The Community of Nations' in imposing sanctions based on lies.

> One of the most important cultural monuments standing at the foundation of any society of enduring worth is that those accused of wrong - doing –like the Taliban – should be brought before an impartial court. The Taliban were condemned by the leading purveyors of 'might makes right' – an ethic that has the potential to turn all of society to dust and rubble.

After the statues were turned to dust and rubble, Japan, the most economically powerful nation of Buddhist heritage, reconfirmed their commitment to provide humanitarian aid to the people of Afghanistan[173]. They reconfirmed their commitment to people over stone. The statues ultimately appeared more important to the world's Art lovers than to religious Buddhists.

On March 16, after the statues had been destroyed, the 24 year old junior Taliban envoy gave an interview to Barbara Crossette of the NYT. The envoy, whose junior status protected him from the expulsion protocol, explained the ban as a response to an otherwise unreported event. He said: "the Islamic government made its decision in a rage after a foreign delegation offered money to preserve the ancient works while a million Afghans faced starvation."

> "The destruction, according to his account, was prompted last month when a visiting delegation of mostly European envoys and a representative of…[UNESCO][174] offered money to protect the giant standing Buddhas at Bamiyan, where the Taliban was engaged in fighting…[their] opposition...[175] Other reports, however, have said the religious leaders were debating the move for months, and ultimately decided that the statues were idolatrous and should be obliterated."[176]

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[170] Taliban Tanks And Artillery Fire On Buddhas; Ahmed Rashid Reports On…Extremist Vandalism, p.18, Daily Telegraph, Lond. 3/03/01

[171] See Append. 10 Ahmed Rashid not reliable on pre 9/11 Taliban . Also see fig 5, p. 17 his comments in connection with opium poppy ban – subsequently admitted to have been "mistaken" & "confused" – but still uncorrected as [9/'16] & Ch. 22c – where he's the 'consultant' – in #3 spot in the credits – for a vicious anti-Taliban film

[172] "Temples Of Doom; Statues Blasted To Dust" Mohammed Gul in Kabul, Herald Sun (Melbourne, Austral.), 3/3/01, Sat., AP, p. 22, 549 wds

[173] **A.** "Japan Grants Emergency Relief Aid To Afghan Refugees" BBC, 3/29/'01, citing: IRNA news agency, Tehran, 27/3/01, "Japanese aid arrives in Afghanistan." AFP, 3/26/01, Internat. news, Islamabad. "Some 16 tonnes of Japanese aid arrived in the western Afghan city of Herat Monday to help more than 90,000 people displaced by drought…Another 12 tonnes of relief goods, including tents, blankets and plastic sheets, was due to arrive later in the week, the IOM said in a statement….Tokyo recently announced almost seven million dollars in emergency assistance for Afghanistan. Only a fraction of the UN's 229-million-dollar annual appeal for Afghanistan has been met so far despite the growing crisis." **B.** This happened even though before the destruction "…Japanese ambassador in Pakistan, Sadaaka Numata, conveyed to his Taliban counterpart, Abdul Salam Zaeef, that the destruction of Buddha statues could put Japanese economic aid to Afghanistan in jeopardy … reminding him that 80 per cent of Japan's population followed Buddha." Deutsche Pr.-Agentur, "UNESCO unable to convince Taliban to preserve statues", Mar.5/01, DATELINE: Islamabad

[174] As noted above [see footnote 128] , UNESCO also tried to stop the united efforts of the Taliban & Ahmed Shah Massoud to transfer Pre-Islamic Afghan art to Switzerland for temporary safe keeping..

[175] **A.** In the afternoon of day NYT story appeared, [see footnote176], & Amb. Ramatullah had met with State Dept. officials, State Dept. spokesman, Boucher, was asked about it at the Daily Press Briefing:

Q …what do you make of Mr. Ramatullah's explanation…that it was done…after a UNESCO…[offer of] money to help preserve these things?

A In our view, these are inaccurate and quite self-serving. The ongoing major assistance from Western donors has been provided to...impoverished Afghans for years. In the current emergency, further help is being provided, including large food shipments … and other support for emergency agencies…in Afghanistan." [EMPHASIS ADDED]

[In State Dept Press Briefing, 2 months later [5/17/01], with Sec. of State Colin Powell as key speaker & other senior State Dept officials, drought was called "worst in Afghanistan's history" by Jeff Lundstead, Dir. for Pak., Afg. & Bangl., Bur. of S. Asian Affairs, State. Powell said "our humanitarian assistance to date this year will reach $124 million. This includes over 200,000 tons of wheat." This also included new aid of $43E6 & 65K tons of wheat anounced at that briefing. He also said "We will continue to look for ways to provide more assistance for Afghans, including those farmers who have felt the impact of the ban on poppy cultivation, a decision by the Taliban that we welcome. We distribute our assistance in Afghanistan through international agencies of the[UN & NGO's].... We provide our relief to the people of Afghanistan, not to Afghanistan's ruling factions. Our aid bypasses the Taliban..." Len Rogers, Dep. Assist. Admin., Bur. of Humanitarian Affairs, USAID, noted "...apparently there has been sufficient discipline inside Afghanistan -- and I don't know the nature of that discipline -- ...to be successful in the poppy bans."

[EMPH. ADDED]. So, it looks like Rogers hadn't seen rept. of Callahan,[C] et al, or didn't fully believe it. C was interv. by B. Crossette, 5/18/01- day after this Press Conf. However, C. 's mission rept writing & wrap up mtg ended 9PM, My 3,Islamab. & team left Islamab. May 4. p. 22&27, Mansfield rpt. See footnote 38&874 & see APP. 2 & 3]

" … Jeff Lundstead said "Sure, I'm the one who talked to him. But…he's not a high official." [ref. to conv. with Hashimi noted in Q&A of 3/16/01] FDCH Political Trans., 3/17/01,…Powell Holds Briefing On Humanitarian Aid To Afghan.]

[Q&A continued from above 3/19/01 press conf. with Boucher]

Q. So you don't you buy his explanation? A. We definitely don't buy this explanation…

Q. Did this come up during the meetings today? A. I'm not sure that this explanation came up. I don't know.

NOTE: HE DOESN"T DENY UNESCO HAD REFUSED THE TALIBAN REQUEST.

B. In '11, in 8 p. rpt on UNESCO's efforts to prevent the destruction– going back to '98- no mention is made of this, or any other possible UN faux pas, or Taliban preventing the looting of the Kabul Art Museum: "UNESCO Action For The Safeguard Of The Statues Of Buddha And The Prevention Of Future Intentional Destruction Of Cultural Heritage" Mounir Bouchenaki, Dir. Gen., ICCROM, Paris, 2 Mar./'11. Former Dir.,Cultural Herit Div., UNESCO,'90-'00, Dir. W'rld Herit. Centre ('98-'00), Dep. Dir.-Gen. for Culture ('00-'06) [see footnote 118]

In the same interview, the young envoy, Sayed Rahmatullah Hashimi, also noted: "If we had wanted to destroy those statues, we could have done it three years ago,… So why didn't we? In our religion, if anything is harmless, we just leave it. If money is going to statues while children are dying of malnutrition next door, then that makes it harmful, and we destroy it."[177] **TEXT CONTINUES ON PAGE 48**

[176] **A.1** "T Explains Buddha Demolition" B.Crossette, NYT 3/19/01 Late Ed. – Fin., A-9-C.1; F'n Desk;, See Also App 16, Footnote 936- 939—a transcript of T Amb.explaining destr. of statues to group at U. of S. Cal. , LA, 3/10/'01 **A.2** After 1700 years Buddhas fall to Taliban dynamite" Ahmed Rashid , Islamabad, Mar.12/'01 The Telegraph. "Mullah Wakil said the edict had been under discussion by the Taliban authorities for mare than a year and did not permit the removeal of the statues to other countries…" **B.1** A rept 5+ yrs. later that cites "Afghan specialist Olivier Roy"___ as key source & makes no mention of reported UNESCO faux pas, opium ban or T's treatment of Jews, claims there's evidence OBL influenced M. Omar to destroy statues. AFP, 10/21/06 "Bin Laden's fingerprints seen on ruins of Bamiyan Buddhas" Selim Saheb Ettaba, 694 wds, Dateline: Bamiyan **B.2** In only article found in LN where Roy comments on T opium poppy ban, he writes: "In the beginning, Pashtuns were happy with the T's re-establishment of law and order and of a Pashtun regime in Kabul. Soon, however, many became upset by the T's purist onslaught on tribal customs, and resented being forced into the army and commanded to cease growing opium poppies at a time of profound economic desperation." EMPHASIS ADDED [many isn't most] NYT, Oct 7/01, "Afghanistan After the T" O. Roy. **C.** 2/27/01 D. Presse-Agentur, World begs T to spare religious sculptures, 18:42 C E Time. 'In Islamabad, T ambassador Abdul Salam Zaeef said that idols in Hindu temples and homes in Afghanistan would not be destroyed. "Religious minorities and their ritual worship are protected in an Islamic state," he told dpa. He dismissed the world's concern for the UNESCO-protected Buddha relics in Afghanistan. "An even larger issue is the suffering of living people because of the United Nations sanctions," he said…'

[177] **A.** Aug 4/'16, rec. inform'l explan. from SRH, incl. results of study he made after '10: story he'd given in '01 was 2nd hand from associate who got it from a sr. T official in Kab. Hard to reach Kand. leaders: few phone lines, always busy/large time diff. After '10, he got better info. GET PERMISSION. [But see RK at **B.12 d**] [The results of my investigation following this lead are summarized at footnote **177-G** – part this very long footnote – on page 48. Abbreviations in Blue found in Part G of this footnote are defined in Blue Initials in the earlier parts of this footnote and notes starting with a Red Letter refer to other parts of this footnote. **Footnote 177-H** gives an important additional reason for why I wrote this sefer.]

B.0.a Carla Grissmann[CG 1928-2/15/'11] author, 3.8k word article on Museum in Enc. Iranica. [B6] [See footnote 947H] _____ **B.0.b** From NYC, worked 3 decades at Kabul Mus'm[KM] & one of very few people who knew where Museum's treasures were hidden; **B.0.c** journalist at Jerus. Post bef. '70, Obit, 1.3k wd Telegraph [Lond], Apr 8/'11 & Notice: Mar.12/'71 p. 11,c4, The Daily Register. Red Bank-Middletown, N. J. **B.0.d** "…a Mother Teresa without the religious overlay, the most trusted American in Afghanistan, a self-effacing person with an amazing ability to get those around her to drop pretense and do the humanly-right thing." Remembering [CG], 11/16/11, Karl Drobnic, _____ **B.0.e** "[CG] was kind, quiet, hardworking, friendly, and respectful to everyone. She believed in the goodness of humanity, and for her there was no difference between black and white. She lived simply, but with great dignity… may her soul rest in peace." P.6-8,"The Carla I Knew" Omara Khan Massoudi, [OKM] Dir., Nat'l Mus'm of Afghan'n,[email sent Nov/10/16 _____]in Essays In Memory of Carla Grissmann, 1928-2011 Jolyon Leslie, ed. Kabul,10/'15 [EMCG]; **B.0.f** "…she worked closely with everyone at the museum, from the Director on down to storekeepers,guards, and cleaners; a hard task master determined to pass on not only her skills but her work ethics as well." P 33 NHD in EMCG **B.0.g** "Bamiyan's Buddhas were dynamited on 8 March 2001 while Carla attended an international conference on Afghanistan's cultural heritage in Paris." P. 45 NHD in EMCG **B.0.h** " Wherever Carla worked, her ability to relate positively with people of all nationalities and all walks of life, from ambassadors to illiterate gardeners, was obvious." P65 "[CG] At The Asia Foundation" Elizabeth White, p63-66, EMCG **B.0.i.1** " Was there anything fun or interesting that didn't make the final draft? …an Afghan bank official… claimed he had been tortured by the Taliban and refused to reveal where the works were hidden. [CG]…told me this was absolutely untrue…." [CG] deserves a great deal of credit for spotting eight of the pieces in the exhibition on the black market in Peshawar… stolen from the …Museum... She bought them on the spot and placed them in safekeeping." Richard Covington [RC] on "Lost & Found" Smithsonian.com _____ **B.0.i.2** "Since keys to the [safe with the Bactrian gold] safe could not be found, a locksmith had been summoned. It took just 15 minutes for him to penetrate it with a circular saw… During the past year,[2007?] about 7,000 visitors came to the museum [2-4/hr?]; the numbers seem to matter less than the symbolic importance of keeping the building open." RC "Lost & Found" Smithsonian Mag. 9/ [NOTE: These 3 comments by RC & CG, here & at at **B.0.i.2** suggest the Taliban could have opened the safes just as easily whenever they wanted to —but chose not to. ASA] **B.0.j** In memoriam – in Russian _____ **B.0.k i** "[CG]… has the gift of making friends without vocabulary." **ii**"… on her first day at the National Museum... [CG]…found the lavatory there embedded in dirt – 'it hadn't been cleaned for twenty years' – and…set to with her Swiss army knife, boiling water, ammonia and some willing security guards. 'After four days it was gleaming,' she says with satisfaction." **iii** 'The deputy culture minister had six children,' Grissmann says, 'and one of them, a boy, fell off a wall. I prayed for him while he spent five nights at his son's bedside.' The son recovered.' **iv** 'I walked in [to the office of *Realités*], God being great, at just the moment they needed an assistant editor'; [2.4k wds, nothing on incident noted at B.1] 'Interview: Carla Grissman' Hermione Eyre,[HE] Steppe, #8, Winter '10 _____ Email sent to her web page/agent for HE's book "Viper and Wine" _____ The contrast between the title & content of this book & CG's book [see below, B.2] suggests that HE not on CG's wavelength. **B.0.i.1** "Most of all, I would like to thank [CG]… Her candor, her patience, and most of all her fact- (and reality) checking were invaluable." [after a list of 18 people] p4 of 85. **B.0.i.2** "[T]he Tillya Tepe treasure…in 1988… was placed in a vault… in the Presidential Palace. The Afghan government, the museum staff and the international community associated with the museum at the time were all aware …it was by no means considered a "secret hiding place" as the media …led the world to believe …almost 20 years later. [CG said]… "everyone knew where they were stored."" p. 24. **B.0.i.3** "A few ethnographic objects were put on display, again for a one day exhibition, in celebration of Afghan Independence Day on 17 August 2000." citing footnote 137 'Grissmann, interview by author, 28 October 2007" p. 30 [NOTE: ASA The quote in red is from KM not from CG tho' CG, as shown , is cited as the source of the info. Nothing in thesis about incident at **B.1&2] B.0.i.4** '…it was thanks to the …museum staff to save the broken shards of objects destroyed by the Taliban, that they could perhaps eventually be pieced back together one day. CG described the scene left by the Taliban: "You have to imagine chaotic ankle-deep torn brown paper wrappings, thousands of stucco, clay, schist fragments. The museum staff didn't throw anything away but carted even the smallest pieces to the museum for sorting through." P32, citing Aug 12, 2007 interview with CG. **B.0.i.1-4** from Karalyn Monteil [KM], "A case study investigation of the impact of war on the National Museum of Afghanistan and the efforts of the international community to revive it." MA Thesis, Museum Studies, U. of Leicester, '07 . No words connected with word Hindu in thesis; 6 words connected with word Buddha do. **B.1** "…in August 2000, the moderate Mullah[Mawlawi Abdurahman Ahmad] Hotaki [deputy minister of culture and information [info. in brackets from: The Globe and Mail (Canada)Aug/12/98, 'Taliban winning war but legitimacy may be more elusive U.S., Russia, Iran wary of Afghan militants' demand for international recognition', Hugh Pope, WSJ, Pg. A12, 548 words, Dateline: Kabul; The name Hotaki is assoc. with the Hotak div. of Pashtuns, same as MO, generally found in Kandahar, where there was a short lived dynasty of kings with name Hotaki] proposed mounting an exhibition to mark the museum's rudimentary reorganization. He invited fifty rural mullahs to the opening. [**B.1a** NOTE: would Hotaki invite two Taliban officials, Defense Minister Obeidullah & Deputy Prime Minister, Mullah Hassan, as stated in KG's scenario [See **D.12**] who were senior to him – mixed in with what CG calls rural mullahs? More likely , they were actual rural mullahs – identifiable by their language & accents as Kandahari or Southern Pashtun – perhaps they were of Hotaki's tribe or ancestral area -- & Hotaki wasn't prepared for their visceral – but very traditional-- reaction to the type of life size, realistic 'idols' they had never seen before . ASA] **B.1b** The centrepiece of the show was a partially draped figure, an exquisite fourth-century painted clay Bodhisattva. Without warning, one of the mullahs spat at the Buddha. Then, like poison spreading from a wound, the other men started to beat the brittle clay with their bare hands. `That was where it started,' Carla tells me, unable to keep the emotion out of her voice, 'and we didn't get the message. These semi-literate, provincial mullahs were only doing what they had been taught to do.' The Taliban believed that the depiction of living creatures promoted idolatry and was 'un-Islamic'. The rural mullahs were hurried away to the next room but, six months after the incident,[NOTE: mid 2/'01.For related events in that Feb.see footnotes142,144&947G] a high-ranking delegation led by Qadratullah Jamal,[QJ] the Minister of Culture, arrived at the door with sledgehammers, axes and armed guards. Day after day for two months,[*This 2 months is not a direct quote from CG . She may have been referring to the two months of Feb and March – not to an ~60 day period.* ASA] they broke into tin trunks, opened packing cases, removed the carefully wrapped objects and smashed them. When they finished, they drove to Bamiyan to blow up the massive Buddhas…'The delegation laughed like children as they smashed the statues,' says Carla. She looks away and touches the corner of her eye. 'The museum employees could do nothing but watch.'"[Interviewed in KM, '04, underscored CG quotes added. From: Magic Bus: On the Hippie Trail from Istanbul to India. Rory MacLean, [RM]Viking, 6/'06] **B.2** "She told me about the event she believes was the starting point for the Buddha outrage: the day a group of mullahs came and began to hit a Buddha on display because it "had a human face". The staff stopped them, after which the mullahs took their rage elsewhere. The dynamiting could have been stopped, she believes, had Unesco and Western governments taken the trouble to involve "people like me who understand the country" instead of sending people who knew nothing and used confrontational tactics that immediately got the authorities' backs up".[see B.0.g]Interv.,CG's flat, Fulham Rd, London, ~mid '01, 'Light Years from New York', Maureen Freely,[MF] review, Dinner of Herbs, CG, [Arcadia] pub. 2/15/01] & Eland Books. #24/'01, Cornucopia [Mag.], email to MF 9/13/16____ [see footnote 947A For example of 'confrontl' rhet.,] Title from: Prov.15:17: 'Better *is* a dinner of herbs where love is, Than a fatted calf with hatred.'

טוֹב אֲרֻחַת יָרָק וְאַהֲבָה-שָׁם מִשּׁוֹר אָבוּס, וְשִׂנְאָה-בו.

B.3 "True to character, when the material from the collection that had been stored in the vault at the Arg palace in Kabul was opened in 2004, Carla was there to witness the process – although she later admitted that she found the fanfare with which the members of the government used the occasion to present themselves as saviours of cultural property a travesty. …only she had the knowledge to ensure that everything was accounted for in the museum. " Jolyon Leslie, former director of the Agha Khan Cultural Foundation **B.4** "During the civil war, 14 rockets were fired at the museum in one day. Carla and I were both there. She wasn't scared. She was just crying for the war and the losses of people and of the pieces of the collection." *Omari Khan Massudi, Dir. of Afgh. Nat'l Mus.* [Emphasis added – note – people before things.] **B.5** "In August 2000 to celebrate Afghanistan Independence Day, the Museum opened for the first time in more than a decade, with the full support of the Taleban authorities, including the then president of the museum, Naqibullah Ahmadyar, who explained why the Taleban supported the exhibit, despite there being statues of human beings on display: "It's nothing to do with ideology. It's about the culture and history of the country and how the country has been defined by them….." Six months later of course, those statues were smashed, but after 2001, many of the shards were lovingly and painstakingly put back together and the statues can be seen again at the museum.'[note to memorial by AAN's snr. analyst, Kate Clark. Parts **B.3-5** from '[CG],Defender of the Kabul Museum Remembered (amended)' Author: Kate Clark, Afghanistan Analysts Network, 2/20/'11 [EMPH. ADDED] _____ **B.6** " From 1997 to 2000 the Museum staff, now numbering only 20 [Note: 71 in pre-Taliban 1996], continued sporadic work on the inventory with the support of the Taleban Deputy Minister of Culture. Restoration of the ground floor and façade of the Museum was carried out. As the Taleban needed an official guesthouse, the objects stored in the Kabul Hotel were…[moved to the MIC]…In June 2000 a Taleban decree was issued in Kandahar by MO protecting all cultural and historic relics of Afghanistan and making illegal excavations and smuggling of artifacts out of Afghanistan punishable by law. That same year, to commemorate Afghan independence in August, the Kabul Museum was ceremoniously opened for four days…[Note: Nothing on incident noted at **B.1&2**] On [2/26/'01]…Mullah `Omar reversed his earlier decree…" Kabul Museum CG Enc. Iranica, 3.8k wds. _____ **B.7** A similar rept "Saving Afghanistan's Heritage" by CG & Frederik Hiebert (National Geog. Soc) notes "…in July 2000, a [Taliban] ministry [of Information and Culture] commission unofficially confirmed that the seals on the Tilya Tepe [Bactrian] gold and the numerous museum trunks in the bank vault and the ministry were still intact. Mullah Omar [MO]issued an edict protecting all cultural and historical relics of Afghanisan and making illegal excavation and smuggling of artificats out of Afghanistan punishable by law. The good news lasted only a short time. In March 2001, the world watched in impotent shock as the Taliban dynamited the Bamiyan Buddhas, destroyed major objects in the Kabul Museum, and vandalized the ministry and museum storerooms. [Note , nothing on **B.1&2** & no attempt to explain Taliban about-face.] p. 47-53 Afghanistan: Hidden Treasures from the National Museum, Kabul, Ed.: Frederik Hiebert & Pierre Cambon, 303p, National Geog, '08. OKM [**B.0.e**], p39, same book, gives false impression museum's storerooms were "looted and destroyed" by Taliban, when they took Kabul in '96; CG says, p. 47-8, this was in early '96, before Taliban. **B.8** "In 1999, a Taliban edict called for the protection of all historic and cultural relics of Afghanistan and made any illegal excavations or illicit trading of objects punishable by law. The sudden reversal of this mandate in March 2001,[[Note, nothing on [B.1&2] & or explanation of reversal.] as the world watched the dynamiting of the Bamiyan Buddhas in impotent horror, has yet again put the future of Afghanistan's cultural heritage on the edge of obliteration." ICOMOS World Report 2001-2002 on monuments and sites in danger: Afghanistan, CG _____ **B.9** "[The Museum opened]… Afghan Independence Day, [8/17/'00]… [&] looked wonderful. All bullet/rocket/shell damage to façade had been filled in, smoothed over and painted. There were 24 objects on display in the entrance and hall/way…including the superb clay Bodhisattva from Tepe Maranjan….Before the ribbon was cut there were speeches and an academic paper on [~1850 yr old] Rabatak inscription [Note: not damaged by Taliban]. Quite a number of people visited the museum after the 17th, but by August 23, everything was packed up again…" CG, p.10 SPACH Newslet., #7, 7/'01 **B.10** "CG… organized the exhibition[which opened 8/17] on behalf of SPACH…The BBC gave full coverage to the event on television and radio.[BBC Kabul correspondent 17/8/'00, 13:02 GMT 14:02 UK Afghan national museum reopens] Several high-ranking Taliban, including the Ministers of Education and Foreign Affairs, also attended. … The Rabatak inscription, was the centerpiece … Mr. Ferowsi, director of the Institute of Archaeology, gave an interpretation of its meaning. [also shown]…was the clay Bodhisattva from Tepe Maranjan. Within days, however, all exhibition artifacts…, were returned to the safer premises of the [MIC]..." The Retrieval of the Rabatak Inscription, Robert Kluyver[RK] p. 17-18, 10/'00 SPACH Newsletter, #7, 7/'01[Note, nothing on B.1,2 at B.9,10] **B.11** CG attended Colloque International 'Patrimoines D'Asie Centrale', UNESCO HQ, Paris, Mar 2/'01, "I can remember her …commenting briefly in public at this occasion in a trembling voice." "I knew Carla well and she spoke to me about what she has seen. Yes, she never wrote anything on this, at least to my knowledge." N/1/'16 Email rec. from Prof. C. Osmund Bopearachchi,[OB] ___ OB gave paper, &PBD & RK; sent pdf #407,N/2; 1st call to UNESCO: D. Loundras, Amb.Gr. to Pak & Chair, SPACH.p 229, _____**B.12** Rec email from RK Robert Kluijver 6/6/'17 (_____) with cc's to christopher.melchert@pmb.ox.ac.uk jjelias@sas.upenn.edu ; barnett.rubin@nyu.edu ; strickarchive@gmail.com & BCC's to MH & NM[see footnote 295]**B.12 a** on "50 rural mullahs" incident [see CG B.1][*Text in black is from ASA's letter to Prof Christopher Melchert & others May 8, 2017 at 5:31 PM which had been forwarded to RK [by unknown at this time] Times New Roman Text in red is from response of RK – which was inserted in red in text of original letter. Bracketed Italics are subsequent insertions by ASA – as this.*] I was in Kabul at the time, although I didn't witness the incident. I can confirm it happened, as it was witnessed and commented upon by my Afghan colleagues. It was a 4th century clay Bodhisattva found at Tepe Maranjan, Kabul. They began spitting at it and hitting it with their bare hands. Not all '50' (nobody counted them, approximate number) but just a few of them. However their actions drew the approval of the other present mullahs. The museum staff ushered them into another part of the museum. This was in August of 2000 -- on the 2nd or 3rd day of the opening of the Kabul Museum. Correct The first day of the opening included senior Taliban officials, notable scholars and a scientific paper on a newly discovered dual script inscription-- the Rabatak Stone…The BBC was there -- together with other reporters and photographers. There were apparently no reporters or 'dignitaries" on hand for the events with the "50 rural mullahs" observed by Ms. Grissmann. That's right…What appears to have happened is that the "50 rural mullahs" who were religiously offended by that Buddhist statue -- took their complaints about it to the leading Moslem Scholars. These scholars took the question seriously, deliberated for some months and then announced their decision -- that all such statues be destroyed. However, they did not announce it publicly. They gave the decision to the Taliban -- the executive arm of Islam in Afghanistan -- to act on it -- and to do the actual work of destruction. I imagine the Taliban were also given a timetable: the destruction must start before a certain date and finish by another certain date. I also imagine that before the scholars reached their decision, they ordered that nothing be done to the statues -- that they should not be damaged, sold or removed from the country -- until their formal ruling was made. Your speculations seem to make sense, but I cannot corroborate. [**B.12 b**] What I can add is that a 'secret edict' (farman) by

Mollah Omar had been sent to the Ministry of Information and Culture as early as November 2000. The edict requested the Ministry to provide a full list of all the pre-Islamic artefacts in its possession, and to authorize the transfer of that collection to an undisclosed location, and in the meanwhile to strictly guard it. A reliable source read it in the office of the Deputy Minister of Culture (Hotaki) and told me about it. I informed the board of directors of SPACH, most of them Western diplomats, but they did not believe the Taliban could make such a 180 degree turn in policy without announcing it. [B.12 c] A delegation of these diplomats (none of whom attended the museum opening in August 2000, to the Taliban's great chagrin) went to Kabul (I believe it was early December) to seek confirmation of the Taliban's continued protection of cultural heritage. They spoke with Qudratullah Jamal, the Minister, who had never been in favour of cultural heritage preservation and didn't like dealing with such foreigners. [*But see* footnote 128.B-D] He gave them this reassurance (a lie, given that he knew of the secret edict) [*It need not be understood as a lie - as the concentration of the artifacts in one secret place would facilitate their rapid transfer out of the country- e.g. to Switzerland* [see F.4a]-- *or temporary burial if these options arose in the wake of the Ulema decision & actions of the UNSC.*] [B.12 d] [The Ulema decision could have also included a minority opinion that allowed the statues to be removed from the country to a place—like the Afghanistan Museum in Exile in Switzerland – where they would not be worshipped.[see footnote 75 for an example of different opinions among Moslem Scholars in Afghan.] Added by ASA6/20/17] and it was then that the offer was made to fund the preservation of the Buddhas. As you note in your book, this offer provoked anger among the Taliban leadership, in combination with the hardening of the sanctions in the midst of a serious drought, the non-recognition of the successful opium ban, the expulsion of Taliban diplomats from New York and elsewhere and other measures to snub the Taliban and increase the hardship in Afghanistan. [B.12 e] I agree with one of your main conclusions, that there is no evidence that the decision to destroy the Buddhas was the result of pressure by, or the sign of increased influence by, 'Osama Ben Laden' or any of his Arab sympathizers. It is much more likely a measured response by the Taliban to the international community, and they based themselves on the ulama's decision. [B.12 f] [see footnote 938 where SRH says it was *"UNESCO and NGO from Sweden, or from one of these Scandinavian countries Norway, Sweden"* & see footnote 939 A *which notes that SRH said the delegation was made up of* a. *"Western Diplomats" offering to repair the statues,* b. *"the United Nations and some foreign visitors…" The SPACH executive committee at the time was almost entirely western diplomats and UN officials with one Amb. from Norway & 1 member from UNESCO. 4 were diplomats from countries on the UNSC including permanent member France.*] [B.12 g] The following listing of Exec. Com. members, is taken from SPACH Newsletter, issue 7 July 2001, H.E. Dimitrios G. Loundras, Chair, Amb. of Greece; Nancy H. Dupree, Vice-Chair, ACBAR/ARIC, US Citizen; Mirella Dummar Frahi, Treasurer, UNDP/UNOCHA [wife of Bernard Frahi? Fr./ It. Citizen; Roberto Palarino, Embassy of Argentina; H.E. Ferry de Kerckhove, Canadian High Commissioner; Ms. Kaija Ilander, Charge d'Affaires of Finland; Jean-Yves Berthault, Charge d'Affaires, France; H.E. Angelo Gabriele De Ceglie, Amb. of Italy; H.E. Mr. Sadaaki Numata, Amb. of Japan; H.E. Mr. Jaap A Walkate, Amb. of the Netherlands; H.E. Mr. Tore Toreng, Amb. of Norway; H.E. Christian Dunant, Amb. of Switzerland; Prof. A. H. Dani, Qaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad, Pak.; Michael A. Sackett, UN coordinator; Mrs. Anjum Riazul Haque, UNESCO; Ms. Brigitte Neubacher, Programme Coordinator, SPACH; Mr. Ehsanullah Mamundzai, Administrative & Finance Officer,SPACH. [B.12 h] Of the 10 country representatives, all but the Jap. Amb. were Western Diplomats. Of the 9 Western Diplomats, 4 represented countries on the Security Council [see footnote 137A for complete list of UNSC members & their votes on sanctions] ; 1 of these 4, France, was a veto carrying permanent member. All of these 4 [in blue, Arg, Can,Fr,Neth] voted for sanctions. 3 other Exec Com members were UN officials; of three civilians, one – the Vice Chair- was a US citizen. The US, a permanent member of the UNSC, voted for sanctions; the two remaining civilians were from Pakistan/Afghanistan. [B.12 i] "There was a tragic setback early in the year 2001 when the Tali ban reversed an earlier edict by their supreme leader Mullah Omar and destroyed the two Bamiyan Buddhas, despite the outcries of the international community worldwide. Destruction was also reported from Ghazni and in the Kabul Museum where unique pieces of art have vanished." Dimitrios M. Loundras, pdf p 2 of 24.[Issue 6 is dated May, 2000.]

C.1 Nancy Hatch-Dupree [NHD] "In the closing months of 2000 it was evident that hardliners within the T...were gaining the upper hand...under the direction of their Arab guests... The saga of the destruction at Bamiyan began in July 2000 when [MO]..., following the advice of the Supreme Court and Council of Ministers ordered ...The Ministry for the Prevention of Vice and the Promotion of Virtue [NOTE: Should be "Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice".] to determine the appropriateness, according to Shariah law, of the National Museums holdings. C.2... On 6 Feb 2001 orders were given to destroy an unspecified number of offending objects in the museum; on [26/2/01, MO] issued an edict mandating the destruction of all non-Islamic objects; on 8 and 9 March the Bamiyan Buddhas were dynamited. MO seemed unconcerned that his edict negated those that he had previously issued mandating the protection of the cultural heritage. There can be no more telling proof that he and his associates no longer excercised control. But even this was not enough. On 17 March...[Min. of Info.& Culture, QJ],....personally continued the iconoclastic campaign by smashing to bits with a sledge hammer some of the museums most popular sculptures."[Note: There are no refs in 284 wd sect of 13 p. paper with 19 bibliog. items. ~100 words before this section, NHD's statement: "No losses were reported [of Kabul Museum objects] after the Taliban took over." cites CG "The recent History of the Kabul Museum" p4-9, SPACH Newsletter #7,. July 2001. ASA] Cultural Heritage And National Identity In Afghanistan, NHD, Third World Quart., v 23, #5, '02 p 977-89 [EMPH. ADDED] _____ C.3 "…[17/8/'00…Deputy Minster Hotaki staged a symbolic 3-day opening of the museum... Supportive leaders in the ministry were dismissed and hardliner [QJ]was appointed Minister of Information and Culture in October.[[NOTE: But QJ worked closely with PBD, see footnote 128-B] These menacing moves culminated in a cabinet meeting in [2/01]... at which, after hours of debate, without consensus, the momentous decision to blow up the Bamiyan Buddhas was taken. Mullah Omar's edict ordering the destruction of all non--Islamic sculptures in Afghanistan followed on the 26th" [citing: [KM], p. 64, supra B.0.i –but underscored text not in KM's work!] NHD, p. 44 "Safeguarding Afghanistan's Cultural Heritage" p32-49, EMCG [B.0.e] [Underscore added]

D. Kathy Gannon's[KG] version: Her book, , I is for Infidel [Public Affairs Pr., '05] ch. 'The Taliban Bloodied', devoted to showing BL manipulated Taliban [T] into blowing up Bamiyan statues. She ends ch. D.1 "The destruction of the Buddha statues guaranteed that the rupture with the West would be permanent. Al Qaeda had to have been far along in its planning for the 9/11 attacks.... Perhaps [BL]... was already thinking about the aftermath of those attacks...[H]e would need a sanctuary... that only a country that was irredeemably outside the international consensus could provide. [BL]... helped create such a country... When he issued the edict ordering the statues destroyed, Mullah Omar [MO] became a symbol to Muslim extremists... How, then, could he ever hand over BL, a great Islamic jihadist...who would achieve the most brutal mass murder on American soil in modern times? He could never betray such a man to infidels. It was checkmate. [BL]...had won." D.2 [NOTE: MO wasn't an "extremist" who countenanced even ordinary murder – of Americans or Jews. He didn't turn over BL for lack of a proper Sharia Law venue, not out of support for BL's program. [SEE CH. 5 ON THIS] The easiest way for MO to have alienated the world & gained support of Wahabi Jihadis would've been to murder at least one of the two Jews, God Forbid – as called for by BL in his Jihad against Jews…" [See footnote 26]. But, as has already been pointed out, the 2 Jews were treated with respect.] D.3 "The Taliban Bloodied" – has several important observations by KG. The most relavant here is her rept. of defeat of the T in Mazar-e-Sharif in May '97: [p. 72] "As the Red Cross was looking for volunteers to pick up the dead, [I saw that] Shiite Muslims were still mutilating bodies." [Note: A more complete version of this rept is in CH. 10 on the death of Sheikh Mazari – see footnote 292] [D.4 Note: This mutilation of T by Shiite/Hazaras [S/H] may've led to mutilation of S/H in Bamiyan by T led by Dadullah. [see footnote 718-B] D.5.a KG's very next statement, however betrays a problem with the chapter & the entire book. "The defeat of Mazar-e-Sharif was the Taliban's first loss and it had been brutal." But the T had suffered a major loss in early '95 – when they'd been driven from Kabul & it took 1.5 years– to the fall of '96-- before they could take & hold it. In her treatment of the battle of Mazar in '97 –which the T retook & held in '98 –KG doesn't mention top S/H leader Mazari- from Mazar & buried there with a large funeral after T, when defeated in Kabul in '95, had reportedly tortured him & thrown him to his death from a helicopter. This may've been a key motivator in S/H attack on Taliban in Mazari's home town. KG doesn't mention Mazari in her book.[See CH. 10: DID THE TALIBAN THROW SHEIKH ABDUL ALI MAZARI OUT OF A HELICOPTER?] D.5.b She also doesn't appear to say why the warlords fought so hard for Mazar-i-Sharif –eg: exorbitant tolls on nearby Hairatan Bridge to Central Asia & royalties on local gas fields. [See CH. 13: WHAT WERE THE ENEMIES OF THE TALIBAN FIGHTING OVER? GIANT CHECKPOINTS] D.6 KG also doesn't appear to mention any of the Taliban Government's domestic sources of revenue, eg: normative Shariah Law taxes on harvests, etc. [see CH. 18: WHERE DID THE TALIBAN GET THEIR MONEY?] The only sources of Taliban Government's funding mentioned are from outside: Pak., S. Arabia, UAE [p.45] & BL. Thus, when, on p 77, she writes: "In Dec.…'00, …[BL] and al Qaeda were financing the defense and intelligence ministries…." – we have little reason from her book to question this. D.7.a.1 Her source for most inside info. appears to be Mullah Khaksar [MK] [name found 37X in book]. KG tells us she first met him in '99, when he was Deputy Interior Minister in Kabul – but that he'd been T's intelligence chief. In 1st mention of him found in LN search-- 12/14/96 –he's "minister of accountability" – in Karachi, for "medical check-up". "Seven Afghans stoned to death for adultery in six weeks". This, as mentioned where previously cited, [see footnote 60-B] is a garbled report. It may've been garbled at the source – by MK. It's the only ref. to a "minister for accountability" [/'…of accountability'/"accountability min…'] connected with T in '94-8/'01. There's nothing in LN in this period ref'ng to him as Intelligence Chief. He's ref. to as "deputy interior minister" 4/27/97, & on 10/14/97 as "Interior minister"—having been "given the ministerial post after the T seized Kabul in September last year." From 8/16/97 to just bef. 9/11 he's ref. to 8 more times –but only as "deputy interior minister" He was 1st T official to defect to US [11/30/01, Wash. Post, 'Defector Says BL Had Cash, T In His Pocket', Peter Baker, Pg. A01, 1439 wds, Dateline: Kabul, "U.S. intelligence agencies have described in detail how BL bankrolled the T, providing an estimated $ 100 million in cash and military assistance since 1996."[Article says nothing about money from taxes etc, or opium poppy ban. see CH. 28 TOOLS FOR DETECTING PROPAGANDA] D.7.a.2 To add another element of perspective to this purported $100E6 from BL, the US withheld ~$200E6 in Afghan. Gold Reserves held in US Fed. Reserve Bank -- from T from '96 – because it refused to recog. them. 'U.S. Plans Release of $221 Million in Afghan Assets', Alan Sipress 1/15/'02, Wash. Post D.7.b. Biographical Encyclopedia of Afghanistan, [BEA] L. D Adamec, Pentagon Press [India] '08, p.88, has "A police officer who took the title mullah during the T regime. During…Karmal's government he went to Moscow & allegedly studied for three years in the field of intelligence under the supervision of the KGB. He was an active member of Khalq.[Marxist group, see footnote 823-B] During the communist government he was working as director of zone 12 for Khad [Communist secret police under Najib.]. He switched sides and became T deputy minister of the interior and a member of the supreme council advising [MO] … An Achakzai Pashtun and Native of Kandahar, born about 1960." D.8.a He'sintroduced in KG's book, in his Interior Ministry office seated "…smoking a cigarette…The room was full of burly men with beards."[p22] This is curious – as the T had banned smoking at sporting events more than a year before [6/23/97 see footnote 703] Smoking tobacco in Islam – according to the Deobandi school, is makrooh–disapproved but not forbidden _____ _____ D.8.b [NOTE. ASA Amir Shah[AS], KG's fixer/translator was the one who met MK in above scene. He'd gone to rescue his Hazara "elderly uncle" "Haji Jan" who'd been arrested for no apparent reason by one of MK's police. After meeting with AS, MK had AS's relative released & policeman apologized to the family for arrest but wasn't punished-tho' he was apparently guilty of kidnapping or hostage taking for ransom . This could've been a set-up for MK to ingratiate himself to AS & KG. These events were after bombings in Kenya & Tanz. & US cruise missile attack on Afgh. 8/'98. KG only says she first met MK in '99– not what month. He could've been looking for 'US friends' if T became US enemy. D.9 Here's heart of KG's argument [p78-81] "The destruction of the statues provides one of the most significant pieces of evidence of [BL's]… total control over the T. …Left to himself, [MO]… called them a national treasure and suggested that they might be a source of income. In late 1999, just sixteen months before they were destroyed, [MO]… ordered them protected… D.10 "Any, excavation or trading in cultural heritage objects is strongly forbidden and will be punished...The famous Buddhist statues at Bamiyan were made before the event of Islam in Afghanistan, and are amongst the largest of the kind …in the world. In Afghanistan there are no Buddhists to worship the statues. …The government further considers the Bamiyan statues …a potential major source of income for Afghanistan from international visitors….Further, international Buddhist communities recently issued a warning that in case the Bamiyan statues are damaged, then mosques will be damaged in their regions. The Muslims of the world are paying attention to this declaration. The Taliban government states that Bamiyan will not be destroyed but protected." [NOTE: A more complete text of decrees of MO on this subject may be found on p 64 of KM thesis – see B.0.l , supra] D.11 "…In the…[Aug.10/'00], issue of the Gazetteer, the official government record issued by the T's Justice Ministry, the T government was ordered "to take proper measures, with the help…of concerned institutions, for supporting preservation, maintenance and repair of cultural &/or historical monuments." D.12 "In August 2000, the T even opened the…National Museum …The T who were closest to [BL], particularly Defense Minister Obeidullah [from Panjvai, Kandahar, p31, US DOD Information Rept. Nov.7/'01, Biographical Data on [MO] and Senior Members of the T _____] and the deputy prime minister, Mullah Hassan, [Same as M. Muhammad Hassan, Gov. Kandahar Prov.[from BEA] see footnote 75] reacted with outrage to one of the museum's most prominent artifacts: a naked 2,000-year-old seated bodhisattva, made of baked clay, wearing only an earring, armband, and necklace. Both men, whose ministries and personal wealth depended on [BL]… , publicly slapped the naked statue across the head and shoulders to show their disgust at its nakedness. [BL]… seized the moment: In the T central council, he denounced the presence of statues anywhere in Afghanistan. Without mentioning them by name, it was clear he had his sights on the giant statues in Bamiyan. Against the backdrop of new UN sanctions and increasingly belligerent international statements, the few remaining moderate T voices were overwhelmed. Instead, [BL's] … hardliner rhetoric set the policy, and he campaigned vigorously for the destruction of the statues, knowing the symbolic value of the act. He knew it would cement the world's revulsion toward the Taliban. [EMPH. ADDED] D.13 "No one listened to those seeking to preserve the statues, some of whom went to Mullah Hassan's home in Kabul during …the debate to plead with him to save the statues. The final decision was up to [MO]…, who sought [BL's]… direction. [BL]… said destroy them. On…[2/26/01], an edict was issued in [MO's]… name. It read : D.14a see footnote 155 for most complete text of edict. D.14b [NOTE: No mention in book of attack on museum, [E.1, E.2b E.2d, E.2e & actually noted by KG at 947G] which was~ 3 wks before attack on statues & ≥2 wks before MO decreed their destruction. Further, reporters & others were not at first allowed to see this destruction and it was denied by T officials – tho' according to B.2, it was led by "a high-ranking delegation led by QJ] the Minister of Culture D.15 "… in March 2001, the T took a few journalists to Bamiyan. …[AS]… traveled with me... We were piled into pickup trucks for the ride to where the statues had been. [When]…two truckloads of fighters passed us. [AS] …whispered: "All of them are Arabs". The destruction had been professional…' D.16 [Note: a. 'destruction had been prof.': experts were used –likely not from Afgh. but from Arabia – maybe BL's Co. Doesn't mean decision was BL's or his conspiracy. Remarkably, CG, who actually saw who started ruckus, not in KG's book. b. Even more remarkable as KG cites CG in 2 contemporaneous articles on statues destruction.[see footnotes 947-F&G 3/21 &13/'01] The 3/21/01 report says the "naked" statue "enraged the T leaders, [according to]… several people who had attended the opening. The T apparently slapped the statue around the head and shoulders, causing the museum workers to buy a glass case to protect it." D.17 [Note: a. Book has no ref's to Deoband or different punishment methods: Wahabi vs. Deobandi/T–e.g.: adultery: beheading vs. stoning. Yet we have: Apr. 9/01, "Hundreds of thousands of religious radicals pay tribute to hardline Islam" KG, 779 words, Dateline: Peshawar, Pak., where Deoband is clearly noted as the source of T Islam & 'Wahabi' isn't there. b. same # judicial executions in Kabul in '96-'97 & '00 [SEE APP. 18 & [19 [incl. note D.]] – no 'hardening'. c. No mention of Durand line by KG before '09 – 4 yrs after book was pub. & there seems to be no mention of the 'Pashtuns on both sides of the border' issue in book. d. Tho' at D.5.b & D.6, supra, it's noted that the book appears to say nothing about 1. money warlords were fighting over, e.g.: customs at border crossings – or 2.: legit sources of money for T, both are noted by KG in her book-talk at CFR– where she'd had E. R. Murrow Press Fellowship in Sep/03-Jun/'04 [working on book?]. 9/28/05, FNS, CFR meeting 'Inside Afghanistan' Speaker: KG, Author, I Is For Infidel…, Presider: Steve Coll, The New Yorker, 8370 Wds: "[Ismail Khan was] getting $125 [from ea. 100's of trucks/day from Iran]… coming into Herat… a huge amount of money for the national exchequer". [see footnote 595B] e. Book fails tests A:1&2 "They show T receiving…support from outside… sources but don't mention:– legit. income & Durand line – noted in CH 28:… DETECTING PROPAGANDA D.18 rec. reply from KG 9/20/'16 thru facebook & sent reply, rec resp 9/20 & sent pdf of # 400 9/21 by email. [see more bottom right , p 248]

E.0 LexisNexis[LN] search [Aug 5/'16] on opening of Kabul Museum [KM] [suggested as key point by SRH in 8/04/'16 email], found: E.1 [not LN] Feb 12/01 [Mon. 9:56GMT] BBC, Kate Clark, Kabul, 'Reports in Kabul say senior T have destroyed more than a dozen ancient statues in[KM]…. Reports started to circulate last week that the T…destroyed…statues of the Buddha dating back nearly 2,000 years. The T have denied the reports, but have prevented anyone going to the museum to check … The head and deputy head of the museum were both out of the country last week when the alleged destruction occurred.'_____ E.2a The Guardian (Lond.), 3/3/01 Sat. rev.: How the Buddha got his wounds: On Monday Afghanistan's T rulers were promising to safeguard the country's historic treasures. On Thursday they started shelling them. Luke Harding[LH], explains what changed their minds" P. 4, 1087 words E.2b "Three weeks ago, T officials allegedly broke into [KM]…and destroyed around 50 objects of cultural significance, according to reports… E.2c a few things were still on display when I visited last October: a couple of friezes, a limestone Islamic bowl and a rather fetching statue of King Kanishka, who ruled Afghanistan 1,800 years ago.[NOTE: Doesn't mention any Buddhist statues – maybe they had been hidden by CG et al the time he visited – ASA] E.2d "We don't know how great the damage is. We weren't allowed into the museum to verify the reports," one member of the SPACH delegation said…[See B & C supra, that this destruction took place; note E.5 on reassembly of such statues.] E.2e [O]ver another cup of green tea four months ago,[NOTE this would have been early Nov.2000- ASA] Hotaki assured me that the T had no intention of damaging the statues. To suggest as much was "foreign propaganda", he said." E.3a Nov.5/'00, "Welcome to our beautiful country: Mullahs bid to attract tourists to tragic Afghanistan", The Observer, [LH] Kabul, Pg. 26, 887 words, "'We extend a warm welcome to foreign tourists,' Abdul Rahman Hotaki, the Deputy Minister for Cultural Affairs, said yesterday…. Tourism used to be worth [$25E6/yr]...Hotaki said. His government was now trying to 'improve facilities' to attract more guests. The 'top priority' was to prevent further damage to Afghanistan's unique heritage, which includes relics from Greek, Buddhist and Islamic dynasties…" Three months ago Mullah[MO], … [decreed]… 'The government considers the Bamiyan statues as an example of a potential major source of income…' E.3b.1 11/17&29/'00 both by [LH]– on same subject but not from Kubul E.3b.2 Feb 5/01 *The Times* (Lond.), "T offers US deal to deport [BL].", Zahid Hussain, Kandahar, pg. 1; Issue 67054. (288 words) E.3b.3 F/9/01,AP,*The Times*,Lond., p.18;# 67058.(42 words)"Drought kills 150". Incl. 103 children in Baghlan Prov. Afghan. E.3b.4 Mar7/01, The Times,Lond., "Festival delays destruction of giant statues", Stephen Farrell in Delhi180 words, Abdul Salam Zaeef, the T Ambassador to Pakistan, said [nearly a quarter of the two 1,500-year-old statues had been

destroyed and the] …destruction would be completed after the feast, which ends tomorrow… Thousands of smaller artefacts have also been wrecked. Among them is believed to be a 2,000-year-old statue of a seated Bodhisattva, whose naked form is said to have enraged T clerics when KM was briefly reopened last year. **E.3c** [LH, Kabul] 3/31/01 The Guardian,Lond., T will not hand over Bin Laden. P.18, 435 words "Key moderates who advocated a degree of engagement with the west, including the culture minister, Abdul Rahman Hotaki, have been sacked." [NOTE apparently he was only transferred to the Foreign Ministry as can be seen from the next 2 reports] **E.3d** 8/16/01 DPA, Western envoys and T again meet on prisoners issue, Dateline: Kabul, "… diplomats held another meeting with the T foreign ministry in Kabul on Thursday to demand consular access to their eight nationals being held by the T religious police. They met Molvi Ahmed Hotaki, the ministry's consular affairs officer." **E.3e** Sept 10/01 FNS State Dept, Regular Briefing, Philip Reeker, Dept Spokesman, Wash., D.C., 9724 words "Today the U.S… consular officials and the parents of the Americans met with Mr. Hotaki (ph), the head of the consular division of the T's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to discuss the case." **E.4a** 8/22/'00 AFP, 'Afghanistan's looted museum reopens after eight years', Mohammad Bashir, 560 wds, Dateline: Kabul, [OKM], deputy head of the [KM], was delighted that …there were visitors … includ[ing]… notables from the ruling Taliban militia as well foreigners such as Nancy Dupree, …[for] the official opening of a three-day exhibition Thursday [NOTE; 8/17, Afghan. gained indep from Britain 8/18/'19; If Islamic day starts at sunset, then sunset of 17th. Thus diff in reports museum opening was for 3 & 4 days] to celebrate not only Afghanistan's 81st anniversary of independence, but its surviving cultural treasures… Anxious to boost their international image, the Taliban have put a high priority on protecting the country's heritage even if much of it …has been ruined by …war. Several television and still cameras, including a film crew from the T Radio-Television station, were present at the opening function [Note: maybe there are photos of who was there?] ….T officials seemed …happy to pose for the media….The three-day exhibition presents Buddha statues,…stylized stones, woodwork and bronzecraft. inaugurated by the T Minister of Health [former commander, Mullah Akhund [BEA]…Abbas. … [O.] Khan [Masoodi] said a number of pieces illegally excavated …had been seized by T police in recent months. Eighteen out of 48 pieces publicly unveiled on Independence Day Friday were intercepted on their way to …Pakistan…" [No mention of incident at B1&D12- tho' this article is dateline Kabul 8/22 the museum was open 8/17-20] Another article by same AFP writer on Thurs, 8/17 notes museum opening **E.4b** F/5/01, mon. The Times,Lond., T offers US deal to deport [BL], Zahid Hussain in Kandahar, Afghanistan, 264 words, "The T authorities will consider exiling [BL]… to a third country if they receive assurances that the West will recognise them as Afghanistan's legitimate government. Senior T leaders said their main fear was that the US and other Western countries would continue to ostracise their administration even if [BL] left Afghanistan. "We hope the new American Administration will be more flexible and engage with us," Abdul Wakil Muttawakil, the Foreign Minister, told The Times." **E.4c** Feb 6/01, AFP, Afghan foreign minister dismisses Times report on bin Laden, 285 words, DATELINE: ISLAMABAD, Feb 6, The Afghan foreign minister Tuesday dismissed a report in a British daily that the T militia was ready to hand over indicted terrorist [BL] in exchange for international recognition.Foreign Minister Wakil Ahmad Mutawakel told the Pakistan-based Afghan Islamic Press that Monday's report in The Times was a "total lie.""I have never said this to any reporter. There is no change in the T's policy on Osama," he told the private agency."He can leave Afghanistan on his own if he wants but we will not expel him." **E.4d** Feb 6/01, AFP, Iran delayed Afghan Haj flights: official, 211 words, DATELINE: KABUL, Feb 6, State-run Ariana Afghan Airlines complained Tuesday that Afghan Haj pilgrims to Saudi Arabia were being grounded due to delayed overfly permission from neighbouring Iran. Ariana Vice President Qari Rahmatullah Rahmat said the company had missed 50 flights due to carry some of the 15,000 Afghans planning to go to Mecca for the Haj pilgrimage this year… Ariana's domestic fleet of some half a dozen of Russian Antonov-24s came to a halt early this month due to a lack of aviation fuel normally imported from Turkmenistan. **E.4e** Feb 6/01 FNS, U.S. HUMANITARIAN AIRLIFTS TO AFGHANISTAN STATE DEPARTMENT BRIEFING, 2520 words, MR. ROGERS: Well, thank you all for coming today. My name is Len Rogers.. We are fearful that there is risk of either a major refugee migration or possibly a major famine in Afghanistan. …a prolonged drought that has effectively destroyed domestic agricultural production in Pakistan. As early as last summer, the U.N. was estimating that there might be as much as a million tons needed of additional grain imports, cereal imports, into Afghanistan. …Around Herat in western Afghanistan, there are some 80,000 internally displaced who have come from the northern provinces in the country -- people who have lost their homes because they're no longer able to sustain themselves -- and they've moved to Herat, living in very difficult conditions. In fact, recently there has been a bitter cold snap, and some people that -- people on the site, U.N. observers, have estimated that as many as 500 people may have frozen to death, many of them women and children. . **E.4f** Feb 7/01, AFP, 150 Afghans die of cold, starvation in northern province: report, 233 words, DATELINE: KABUL, At least 150 displaced people have died of cold and starvation over the past few months in Afghanistan's northern province of Baghlan, the ruling T mouthpiece Radio Shariat said Wednesday. "Among the dead were 22 women, 22 elderly people, 57 children and 49 young girls," the station said, adding that most of the victims were from the Charshanbe Tepa camp in Baghlan. Some 400 people died last week in displacement camps around the western city of Herat after temperatures plunged to as low as minus 25 degree Celcius (minus 13 degree Fahrenheit), according to UN officials". **E.4g** Feb/7/01 weds. NYT, T Seem to Be Making Good on Opium Ban, U.N. Says , BARBARA CROSSETTE, Pg. A3, 588 words, DATELINE: UN, Feb. 6 "Initial results from a survey of opium-growing areas of Afghanistan in recent days indicate that the T may have succeeded in sharply reducing the annual poppy crop, astonished [UN] narcotics-control officials say….Poppies are now in bloom in the Afghan fields, allowing aerial and ground surveys to be done across large areas to test the ban on opium production by the T, On Monday,[Feb5] the [UN] Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention's regional office for Afghanistan and Pakistan said that surveys in the northern provinces of Nangarhar, Laghman and Kunar, which together contain more than 25 percent of the total land that had been devoted to the poppy crop, found no significant signs of cultivation this year. Similar reports are beginning to come in from Helmand, which had 52 percent of the land devoted to the crop last year…Bernard Frahi, a French expert on narcotics and organized crime who led the survey teams in Afghanistan from Feb. 1-4, said in a report that his mission visited farmland known to include about 2,000 major pockets of opium production. The inspection was done by all-terrain vehicles and on foot. "Although it is hard to believe," Mr. Frahi, the regional director, wrote to his headquarters in Vienna, where the [UN] drug program is based, "No poppy field has been identified in the area." Mr. Frahi said he was accompanied on his inspection tour by drug officers from Canada and Norway and one Pakistani agricultural expert attached to the narcotics affairs section of the American Embassy in Islamabad. **E.5a** Feb 5/'14, [KM] restores T-smashed ancient Buddha statues, ANI,1497wds, Kabul, Archaeologists and restoration experts have reassembled and restored several statues… smashed by the T in 2001 …People …working at the museum…collected pieces of the statues smashed by the T. …they had hurriedly sorted out the fragments and put them into sacks and boxes that later would help the re-assembly work." **E.5bi** [not LN] **PBD** "Here's 18[ft³]…of artifacts from the KM, in pieces no bigger than my little finger. The T came in the morning, hammered [nearly all]….day." **E.5bii** "Rabbani, the recognized president of Afghanistan, gave written permission in May 2000 to bring the materials here to Bubendorf and this was not acceptable to UNESCO." **E.5biii** "Afghan archaeologists in Kabul knew what the future held, and on that same December [2000] trip…they pleaded with Bucherer to spirit whatever artifacts remained in the Kabul Museum and various storerooms out of the country. "I had to tell them that I couldn't do it without the official agreement of UNESCO. Even if I had their agreement, I now doubt whether the Afghans would have managed to bypass al-Qaeda." Kristin M.Romey, 'The Race to Save Afghan Culture', Archaeology. My/Jn'02, V. 55 # 3, p 18. 8p. 9 Color Photos. **E.6** [not LN] "SPACH An overview of activities since 1994" B. Cassar & A. R. Rodriguez Garcia, p 15-37 in Art and Archaeology of Afghanistan: its fall and survivial, [AAA] ed. Juliette Van Krieken Pieters,[JVKP] 412+p, Brill, '06. Subch. 'The Brief Reopening of the National Museum in…[8/00],'p. 24,~250 wds, notes nothing untoward. Next subch. 'Iconoclasm in 2001', p. 25, begins "Few could have predicted at that time [the museum opening 8/00] that the T would embark on a spree of iconoclasm…" & ends "Museum officials responsible for the objects lived under dramatic conditions in those days, and the trauma has remained since then." CG is noted on p 23-4, but not in connection with opening. [EMPH. ADDED] **E.7.1** [not LN] CG has her own ch. in E6 book "The KM, Its Turbulent Years" p61-75. Her 80 wd subch. 'The reopening of the Museum in 2000' on p 68, notes nothing untoward. CG says opening was for 4 days, E4 says 3**.** **E.7.2** "The turning point came in 2003…the smashed Tepe Maranjan Bodhisattva and much loved King Kanishka, among other pieces, were restored by experts from the Mus·e Guimet." P. 69 **E.7.3** "In summer 1998 with the support of the T Deputy Minister of Culture work on …[KM]…was taken up again… using a $14,000 UNESCO grant made in 1995."p 68. **E.8** 11/22/01 "[BL], Bombs and Buddhas; Documents Left in Kabul Detail Foreigners' Roles", Keith Richburg[KR] Wash. Post P.A01, 2075 wds, Datel: Kabul, 11/ 21 "… minutes of a meeting, Islamic Movements first met and decided to send a delegation to the Taliban to discuss the fate of the Buddha statues … "Even though the meeting decided the two statues …had thousands of years of history… they are only pieces of stone and mud, and we don't care," …The meeting [with]…the T occurred a few days before the T began destroying the Buddhas. " [ASA NOTE: says nothing of other factors that may've been discussed, names of participants or time frame – except "a few days before" with no date. Email sent for clarif. 9/9/16 no human response_____] **E.9** 8/Sep/00 T's deputy minister of information and culture in charge of cultural affairs, Mowlawi Abdorrahman Ahmad Hotak, has appealed for …UNESCO to help restore and revive Afghanistan's cultural heritage, and restore to the country historical artifacts…Bakhtar Information Agency 6/Sep/00./[IRIN-Asia:e-mail: _____] _____ **E.9.a** "Contrary to what many people think , the illegal excavations and illicit trade in antiquities did decline sharply during …T rule(1996-2001)" p.206 **E.9.b** "[When the museum was opened in Aug '00] many Taliban visting the museum for the first time .. were shocked by the statues depicting human features of a Boddisattvah … [&] an outcry appeared to occur…probably [sowing the seeds] for the decision to demolish… [the statues]…Since 9/11 we now know that the decision to demolish the buddhas …was the result of an internal power struggle heavily influenced if not dictated by foreign forces or al-Queda." P. 210; EMPHASIS ADDED [Note: no source for EMPH CLAUSE or mention of UNSC etc. ASA] **E.9.c** "[BL]…spreads Wahabism, the … branch of Islam that forbids all depictions of living beings. The afghans as such did not want their Buddhas to be destroyed." [Note: No source for this. No mention of pre-Wahabi efforts to destroy/deface Buddhist relics in Afg., or arabasque decorations, Darul Ulam Deoband Fatwa: 1156/899/B =9/1434 "It is unlawful to carve the statue or the picture of any living creature or get it prepared by someone else and deal in the same with profit or without profit". _____ ASA] p. 212 **E.9.d** "Why an evacuation [to Afgh mus'm in exile in Switz.]never took place is not fully known" EMPH ADDED p.216 JvKP, AAA **E.10** 12/13/00 MO mtg China Amb. in Kandahar may've been last point where Talib. still pro-statues. China & Malaysia didn't note opium ban in Sanctions abstentions [See footnotes 137F,138] [18% China;20% Malays., 40% Japan,7% World: Buddhist in '00, Pew] _____ **E.11a** AP, 3/15/01, "Taliban order 100 cows killed to atone for delay in destroying Buddhas", Zahid Hussain, 508 words, Dateline: Kabul, "MO…Friday ordered 100 cows slaughtered …and the meat distributed to the country's poor and hungry on March 19…the Taliban reportedly moved truckloads of explosive material to the site and the statues were eventually felled by stuffing explosives into large holes bored into the statues….The order comes barely a week after the Islamic festival of Eid al-Adha, when devout Muslims sacrifice an animal, usually a sheep or a goat. According to Islamic tradition one cow is equivalent to seven sheep". There is no mention in the article of Abraham the Akeida, & the sacrifice of a ram [see Note H and insert biblical ref and comment re Isaac & Ishmael & yom Kippur] which this Holiday is said to commemorate; Also not mentioned is that a third of the meat slaughtered by a private family is tradtionally given to the poor , a third to friends & relatives and a third is consumed by the family. [See footnote 181] **E.11b** March 22, 2001 (26 Dhu'l-hajjah 1421): journalists were taken on a tour of Afghanistan's national museum to see the results of the destruction there. March 26, 2001 (1 Muharram 1422, New Year's Day in the Hijri calendar): Twenty journalists were flown to Bamiyan to see the destroyed statues. [See footnote 181] **E.11c.1** 3/16/01 The Times,Lond., "Afghans shaken by T acts of vandalism", Zahid Hussain in Kabul, 582 words "The few remaining artefacts that survived the plundering of Mujahidin soldiers from various warring factions were wrecked last week by T zealots on the order of their supreme leader, who declared that all images reviled Islam. The 2,000- year-old clay statue of Bodhi Sattva (Sitting Buddha), once a showpiece of the museum, is now rubble. **E.11c.2** 3/17/01, AP, 'Afghan clerics made decision to destroy Buddha statues', Zahid Hussain, 487 words, Dateline: Kabul, "The decision to destroy ancient statues of Buddha was …made …by 400 clerics who debated for several months before declaring them "unIslamic," the T's information minister [QJ] said Saturday…once their decision was made there was no reversing it..."They came out with a consensus that the statues were unIslamic," he said…Even …Mullah [MO]…could not deviate from their decision, Jamal said." [Quran 35:28 refers to the scholars of Islam] **E.11d** 3/19/01, Japan Economic Newswire, "Cows slaughtered over delay in Buddha statues destruction", 392 words, Dateline: Kabul, On Friday, special UNESCO envoy Pierre Lafrance told Kyodo News that T must recognize the importance of preserving Afghanistan's cultural artifacts. In response to the statement, a T official said …that museum artifacts in Afghanistan inherited by the T government were safe [Note: it does not say ALL were safe. ASA] and reports about thefts were baseless[NOTE: It doesn't say reports about damage to statues were baseless. ASA]." **E.11e** 3/20/01 Washington Post, Buddhas' Rubble Marks a Turn for T, Pamela Constable, p. A01, 1498 words, Dateline: Kabul, 3/19, "…police detained six journalists for trying to photograph the [KM], which has been sealed shut. Officials are especially touchy about reports that early last month they destroyed more than 50 pre-Islamic artifacts in the museum, including a famous seated Buddha. They insist that the statues were smashed only after the Feb. 26 order from Omar, following a period of research and advice from religious scholars. But diplomats [SPACH supporters –ASA?] and preservationists [CG & co-workers, ASA?] said the campaign to destroy the Buddhas and other "idols" began last year, when the museum opened briefly. Some conservative Muslim clerics were reportedly offended at the displays and slapped some of the statues. The museum was quickly closed again, and one official who had worked with foreign preservationists was transferred. **E.11f** 3/31/01, NYT, U.N., in Shift, Moves to Save Art for Afghans BARBARA Crossette, pA1, 1907 words "Mr. Manhart [of UNESCO] said today that Unesco backed Mr. Bucherer's project but that it had to be approved by the Swiss Foreign Ministry and that talks had been going on for nine months. …we are bound to the 1970 [UN] convention[which restricts the removal of artifacts] and this made things very complicated." **E.11g**, 3/26/01 AP, KG, 812 words, Dateline: Bamiyan, "Reports from Ghazni, where an ancient Buddhist monastery is located, and from the [KM], say the destruction of the statues had begun on Feb. 4 and 5." Nothing about Arabs in this very detailed story or UNSC sanctions , etc. **E.11h** 3/24/01, AP, The Toronto Star, T Rage Against Idols Has Precedents, Robert Barr, 909 words, "[William] Dowsing had the authority of Parliament. In August, 1643, it enacted an ordinance "for the utter demolishing, removing and taking away of all monuments of superstition and idolatry." It was a long list: images of God, the Virgin Mary and saints; crucifixes, stone altars, communion rails and candlesticks. Chancels were to be made level with the rest of the church…" **E.11i** 3/23/01/ AP [KG?], "… There are no more statues left," said Ahmed Yar, president of the KM, who refused to say where the statues or their remnants were located. …Nearby sat a stone block bearing script cut into it in the 2nd century, and a 15th-century basin, ornately carved with Islamic writing, found in 1925 in the southern city of Kandahar. The last time the museum was opened to the public was in August 1999[sic, should be 2000]. At that time, the most priceless artifact, a 2,000-year-old seated Bodhisattva made of baked clay, enraged several T clerics because it was mostly naked. …The T apparently slapped the statue around the head and shoulders, causing museum workers to buy a glass case to protect it. "It is one of the most beautiful, ethereal Buddha statues," CG, …has said. **E.11j** 3/23/01, The Washington Post, Emptiness On Display In Afghan Museum; War, T Edict Leave Few Artifacts, Pamela Constable, P. A20, 735 words **E.11k** DATELINE: KABUL, Afghanistan 3/22 3/23/01 The Times,Lond.,[BL] allies 'seize control' in T struggle, Zahid Hussain in Kabul , 546 words **E.11l** "One of these niches, which was found sealed during excavation, housed the famous Bodhisattva image on display in the KM; it is now restored after having been seriously damaged by the Taliban." _____ **E.11m** Jan/12/2014, NYT, Saving Relics, Afghans Defy the T, Rod Nordland, "Three hundred of the most important of the 2,500 objects the T had smashed have been painstakingly reassembled in recent years, and many of the others are arrayed in boxes and trays, awaiting their turn for restoration." **E.12a** 3/29/01, The Daily Telegraph(Lond), Statues destroyed 'to mask museum sale', Ahmed Rashid, 129 wds " The destruction by the T of pre-Islamic statues, including the two Buddhas of Bamiyan, was a ploy to cover up the sale of 40 smaller figures, according to opponents. Afghanistan's opposition United Front claimed that the T sold 40 statues from the [KM]. "The T were facing enormous pressure to open up the museum for diplomats and experts so they issued the edict for the destruction of all statues to cover up the sale," said a front leader based in Dushanbe, Tajikistan.The statues were from several historical periods. This week, journalists were taken to the museum and told that the 40 statues were destroyed, but there was no rubble and the T would not say where it had been disposed." [NOTE: Rashid doesn't check with experts to learn if any missing items have appeared on market or what they think of allegation. He doesn't say how T had behaved re: stealing from KM etc. & is uncritical mouthpiece for T enemies. ASA]

F. 1a.i **PBD** The Swiss government [SG]offered also to meet the cost of a charter--flight to Kabul to pick--up the objects, but, …[w]hile Mr. Bouchenaki of UNESCO had initially agreed with the idea of a *"pilot project to protect cultural property in the case of political unrest"*, the legal section under Mrs. Prott resolved that this would represent an illegitimate export of items of national importance….[&] it became impossible for[SG] to cover the cost of the transportation.[ASA NOTE: Flight would've needed UNSC approval, re. sanctions, [See footnote 139 par 11.] & would be at risk of attack by 'Arab Friends'. [see **F.1b,** & **E.5biii**]] In December 2000 [ASA NOTE: Before or after UNSC sanctions vote of 12/19?] I had to go to Kandahar and Kabul to bring the bad news that UNESCO did not permit to bring the objects to a safe place. This created much concern among the T leaders and I was told *"we managed up to now to move the items from one corner to another, but our Arab friends who are eager to demolish all the representations of living creatures become more and more suspicious, and we cannot further hide the items."* P51 **EMCG** **F.1b** LYNDEL V. PROTT [LP], in 3/01, Director of the Division of Cultural Heritage, UNESCO] "UNESCO was …approached by a private individual with a proposal to rescue movable cultural objects [from T controlled areas]…Aerial transport would have been involved and for that some kind of guarantee of security would have been [needed from the T]… That was not forthcoming and the mission did not take place" [An apparent ref.to Houshang Mahboubian [HM]who, in a written communique the Afghan embassy in London, on Mar 2/01, offered to buy the larger Buddha for $5E6, have it cut out of the rock in pieces & airlifted out of Afghanistan" Unfortunately however, UNESCO was against Mahboubian's proposal and informed him that any attempt in the direction is considered criminal according to the UNESCO Convention of 1970. Subsequently, due to the delayed communication, the bureaucracy and a breakdown in the line of the negotiations with the T, …the T went ahead and destroyed the statue using dynamite." The Bamiyan Buddha _____ Mar/5/01, The Times,Lond., "T smashes statues of 'infidel' Buddha", Zahid Hussain in Islamabad and Stephen Farrell in Delhi, 639 words "…Last night …[HM], …said …"I am ready to buy all the pieces the Government wants to destroy...[for] Pounds 68 million…dividing the [big] statues into pieces and moving them first to London. "The Japanese are very keen to have these pieces. In Hong Kong lots of people are interested." Email sent to HM nov 7/16 thru his website – copy saved to flash drive _____] p 197 "The Protection of Cultural Movables from Afghanistan: Developments in International Management. P189-200, [AAA] JvK-P, '06 [ASA NOTE: After UNESCO delay & Sanctions vote, T changed? email sent for clarification 9/9/16 ____]. On 10/Sep/16, rec. 850+ w email from LP – but timing issues not yet clarified. She wrote "As for the delay, there was considerable concern by many bodies, cultural experts and the States they belonged to, about endorsing volunteer museums and it took some time to get agreement on the rules set by UNESCO with the consent of the various bodies involved."[See B.0.i.1 on CG's purchase] new email, 9/12/16, with pdf of this book, requesting details on timing. Rec. reply 10/26; sent reply 10/31. **F.2** JOLYON LESLIE [JL] "…many Afghans remain ambivalent about certain objects in the collection that they perceive to be contrary to 'Islamic values'. During efforts in 1993/4 to persuade Ustad Mazari…to…halt… indiscriminate looting of the museum by [his] fighters…, he was bemused by our assertion that the collection was part of his heritage.… The destruction by Talib zealots of some figurative objects in the museum in 2001, prompted in large part by anger at the regime's international marginalization, was justified on religious grounds because the objects targeted were perceived to be 'shrines of unbelievers'...While a… Bodhisattva in a display case in Kabul may in the eyes of outsiders have been effectively neutralized as idols to worship…the veneration with which we seem to treat them might be perceived by some Afghans as a form of idolatry. P 87-8, in "The Lady In Black", p78-89 EMCG [EMPH ADDED][see footnote 95 for JL cont.] **F.3** *'Ulema'* were for discussing religious matters and for deciding on issues of *shari'a* in which they knew best. The role of the *Ulema'* was to engage with more general Islamic deficiencies in our system and to make sure that all our actions and plans were in line with the *shari'a*." ZAEEF "My Life…" p 89. **F.4a** Roy Guttmann [RG] , How We Missed The Story 2008 United States Institute for Peace p236-237 PBD rec. call Nov 1 to come to Afg. to help – met QJ in Kabul & Abdul Jalil "Deputy minister of foreign affairs and close aid to Omar" PBD recalled Jalil saying the continuing drought had brought "great problems" the T had banned opium in the hopes that the UN embargo would be lifted, but they were slapped with a second embargo "It all drives us more and more into the arms of our friends" he said. The plan was that a western country should send a Hercules transport filled with humanitarian aid, Jalil and others would manage to stock it for the return trip with the holdings of the KM … " At the museum, staff started taking everything they could move and placed it in vaults or inside rooms …PBD won the support of officials at UNESCO in Paris on condition that the Swiss government would pay the 200,000 Swiss Francs [~$340,000] for the charter. A UNESCO official, Christian Manhart, said Germany was willing to send an aircraft on a humanitarian mission, but wanted sufficient security guarantees from the T regime. but those guarantees were not forthcoming "This offer of a deputy minister was not backed up by his hierarchy," Manhart said Germany withdrew its offer and the scheme died.[citing at his footnote 6 p297 interviews with PBD in Bubendorf & 2 by telephone 3/03, 3/03 &2/06; interv. with Manhart by tel 12/05. **F.4b** Hercules has 20 ton capacity and cruising speed of 400mph. It has a reported ownnership cost of $14k/ flying hr.in 2013, It is 32,000 miles from kabul to Basel, Switzerland – near Bubendorf. C17 globemaster cargo plane has 70+ ton payload , 500+mph cruising speed & $24k/hr cost in 2013 [Costly Flight Hours By Mark Thompson ____ April 02, 2013 If Air freight rates were about $0.5/ton mile . A 20 ton load would be $320,000 Rate for 200-2001 is from *World Air Transport Statistics (WATS)* cited on p 8 of Transportation Costs and International Trade Over Time, David Hummels, Assoc, Prof. of Economics, Purdue Univ., West Lafayette, Indiana. e-mail ____ _____ **F.5.** _____ 436. Smash!: The obligation to destroy idols, Rabbi Jack Abramowitz"You shall utterly destroy the places where the nations…worshipped their idols…" (Dt. 12:2). "It is a mitzvah to destroy idolatrous places wherever and whenever we have the opportunity to do so, but one need actively pursue the opportunity only in Israel. This mitzvah applies to men and women in all times and places. It is discussed in the Talmud in tractate Avodah Zarah (45a-46a and 51b-52a). It is codified in the Shulchan Aruch in Yoreh Deah 146. This mitzvah is #185 of the 248 positive mitzvos in the Rambam's Sefer HaMitzvos; it is not listed in the Sefer HaMitzvos HaKatzar of the Chofetz Chaim". Get more specific sources related to this case.

CARLA GRISSMANN
3/26/07
P62 EMCG

It's more likely that this relatively minor faux pas on the part of some Europeans and/or UNESCO was not the full reason for the edict to destroy the statues:

It was just the proverbial straw that broke the camel's back.

This is suggested by the envoys' own words in the same interview. "What do you expect from a country when you just ostracize them and isolate them and send in cruise missiles[178] and their children are dying?...You don't recognize their government…It is a kind of resentment that is growing in Afghanistan."[176]

He also said "the Taliban would not destroy statues actually being worshiped, and would not touch the Hindu temples still left in Afghanistan."[176] This contradicts their reasons given for not destroying the statues when they took control of the Kabul Art Museum four years before. Then, and in Bamiyan a year later, they said they wouldn't destroy the statues because, with nobody worshipping them, they aren't considered idols.[179]

BODHISATTVA
SEATED IN MEDITATION
CLOTH DRAPED OVER ONE SHOULDER, *2ND - 4TH CENT, TEPE MARANJAN EXCAVATION. TERRACOTTA,* GANDHARAN *NATIONAL MUSEUM OF AFGHANISTAN,*
TITLE: JOSEPHINE POWELL AF1-265**B&W**
THIS WAS THE STATUE THAT WAS ATTACKED, DESTROYED & REASSEMBLED[?]
B.9, B.10, SEE ALSO P. 245
FROM HARVARD U. GET PERMISSION.
".... IMPORTANT PIECES REMAIN. [INCL.] ...A LARGE, SEATED, PAINTED CLAY BUDDHA... THIRD TO FOURTH CENTURY FROM TEPE MARANJAN... " SAME PHOTO B , P46 "MUSEUM UNDER SIEGE" NHD, ARCHAEOLOGY, V. 49, # 2, '96), P. 42-51
[ALSO CALLED: BODHISATTVA SIDDHARTHA, OR A BEJEWELLED BUDDHA , P. 344, CAT . OF THE NATIONA L MUSEUM OF AFGHANIST AN, 1931–1985 FRANCINE TISSOT, UNESCO 2006

G. T leaders favored using pre-Islamic relics to help econ. [D10-12;E2,3,4a,9]. CG says 'Rural mullahs' [2x]/ 'semi-literate, provincial Mullahs'[1x] [who] 'were only doing what they had been taught to do...[believing] depiction of living creatures promoted idolatry and was 'un-Islamic' [B1] began iconoclasm [8/'00][&RK at B12a]– not 'Arab friends', PBD[F1];'Arab guests', NHD [C1]; 'Islamic Movements',KR[E8]& not when KG's 'T...closest to [BL]... [Def. Min.] Obeidullah ...[& Deputy P. Min.], Mullah Hassan...publicly slapped the naked statue...to show their disgust at its nakedness' [D12, supp'ted by SRH, see footn. 947-I, contr. with D16b] CG says statue attacked was 'centrepiece of the show...partially draped...fourth-century painted clay Bodhisattva'[B1]not 'naked 2,000-year-old seated bodhisattva...wearing only an earring, armband, and necklace'KG[D12][See photos, p.48&245] CG could tell Def. Minister from 'rural Mullah'. If she didn't know him, she'd find out & take action.[ASA?] Mullahs' asked for a Shariah Ruling[SR][C1,D12-14]. During 'several months' SR was developed [E11c.2] cognocenti, incl.QJ, [T. Min. of Cult.] & PBD [see footn.128-B] tried moving vulnerables- eg: KM statues– to Afgh. Mus'm-In-Exile- in Switz.- officially opened 7/Oct[see footnote 128-D]& Sr. T still 'pro-Statues' Sep8, Nov5;SR late Nov[B12b see footn.128-D.2] 12/13/00 mtg MO&Chin Amb? [B12c,E9,3,10]but UNESCO blocked transfr: art couldn't leave Afg. w/o T OK [PBD F1a; Flight blocked:T didn't insure safety. [PROTT/UNESCO [Delay/UNSC vote? Not clear.ASA][E5biii,F1b];B. Crossette, see footn.128-A,PBD 128-B] Since pieces to be transf'd would be picked by KM staff, CG knew both plan & [as PBD's colleague]UNESCO issues. Had UN recogn. opium poppy ban, etc, maybe MO could've returned SR based on new info: destroying statues looked like 'returning evil for good': un-Islamic*. Reality of rejection led MO to withthold export OK needed by UNESCO [C2,E2,F4, See footn.128-D.2,157], agree to anti-statue SR & ignore 'UN' pleas. Costly UNESCO 'statues' program: SPACH offer in Dec. by 'western diplomats' 'UN officials' noted by RK [B12d] particularly as JE says such offers made in the face of starving children turned such objects to idols in Taliban eyes [see footnote 181B] 'Hammer smashing' KM statues[B&C] may've been seen as partly reparable[B0I.4,E5a ,E7.2, E.11m] If QJ-seen by CG at KM in charge of breaking statues [B1] wanted permanent destruction, he'd've kept staff from collecting debris & had it crushed by tank treads-knowing KM staff could restore broken statues. Partly contradicted by action at MIC[E5b]Note: NHD[C] & AFP[E4] don't cite sanct'ns or Mullahs Incident [MI][B1,2]tho' there 1st day. [see footn.128]CG not noting MI[B0I.3,B6,E7]may be due to ongoing trauma[E6,B11]or, with her background among rural Moslems[B2]& as organizer[B10]she should've forseen MI. She could've put box over statue with pictures of Robatak stone on box to disguise it.[ASA] She'd also put so much of her life energy into KM/so close to its contents[B6]she felt more responsible/pain. Interv'ws of CG as 'person' got full story, with tears[B1,2,11]; of KM expert': partial story. [B.0k,B.0I,B.3,6,E7]Record of CG's at "Patrimoine d'Asie Centrale"?[B11][For more on CG/KG comparison see footnotes 947&960]Why did KM & Ghazni Buddhist site attack start 4-5/Feb[E11g,E2]with denial/no publicity?[E1]News of children dying from cold/drought? [E.4e,f]New Bush Admin. closing Talib. UN office?/ k's of haj travelers blocked by effects of sanct'ns [E4d]? Earliest rept of 10% UN opium survey Feb5/01 ignored–pub in NYT 2 days later[E.4g]? Intended to pressure MO into making formal edict? MO's decision to let it stand was made before these late events. [ASA guess: SR came 'several months' [E.11c.2] from mid Aug. complaint & had timetable for start & finish & non-adherance fine. Before early Nov.: Advisory from scholars while deliberating: don't damage or move statues before SR [B12b & see footn.128-D.2.b]SR [possibly including a minority view: send statues out of Afg. to where they wouldn't be worshipped- e.g. Afg. Museuem in Exile in Switzerland [B.12d]] issued Nov/Dec. [B.12b]: 2-3 months to start; 2 more to finish; date for KM/ Ghazni attack was set not long thereafter—perhaps timed to coincide with KM's 'head and deputy head' being 'out of the country' [E1]. Ghazni timing:[see footn.181A.2]. Sacrifice of 100 cows [E11.d] was to compensate for late completion for Bamiyan destruction. MO's Edict & subsequent destruction at Bamiyan were timed for Haj month—in memory of idol breaker Avroham Avinu's sacrif. — to get most support in Moslem World. The prohibition of journalists seeing KM 'results' & related denials[E1,E11d]focused public on MO's Edict. This also allowed time to clean up KM & store pieces for subsequent restoration.] Rashid used this story to serve as mouthpiece for T enemies – pushing idea that T destroyed statues to cover up sale of 40 pieces from KM. [E.12a] [SEE APP. 10:...Rashid not reliable...]

H. TORAH ON STATUES **H.1** Until the morning of, Aug 10,'16, when I was thinking of why the professors at Yale didn't rise publicly & forcefully in the defense of SRH, I didn't realize that there was an important factor that differentiated me from those professors: I was aware of the destruction of the Bamiyan statues but it didn't prejudice me against the Taliban. I just assumed they were religious Moslems - well known for detesting idols-- & that given the opportunity, they blew them up. Had I seen this act as deliberately destroying 'the great cultural monuments of the world',[see footnote 172] it would've been difficult for me to spend even a little time researching the questions that began this book. **H.2** I didn't begin researching the statues issue until summer '11, almost a decade later. Even then, the impetus didn't come from me. It was a simple, respectful question from a religious Jewish woman – after she heard me debunk stories of the Taliban being drug-soaked, Jew-hating, blood-thirsty, misogynists. She just asked ~"What about the statues in Bamiyan?" So, I tried to answer her question. **H.3** At the heart of our culture - our civilization - as Jews, Moslems & much of the rest of the world – is the story of Abraham - Avrohom Avinu - Our father Abraham**. He spoke '70 languages' & lived in a tent with 4 doors – so people could enter from any direction—physical, cultural or spiritual. Several chapters in the Bible are devoted to the aesthetics – colors, materials & designs – of the Tabernacle in the desert. Even its furnishings & the clothing of the high priest that served in it are described in great detail. *** Yet, almost nothing is given about the aesthetics of Avrohom's tent, furniture or clothes. They weren't considered important.**** What was- & is –important, was his proverbial hospitality to guests-- to strangers who looked so often like desert stragglers. This hospitality brought people closer to the ways of kindness, righteousness & truth – to the ways of God. Avrohom Avinu was also the enemy of dictators. From his youth, he fought the idolatry that demogogic murderer-tyrants - like Nimrod - used to steer people away from God. As a mature man sitting by his tent, he argued with God for the survival of the depraved, self-worshipping, youth-led materialists of Sodom– as long as there were ten righteous people in their midst. As an old man, he struggled to know & do God's will in a real world so full of uncertainty & ambiguity. **H.4** His monument isn't his tent—long since returned to dust. It's his kindness-centered hospitality, struggle for righteousness & active opposition to idolatry in all its protean forms. It's not carved in towering cliffs along the ancient roads he traveled. This greatest of 'cultural monuments' is found throughout the world—indestructible – inscribed in the Homes & Hearts of his Children. In contrast, Museums are often full of the relics of the arrogant Nimrodian murderer-materialists Abraham fought. **H.5** Copper snake made by Moshe, [Num. 21:9] was broken in pieces by the righteous Jewish King, Hezekiah, more than six centuries later, when it had become an object of idol worship[2 Kings 18:4]-not preserved in a museum. [see F.5]

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* Prov.17:3; Al-Muntakhab,Repentance, Sura 9:74 **Genesis & Midrash ***Exodus & Midrash

[See author's Sefer Chidushei Torah: אומרים שבעים : THEY SAY SEVENTY for new insights on both life & teachings of Avrohom Avinu & materials & colors of Taberacle. Chidushim connected with every parsha in chumash, 225 p 180k words.]

**** a. Similarly, the home of my exceptionally wealthy great-grandfather, R. Shlemeh Adler of Kletsk, [d. ~1909] had no *objets d'art* or fancy furniture. He was 8th in a line of Rabbis from father to son -- from R. Salmon Adler of Frankfurt Am Main & Pinczow, Poland & through his decent from the great-grandfather, R. Nathan Adler [d. 1707], of R. Nathan Adler – ha Chasid - of Frankfurt [1741-1800], was a descendent, through the 13th century, Shimon Ha Darshan of Frankfurt – author of Yalkut Shimoni-- ילקוט שמעוני [most comprehensive midrashic sefer] of Aharon ha Cohen- older brother of Moshe Rabeinu. ["The Adler family : Address delivered at the Jewish Institute...on June 6th, 1909, on the occasion of the Jubilee of the Chief Rabbi "28 p., M. N. Adler, 1837-1911

b. R. Shlemeh Adler of Kletzk, like so many of our greatest Rabbis of the past, deliberately avoided making money from being a rabbi. *[As we learn from our sages: "Do not make the Torah into a crown with which to aggrandize yourself or a spade with which to dig.* Talmud, Perkei Avos 5[or7]b] He had a business in dried fruits, nuts & grains that extended from the Middle East to England. He was learned in everything that was useful for understanding Torah & the world. Though he had none of the usual material finery, he had a library which included, in additional to traditional Torah works, Newton, Faraday, Darwin, Marx & Tolstoy -- & read them in their original languages.

c. There's a pair of special gifts that come to some – including those who, though wealthy, walk humbly & eschew finery. 1. Ability to routinely experience the deep richness & intense beauty of the ordinary world. 2. Never being bored - we find the world – inside & out - extremely interesting. With these 2 gifts, we don't pursue excitement or entertainment for their own sake or collect rare & expensive things to magnify ourselves in the eyes of others. We use the best of our physical & intellectual world: food, clothing & cleanliness- together with knowledge & ideas- to, for example, enhance the Sabbath & with that, our connection to the transcendent & immanent values of Torah & God.

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[178] Ref. to UN sanctions & US attacks on OBL's base in Afghanistan after the bombing of two US embassies in Africa in 1998. See footnote 176

[179] Taliban top leadership say Buddha statues will not be razed 275 Words, 28/4/97, AFP. [see footnotes 118-B & 127-A for details, also 180 & 181]

By not attacking Hindu shrines or statues that were actually being worshipped, the Taliban were saying that this isn't an attack against ordinary people. It's a political act[180] that's consistent with Islam and a signal to all those who'd trample on the country – with sanctions and other oppressions - that the Taliban will find an effective way to retaliate. It was the kind of thing that couldn't be stated openly but which should have been felt most by those who'd imposed the sanctions and engaged in the oppression.



The targets of this statues destruction program – senior UN diplomats and public officials in the world's most powerful countries -- couldn't say why the statues were destroyed without making themselves look like the oppressors & hypocrites that they were.[181]

The world's half billion Buddhists[182-A] were aggrieved by the destruction of the statues, but it wasn't the sort of thing that would lead them to start killing Muslims or destroying Mosques. The fact that they didn't retaliate suggests that some good might come of this in the long run.

The Buddhist community is seen on the world stage as victims of the Taliban. By applying Buddhist principals of peace building, where:

"Only love-and-compassion dispels hate" [182-B]

they may be able to transform this destruction into an avenue of Peace. They could claim responsibility for the destruction of their statues by their failure to adequately recognize the olive branch the Taliban had extended to the World with their opium poppy ban.

Had the Buddhist Community of the World recognized this ban and commended the Taliban for protecting their art until then, the Buddhists could have created a diplomatic space to negotiate for the betterment of all concerned – and their statues would almost certainly not have been destroyed [183].

Their aggrieved status gives them the capacity to forgive and foster a general climate of understanding and reconciliation. It could lead to real, lasting peace in Afghanistan.

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[180] **A.** Attacking Hindu shrines would likely've led Hindus in India to attack Moslem minority. Thus far, (11/'16) the author hasn't found any reports of Hindu shrines attacked by the Taliban. Knowledgeable Hindus from Indian subcont. said Hindu shrines weren't attacked. (Pers. Convers. 10/12 NYC) **B.** [The Taliban said their actions were in]…line with Islamic injunctions to respect other religions… Since no one worshipped the Buddhas, they were not covered by rules of protection that were extended to idols in Hindu temples and homes in Afghanistan." P23, JE, infra [see footnote 181] **C.** Pieces in museums would apparently not be protected. The 1931-85 Cat. showed KM had few Hindu pieces: 3, p.351; 1, p.355; 2, p.472; There were 9 hits for Hindu [not "Hindu Kush"] & 226 for either budd or bodh, in Francine Tissot, UNESCO Catalogue of [KM]

[181] Jamal J. Elias,[JE] interprets these events based on the timing of the statue destruction with respect to the Eid al-Adha /festival of sacrifice commemorating the sacrifice by Abraham— known to both Jews & Moslems as the idol smasher. **A.1** He notes: "The Hajj pilgrimage, a central ritual that ends on Eid al-adha, the holiest day of the Muslim year, fell on March 3-6. *"[2/26/'01… (2 Dhu'l-hajjah 1421): Mullah Umar announced that all statues in the Taliban-controlled areas of Afghanistan were to be destroyed.*" P16. **A.2** Maybe Ghazni attack date was start of Mahmud of Ghazna's ~460+km march from Nahrwala/Anahilapataka/Patan[then a large city & royal capital of Gujarat, India] Dec/1025 CE to attack Shiva Temple at Somnath, Jan/6/1026, *Dhu'l-hajjah*. Dates: Asoke Kumar Majumdar, 'Chaulukyas of Gujarat: … the Tenth to the End of the Thirteenth Century', 1956

B "…the very fact that money was offered to save the statues transformed them from artifacts into idols since they were now being venerated more than human lives, and this reverence necessitated their destruction. When Mullah Umar rhetorically asked the Afghan people and Muslims all over the world if they would rather be the smashers of idols or the sellers of them, he was clearly referring [to Afghan iconoclast]…Mahmud of Ghazna…who sacked the Shiva temple…[1025 CE]. The local priests and rulers allegedly offered a treasure to ransom the main Shiva Linga icon, and Mahmud is legendary for having replied that he was a smasher of idols, not a seller of them. Mullah Umar was also referring to the prophet Abraham, who broke with the religion of his father Azar, a maker and seller of idols, and it was this latter claim that resonated in the popular [Urdu] press…"p 24-5 (Un)making Idolatry From Mecca to Bamiyan, *Future Anterior*, V. IV# 2,'07

[182] **A.** See footnote177E.10 **B.** (Dhammapada 1:5) cited by Ven. Dr. T. Kenjitsu Nakagaki "Peace Building Based on Buddhist Principals" talk at Peace Islands Inst./ Turk Cult. Cntr, 10/17/12, NYC [Dhammapada, a collection of mostly ethical sayings, is a classic text of Buddhism, a way of life based on teachings of Buddha [Siddartha Guatama] thought to have lived in N India betw. the 6th & 4th cent. BCE [Britannica.com, 10/'15].

[183] At the same meeting, the author noted 3.5K yr old Torah Teaching that aimed at turning hatred & enmity into amity: [Exod. 23:4-5]

כִּי תִפְגַּע שׁוֹר אֹיִבְךָ, אוֹ חֲמֹרוֹ--תֹּעֶה: הָשֵׁב תְּשִׁיבֶנּוּ, לוֹ. כִּי-תִרְאֶה חֲמוֹר שֹׂנַאֲךָ, רֹבֵץ תַּחַת מַשָּׂאוֹ, וְחָדַלְתָּ, מֵעֲזֹב לוֹ--עָזֹב תַּעֲזֹב, עִמּוֹ

"If thou meet thine enemy's ox or his ass going astray, thou shalt surely bring it back to him again. If thou see the ass of him that hateth thee lying under its burden, thou shalt forbear to pass by him; thou shalt surely release it with him".

Ordinary hatred & enemies are usually the result of communications failures. By following the teaching of these verses, hatred & enmity will be neutralized & Peace restored. The burdened animals will also benefit

MASOOM STANEKAZI,[KARZAI GOV.]RIGHT, & QARI DIN MOHAMMAD HANAFI, WHITE BEARD,[TALIBAN],KYOTO, 6/28/12. PROF. MASANORI NAITO/DOSHISHA U., WSJ. SEE FOOTNOTE 184B BELOW.

There are several hundred million practicing Buddhists in the world. The highest concentration in combined spiritual and geopolitical influence is in Japan. It has not been directly involved in the war and occupation of Afghanistan. This puts the Buddhists in Japan in an excellent position to work with the Taliban and that's what some in Japan are already doing[184].

The people of Mongolia are also primarily Buddhist. Unlike Japan and other Buddhist communities, they are also ethnically and historically linked to Afghanistan: the Hazaras of Afghanistan are understood by scholars to be descendants of Mongols[185]. The majority of the people in Bamiyan Province – where the great Buddhist statues stood – are Hazaras. However, the Hazara– Mongol presence in Afghanistan isn't limited to this province. Close to 9/10ths live in other provinces, with a substantial fraction in the capital city, Kabul. Altogether, they make up over 1/8th of the Afghan population[186].

The Hazaras of Afghanistan today are not Buddhist. They are nearly all Moslem – but they're mostly Shiite Moslems. So they have some distance from the overwhelmingly Sunni Taliban. Perhaps this mix of links and distances could provide a social space for building Peace.

A group made up of Mongolian and Japanese Buddhists could meet with leaders of the Afghans – including both representatives of the majority Sunni Taliban and the doubly minority Shiite Hazaras. The social dynamic of this meeting would have each group not knowing what to expect from the others – except that all are trying to find a way to Peace.

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[184] A. "Taliban representative joins Afghan government official in Japan's peace forum" Japan Daily Press. Adam Westlake 6/28/12. B. "Afghan Foes Sit Together in Kyoto" Habib Khan Totakhil & Nathan Hodge, WSJ, 6/28/'12 3:28 p.m. ET. C. Head of UNESCO at time of supposed UNESCO Faux Pas destruction of statues was career Japanese diplomat, Kōichirō Matsuura: 1st elected to this post: '99, re-elected for another 4 yrs: '05. D. China actually has 2-5X as many Buddhists as Japan [see footnote 177-E.10] E. More recent talks incl. 'Report of a 2-day Pugwash meeting on *Security in Afghanistan* Qatar, 2-3 May '15', P. Cotta-Ramusino, Secretary General of Pugwash). 40 particapants, incl. Taliban.

[185] "The Genetic Legacy of the Mongols", Tatiana Zerjal, et al, Am J Hum Genet. Mar., '03; 72(3): 717–721.

The fig. above, adapted from Fig. 2 of this paper, shows an extremely high % of Mongolian Y chromosome markers among Afghan Hazaras © 2003, The American Soc. of Human Genetics. All rights reserved.

[186] A. Some sources give 19% -- incl. some versions of the CIA World Factbook. CIA published data on ethnic & language distribution in Afghanis. in '91 & '92 with some large, unexplained changes taking place between these two years. In '91 & before, the CIA had:

Language: Pashtu 50% [This is the CIA spelling] , Afghan Persian (Dari) 35%, Turkic languages (primarily Uzbek & Turkmen) 11%, 30 minor languages (mostly Balochi & Pashai) 4%; much bilingualism.

Ethnic divis'ns: Pashtun 50%, Tajik 25%, Uzbek 9%, Hazara 12-15%; minor ethnic groups incl. Chahar Aimaks, Turkmen, Baloch, & other.

In 1992 and after , the CIA had:

Language: Pashtu 35%, Afghan Persian (Dari) 50%, Turkic lang. (primarily Uzbek & Turkmen) 11%, 30 minor lang. (prim. Balochi & Pashai) 4%; much bilingualism.

Ethnic divisions: Pashtun 38%, Tajik 25%, Uzbek 6%, *[not a typo!]* Hazara 19%; minor ethnic groups include Chahar Aimaks, Turkmen, Baloch, and others.

In an official USG report on the first 5 yrs of the US led war in Afghanistan, the Pashtuns are said to be "approximately 40 percent of the country's total estimated population of 27 million."

"Tajiks…, approximately 27% " "the Hazara… group makes up about 10 percent of the population"

"The Uzbeks… comprise the next largest ethnic population."

"The nomads called Aimaqs and the more sedentary farmers identified as Turkomen make up another 10 percent of the population"

"Roughly 80 [%] …practiced the Sunni … Islam. The rest were Shia." p.11-13 The United States Army in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) October 2001–September 2005: A Different Kind of War, 5/10. Donald P. Wright, et al ,

B. A possible explanation for this change may be the results of a study of casualties & displacement of the people of Afghan. as a result of the Soviet-Afghan war. That study, by Marek Sliwinski, showed that Pashtuns had declined relative to Hazaras as a result of both death and migration. The Major rural centers of Hazara population -- in the mountainous center of the country -- were relatively untouched by the war. The southern, rural, Pashtun areas were, according to this study, largely depopulated. Since much of this depopulation was a result of refugee migration to Pakistan, the refugees might return and restore at least part of the apparent Pashtun deficit.

The study is flawed by its dependence on interviews with refugees in the refugee camps of Pakistan and may not represent either the situation of those who remained in the country or those who went to Iran or other places. See APPENDIX 23 THE NUMBER OF CASUALTIES IN THE SOVIET AFGHAN WAR

C. The following paragraph is from "The Opium Economy In Afghanistan: An International Problem" Office On Drugs And Crime, Vienna, 2003, 226 pdf pages. Pdf page 52, p 48 .

"The United Nations Population Division estimates Afghanistan's population at 21.2 million in 1999 and 21. 8 million in 2000. A survey conducted by the Taliban in 1999/2000 arrived at a population figure of 23 million. The Economist Intelligence Unit, based on another UNDP report, put the figure 'in excess of ' 25 million people. Similarly, the Fischer Weltalmanach 2002, based on World Bank data, put the figure at 25.9 million for 1999. The World Bank, in its *World Development Indicators 2002* estimated the figure at 26.6 million in 2000."

CHAPTER 9:

PERSECUTION OF HAZARAS AND SHIITES UNDER THE TALIBAN?



The discussion of the destruction of the Buddhist statues of Bamyan brought into focus the situation of two minority groups in Afghanistan – the Hazaras and Shiites. Ahmed Rashid, whose book 'Taliban…' would hit the number one spot on the NYT Best Seller List[187] -- took the opportunity of the destruction of the Bamyan statues to accuse the Taliban of persecuting these two groups[188].

Hazaras make up an estimated 90% of the roughly 400,000 people of Bamyan Province. In Afghanistan, most Hazaras are Shiites[189] and vice versa. There are roughly three million of each[190]. They're concentrated in the mountainous areas of central Afghanistan – centered on Bamyan province. There are also major concentrations of both in the cities of Kabul, Herat, Ghazni and Mazar-i-Sharif. How did the Taliban – who were overwhelmingly Pashtun and Sunni – treat the Shiites[191] and Hazaras[192]?

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[187] weeks on best seller list & sales prior to this

[188] See footnote XXX

[189] "Hazāra Aymāḳs of northwestem Afghānistān .. and the Taymannī Hazāras are …Sunnī" _____

[190] 15-19% of the Afghan population is Shiite according to Library of Congress – Federal Research Division Country Profile: Afghanistan, 8/08

The % of Hazaras jumped sharply in the estimates put out by the CIA – mostly at the expense of Pashtuns. The estimates range from 12-19% -- see footnote 186.

[191] The top map shows the distribution in Afghanistan & much of the Muslim world of the different schools of thought in Islam. The insert shows that the predominant school in Afghanistan – Hanafi – is different from what is dominant in Arabia – Hanbali – but matches what's found in much of Pakistan and Central Asia. It also shows that Shia Islam is concentrated in the Afghan central highlands –extending in the west to Herat. A map with the distribution of Ismaili Muslims in NE Afganistan is on p. 111. Taken from _____

[192] The lower map gives the ethnolinguistic distribution in Afghanistan in '97. It shows the Hazaras concentrated in the Central Highlands – like the Shiites- but fails to show the substantial Hazara communities in either Kabul or Ghazni. An enlarged version of the upper part of this map -- with the map key -- & showing political control in 9/01 is on p. 111.

Another map, National Geographic '03, based on data from Thomas Gouttierre of the Center for Afghan Studies, Univ. of Neb. at Omaha, shows more detail for specific Afghan cities.

CHAPTER 9a

PERSECUTION OF SHIITES

The Taliban entered the first large city with a substantial non-Hazara, Shiite population[193] – Herat - in early Sept. 1995. They entered "without a fight" "…quickly established a new local government and declared a three-day holiday."[194] There was "…hardly a shot fired…, no looting… and "…[with the exception of the governor of the province, Ismail Kahn and his immediate entourage]…few townspeople fled from the invaders…. 'The city is tense but peaceful,' one relief worker said. …"[195] .

However there was some fighting, burning and killing – in Kabul: "Following Taliban's stunning victory in Herat, …about 5,000 supporters of President Rabbani[196] attacked the Pakistan embassy in Kabul and set it on fire. They also killed a Pakistani employee of the embassy and injured 25, including the ambassador, military attache, and the first secretary."[197]

A week later "A spokesman for the Afghanistan branch of the United Nations Children's Fund told journalists the situation was relatively calm in the town, [Herat]. But he said the [Taliban]…were not allowing women to work in public services except in the health sector. [emphasis added] [198] We also see where the Taliban were getting some of their more sophisticated military equipment – from people like Ismail Khan who ran away and left it to them.[199]

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[193] **"Shaikh Najafi, one of the Shiite leaders in Herat Province, …estimates that …around 25-30% in the City of Herat [are Shiite]…." Unhcr Advice 18/3/04. Refugee Review Tribunal, Australia, # AFG17479, 9/9/05**

[194] **Sept. 5/95, Islamic Student Militia Overruns Strategic Western City, Kathy Gannon, 480 words, Dateline: Islamabad, Pakistan.**

[195] **Despite his fierce reputation, Mr. Khan, an ethnic Tajik, Sunni Muslim, with his family and supporters, fled in a 50-car caravan at night across the desert towards Iran. …"It's a mystery to us why Herat fell. Ismail Khan had thousands of militiamen, but it seems there was no serious fighting," said David Lockwood, a security coordinator for the UN Development Programme in Afghanistan." The Independent, Lond., Sept. 6/95, Student army seizes key Afghan city, Tim MCGIRK, p 10, , New Delhi**

After escaping to Iran "Ismael Khan, … accused the intelligence services of Pakistan, Israel and the United States of being behind the student-led Taliban's advance on western Afghanistan." AFP,Sept/10/95,Dateline:Tehran. [EMPHASIS ADDED]

[196] **At that time he was the President of the UN recognized official government of Afghanistan.**

[197] **UPI, 9/9/95, Anwar Iqbal, Dateline: Islamabad, In contrast, when the US fired scores of cruise missiles at Afghanistan in Aug. '98, & anti-US protests broke out in many areas "One senior aid official said the Taliban had moved quickly to protect aid workers in Kabul & other cities." The Globe and Mail, Canada, 8/22/98,'U.S. missile strikes spark Muslim fury White House scrambles to justify decision' B. Mckenna & J. Stackhouse, dateline: Islamabad & DC.**

[198] **"And although the schools were open once more, girls and women teachers had been excluded, he added. The Taliban forces took similar measures when they took over Kandahar several months ago, he said" AFP, 9/12/95 Islamic fighters ban women from work, girls from school, Dateline: Geneva. [EMPH. ADDED]**

[Note that the ban is only on public service work – not on all work and not on the health sector. – but the headline gives the impression of women being banned from working].

[199] **"The Defence Ministry in Kabul said the Taliban had captured at least 10 functioning aircraft, including jets, helicopter gunships and transport planes, in Herat. Numerous tanks and pieces of artillery were also lost." AFP, 9/13/95, Byline: Terence White, Dateline: Kabul, [EMPH. ADDED]**

A month after this we learn "nurses and doctors returning home from a day's work…are just about the only professional women allowed to function…[in Herat under the Taliban] "… the Holy Koran …stipulates that women must not mix with men, neither at work nor at school. If they want to study, they can do so at home…," explains the man in charge of "Foreign affairs" in Herat, Sayed Abdul Malek." [200][EMPH. ADDED]

Five months after the Taliban took over governance of Herat, Pulitzer Prize winning reporter John F. Burns of the NYT, arrived on the scene. After 5 days there, in a 2735 word, page 1, piece, he tells us that he "and an accompanying photographer moved freely about the city…" He notes a lot of anti-Pashtun sentiment on the part of some of the people who are closely tied to the language and culture of neighboring Iran.

There is no mention of anti-Shiite or anti-Hazara activity on the part of the Taliban. In fact, there's no mention Shiites or Hazaras as such among those Burns interviewed. Yet he notes: "… Iran…has joined India and Russia in an airlift of arms, ammunition and other supplies to the Massoud forces in Kabul." [201] In two subsequent pieces dateline Herat, with more than 1000 more words, Reporter Burns makes no mention of any anti-Shiite or anti-Hazara activity on the part of the Taliban.[202]

This is particularly remarkable as, only half a year before the Taliban entered Herat, they had been accused of torturing and murdering the most outstanding Shiite leader in the country and throwing him out of a helicopter. This reported atrocity – where the leader's eight senior colleagues were also killed – would become the rallying cry of the anti-Taliban, Shiite-Hazara community. The lack of mention of these deaths suggests the Shiite leaders of Herat didn't believe the story.

It also suggests that the Shiite leaders of Herat were familiar with the live–and-let-live *modus vivendi* that has prevailed among the different Muslim groups in neighboring Pakistan. In Pakistan, where so many of the Taliban were educated – there are over 40 million Shiites – 20-25% of the Muslim population -- and they generally get along with the Sunni majority.[203]

The same is true in India where a similar fraction of the country's 150 million Muslims are Shiite[204]. In Deoband – the leading school in South Asia for the type of Sunni Islam practiced by the great majority of the Taliban -- half the city is Hindu with a long record of mutual tolerance[205]

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[200] IPS, 10/25/95, Women Retreat As Taliban Advance, Philip Brown, Dateline: Herat [This is 1st article dateline Herat from Aug 1/95, in LexisNexis 10/14/13, Nat. Lib of Israel.]

[201] NYT, 2/14/96. Late Edition – Final, The Fiercely Faithful -- A special report. ;From Cold War, Afghans Inherit Brutal New Age, Sect. A; p1; Col. 3; Foreign Desk; Second Front.

[202] NYT, 2/18/96, "The West in Afghanistan, Before and After" Sect 4; p 5; Col 1; 1069 words, DATELINE: HERAT, Afghanistan

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[203] Give refences on this

[204] Give refences on this

[205] Give refences on this

CHAPTER 9b

WHAT ABOUT TALIBAN TREATMENT OF HAZARAS?

Less than 10% of the Shiites in Herat were Hazaras -- so Hazaras made up only 2-3% of the overall population of the city.[206] Maybe Hazaras were too inconsequential in the city for the Taliban to bother with – or for Reporter Burns to mention. This was certainly not the case in Kabul. There, half of the city was either Hazara or Pashtun – with about equal numbers in each group.[207].The Taliban had two major reported encounters with the Hazara population of Kabul: in early '95 and late '96.

Between late November 1994 and January of '95, en route to their first encounter with the Hazaras of Kabul, the Taliban took control of Ghazni Province and its capital of the same name.[208] Ghazni city – with about 120,000 people -- had about the same ethnic mix as Kabul – with Pashtuns and Hazaras acounting for 1/4th and 1/5th respectively. There were also about 5% Hindus[209]. Ghazni Province as a whole, had a million people[210] -- half Pashtun and nearly as many Hazaras[211]. There were no reports of the Taliban engaging in any anti-Hazara or anti-Shiite activities in the city or province[212]. Instead we learn they:

"cleared illicit check-posts collecting tolls on the national highway… [and]…were generally well received in Afghanistan so far, because they were perceived as pious Muslims campaigning against corruption"[213]

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recounts this story, Niamatullah Ibrahimi niamat.ibrahimi@gmail.com , 11/14/13, He responded the next day: saying:

> Hi Adler, Thank you for your email. Can you please say a few words about yourself? As always, it helps communication if we know each other better. I would also be interested to read a pdf of your forthcoming book. Best regards,Niamat".

But as a result of a mix-up on my part, he apparently didn't get a timely response. Mix-up realized 11/28/13, material sent on that date, nothing yet received as of 2/20/19]

"The first contact between the Hazaras and the Taliban occurred in Ghazni in October 1994. Mawlawi Ehsanullah Ehsan, a senior representative of the [Taliban] movement, held a detailed discussion with local leaders of *Hizb-e Wahdat* and *Harakat*. Here he stressed that they [the Taliban] would refrain from any military encroachment into the Hazara territories and that in future they aimed to officially recognise the Shiite jurisprudence, distribute power based on the population figures of all ethnic communities and to grant autonomy to the Hazarajat. He impressed the Hazara delegates, who communicated his message to their senior leaders in Kabul. His messages echoed across the political spectrum of the Hazaras. As a result, the Taliban faced no considerable resistance by the Hazaras in the provinces. The *Hizb-e Wahdat* forces deployed from Kabul were rejected and attacked by the local Hazaras well ahead of the Taliban arrival. This was further strengthened by the obvious military supremacy of the Taliban. Most *Hizb-I Watan* leaders in Ghazni were convinced that an armed resistance would antagonise the Taliban and leave them in a situation of military confrontation and limited capacity to resist. After the Taliban captured the provincial capital, they removed all Hazara officials from their offices but did not attempt to disarm or persecute them [Did they remove other officials or only Hazaras?]." [words in brackets added by ASA for clarification. Emphasis added Question of ASA.]

Pdf p. 12-13 & footnotes 13 & 22 "Development As State Making -Divide And Rule: State Penetration In Hazarajat (Afghanistan) From The Monarchy To The Taliban", Niamatullah Ibrahimi, Working Pap. 42, Ser 2, Crisis States Research Centre, Jan., '09, _____

B. In a later work, he wrote: "On 15 March 1995, during a trip to the district of Chaharasiab, the Taliban base outside Kabul, Mazari and nine other senior figures of Hezb-e Wahdat were captured and then summarily executed by the Taliban. The Taliban claimed Mazari and his associates were killed in a gun battle aboard an aircraft that was flying them towards Qandahar. While the exact circumstances in which they were killed remain a mystery, most accounts of the examination of the bodies of Mazari and other Wahdat leaders show they were severely tortured before being killed. As for the future, the killing sent shock waves through the entire Hazara community, plainly demonstrating the Taliban's uncompromising attitude. The Taliban handed over the bodies of Mazari and other Wahdat leaders to the Hazaras of Ghazni. The body of Mazari was carried on foot in the cold winter of Hazarajat from Ghazni to Mazar-e Sharif where he was buried after a week-long procession. Besides his leadership in the transformation of Hazara politics, the manner in which Mazari died has gained him an iconic status among the Hazaras, a position he continues to holds more than two decades after his death." P198-9, The Hazaras and the Afghan State: Rebellion, Exclusion and the Struggle for Recognition, xviii, 285p, Hurst & Co., '17, Distrib: Oxford U.Press. ISBN:9781849047074 hardback.

Emphasis added. No sources are given for these assertions. A contemporaneous news report said there were a total of 9, including Mazari , see footnote 282. "Most accounts" is not the same as "reliable accounts". Most

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206 Data from National Geographic map , see footnote 192,

207 Ibid. Tajiks are given 45%, Uzbeks 2%, Baluchis, Turkmen and Hindus each 1% as of 2003 . Figures may've been somewhat different during the Taliban period – % of Pashtuns higher and the % of Tajiks – allied with the Talibans Enemies, substantially lower. See if there is data from the 1995-2001 period .

208 AFP, 11/28/94, "Afghan state security forces continue Kabul cleanup" Terence White, Dateline:Kabul,11/28

209 UNHCR Sub-Office Central Region, District Profile, 06/07/02

210 Settled Population of Ghazni province by Civil Division , Urban, Rural and Sex-2012-13 http://cso.gov.af/Content/files/Ghazni(1).pdf

211 Naval Postgrad School, Prog. for Culture & Conflict Studies,5/18/'10

212 A. There is an interesting account of the first contacts between the Taliban and Hazaras – not reported in contemporaneous English sources, but based on an interview with one person, Ustad Fekrat, [Ghazni],1/'07. The account is consistent with the non-persecutorial nature of the Taliban approach to the Hazaras and Shiites as suggested by contemporaneous news reports.

[The author of this book is making an effort to find more about / contact this person – who does not appear in a LexisNexis search and only appears in this one source in a Google search. In response to a query, an Afghan Hazara blogger with the same last name and Prof. Barnett Rubin both said that did not know him. An email was sent to the author of the paper that

accounts may just be repeating propaganda. This book was published ~15yrs after Michael Griffin's book Reaping the Whirlwind – which cites a medical exam of Mazari's body. See footnote 284 [Michael Griffin's book is not cited in Dr. Ibrahimi book.]

Dr. Ibrahimi makes no menton of how the Taliban interacted with the Shias of Herat later in '95, & describes the massacre of the Taliban in Mazar-i-Sharif, noting [p200-1] "Thousands of Taliban fighers were caught in the hostile streets of Mazar-i-Sharif. Hundreds were killed while fleeing and hundreds of others were captured by Malik's forces and later suffocated to death inside metal containers….[in retaliation, in '98] most of the 2000-3000 Hazara forces defending the city were killed in battle or captured and "it is estimated that 5-6,000 civilians were massacred in 2 days after the Taliban took control of the city, and thousands more were taken prisoner" [no direct source given for death tolls, prisoners captured on either side. Nothing is said on what happened to the Hazaras reportedly taken prisoner by Taliban.]

C. The failure of Dr. Ibrahimi to name even one of the associates of Mazari who supposedly had been "severely tortured" & "summarily executed' suggests that the families of these colleagues of Mazari didn't agree to repeat this story but were privately telling a very different story based on actual examination of the bodies by suitably qualified forensic experts.[see footnotes 282-285]These family members are also likely to have heard the story of the pilot of the helicopter.[See footnotes 294-295] It's also possible that some of the promoters of the "tortured-executed" story are intimidating the family members of the others who died – not to publish what they know.

D.1 The following names of the 8 colleagues appeared in the English Lang. Wikipedia article on Mazari, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abdul_Ali_Mazari accessed by ASA Jul 6/2020 superscript #'s added by ASA: "On March 12, 1995, the Taliban leader Mullah Burjan requested a personal meeting with Mazari and a delegation from the Islamic Wahdat Central Party (Abuzar[1], Ekhlaasi[2], Eid Mohammad Ibrahimi Behsudi[3], Ghassemi[4], Jan Mohammad[5], Sayed Ali Alavi[6], Bahodari[7], and Jan Ali[8]) in Chahar Asiab, near Kabul.[footnote 16, citing "Father of Hazara Nation - Abdul Ali Mazari". *www.hazara.net*. Retrieved 2019-06-11. This source, accessed by ASA Jul/6/20 reads: *"According to Hazara Press, the Leader of the Hizb-e-Wahdat Party, Ustad Mazari and a group of Islamic Wahdat Party Central Committee members (Abuzar, Ekhlaasi, Ebrahim Behsudi, Ghassemi, Jan Mohammad, Sayed Ali Alavi, Bahodari, and Jan Ali), were on their way (in two cars) to meet Mullah Burjan, the Taliban commander, who requested a personal meeting with Ustad Mazari. On their arrival, the leaders were taken by surprise when they were forcefully abducted by Mullah Burjan and other Talibans in the vicinity of Pule Ghul Bagh. They were killed in Ghazni on March 11, 1995."*] [cont. of Eng. Wik.] *On their arrival, the group were abducted and tortured. The following day Mazari was executed and his body was found in a district of Ghazni. The Taliban issued a statement that Mazari had attacked the Taliban guards while being flown to Kandahar. Later his body and those of his companions were handed over to Hezb-e Wahdat, mutilated and showed signs of torture."* [footnote 5, citing http://www.bakhtarnews.com.af/eng/politics/item/21614-mazari-conferred-title-of-%E2%80%98martyr-of-national-unity%E2%80%99.html [This source, accessed by ASA 7/6/20 relates *"Sunday March 13, 2016 Kabul (BNA) Based on a decree, President Mohammad Ashraf Ghani conferred the title of "Martyr of National Unity" to Shaheed Abdul Ali Mazari here yesterday, a presidential statement said."* There is nothing in the rest of this 214 word statement about Mazari being "executed", the hand over of the bodies, mutilation or signs of torture.]

D.2 The Persian Language Wikipedia article accessed by ASA Jul 6/20 & auto translated to English by Google translate, showed several names of these 8 colleagues: https://fa.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D8%B9%D8%A8%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D9%84%DB%8C_%D9%85%D8%B2%D8%A7%D8%B1%DB%8C *"Eventually, despite constant political efforts and military resistance, the Islamic Unity Party in western Kabul was defeated, and Mazari was arrested by the Taliban on March 13, 1994, while on his way to negotiate with the Taliban leaders. Abdul Ali Mazari, a member of the Central Council, Abuzar Ghaznavi[1], a member of the Central Council and a member of the Security Committee, Mr. Ghaemi[4?], a member of the Central Council and a member of the Finance Committee; Seyyed Ali Alavi[6], a bodyguard And my comrade Abdul Ali Mazari, the commander of Jan Mohammad[5], one of the prominent commanders of the 2nd Infantry Division of the Islamic Unity Party, and three others were given to the people in the suburbs of Ghazni. Mazari was thrown from a helicopter. Due to the severe shooting of these people, their bodies could hardly be identified.* [footnote 11 citing هفته نامه امروز ما - شماره سوم - ۵ حمل ۱۳۷۴. Auto translated by Google : "Our Today's Weekly - Issue 3 - April 5, 1995" . Thus 3 or 4 of the 4 names given match the English Wikip. source, 3 names are not given & the total – 7 - is one less than the 8 names in the English source. None of 16 other Wikip languages with articles on Mazari named any of those who died with him . The other languages were: Bengali, German, French, Indonesian, Japanese, Polish, Russian, Urdu, Chinese, Persian, Italian, Western Punjabi, Pashto, Ukranian, Netherlands, Norwegian, Czeck. None in Arabic or Spanish: ASA 6/26/20]

A contemporaneous news report added, that "as [the Taliban]traveled up the main road toward Kabul its fighters are said to number up to 25,000, though the figure cannot be confirmed. Its front-line fighters outside Kabul are believed to number fewer than 2,000.[214]

On Feb 10th -- on the road to Kabul -- the Taliban took control of the town of Maidan Shahr, 42km by road from the heart of Kabul[215]. This town of roughly 30,000 was only 1% Hazara,[216] It was also the capital of Wardak Province – with about half a million people – over 1/3rd of whom Hazara[217] As with Ghazni, in Wardak, there were no reports of any anti-Shiite or anti-Hazara activities on the part of the Taliban -- despite a history of longstanding Pashtun - Hazara conflicts in the province[218-A,B].

[213] Quoting a 'defense ministry official' of the Government in Kabul.AFP,11/28/94, 'Af-ghan state security forces continue Kabul clean-up',Terence White, Datel: Kabul,11/28

[214] AP, Feb. 5/95. "Religious Students Form Powerful New Militia in Afghan War" Tim Johnston, Dateline: Kabul, Afghanistan

[215] Google maps 10/20/13, with a route on the Kabul-Ghazni Hwy. The heart of Kabul is taken as the Presidential Palace.

[216] UNHCR Sub-Office Central Region, District Profile, 06/07/2002

[217] ~36% were Hazara and most of the rest Pashtun, based on the numbers in a table in wikpedia accessed Nov.11/13. Some of the data in the table appeared to be from documents on individual districts of the province – analogous to the one above on Maidan Shahr.

[218] A. Unlike Ghazni City, where Hazaras & Pashtuns lived in close proximity to each other & the main route to Kabul, Wardak Hazaraas were mostly located ~50 miles west of the road - in the more mountainous areas of the Province. There may have been little opportunity or reason for meatings between the Hazara-Shiites and the Taliban.

The long standing conflict in this province combines racial, religious, lifestyle & political issues -- centering on transhumance of shepherd Pashtuns from wintering areas in lowlands, to mountain pastures in summer. In summer, these migrating Pashtun pastoralists make up about 1/5th of the population of Wardak. *"Provincial Development Plan, Wardak Provincial Profile" prepared by the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD), 2007.*

Similar situations exist in other Afghan provinces. The great Majority of Pashtuns are not nomadic – either in Wardak or in Afghanistan as a whole. ["The Kuchi & Hazara Land Dispute Conflicts – An Endless Struggle for Land Ownership", by *Nastrat Esmaty]*

B. "…during their advance in Uruzgan and Ghazni, both provinces with significant Shiite minorities – the Taliban had been noticeably conciliatory

The day the Taliban took control of Maidan Shahr was not only the 10th of February. On the Muslim lunar calendar it was also the 10th of the Muslim 'Holy Month' of Ramadan,[219]

"The victory opened the main route into Kabul after a long blockade [by the forces of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar.][220] …. More than 30 trucks carrying cooking oil and wheat flour for different traders, reached the capital by noon, travelling down the road from Kandahar…. Locals said if the route remained open food prices in Kabul would drop considerably, to the relief of residents suffering from shortages caused by the blockade."[221] "These were the first such convoys from the south in three years, witnesses said…. [A]ll experts agree they [the Taliban] get enormous goodwill from war-weary citizens."[222]

In the next few days the Taliban vanquished Hekmatyar from all of his positions around Kabul and were face to face with the forces they'd ultimately oust from the city.[223] "Taliban and government troops were joking with one another across one front." [224] There were still no reports of anti-Hazara or anti-Shiite expres-sions or activity on the part of the Taliban.

They had taken control of "40 per cent of the country in barely three months…. [with] a powerful promise -- to rid Afghanistan of the old Islamic resistance groups, many of which had long since turned to pillage, rape and murder, and institute genuine Islamic rule."[225] Before the Taliban ar-rived at the outskirts of Kabul in mid-February '95:

"The [non-Taliban] factions …[had] been fighting among themselves for the past three years, leav-ing more than 20,000 [226] dead in Kabul and de-stroying much of the city."[227] There'd been "al-

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in their dealings to the point of not disarming Shiite mujahidin when they did disarm fellow Sunnis" Anthony Davis, p.57 "How the Taliban became a military force"[Ch.[p43-71]"Fundamentalism Reborn? Afghanistan and the Taliban" William Maley,Editor.,'98, Hurst and Com-pany,London]citing: "Interview with wesern diplomat, Islamabad , March 1995; Rahimullah Yusufzai 'The New Mujahids", Newsline Feb. 1995.

[219] …the most sacred month of the Islamic calendar. It is a time of spiritual reflection, improvementand increased devotion and worship. Muslims are ex-pected to put more effort into following the teachings of Islam."

In Muslim Tradition "all good deeds are more handsomely rewarded in Ramadan than in any other month of the year." Statements concerning the observance of Ramadan are from the Wikipedia article on the subject re-trieved Nov, 5, '13 [get better sources]

[220] " Mr. Hekmatyar, responsible for much of the most ruthless shelling of Kabul, is a hard-line Muslim fundamentalist who in the late 1980's received a disproportionately large share of all the weapons that the United States supplied to the rebels– one of the largest recipients of military aid from the US during the anti-soviet war in Afghanistan."

"After Soviet troops swept into Afghanistan in 1979, roughly $3 billion -- the exact amounts were never made public -- was routed through the Central Intelligence Agency to Muslim rebels known as mujahedeen, or soldiers of God, who fought a successful 10-year war to drive the Soviet troops out….with an estimated one million Afghans dead."

"The United States was not responsible for the Soviet Union invading Afghanistan, but we were responsible for arming the mujahedeen groups that grew to be Frankensteins," said Stephen Masty, the 40-year-old head in Kabul of CARE International, …

At least a million of the city's residents have fled to refugee camps, leaving 600,000 others to fight for survival in the ruins." NYT, 2/22/95, 'As U.S. Aid Ends, Need of Afghan War Victims Persists', John F. Burns, p A3;, Datel.: Kabul, 2/ 21 [EMPHASIS ADDED]

[221] AFP, Feb/11/95, 'Supplies into Kabul improve after Taliban victory', Datelin: Kabul

[222] AFP, Feb. 12/95, 'Talibans close in on Kabul, allow food trucks in', Dateline: Kabul

[223] In September of 1996

[224] The "Taliban … 4,000-member Islamic student army … [was] face to face with the …[army of President Rabbani and his military commander, Massoud]'The Ottawa Citizen, 2/16/95, Thursday, 'Student forces set to take on army', Peter Greste; The Guardian, Dateline: Kabul

[225] NYT, 2/26/95, 'Outside Hands Still Stir the Afghan Pot', John F. Burns , S.4, p.3, C.1, Dateline: Kabul

[226] As of 4/95 "The International [Committee of the] Red Cross estimates more than 20,000 people, mostly civilians, have been killed in Kabul since the communists were overthrown in 1992." AP, Apr. 3/95, " 10 Bodies Found in Mass Grave at Kabul University", Dateline: Kabul. See footnote , p1 of 2, APPENDIX 24: WAR RELATED KILLING IN AFGHANISTAN DURING THE TALIBAN PERIOD for more and earlier ICRC refs on Kabul killings.

This compares with a report that "…in early 1994…an estimated 25,000 people were killed in the city between January and June" citing "Afghan Army Ousts Foes from Capital," *NYT*, 6/27/94.[P63 The Afghanistan Justice Project, Casting Shadows: War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity: 1978-2001 ['05]_____ But, NYT article actually says: "The fighting was the fiercest for weeks in Kabul, where more than 2,500 people have been killed since the latest battle for supremacy …began Jan. 1." [emphasis added]

[227] A. AP, Feb. 4/95; 'New Islamic Faction Says it is Advancing on Kabul', Dateline: Kabul.

B. AFP, 9/24/94 "Truce halts bloodshed in southwest Kabul" 467 words, Terence White "A temporary ceasefire, called for early Saturday to facili-tate mediation between warring Shiite Harakat-i-Islami and Hezb-i-Wahdat factions was still holding by the afternoon…" "The Iranian ambassador asked us for a ceasefire so he could go to west Kabul to talk to Mazari," a Harakat spokesman said. Iranian ambassador Ghulam Reza Hadoddi was said to be carrying a message from Tehran for Wahdat leader Abdul Ali Mazari, who started a simultaneous fight with Harakat and a rival Wahdat leader 11 days ago. …[in] the fighting between Harakat and Mazari's Wahdat faction…some 1,200 or more Shiites have been wounded and an estimated 350 to 400 killed."

C. AFP Oct.5/'94 "Lull in southwest Kabul fighting", Terence White, 534 words, Dateline: Kabul, The Shiite community in southwest Kabul was largely spared the rigours of the current 10-month-long battle for Afghan supremacy until Wahdat leader Abdul Ali Mazari attacked [pro-Rabbani Shiite faction] Harakat [-i-Islami] three weeks ago, bringing death and de-struction to their doorsteps. Now the Shiite community is split not only between Wahdat and Harakat, but also within Wahdat itself. Rival Wahdat leader Mohammad Akbari has sided with Harakat in the fight against Mazari and Hekmatyar's Hezb-i-Islami faction.

D. Xinhua News Agency, 12/12/94, "[Y]ear-ender: another year of afghan civil war", Pan Yi, 631 words, DATELINE: islamabad,; ITEM NO: 1212044, [T]he year 1994 witnessed continuous factional fightings in afghanistan without winner. …[T]he new round of fierce fighting erupted on january 1,

most daily rocket attacks by rival factions dug in on the city's outskirts."[228] For the civilians "[t]here hasn't been electricity or running water for almost two years. The nominal government doesn't function. Schools are rare and there is no formal economy".[229]

CHAPTER 9c:

WHY DIDN'T THE TALIBAN JUST STICK TO THE PASHTUN AREAS?

Some have asked: Why didn't the Taliban just stick to the Pashtun areas where there strength was greatest and avoid conflict with the more ethnically diverse – and less Islam oriented parts of the country?

Kabul, for example, was half Tajik, nearly 1/4th Hazara and had more than 15 years of heavy Soviet influence. The other areas –controlled by Ismail Kahn, Dostom, Massoud and the Shiite/Hazaras were also majority non-Pashtun. In the case of Dostom's key city – Mazar-i-Sharif -- a large fraction of the people were -- like so many in Kabul after years of Soviet influence -- not so religiously observant.

If they had just stopped before taking Kabul from Massoud and the other armed factions, the tensions between Masoud's Tajiks and the Shiite/Hazaras would have remained and fighting between and among them would have continued. As we will see in **PART TWO: WHERE DID THEY GET THEIR MONEY?,** the routes to Iran through Ismail Kahn's area and to Central Asia through Dostom's territory would have been blocked by people who were essentially gangsters extracting tolls from truckers and travelers.

Iran, Russia and India would have continued to supply these gangsters with weapons to fight the Taliban. The Rabbani – Massoud group would have continued to flood the country with unredeemable money – destroying the value of the currency.

The Taliban demonstrated in Herat in late 1995 that they were not interested in imposing the Pashtun culture on the more Persian oriented peoples of the country and that they were not interested in persecuting the Shiites.

That Iran, Russia and India continued to support their respective clients– the enemies of the Taliban -- upto and beyond 9/11/01 -- suggests that they were more afraid of a genuine religious Sunni led Muslim country on their border, than they were of the chaos of the war spilling over into their lands.

They -- Iran, Russia and India -- also did it because there was no power interested enough and able to stop them – because they thought they could get away with it – and for a long time – for more than a decade -- they did.

1994, when the uzbek militia leader rashid dostum who had allied with president burhanuddin rabbani suddenly joined hands with rabbani's arch rival gulbuddin hekmatyar. from then on, hekmatyar's hezb-i-islami, dostum's jumbush-i-melli and abdul mazari's hezb-i-wahdat stood on one side fighting against rabbani's government allied with rasool sayyaf's ittehad-i-islami. up to now, the fighting is still continuing not only in kabul but also in other parts of afghanistan, leaving at least 7,000 people dead and 900,000 displaced.. "the afghan fightings have become a pure power struggle pursued by a number of powerful factions," said fazul rehman, a research fellow from the pakistan institute of strategic studies. he described the composition of two rival groups as a mixture which could not be divided according to religion, ethnics or ideology." [EMPHASIS ADDED]

[228] AP, Feb/5/95,., "Religious Students Form Powerful New Militia in Afghan War", Tim Johnston, Dateline: Kabul

[229] A. AP, 2/27/95, 'Touring the Battered City is a Lesson in Survival Skills', Greg Myre, Dateline: Kabul

B. The Times Higher Education Supplement, 4/21/95, ...[see footnote 124-C for source & more from this article] "Kabul University reopened this month but no students and few lecturers were at the formal ceremony in the Afghan capital. ...Amir Hassanyar, university chancellor, said: 'This time we are not on the front line. Although there is a lot of work to be done we do not have to worry about rockets.' ...

Fifteen years of conflict has created a brain drain in which many of the educated elite fled rather than fall victim to successive regimes ...The chancellor claims that fewer than 20 per cent of the teaching staff are still in Kabul. Thousands of students have had to drop out. 'We used to have 11,000 students on campus before the fighting started; so far 1,200 have enrolled,' Dr Hassanyar said.

One of the university's former academics, President Burhanuddin Rabbani ...stressed his government's commitment to education, saying: 'We have a large programme for the university and we want to help but we are short of money'.

The government has been eager to open secondary and primary schools, which have also been closed for the past three years. Unlike the university, which was on the frontline, many schools now opening had become home to thousands of families whose houses were destroyed in the conflict.

A month ago the opposition factions were pushed 30 kilometres outside the city, beyond rocket range. ...the Taliban...in the south ...enjoyed popular support in the areas that fell under their control."

[EMPHASIS ADDED When it is said that the Taliban closed girls schools – it is important to consider that for three years – before the Taliban chased off Hekmatyar from his artillery nest – and were then driven off themsleves – there were no schools open.]

CHAPTER 10

DID THE TALIBAN THROW SHEIKH ABDUL ALI MAZARI OUT OF A HELICOPTER?

This question -- about the death of a single man most people outside of Afghanistan have never heard of -- appears to be relatively unimportant. Yet it is key to understanding the cause of most of the direct war related deaths in Afghanistan during the Taliban period[230-A]. It's also a key to reconciling the Sunni-Pashtuns and Hazara-Shiites.

Sheikh Abdul Ali Mazari was the most outstanding and most recognizable leader among the Hazara-Shiites of Afghanistan. He was the leader of Wahdat [230], the main Hazara-Shiite faction in the country -- and the dominant leader of the Hazara-Shiites living in Kabul itself. He was also allied with Hekmatyar's largely Sunni-Pashtun group -- the group that the Taliban had just vanquished from the area around Kabul.

When I saw the allegation that he had been tortured and thrown to his death from a helicopter[231], I had already written most of this book. I had already shown that many of the ugliest stories given out about the Taliban were just made up. This story seemed to fit the pattern for ugliness. It



ABDUL ALI MAZARI

"…was taken prisoner Saturday and forced to pose by the Taliban …Yesterday Mazari was slain during a helicopter flight. (Reuters Photo) [modified Google Translation of Dutch Text.] *NRC Handelsblad* 3/14/95, "Afghaanse shi'itische leider doodgeschoten", Pg. 5,: 538 words, Kabul/ Islamabad, 14 Maart.[See footnote 231-A]

THESE TWO DIFFERENT PICTURES SUGGEST THAT THERE WERE A WHOLE GROUP OF PICTURES TAKEN AT THE SAME TIME AND PLACE

was also inconsistent with the pattern of how the Taliban related to the Hazaras and Shiites that I had just explored in the last two chapters. There was no evidence of anti-Shiite or anti-Hazara statements or activities in this early period.

I decided to look in detail at everything that I could find up to the reported incident and after it – that might reveal a pattern. I also looked more closely at the one account of

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230-A We will see that ~6k people were killed directly in connection with the alleged murder of Mazari [See footnote 718.B3]

230-B Short for Hezb-e [Hezeb, Hizb-i, Hizib] Wahdat-i Islami-yi Afghanistan [Islamic Unity Party of Afghanistan] It was 'formed to unite the country's eight Shi'a parties. It is the main Shi'a party in Afghanistan and draws its support from the ethnic Hazara minority' From: U. S. Bur. of Citizenship & Immig. Services, *Afghanistan: Information on Hezb-e Wahdat*, 5/27/03, AFG03002.-OGC, [accessed 14/11/13]avail. at: _____

231 A. [According to the Taliban] "Mazari was slain yesterday in an attempt to free himself... According to others, however, Mazari was just executed."3/14/95,NRC Handelsblad, "Afghan Shiite leader shot dead" P.5 Kabul / Islamabad, 3/14. B. "The Hazara still felt very angry over the killing of the Wahdat party leader Abdul Ali Mazari by the Taliban last year" 9/Oct/96, Taz, Die Tageszeitung, Die grosse Konfron-tation, Thomas Ruttig, p.18. Modif. Auto. Google transl. of German & Dutch originals, resp. C. "The Hazaras subsequently claimed that Mazari was pushed out of a helicopter to his death by the Taliban…" Taliban: Islam, Oil and the New Great Game in Central Asia, p 35, Rashid, 2000. D. "Mazari was …thrown out of a Taliban helicopter …his body and those of his companions were…all mutilated and showed signs of torture." Wikipedia article on Mazari, Sept 4/14 _____

the physical evidence of Sheikh Mazari's body after supposedly being thrown from a helicopter. The conclusion was that this story was almost certainly just made up – but why? The question of 'why?' is pivotal. Why were some of the leaders associated with this fabricated atrocity fighting against the Taliban? We will explore this in :
PART TWO: WHERE DID THEY GET THEIR MONEY? .

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On Feb 8, just a week before Hekmatyar had fled, Sheikh Mazari's group renewed their rocket attacks on the nominal government in the heart of the Capital.[232] This was a government controlled by the Sunni-Tajik President Burhanuddin Rabbani and his Sunni-Tajik military commander, Ahmed Shah Massoud[233]. It was in the Holy Month of Ramadan and two days before the Taliban removed the blockade of Mazari's ally, Hekmatyar, at Maidan Shahr.

The same day, Feb 8th, a Reuters report quoted a "local Taliban commander, Mullah Boorjan, as saying that this fighting is 'un-islamic'" and that

> "'We have sent words to both sides to stop the fighting, which is inhuman and killing innocent civilians,'

…Wahdat has threatened to launch Scud missiles against the Government forces unless they stop their two-day-old assault on its enclave in the south-west of the Afghan capital. 'We have 20 Scuds and three launchers . . .' Mr Mazari said at his headquarters in Kabul's Karte Seh district, which is under attack.

> 'I will use the Scuds if I have to. We have decided to defend ourselves to the last man and to the last drop of blood,'

Mr Mazari said, as Government jets and artillery bombarded the area. Government forces said the onslaught that they launched on Monday [Feb 6th] was aimed at protecting civilians from intermittent rocket attack by Wahdat."[234] [emphasis added]

By Feb. 15, the day after Hekmatyar and his forces were ousted by the Taliban from their strongholds around Kabul, "Mazari …started negotiations with the Taliban to prevent a direct confrontation." [235]

> This is the first specific report in the LexisNexis English news database of any two-way interaction between the Taliban and Shiites and/or Hazaras in Afghanistan.[236]

Two days later, Fri., Feb 17, "U.N. envoy Mahmood Mestiri flew into the Kabul Airport, which was reopened after having been closed for more than a year due to the heavy fighting..."[237] After a 90 minute meeting with the Taliban, he said they were … demanding that the [proposed peace] mechanism be made up of 'good Moslems,' and that there be one representative from each of Afghanistan's 30 provinces." [238]

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[232] AP, 2/8/95 'Rival forces fight in west Kabul, DATELINE: Kabul

[233] It's interesting that all 4 of those named who were fighting for control of Kabul had foreign /secular educations. A. Rabbani received MA at Al-Azhar Univ. in Cairo in Islamic philosophy. [At the time he was there –66-68–"The Azhar Reform Law no. 103/1961 was aimed at integrating al-Azhar into the wider field of higher education…Already bereft of its *awqāf*, al-Azhar was now on the state budget, and the ʿ*ulamā*ʾ had become functionaries." _____ This was at a time under Nasser that Egypt was coming closer to the USSR]; B. Hekmatyar studied engineering in Kabul University. C. Massoud studied in a French high school in Kabul and also studied Engineering at Kabul U.. D. Mazari studied Islamic theology in Iran & Iraq.

[234] "Halt Kabul clash - student militia" 3/9/95 The Age (Melbourne, Australia), Thursday , Late Edition, SECTION: NEWS; International News; Pg. 10, LENGTH: 332 words, Kabul, Wednesday.Reuter

[235] AFP, 2/15/95, "Taliban demands Rabbani troop pullback", Kabul

[236] The Feb 8th Reuter report that the Taliban "sent words" to both sides , does not include any menton of a direct response. However, in Tehran, on Feb 12th,"In an interview with IRNA, an Afghan opposition official in Iran accused the Talibans [sic, this is the spelling throughout this article] of being backed by the United States. An official of Hezb-e-Vahdat,[sic- elsewhere spelled Wahdat] a pro-Iranian Shiite Moslem opposition group in Afghanistan, told AFP his group was "puzzled" by the emergence of the new group. Mohammad Nateghi said the Talibans were "very backward and against a role for women in society." AFP, Feb. 12/95, "Iran wary of Talibans' rise in Afghanistan" Dateline: Tehran, Feb 12.

A month later, this same Mohammad Nateghi, will play a role in the debacle of both the Wahdat and the Taliban in Kabul.

[237] Ibid

[238] AFP, 2/18/95, "UN plan delayed as militants demand control of Kabul security", Terence White, Dateline: Kabul.

The same day [2/17] —in the middle of Ramadan -- "Afghan government troops …heavily attacked forces of ,,,Wahdat …west of Kabul …and about five to six hundred Wahdat fighters were reported being trapped because Taliban forces had controlled their retreating route. It was reported that Wahdat's leader, Abdul Mazari, sent two men to negotiate with Taliban's commander and expressed the will to turn their positions west of Kabul[239] to Taliban. However, Taliban insisted that Wahdat's men should lay down all their weapons while withdrawing." [240]

Still, most of Kabul remained relatively quiet with brisk business in fresh meat and produce.[241] The "rocket duels" between government troops and Wahdat[242] were "reminders of an unresolved conflict that many fear[ed] could reignite at any time."[243]

[239] Note: "west of Kabul' is not the same as West Kabul, where the Hazaras actually lived.

[240] Xinhua News Agency, 2/17/95, Fri., "afghan govt force attacks opposition force." Dateline: Islamabad, Feb. 17;

[241] NYT, 2/20/95 'With Kabul Largely in Ruins, Afghans Get Respite From War', John F. Burns, p A1; Col. 1, 1595 words, Dateline: Kabul, 2/ 19

[242] This was the " Hezb-e-Wahadat", the leading Hazara armed group in Afghanistan. It was headed by Abdul Ali Mazari and controlled about 10% of Kabul – on the western side. The remaining 90% was controlled by the Rabbani/Masssoud group.[part of this info is from the 2/18/95 AFP article , infra] AP, 2/17/95, U.N. Official Arrives Amid Renewed Hopes of Peace, Greg Myre, Dateline: Kabul .

"There is still sporadic shooting between Rabbani's troops and a Shiite Muslim faction in the southwest of the city" AP, 2/19/95, "U.N. Peace Plan Bedeviled by Last-Minute Maneuverings", Greg Myre, Dateline: Kabul; AP, 2/21/95, "U.N. Plan Stalls, New Government Weeks Away:, GREG MYRE, 618 words, Dateline: Kabul

[243] NYT, 2/20/95, supra

While Massoud used the Holy Month of Ramadan to launch a heavy attack against Wahdat, the Taliban acted consistent with the time:

> "Islamic preachers and students…[were] streaming into Kabul, urging Rabbani's defenders to give up their guns. [Some thought] [c]oming from clergymen… this … message of peace …[might] prove to be Rabbani's downfall.[244]

This was consistent with the usual way the Taliban had been advancing, as a 'foreign aid worker explained:

> "They send word up to whatever commander stands in their way that they're coming. 'If you are an honest Muslim you will join us, if not, you'll be swinging from a tree come tomorrow,' the Taliban tells them.

It's amazing how few mujahedeen stayed to fight them." …Their only aim, they insist, is to disarm all the feuding warlords. Now Rabbani is highest on their list."

"Taliban has marched about 330 miles across the country disarming militants, burning poppy fields, executing drug dealers and halting highway banditry…. 'We don't want war, and we will continue talks and negotiations to the last," said

[244] The Ottawa Citizen, 2/21/95, "Afghan student militia spurns UN, sets sights on government army; Many consider Taliban as heroes", Tim Mcgirk; The Independent. Dateline: Kabul

the Taliban's Rabbani, claiming his group has "infinite patience.'"[245]

While the Taliban sent preachers and students into Kabul to talk, "[t]he government has sent additional tanks to reinforce its position[246] in recent days, but there's been no shooting in the area."[247]

Five days later,[2/26] – still in Ramadan -- "President Burhanuddin Rabbani's troops launched rockets and machine-gun fire on positions held by …[Mazari's Hazara militia] that holds a small corner of southwest Kabul - the only part of the city not controlled by government forces or their allies..[248]

A week later [3/6] – with Ramadan ended -- the government … launched a major "offensive... from three directions" against Mazari and the Hazaras in the city. "Jets bombed neighborhoods …and were followed by rocket, artillery and heavy machine gun fire" .[249]

The next day [3/7], "Infantry loyal to Afghan President Burhanuddin Rabbani made some ground against … [Mazari's Hazara militia]… in south Kabul Tuesday in an offensive backed by tanks, amid reports of more fighting between Rabbani forces and the Taliban student militia in the southwest[250]

"Abdul Rehman, a Taliban spokesman, said … negotiations with Masood were underway for the handover of Kabul's security to the Taliban." He also said "the Taliban were not taking sides in the battle with the …[Hazara] militia which is sandwiched between Rabbani and Taliban forces. He said … [Hazara]…fighters would be allowed safe exit only if they surrendered their weapons to the Taliban." [251] On the same day, another source also noted "The Taliban have not been involved in the latest fighting." [252]

A day later, Wednesday, March 8, two days after Massoud had launched a major offensive against the Hazaras, the situation had changed: "Taliban forces …launched their first offensive against troops loyal to President Burhanuddin Rabbani with an attack on the southwest of the capital Kabul,…"

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[245] The Washington Post, 2/21/95, "Afghan Militia's Rise Pushes U.N. Peace Effort Near Collapse", John Ward Anderson, 1076 words, Dateline: Kabul, 2/20 It should be clear that there are two Rabbani's in this story – not related to each other. Mullah Muhammad Rabbani is a senior Taliban leader. President Burhanuddin Rabbani, is the head of the nominal government.

[246] 'Sending the tanks to reinforce its position' was the work of Ahmed Shah Massoud – the unofficial Def Minister. He was the son of a prosperous colonel in former king's army.

He attended a prestigious French language, secular high school in Kabul and then studied engineering at Kabul University. There is no indication in his background of intensive formal studies of Islam. In contrast, the Taliban were primarily intensive students of Islam with relatively little exposure to western education.

[247] A. AP, 2/21/95, "U.N. Plan Stalls, New Government Weeks Away":, Greg Myre, 618 words, Dateline: Kabul. B. "Afghan government forces today drove out fighters of taliban and Hezb-I-Wahdat from southwest Kabul and controlled the whole capital. ...government forces unleashed a sudden attack against fighters of Taliban and wahdat late Saturday when its reinforcements arrived. All heavy weapons including artillery, rockets, tanks and jet fighters were used in the overnight fierce battle.... as the situation in kabul became more and more intense and confusing recently, many reports coming from the city conflicted one another." [EMPHASIS ADDED] 3/12/95 Xinhua News Agency, SUN., "Afghan govt forces expel Taliban, Wahdat from Kabul" Length: 201 words, Dateline: Islamabad, 3/12; ITEM NO: 0312133

[248] AP, 2/26/95, Fierce Rocket Exchange in Kabul Dateline: Kabul

[249] The quote is from "government spokesman, Dr. Abdullah" AP, Mar.6/95, 'Government Disregards Truce, Unleashes Major Attack', Tim Johnston, Dateline: Kabul,

[250] AFP, By Terence White, KABUL, March 7 (AFP)

[251] AFP, Mar. 7/95, 'Kabul calm after a day's battle', Dateline: Kabul, March 7

[252] AP, Mar., 7/95, 'Fighting Leaves at Least 30 Dead, 90 Wounded in Afghanistan', Tim Johnston, Dateline: Kabul,

FROM HERE THE STORY TAKES TWO FORMS, GIVEN BELOW AS A.1-3 & B.1-2.

TALIBAN & HAZARAS COOPERATING

A.1 "The [Hazaras] apparently decided late Wednesday [March 8] to hand over to Taliban rather than surrender to Rabbani's troops…']"[253]

A.2 The Taliban… relieved …[Hazaras] in [several] positions in the capital and launched an offensive backed by tanks…" [The Hazaras] had been engaged in fierce fighting for three days with Rabbani troops. [The Hazara] fighters had voluntarily given up their arms and positions in the southwest of the capital to the Taliban, [according to] the Islamic Press Agency, …in Peshawar, Pakistan.…Sukhoi SU-22 jets were used to stop the Taliban advance." [254]

A.3 [The Taliban] …took over the southern edge of Kabul Thursday [March 9] to protect [Hazaras]… who have been heavily bombarded by presidential troops for the past three days. The [Hazara militia] gave their weapons to the Taliban student warriors on Thursday during a lull in the fighting. "[The Hazara militia]… held negotiations with us and have decided to deliver their weapons to us," said Mullah Mohammed Haruus, a Taliban spokesman. "The Taliban have agreed that they would defend the civilians against the government," he said.[255]

[253] AFP, 3/9/95, 10:24 E.T., "Taliban advance into Shiite positions in southwest Kabul", Terence White, Dateline: Kabul, Mar. 9

[254] AFP. Mar. 8, 1995 09:42 E.T. 'Urgent', Dateline: Kabul, Mar. 8

[255] AP, Mar 9/95,Thursday 12:09 Eastern Time, 'Taliban Protecting Shiite Muslims in Southern Kabul', Tim Johnston, Dateline: Kabul

TALIBAN & HAZARAS NOT COOPERATING

B.1 "A leader of the [Hazaras]… Thursday categorically denied that fighters from his group had abandoned their positions in Kabul to the Taliban "Mohammed Nateghi [in Tehran [256]] told AFP here that "Wahdat fighters were occupying Thursday afternoon the same positions" in Kabul and reports that they had surrendered them to the Taliban were "false."… Nateghi said the Taliban had proposed acting as mediators between the [Hazara]… fighters and Rabbani's forces. "[Mazari's Hazara militia]… accepted the proposal, but so far there has been no reply from the government forces," he added. [257]

B.2 The Shiite Moslem Hezb-i-Wahdat faction has agreed with the Taliban …to join forces against government fighters … Mohammad Nateghi said here Friday [Mar. 10]. He also said the Hazaras "would hand over to the Taliban… positions [the Taliban] captured last month"… [when the Taliban drove Hekmatyar away from Kabul]. Nateghi said… "Wahdat will be disarmed only in the framework of a general disarmament of all the rival groups after the creation of a transitional government and national army." He denied that… "Wahdat decided late Wednesday [Mar. 8] to surrender to the Taliban… rather than to Rabbani's troops." [258]

[256] In the Mar. 9 AFP piece, [194, infra] the impression is given that Nateghi, the Hazara spokesperson, was in Kabul, but in an AFP article the foloowig day from the same reporter , it is clear that he is in Tehran. [AFP 3/10/95, 06:55 Eastern Time, "Shiite faction, Talibans join forces against government, spokesman says"Dateline: Tehran, Mar. 10]

[257] AFP, Mar. 09/95 10:24 Eastern Time, 'Taliban advance into Shiite positions in southwest' Kabul, Terence White, Dateline: Kabul, March 9 This is the same article that A.! is absed on. The article is in two parts. A.1 is from the part dateline Kabul and has the initials of Terence White ; B.1 is from the part that has no dateline and has the initials of other reporters – not Terence White.

[258] AFP 3/10/95, 06:55 Eastern Time, "Shiite faction, Talibans join forces against government, spokesman says"Dateline: Tehran, mar. 10, lma/mch/lp, AFP

The differences in the two reports – one claiming the voluntary disarming of the Hazaras and the other claiming that there was no disarming at all –may have reflected differences of opinions among the Hazara leadership on what to do in the midst of the battle. The strongest Hazara leader on the scene – and in the country -- Sheikh Mazari, had received much of his religious education in Iran[259] and was the largest recipient of military support from Iran during the fight against the Soviet Union[260]. It could be that he and his Iranian-Shiite backers were not prepared to see the Shiite/Hazaras disarmed by the largely Sunni/Pashtun Taliban. [261]

Other Shiite/Hazara leaders, more in touch with the reality than their Iranian backers, may have seen that the Taliban hadn't been anti-Shiite/Hazara in nearby Ghazni and Wardak Provinces.[262] They had not "preached loathing of other ethnic groups".[263] It would have also been clear that the Taliban generally acted with a high degree of moral integrity, courage and military effectiveness. The Taliban's offer to take over Hazara positions, put their lives on the line to protect Hazara civilians and deal with Massoud, gave them even more credibility. These leaders could've easily seen the Taliban as reliable allies who would not attack Hazaras after disarming them [264].

At the same time, it would have been natural for the Taliban to be cautious in dealing with Mazari – since so much of his support and guidance were coming from Iran and Iran, up to that point had been somewhat critical of the Taliban [265] , [266] , [267].

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[259] Give ref

[260] Give ref

[261] AFP. 3/6/95, 06:54 E.T. "Dozens dead or wounded in president's attack on Kabul rivals", Terence White, KABUL, 3/ 6 (AFP) Reportedly, the Hazara militia in Kabul had "been reinforced by more than 1,000 ethnic Uzbek fighters and 700 other Shiites." The Uzbeks – probably aligned with Communist General Dostom of North Central Afghanistan and the "Other Shiites" probably more aligned with Iran -- were both less likely to give up their weapons to the Taliban. [Also see footnote 227-B on intra Shiite murderous rivalry in Kabul in previous 3 years.]

[262] Supra

[263] T*he Times* (Lond.), 2/20/95, p.10; "Taleban wages a moral crusade in Afghanistan", Christopher Thomas.

[264] This hypothesis is supported by the following : "More recently, Wahdat -- …in southwest Kabul …was split into two groups. While the Mazari-led group was bitterly against striking any compromise with Rabbani's military strongman…Ahmad Shah Masood, the other headed by Akbari (eds: one name) adopted a conciliatory stance". AFP, 3/13/95 . 11:50 Eastern Time. "Afghan Shiite leader killed: Taliban spokesman", Dateline: Peshawar, Pak., 3/13

A much smaller but still significant third group present among the Hazaras was led by Sheikh Asef Mohseni's. His group Harakat-i-Islami was generally on the side of moderation. See Infra

[265] AFP, Feb/12/95, 12:28 E.T/, "Iran wary of Talibans' rise in Afghanistan", Dateline: Tehran,."…the official Iranian news agency IRNA has carried critical reports on the Talibans, saying they forced women to stay at home…[and their] slogans had "managed to attract the support of part of the Afghan population," and they could not be ignored."

[266] AFP, 2/16/95, 04:06 E. T. "Iran warns Pakistan against Taliban attack on Afghan Shiites", Dateline: Tehran, 2/16 According to diplomats in Tehran, leaders of the Shiite Moslem Islamic republic are increasingly concerned about the growth of a Sunni Moslem movement completely out of their control which could pose a threat to the Shiite community."

[267] AFP, 2/19/95, "Iran warns of foreign plot in Afghanistan", Dateline: Tehran, Iran on Sunday warned of a foreign plot to stir religious and ethnic conflict in Afghanistan amid the spectacular rise of a militant Islamic force, the Talibans…." "Meanwhile, the conservative daily Resalat accused the Talibans of being backed by Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the United States".

AFP, Mar/11/95, "Taliban press attack against south Kabul Shiite faction", Terence White, KABUL, …"We captured …80 Shiite prisoners," one of the Taliban fighters said. He said …the Wahdat …had reneged on an agreement to surrender their positions and arms to the militant students. The Wahdat ...on Thursday [3/9] reached an agreement with the militant students to jointly take over some military positions against Rabbani forces in southwest Kabul. "We didn't want to fight Wahdat but they fired on us first," said another Taliban fighter in a captured house of a senior Shiite leader…Sayyad Mansour Naderi, [where] the Taliban showed AFP two rooms apparently used as a jail by Wahdat, as well as large stores of captured ammunition. …The Taliban said they were not being fired on by pro-Rabbani forces, although two artillery rounds were

The next day, Friday, March 10, the Taliban captured Sheikh Mazari. They did it, according to AP's Kathy Gannon, by "posing as Muslim women wearing veils."[268] However, a religious Muslim scholar from the area wrote that Sheikh Mazari was spotted in a taxi at a Taliban check-point trying to escape from the battle.[269]

The next day, Reuters photos showed him bound hand and foot at Charasyab[270], the Taliban stronghold, 25 km south of Kabul[271]

The abduction may've been intended to promote a common front against a mutual enemy -- by getting the most anti-Taliban, Hazara leadership out of the battle zone. Such intentions were not realized. Instead, the same day the photos were taken, Saturday, March 11, just two days after the initial conflicting reports, the Hazaras and the Taliban were reported fighting each other.[272]

That same Saturday, their mutual enemy was attacking both – and the Hazara civilians they had both aimed to protect.

"…forces led by Ahmed Shah Massoud, [in the Hazara section of Kabul] …went on a rampage, looting whole streets. Medical workers said they knew of at least six rapes. "We think there has been widespread rape, but social taboos are so strong that it is impossible to know how many victims there have been," one medical worker said…. Government soldiers, bent double, carried off booty, while others argued over the spoils. More than 100 people were killed and 1,000 wounded in last week's battles for Karte Se [the main Hazara section of Kabul] hospitals said.[273]

With this underlying disunity, by the next day [Sun., Mar. 12] both the Taliban and the Hazara militia had been driven out of the city and were in an organized retreat. [274]

Less well organized than their erstwhile protectors: "[t]housands of civilians were fleeing to the south of Kabul, and Government troops were seen looting abandoned homes".[275]

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fired at the post, exploding on the road behind the AFP vehicle."…

[268] AP 3/13/95, "Leader of Rival Afghanistan Faction", Kathy Gannon, Dateline: Islamabad, Pakistan

[269] [see text at column B. infra – where two parallel stories are given of what happened.

[270] Afghan leader's remains handed over.*The Times*, Lond, 3/15/'95. 9; Issue 65215. (141 words) The photo [see footnote 270-A] was pub. by Reuter & appeared in stories in at least 3 non-English periodicals covered by Lexis Nexis—which doesn't have pictures. A NRC Handelsblad, 3/14/95, "Afghaanse shi'itische leider doodgescho-ten, Pg. 5,: 538 words, Kabul/ Islamabad, 14 Maart. B Het Parool, 3/14/95, "Abdoel Ali Mazari (foto)" Pg. 5/2, 120 words. C Trouw, 3/15/95, "Taliban hakken handen af en verbieden volleyball", Jan Bezemer, 1210 words, Amsterdam.

[271] Supra AFP 3/12/95

[272] "Clashes continued Saturday] in Kabul between the [Hazaras] …and the Taliban,... [AFP, 3/11,infra]

[273] 3/14/95, The Guardian (London), "Captive Afghan Leader Killed", Peter Greste In Kabul, Pg. 12, 654 words, Reuter

[274] Part of the explanation of the relatively easy rout of the Taliban at this point was that, according to their most senior leader in the area, Muhammad Rabbani, the "Taleban was presently preoccupied with disarming opposition groups in the nine southern provinces it had seized in the past six months. After that, it would turn its attention on Kabul…. only 2,000 to 3,000 men were at the gates of Kabul. More fighters could be summoned quickly if it were decided to march on the city."

"But we have no plans to attack," he said. ``We want to settle this peacefully. We are ready to accept responsibility for safeguarding Kabul while a new Islamic government is formed. An official army can then be established."

The Times, Lond., 2/21/95: News: p10, "Defiant Rabbani threatens UN Afghan peace plan; President Rabbani", Christopher Thomas, Kabul [The "defiant Rabbani" in the title is the Pres. of the Gov., Burhanuddin Rabbani, not the Taliban leader with the same last name, Mullah Muhammad Rabbani .]

[This was three weeks before the actual rout and the Taliban could have brought up more troops in that time – but there are no reports of a significant military buildup on the part of the Taliban – while Massoud was reported bringing in more tanks and troops.See footnote 246 on tank build-up]

[275] NYT, 3/12/95, Sun., Late Ed.Fin. 'Afghan Government Attacks Student Militia', Reuters, Dateline: Kabul, Afghanistan, Mar. 11

By the next day [Mon.3/13] the same representative in Tehran who was responsible for the earliest Wahdat criticism of the Taliban[276] and for all of story B was interviewed by AFP. He said that a diplomatic team had already been sent to Kandahar "to win [Sheikh Mazari's] freedom. The representative, Mohammad Natghi, also said that, with "intense diplomatic efforts" underway … "they had been promised that he would be released soon." adding :"There is not one reason for Sheihk Mazari's capture as the Wahdat[277] is not at war with the Taliban…"[278]

The same day [3/13] "Pro-Rabbani troops were expected to launch an imminent assault on the Taliban headquarters at Charasyab, 25 kilometers …south of Kabul …military officials said.[279] With attack on their base imminent, the Taliban put Sheikh Mazari and eight other senior Wahdat officials captured at the time into a helicopter. The destination was Kandahar where, as already noted, a Shiite-Hazara diplomatic team was waiting to receive them.

Some of the most senior Taliban leadership – like Mullah Omar -- were also in Kandahar. It would be a good place for the Taliban and the Shiite-Hazara leaders to discuss their mutual interests face-to-face. It would also be a good place for the Taliban to offer apologies and ask for forgiveness for both the unplanned photographs and any mistreatment the Shiite-Hazaras may have received in the course of their trip.

Sheikh Mazari and his associates never arrived in Kandahar. They died en route. "The Taliban spokesman told a BBC reporter that Mr. Mazari had grabbed a machinegun from one captor and shot and wounded the pilot, forcing the helicopter to make an emergency landing. Mr. Mazari and several other passengers were killed in the skirmish"[280] Another source adds that after the emergency landing Sheikh Mazari "then killed six more of those aboard before being shot and killed himself,"

"The official Kabul Radio, monitored in Islamabad, said Mazari was killed while being transported from the Taliban's Charasyab base near Kabul to the southern town of Kandahar. There were conflicting reports about the incident, with Afghan government commanders saying they had monitored Taliban communications and believed Mazari and 14 others in the helicopter had all been killed."[281]

The total of 15 killed on the Helicopter trip is consistent with the subsequent story of the handover of the bodies -- including those of Sheikh Mazari and 8 of his dead colleagues. These nine – combined with the six Taliban guards said to have been killed by Mazari – makes 15. It suggests that the wounded pilot – and perhaps some other crew members – were not killed and were in a position to relate the story. Some of them may still be available to clarify in detail what actually happened.[282]

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[276] See footnote Supra, 182

[277] Within the Wahdat, Mohammad Akbari, represented a strong minority faction that was more inclined to reconciliation with the government. Another Hazara group in Kabul was already cooperating with the government -- Harakat-i-Islami .

[278] AFP 3/13/95 , 09:30 Eastern Time, "More fighting between government forces and Taliban, Dateline: Kabul, March 13

[279] AFP, 3/13/95, 09:30 Eastern Time, "More fighting between government forces and Taliban" Dateline: Kabul, 3/ 13

[280] *The Times* (Lond.),3/14/95; pg. 13; Issue 65214 "Kabul Shia leader killed as battle for city intensifies".Christopher Thomas & our Foreign Staff.

[281] The Washington Post, 3/14/95, Final Edition, 'Afghan Leader Slain', p A13, DATELINE: KABUL,

[282] "Mohammed Ali Javed, leader of the [Shiite-Hazara] pro-government Herakat-e-Islami and the Planning Minister, said Taleban delivered nine bodies of captured Hezb-i-Whadat officials to the Herakat-e-Islami headquarters yesterday. One of the bodies was that of Mazari. 'We still don't know how they died.' Mr Javed said." "Afghan leader's remains handed over." *Times* [London,] 15 Mar. 1995: 9. *The Times Digital Archive*.

Author Michael Griffin personally interviewed an expert who'd examined Sheikh Mazari's body:

> "His facial skeleton, [the] witness said, had been dislocated from the skull, a condition often seen in the victims of high-speed road crashes. There were multiple bullet wounds in the abdomen, inflicted after the first wound but, probably, while he was still alive."

Griffin added "The details tended to confirm the popular belief that he had been pushed out of the helicopter[283], although the Taliban insisted that Mazari, a burly man, had attempted to overpower his guards while airborne."[284] Nothing is said here about signs of torture of Sheikh Mazari or of the condition of the bodies of any of his eight colleagues.

It could be that the facial injuries were the result of a helicopter jolt or crash – not the result of being pushed out of a helicopter and falling from a substantial height. Someone falling to their death like that would sustain multiple injuries – not limited to the facial skeleton. Such other injuries were not noted in the interview.

The following professional medical text gives a range of alternatives in considering the causes of the Sheikh Mazari's "facial skeleton, …dislocated from the skull".

> "The bones of the middle third of the facial skeleton…are comparatively fragile, and hence get fractured easily...The etiology of middle third facial fractures included road traffic accidents…assault and violence …"(Kahnberg et al., 1987)."[285]

The total number of guards is not stated but it seems unreasonable to assume that there were only 6 guards plus the pilot for nine very important passengers. It may be, that seeing their six fellow guards killed and Sheikh Mazari still holding a machine gun, the remaining guards killed him and all of his colleagues. The facial injuries could have resulted from being hit in the face with a rifle butt before being shot.

The only beneficiaries of a premeditated murder of Mazari and his colleagues would've been enemies of the Taliban – who would claim him as a martyr and the Taliban as the villains. It is clear that the Taliban were not looking to make new enemies of the Shiites and Hazaras. Their record in Ghazni and Wardak and in the weeks just past when they were at the gates of Kabul, gave no evidence of murderously anti-Shiite-Hazara sentiment. As already noted at the end of the previous chapter, there was no mention of this incident when the Taliban entered the city of Herat just half a year later – though a substantial part of that city is Shiite.

There is an important report of a meeting that took place in Kandahar apparently within 5-10 days of Mazari's demise.

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[283] Killing people by throwing them from helicopters and airplanes was a reported feature of wars in Algeria and South America. However, the key advantage of these "death flights" was that the victims were thrown into the ocean or some other place where their body would never be found – providing deniability to the murderers – who were usually affiliated with the government or one of the sides in a war. In the case of Sheikh Mazari, his body – and those of his colleagues were turned over to responsible people the following day.

[284] Reaping the Whirlwind" p 40/pdfp64, ' 03. His footnote 23, ch. 3, leads to source in Notes, on p 388 "Personal Interview, January 1997" Same date given by Griffin for his source on Najib. Not being castrated: see footnote 354. Rec. email from Michael Griffin, Wed., Aug. 10, 2016 2:06 PM: [cross ref/etc othr M.G.email]

> Dear Mr Adler,
>
> Many thanks for your letter and kind words. I am currently in Germany and cannot put my hand on a copy of Reaping, but think that my source for that quotation was a UN staffer in about 1996 - my last field visit before the book's publication in 2001. A very long time ago now. I suspect, but cannot confirm, that the same UN source have me info about the manner of Najibullah's death….

This appears to be saying that Michael Griffin, an intelligent, thoughtful person, who took the trouble to obtain this expert report, believed that it supported the "popular belief." This could mean that in the environment of longstanding hostility between Pashtuns & Hazaras and between Sunnis & Shiites – combined with the chaos of the fighting in Kabul & the photos of Sheikh Mazari in captivity—it may have been easy for Shiite Hazara leaders to make a similar mistake. A significant number of them may have honestly thought that the death was deliberate murder – by throwing Sheikh Mazari from a helicopter. If this is so, it means they did not fabricate the story – only imagined what they thought was most likely. An honest mistake in time of crisis is easier to admit than a deliberate/malicious fabrication.

[285] "Microplate osteosynthesis in middle third fractures of the face" Vijay Ebenezer 1 and Balakrishnan Ramalingam 2, Universal Journal of Medicine and Dentistry (ISSN: 2277-0992) Vol. 1(6) pp. 070-075, September, 2012 *Corresponding author Email: drvijayomfs@yahoo.com

> **"Taleban, meanwhile held talks this month with the Supreme Coordination Council of the Islamic Revolution of Afghanistan in the town of Kandahar. This anti-Rabbani alliance included Hekmatyar's Hizbe Islami (backed by Pakistan), Dostum's Jumbush e Melli Islami (reportedly backed by Uzbekistan) and Mazari's Hizbe Wahdat (backed by Iran)".[286]**

This may have been a meeting that the Taliban were eager to have Sheikh Mazari and his colleagues attend. It may also be that Sheikh Mazari and his colleagues in Kabul did not trust the Taliban enough to voluntarily go with them to this meeting. That distrust would have been amplified by his abduction and led him to think that it is better to die fighting than to be imprisoned – or worse – under the Taliban.

Some authors, who believe the Taliban deliberately killed Mazari and his colleagues, see it as revenge for betrayal in Kabul. They understand that the Taliban thought they had an agreement with Mazari to join forces against Massoud and that, instead, Mazari joined forces with Massoud to attack the Taliban[287].

What would have been clear to Taliban leadership on the scene in Kabul was that reports were conflicting and that the Hazaras were not acting in unison either for or against them. They might have understood that this resulted from misunderstanding and distrust – on the part of the Hazaras. The solution would be to talk with the Hazaras and show them that the Taliban were not interested in oppressing them. The intended meeting in Kandahar was the solution – not torturing a key Hazara leader and throwing him out of a helicopter.

Just over a year later – May '96 - "Dr. Ali Talib, a spokesman for the Wahdat party, [said]…the Taliban and his party …were cooperating with each other in central Afghanistan." [They]… have agreed to…reopen roads between the areas under their control in Bamiyan, Miadan [sic] and other provinces…The Taliban has already accepted a Wahdat demand to investigate the killing of [Sheikh]…Mazari, who died under mysterious circumstances while in the militia's custody last year."[288]

When the Taliban entered Kabul the second time – a year and half later -- in 9/96,

> **"The Hazara officers [under Sadeq Mudaber] said that when Kabul fell last Friday the Taliban sent tanks to the Dashti Barchi [Hazara] area [of Kabul], but after negotiations they were withdrawn without acrimony."[289], [290]**

In a related case, the allies of the Taliban captured Herat leader, Ismail Khan in battle and turned him over to the Taliban. He was held, untortured, in a Kandahar prison, from 5/97–3/00—after which he escaped. [291]

With all of this, when the Taliban, in 1997, entered Mazar-i-Sharif – the home city of Sheikh Mazari -- things did not go well. Instead of the kinds of positive or wait-and-see receptions they had experienced elsewhere, they were met with an ambush and were massacred. Thousands of Taliban were

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[286] IPS-Inter Press Service, 3/30/95, "Afghanistan: New Factors Complicate Afghan Political Quagmire", Mushahid Hussain, 845wds, Dateline:Islamabad, 3/30The story of this meeting is given in an earlier report in: "The News" 3/20/95. "Both Massoud himself and emissaries from Hekmatyar have held meetings with the Taliban, as have Sayyaf, [Mohammad Yunus] Khales [traditional Moslem leader under whom many Taliban served in the anti-USSR war] and representatives of Dostam." [Quote also cites Herald, 3/95 [probably the monthly out of Pakistan] and Asiaweek 4/28/95] citation from p 75 "Aiding Afghanistan: The Background and Prospects for Reconstruction in a Fragmented Society" 1995, Asger Christensen, NIAS Reports, *26, (NIAS), part of the U. of Copenhagen.

[287] Give refs In addition to published sources, this is consistent with the report of NM, supra.

[288] UPI, 5/19/96, "Taliban, Shiites may be uniting, Anwar Iqbal, Dateline: Islamabad,

[289] AFP, 9/30/96, Ethnic Hazara enclave in west Kabul not under Taliban control, Terence White

[290] In contrast we have "The [mainly Hazara] Shia had a major military force in Kabul until Massoud crushed them, committing many atrocities against civilians, in an offensive in February 1995." Fed. News Serv., May 9/96, Prep. Statmnt of Barn. Rubin, CFR, at House Internat. Rel. Commit. Subcom. on Asia & the Pacific, on Afghanistan.: 6347 words

[291] Give refs/sources

murdered[292]. Much of the ambush took place in the Hazara community of the city. This is even more remarkable as only about 10% of the city were Hazaras[293].

Why would the Hazara-Shiites attack the Taliban here, but not in the several other places we have discussed: Herat, Kabul and the central Afghan provinces? One as yet unpublished report from an author usually sympathetic to the Hazaras says that the Hazara-Shiite leaders did not believe that Sheikh Mazari was tortured and thrown out of a helicopter. The report says that this story was

> "designed by Hazara propagandists to enlist the memory of Mazari in the new round of conflict against the Taliban" [294]

This is from one of two reports on these events from two very different sources: The report shown in the left hand column, is from a professor usually supportive of Hazara positions. The report on the right, is from a religious Muslim scholar directly familiar with the Taliban[295].

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[292] "As the Red Cross was looking for volunteers to pick up the dead, Shiite Muslims were still mutilating bodies." I came across one man waving a knife dripping with blood and shouting; "This is what we do to outsiders," I saw hundreds of Taliban prisoners stuffed inside the back of trucks... An Uzbek guard, who had taken them prisoner, later said they were driven to the plains north of Mazar-e-Sharif, where they were slaughtered. He explained how he killed them. First he forced them at gun-point to jump into deep wells and then he lined up his men, who then fired their Kalashnikovs into the wells before tossing in grenades. His men alone were responsible for killing 1,500 Taliban prisoners. The Taliban asked the United Nations to investigate the carnage but it made only one attempt. It acknowledged that massive killings had occurred but never followed up." Kathy Gannon, Mazar-e-Sharif, 5/97, p. 72, in her book I is for Infidel Public Affairs Press, '05 [For more on this book see footnote 177 D]

[293] http://ngm.nationalgeographic.com/ngm/0311/feature2/images/mp_download.2.pdf

[294] Note On The Death Of Baba Mazari, 2p. 681 words, rec. from M.S. Jan. 12/'14 avshadler@yahoo.com

[295] Rec. Jan 3&8/'14 from N.M. – avshadler@yahoo.com
Get permission to give name, improve English, clarify ambiguities. See if there is a parallel story re: reneging on an agreement.

GENERALLY PRO-HAZARA

The Taliban arrested Mazari in March 1995 after they reneged on what Mazari and the Hazaras understood to be an alliance during the period of three-way struggle for control of south and west Kabul (Hizb Wahadat within Shura Hamahangi vs Jamiat within Islamic State vs Taliban as IEA).

It has been widely publicised, for example in Abdul Ali Mazari's wikipedia page, that the Taliban killed Mazari by throwing him out of a helicopter close to Ghazni.

This account is factually incorrect and was designed by Hazara propagandists to enlist the memory of Mazari in the new round of conflict against the Taliban.

Alternative versions -

A photograph was circulated in Kabul immediately after Mazari's death, showing him being restrained and humiliated by a couple of Taliban. The picture must have been taken after the Taliban arrested Mazari, before they flew him off to the south. Hazaras considered this picture inflammatory as it seemed to fit into an age old history of conquering Pashtoons humilia-ting the Hazara elite. Given the Taliban's aversion to photo-graphs, it is remarkable that any of their people took and circulated such a picture. My understanding is that taking and releasing of the picture was an act of prejudice and hubris by Taliban fighters in Kabul, not unlike some of the contempo-rary the social media exploits of US troops! And that it ran contrary to the public diplomacy pursued by the Taliban leader-ship. Nevertheless the picture is a significant element in the opening of the gulf between the Hazaras and the Taliban.

Continued next page

SCHOLAR CLOSE TO TALIBAN

Actually Mazari didn't come to Taliban, he and his people fight with Taliban, and heave fight, his people breakage and can't to fight any more with Taliban, as you know the Taliban fighter were very brave and had a strong morale. So when Mazari and his gunmen can't fight, the tried to escape, and spread his people, he and his senior commanders (some of them) tried to go out form the war area by Taxi, Mazari wear a dirty and old cloths, and make himself like civilian, even like poor person or labor, also his commanders, in Charasiab their taxi stopped for checking by Taliban, one of the Talib understand that the person in Taxi is Mazari, and called to other Taliban, suddenly they captured.

Actually other 8 person all of them were not captured in one place and one vehicle, some of them captured in different areas, but closed area, bcz they lost the fight, and wanted to escape.

Regarding respect to Mazari, when he captured, he didn't threated and the Taliban behaviore with him was good, also Taliban didn't tied up his hands in the beginning, and didn't keep him in tempraty prison, but keept him very well, even like guest

As I know, Taliban didn't want to kill him, same like Torn Ismail Khan, who is Governor of Herat, captured by Taliban, Torn Ismail Khan killed too many Taliban, he is Tajick, but Taliban kept him in prison, finally escaped.

Next for Mazar respect, Taliban arranged Helicopter, they can delivery him by vehicle, but due to bad condition of the road and tiredly journey, they accept expensive way, and arranged *Helicopter, they can to arrange a vehicle with security guard.*

Continued next page

GENERALLY PRO-HAZARA
CONTINUED

The Taliban in Kabul decided to transfer Mazari to Kandahar. They loaded him into a helicopter in Charasiab in Logar, south of the city. Those on board included two pilots (Najeeb and one other), one Taliban armed guard, Mazari and two bodyguards of Mazari. The only gun on board was held by the Taliban guard. The pilots were unarmed.

During the flight one of Mazari's bodyguards, perhaps called Rustam (!) managed to free himself from the ropes with which the Taliban had restrained him. He over-powered the guard and grabbed his gun. Rustam, as befits the name, had the build of a wrestler. In the course of the scuffle the gun discharged and hit the pilot who was at the controls. The pilots decided this was an emergency and went into an emergency descent. They performed a hard landing in the sand of the "dasht" (rangeland) between Moqor and Qarabagh of Ghazni Province. This is south west of Ghazni city, towards Kandahar.

Everyone was injured in the landing. However Rustam, Mazari and the other Hazara bodyguard emerged with the gun. I believe that they killed the Talib guard but left the pilots in the helicopter, essentially considering them to be neutral – professional military inherited by the Taliban in their sweep across the south.

Mazari and companions headed north across the dasht on foot. The Hazara area is located just to the north of the highway in that area. Qarabagh District is Hazara in the north and Pashtun in the south.

A party of taliban travelling along the highway in their trademark Datsun pick-up noticed the dust cloud set up by the hard landing and crossed the dasht to investigate. They found the pilots who explained what had happened. The Taliban radioed for reinforcements and set off in pursuit of the fugitives. They found Mazari and surrounded him. Rustam and Mazari resisted but only had one gun and limited ammunition. The Taliban caught and killed the party.

Subsequently the Taliban handed over Mazari's body to Hizb Wahadat representatives, who organised a long march from ghazni to Mazar through the snow-bound Hazara territory and buried him with due pomp in Mazar.

Source – Gen. Naqib, a helicopter pilot who was present in Mazar at the time but subsequently received an eye witness account from the pilots on Mazari's last flight. Naqib has promised to check his earlier notes to see if he has mistaken any of the details. He is confident that this version is substantially what he received from the pilots.

SCHOLAR CLOSE TO TALIBAN
CONTINUED

Actually Mazari captured by Taliban during fight, and was with him his famous commander Shafi Dewana, they can't escape, captured alive, Taliban arranged a Helicopter to delivery them to Kandahar (Base of Taliban),

when Helicopter arrive to the area of Ghazni, Shafi Dewan can open his hands and attacked on the one of Guard (Talib) and taken a gun from him, started firing, Pilot had emergency landing,

there were another guard (Talib) also, after the helicopter landing there were firing between Talib and Shafi Dewan, and Mazari and Shafi can to escape from the area,

but there was a Taliban vehicle on the road, and saw that Helicopter landed, they changed the Direction from the road and went to helicopter, they heard firing, if this vehicle of Taliban was not in the area, it is clear, Mazari and Shafi can to escape from the area. The Taliban vehicle was on the Road of Ghazi to Kabul, shafi Dewan also had firing on Taliban, finally during firing both of them Mazari and Shai Dewan killed, bodies given to Shaia and Mazari buried in Mazar e Sharif.

It is confirmed that Mazari didn't fired, he opened *[untied]* his commander's hands.

It is also reported on that time the Taliban Spokesman Mr. Mutawakkil.
I check the information and get additional info from reliable sources. Don't worry, you studied the books and articles which are established by Hazar people, still they saying different thing about Mazari and Shafi Deewana.

Some authors attribute this massacre in Mazar-i-Sharif to a failure of the Taliban to live up to a supposed agreement to give the local commander who had helped them – Malik – the governorship of the Northern Provinces. Instead, they say, the Taliban gave him the position of Deputy Foreign Minister – a supposed slight. This was, we're told, the reason that thousands of Taliban were murdered in and around Mazar-i-Sharif.[296]

A man doesn't get the job he wants – so he permits or encourages the murder of thousands? What kind of man was this? What kind of job could be so important to him? What were these people – Malik, Dostam and their various allies – really fighting over?

The first question: 'What kind of man…?' – is easy to answer. Malik was not a religious Muslim. He'd been a close ally of General Dostam – functioning both as Dostam's Foreign Minister and key military leader. Dostam was a Communist and former Russian collaborator during the Afghan-Soviet war. He made himself the effective ruler of Mazar-i-Sharif and several neighboring provinces in the Afghan North. He issued his own money, ran his own airline and commanded a force of 50,000 trained troops. [297]

Before we get to the issues of motivation, we have one more atrocity story to deal with that is closely related to both the story of the torture and murder Sheikh Mazari –and what the enemies of the Taliban were fighting over.

CHAPTER 11

Was The Former President Of Soviet Occupied Afghanistan Tortured, Castrated & Jeep-Dragged By The Taliban?

Two very well informed sources associated with prestigious and usually reliable publishers tell us that the Taliban castrated and tortured Najibullah[298] - the last president of Soviet-occupied Afghanistan. The more prestigious of them says they also did it to his brother, Shahpur Ahmedzi, who'd served as the head of the Afghan version of the Soviet KGB.

This report, from the pen of the Cambridge educated[299] former ambassador of the UK to Moscow, Sir Rodric Braithwaite, was published by Oxford University Press. Sir Rodric was also Foreign Policy Adviser to UK Prime Minister John Major and the UK Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee[300].

He tells us: "The Taliban forcibly seized him [Najibullah] and his brother [Shahpur Ahmedzi] in the UN headquarters, tortured them, castrated them, and hanged their bodies in the centre of the city."[301] No source is cited for these statements in a book that is full of references and notes[302]. Sir Rodric makes no claim he was there.

The second prestigious account[303] was produced in the same time frame as a set of ten articles that won the reporter, John F. Burns, a Pulitzer Prize for International Reporting. Two months after the execution, he wrote:

"When the mullah [Mohammed Hassan, Gov. of Kandahar Prov.] was asked why Mr. Najibulah's executioners had castrated him before he died, in defiance of the Koran's injunctions against mutilation of the body -- a fact witnessed by the thousands of Afghans who stood in shocked silence before the suspended corpse -he seemed momentarily lost for words, saying that he had not known this.

"Najibullah killed thousands upon thousands of our people. He was one of the people who brought the Russians to our country, so even if he died a thousand deaths, it wouldn't be enough. But if he was mutilated, I can tell you only this: There is nobody among the Taliban who could have done this. It is the action of an ignorant, illiterate man, and if it was done, it can only have been done by our enemies."[304] A, B

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[296] Matinuddin, p95-101 citing "Defense Journal, golden Jubilee Issue August 1997 p 111 [the footnote actually says 1947 – but this must be a mistake] and Rashid 2000 p 58

[297] Give ref. what Dostom, Malik & other enemies of the Taliban were/are -- fighting over & how this contrasts with the Taliban – are explored in PART TWO:WHERE DID THEY GET THEIR MONEY?

[298] Full name: Mohammad Najibullah Ahmedzi. He dropped the relgious parts of his name, leaving Najib, ="noble man".

[299] He achieved First Class Honours in Modern Languages.

[300] Sources of Sir Rodric's credits come from his website at the U. of Buckingham where he's listed [8/31/14] as "Senior Research Fellow in Diplomacy and International Affairs" Similar info is on the Enc. Britannica website.

[301] Afgantsy: The Russians in Afghanistan, 1979-89, '11, Oxf.. P. 303

[302] The book has 44 pages of notes, sources and bibliography.

[303] A 3rd prestigious acc'nt, from Yale U. Pr: Ahmed Rashid's 'Taliban…' says the Taliban "dragged his body behind a jeep for several rounds of the Palace…"It became a NYT #1 best seller after 9/11 --promoted by key politicians in US, UK & Germany. For his 'story' of Najib's demise, see footnote 813.

[304] A[EMPH ADDED]11/24/96, NYT, Sun.Late Ed.–Fin., "Conversations/Mullah Mohammed Hassan; With Sugared Tea and Caustic Rules, An Afghan Leader Explains Himself", S4,P9,C1; Wk in Rev., 1590 wds,Datel: Kand. The 10 pieces that won Burns a '97 Pulitzer were pub. 2–12/96. The prize cited his work of 11/3&30, not the one quoted here from 11/24. LexisNexis showed Burns wrote 29 pieces on Afgh. for NYT in '96. B. That Burns says "thousands" when there were none is case of "Oifen goniff brent dos hittel" [see footnote 512]

The effect of these and similar reports was to lead decent Muslims who were not otherwise informed – and most decent non-Muslims as well-- to think that the Taliban were not religious Muslims but vicious butchers in the guise of clerics. This was the intent of these stories – and they were very successful.

Despite these prestigious reports and the implication of the New York Times story that the castration was "a fact witnessed[305] by the thousands of Afghans who stood in shocked silence before the suspended corpse" there are no contemporaneous reports suggesting anything of the kind. Of 34 reports in English in the LexisNexis data base – dateline Kabul –from September 27- to 29, '96 – when the bodies were actually hanging in the city center or had just been taken down -- none said that they had been tortured[306], castrated or mutilated.[307]

The most detailed contemporaneous, 9/27/96, report of what happened came from a noon press conference at the UN, where the Secretary General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali's spokesperson, Sylvana Foa, gave the following account:[308]

> **"Turning to events in Kabul[309], Ms. Foa said that at 4 p.m. yesterday, government soldiers guarding the compound of the United Nations Special Mission to Afghanistan had fled. The soldiers had been placed there by President Burhanuddin Rabbani who had repeatedly promised the Secretary-General that he would make sure former President Najibullah was protected...[310] When they left at 4 p.m., there was only one person in the compound besides Mr. Najibullah and three people in his entourage, and he was what was called a "chowkidar" or nightwatchman, an unarmed man….. At 1:40 a.m.,[311] five armed men walked through the gates of the compound, brushing past the chowkidar and heading straight to Mr. Najibullah's room.[312] Evidently, they knew exactly where he was. They talked to him for several moments, and then they took him away by force.**
>
> **Meanwhile, she noted, after the government soldiers had fled, a United Nations coordinator in Kabul[313] had tried calling around town to anyone**

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[305] This gives the false impression that he was hanged with his genitals visible – but photos show him fully clothed: e.g. Haider Shah/Reuters photo two brothers hanging in Kabul, Fri. 9/27/96, may be found at :

[306] Four reports came up when torture was included in a LexisNexis search – all from AP reporter Kathy Gannon. The earliest noted :

> "During Najibullah's six-year dictatorship, thousands of Afghans were arrested, tortured and killed, according to human rights groups."

The other reports used the word torture in a similar vein – what Najibullah had done– not what the Taliban did to him. She actually appears to have observed the bodies of Najibullah and his brother - and wrote:

> "Crowds cheered at the sight of the bloated and beaten body of former President Najibullah, dangling outside the presidential palace a few blocks from the U.N. compound where he had been in hiding since his communist regime was overthrown in 1992."

She also noted: "…a U.N. official said on condition of anonymity… they learned the former president and his brother had been dragged from the compound by Taliban soldiers."9/27/96, AP, Fri. 04:40 E.T, [If Eastern Daylight Time –used in NYC at this time of year- then in Kabul it would've been 1:10PM] "Afghan Rebels Seize Capital, Execute Ex-President Najibullah", Byline: Kathy Gannon, 846 words, Dateline:Kabul. 8 hrs later, she added:"The bodies of Najibullah and his brother, scarred by bullet wounds and bruises, remained all day in the hot sun…" 12:34 E.T., AP Photo TOK102, 964 words, Dateline: "[EMPASIS ADDED]

[307] The search was: (taliban or talibaan or taleban) AND DATELINE(kabul) and (hang or hanged or hanging or executed) – which proucded 34 hits. These included AFP, AP, AP, AP, Calgary Herald-citing AP X2 (early and late edit.), NYT citing AP, UPI, Wash. Post, AP 29; AFP, AP, AP, AP, AP, AP, Reut – Globe and Mail –Canada, NYT-AP, Reut&AP-Phil En, Reut & AP-Phil En, AP, AP, AP 28; AFP, AFP, AFP, AP, AP, AP, AP, NYT-Reuters, Ottawa Cit –AP&Reuter, St Paul Pioneer Press – no name or source, St Petersb. Times, Florida – wire services 27

When the search was modified to (Taliban or talibaan or taleban) AND DATELINE(kabul) and (hang or hanged or hanging or executed) and (castrate or castrated or castrating), there were no hits. When the search was modified again to pick up reports of mutilation, it also produced no hits: (Taliban or taleban) AND DATELINE(kabul) and (hang or hanged or hanging or executed) and (mutilate or mutilated or mutilating).

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[308] Daily Press Briefing Of Office Of Spokesman For Secretary-General, Noon Briefings

[309] After ~120 words on events in Gaza, the West Bank & Jerusalem

[310] This suggests that Najib was effectively more a prisoner of the Gov. of Afg.– than a protected UN guest. If he was really under inviolate UN control, they could presumably have flown him out of the country in a UN helicopter. His choice for 4.5 years had been this UN 'prison' or likely death at the hands of the Afghans outside. This is confired by the following remarks further in the press conf.:"The Secretary- General had for a long time been personally engaged in efforts with the Government of Burhanuddin Rabbani to try and get them to allow former President Najibullah to leave the country. …The Government had responded that it was a national problem and that the former President's fate was up to the Afghan people… They obviously felt that if they let him go, there would be political ramifications on the Government."

[311] This was ~40 min after the Taliban captured the Presidential Palace. "9/27/96, AFP, "Events surrounding execution of Najibullah", 587 words, Dateline: United Nations, 9/27

[312] "The Taliban have reportedly not entered any other diplomatic compounds in Kabul. Of the four foreign missions in Kabul -- India, Indonesia, Iran and Turkey -- three evacuated their ambassadors or charge d'affaires from the capital before the Taliban arrival. The Iranian embassy is still open and the Indonesians have kept a skeleton staff in Kabul." 9/29/96m AFP, UN peace envoy arrives in Kabul., Dateline: Kabul, 9/29.

[313] Ms. Foa noted further in her remarks: Regarding the whereabouts of other United Nations staff, the three international staff members remaining in Kabul were at the United Nations guest house there, five to 10 minutes away from the compound. Nejib. was at the " United Nations compound next to the French embassy" AFP 9/27/96 'Thousands flock

that had a vehicle in the area and who was actually functional, but "there was nothing anybody could do to get there; …". At approximately 6 a.m., another group of armed men, who were believed to be Taliban, returned to the United Nations compound and took Mr. Najibullah's younger brother. At approximately 8:30 a.m., they returned again -- by this time, two United Nations coordinators had been able to get there. Over their protest, the group began searching the compound, but they did not find the other two members of the Najibullah entourage, who evidently had already fled. Shortly thereafter, the bodies of former President Najibullah and his younger brother were found in a park, hanging[314]. United Nations sources said Mr. Najibullah had evidently been shot in the head, and his brother was hanged[315]. …

Other reports from Kabul had indicated that the city was relatively calm just now, she said… [and that] there had been conversations with Taliban for months …[she reiterated that Kabul] was relatively quiet; the firing seemed to be in celebration, and the streets were fairly busy with some people returning to their homes. There were fewer taxis than usual, but the shops were opening. …[She said that the two aides who had escaped were] Mr. Jafser and Mr. Tukhy[316]…[She concluded by saying:] The United Nations biggest concern right now was to carry on with the humanitarian assistance, she said, because people were in very, very bad shape there. "

The report goes on to note injuries, thefts and minor damage at other UN facilities in Kabul – by "uncontrolled elements". By contrast, there is no mention of any injury to UN staff or theft or damage to UN property in the course of the Taliban taking Najibullah and his brother and searching for the other two. In this account, the UN employees did not witness any beatings or make note of any unusual activities as the captives were being taken away – other than that they were taken "by force".

Half a year later, a UN document notes that Afghanistan "is a party … to the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment"[317]. The document *"Endorses the Special Rapporteur's condemnation of the abduction from United Nations premises of the former President of Afghanistan, Mr. Najibullah, and of his brother, and their subsequent summary execution;"*[318] It is concerned with the *"abduction… and summary execution"* but does not even suggest that there may have been "*Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment"* involved in this.

So where does the idea that the Taliban castrated Najibullah and his brother come from? The first substantive report from the scene that said his body had been mutilated was from the day of the funeral – the Monday afer the execution.

"He was apparently shot before being taken out into a public square…and publicly hanged along with his brother. ...Najibullah's mutilated body was handed over to the head of his Ahmedzai tribe in Kabul on Sunday and taken to his home town of Gardez…about 100 kilometers (60 miles) southeast of here, a relative and aid agency officials and family friends said. "He and his brother were handed over to his tribe at a Red Cross hospital and was driven down to Paktia in one of two mini-buses carrying a small group of mourners to the funeral," former family friend

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to see bodies after Najibullah hanging', Terence White, Dateline: Kabul, Sept 27. ≥0.4km from the citadel wall of the presidential palace.

[314] A They were hanged in Ariana Sq, ≥ 0.6km from the UN compound. From the way this report is written, the UN staff realized they were hanging after 8:30AM. However,a contemporaneous report on the scene has the hanging much earlier; "Shortly after dawn, thousands of Kabul residents ventured from their homes to find Najibullah's body outside the palace from where Rabbani had fled. " AP, 8/27/96, Fri. 12:34ET, AP Photo TOK102, Byline: Kathy Gannon, 964 Words, Dateline: Kabul .

B The same report also has 'Najibullah had made a frantic call by shortwave radio after 3 a.m. (2200 GMT) to another U.N. post in Kabul to say that his guards had vanished, a U.N. official said on condition of anonymity. "I need some security," the official quoted Najibullah as saying. He said nothing more was heard until they learned the former president and his brother had been dragged from the compound by Taliban soldiers.' This could have resulted from confusing Najib and his brother on the receiving end of the "frantic call".

C The time for the Fajr -- dawn – prayer in Islam for September 27, was 4:22. Any deliberate public execution would be done after this time so that the public could witness it. Sunrise for that day in Kabul is 5:45 AM.

[315] "Muhammad Najibullah, the former President, was shot dead by the militants before he and his brother, Shahpur Ahmadzai, who was still alive, were hanged…." 9/28/96 The Times, Swift revenge as Taleban seizes control of Kabul, BYLINE: Christopher Thomas in Lahore and Zahid Hussain in Islamabad, (taliban or talibaan or taleban) and (hang or hanged or hanging or executed) and "islamic press"

[316] They were cought & executed the next day. See Appendix 18

[317] P.1 of 6, 'Situation of human rights in Afghanistan' E/CN.4/1997/L.110, 14/4/97

[318] Par. 37 of "Final report on the situation of human rights in Afghanistan submitted by Mr. Choong-Hyun Paik, Special Rapporteur, in accordance with Commission on Human Rights resolution 1996/75", 2/20/97, E/CN.4/1997/59. This contains appendices with offical lists of rules promulgated by the Taliban

> Engineer Aman told AFP. "The funeral was attended by hundreds of tribe members, but Najib's wife and children were apparently not able to attend the service," Aman added of the family who live in the Indian capital Delhi. The funeral service apparently defied a national Taliban ban annnounced earlier Monday on marking Najibullah's death with prayer services."[319] [EMPHASIS ADDED]

In this detailed story with inputs from several people close enough to be able to comment, there is no direct description of the nature of the mutilation. However, if we take the dictionary definition of mutilate as: "Inflict a violent and disfiguring injury on"[320] then the very visible bullet wound to the head[321] could be the mutilation referred to and it is not necessary to assume there were any others. Further, it's clear here only Najibullah's body was disfigured. This is consistent with the UN and other reports that refer only to Najibullah being shot before being hanged.[322]

The day Najibullah was hanged – two days before the report that his body was mutilated -- there was an unconfirmed report that he had been deliberately brutalized:

> Tens of thousands of people flocked to see the bodies of former Communist president Najibullah and his body-guard after they were hanged…."The two men [hanging in the public sq.] are Najibullah and his bodyguard Jabseer," Taliban militiamen told AFP. Najibullah's body was bloodied -- unconfirmed reports said he had been dragged behind a jeep…[323]

This report can't be considered too reliable as the person hanging with Najib wasn't his bodyguard, General Jafsar, but his brother, Shahpur Ahmedzi. The report also fails to note the bullet wound to Najib's head – which might account for all of his blood stained clothing.

While this account refers to "an unconfirmed report" that Najib had been dragged behind a jeep, the French AFP "updated version" by the same author on the same day had *jeep dragging* "according to some reports."[324] By the next day it had become "according to witnesses, Najibullah was dragged behind a jeep."[325] A day later, the NYT gave a more nuanced version: "Other accounts here said Mr. Najibullah, whose body was battered and bloody, appeared to have been dragged behind a jeep before being shot in the head."[326] [EMPHASIS ADDED]

The last AP report from that day, said:

> "The bodies of Najibullah and his brother, scarred by bullet wounds and bruises, remained all day in the hot sun,…

This report appears to say that both bodies had bullet wounds -- which wasn't the case. It could be that the language on the bullets is ambiguous.[327] None of the 4 AP reports or the Reuters account from that day [328] -- all from Kabul -- say anything about being jeep dragged.

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[319] 9/30/96. AFP,"Taliban say ex-communist president did not deserve defence", Dateline: Kabul, 9/30, Marc Lavine

[320] Oxford dictionaries -- not the same as the OED _____

[321] Another doctor's report described the wound to his head as "his brains blown out at close range" see footnote 354

[322] The day of the funeral, 2 stories claimed both bodies were "mutilated" -- niether based on an eyewitness account. Both included other exaggerated statements of the Taliban's misconduct & neither included anything good about them. A. 9/30/96, UPI, "Clinton courts Muslim militia in Kabul", Sid Balman Jr., Dateline: Washington, 9/30; B. 9/30/96. The Independent, Lond., "Women of Kabul hide behind veil of fear as Taliban banish them from the streets"; Sarah Horner reports from Afghanistan's capital, newly conquered by fundamentalists", Sarah Horner, P. 11, 760 words

[323] 9/27/96, AFP, 27:08 GMT[sic] , "Thousands flock to see bodies after Najibullah hanging",Terence White, DATELINE: KABUL, Sept 27

[324] "Selon certaines informations, son corps aurait ete traine derriere une jeep avant d'etre expose a la foule.", 9/27/96, AFP, Version Actualisee, Terence White, Origine-Depeche: Kaboul

[325] A.9/28/96, Xinhua News Agency, "major news items in leading french newspapers", Dateline: Paris, 9/28; #: 0928099; B.On the same day & topic, Ahmed Rashid wrote "He and another man were beaten senseless and bundled into a pickup truck. One report said they were tied to the back of the vehicle and dragged through the streets." Hamilton Spectator (Ont., Can.), dateline: Islamabad. This is Rashid's only rept on the topic in the half year thru 3/'97. But see footnote 813. C. However, on the 9th he'd written: "Western and moderate Islamic countries fear that if the Talibans [sic] take Kabul, it could lead to the division of Afghanistan, the spread of Islamic fundamentalism in central Asia and an explosion in arms and drug-trafficking in the region... The Talibans now control 17 of the country's 33 provinces. ...The rebels have never won a major battle. ...their successes stem from political and military vacuums created by the 18 years of warfare."Kabul pours in troops: Thousands sent to hold rebels back", The Gazette (Montreal) Ahmed Rashid of the London Daily Telegraph, 294 words, Dateline: Islamabad. Nothing good about the Taliban – who are called rebels & associated with "arms and drug-trafficking" , nothing bad about Rabbani & his allies, no mention of Russia – the key behind the scenes player. D. "On 4 Oct... Russian and Central Asian leaders will gather in Almaty to discuss the implications of the Taliban. ...Turkmenistan announced that it would not attend the Almaty summit due to its policy of "positive neutrality,".... Kazakstani Security Council chief...Tursumbayev said Russian Security Council Sec...Lebed['s]... 1 October assertion that the Taliban coveted territory in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, ...[w]as "rash and lacking foundation." L. Bezanis & B. Pannier, OMRI Daily Digest, 96-10-04 _____ see footnote 343 A

[326] 9/30/96, NYT," New Afghan Rulers Shock Even Their Backers in Pakistan", John F. Burns, P.A- 3; C. Dateline: Islamabad, 9/29

[327] A. 9/27/96, AP, 12:34ET AP Photo TOK102, Kathy Gannon, Dateline: Kabul; B. Friday 08:42 ET. C. Friday 04:40 ET. D. Friday 01:59 ET

[328] See footnote 450. 9/27/96, Ottawa Citizen, Fin Ed., "Islamic rebels seize Afghan capital",AP&Reuter [Alistair Lyon], P. A12. Dateline: Kabul

Two professional photos of Najib hanging from the gantry in Ariana Sq.—one with his brother hanging as well-- show no wounds to the hands or forearms of Najib – which are clearly visible – and no obvious tears in his pants -- strongly suggestive that he wasn't jeep dragged.[329]

Two weeks after the executions, the first account of his castration appeared. The text below combines two versions of this account by the same author. Words in Times New Roman are from the first version[330]. /*Words in italics between slash marks are from the second – published 15 years later*[331]/ and words in Arial bold are common to both. It claimed:

***"/They took him away to…/* He was taken to …the nearby presidential palace where he …was beaten, tortured and */shot/* mutilated. */His blood stained corpse, along with that of his brother was then hanged/…* His body was suspended on a rope and put on public display alongside his younger brother, who was hanged to death. A doctor who examined his [Najibullah's] body after it was taken down from the */traffic gantry/* public place where it hung saw marks of heavy beating on the torso, */as if /* apparently from rifle butts or other blunt objects. Najibullah's testicles had been cut off."[332]**

There is no mention of the kind of friction burns, scrapes, abrasions or rope marks that would be found on the body of a person dragged behind a jeep[333]. There is also no mention that a doctor who examined his body found "his brains blown out at close range."[334] This was something seen by thousands of people and would have easily explained his blood stained clothing.

There is no mention of the nature of the torture and how it was observed – since it took place in

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[329] Orig. pict. heading from AFP/Getty Images: **A.** "Bodies of former Afghan communist president Najibullah (L) and his brother Ahmadzai swing from a traffic post in Kabul [27/9/'96]… The two were executed by the Taliban militia after being taken out from the [UN]…compound where they have been under house arrest since 1992". AFP Photo: Saeed Khan. **B.** Insert – from a diff. angle, same artist/time/place -- shows more of backside of Najib's left arm – no evident bruising. [cropped from screen shots – show hands & clothing but no faces of deceased or the others in the scene. Najib is hung by a rope going under both arms & around his back. The 2nd, thicker, white rope may've been used to hoist -- not to drag- him. Orig. pictures ~11.5 Mb/1.6kx2.5k/300dpi. ___
SEND TO CREATOR & GET PERMISSION. **A.** _____ **B.** _____

[330] Oct/12/96, The Guardian, Lond., "Najibullah's Mortal Mistake; Jonathan Steele in Kabul describes the last hours of Afghanistan's ex-president, P. 13, 1560 words

[331] P.174, Ghosts of Afghanistan: the haunted battleground, '11, Jonathan Steele, Counterpoint, Berkeley, Ca. [The book has no footnotes in this section] 1st rev. Rupert Edis, 743 words, The Sunday Telegraph, Lond. 9/25/'11, 6/15/15: Email about this sent to ___ not to ___

[332] This Oct. 12 report by Steele is the apparent unstated source of a piece a month later by renowned international human rights advocate, Prof. Fred Halliday. In 2100 words, he has nothing good to say about the Taliban, stressing an idea that the Taliban are essentially a creation of Pakistan. About the Taliban's treatment of Najib., he writes: They took him to the former presidential palace, beat and castrated him, and then, when he asked to make a final statement for posterity, shot him in the side of the head and hung his body, alongside that of his brother, from a traffic control tower.". "Kabul's Patriarchy With Guns", 11/11/96 The Nation. Prof. Halliday's work is, in turn, cited within a month by top Afghanistan scholar, Barnett Rubin. Rubin states, on the authority of Halliday, that Taliban troops "tortured, killed, and hanged" Najibullah. Afghanistan: The Forgotten Crisis- Update March – November Dec. 1/96 _____ It's interesting that Prof. Rubin leaves out castration.

[333] In Jasper, Tex, Jun7/98, James Byrd Jr, was, stripped of his clothing, chained by his ankles & dragged to his death behind a pickup truck. "flesh was torn away on the bumpy asphalt road, eventually exposing many of his limbs to the bone." Police found Byrd's remains in 81 places along the road. He died after ~1.6km when his head was severed on impact with a culvert. Affidavit of James Gunter, Peace officer. _____ The distance around the walled citadel of the Presidential Pallace is ~1.2km & it's ≥600m from the pallace to the place where the hanging took place in Ariana Sq.

[334] See footnote 354 for fuller accnt of this dr's rept, incl. issue of castration – interviewed by Michael Griffin, 1/97.

the pre-dawn hours inside a large building controlled by the Taliban. Presumably, whoever observed this would also have observed that he either had – or had not – been dragged behind a jeep. Dragging behind a motor vehicle is not mentioned in this account at all. [335]

Also lacking in this – and all the other accounts found -- is the time Najib was actually hung. We'd think that those who were close enough to observe his supposed torture and dragging could tell us what times those took place and would have been interested enough to try to see what happened next – that he was hung. [336]

The name of the doctor is not given, nor his affiliation. We're not told where this examination took place—or who else, if anyone, was there. We are also not told if this doctor gave his report directly to the author or if the author received it from a third -or later- party. We're not given a clue if the author tried to contact Najibullah's family or those who performed the ritual washing of the body that usually accompanies a Moslem Funeral.

As we've seen, most of the details of this story are repeated – with little change—when the reporter included it in his book "Ghosts of Afghanistan" 15 years later. The statement: "Najibullah's testicles had been cut off." -- or anything of similar meaning -- is wholly lacking from the book.

There are multiple major discrepancies between key features of both versions and the contemporaneous stories – both from the UN and other on-the-scene reporters. The actual funeral is not even mentioned nor the transfer of the body to the family. Curiously, there's nothing good said about the Taliban in the entire 1560 word article.

There is also no clear contrast given between the treatment of Najibullah and that of his brother and their two associates. We are told that Najib's brother was hanged to death in Steele's later account, but in the first account this detail is missing. In neither version can we tell if Najib's brother was also tortured, beaten, dragged behind a jeep, shot or castrated. Without this contrast – Najib's brother's body, hanging in public view, showed no signs of being beaten, shot or dragged behind a jeep – the reader isn't led to the obvious question: Why should the Taliban have needed to do these to Najib and leave his brother -- in these particulars – untouched? Steele also gives no comparison between his account and the UN or other contemporaneous reports. There isn't even a mention that such reports exist, let alone discrepancies between those reports and what Steele writes. The failure to mention these other reports frees Steele – in the short run -- from the burden of explaining the differences. [337]

Steele, to his credit, provides a possible explanation of why Najib was shot before being hanged:

***"He wanted to make a final statement to sum up his life. In Islam that is important. He may have insisted and started yelling. That's when they shot him."*[338]**

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[335] Niether of the two accounts that include a doctor's report, this & the one by Michael Griffin [see footnote 354], point out what should have been obvious -- that the doctor's account is incompatible with the body of Najib being "jeep-dragged".

[336] John F. Burns does report the time that Najib was taken and the time that he was killed—which, since he was shot in the head, may have been hours before the time he was hung. "Taliban fighters dragged Mr. Najibullah from the compound at 1:30 A.M. on Friday, and had killed him by 4:30 A.M., United Nations officials said. He had been tortured and shot, and his mangled corpse was hanged alongside his brother's." 10/01/96, NYT, Tues , late Ed., final, "New Afghan Rulers Impose Harsh Mores Of the Islamic Code" P.A1C 1; 1238 wrds, Dateline: Kabul, Sept. 30.

This report is 3 days after the UN Press conf. on what happened. It gives the false impression that UN officials are the source of the statement Najib had been tortured. There is nothing in the offical UN conference report or in the reports of journalists who attended, about torture. There is nothing in the UN report of the time he was killed – only that by ~8:30AM they knew that he had been hanged. It could be that the 8:30 of the UN report became 4:30 as the result of a misreading 8 as 4. In any event, 4:30 would be consistent with Kathy Gannon's contemporaneous report that he had been seen hanging at dawn. See footnote 314 A

[337] Among the most obvious discrepancies is the failure to mention the night watchman – who, consistent with his function, provided times for the several events that he observed. Instead, Steele mentions "a member of the kitchen staff" who according to the UN report was not there. The UN says there were only 3 staff present - 2 UN coordinators & the night watchman– and only the watchman when Najib was removed. The UN says he was taken by force; Steele says he went voluntarily.

[338] This is the speculation, recorded by Steele, of "Terry Pitzner, the American officer incharge of the United Nations High Commission for Refugees in Afghanistan…As the designated link man between… [Najib] and the international community, he regularly visited the compound."

However, in several other public hangings under the Taliban, there were no final speeches summing up the person's life. It may be that a person who's hanged receives special treatment as a notorious social criminal[339] and denied what may be granted to ordinary capital offenders.

The most likely scenario is that when Najib understood they were going to hang him, he put up a fight. The Taliban beat him down with rifle butts, shot him in the brain at point blank range – also with a rifle -- and hung him. The blood from this massive head wound ran down his body. The bloody mess made it appear to some onlookers that he'd been jeep-dragged. His brother may've learned what had happened to Najib or just preferred to be hanged intact.

Steele makes no effort to explain why Najib was beaten before being shot. He also says nothing about the status of castration in Islam – that, as his colleage, NYT Reporter Burns, put it: It's a "defiance of the Koran's injunctions against mutilation of the body"[340]-- something one wouldn't expect of religious Moslems in this context.[341]

There is something far more curious, important and sinister about Steele's castration and torture piece: what he – and Burns --[342] published just in the two days before. In those immediately prior articles, they bore witness to the formation of what would be called the Northern Alliance -- the alliance of the enemies of the Taliban. It took place at a meeting in Khinjan "chaired by Said Mansour Nadiri, the head of the Ismaeli Muslims of Baghlan province". [343]

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[339] In the seven public hangings in 2000 described in the Western Press, there were no speeches reported of those convicted.

A. Four men were hanged in Kabul in 9/2000 after having been found guilty of setting off bomb blasts and firing missiles at the airport – "to create panic and fear among the residents" –with pay and supplies from Ahmed Shah Massoud. Buildings were damged but nobody was killed in these bombings. At least two of the four were "caught red-handed…as they were attempting to plant explosives at the Kabul airport" They were convicted by a military court. The sentences were endorsed by Mulla Omar "The opposition has denied any link with the Kabul explosions, arguing they were a result of internal feuding among the Taliban." 9/26/00, AFP, "Afghan Taliban hang another pair over recent explosions" 301 words, Dateline: Kabul; 9/24/00 AFP; 9/23 AFP; 9/23 AP

B. Three men who confessed to killing & robbing several people on Kandahar-Herat Hwy, were arrested several weeks before their execution. The case went through three levels of judicial review and the executions were approved by Mullah Omar. Relatives of victims hanged them in a stadium in Kandahar, Oct 2, '00, where they were to be left hanging for 3 days as a warning to others. Thousands of spectators watched. While the hanging occurred onlookers and Taliban soldiers shouted Allah-o-Akbar or God is Great. Oct 2/00, AP, "Taliban execute three convicted murderers", Dateline: Kabul; AFP, Xinhua [SEE APPENDIX 19 JUDICIAL EXECUTIONS UNDER THE TALIBAN FOR ALL CAUSES 1/1/00 To Dec. 31, 2000]

[340] See footnote 304. It's interesting that when Burns notes the demise of Najib in an article only days before the Steele piece, he says the Taliban: "marched him from a United Nations compound in Kabul and summarily beat, shot and hanged him"– with no mention of castration, torture or jeep-dragging, 10/6/96, NYT, "A New 'Great Game'? Afghanistan Reels Back Into View", John F. Burns, S.4,P.5,C.1, Dateline: Kabul

[341] Give ref

[342] A 10/10/96, NYT, "Afghan Force Counts Losses After Ambush Stalls Its Drive", John F. Burns, P.A-10,C.1, 822 Words, Dateline: Pul-I Khumri, Oct. 9.[Same day as the claim of the Rabbani/Massoud/N. Alliance at the UN in NYC, that Taliban used "chemical weapons" to take over Kabul see footnote 343 B.] Nothing good about Taliban nothing bad about NA.

B Oct/11/96, NYT, "2 Afghan Factions Sign Pact To Fight New Kabul Rulers", John F. Burns, A; PageA- 1; c.6; 1553 words, Dateline: Khinjan, 10/10. It has nothing bad about the Northern Alliance – tho' noting that Dostom as a "former Communist" had "Soviet-trained forces" ; nothing good about the Taliban

C Burns' article just a few days earlier presents the Taliban as bringing peace but also extremism: Oct/7/96, "Afghanistan's Professional Class Flees Rule by Ultra-Strict Clerics", P. A-8; C. 1; 2090 words, Dateline: Kabul, Oct. 6.

D Burns' article on the Kabul art museum, one of his Pulitzer Prize pieces, makes no mention that the looting stopped when the Taliban took it over, 11/30/96 NYT see footnote124 http://www.pulitzer.org/archives/5971

E Burns' article on the advance of The Taliban several months later seems relatively objective – not supportive of the Northern Alliance. 2/16/97, NYT, "As Foes Splinter, Afghan Islamic Victors Press On", John F. Burns, P. A-3; C.1, 1252 words, Dateline: Salang Pass, Feb. 9

[343] A Oct/11/96, The Guardian,Lond., Warlords' Pact Threatens Taliban; Jonathan Steele in Khinjan uncovers a secret military alliance which promises to make peace or break Afghanistan's dominant militia, Jonathan Steele, P. 14, 1427 words

B. The first major salvo in what would become the Northern Alliance's anti-Taliban propaganda war may have been launched in NYC Oct 9/96:, The Daily Yomiuri, "Rebels used chemical weapons, diplomat says" K. Knutsen, Pg. 5, Dateline: New York:

"A defiant diplomat of the ousted Afghan government of President Borhanuddin Rabbani told the U.N. General Assembly Monday that the country's new Islamic rulers used "some type of internationally banned gas or chemical weapons" to take over Kabul last month. Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs Abdul Rahim Ghafoorzai…suggested that the weapons had been supplied by Taliban's foreign sponsors and called the Taliban "an illegal and illegitimate

He -Steele- says of Dostom, Massoud, and Abdul Karim Khalili: "Ironically, they [the Russians – who had a representative facilitating the meeting] -- now find themselves backing the very people who resisted the Soviets in the Eighties". He tells us this without a hint to the reader that, as we will see in the next chapter, Dostom and Nadiri were openly allied with the Soviets and that Massoud had made truces with them.

Burns notes that the presence at the Khinjan meeting of the "Russian Consul General in Mazar-i-Sharif, Oleg Nevelayev …signaled the strong diplomatic support that General Dostum and Mr. Massoud have received from Russia." He mentions "brand-new trucks carrying antiaircraft guns …[and] what appeared to be brand-new uniforms and boots of the kind worn by Soviet troops when they occupied Afghanistan in the 1980's".

Niether Burns nor Steele – "the only foreign newspapermen on the scene"[344]-- mention that, since its inception four years before, the nominal government in Kabul –with Massoud and Khalili -- had been financed by unredeemable Afghan currency printed in Russia. The Russians still held this "print yourself rich" card and could cut off the supply any time they wished. In fact, they'd continue to supply this official Afghan currency to Massoud, Khalili and their partner Dostom for the next five years – until it wasn't worth its printing cost. [345]

Just four days after Steele's distinctive piece on the execution of Najib, he published a long story on Khalili's group in Bamiyan. It's the main part of a piece entitled: *"Afghan Allies Close In On Retreating Taliban Militia; Morale rises among opposition armies as united leaders plot advance on capital"*[346]

There is not a single phrase in this lengthy -- 1534 word -- piece that is favorable to the Taliban or adverse to any of the members of the newly created Northern Alliance.

He also tells us the three reasons Khalili's Hazara –Shiites want to fight the Taliban:

A. "We accept women working and girls going to school. We don't want to withdraw from the world,".[347]

B. "The Taliban's Pashtun nationalism is another source of alarm. "In talks with the Taliban we called for respect for equal rights, but had no positive response," he added."[348]

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mercenary force that has been imposed on the Afghan people." …Ghafoorzai also accused the Taliban movement of flouting human rights, deliberately shelling civilian centers, defying U.N. resolutions, destroying museum artifacts and running a 75 billion dollars heroin industry." [EMPHASIS ADDED]

[344] Steele , Oct 12/96 see footnote 330 They may've been the only reporters there. AP, AFP, Reuter & UPI – all of which reported from Kabul when Najib was hanged & buried – weren't there. It was by invitation only. AFP, BBC,Algemeen Nederlands Persbureau [ANP], gave the impression in their reports that the meeting was in Dostoms's stronghold. Mazar-i-Sharif. Oct 11/96, AFP, "Alliance of three Afghan factions against the Taliban", Marc Lavine, Dateline: Kabul. Steele and Burns say nothing about Nadiri, other than his chairing the meeting. His home was described – after he fled the Taliban as "a modern monument to megalomania…the indulgent creation of a man who once ruled all he surveyed" [See footnote 362] At his website, we are treated to 167 pictures of him -- many with eagles, none with books open before him. http://www.ayubkhan.com/menhtml/?name_id=11

[345] We will discuss the sources of support for the Taliban and their enemies in PART TWO: WHERE DID THEY GET THEIR MONEY?

[346] 10/15/96, Guardian , p 1, Jonathan Steele In Bamyan And Agencies In Kabul, This was the day after the 2nd meeting of the Northern Allaince -- where – as Steele states in this piece – they "hammered out plans for the next stage of their advance, at their second meeting since forming an alliance against the Taliban four days ago".

[347] In another article only two days later, Steele notes the stituation of the rural women in Bamyan and surrounding areas: "[The]… mother and sisters [of the anti-Taliban fighters] never leave home because this is not accepted in the backcountry. The Taliban militia's ban on professional women has shocked Kabul and the outside world. But it is fully in line with rural traditions, regardless of whether the village is Sunni or Shia, Pashtun or Tajik. Field and house-work are all that women are allowed to do, even in small towns.

During an hour's stop in Ghorband, [~50 miles NW of Kabul, 100 miles by road] while a puncture was fixed, we did not see a woman in the main street." 10/17/96/ The Guardian, Lond., "Afghan Foot Soldiers March On In The Dark; Promiscuous alliances have left many in the ranks fighting more from habit than conviction", Jonathan Steele. Bamyan, p. 1,.1560 words

[348] However, by that time the Taliban had already said publicly: A. "Tajiks, Uzbeks, Pashtuns, Hazaras, they are all Af-ghans," said Mullah Rabbani… who heads the Taliban administration of Kabul… in an interview Friday. "We will share government with everybody." 9/29/96, AP, "King Evokes Memories of a Peaceful Past", Kathy Gannon, Dateline: Kabul.

B. "We don't have any problem with the Taliban," Hazara military officers said, adding they had "sent a delegation to talk with the Taliban council today." 9/30/95, AFP, "Ethnic Hazara enclave in west Kabul not under Taliban control.", Terence White, Dateline: Kabul, 9/30.

C. Even as the Taliban advanced in Hazara territory the following February, there was nothing anti-Shiite or anti Hazara in the story: "The Taleban Islamic army broke into northern Afghanistan for the first time yesterday after weeks of hand-to-hand fighting in extreme weather conditions high in the mountains…[and] now control the highest point overlooking the last

C. "The third, and perhaps greatest, factor is that the Hazara's leader, Abdul Ali Mazari, was captured by the Taliban last year and killed in custody. The Taliban claimed he had grabbed a Kalashnikov rifle while in a helicopter. But reporters had earlier seen him tied up in a room in a state of terror." [EMPHASIS ADDED]

No mention is made here of the benign Taliban relations with the Hazaras and Shiites on the way to Kabul in early '95 or in Herat, half a year later. No mention is made of the attacks of Massoud on the Hazaras in Kabul when he routed both the Taliban and the Hazaras in early 1995.

We have already seen that the story of the torture and deliberate murder of the Mazari was a fabrication. The Taliban rules on women's dress and travel were more intended to prevent promiscuity than to prevent women and girls from working, studying or teaching. They closed girls' schools because the curricula in these schools were overwhelmingly a product of Soviet influence[349-A].

The Hazaras of Bamiyan who were rushing to ally with Dostom and Massoud would have done well to heed what the Taliban leaders in Kabul were actually saying :

"We want to establish an Islamic government that will not be against or opposed to the modern world,"[349-B]

-and an old Afghan proverb:

"What begins harsh and uncompromising will soften and relax."

A Taliban commander surrounded by two dozen burly fighters carrying assault rifles, quoted this proverb and added:

"Wait and see."[350]

The first English, Kabul based, report, that mentions castration came more than 80 days after the event and is from the same, prestigious, Pulitzer Prize winning N.Y.Times reporter, John F. Burns, whose work we saw in the first part of this chapter."[T]he Taliban began their conquest of Kabul by castrating, shooting and finally hanging the last Communist President of Afghanistan, Najibullah."[351] Extending the search time frame to the end of '97 produced no further mentions of castration—with a dateline Kabul.

John Burns' Pulitzer Prize wasn't for any of his articles that mentioned the castration of Najib. One of his Prize works, though, included a photo of the meeting of Dostom and Massoud at Khinjan. Published three days after the Kinjan meeting with a dateline at Mazar-i-Sharif –the 1271 word piece has mostly good things to say about Dostom and nothing good to say about the Taliban. Mazar-i-Sharif was Dostom's home base and the capital of the newly formed Northern Alliance. The title of the piece: *"Afghan Fights Islamic Tide: As a Savior or a Conqueror?"*[352] and Burns' quote from a local diplomat: "He thinks of himself as the new Tamerlane," gives readers a good hint of what Dostom is about:

"[…Tamerlane's] imperialism was imbued with no purpose other than the agglomeration of sheer power built on the corpses of millions. Till the advent of Hitler, [he] … stood -

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ten provinces… The defenders were Hazaras…led by their commander, Karim Khalilli…but it appears that Taleban bribed some of his commanders to stand aside." 2/26/97, The Times, "Seizure of key pass puts defiant north at Taleban's mercy" Christopher Thomas, reports from Pul-i-Khumri on a mountain victory for the Afghan Islamic forces." One wonders who revealed they'd been "bribed"–after the "hand-to-hand" fighting? They also demonstrated this, as we have already seen , by not persecuting the Hazaras of Kabul or Shiites of Herat [see CHAPTER 9: DISCRIMINATION AGAINST MINORITIES]

349-A No source given? Probably included a mix of Soviet Era curricula and anti-Soviet "K is for Kalashnikov" curricula . Check with Pia Karlsson and Amir Mansory on this. See Appendix 6 – including excerpt from their PhD thesis and links.

B. Sher Mohammad Stanekzai, a member of the six-member Taliban governing council in Kabul.Oct 4/96 The Toronto Star, 'Can rough justice heal Afghanistan?',Gordon Barthos , P. A23,

350 9/28/96, AP, Taliban Waste No Time Imposing Its Own Brand of Islamic Rule", Kathy Gannon, Dateline: Kabul

351 12/19/96, NYT,"At an Afghan Execution: It's Swift and Personal",P.A-3;C.1; 1424 wd, Dateline: Kabul, 12/18. This was also in the same time frame as his Pulitzer Prize work – but not incl. in the ten articles cited in the Prize. This report is mostly about the only execution in Kabul during the whole first year the Taliban governed the city – other than the execution of Najibullah +3 associates. See Appendix 18 Formal Punishments In Kabul Under The Taliban From 9/27/96-9/27/97,Their 1st Yr In The City

352 10/14/96, NYT, P.A-1; C. 1; Dateline: Mazar-I-Sharif, 10/13. The article it's a "city of two million people" ~10X too high for '96.

forth in history as the supreme example of soulless and unproductive militarism" [353]

Based on a personal interview in January '97 with a doctor who examined Najib's body, author Michael Griffin found the allegation that he'd been castrated was "not confirmed" [354]. Even so, as of Dec. 9/'15, there are 163 articles in LexisNexis "all news (English)" that refer to Najib's castration.[355] None were found that noted this was "not confirmed".[356] Another Lexis Nexis search for reports by the five contemporaneous, dateline Kabul, reporters to see if they subsequently wrote anything about the castration of Najib also turned up nothing.[357] A Google search on the italicized expression below [see footnote 354] returned only Griffin's books.

[353] A. P174, The History of the Mongol Conquests, John Joseph Saunders, U. of Pennsylvania Pr., '01, 1972 . B. Estimates of the number of people who died as a result of his actions range from 7-20E6. B. Selected Death Tolls for Wars, Massacres and Atrocities Before the 20th Century; However, he was a mega-murderer who loved art, architecture & scholars: "Tamerlane often spared the lives of the artisans and poets of the lands he conquered, shipping them en masse to Samarkand to enhance his magnificent city....[His] dictum [was] that the most important duty of the wise ruler is to construct beautiful and lasting buildings." C. Uzbekistan In the Shadow of Tamerlane, Kenneth Weisbrode, World Policy Journal, V. 14, # 1 (Spring, 97), pp. 53-60. D. "At his court in Samarqand he collected some of the greatest religious and scholarly talents of the age", Tamerlane's Career and Its Uses , Beatrice Forbes Manz, Journal of World History, V. 13, #1 (Spr. '02), p. 1-25, University of Hawai'i Press A. _____ B. _____ C. _____ D. _____

Half a year later, a World Bank study found Dostom's commanders collecting revenue "indiscriminately or personalistically" from the people he ostensibly governed. See footnote 614 A

[354] A. "A doctor who examined his body said that there was bruising on his upper torso – probably from rifle butts – a bullet injury in the upper abdomen, his fingers had been broken and his brains blown out at close range. *Reports that he had been castrated were not confirmed*" [underscore and *italics* added] Michael Griffin, *Reaping The Whirlwind:...*, '01 &'03, Pluto Books, p. 3 which cites footnote 8 of chapter 1 [found on pdf p. 411 of '03 ed.], "*Guardian*, 12 October 1996; personal interview, January 1997." [The Guardian 12/Oct/96 ref. is to Jonathan Steele – see footnote 330] The '01 & '03 edtions have the same statement – word for word – with the same footnote 8. In the '01 edtion, footnote 8 is on p 258. The 2nd ed. is nearly 180 p longer than the first. [email sent 5/15/15 to davidc@plutobooks.com] After months of effort to reach Michael Griffin, I connected with him through his publisher, Pluto Press. I gave him – by direct email – the specific citations to his work in this book that I thought he'd want to see. I also asked him if he had any more details on what he'd written or comments on what I wrote about his work. I received the following reply:

> *Wednesday, August 5, 2015 5:19 PM,*
>
> *Dear Mr Adler,*
> *I appreciate your frustration, but I do not have the time to read through 280 pages to find out which of my words from 15 years ago you are alluding to. Please be more specific, or let's let it drop.*
> *Best wishes*
> *Michael Griffin*

An immediate follow up email to Michael Griffin resulted in no response.

B. "Both the paperback [2nd ed., '03] and the original ['01] [of "Reaping the Whirlwind"] were pulped in 2004 as a result of successful libel action here in the UK [by Saudi billionaire Kh. Bin Mahfouz] ." Michael Griffin, in "Five books on terrorism you aren't allowed to read" _____ See also "Libel Tours" M. Griffin, p. 136-46, Index on Censorship, V. 38, #2, '09. Pdf of '03 ed. was available at _____ 6/15/'16. Books ordered pulped 3/15-17/'04, AFP, 3/17/04, "Saudi financier gets apology for book claiming Al-Qaeda links", Rob't Macpherson, 499 wds. Wayback Link

[355] The search was (castrate or castrated or testicles) AND Najibullah and not zaz any date

[356] The search was (castrate or castrated or testicles) AND Najibullah and ("not confirmed" or unconfirmed or "not confirm" or "Michael Griffin") any date. Curiously, one report that Najib was castrated cited Michael Griffin's book – but failed to notice that Griffin had written that the report of castration was not confirmed. "1001 Taliban Nights; There are no "moderates" in the Afghan regime", Matt Labash, The Weekly Standard, Nov.12, 2001, Vol. 7, No. 9; Pg. 21, 1753 words

[357] The search was (castrate or castrated or castration or testicles or emasculated or emasculation) and ("Terence White" or "Kathy Gannon" or "Alistair Lyon" or "Marc Lavine" or "Sarah Horner") and (all available dates) and (all news (English) run from the NLI,Dec. 9/'15.

However, a report by one of them did turn up in a Google search: "Flashback: When the Taleban took Kabul. The Taleban have been brutal to opponents.", Terence White, former AFP correspondent in Kabul. 10/15/'01 _____ [The comments in blue inserted in brackets within the text refer to the UN press conference, of 9/27/96. see footnote *308*] "It was shortly after 0100 on 27 September 1996, when I monitored nervous radio messages from Afghan guards [the UN report said there was only one guard] at the United Nations compound..... The guards told their Western bosses, who were staying in another part of the city, that some people were knocking on the gates demanding to see their "special guest"....

I was lying in bed, fully clothed and fully awake, flush with adrenaline and uncertainty, pondering how we would be treated by the Taleban. The UN guards were instructed not to resist [The UN report noted that the single guard – actually a night watchman- was unarmed.] and a squad of religious militants grabbed Najibullah and his brother, who was staying with him.[The UN report said the brother was taken several hours later.]

It wasn't until next morning that, along with tens of thousands of Afghans, I understood how Taleban rule would be. The hapless pair were hanging lifeless from a traffic control box, but they didn't die that way. Their bloodied and mutilated bodies [Only Najib's body was bloodied – by a bullet wound to the head.] were gruesome testimony to death by torture; Najibullah was said to have been castrated.... Curiously, the first gamblers, thieves and homosexuals apprehended by the Taleban were not punished severely but paraded through town with blackened faces as a humiliation. [This is consistent with what Terence White and others reported at the time.]

However, within a year, public executions, amputations and stonings were a regular Friday event in Kabul. " [This is a fabrication – possibly based on the work of Zohra Rasekh [see footnote 658 & associated text, & see CHAPTER 22a: MURDERING SCHOOL TEACHERS FOR TEACHING GIRLS]]

White's last dateline Kabul report in the following year was from July 27 1997. His dozens of DATELINE KABUL reports from Sept 96 to that date appear to be even handed. See Appendix 18 FORMAL PUNISHMENTS IN KABUL UNDER THE TALIBAN : 9/27/96-9/27/97,THEIR 1ST YR IN THE CITY]



At left, is the route from Massoud's home, Bazarak, Panjshir Valley, A, through Jabal-os-Sarāj, B to the S. entrance of the Salang Tunnel, C, to the Ismaili town of Doshi, D, to the home of the Ismaili leader, Nedari at Kayan, E. At right, is the route from the entry port of Hairatan, A, through the Salang Pass and Tunnel, B-C-D, to Kabul E. & Kandahar F. Route BCD in the left map is the same as DCB in the right. [from google maps-/topographic 2/2/14 , get permis.]

CHAPTER 12

THE NORTHERN ALLIANCE & THE SALANG PASS

The founding meeting of the Northern Alliance, which we saw in the last chapter, took place under the chairmanship of Said Mansour Nadiri in the neighborhood of the Salang Pass. Jonathan Steele, one of the two outside reporters to cover the meeting, thought it "ironic" that the Russians in 1996 would be "backing the very people who resisted the Soviets in the Eighties". It was not ironic. It was predictable. The key people who formed and facilitated the Northern Alliance- the principal enemies of the Taliban -- Dostom, Naderi and Massoud, were the same people, who had collaborated with the Soviets to protect the Salang Pass in the 80's.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 put both Ahmad Shah Massoud and the most well known Afghan leader of Ismailis[358], Sayed Mansur Naderi, in a very unusual situation. They were each in a position to obstruct the strategic Salang Highway and Tunnel. This route wound through steep mountains on either side and was very difficult to defend. A rockslide set off on the mountains could have easily blocked the road[359].

This route was also, by far, the shortest route from the Friendship Bridge [at A in the map 11] on the Afghan- Soviet border, to the capital of Afghanistan, Kabul [E], Bagram Airbase and the most important city of the Pashtun South, Kandahar [F]. Obstructing this route would have helped pro-

[358] The Ismailis were ~10% of the Shias who were, ~20% of Afg. ~1/2 were also Tajiks living in Badakshan Prov..["It has been estimated without official record that there are over 200,000 Ismailis in Badakhshan, Afghanistan" Ismailis In Afghanistan] Most of the rest were Hazaras living in Baghlan, Kabul & Bamiyan Provs. ~5K Tajik Isamilis lived in Takhar Prov. [Afghanistan: the Tajik Ismailis of Takhar--an end to isolation, Emadi, Hafizullah, Contemporary Review, 9/22/09] Many Ismailis – 100k+ -- live in Tajikestan incl. a large % of Gorno-Badakhshan.

[359] "In 1982 a …Soviet convoy traveling through the Salang Tunnel suffered the loss of 800-1000 killed as the result of an explosion. Whether it was caused by a vehicle accident or Mujahideen explosives has never been clarified, but the result created a deep scar in Soviet transport operations that continued to haunt them till their withdrawal in 1988-89." Pdf p 15

tect the mostly Pashtun population to the south of these mountains from the Soviets.

"The one battle the Soviets could never afford to lose was the battle to keep open the Salang Highway. It was along this route that three-quarters of the the 40th Army's supplies were brought from the Soviet Union."[360]

The situation was clear to the Soviets. They could try to buy off the Ismailis and Massoud – neither of which had a strong liking for their Pashtun neighbors to the south – in return for not attacking the Soviet convoys traversing this highway[361]. If either group – the Ismailis or Massoud's Panjshiris-- did not make such an agreement, they would likely have been targeted by the Soviets for annihilation – or, at best, for long term evacuation from their homes and farms. If, on the other hand, either group made the wrong kind of deal with the Soviets, they might be subject to attack by their fellow Afghans. These anti-Soviet fighters included not only the Pashtuns in the southern half of Afghanistan but their co-ethnic and ideolgical allies in the North as well. The Soviets would be aware of these potential problems.

The leader of the Ismailis, Mansour Nadiri, was made governor of his province – Baghlan. He allowed the mujahidin to operate there but prohibited attacks on the Salang Pass. The Soviets also gave him the power to disburse government funds[362].

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[360] Afgantsy: The Russians in Afghanistan, 1979-89, Rodric Braithwaite, 2011, Oxford U. Press. This is an interesting and worthwhile book but, as we saw in the previous chapter on the death of Najib, not reliable when it comes to the Taliban.

[361] A. Nadari's home was at Kayan, ~ 30km by road, west of the Salang Road at Doshi. He received government funding and arms and became a general and governor of Baghlan Province – which includes the northern approaches to the Salang Tunnel -- with 13,000 troops by 1989. At the same time he collaborated with insurgent groups, allowing them to operate in Baghlan provided they did not interfere with Soviet logistics transport in the region. P159 The Fragmentation Of Afghanistan, 2nd ed, Yale U. Press ,'02, Barnett Rubin, [citing Olivier Roy, personal communication and other sources that I have not yet been able to see directly -- at his footnote 40 p. 328] "Masoud effectively controlled areas south of the area under …[Nadiri] … and may have received one fifth of all goods he allowed to transit to Kabul" p259, [similar comment on p 159] Rubin supra citing at footnote 24, p 340 "The Independent [london] Aug. 19, 1989" This is apparently a typo – for : Aug. 12/89, The Independent, "Mujahedin in secret talks with Kabul" Ahmed Rashid in Islamabad, Pg. 10 "There has been intense speculation that the Tajik commander, Ahmad Shah Massud, has also made a secret deal with Kabul to allow food and arms convoys from the Soviet Union through the Salang Pass in exchange for one fifth of the goods."

B. "Dostom… defended the security of the road from Hairatan… to the Salang pass, where …[the] Ismaili Hazaras, took over. This [was]…the regime's main supply route…" p117-118, Afghanistan from the Cold War through the War on Terror Barnett R. Rubin, Oxford U. Pr., '13, [emphasis added]

C.1 "Ahmed Shah Massoud…[a]ccording to Western sources… demanded and received a bribe [from the Soviets] of roughly $350,000 in exchange for a truce beginning February 1983. When the truce expired in February 1984, Massoud allegedly advanced three demands for a new truce: twice as much money, continued direct negotians with the Soviets… and autonomous jurisdiction over the Panjshir Vallley. The Soviets were willing to accept the first two demands but not the third. Two months later, the Soviets launched their seventh offensive against the Panjshir Valley" J. Bruce Amstutz, [U.S. Charge D'affaires in Kabul from 1977 to 1980] p292 Afghanistan: The First Five Years of Soviet Occupation, 1994, citing "Six Years After" [MacFarquhar, E] Newsweek, 12/23/85 V.106, #26, p34 [*Important note – there are apparently two different articles on this page in two different editions of Newsweek. One is the article cited here. The other is unsigned and has only praiseworthy things to say about Massoud. This latter article is in Lexis Nexis. The former is in Ebsco.—both, as accessed in the NLI 2/20/24*]

C.2 "Mr. Massoud has continued to allow thousands of trucks to move down the Salang Highway to Kabul from the Soviet frontier, NYT, 8/30/89, "Afghan Rebels Losing Against the Enemy Within", John F. Burns, P A8, Dateline: Peshawar, [emph. Added]

[362] His home is called "a modern monument to megalomania…the indulgent creation of a man who once ruled all he surveyed … Until last August, Sayed Mansur Naderi …controlled Baghlan Province for nearly a decade. He was both benefactor and brigand, according to local residents; he bestowed blessings and charity on supporters but also milked local industries and sent armed militias to loot farms and extort money from travelers.

In his hilltop stronghold, Naderi constructed a fantasy of imported princely delights:[including] …a glass-walled aerie atop …the home [with] a mammoth metal eagle, a symbol Naderi chose for himself. …even a factory that produced gold coins from the crushed ore of a private quarry 25 miles away….Last August, it was overrun by …the Taliban…. Naderi, 63, and his family had already fled, and he reportedly lives in London.

The result was that most of the mujahidin who were best postioned to attack him – those in his own area – were beholden to him. They would also not feel the brunt of the Soviet efforts south of the pass.

Massoud reportedly made his first tacit truce with the Soviets in April of 1980 – after attacking the Soviet-Salang convoys on an almost daily basis in the months before and feeling the brunt of a 4 day Soviet attack on his Panjshir positions earlier that month.

> **"Masood indirectly signed a tacit agreement with the Soviet military command, where he took on a commitment not to carry out hostile acts against the Soviet and government forces. In response, we promised not to carry out air strikes in Panjshir and not to attack his caravans in the valley and out of it[363]. We would also provide Ahmad Shah with aviation and artillery support - if his troops clashed with rival militias of the Islamic Party of Afghanistan."[364]**

This truce enabed the Soviets to build a double-pipe fuel line through the pass and down to Kabul[365]. With this pipeline they could far more easily refuel their planes and tanks that were used in suppressing the Pashtuns in the South. They would not be dependent on driving flammable fuel tankers along the dangerous route. The Panjshir valley itself was not important to the Soviets – except to the extent that it provided sanctuary to people who might attack the Salang Pass.

Masoud concluded an open truce with the Soviets in Dec-Jan 1982-3 that lasted until early April of '84. [366] During these 15 months,

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Both hated and revered, Naderi and his family protected their followers during a decade of almost unimaginable turmoil -- from the waning days of the 1979-89 Soviet occupation to the period of anarchy and civil strife in the early 1990s when Afghan communist rule gave way to a fractious coalition government.…

[T]he Taliban takeover has brought some positive changes to Baghlan …After years of turbulence, there is now a sense of security …[which] once depended on the benevolence, might and shifting alliances of warlords like Naderi…

[T]he Taliban are trying to rebuild local industry in nearby Pol-e Khomri, the once thriving provincial capital. Under Naderi, some longtime residents said, factories were looted and cash was extorted from traveling businessmen at checkpoints…. "Since the Taliban came …[the cement plant has been fixed] with spare parts and …[is] producing at full capacity again…Several business owners, speaking in Dari, praised the Taliban for bringing peace. But one, glancing around nervously, whispered a few words of English: "It's terrible. Everyone who had money escaped last year, and now there is no work. The only good thing is that people don't have guns any more. The Taliban took them all away." The Washington Post, 5/21/99, "New Order Rises From Afghan Lair; Taliban Militia Reshapes Warlord's Luxury Base", Pamela Constable, Pg. A23, Dateline: Kayan, Afghanistan.

[363] These caravans carried Lapis Lazuli, emeralds and – sometimes as we will see, opium, out of the area and weapons from Pakistan into the area. See Chapter 13

[364] Modified google translation of original Russian. "Ahmad Shah" by Alexander Antonovich Lyakhovsky, Major General, 2004, _____ Site includes comments and email addresses of those commenting. _____ See: Ляховский Александр – Трагедия и доблесть Афгана, Alexander Lyakhovsky, *The Tragedy and Valor of Afghan*, Moscow, GPI "Iskon," 1995 _____ Ляховский Александр Антонович , Ахмад-Шах. ВЕСТНИК АНАЛИТИКИ №2, 2010 143-8 Александр ХОРУНЖИЙ МИССИЯ В ПАНДЖШЕР подполковник Анатолий Иванович Lieutenant Colonel Anatoly Tkachev , Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff, says his 'achiles heel' was vanity – it led to his death. Tkachev was the one who actually met with Massoud and arranged the truce. He says that before the meeting, an extensive investigation was made of Massoud's character – by interviewing people who knew him in school and as he was growing up.

This file may still exist and help to explain what Massoud was actually trying to do. Sent email to Oleg Taran , key author of the Afghan: History of the War 1979-1989 website 8/22/14 _____ Requested that intel file on Massoud be posted on the internet in email to _____

[365] **A.** "…petroleum pipeline from the Soviet frontier to the Bagram Air Base near Kabul…" Wash. Post. Apr. 6, '83, "Afghan Rebels Match Soviets' Spring Offensive", William Claiborne, p. A23, Dateline: New Delhi, [see if earlier refs can be found] **B.** In good conditions they could lay a 4" pipeline at a rate in excess of 40 miles per day with a special truck and a two man crew. p.73 "Logistics: The Soviets' Nemesis To Conventional War In Central Europe?" Gilbert H. Edmondson, 1989, Air University, http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a217257.pdf citing, p.13, Hanes, Hal D. 1981 **C.** The USSR's "pipelaying battalion" in Afghanistan had 280 people in '86—of 100,000 total, P 231; A pipeline laying battalion arrived 6/'80 & by 8/'80 had built a pipeline [~240km by road] from Termez to Pol-e-Khumri – where a fuel tank farm had been built within days of the army arriving. [Pol-e-Khumri is ~230km through Salang tunnel to Kabul] p60 [citing G[eorge] Jacobs 'Afghan Forces: How many are There?' Jane's Defense Weekly, 22/6/'85 [1228–33]] Mark Urban [Defense Correspondent, the independent] "War in Afghanistan' '88, MacMillan, London.[curiously , nothing on the pipeline thru the Salang pass.]

[366] **A.1** "Last year, Mr. Massoud and the Soviet command arranged a cease-fire, which lasted 15 months until March. "NYT, 5/23/84, "Soviet Said To Seek Afghan Truce", Sanjoy Hazarika, New Delhi, 5/22 [emphasis added] **A.2** "In January of 1983 [the Soviets, in the person of Col. Anatoli Tkachev, Soviet Miliary Intellig., GRU]… negotiated a ceasefire with…[Massoud] which was more or less scrupulously observed by both sides until April 1984." '…The civilian population returned to the Pansher, the situation on the road between Salang and Kabul became very much more quiet, and there was no major military operation in the Pandsher [sic] Valley until April 1984.'"[EMPHASIS ADDED, 'quote' is from Tkachev. From: "Afgantsy…" See footnote 301] A.3 "According to several Soviet sources … they seem to have never run out of ammunition or POL." pdf 18 of 25, [emphasis added] U.S. Army, "Lessons

the Soviets were in a position to run supplies through the Salang Pass relatively unimpeded. They could build stockpiles in the south to last for more than five years.[367]

After the truce, even the pipelines would not be critical as fuel could also be stockpiled during the truce[368]. Occasional successful attacks on convoys or pipelines by the mujahadin wouldn't seriously harm the Soviet position. It may even be that attacks on convoys of fuel tankers were planned -- to show that the mujahedin were having spectacular -- and suitably cinematographic-- successes – blowing up fuel tankers – while the effect on the Soviets was minimal[369].

These ineffective attacks combined with highly visible "counter attacks"[370] on the areas of Massoud would help protect him from accusations that he'd collaborated with the enemy.

The deal makers would come closer to the Soviets[371] and the Soviets, would be able – for what to them would be a modest cost – to project their power into the south of the country. The people of the south – overwhelmingly Pashtuns--would feel the brunt of Soviet power and either be driven from their homes as refugees or killed. The death rate in the war – according to Sliwinski - increased sharply after the truce [372]

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from the War in Aghanistan," May 1989 (Army Department Declassification Release)" from: The September 11th Sourcebooks, Volume II, Afghanistan: Lessons From The Last War, U.S. Analysis of the Soviet War In Afghanistan: Declassified, Ed. by John Prados, Oct. 9/01, National Security Archive _____

367 **A.** Based on data on what made up a three months' supply: see APPENDIX 22 What the Soviets could ship through the Salang Pass during a 15 month truce with Massoud. The truce began at least informally some years before. This probably gave the Soviets the time they needed to build the double pipeline – in addition to stockpiling some year's worth of other supplies. So our figure is probably conservative

B. "According to a Government Accountability Office report published earlier this year, 44 trucks and 220,000 gallons of fuel were lost due to attacks or other events while delivering fuel to Bagram Air Field in Afghanistan in June 2008 alone." $400 per gallon gas to drive debate over cost of war in Afghanistan Roxana Tiron - 10/16/09, The HILL. This is ~0.7k Tons = 10 hrs of single pipeline use, as shown below.

368 At 2.5m/sec typical flow speed in 10cm diam. pipelines, flow =70 T/hr/pipe=1850 US tons/day/pipe; 8E5T/pipe/15 months. If ~100kT needed/qtr for the combined forces, then each pipe could supply 2 yrs, 8 yrs for 4 pipes – 2 via Kabul & 2 via Herat. *["Flow rate in pipelines [for jet fuel] is limited on the lower side ... to 2 m/s and on the higher side ...[to] 3 m/s" Jet Fuel Pipelines..., A. Sera, M. MacDonald, Dubai, U.A.E Dec/09 V. 236 #12].* _____This is consitent with 2k tons of fuel/day upper limit of these pipleines cited on p 73 by GH Edmondson. see footnote 365 B & 369A.2 [with ~5,000 gallons per truck – as noted with US military fuel trucks [see footnote 367-B , above , and ~3kg/gallon of fuel, 1 fuel truck is ~15 tons of fuel or less than 1% of fuel shipped/day /pipe.

369 **A.1** "A typical skirmish occurred on the Salang Pass on 16 October 1986, ..., when a column of oil tankers, more than a mile long, was attacked by several hundred of Masud's fighters..., accompanied, it is said, by a Western TV crew out for some spectacular footage. ...A number of tankers were set on fire and the drivers bailed out to take cover." Afgantsy...see footnote 301 citing: David Gai & Vladimir Snegirev, Vtorzhenie: Neizvestnye stranitsy neobiavlennoi voiny [Invasion: Unknown Pages of an Undeclared War] Гай & Снегирев , Вторжение : Неизвестные страницы необъяв-ленной войны (Moscow: Ikpa, 1991 pp. 227–9. [EMPHASIS ADDED] The original Russian text: "Рядом с ними окапывались операторы западных телевизионных компаний: это для их съемок готовилось предстоящее уничтожение колонны афганских машин, которая транспортировала в Кабул топливо... Да, было что снимать кинооператорам." "Next to them [Massoud's men], the crews of western television companies were dug in: it is for their filming the forthcoming destruction of the column of Afghan trucks that transported to Kabul fuel was prepared..... Yes, it was that the cameramen shoot." [*NO PRIMARY SOURCE?*]

A.2 This book also notes "«Духи» постоянно их взрывали... потери топлива составляли до 25 процентов." "'Gangsters' constantly blew them [the pipelines] ...[&] fuel loss amounted to 25 percent. ~ p256."[This may refer primarily to the 1986 period.] Full text of 380+ p. book in Russian at: ___ saved to flash drive.

A.3 In support of the idea that there were staged battles to make it look like the Mujahadin were fighting, Zaeef notes: Communist collaborators "...handing out truckloads of money to various groups, in exchange for which they would conduct staged and pre-announced attacks on each other in which there would be no casualties." My Life With The Tal. P. 48.

A.4 "More than eleven thousand lorries and fuel tankers were lost, and the mountain passes and valleys of Afghanistan were still littered with their carcasses twenty years after the war had ended" Ibid, cit. V. Ablazov, *Afganistan, chetver-taya voina* (Kiev/02), p.189.[How many were lost to attacks & how many just wore out? Typ. US military heavy tanker truck lasts ~20 yrs, med. wt trucks of different types:15 yrs. ~1/5th US Army heavy trucks are tankers. Most trucks were med. & light; probably <500 of 11k trucks were fuel tankers, based on "Army Tactical Wheeled Vehicles", *Carolyn Wong, et al. 2011, RAND*] _____

370 One of the most famous 'fake' military encounters was the Battle of Anghiari [1440, Italy], in which over 10K soldiers fought for 4 hrs and "*...only one man died, and he, ...having fallen from his horse, was trampled to death." History of Florence", Nicolo Machiavelli, Bk V, Ch. VII* _____

371 This may explain why Massoud had so few stinger mssiles. Out of more than 500 delivered, he got only 8 and used only 2 – with only one hitting its target. *"From beginning to end, I had eight Stingers, and we just fired two of them. When we fired one of the Stingers, we brought the aircraft down, and the second one did not hit the aircraft. I had six Stingers until recently." transcript of an interview ...for CNN's Cold War docum. series.* _____

"For each plane confirmed down by a stinger missile, the commander responsible received two missles" Rubin, Frag. P 196 citing "The bear Trap..." Yousoff and Adkin, 1992, p 177.

372 This study can't be used 'as is' to estimate the relative damage to the different parts of the country because it is based on simple, linear projections from the results of interviews with refugees in the Pakistani refugee camps. SEE APPENDIX 23 **for more on the population/casualties of war issues** _____

The truce with Massoud was not fully kept by either side. The full Afghan partners of the Soviets – the most senior leaders of the puppet government in Kabul-- were afraid of Massoud – particularly if he was left in place after the Soviets pulled out. Also, the Soviet military on the scene in Afghanistan had a different sense of the war than the political elite in Moscow. The former saw both the futility of conflicts with Massoud and the benefits to their soldiers – in life and limb – that a truce would bring. The latter did not see the futility or the carnage so clearly and may have been less supportive of such a truce.

What truce there was, helped to damage relations between the Pashtuns and both Massoud and the Hazara-Ismailis– who could easily have been seen by the Pashtuns as traitors[373].

In contrast with what happened during the Soviet Afghan war, when the Taliban crossed through the Salang tunnel on their way to take the northern provinces in May 1997, Nadiri and his allies, blocked the pass and trapped the nearly 6,000 strong Taiban contingent. When in late May, the Taliban effort at Mazar-i-Sharif turned into a massacre of the Taliban and the loss of the surrounding area, much of this large Taliban contingent was trapped. For more than a year, they had to be resupplied by air to the northern city of Konduz – with the supply planes attacked as they came in to land.[374]

DEPOPULATED VILLAGES, PACTIA PROVINCE
Pdf page 11 of 15.

DESTROYED HOME, KHOST AREA, PACTIA PROVINCE
Pdf p 10 of 15

DESTROYED LAKA TIKA BRIDGE ON THE WAY BETWEEN KHOST AND GARDEZ, PAKTIA
Pdf 14 of 15
[ORIGINAL IN REPORT IS MADE FROM TWO PARTLY OVERLAPPING PHOTOS]

UNOCHA MISSION
[UNITED NATIONS OFFICE FOR THE COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS]

GARDEZ-KHOST, PAKTIA PROVINCE, EASTERN AFGHANISTAN
21-24 JULY , 1997

SEE PAGE 157 FOR A MORE POSITIVE IMAGE AND ADDITIONAL DETAIL ON THIS SOURCE
https://ia600700.us.archive.org/7/items/azu_acku_pamphlet_lc3737_a34_v54_1997/azu_acku_pamphlet_lc3737_a34_v54_1997.pdf

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[373] **"There is also a considerable amount of suspicion in southern Afghanistan to this day about the role of Northern Alliance commanders like Massoud who are blamed for letting Soviet supplies pass through to southern Afghanistan on account of his 'hatred' for the Pashtuns" p57, An Enemy We Created, 2012**

[374] **p 85-6/pdf 135-6, My Life with the Taliban, Zaeef. However, an AP report from Salang says that the Taliban used dynamite to at least partly unblock the pass so that a single lane of jeeps could get through – maybe only, smaller, 4WD vehicles? 5/28/97; "Taliban move thousands of troops through Hindu Kush mountains" With BC-Afgha, Zaheeruddin Abdullah, Dateline: Salang Tunnel.**

PART TWO:

WHERE DID THEY GET THEIR MONEY?

If we can learn where the money came from,

we can see

who's pulling the strings

and

what their motivations are-

both of the

enemies of the Taliban

and

of the Taliban themselves

CHAPTER 13

WHAT WERE THE ENEMIES OF THE TALIBAN FIGHTING OVER?

GIANT CHECKPOINTS

Most of the Taliban's chief enemies were united in the Soviet period to defend the Salang Pass for the Soviets. In the fall of '96, when the Taliban chased them from Kabul and headed toward that same pass, they united again to form the Northern Alliance.

These and other key enemies such as Ismail Kahn, were certainly not all of a piece -- though they had much in common. They all had - and wanted to keep -- control of sources of tremendous unearned wealth. These were what amounted to giant checkpoints on the Afghan economy: on highways, on natural resources, and on the printing of the country's internationally recognized currency.

Dostam and Malik – who we met in our discussion of the massacre of the Taliban at Mazar-i-Sharif in 1997[375] - were -- and are -- fighting over two such checkpoints.[376] The first is a natural gas field centered on Dostam's home town, Sherbegan, with billions of dollars in proven reserves and an electric power plant and fertilizer factory that run off a trickle of this gas [377]. The second is a place that most people outside of the area never heard of: Hairatan. This town, with its Friendship Bridge over the Amu Darya River, is the gateway – the over the road, truck and train 'pipeline' – to, from and through Afghanistan for much of Central Asia[378].

These two set-ups are giant checkpoints for warlord-gangsters to collect unaccounted for "customs" and "taxes"[379] – at a rate of over $100 million/ yr.[380-A,B]

The Wahdat-Shiite Hazaras in the Mazar-i-Sharif area and the Dostam–Malik–Massoud Nexus had a long standing agreement over the distribution of the take from these checkpoints. Dostam-Malik and their crew got half,

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[375] See footnote 297

[376] Malik & Dostam are in the anti-Taliban Afghan government – still fighting with each other with their own militias – militias that were supposed to have been disbanded a decade ago. Give ref

[377] **A.** Afghanistan has "proven natural gas reserves of 5[E12ft^3]" all of it in the area that had been controlled by Dostum. At $2+/kft^3 in 2000, this would have been worth ~$10E9. Worldwide proven nat. gas reserves are over 1000X this. In 2000, Afghanistan consumed ~110k Oil Equivalent Tons in natural gas, ~the same in oil, ~30k OET in hydro & ~250k OET in biomass. Almst no coal was used. p. 116 Energy Outlook for Asia and the Pacific _____ . **B.** The fertilizer plant in Mazar-i-Sharif had a capacity of 105 k tonnes of urea/yr. The pipeline to this plant carried up to 0.5E9m^3 gas /yr. ~15E9ft^3/yr [The price of urea was 100-200$/ton in the 1995-2000 period, 1 Gj ~1kft^3 natural gas, 1Pj=1E9ft^3 nat gas to produce 50kt urea _____] A UN report put the fertilzer plant's capacity in '92 at 400 tonnes/day – or ~120k tonnes /yr [pdf p 21 "Afghanistan Balkh Province, A Socio-Economic Profile" UNIDATA, A Project of UNDP/OPS & UNOCA, 3/'92 _____ So the fertilizer would be worth $10-20 E6/yr. This is if operated near capicty, but , according to Zaeef, it and other plants were operated at a small fraction of capacity under Dostum & his commanders. See footnote 380-B] The pipeline to the Soviet border carried up to 4E9m^3 gas/yr. So ~1/7th of the gas went to produce urea and the rest for electricity. The generator associated with the fertilzer plant was 48MW. 48MW x 1yr = 1.5Pj/yr,~4E8 kWh/yr. [the UNIDATA report, supra, pdf 21, has 3 turbines here in '92 @12kw ea] At ~$.05/kwhr net to Dostom, this would mean an additional $20E6/yr. So Dostom's combined take on these two operations would be $30-40E6/yr. Allowing for old thermal power plant electricity conversion, this would need ~5Pj/yr – or ~1/3rd of the gas capacity "What Russians built in Afghanistan until 1989"_____

[378] "In the months before the cessation of aid from the Soviet Union in January 1992, Dostum entered into negotiations with Ahmad Shah Massoud to form an alliance of northern forces. …[to maintain control of Hairatan]… On March 19 [1992] the northern alliance of Massoud's forces, Dostum's, those of Hizb-i Wahdat and Parchami rebels took control of Mazar-i-Sharif." p. 101, "Casting Shadows: War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity: 1978-2001" The Afghanistan Justice Project, '05, Citing " Rubin, *Fragmentation*, p. 270"

[379] '"The whole warlord system is based on the interception of national revenue at the points where it is levied and on nothing else," British journalist Putnam Weale reported at the time.' [the reference is to China in the 1920's] AP, 12/21/96, Loot, limos, loyal young 'guns': The strongmen who define an age, Charles J. Hanley. Dostum tops the list. "He grew rich taxing the local bazaar trade with Central Asian republics…"

[380] **A.** See footnote 595 on amount collected AFP, 5/29/03, **B.** "Afghanistan's natural resources are concentrated in the north of the country. At that time, the chemical factories, a hydropower plant, the gas sector, refinery sector, the cement factory, coal mines and factory, the factory for refining marble and precious stones, salt mines and other heavy industries were all located in the northern provinces and had been divided among various *jihadi* commanders. Due to the war and what often amounted to neglect, all these industries were damaged and run down. Productivity at the Qudu Barq [power plant and fertilizer] factory in Mazar-e Sharif was down by over 80 per cent. The commanders in charge of the facilities had not even performed the most basic repairs and maintenance work, and sought merely to exploit the resources for their own profit. The hydroelectric dam, for example, was meant to be producing 18MW of power, but its output had decreased to 6MW. The chemical factory was meant to produce 4,000 sacks of fertiliser,[per day? but it only managed around 700.[Also See footnote 377-B] [With]… the oil wells in Sar-i Pul …[l]ocal commanders would take turns each night to extract as much oil and gas as they could…without considering the damage that this might inflict. By the time I joined the ministry, the wells were in a dire state of decay, badly damaged by earthquakes and tremors. …as the land structure underneath was damaged by this mistreatment." Zaeef "My Life…" , p 94

Massoud got 1/3rd and the local Wahdat, led by Karim Khalili, took a sixth. [381], [382]

If the Taliban took over these checkpoints and operated them under Moslem Law, all of the partners in the Mazar-i-Sharif/Hairatan operations would be sidelined – together with their largely mercenary militias[383]. To help pay their "fight for pay" soldiers, Dostam, –would-be successor, Malik—and the other two- had shares in another 'check' point: a contract with the Russian government to print banknotes- official Afghan currency-- on request, without regard to redeemability. They were counterfeiters.[384]

This may have led Malik and some of the local Whadat-Hazara leaders to instigate the murder of the Taliban when they came to Mazar-i-Sharif. This may've been the reason to promote and maintain the image that the Taliban had tortured Sheikh Mazari and thrown him out of a helicopter. This may've been the underlying reason the Taliban came back a year later – after they'd been massacred -- and massacred a similar number of Hazaras[385].

This may have been why, as we've seen in Chapter 9, the Hazaras and Shiites of Herat and Kabul in '95 and '96 – and even some parts of Bamiyan and Maidan in those years -- were on relatively good terms with the Taliban.

These normally good relations also explain why the Taliban, when they returned and successfully took over Mazar-i-Sharif in 1998, had to call for attacks on the Shiite-Hazaras in that place[386]. The ordinary Taliban under more ordinary circumstances would not have thought of attacking Shiites or Hazaras as such.

The idea that the Taliban murdered Sheikh Mazari is useful to this day – to Dostam and Malik and to any group – including the US -- that wants to weaken the Taliban.

These particular giant checkpoints were not the only interests of the enemies of the Taliban. Another was gems – emeralds and lapis lazuli. Still another was opium. Yet the Taliban's enemies claimed it was the Taliban – not they – that got most of its money from the poppy trade.[387]. This shouldn't surprise us. Chazal – our sages of the Talmud -- said:

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[381] See footnote 607 for details/discussion AFP, 5/29/03, "Afghan president attempts to neutralise old warlords", Herve Bar, Dateline: Kabul

[382] **A** Massoud had his own giant checkpoint on the Salang Hwy "Tariffs imposed by Jamiat [Massoud's group] on trucks coming down the Salang highway, Kabul's military and commercial life-line with the Soviet Union, are estimated to amount to more than five million Afghanis a week. 'That's what Hezbe are fighting for, to get all that money,' says an experienced Afghan journalist." See footnote The Guardian Lond., January 5, 1988, [There were ~50 Afghani/$US in that time frame [The Globe and Mail (Canada), Jan, 4/88, Foreign Exchange prepared by The Bank Of Montreal, as at 12/31/87] So this checkpoint was worth over $5 million/yr at the time – assuming Massoud was able to get the more favorable official bank or US Treasury exchange rates. If he was only able to get the Kabul/market rate, which valued the afghani at ~150/$, income from this would only be ~$1.7million/yr. See exchange rate chart , p 67

B "…big oil dealers at the wholesale oil market …[Kabul] own nearly 500 oil tanker trucks. Every day, about 10 to 15 tanker trucks arrive from Turghundi and Nimroz carrying an estimated 2 million liters of Turkmen and Iranian oil. And even though Afghanistan has virtually no gasoline stations, gasoline is sold in cans at shops all over Afghanistan for half the price it costs in neighboring Pakistan." Japan Economic Newswire, 11/29/99, "Afghan economy thrives despite U.N. sanctions" Shahid-ur-Rehman Khan, Dateline: Kabul/ Kyodo/ Kyodo News Service

[383] There's an interesting set of testimonies of Massoud , Dostom & Karim Khalili before the US Senate in 1998 after the massacres in Mazar-i-Sharif in 1998: Fed. News Serv., Oct/8/98,Hearing, Sen. Foreign Rel. Subcom. On Near Eastern And S. Asian Affairs, Chair.: Sen. Sam Brownback (R-Ks) Events In Afghanistan, Panel II Sect.: Hearing With Def. Dept. Personnel. No mention of massacre of Taliban. Khalili had been Afghan. Econ. Minis. 1993-1995 & has been 2nd VP in Karzai Gov. See footnotes 343, 345, 379, 381, 607, 672, 976

[384] When Dostom was not allied with Massoud, he also had Afghan currency printed on his own in Uzbekistan, ie: "Kabul government accuses Uzbekistan of printing fake Afghan currency" AFP, June 10/95 , Dateline: Kabul. "The Afghan central bank Saturday accused Uzbekistan of… ["printing millions of packages of forged I,000 (Afghanis) notes…[" [f]or the past two months…"]"] …and transferring the "counterfeit" to northern Uzbek warlord Abdul Rashid Dostam" If we assume that each package contained 100 bank notes and that 3 million packages were printed, this would be 300 million x1000 =3E9afs. At ~3E3 afs /$ = $100E6. However, the Uzbek afs generally traded at close to face value in Dostom controlled provinces in the North and half their face value in Kabul, so this may have been worth closer to $50E6 on the open market.

[Gulbaddin Hekmatyar – the anti US, Muslim Radical & the communist Dostam were allied at this time against both Massoud & the Taliban.]

See also references to Dostoms currency – the Dostomi – valued at 18,000-120,000/$ at reports in ENDNOTES at 2/17/97, AFP, "Iranian support lends sharp increase to Afghan currency value in north", 12/11/97 AFP "Afghan currency slides as mystery bank notes pour in" On Russian counterfieitng with Massoud, See footnote 394 C.

[385] Give ref

[386] "In one speech, [the newly installed Taliban governor of Mazar, Mulla Manon] Niazi was reported to have stated, "Last year you rebelled against us and killed us. From all your homes you shot at us. Now we are here to deal with you." Afghanistan: The Massacre in Mazar-I Sharif, Nov. 1/98, Human Rights Watch _____

[387] "Massoud's intelligence aides estimated the total Taliban budget at $250 million a year. The official budget announced in July 2001 was $80

וכל הפוסל פסול
ואמר שמואל במומו פוסל

"Samuel[388] said: 'Those who regularly make false accusations against others are themselves guilty of the very evils they accuse others of'[389]

The same person – Ahmed Shah Massoud -- who accused the Taliban of getting most of its money from opium, claimed his own money came from more kosher sources:

"…Massoud's United Front budget was approximately $60 milliion a year, most of it raised from the sale of lapis lazuli mined in Badakhshan Province [390], ['emeralds from mines in the Panjsher'[391]] or from Afghan currency printed in Russia." [392]

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million, It is possible that income from opium sales (the Taliban skimmed 2% off the profits) made up much of the rest." [the source of this is]"On United Front and Taliban budget, author interview with senior Afghan government official who spoke on condition of anonymity, Kabul, March 2003; and on Taliban skimming of opium sales, [former Taliban foreign ministry official Vahid] Mojdeh, unpublished manuscript, 38-39" From a footnote to a statement that "U.S. Intelligence estimated that he[Osama bin Laden" raised $30 million a year for al Qaeda and invested $10-$20 million a year in the Taliban" p 205 How We Missed the Story: Osama Bin Laden, the Taliban and the Hijacking of Afghanistan, Roy Gutman, US Institute of Peace Press, 2008 _____

While we're with this source & p., the author states: "At the later stage of the conflict [in Af.], he [OBL] was able to deploy 1,500-2,000 fighters and they were, according to Massoud, by far his fiercest opponents."

[388] Samuel of Nehardea -- or שמואל --one of the greatest sages of his age (165-257CE) was also an astronomer & medical doctor.

[389] Talmud, Kiddushin 70 a & b. Hebrew text from ____ Translation by the author, English translation available at ____

[390] Quote, except for part in[ ], Gutman, '08, p. 205, see footnote 387

We can calculate how much he may have made from Lapis Lazuli . We assume that he used 3000 pack animals/yr[A] & these were mostly mules[B] carrying a net avg. of 100kg ea.[C] We'll also assume that the avg. price he received for unprocessed stone was $0.07/ct in 2000 [D.1]. This gives us 300 tons/yr or 1.5E9 ct. – 25X the sales rate in 1972 -- and $105 million. If this were taxed at the same 10-15% stated for emeralds [E] , he'd receive $10-16 million from lapis. Massoud, able to select the best material [D.2] and ship it directly to the retailer, might have been able to make millions more/yr.

A "Last year, nearly 3,000 pack-animals loaded with lapis lazuli made the journey through Massoud's territories to Pakistan. Each one was taxed en route. The Guardian Lond., Jan. 5/88, "The heroes with tarnished haloes…", George Arney, Dateline: Islamabad. **B**."… from high in the Afghan mountains, lapis is taken by mule under armed guard to Peshawar near the Khyber Pass…" - overmining has dropped price by factor of 5 only 30 years supply left at current rates of extraction "a kilo of purest lapis a rock about five inches across traditionally sells for about $ 3,000 (Pounds 2,000), but at today's price fetches just $ 500" [this would be $0.6/ct & $0.1/ct resp.] Sunday Times, Lond., Aug/11/96, "Lapis lazuli - a blue-chip stock?" Paul Ham and Michael Stares. **C**."LA Times, 7/7/09, "Marines' beasts of burden are again leading the pack", Tony Perry "But a 1,000-pound mule or 400-pound donkey can easily carry a load one-third its weight -- or more, if necessary…" _____

D.1 "Afghanistan has ten grades of lapis lazuli with greatest supply in grades 5 to 10; West Germany has been biggest importer of Afghan lapis lazuli (most of it smuggled out of Afghanistan) purchasing 7,092 kg. in 1972 for d.m. 1.9 million."[It is not stated what grade/s were purchased] "GOA[Gov. of Afghanistan] seeks US distributor for precious and semi-precious stones" 1974KABUL05521_b 8/31/74 Cable from Kabul to US Dept of State, Declassified 2005, _____ [in 1972 there were ~3.2DM/$. So, this was 7.1E6 grams for ~6E5$ ~$0.017/ct wholesale, uncut in 1972., this would be $0.07 in 2000 and $0.11 in 2014.

D.2 Another source states " Lapis is "gem quality lazurite – production ~8 Tonnes /yr in Afg…, 10 grades with no. 1 $1200/kg in 1978 [this is $0.24/ct]" "Physical Resources And The Development Of Afg…" *John F. Shroder, Jr., Univ of Nebraska at Omaha,* Studies in Comparative International Development / Fall.Winter '81, citing, KULKE, H., 1976, "'Din Lapislazuli-Lagerstatte Sare Sang (Badakshan)", Afghanistan Jrnl 3: 43-56. **E** see notes **G** & **H** connected with emeralds in next footnote.

D.3 Another source: Longing for the "Schurawi" [The Russians] Christian Neef, Der Spiegel, Jun 5/'00, #23;P 184, 2632 wds. Massoud urgently needs new ammunition, more military equipment - Dollar so. …north of the Panjshir Valley [3000m above the village of] Madan, … lapis lazuli [is mined.] The mountains are full of precious stones and gems. …Lapis lazuli and emeralds are Massud's main source of income... the men bring 300 kg of …lapis lazuli stones … daily from the mountain. …[then transport them with] asses in a three-day march to 100 km distant Chitral,… Pakistan. $ 50 a kilo costs at the bazaar in Madan, "in Chitral…it's worth ten times," [Massud brings] $ 60 million annually out from the mines, believe insiders. [300kg/day x $500/kg x 360 days /yr.=$54E6 for 108 tons/yr [comp with 300 tons/yr estimated above, based on 3000 pack animals/yr. 108 tons may be for only one grwop of mines] but this is gross & cost of caravan & mining must be paid for out of this] [The Taliban spent] $80 million spent for their battles, last year; hard to believe that the Northern Alliance takes less for their resistance…The farmers eke out a poppy - heavily indebted to the landowners who also are often Massoud's local commanders. …old Indian power plant turbines keeps running - they give every other day and then only every fifth house current. "People wish in the time of Schurawi crew back. Among the Russians they had had something to eat, and only now deliver something in this forgotten region." [Mentions nothing in this article about printing money or how much Massoud might be getting from opium – but see footnote 475—where opium is the focus]

[391] The part in brackets is from "He [Massoud] insists he is financing the war by selling emeralds from mines in the Panjsher, and …lapis lazuli from …Badakshan..." Sydney Morning Herald, 7/31/99 "Hounding the Taliban", Christopher Kremmer.

We can calculate how much he may have made from emerald mining: If we take the highest estimate of emerald production in the year 2000 -- $50 million [F] -- and apply the reported tax rates of either 10%[G] or 15%[H]. These taxes would've brought in $5-7.5 mil./yr from emeralds. In addition, he charged digging fees and was able to buy gemstones directly from the minors to sell on the world market.[G]

F "Yearly emerald production values [in the Panjsher Valley] are unknown but estimates range up to $50 million for production in year 2000." P9 Emerald deposits of the Panjsher Valley,… Lawrence W. Snee, et al , USGS, Administrative Report 2005, ____ **G**"…Masood decided to exploit the mineral wealth of the Panjshir Valley…to …pay


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10
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2 PT MOVING AVG., KAB
2 PT MOV. AVG., M & US
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NOTE
LOG SCALE
THE MONTREAL RATE IS THE OFFICIAL EXCHANGE RATE. THE KABUL RATE IS THE RATE ACTUALLY AVAILABLE IN KABUL OR OTHER BAZARS ACCDNG TO NEWS & ENCYCL REPTS.
SEE NOTE BELOW FOR DATA SOURCES.

THIS IS AN IMAGE OF "LIVE" CHART – WHICH MAY BE FOUND IN DRAFTS BEF. 344

MASSOUD & CO. & HYPERINFLATION, COUNTERFEITING MONEY *TO* GET RICH QUICK, WIN "FRIENDS", PAY BILLS & WRECK THE ECONOMY OF YOUR ENEMY

THE DATA SOURCES FOR THIS CHART & THE CHART ON THE NEXT P. ARE IN THE ENDNOTES, P. 258-64, IN ORDER BY YEAR OF THE REPORT OR, IN SOME CASES, BY YEAR OF THE DATA.

Chapter 14a

MASSOUD & CO.

PRINTING MONEY IN RUSSIA

None of these sources is from the general public Massoud is ostensibly defending and one of them: "currency printed in Russia" looks like a combination of counterfeiting[393] and subsidy by the Russians – the people he was ostensibly fighting against -- with US and Arab money -- for a decade.[394]

Following the example of Najibullah, who had negligible domestic revenue sources[395], the mujahedeen started to try printing their

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the bills of his Islamic army. For help, he turned to Gary Bowersox, [who, after conducting a survey based on] ...a Soviet study made in 1977... said preliminary findings point to a potential in billions of dollars...Gem mining in the Panjshir is ...by prospectors who pay digging fees. Masood also either collects a 10 percent tax on gemstones or buys them to sell on the world market.... AP, 10/25/90, "Guerrillas Mining Emeralds, Rubies to Finance War", Patrick O'donnell, dateline: Taloqan, Afghan. **H** "Commander Ahmed Shah Masood... governs more than 5,000 villagers mining emeralds in the Panjshir Valley [Commander Abdul Mahmood, pers. comm., 1990; O'Donnell, 1990P.37 "...a tax of 15% of the value [of the emeralds] is collected." Emeralds Of The Panjshir Valley..., Gems & Gemology, Spr.'91, p. 26-39. Gary Bowersox, et al. See also: The Gem Hunter: True Adventures of an American in Afghanistan, Gary W. Bowersox, '04, incl. 77 refs to Massoud _____ See also Mineral Resources in Afghanistan _____ Source Material and Statistics on the Economy of Afghanistan _____"Emerald deposits in the Panjsher Valley. Michael Davidov, Mineral And Gem Enterprises"_____ Michael Davidov Diamonds Ltd,___

[392] p. 205, Roy Gutman, supra, see footnote 387. The lapis & emerald mining would've brought in up to $22.5E6/yr – assuming the higher 15% tax rate. Added to this would be digging fees & private sales by Masoud. Unless these combined to something close to the calculated taxes – all of which are at the upper ends of estimates, the largest fraction of his budget would've been paid for by printing money – or something else...

Between '92 & '96, when Massoud & Rabanni were the leaders of the Kabul gov., "Kabul's main income was printing money as the [other] zones [of Afg., under control of, e.g. Dostam & Ismail Kahn] now contained their own customs revenue...[T]he continuous issuance of new money had reduced... [its] value...to almost nothing" [P 119, Rubin, '13]

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[393] Carrying false weights to cheat people – even w/o using them & having false measures to cheat people in one's home– again, even w/o using them -- are an "abomination" in Torah Law: [Deut. 25:134-16]

לֹא-יִהְיֶה לְךָ בְּכִיסְךָ, אֶבֶן וָאָבֶן: גְּדוֹלָה, וּקְטַנָּה.
לֹא-יִהְיֶה לְךָ בְּבֵיתְךָ, אֵיפָה וְאֵיפָה: גְּדוֹלָה, וּקְטַנָּה.
אֶבֶן שְׁלֵמָה וָצֶדֶק יִהְיֶה-לָךְ, אֵיפָה שְׁלֵמָה וָצֶדֶק יִהְיֶה-לָךְ--
לְמַעַן, יַאֲרִיכוּ יָמֶיךָ, עַל הָאֲדָמָה, אֲשֶׁר-יְהוָה אֱלֹהֶיךָ נֹתֵן לָךְ.
כִּי תוֹעֲבַת יְהוָה אֱלֹהֶיךָ, כָּל-עֹשֵׂה אֵלֶּה: כֹּל, עֹשֵׂה עָוֶל

"Thou shalt not have in thy bag diverse weights, a great and a small. Thou shalt not have in thy house diverse measures, a great and a small. A perfect and just weight shalt thou have; a perfect and just measure shalt thou have; that thy days may be long upon the land which the LORD thy God giveth thee. For all that do such things, even all that do unrigh-teously, are an abomination unto the LORD thy God."

[394] **A** "... President Rabbani placed an order with his former enemies, the Russians, to print up bales of new Afghan currency notes. Flown in by Russian cargo planes ...the crisp new bills were passed out by the jeep-load to commanders ...along the front. .... When the Afghani began falling against the dollar, wiping out people's meagre salaries, the police shut down the money bazaar." The Independent (Lond) 3/22/96, 'Kabul pays to keep enemy at bay', Tim Mcgirk, Kabul, P.9,[emph added]

B "In his attempt to oust the ruling Taliban militia, the wily guerilla leader Ahmed Shah Massoud has taken to printing fake currency notes in large denominations in Russia. [This]...resulted in a crash of the local currency, the Afghani. Cleverly, Massoud prints notes with the same serial numbers as existing notes, so the Taliban doesn't know how much fake money is in circulation. It seems Massoud has discovered that in a war, the printing press is a more potent weapon than guns and rockets." Business Times (Singapore), 12/18/98 **[EMPHASIS ADDED].**

C "Whenever it needed to pay its bills, Rabbani's government went to its printer in Russia and ordered up a new batch of afghanis - "afs" for short. The Taliban ...[banned] the exchange of any afs with new serial numbers. The alliance responded by printing new notes with old serial numbers - effectively counterfeiting its own currency. ... the national bank governor joined Gen. Dostum's renegade faction, and with his signature Dostum was able to order a new batch of notes from the Russian printer..." The Philadelphia Inquirer, Dec. 5/01 'Afghan currency is foreign; Like the country, its money has a rough past.', Andrew Maykuth; Pg. A01, 1238 words, Dateline: Kabul, Andrew Maykuth's e-mail address is foreign@phillynews.com.

[395] In 1992, the government that took over from Najibullah found nearly all government expenditures had to be delivered weekly from Russia. p 164, Barnett Rubin, Fragmentation of Afghanistan, State Formation and Collapse in the International System '02.

way to success shortly after they took over Kabul in mid-spring of '92.[396]

Interim President, Sibgatullah Mojaddedi, said he was doubling salaries for the 700,000 government workers -- school and university teachers, bureaucrats, doctors and engineers. Afghanistan's central bank said they were awaiting printed banknotes from Russia[397].



The announcement was seen as a desperate bid "to get the bureaucracy to overcome its apprehension of the mujahedeen and return to work… Estimates put the number of civil servants, doctors and teachers who fail to report for duty because of the lawlessness in Kabul at between 70 and 90 percent."[398]

The chart at left gives the Kabul market exchange rate over two decades. It shows -- between the two black arrows -- that the value of the afghani declined with respect to the dollar by a factor of 50 from the time Massoud came into Kabul to the time just before he left and the Taliban took over 4.5 years later. Part of this decline was a result of printing unredeemable money and part was due to a change in living conditions in the city and anticipated future developments in the country. Official Afghan currency with a face value of 8 trillion afs was printed in this time frame[399]. But how much was it worth at the time it was printed?

We will assume to begin with that the social factors account for about a factor of 5 of the total factor of 50. This is the amount the afghani increased in value from late December of 1991 [left red arrow] to the time Massoud entered the city about 4 months later [left black arrow]. At the low point of the afghani in December, the people were subject to artillery barrages on a routine basis and Kabul was under siege – preventing much of the food supply from reaching the city.[400] There was also a high

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[396] "Kabul tries to woo its frightened bureaucracy", AFP, 6/21/92, 720 words, Dateline: Kabul

[397] "The previous consignment of Afghanis, weighing about seven tonnes, had arrived earlier in June from Moscow, and was airlifted to Mazar-i-Sharif to pay off soldiers, officials and commanders supporting Mojaddedi's government." Ibid. see footnote 396. The key commander in Mazar-i-Sharif was the long term Soviet and Russian ally, Dostum—at this point allied with Massoud and Mojaddedi.

[398] **A.** Ibid 396. **B.** Two months later the situation was worse: "Under the rebel siege, law and order has collapsed in Kabul. Rival militias man roadblocks, robbing citizens from other ethnic groups. "They're all doing it - the Uzbeks, the Hazaras, the Tajiks, the Pashtuns Pathans . Nobody can stop them," said an expatriate worker." 8/28/92 The Independent (London), "Rebels offer Kabul leaders brief respite', Tim Mcgirk, New Delhi, P. 12. **C.** "Kabul is a city haunted by fear, blasted and burning from rockets randomly fired by rebels on its outskirts. For nearly a month, its one million people were virtual hostages in their homes….An estimated 500,000 residents have deserted the city …In four months, Kabul has suffered more destruction than in the 14 years of civil war…Kabul has no electricity or running water and will not have any for months, even if peace comes. …staples of the Afghan diet, have tripled in price and consume almost all of an average Afghan's salary. Winter is months away, but many people already worry about having enough food to get through it." NYT, Sep.6/92, "Those Still in Kabul Cope With a Broken City", AP, Sec. 1; P. 13; Col. 1; Kabul,

[399] We know that at the time the old Afghan currency was redeemed for a new type in late 2002, 15.9E12 official government afs were turned in. Of this, we learn that 0.9 trillion was printed on order in 2002, and 7 trillion was printed for Massoud and Co. during the five year Taliban period. The Taliban did not print currency. This leaves 8 billion printed during the period from spring of 1992 to fall of 1996. IMF report 2003 and 4/23/02, AP, " Money mystery: Afghan currency plummets", Niko Price, Kabul

[400] 12/26/91, "Kabul ends blockade of highway, rocketing of capital continues"DATELINE: KABULm "The Afghan Army reopened a vital highway which had prevented supplies from reaching Kabul as the city continued to be shelled by guerrillas on Thursday. At least six people were killed and six more injured when rockets fell on Kabul Thursday. Eight had died and nine were hurt in similar attacks on Wednesday. Heavily overcast skies prevented government helicopter gunships taking off for

level of uncertainty as both the heavily armed Najibullah regime and their mujahedeen opponents were cut off from supplies from the USSR and US respectively. [401].

This is as it would be during most of the time Massoud & Co. governed Kabul. The conflict that erupted between Massoud and Hekmatyar so decimated the city in their first three years that its population was reduced to less than half of what it had been in the later years of the pre-Massoud regime. Even the schools were closed.[402]

> In early 1995, the Taliban broke Hekmatyar's long term blockade of Kabul and stopped his rockets and shelling– driving him from the artillery nest from which he'd bombarded the city[403]. The public schools, the university and the airport were reopened[404]. The effect of this relief from physical oppression is highlighted by the yellow arrows. The value of the afghani went up by about 2/3. However, uncertainty remained and Massoud succeeded in driving the Taliban back. They would not oust Massoud from the city for another year and a half.

When they finally drove him out in the fall of 1996, the afghani strengthened dramatically – rising in value by over 150% in a month. However, when it was seen that the fighting was continuing and there was no sign that it would end soon, the value fell back to midway between these two points. This is shown as the gap between the two green arrows on the chart. Then Massoud hit back with a barrage of freshly printed hi-denomination afghanis – and drove up the exchange rate by 50% in just a few months[405].

In the next two years -- 1/'97-1/'99 – the underlying, currency-based value of the af declined by only another factor of two. This reflected a sharp decline in the number of civil service workers Massoud had to pay as the Taliban controlled first Kabul, then Mazar-i-Sharif and most of the rest of Afghanistan. However, the loss of the giant Hairatan check point and other sources of revenue in the north meant that both Massoud and his sometime ally

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retaliatory strikes Thursday. Meanwhile, truck and private bus drivers here said government infantry led by tanks has cleared a path through mujahedeen blockades on the Salang highway, Afghanistan's most important lifeline to the outside world. The government operation ended a 15-day blockade by the rebels of Salang, the highway which links Kabul with the Soviet-border trade town of Hairaton. Truckers said the main haulers of food and fuel from Hairaton were still waiting for the official green light before driving to Kabul where shortages have gained alarming proportions. The local currency, the Afghani, crashed earlier this week and reached a record 2,100 to the dollar because of panic buying by private importers and individual purchasers, but market sources Thursday said hard currency sold for 1,500 as reports came in that the blockade has ended.

[401] **A.** AP, 1/1/92, Wed., "Arms Cutoff Has Little Effect on War-Weary Kabul", John Jennings. , Dateline: Kabul, "…rockets are still being fired from rebel hideouts in the mountains that ring this city of 2 million, a reminder that for some time the arms cutoff will have no effect….the dull thud of incoming rockets and the bursts of machine-gun fire and government artillery echoed through the city…. there is no doubt most of the attacks are haphazard….both sides have stockpiled enough munitions to keep fighting for another two years. Both sides will have little difficulty restocking their supplies….diplomats say the government has stored enough fuel to keep its jets flying and the tanks rolling for months. They also confirm the government's claim that the former Soviet Asian republics have agreed to sell aviation fuel to Kabul. Diplomats also say China has secretly offered to sell weapons to Najibullah's government. Beijing supported the rebels during the Red Army's nine-year occupation but abruptly stopped once the last of the 115,000 troops withdrew in February 1989. Chinese officials now fear a radical Islamic government in Kabul might one day try to stir up trouble in their border provinces…." **B** Jan/3/92. The Atlanta Journal and Constitution, "Afghan rivals spinning their wheels EDITORIAL; SECTION A; PAGE 08, LENGTH: 438 words "Few now doubt that Afghanistan's civil conflict will rage on indefinitely at its current low but vicious level, even though its warriors have been cut off by their principal suppliers. President Najibullah's forces and his enemies both have prodigious stockpiles of weapons; and Afghans as the newly titled world leaders in opium production have plenty of loose cash should they run short of ammunition." **C.** Jan.7/92, AFP, "Afghan arms ban welcomed, but serious doubts remain", Anosh Ahamath , Dateline: Kabul, "The regime is conserving every drop of fuel for combat purposes, and intellectuals here believe that the adverse fallout of the conservation on the civilian population poses an immediate economic, not military, problem for Najibullah."

[402] See footnote 220

[403] see footnotes xx

[404] Give ref on schools, electricity? Etc. reopened

[405] See: ENDNOTES--*DETAILED SOURCES ON EXCHANGE RATES OF THE AFGHANI IN KABUL 1987-2003 [In date order]*



– Dostom -- would find it too tempting to just print more money to pay their soldiers and friends. [406]

The chart above shows average monthly market exchange rates for the last three years of Taliban governance of Kabul and the first two years of the post-Taliban period[407]. The last three Taliban years saw the exchange rate decline by a further factor of two. Most of this drop was not currency based. It was due to the terrible drought—which began in 1999 -- and the impact of UN sanctions and their associated restrictions, tensions and uncertainties. When the sanctions ended -- together with most of the Taliban regime – and then the rains came -- the exchange rate dropped back to the pre-drought, pre-sanctions levels[408].

At three points in the '99-'01 Taliban period – black arrows on chart-- there were reports of the market being flooded with newly printed currency[409]. We will assume that currency injections occurred at these points - producing relatively small but noticeable losses in value. They appear to have been timed to exacerbate the effects of the drought and sanctions.

So let's see how the information we have on the amount of afs printed by Massoud & Co. - and when they were printed -- fits into this picture. Eight trillion afs were printed during the four years[410] that the currency supply part of the exchange rate declined by a factor of ten. The fourth root of 10 is 1.778. So the exchange rate was increasing by a factor 1.778 per year. If there were yearly salary adjustments and the amount printed and paid out kept pace with the decline in value of the af – and if the total added up to 8 trillion then:

$$0.69 + 1.23 + 2.19 + 3.89 = 8.0$$ [411]

This would give us an initial payment of about 0.7 trillion afs for 700,000 civil servants or a million per government employee per year. However, this would require an exchange rate of about 2,000 afs to the dollar [at red arrow on chart, see page 68.] to give us equivalent annual salaries of about $500 each.[412] The actual exchange rate

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406 See footnote 394 A

407 Data in "new afghanis" ; 1000 old afghanis = 1 new afghani; Source da Afghanistan Bank , p 26 [pdf p 27] of :IMF rept 11/03 _____ For a better version of a similar chart – with data only thru 8/'03 see p. 113 of IMF Rept _____

408 The very sharp drop in 10/'01 was also the result of the massive liquidation of opium stocks as people sought cash to protect themselves from the impending calamity of the invasion. It was also clear that with the Taliban on the way out, the ban on opium growing would become a nullity and new poppies would be planted – reducing the value of inventories.

409 **A.** 12/15/98, AFP, "Afghan currency hits all-time low as opposition prints cash", Mohammad Bashir Dateline: Kabul. **B.** 4/19/00, Wed., AP, "Taliban shut down money market to stop freefall of Afghan currency", **C.** [1/20/01] AFP, "Afghan currency plunges to all-time low" DATELINE: KABUL, Jan 20

410 See footnote 399

411 0.69x1.778=1.23, etc, etc

412 In 1988-9, they were getting ~$600/yr, *[2/27/89 The Times (London) , "Quest for food and fuel takes rising toll; Afghanistan", Christopher Walker, Kabul, Issue 63328., 792 word, "…Kabul…a …city of 2.5 million… the average civil service salary is less than Pounds 30 a month..." In 1988-89, £1 =$1.7 So this would be ~$50/month and $600/yr.]* with per-capita GDP for all of Afghanistan about half of that *[Afghanistan GDP/capita, current US$: $298, $265, $252 & $176 in '89, '91, '92 & '93 respectively. UN Data _____.]* In 1991, with the GDP/capita~10% lower, the pay ranged from $3.6/month for a clerk to $10.50 for a department head. However they were also getting food and fuel coupons with a value of $21/month. *[6/26/91, AFP, "Skyrocketing prices hit Afghans"]* In April of '92 –when the doubled pay was announced -- the situation was worse: "The average government salary is about $ 3 per month, and the subsidized

when this program commenced was closer to the start of the "Massoud in Kabul" trend line [at the purple arrow on the chart] -- 800 af/$. At twice the earlier local low point of the exchange rate[413], it allows for the chaos and wreckage that had already set it and would increase in the city over much of the next four years.

Also, as already noted[414], the number of people in Kabul declined sharply in those 4 years – and presumably the number of civil service workers declined as well. Further, we would have only 7 trillion left in this scenario to drive up the exchange rate first by 50% in the first few months of the Taliban in Kabul and then by at least another factor of two in the following years. To account for this, we will assume:

A. The money for the 3 month Currency Blitz [CB] at the start of the Taliban rule of Kabul was ordered in advance & is included in the 8 trillion.

B. The exchange rate for the 1st payment was 800 af/$ shown on our chart.

C. The number of civil service workers nationwide declined 10%/yr. [=70,000/yr.] from the initial headcount of 700,000[415].

D. To simplify things, the drop in the civil service head count offsets the drop in total population in Kabul as far as the exchange rate is concerned.

This puts the sum before the Currency Blitz at 0.28+0.44+ 0.70+1.09 = 2.5 trillion afs[416].

It should initially strike the astute reader as unlikely that a one year currency injection of .28 trillion af – with a value of only $345 million-- could increase the exchange rate by 78%. How could currency worth only about 1/10th of Afghanistan's GDP at that time[417] have such a large effect? The answer is that the monetary part of the economy was largely dollarized[418]. Larger purchases were generally handled in dollars and rupees,[419] much of the economy was non-monetary – like subsistence farming and barter among farmers and traders[420] and most exports – including opium -- were paid for in dollars and other foreign currencies[421].

Our 4 year currency scenario gives us a check – a way to compare with another report of the budget, the value of the afghani and the inflation rate. We learn:

> "Finance Minister Kareem Khaleeli [422] said this year's government budget is

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coupons …have not been distributed to most city residents for months because the government is out of supplies..." [*Most - but not all – EMPHASIS ADDED.]* The per-capita GDP was also down and heading much lower for '93 *[see above in this note]*

[413] This 400 af low point – shown by lower black arrow on the same chart, is also the projection of the afghani market exchange rate in the Soviet- Najibullah period between 1982 and 1989 – shown by orange dashed line. This was a period when supplies and peace were relatively well maintined in and around Kabul and some of the larger cities – even as the Kabul regime lost whatever control it may have had in the countryside

[414] See footnote 220

[415] In 2002, IMF staff reported : "…estimates for total civilian [civil service] employment range widely from 240,000 to 331,000,["of which 60 percent were in the provinces and 40 percent at the center ." (This added from p 57, par 99)] excluding military personnel (about 100,000) and government enterprises (about 35,000). In addition, little is known about the status, competence and efficiency of the civil service....numbers are still out of proportion to the minimal services actually delivered." IMF 2003 , p87-8, par 151 [EMPHASIS ADDED]

[416] 0.69+(.9*1.23)+(.8*2.19)+(.7*3.89)=6.272; 6.272*(.8/20)= 2.51; 92-3 = 1st yr = 0.69*.4 = .276E12 @ 800af/$= $345E6; 93-4 = 2nd yr - 1.23*.9*.4 = 0.443E12= $311E6, @ [800*1.78= 1424=af/$]; 94-5 = 3rd yr = 345*.8= $276E6; @ 800*1.78*1.78 = 2535af/$; 95-6 = 4th yr = 345*.7=$242E6, @ 800*1.78*1.78*1.78=4512af/$; ∑4 yrs= $1.174E9

[417] Afghanistan's GDP is shown as $3.47E9 , '92; and $2.66E9, '93; $2.11E3, 94; 3.24E9, '95; $3.12E9. '96; $3.02E9, '97; $$2.91E9, '98; $2.72E9, '99; $3.53E9, ''00; $3.62E9, '01. All data in current US$ from _____ UN statistics based on data from the Asian Development Bank

[418] **Give refs**

[419] 4/25/2000 [tues.] , AFP, "Taliban ban use of foreign currency in local trade", 475 words, Dateline: Kabul

[420] **Give refs**

[421] **Give refs**

[422] See footnote 976

about 380 billion Afghanis (dlrs 200 million) But there's no evidence that the government is able to collect any taxes due to the civil war which has crippled the economy. …Inflation is over 100 percent a year and the currency is rapidly losing its value"

This report puts the exchange rate at 1900af/$ -- right on our trend line at the time it was published in Dec 1994 [423]. But the stated budget of 0.38 trillion af is much less than either the previous 93-4 budget of 0.44 trillion af or the following, 94-5, budget of 0.70 trillion af. We would expect the budget to be about equal to the average of these two[424] or about 0.55 trillion af. The 0.17 trillion gap is consistent with two other statements in the same article:

A. "Ahmad Shah Masood, is widely believed to be paying various commanders to fight on his side….

B. Afghanistan's money supply does not appear to be closely controlled by the coalition government, which is made up of the various warring parties and barely functions."

If this fraction – ~30% -- is representative of what was being siphoned off for these commanders and similar payoffs, it would amount to about $0.3 billion in Massoud's four year pre-Taliban period and about half a billion dollars by the fall of 2001.[425] It's consistent with a London Times report from the same time frame of Massoud's "commanders, who live in opulent style." [426]

After paying out 2.5 trillion – on and off budget -- in freshly printed afs, a maximum of

8.0-2.5=5.5 trillion afs

would be available to be distributed in the 3 month currency blitz. This is 5 times the salaries—and commander's emoluments -- in the entire previous year.[427]

The Currency Blitz would actually require only 1.9 trillion afs in our scenario[428]. It would leave 3.6 trillion to be combined with the 7 trillion we are told was printed after

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[423] 12/17/93, AP, "Another Afghan Dispute: Who Controls the Money?", John Jennings, Dateline: Kabul

[424] The currency injection/budget figures in our scenario are Sept -Sept-- as Massoud fled Kabul in Sept. '96. The official Afghan budget was based on the solar year starting Mar. 21. [pdf p 46. footnote 2 of ____] It isn't clear which budget Fin. Min. Khaleeli is referring to—the one starting the following Mar. '95 or the one that was on-going at the time he spoke. To be conservative – to minimize the discrepancy -- the latter is assumed.

[425] See footnote 437

[426] **A** "Defiant Rabbani threatens UN Afghan peace plan", Christopher Thomas in Kabul. Times, London *2/21/95*: News: p10 The article also refers to "…no visible support for the lorryloads of currency it prints on Russian presses…" **B.** It was not only Massoud's commanders but his sometime ally General Dostom & Co.: "…in his expensively furnished office …The big four-wheel-drive vehicles roaring around town belong to his commanders, who are resented for their opulent lifestyles. 2/27/97, The Times (London), "Whisky-loving warlord defies Taleban tide", Christopher Thomas in Mazar-I-Sharif.[Emph. Added] **C.** In the same time frame – 1st half '97 – a World Bank/UNDP survey team found Dostoms's commanders just siezing the land and animals of people in their domain to "add… to the war coffers or personal profit." See footnote 615 . **D.** U.S. Plans Release of $221 Million in Afghan Assets "The bulk of the assets to be released, $196 million, is gold reserves maintained by the Afghan Central Bank at the U.S. Federal Reserve bank, …[&] date from before 1996, when the Taliban took control in Kabul. The U.S. government never recognized the Taliban as the legitimate rulers of Afghanistan, thus denying …[them] access to the gold… The imminent release of [these] assets …would not cover about $34 million deemed …to belong to Taliban-controlled banks and other entities, which were frozen by the administration after the Sept. 11 attacks …" Alan Sipress 1/15/02, Wash. Post

[427] (.7*3.89*.40)=1.089

[428] This would mean another 1.09*1.78 =1.94 would have had to be added in the next year to increase the exchange rate by $10^{0.25}$. If the amount added in a quarter of a year to maintain this rate would be $1.78^{0.25}$ =1.155; 1.155*(1.09/4) =.315 trillion afs/3 months. To drive up the rate of change of the value of the af from 15.5% per quarter yr to 50% per quarter year, would require an injection of 50/15.5= 3.23 times the amount of what would have been the salary payout, or 1.0 trillion afs.

However, since the continued fighting after the Taliban took Kabul drove the exchange rate from 8000af/$ to 15,000af/$ before the start of the currency blitz, we must multiply our result by 15/8 to get the actual currency payout of 1.91E12 af in the blitz.

Massoud fled Kabul. Most of this 3.6 trillion –largely in high denomination notes -- was probably carried off by Massoud and Company. Some relatively small amount may have been left in the Kabul bank vaults in the rush to leave the city[429].

These 10.6 trillion afs – combined with 1.65 trillion af worth of unofficial notes printed mostly by Dostom[430] -- gives us 12.25 trillion af equivalents. It's enough to yield the observed increases in the currency based exchange rate for the remainder of the Taliban period.

Producing the currency-based doubling of the exchange rate over the next two years of the Taliban -- from the end of '96 to the end of '98 -- would have required nearly 10 trillion afs.[431] The remaining 2.3 trillion afs would have been enough to account for several reports of new afs flooding the market during the rest of the Taliban period.[432] The actual enduring effect of these latter currency injections would have been relatively modest.[433] Still, without currency us-

[429] Dec. 11/97, AFP "Afghan currency slides as mystery bank notes pour in", Stefan Smith, Financial pages, 440 words, Dateline: Kabul, 12/11, "Afghanistan's currency, the afghani, is tumbling in value after an influx of mystery new banknotes flooded the Taliban-held capital, money traders told AFP Thursday". In less than a week, the afghani has plunged from 24,000 to 28,500 to the US dollar, …Throughout the year, the afghani remained stable at between 20,000 and 22,000 to the greenback, but traders are now puzzled over who is printing bundles of crisp new banknotes. "The notes used to be printed by the former regime, but there are reports the Taliban are now also printing," said Mohammad Haidari, a dealer in Kabul's bustling but bombed-out money market. He said confidence in the currency is falling as Taliban administered ministries in the capital have begun paying their staff with fresh banknotes delivered in freshly sealed plastic wrapping. Many civil servants have not been paid since the Taliban seized the capital in September 1996, while women -- who are banned from work -- were promised they would still be paid in absentia, although cash was seldom given out. Now, even women civil servants have been requested to sign in at work to receive their salaries, which at an average of 250,000 per month [This would be about $10/month – my note] are fast losing value."The Taliban have definitely got their hands on a lot of new notes, but they are flooding the market and stability definitely needs to be restored," another currency trader added. Officials from the state bank and finance ministry were not available for comment, …According to money dealers, cash printed by the former government of President Burhanuddin Rabbani has found its way across frontlines into Taliban areas, but the money supply has remained stable. "Some traders say the Taliban have started printing money in Dubai, which would account for the new notes, but only Allah knows where they come from,"

[430] There were 3.3 trillion in unofficial afs redeemed during the currency changeover. From IMF Country Report No. 03/299 see p 264, col. 2, par. 1

[431] If, to start with, 0.69*(8/20) =0.276E12 af was enough to drive up the exchange rate by ($10^{.25}$-1.0)*100 % =778% when the starting rate was 800 af/$, then to increase the rate to 100%, starting at 22,500af/$, would require a currency injection of (1.00/.778)*(22.5/.8) = 1.285*28.125 = 36.15; 36.15*0.276E12=9.978E12 af. However, to increase the rate by 100% over a two year period would involve a first stage increase of ($2^{1/2}$)-1*100% = 41.5%. 41.4/78 = .53; .53*(22.5/.8)=.53*28.125 =15.0; 15*(.69E12*(2000/800))= 15*.276E12 =4.13E12af., at 22,500af/$; 1.415*4.13E12= 5.84E12 af in the 2nd year at 31.820 af/$ [4.13+5.84=9.97 check total] . This does not take into account the reduction in the number of civil service workers in Kabul – but the result shows we are in the right range.

[432] **A.** [4/19/2000],[weds],Xinhua General News Service, 4/20/00, Thurs, "Afghan Taliban Order Halt to Kabul's Open Currency Trade", Dateline: Islamabad, 4/19, "The decision was taken when the Afghani fell to all-time low. On Wednesday, one U.S. dollar was being changed for 75,000 Afghanis in Kabul's Sara-e-Shahzada market, forcing the Taliban authorities to halt the business. AIP said the Islamic militia also banned carrying Afghani from opposition-held northern Afghanistan and from neighboring countries into Taliban-controlled areas.The report quoted an unnamed Taliban official as accusing the opposition of having been pouring in billions of fake Afghanis into Taliban-ruled areas to destabilize the currency **B.** [1/20/01] AFP, "Afghan currency plunges to all-time low" DATELINE: KABUL, Jan 20 'Afghanistan's currency Saturday plunged to an all-time low a day after tough UN sanctions took effect [Jan 19 2001] on the expiry of a deadline for the Taliban to surrender suspected terrorist Osama bin Laden. One US dollar fetched around 79,000 afghanis..."The sanctions have panicked the people," said Haji Amin Khosti, head of the market, which acts as the country's central bank…. Rabbani, still recognized internationally as head of the country's state, prints bulk amounts of afghani in Moscow only to convert them into hard currency at the money markets in the Taliban-held areas, Khosti said. …."The opposition is playing a great role in the depreciation of the afghani value," head of the market said.' [EMPHASIS ADDED] .[These are duplicates of items in the endnotes]

[433] We will assume that currency injections took place primarily starting at the points where the three black arrows appear on the chart on page 70 – at 42,000, 55,000 and 63,000 af/$. We also assume that, for want other information and to simplify these calculations, the face value of each injection was the same: 0.77E12af. Returning to our original calculation [see footnote

ers knowing how long these injections would continue, the psychological effect might be quite lasting.

This scenario also gives us a way to calculate the dollar value of the currency at the time it was printed.

In the first four years, the payments for civil service workers – and "commanders"-- would have totaled $1.174 billion.[434] In the next two years, the amount would have been $.184E6/yr.[435] or a total for the 2 years of $.367 billion. In the last ~3 years, 2.3 trillion afs at an average about 52k af/$ would have yielded $44.5million or about $16E6/ full year.[436] The total comes to $1.59 billion.

10% of this -- about $160 million -- could have easily found its way into the pockets of the people on the inside who were ordering and distributing the money.

This would still have left 20% -- over $300 million -- for the commanders who – as already noted - lived in "opulent style".[437]

Good records were not kept.[438]

416] where .69E12 produced a 78% increase in a year from a starting exchange rate of 2000af/$, the effect of 0.77E12 afs would be about (0.77/.69) *(2/42)*78=1.116*0.0476 = .0531*78 = 4.14% in a year or higher -- but less enduring -- effects if injected over shorter periods of time. The actual increase appears to have been about twice this – but the increase took place in a single month.

We will assume, for a first approximation, that the product of the percentage due to currency injection and the effective duration of its effect is relatively constant. This would mean that if all of the 8.33% increase at the time of the first currency injection were due to currency issues and not to other exogenous factors – such as the drought- its effective endurance would have been 4.14/8.33 = about half a year. This is about the endurance of the jump in price associated with this injection. The next injection – at 55,000 af exchange rate, produced an increase to 64,000 in one month =16.4%; 0.77E12 af injected at the new 55K af/$ exchange rate would yield 42/55*4.14= 3.16% in one year 3.16/16.4= 1/5th yr. However, this plateau has an endurance of about ½ year, suggesting that most of the increase may have been due to non-currency related issues. The third injection coincides with an increase between Oct –Nov 2000 and Feb –Mar 2001 – a 4 month period , of 17/63 = 27.0%. 0.77E12af injected at the new exchange rate of 63,000af/$ would yield 42/63*4.14 = 2.76%. 2.76/27.0= 1/10th yr. However, this increase takes place over 4 months and 6.75%/month; This suggests that most of the increase is due to other things.

The three 'one year' rates combined are 1.0414* 1.0316*1.0276 = 10.40% If this were spread over 2.75 years, it would be a compound rate of 3.66%/yr. The actual increase was from 42,000-72,000 – thru Oct 2001 or 71.4% in 2.75 years or 21.6% per year. [There is a discrepancy between the IMF supplied chart – which shows monthly averages and the reported daily rates – in that the reported daily rate at the time of the US bombing was about 80,000AFS/$]

There is also a question of whether to use the rate thru April of 2001 – when the Taliban began a crackdown on the counterfeiting of money and where the rate was closer to 75-80,000 afs/$. The overall rate is 5.9X the money injection rate. The average $value of these injections at face values of .77E12 each were $ 18.3E6 for the first, $14E6 for the 2nd and $12.2E6 for the 3rd for a sum of $44.5E6/2.75 or $16.2E6/12 months & an avg. face value of 51.7E3 af /$ for the currency during this period

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434 See footnote 416

435 4.13E12af at 22,500af/$ = $0.184 billion/yr ; 5.84E12 af in the 2nd year at 31.820, = $0.184 billion/yr; equal amounts for each of two years = $.367 billion. [see footnote 431]

436 It is "about " 3 years because it is not clear when we should assume the Taliban regime ended or infusions of US money changed the picture entirely. It is more likely that 16 million/ full year is more accurate.

437 See footnote 426

438 "The last annual government accounts prepared by the MoF [Ministry of Finance] accounting department related to 1989/90 and no government accounts had been put together since then. Most files and fiscal data were missing, including all records of the government's external debt." P49-50 . Islamic State of Afghanistan: Rebuilding a Macroeconomic Framework for Reconstruction and Growth Sept. '03, IMF Country Report No. 03/299,[140 pdf pages] Prepared by a staff team comprising Messrs. A. Bennett (ed.), B. de Schaetzen, R. van Rooden (all MED), L. Dicks-Mireaux (PDR), F. Fischer (MFD), and T. Kalfon (FAD), Approved by the Middle Eastern Department, Sept. 5/03 http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2003/cr03299.pdf

Good records were kept by the Kabul market traders "The (larger) traders keep daily records of the volumes and rates traded and balance their books at the end of each day." IMF, supra, p. 131, "The Money Dealers in Afghanistan"

CHAPTER 14b

BANKING SHENANIGANS?

Meanwhile, it looks like the international banking community and perhaps the U.S and some other governments were subsidizing Massoud.[439] The chart on page 89 [440] shows three different rates for converting afghanis to dollars: the official bank exchange rate—as reported by the Bank of Montreal; the US Treasury exchange rate; and the Kabul/ bazaar market rate.

From 1996, when the Taliban ousted Massoud & Co. from the capital city, to the fall of the Taliban in late 2001, the value of the afghani at the official bank exchange rate was about an order of magnitude higher than the Kabul/bazar rate. This meant that those who could exchange their afghanis for dollars in international banks – all located outside of Afghanistan – would get about ten times as many dollars per afghani as the public in Kabul.[441]

The chart also shows that those who were able to use afghanis to buy directly from the US government at the official US Treasury exchange rates had an even greater advantage. In 1992 they would get 10-20X the market rate in Kabul. By '96 – when the Taliban came into Kabul- this had risen to ~400X and by 1998 they could get ~1000X the Kabul market exchange rate[442].

For every 1% of the face value of the money printed by Massoud & Co. that was exchanged at these extremely favorable official bank or US Treasury rates, it would have meant scores of millions of dollars in the pockets of those who could do it.

Still, it didn't actually require high finance for Massoud and his closest associates to make their fortunes in the printing business. All they had to do is have inside information on when the next plane loads of new money—that they ordered -- will reach the market and buy dollars or make contracts payable in afghanis before most others knew about it[443].

This meant that those – like Massoud and his immediate associates with access to both inside information on afghan money shipments and to the international banks -- were printing themselves rich at the expense of the Afghan public – more than two years before the Taliban under Mullah Omar even came into existence.

Any financial benefits to Massoud and Company from these exchange rate shenanigans would have been on top of the hundreds of millions of dollars in freshly printed afs that they just took and pocketed. As already noted: good records were not being kept. [444]

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[439] So far, only one unusual transaction has been found in press reports – this one involving the UN: "A confidential internal audit on the UN humanitarian relief operation in Afghanistan reveals a pattern of mismanagement with millions of dollars unaccounted for and in which officials …through a companion agency, changed dollars on the black market at inflated rates, while the transaction was recorded at the lower official exchange rate. The report does not say how much money was involved in the transaction nor what happened to the extra money secured through the black market." 11/19/91. Calgary Herald, Alberta, "Afghani relief proved a disaster", Trevor Rowe, Southam News, pg. B6

[440] Some of the data sources for the chart are given below. For more detail on sources, see ENDNOTES.] OFFICAL EXCHANGE RATE DATA 55.07af/$ 5/22/92; 51 af/US$ yr end '92; 1,151 '93; 2468 '94; 3479 '95; 3480 [9/23/96]; 3484 [9/30/96]; 3504 [10/7/96]; ~3400-~3500 [10/96-10/97=1st yr of Taliban].Bank of Montreal/Globe and Mail ,Can.

[441] **See endnotes** for detailed sources and quotes. There is also a curious delay of 14 months in the adjustment of the international bank rate to the Kabul/bazar rate in the 1992-93 period. The Kabul/bazar rate was at 500 afghanis to the dollar in late May of '92, -- over 9 times the official bank rate of 54.07. Fourteen months later-- on Jul. 23/'93 the official rate had risen only to 67.15 af/$. A week later, it rose by more than a factor of 20 to 1,408.61 af/$. 7/26/93 Mon.The Globe and Mail, Canada, Foreign Exchange, Byline: GAM, Prepared by the Bank of Montreal, Treasury Group as at 7/23/93; same source, 8/2/93 issue, reporting data as at 7/30/93. Check to see if there is another source of this data – as it may just be a clerical error!!

It also may be that nobody bothered to inform the banks—and the banks made no real effort to inform themselves -- of what the Kabul market rate actually was.

[442] At this point, it's not clear what could be - or was actually - purchased at this rate. On the plus side, refugees who fled with afghanis would have benefited in purchasing US official documents and services. On the other side, if auctions were held for used cars, office equipment and the like and buyers could pay in afghanis, they would be getting what amounted to a giveaway.

[443] "Against army regulations some frontline commanders speculate in the money-market, purchasing large sums of dollars with their afghani budget. Government contractors often have their payments withheld until a planeload of freshly printed money arrives from Russia" 8/27/96, AFP, "Food equals peace as challenge for Kabul leadership", Terence White, Dateline: Kabul

[444] See footnote 438

CHAPTER 14c

THE PHYSICAL INTEGRITY OF THE KABUL MONEY MARKET AS A BAROMETER OF THE SOCIAL CLIMATE UNDER MASSOUD & CO. AND THE TALIBAN[445]

While we have Massoud & Co., the Taliban and the Kabul money markets before us, we'll look at how the Kabul money market fared when each of these two groups took over governance of the city.

In April 1992, when Massoud & Co. took over from what was left of the Najibullah Regime, the market was closed for 24 days due to security problems[446]. In its place, so to speak, a thieves market sprang up – where stolen goods were available from the hands of the looters and burglars who had effectively taken over the city.[447]

To be fair to Massoud, the chaos came from fighting that was initiated by Hekmatyar – the man whose group received the lion's share of US funding during the decade-long anti-Soviet, Afghan war. Remarkably – and perhaps explaining why Hekmatyar put up a fight -- the troops that had been loyal to the Communist backed government offered almost no resistance when Massoud's men entered Kabul in the immediately preceding days[448]. The London Times reporter in Kabul noted -- without any apparent sense of irony: "The main muscle on Kabul's streets has been supplied by General Abdul Rashid Dostum, an Uzbek militia commander who is, in effect, the ruler of northern Afghanistan….[and has] a reputation for brutality."[449] Dostom and his militia had been close allies of the Soviet's during their war with the mujahedin.[450]

For immediate comparison, when a rocket scored a direct hit on the money market only two months before[451] -- killing at least 30 [452] and injuring over 100 more -- it was reopened in less than a week. [453]

In contrast with these, the Taliban take over in Sept. '96, saw the market remain open[454] and the value of the afghan currency increase dramatically against the dollar.[455]

With the heavy American air support in the fall of '01, the Taliban were ousted and Massoud's handpicked crew returned. The market was looted for everything that could be carried away

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445 Similar comparison applies to the Kabul Art Mus'm. See footnote 123

446 **A**"…most shops remained shuttered, and the old bazaar, home to many carpet shops and the free money market, was empty." 4/28/92, NYT, late ed., pA10, "Fighting Is Heavy in Kabul, Which Awaits New Leaders", Edward A. Gargan, 1134 words, Dateline:Kabul, 4/27 **B**"Afghanistan's main exchange market opened here Wednesday amid tight security 24 days after it shut, citing security fears, traders and witnesses said." 5/20/92. AFP, "Kabul money market opens, dollar down", Dateline: Kabul

447 "Anarchy In Kabul Spurs Thriving Market In Stolen Goods", AP, 5/'92, Tues, John Pomfret, Dateline: Kabul,

448 " General Masood appears to want to dominate the offensive. It rankles with him that when he rode triumphantly into Kabul in April 1992 after the fall of the Communists, he did so on a Dostum tank." The Times, 9/17/96, "Thousands flee as battle for Afghan capital sharpens", Christopher Thomas, [check this out]

449 4/30/92, The Times (Lond.) , "Masood and allies take tenuous hold on power in Kabul" Christopher Thomas in Kabul , others

450 See footnote 361 B

451 2/29/92, AP, "17 Killed, 120 Injured in Rocket Attack on Afghan Capital" Dateline: Islamabad, Pak.

452 Mar.2/92, The Herald (Glasgow), Pg. 4, KABUL: "The death toll from a guerrilla rocket attack on the money market in the Afghan capital Kabul rose to more than 30 yesterday. Eleven people died on Saturday night and 70 people were still being treated in hospital after the attack."

453 **A.** 4/26/92, The Washington Post, Sun., Final Edition, "The Last Battleground", Steve Coll, Magazine; P. W11, 5348 words, "Within a week, the surviving traders were back with their briefcases, under the theory that lightning doesn't strike twice". **B.** an earlier report suggests that the market did not even close: "A rocket fired by the Islamic fundamentalist guerrillas did hurtle into the money market recently, killing 17 people and wounding more than 100. But the dead were buried quickly, the dollar, which surged 40 percent against the local currency, sank back to its old level the next day, and people resumed their struggle to keep body and soul intact." 3/20/92, NYT, "Kabul Journal; Winter, Too, Is Hell. Afghans Teeter on Abyss." Edward A. Gargan, P. A4 Dateline: Kabul, [emphasis added]

454 This is in keeping with the rules of behavior of the Taliban – as spelled out by Mullah Omar.

"Taking care of public property and the lives and property of the people is considered one of the main responsibilities of the *mujahed*; you must try very hard to carry out this responsibility and not allow those opportunists and materialists, those armed people who are interested in material gain, to harm or bother the people or destroy their assets."

From: p 193 'The layha of the Taliban' Ch 6, p 190-198, in , The Shari and Islamic Criminal Justice in Time of War ahnd Peace; M. Ceriff Basiouni, Cambridge Univ. Press, '14, ___

455 "The most visible sign of confidence that Taliban will bring stable government comes from Kabul's money-changers. The rate of the afghani to the dollar, 18,000 a week ago, is now less than 8,000. 9/29/96, Sun, The Observer, "Kabul Victors Put Mercy To Flight", David Loyn, P. 17, 2000 words, see endnotes for more

in trucks –computers, carpets and over $3 million worth of currency.[456]

This contrast between how the Kabul currency exchange fared under the Taliban and what happened under the hand of Massoud & Co. is consistent with the pattern we already noted in connection with the Kabul art Museum. Under Massoud it was repeatedly looted; under the Taliban it was protected – until the destruction of the Buddhist statues. See footnotes 122-125

CHAPTER 14d

THE IMF COMES TO HELP & EXPLAIN

A year after this second coming of Massoud and Co. to Kabul, the International Monetary Fund – IMF – worked with the new government to replace the currency[457]. Under the "print-yourself-rich" scheme, the Afghan currency had dropped to 1% of its value

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[456] **A.** "Haji Amin Jan Khosti, chief of the Shara-e-Shazada money exchange, said unknown thieves looted all 80 shops in the market, driving away with trucks full of the local afghani currency, worth around 50,000 to the dollar. …around 1.5 million US dollars and 100 million Pakistani rupees (1.6 million dollars), plus unknown amounts of various other currencies had disappeared. "This was all our capital. Even the computers, carpets and tea pots have gone. This is a crime against Afghanistan, the Afghans and against Islam," Khosti said." 11/13/01, AFP, "Opposition troops receive joyous welcome in Kabul", Said Mohammad Azam, Dateline: Kabul.[see footnotes123B&124A] **B.** "Residents said they also saw armed men robbing the central bank and driving away in cars stuffed with money. An AFP reporter also saw civilians looting the Pakistani embassy, taking electric fans, air conditioners and blankets…The Taliban…pulled out of the city overnight …Opposition security forces were the first into Kabul just after dawn Tuesday. It was not known at what stage the money market was looted or who was responsible. "We request Kabul citizens to maintain law and order," said Younis Qanooni, a senior member of the opposition leadership who arrived in Kabul behind the police units. "There were some unscrupulous people inside Kabul and they may have been trying to exploit the situation," he said in reference to the looting, without accusing the Taliban. "They do not belong to us and we will deploy our police forces everywhere." But some residents reported opposition soldiers carrying out summary executions of Taliban troops who tried to hide in the city. A Red Cross official said around 20 bodies were believed to be lying in the streets of one area, with six recovered so far." AFP, same byline/date 'Millions of dollars stolen from Afghan money market' 658 wds **C.** "Armed soldiers chased looters carrying carpets and other goods stolen from markets." AFP same byline +Hugh Barnes /date 'Kabul celebrates freedom with looting and music' **D.** "Every night you see gangs of criminals running riot in the bazaar, stealing or demanding protection money from us stallholders,…the deployment of traffic policeman at every major intersection or roundabout, and the ubiquitous presence of brown-uniformed police patrols, has merely created the illusion of law and order, according to Mohammed Kol, a 27-year-old doctor." AFP, 11/23/01, "Kabulis look for international protection in post-Taliban vacuum", Hugh Barnes,Kabul, 11/23 **E.** "Insecurity remains a major hurdle for the distribution of humanitarian aid," U.N. spokesman Eric Falt said Wednesday…For the moment, Kabul is calm and under the control of the northern alliance, which has 3,000 security troops spread about the city…The thieves also operate with the knowledge that there's nothing resembling a functioning legal system in Afghanistan. "The principle of justice in Afghanistan is something that is going to have to be set up in the long term," Falt said...U.N. offices in the northern city of Mazar-e-Sharif and the eastern city of Jalalabad have both been swept clean by thieves. The looting included the theft of food, vehicles and communications equipment - even the window frames were stripped from some offices, said Falt. AP, 11/21/01, "Despite Taliban's departure, much of Afghanistan remains lawless, Greg Myre, Kabul[Emph added] Note: this is 2 days before & 2 days after reports D & F of lawlessness in Kabul. Compare 3K "security troops" with 400 deployed by Taliban. See footnote 971. **F.** '…in a Pashtun district of Kabul… "Soldiers (of the Northern Alliance) have stolen around 10 cars and trucks since the beginning of the week," said driver Mohammad Mourid, "…they would stop the car, tell you that it belonged to the Taliban and then take it away," …[They]have also looted several houses on the pretext of searching for hidden weapons. "…when they don't find any they end up taking anything else they can get their hands on," he said.' AFP, 11/19/01, "Northern Alliance bring comfort and fear to Kabul's ethnic mix, Byline: Pierre Celerier, 602 W'ds, Dateline:Kabul **G.** Washington Post, 11/15, atributes almost all looting/damage to Taliban – incl. money market. Nothing good about Taliban in 1447 word front pager. Keith B. Richburg. **H.** "Mohammed Gul, a Kabul resident, said by telephone that the Taliban had evacuated the streets of the city by 5:30 a.m…."Everywhere in the city, there was nobody," Gul said. "The Taliban have all left."… there were reports early today that opposition fighters had entered Kabul after the Taliban retreat… The Taliban's offices in the city were deserted and some were being plundered by looters…. Taliban officials forced eight foreign aid workers being held in Kabul to go with them as they fled, a jail guard told the Associated Press. The defendants …are accused of spreading Christianity in Muslim Afghanistan. "I saw them with my own eyes. They put them in the truck and then left at midnight. They said they are going to Kandahar," said Ajmal Mir, a guard at the abandoned detention center in the heart of the city where the eight had been held…. Before the pullout, the Taliban were believed to have about 15,000 fighters defending Kabul, about a third of them Pakistani and Arab volunteers, according to opposition estimates." 11/13/01, Wash. Post, K. B. Richburg & Molly Moore, P. A01, 1972 words, Dateline: Jabal Saraj, 11/13. [Kabul Sunrise 11/13/01: 6:24 AM, Fajr [dawn] time was 4:59.] If they used same ~1.2k pickup trucks [payload 1-1.2k kg] estim. for their '96 entry to Kabul [see footnote 627-D], this would've been enough to get ~15k Taliban out of the city in a few hrs -- on back roads & mt. paths where they wouldn't be easy targets for US air power. It isn't clear tho', there were so many in Kabul or that all of them left. **I.** What happened in Kabul when the Taliban left is suggested by a report from Jallalabad [pop.~150k] 2 wks after the Taliban withdrew: "Taliban leave a city on the verge of civil disorder. Life in an Afghan city recently 'liberated' by the Northern Alliance is fraught with lawlessness", Miriam Donohoe, Jalalabad", The Irish Times, p. 12 city edit., 807 wds, 11/30/2001 "Local mujahideen, who poured back into Jalalabad to reclaim the city, set free the prisoners. They had been jailed in connection with a range of crimes, including murder, theft and adultery. Their diet was poor: the only food they got was bread. They had to carry their own water from a pump in the yard. Prisoners who broke the rules were punished by being given manual work to do. But they were never beaten, Obaid insisted. But the situation now is not good in the city. "It is a free for all. There are no courts or judges." **J.** See also "Guerrilla Trucks: Why rebels and insurgent groups the world over love the Toyota Hilux pickup as much as their AK-47s." Somaiya, Ravi. Newsweek Web Exclusive 10/14/'10). [C]ounterinsurgency expert David Kilcullen…[saw] 20 people and a mounted weapon on one[Toyota hylux pickup truck,]." **K.** The US military ran tests of dune buggies vs tanks in 1983 -4, based on modified, unarmored Chenowth 3-seater 'dune buggies' – equipped with mounted machine guns &/or anti-tank misiles. These tests led to deployment of the Fast Attack Vehicle[FAV] & Desert Patrol Vehicle[DPV] .See "Motorized Experience of the 9th Infantry Division 1980-89", S.L. Bowman, J.M. Kendall, J.L. Saunders, 354 p, 22.1 MB, DTIC, ADA370233; http://www.fastattackvehicle.com/

THIS TOW EQUIPPED FAV COULD TAKE OUT A RUSSIAN TANK: PHOTO FROM S. KOREA, from: http://www.fastattackvehicle.com

[457] See footnote 438 source.

when Massoud had entered Kabul a decade before. Yet the IMF gives the false impression that it was the Taliban that had funded itself with the print-yourself-rich trick – called in more professional banking circles "monetary financing". The IMF makes only indirect mention of what Massoud and Co. had done[458]. The IMF report is also not clear that the Taliban had never ordered new money. It also doesn't tell us that the Taliban attempted to outlaw the money printed by Massoud.[459] At the time the IMF report was written, the heirs to Massoud's print-yourself-rich trick were key people in the new Afghan government the IMF was working with. The names Massoud and Dostom don't appear anywhere in the report in any spelling.

CHAPTER 15

PLANELOADS & TRAINLOADS OF WEAPONS FROM RUSSIA & IRAN

Massoud's support also came in more obvious ways – like giant planeloads of weapons directly or indirectly from Russia[460] – usually from the neighboring former Soviet Republic of Tajikistan.[461] He also received trainloads of military supplies from Iran – 700 tons in one well documented event in Oct, '98[462] On top of all this, as we saw in the last chapter, he had a 1/3rd share in Dostam's giant checkpoints. But, did Massoud also get a lot of his money from opium?

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458 They do say, [p.47 IMF'03, supra] "Monetization of the budget deficits resulted in high inflation and a rapid depreciation of the Afghani". The footnote -- 33 – tells us "The Central Statistics Office (CSO) released a report in 1996 showing that the prices of basic goods—such as flour, sugar, and cooking oil—rose on average about 162 times between 1991 and 1995 in Kabul." [This fig. of 162 is probably a typo: the market value of the afghani in Kabul declined by ~16X in this time. The report doesn't say this was almost entirely the work of Massoud &Co.]

459 **A.**"In northeast Afghanistan, controlled by opposition movements to the Taliban, the main source of income came from the gem trade (lapis lazuli and emeralds) through collection of *ushr* on mine owners and *zakat* on traders.*[Note: no mention here of printing money as income source]* But by the end of the 1990s, the misrule and increased isolation of the Taliban regime, together with four years of drought

B." *[My comment: As can be seen in the FAO wheat production data [see page 123,] the drought only began in 1999 & extended for 3 years-through 2001. 1998 and 2002 were not drought years]*

C."and continued fighting, had seriously hampered the collection of official domestic revenues, and the government increasingly returned to monetary financing of the budget deficit." [EMPHASIS ADDED] p48 IMF '03, see footnote 438 _____ email letter sent to IMF and editor Adam Bennett (now at Oxford) Jun. 12/14

D."THIS PARTIALLY DUPLCATES A NOTE FOUND IN ONE OR TWO OTHER PLACES IN THIS BOOK – CONSOLIDATE. On p 98 they do say: "First, there was the official Afghani, which had been issued prior to the Taliban rule and which the Taliban had continued to issue from the remaining stocks in the vaults of the central bank.

E."In addition, duplicates of the official banknotes had been put into circulation during the Taliban years by the then internationally recognized government in exile, which had ordered reruns of earlier issued series from the country's regular printer and had issued these in the northern parts of the country. By using the same serial numbers as used in earlier years, the government in exile ensured that the new notes could not be distinguished from those already in circulation.

F." [Note that the report does not say how much was issued from existing stocks by the Taliban and how much was printed by Massoud &Co. The former was probably trivial compared with the latter.]

G."Furthermore, two warlords had issued their own counterfeit versions of the official currency. [They don't give names or dates] While these counterfeits were very similar to the official currency, they did have some distinguishing features and typically traded at a discount in the Kabul money markets." They also say p 99 – concerning the Taliban and printing money: "the Taliban while in government, had started preparations for the introduction of a new currency and had signed a contract with a reputable banknote printer. Some work had already been done, including preliminary designs of various denominations. Because of the U.N. embargo, however, this agreement had been put on hold,"

H." [The embargo ref. to here may be the first sanctions regime directed against the Taliban that went into effect 14/11/99 persuant to UN US, Russian-proposed resolution 1267 of 15/10/99 unanimously adopted by the UNSC. Text at: "UN Security Council, *Resolution 1267 (1999) Adopted by the Security Council at its 4051st meeting on 15 October 1999*, 15 October 1999, S/RES/1267 (1999), found at: ____ [retr.1 Jul/14]

460 **A.** "…the Taliban sent a MiG-21 interceptor aloft to force the UAE-based Russian charter company cargo jet to land at Kandahar airport. The Taliban have impounded the 30-odd tonnes of AK-47 ammunition and the plane." "The charter jet …had been ferrying …ammunition to …Kabul, and the detained crew were accused of being agents of the Russian government." AFP, 8/18/95 "Religious militants hold Russian aircrew as bargaining chip", Terence White, Dateline: Kandahar

B. "Last week Taliban jets fighters forced two Russian passenger planes to land at the Kandahar airport... The planes were on their way to …Kabul. One plane …was loaded with heavy and small arms. The Taliban … detained the … plane along with its crew." UPI, 8/13/95, "Russia sends diplomat to free prisoners", Anwar Iqbal, Dateline: Islamabad

C. "General Masood has stockpiled … munitions donated by Russia, which sends supplies to his Bagram airbase from a military airport in the Central Asian state of Tajikistan - even though Moscow denies it. Russia recently donated some transport helicopters." The Times (London), Oct. 9/98, "Taleban's army eager to crush last warlord"Christopher Thomas, 651 words

D. "[In Apr.-May/99]…Massoud met the Russian Defence Minister, Mr Igor Sergeyev, in the Tajik capital, Dushanbe, a meeting that, according to the Taliban, should disqualify him from any future role in an Islamic government." Sydney Morning Herald May/1/99, "Child warriors wait for thaw…" Christopher Kremmer, Chenzai, Takhar Prov., P. 26, 1133 words

461 "15 flights from neighboring Tajikistan were arriving in Kabul daily with ammunition for government forces." & "The Taliban is holding a Russian cargo plane that its MiG jets forced down at Kandahar with 30 tons of ammunition destined for Kabul." Wash. Post, Sep/04/95, Taliban Rebels Seize Major Air Base in Afghanistan, P. A21, Kabul

462 P 50, HRW , Crisis of Impunity, '01, The contents of the freight cars were listed as "humanitarian aid" and included 300 tons of flour, enough to supply 5,000 men for 20 weeks in addition to the 700 tons of amo – which was covered by the flour. _____

In the last years of the Massoud-Dostom - Kareem Khaleeli Northern Alliance, they no longer had any of their previous giant checkpoints -- at Hairatan's Friendship Bridge, the Salang Highway -- or the electric power and fertilizer plants.[463] Massoud still controlled the Lapis and Emerald mines and the official currency printing operation.

We estimated the yearly revenue from the gem mines as:

Lapis Lazuli	$10-16 E6, see footnote 390
Emeralds[464]	$ 5- 7.5 E6, see footnote 391
A Total Gems	**$15-23.5 E6** [465]

For currency printing in the last three years of the Taliban, our scenario yielded 2.3E12 official af equivalents with a value of $44.5E6. This was the combined effort of Massoud & Dostom. So, the yearly rate was:

B Printing Currency: $16 E6, see footnote 432

C=A+B = $31 to 40E6 = TOTAL 'LEGITIMATE' $/YR

However, we're told Massoud's budget in this period was $60E6/yr[466]. This $60E6 compares with our estimate of an average of $184E6/yr. from printing money alone in each of the two years '97 and '98. [467] Added to this printed money would have been Massoud's $15 - 24E6 gem mining revenue -- for a total of ~$200E6.[468]

If we assume that the $60 million represents the "official budget" and that the real budget – with enough money for the commanders to live in "opulent style" – is substantially higher, Massoud & Co.'s money rasing challenge increases sharply. We previously found, using our currency injection model, that the "income" of printed money alone was 45% higher than a particular officially announced budget.[469] Applying this % to our reported $60E6 gives us an estimate for Massoud's real budget in 2000 of $87E6. This is close to

$50 million higher

than the estimates of his "legitimate" income from gem taxes and printed money.

An obvious question – before we suggest more nefarious ways they may have filled this apparent $50E6 gap – is why didn't they just print more money? There are four reasons – though the first is by far the most important:

A. Once the market value of the money reached 50K-80K af/$, it cost about as much to print the 1K af note as it was worth as currency. Massoud & Co. had tried to introduce

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[463] These checkpoints came under the control of the Taliban in the 2nd half of 98. See footnote 380 on rev. in prior yrs..

[464] This excludes "digging fees" mentioned in only one source -- with no info. on how much these amounted to. The $5-7.5E6/ yr are both based on the statement for emerald mine output: "estimates range up to $50 million" /yr. [Emphasis added]. We assume from this that $7.5 E6 is an optimistic best guess and includes an allowance for "digging fees".

[465] For comparison, Human Rights Watch says:

A "The ousted [Massoud] government is able to generate revenue mainly through its mining operations and the export of precious stones (especially lapis lazuli and emeralds) ...it earns ...U.S.$7-10 million, from this activity...". [It]...also maintains a monopoly on the production and sale of salt and on the import of gasoline and diesel fuel.",[citing their footnotes 146-7]"The United Front is aware that it loses considerable revenue by being unable to export the stones in even a semi-finished condition, and in 1999 entered into a contract with a Polish firm to begin processing stones mined in the Panjshir Valley. Human Rights Watch interview with Ahmad Shah Massoud, Taloqan, June 12, 1999. See also G. Bowersox and B. Chamberlin, *Gemstones of Afghanistan* (Tucson, AZ: Geoscience Press, Inc., 1995).

B "Gasoline and diesel fuel are brought into United Front areas by means of a ten-inch pipeline [this is probably a mistake as only a 10cm pipeline was used by the Soviets to supply the Kabul and SE Afghanistan. See footnote 365 B] from Tajikistan, which crosses the Amu Darya [actually the Panj, which merges with the Vakhsh River down stream to form the Amu Darya], river at Dasht-i Qala [just N of the Kochka River, near SW end of what was then Yangi Qaleh Distr., Takhar Prov.]... Diesel is also brought in by heavy tanker truck from Tajikistan via the bridge at Ishkashim. Human Rights Watch interviews, Dushanbe, [6/6/99], and Taloqan, [Jun/9/99]." p 34,

C "Both the military governor of Taloqan and the chief civil official in the Panjshir Valley indicated to Human Rights Watch in 1999 that tax revenues gathered by the United Front were just sufficient to cover expenditures for the provision of basic public services." P35 [I assume the taxes referred to are mostly those on the gem trade –altogether under $30E6/yr] Crisis of Impunity ... see footnote 462

[466] See footnote 390

[467] This was avg/yr currency injection needed our scenario to reduce the value of the af by a factor of 2 in those 2 years. [See footnote 431.]

[468] This figure- $200E6 is the same as the official stated yearly budget in ~1994 [see footnote 423] – when Massoud &Co. were governing Kabul. In that time frame they would not have had to support Herat – which had its own revenue stream going to Ismael Kahn. It may not have included Dostom either – as he also had his own checkpoints.

For 1st half of '98 he & his associates would've also had revenue from their giant checkpoints at Hairatan & around Mazar-i-Sharif [see footnotes 377 378]. But these revenues would've been partly offset by the need to pay for the civil service workers in the northern provinces and the support for Dostom, and his army.

[469] (17+38)/38=1.447,*$60E6=$86.8E6. See footnote 424 & related text.

higher denominations back in '96 – when the Taliban took Kabul, but the Taliban declared any af note of over 1K to be counterfeit and worthless. By '99 it had become impractical to print notes that cost nearly as much to print as they were actually worth.[470] [471]

B. In Apr. 2000, the Taliban promulgated new laws to bolster the currency. These included a "crackdown on the smuggling in of afghanis from abroad"[472] more specifically banning "carrying Afghani from opposition-held northern Afghanistan and from neighboring countries into Taliban-controlled areas"[473] That these measures were effective can be seen on the chart on p 71. The strengthening of the afghani in the following months – between the green arrows on the chart contrasted with the steep decline in its value that had continued steadily for half a year.

C. Massoud & Co. probably knew that the Taliban were well advanced in developing a new currency and that if they pressed too hard on the print yourself rich pedal they'd soon find their license to drive taken away.

D. When Dostom overdid it in '97 and his semi-official 'af' went over 120k/$, his Iranian backers reportedly bailed him out – buying up so much of it with dollars that it soon returned to 6 times this value -- comparable to the official af in Kabul. It may have become more acceptable – with the international demonization of the Taliban – for their various behind the scenes backers –Russia, Iran, India and even the US -- to just give them all the 'humanitarian assistance' they could handle.

So how did Massoud and Co. fill their budget gap of ~$50 million per year? Part of it probably came directly from their various backers – as suggested at **D**. above. Part of it almost certainly came from opium.

CHAPTER 16

Massoud Caught Lying About Opium?

We began this section on the sources of Massoud's support with a quote from the Talmud:

וכל הפוסל פסול
ואמר שמואל במומו פוסל

"Samuel said: 'Those who regularly make false accusations against others are themselves guilty of the very evils they accuse others of'[474]

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[470] 27.9E9 afs in new notes – with each note equal to 1k of the old – weighed 500 tons, for ~800E6 notes [P100, par. 2, IMF 2003.] 5E9 bank notes were collected –over 2k tons – with a face value of ~19E12 af. [P101 par. 9.] The highest face value of those turned in was 1k af; 2% of the notes and 36% of their face value. At 50k af/$, a 1k af note would be worth 2¢. This was also the IMF's cost of printing the new notes [$16E6– for 800E6 new notes [p110, par. 184]]

However, it's likely that the new afs – with better security features - cost more/note to print than the old. If cost to print each note were roughly proportional to the weight/note the new notes were 5E8gms/8E8 notes & the old were 2E9gms/5E9 notes. The old were thus 64% of the weight/note of the new ones. So, if cost to print was porportional to weight, 78 notes could've been printed for $1.00 & at 78k af/$ it would've cost as much to print a 1000 af note as it was worth. The lowest values of the af recorded before the 9/11 attacks were 75K af/$ – in 4/00 & 79 K af/$ in 1/01 – the latter after the tightening of UN sanctions. [For comparison, printing U.S $ in '14 cost 5¢ & 13¢ for $1 & $100 notes, resp. From: "How much does it cost to produce currency and coin?" FRB 2014. _____]

[471] **A.** It is interesting that there is no mention in the IMF report of the 5k & 10k af notes. They're mentioned in '94 & '96 – but they were rejected by those who weren't printing them. **1.** Dec/3/96, AP, "Afghanistan's Central Bank Says Most 10,000 Afghani Notes Worthless". **2.** 11/29/94, AP, "Govt. Issues 10,000 Afghani Notes as Inflation Worsens", Tim Johnston, Dateline: Kabul, "With civil war raging and prices rising, the Central Bank has started distributing banknotes worth 10,000 Afghan-is, the largest currency notes ever issued, officials said Tuesday. However, the opposition forces have refused to accept the new 10,000 notes as well as the 5,000 Afghani notes, issued two months ago." **3.**Oct 9/94, AFP, Jitters in Kabul money market, new currency notes spark inflation. Terence White, "Confidence in the afghani melted with the Kabul government's announcement Thursday and Friday night that two new currency notes -- 5,000 and 10,000 -- would be introduced soon"

B. A UNDP/World Bank report of actual surveys in Afghanistan in Mar-May 1997 found both 5k & 10k af notes in use in some districts, eg: **a.** 28-29/Mar/97, Dehdadi Distr., Balkh Prov. – both 5k & 10k af notes were found from Rabbani & 10k af notes from Dostom, The value of the $ had increased in relation to the af by 700% Apr 96-Apr 97 – in Mazar-i-Sharif. Wages for non-govt workers had gone up 330-360% & food prices incr 530% in the past yr. [pdf 28-9 of 91]; **b.** Guzara Distr., Herat Prov. 7 -9 Apr./97, "Afs. 500, 1000, 5000 and 10,000 bank notes of Najibullah and Rabani governments", 23,700 af/$ [pdf p. 45 of 91] ; **c** "5,000 and 10,000 notes of Najibullah and Rabani" were in use in Taliban controlled Kushk District, Herat Province , 4/4/97, pdf p51 of 91.

C. It could be that the Taliban offered a short grace period during which any notes of 5k or 10k would be redeemed for official 1k notes. I have not yet found any explicit mention of this

[472] 4/19/00, AFP, 'Taliban shut money market after Afghan currency sinks'

[473] [4/19/'00],Xinhua General News Service, 4/20/00, "Afghan Taliban Order Halt to Kabul's Open Currency Trade", Dateline: Islamabad, 4/19

[474] For source & explanation see footnotes 388 & 389

We will finish it by analyzing an interview with Massoud in August '01 where he accuses the Taliban – in considerable detail -- of making money on opium. These details – and the underlying reality[475] -- will give us a likely idea of what he himself was doing.

The Interviewer asks [476]:

Q. Warriors on both sides of the front agree that women should wear a burqa. Why should someone like me take sides with the Northern Alliance of commander Massoud?

A. *[Massoud gives a three point answer:] The 1st is that he supports UN supervised free elections.*

***The 2nd is that they* "reject terrorism in any form." *And that for them* "Osama bin Laden is a criminal."]**

***The 3rd point is that he rejects drugs – though he says:* "No doubt, some of the drugs are transported through our area.**

Q. *[The interviewer presses the point on drugs, saying:]* "Opium is also grown in your area. We have seen it in the fields of the villages." [EMPHASIS ADDED]

[Massoud blames the problem on the Ismailis of Badakhshan – the only province still fully under his control. He says these Ismailis grow it for

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[475] A good part of the underlying reality can be seen in "Attack on civilization", Dr. Christian Neef, modifed auto translation from German, [email sent 1/17/17] Der Spiegel, Aug. 7/'00, #32; P.150, 1590 wds:

"In order to finance the struggle against the Taliban, Afghans allied with Russia follow the example of their opponents: they are producing more and more opium and heroin. Through the CIS states, the drug is sent to the West. The small airfield near the Tajik[istan] Parchar [Farchor, Farkhor, Parkhar ~ 20km W of Yangi Qaleh, Taqar Prov.,across floodplain of Pandj river on Afg./Tajik border [see footnotes130 [incl. map & chart of opium growing] 513 B & 875 for more on Yangi Qaleh] is at the end of the world: a 200-meter-long runway of cracked concrete slabs, a humpy clay house, a rusty tanker; The whole guarded by a cow and a badly hatched shepherd dog - no post is to be seen, no staff, no human settlement miles. "Unbelievable," whispers Valery Popov. The Russian colonel, with his troops in Tajikistan to protect the external borders of the Soviet Union of Soviet CIS, is so much pitiable. For the meager air base lies in a dangerous area of no-man's land; Just over a kilometer south, the Pandj is rolling through its muddy river bed - and behind it, Afghanistan, which has been ravaged by the civil war for 22 years.

This is where Popow has nothing to say, can not prevent anything, can only watch when, shortly after 14 clock, suddenly a pale green Afghan Mi-8 helicopter [4-5 ton net load] weaves and settles next to cow and dog. The barren land is turned into a busy airport for half an hour, trucks are driving up the runway, men are carrying dozens of boxes into the helicopter. The cargo, Russian weapons and ammunition, is destined for the "Islamic State of Afghanistan", the front of the Taliban opponents under military officer Ahmed Shah Massud. Its men are the only ones who still resist the radical mullahs in Kabul - in the sense of Moscow, which fears the advance of the [Taliban]...to Central Asia...

The armory in Parchar is discussed with the rulers in Dushhanbe. In order to shorten the long flight to the Tajik capital, the Massud fighters land their machines just behind the Pandj and return immediately to the south. But Russian border troops like Colonel Popov and his squad are not allowed to control in Parchar. Popov thinks this is a huge mistake. Because the helicopter route is no longer used solely for transporting weapons; It has developed into the "main transit route for Afghan drugs to the north", the colonel foams - and that is an "attack on Russia, on civilization". In this case, Colonel Popov is not only ordered to stop the Taliban in the event of a military conflict. He is also supposed to stop the flow of drugs that spills from...the country with the world's largest opium production, to Russia.

Almost daily, his soldiers have bloody skirmishes with narcotics smugglers at the confusing Tajik-Afghan border. However, the border guards rarely confiscated more than half a ton of drugs a year. No wonder, the colonel mocked. 70 per cent of the opium and heroin produced in the neighboring country, according to secret service colleagues, "now arrive in the CIS by air, via Parchar." And the Tajiks accepted this in approbation.

...Understandably, heroin labs are sprouting from the ground in Afghanistan "like mushrooms after the rain", says Popov - especially in the 120 km distant Massud-city, Faizabad, the capital of Badakhshan. ...Wakil Shamsuddin, the Whitebearded Chief of the City Council [of Faizabad] , knows that any serious action against drug production would be a fighting a windmill. "The people of Badakhshan live in a forgotten world," complains the old man.... Left alone, without legal employment opportunities, the farmers of Badakhshan have no choice. ...The opium plant ...also supplies oil, fuel, medicine and supplements for the bread. ...By means of rent and loans, the farmers are indebted for generations to the landowners, who often are the local commanders of the Massud alliance at the same time. ... In Taloqan, the [caital of the] Massud alliance, [is] one of the largest laboratories in which crude opium is refined into highly toxic heroin; In Faizabad there is a temporary storage facility.

By satellite, the Russians found 39 drug depots at the Afghan-Tajik border. Drug experts from the UN even identify their owners - almost all are Massud commanders. They estimate that south of the Pandj, heroin worth up to $ 15 billion awaits transport to Europe, including transit goods from the Taliban area.

And just as there is scarcely any difference in the production of drugs between the divine state in the south and the more liberal realm of the Massud alliance, living conditions on both sides of the border are approaching each other, especially with regard to the strictest possible observance of Islamic laws. At the clothes rack in the director's room, Burkas, the full veil of the teachers, are hanging again. "In the past, we were able to go unoiled to the streets, the men did not have to wear beards," says Zaki. "Meanwhile the Council of the Mujahid has overruled the state." In Baharak, [a city & district in east–central Badakhshan Prov.] women are no longer allowed to go to the bazaar. The city has recently experienced a stoning for the first time: a young man whose father had long since died, had slept with his widow, his pommel - both died a cruel death by order of the mullahs." [EMPHASIS ADDED] [Also, See footnote 390 D.3 for NEEF on masoud & lapis lazuli.]

[476] What follows is a modified Google transl. Germ to Engl. from: Eugen Sorg, Frankfurter Rundschau Also pub. in Rolling Stone, Germ. Ed., Oct 3/01, with note "B. On September, shortly after the interview, he was himself assassinated." The interv. was probably mid-late Aug. _____

their own consumption. He also tries to show that he is enforcing anti-drug laws[477]. He says that the jail is now holding a drug tycoon who was seized with half a ton of opium and adds] **"Now, he's already the third year in prison - despite all his money and clout."**

The difficulties with this answer were:

A. **By the time of the interview, the amount of opium already harvested in 2001 in Badakhshan Province alone was enough to supply the entire US for a full year. It was also ten times what would have been required if every Ismaili in the province -- men women and children -- were full time heroin adicts.[478]**

B. **As can be seen in the table, at right the opium was grown for the most part where the Ismailis didn't live. 90%+ of the Ismailis of Badakshan lived in districts that were free of opium in 2000, 2001 and 2002. About 3/4ths of the non-Ismailis of Badakshan – mostly Sunni Tajiks like Massoud – lived in districts that grew poppy in each of these three years. In the 3 districts that accounted for 94% of total opium poppy acreage in '01 [Fayzabad, Kishim & Jurm], only ~1% were Ismaili. [479].**

OPIUM GROWING IN MASSOUD CONTROLLED BADAKHSHAN PROVINCE SHOWING ISMAILI AND NON ISMAILI DISTRICTS

BADAKHSHAN DISTRICTS [480]	TOTAL POP.[481]	ISMAILI[482] # / % [483 A]	OPIUM[484] 2000	2001	2002
DARWAZ	21.4	13.7/65.4 [B]	ND	ND	CPF
KHWAHAN	13.5	0	ND	0	CPF
RAGH [485]	37.4	0	0	0	CPF
SHAHRI BUZURG	41.7	0	19	41	170
FAYZABAD INCLUDES DARAYIM [486]	194.3	1%	1073	868	2370
		1.9/18.8 [C]			
KISHIM	84.9	0	507	2191	2840
JURM	76.1	1.4/59.9 [D]	773	2897	2690
KERAN WA MENJAN [487]	8.1	3.7/11.2 [E]	ND	ND	CPF
SHIGHNAN	23.6	99 [F]	ND	ND	CPF
		26.1/26.5			
BAHARAK INCLUDES YAMAGAN WURDUJ	61.9		86	345	180
		3.3/23.0 [G]			
		.5/20.4 [H]			
ZEBAK	6.6	6.2/6.2 [I]	0	ND	CPF
ISHKASHIM [488]	10.5	8.6/10.6 [J]	0	0	CPF
WAKHAN	13.2	8.7/9.8 [K]	ND	ND	CPF
TOTAL	593.1	74.1 sum	2458	6342	8250
TOTAL & % ISMAILIS IN DISTRICTS THAT ARE ALWAYS 0, ND OR CPF			67.0 = 90.4%		
	451.8 76.2%		TOTAL & % NON-ISMAILIS IN DISTRICTS THAT ARE ALWAYS GROWING OPIUM		

ND = NO DATA CPF = CONSIDERED POPPY FREE

TABLE NOTES, INCL. A-K, CONTINUE ON NEXT P.

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[477] A. In contrast, Aga Kahn Foundation noted that in '01, during the Taliban's poppy ban, there was an " absence of any [narcotics] interdiction activities in the province," p1 Badakhshan Province: Suggestions for an Area Development based Counter-narcotics strategy. 4/04 B. AFP, Sept 5/'00, 'More than 70 kilos of opium seized on Tajik-Afghan border', 399 words, Dateline: Dushanbe, Russian security guards seized ...more than 1,000 kilos[of opium] in the past week alone...The Afghans escaped arrest and no casualty figures were given....during a crackdown in ...Moskovski...Kumsangir and Shuroabad, the border guard said. Russian troops, who patrol the frontier under an agreement with the Tajik gov..., have reported a sharp increase recently in the amount of drugs destined for the country....a clearing house for Afghan narcotics bound for Russia and the West. The quantity of the drug seized only represents about 5 percent of the overall traffic, according to experts. [If we assume the 1 t = 5% of flow/week, we have 20 t/wk & 1k t/yr – ~1/3 of Af. opium exports in '00. The 3 named sections border Takkar, Konduz, & Badakhshan Prov, respectiv. Note: no arrests & no casualty figs.]

[478] 6,342 ha = 63.42km^2 were growing opium in Badakshan prov in spring '01 – more than twice the yr before. 151E3kg of opium were prod. from this crop, with 10:1 ratio =15MT of heroin. With an avg. of 50mg pure heroin/day every day of the year, enough for over 8E5 avg. users – roughly all of the people in Badakshan Prov. – or ~ all the heroin users in the USA in that year. It is also about ten times the entire Ismaili population of the province. "The Estimation of Heroin Availability: 1996-2000" *Prepared for:* Office of National Drug Control Policy, Dept HHS , USA, March , 2002. _____ 15MT is conservative estimate of the amount of heroin that is generally produced from Badakhshan opium. The UN uses ~7kg of opium to 1 kg heroin. P. 68, pdf p 72 in "The Opium Economy In Afghanistan: An International Problem" Office On Drugs And Crime, Vienna, '03, 226 pdf pages. http://www.unodc.org/documents/afghanistan/Counter_Narcotics/The_Opium_Economy_in_Afghanistan_-_2003.pdf

"Until the mid-1990s, ...Khorog [just over the river from Badakh., Afgh.] was one of the main entry points of Afghan heroin [& 1-1.5k]... were addicted to heroin ...between ['92 & '95, over 5%] of ...24,000 citizens were consuming [heroin] ...every day... [T]he Aga Khan, leader of the Ismaili[s], ...made his help dependent on the halt of drug cultivation and trafficking. "...now ...none of our farmers grow poppy," said [the head] ...of the Aga Khan Foundation in Tajikistan. "We are involved in every community and we know what is going on."...Within a few years, the level of drug consumption and trafficking plunged dramatically in Khorog and its surrounding areas." 'White death' endures in the lands of Central Asia" dateline, Khorog, Tajikistan, Dawn, 2002-07-20 _____

[479] "The patterns of both production and addiction [in Badakhshan Prov.] are patchy and no one quite understands why they have developed in the way they have. Only some areas grow poppy, whilst other areas equally suitable do not, and only some areas have high levels of addiction. The areas that grow are not necessarily the areas that consume, and vice versa. The areas cultivating tend to be Tajik and Sunni (though not exclusively so), those using are usually the Ismaeli communities - although Ismaeli communities in other parts of Afghanistan are not generally opium addicts. The Aga Khan has recently issued a decree that poppy should be neither grown nor consumed and this has led to a reduction in cultivation in Ismaeli areas and some reduction in use." p 23 ...[Contact: Mirza Jahani, PhD Cambridge, chief executive officer of the Aga Khan Foundation in Tajikistan. "We are involved in every community and we know what is going on". Now 8/14, Chief Executive Officer of Aga Khan Foundation U.S.A __ "Most of the drugs cross the river to Tajikistan, the trade being highly organised and very lucrative." P. 24 SMU Area Reports, Badakhshan, Strategic Monitoring Unit, Afghanistan, 5/01 [EMPHASIS ADDED] _____

[480] "In 1932, the first year for which quantitative estimates of production were provided, Afghanistan produced 75 tons of opium. China, in comparison, produced about 6,000 tons in the same year. The area under cultivation in 1932 was reported to be less than 4,000 hectares. For comparison, 92,000 hectares were under cultivation in 1999, 82,000 ha in 2000 and even in 2001, the year of the Taliban ban, some 7,600 hectares were cultivated producing 185 tons of opium, more than twice the amounts reported back in 1932." The Opium Economy 2003 _____

[481] Population data for each district are from the World Food Program for '02._____The sum=593.2. There are substantial differences between these data & data from some other sources.

[482] "Shegnan and Eshkeshem are almost entirely Ismaeli and Wakhan and Zebak more than 90% so" page i, SMU Area Reports, Badakhshan, Strategic Monitoring Unit, Afgh., May 2001 _____

[483] **A.** p. 175 "Nahzat-e-Nawin: modernization of the Badakhshani Isma'ili communities of Afghanistan", Hafizullah Emadi (2005) Central Asian Survey, 24:2, 165-189, ____ citing: "Field survey of the Isma'ili communities of Badakhshan, 2002". This data may not reflect total pop. It's apparently based on villages where there are at least some Ismailis. **B.** p. 174, **C.** p. 176, **D.** p. 177, **E.** p. 176 tot. pop. for part of the district -- Kuran – is shown, but for Menjan , only the tot. pop. of villages with Isamilis is shown. **F.** "Many people succumbed to drug addiction, to the extent that in Shughnan alone there were 2000 drug addicts in 1989" [citing Guy Brailsford, 'A survey of opium cultivation in Badakhshan Province, Afghanistan', Unpublished report prepared by Afghanaid, Dec. 1989, p 12.] "Lack of access to medicine also compels families to resort to opium as a remedy to common illnesses." p 167. 183,240 kg of opium resin were produced in Badakshan Province in 1989, [citing Brailsford, p. 32.] p 168, "… in 2002 …there were 9420 Isma'ili households in Badakhshan with a total population of 74,118. Isma'ilis primarily reside in the districts of Shughnan, Ishkashim, Zibak, Roshan and Wakhan situated in the upper valley of the Panj River as well as in Darwaz and Shekay situated in the lower valley of the Panj River. There are a significant number of Isma'ilis in Kuran-Munjan situated in the extreme south of Badakhshan as well as in Yamagan, Darayam and in a few other regions." p 169-70, **G.** p 177, **H.** p. 178, **I.** p. 173, **J.** p. 172, **K.** p. 175

An earlier source gives the following information: "Ismailis …in the Badakh... prov… of Afgh... reside primarily in Rushan [ ], Shughnan [27.8], Ishkashim [12.6], Wakhan [11.7], Zibak[26.4] and Kuran-Munjan[8.1] regions….inhabitants …are predominantly Tajik in their ethnicity and Ismaili in their religious orientation." "The End of Taqiyya: Reaffirming the Religious Identity of Ismailis in Shughnan, Badakh… H. Emadi, Middle Eastern Studies, V. 34, #3 (7/98), p. 103-20 _____ #'s in [ ]are district pop. in k's, as of '03 – for sources see footnote. Total is 86.5k. _____

[484] The clear distinction between 0 [zero] Opium found and No Data available is given for '00 & '01 in The Opium Economy in Afghanistan-2003, UNODC, p41, pdf p 45 maps 9 &10. In '02 – map 11, the two categories are combined into "Considered Poppy Free" _____This is a duplicate of part of footnote 130. Data from table p. 213, pdf 217.

[485] Also called Raghistan –[phonetically similar to Rushin. Rushan & Roshan – but these 3 refer to a town & district N of Shughnan on the N side of the Panj River in E Tajikistan, in W-central Gorno-Badakhshan. There are 500 Isma'ili households in Roshan [p 175, F. S. '02. See footnote 483 A]].

[486] From '14 district map: Afghanistan, Badakhshan Province, District Atlas, April '14, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, UN,

[487] http://www.mrrd-nabdp.org/attachments/article/144/Keran%20wa%20Menjan%20DDP%20Summary.pdf

C. **Few Ismailis of Badakhshan Prov. were addicted to opium in the summer of 2001[489] – though up to 20% had such a problem both some years before & after.**

Whoever was growing opium in Badakhshan Province, relatively little of it was being grown for their own use. [490]

[488] http://www.mrrd-nabdp.org/attachments/article/144/Badakhshan_Ishkashim_Summary_English.pdf

[489] Give Ref.

[490] **A** *"Opium addiction* is a major issue in Wakhan and Shegnan. Besides the health aspect, opium addiction is also pushing many families into poverty."p2 _____

B. "The increased level of poppy cultivation in Badakhshan was triggered by high opium prices. At the time of planting, in February/March 2001, farmers reported the visit of opium traders promising exceptionally high prices and providing cash advances for this year's opium harvest. Farmers mentioned prices for fresh opium 10 times higher than last year." *Afghanistan Annual Opium Poppy Survey 2001, P. 10* _____ *Current population data for districts :* _____

C. Badakhshan Province: Suggestions for an Area Development based Counter-narcotics strategy, Aga Khan Foundation (Afghanistan) – 4/'04, 16 pp. ", opium most certainly came to the region first with Alexander's Greeks and was later spread by the Moslem Arabs in the 8th and 9th centuries as part of the '*dawa e unani*' – Greek medicine."p1,

"Opium consumption is widespread, particularly in the non-opium growing border districts to Tajikistan *[This is 2.5 years after the interview with Massoud – when opium consumption under the Karzai regime had increased dramatically among the people of Afghanistan]*. While it is difficult to obtain data on consumption rates, as people avoid talking about the subject, it is obvious that large parts of the population consume opium in these areas. While total numbers of regular consumers are low, at an estimated 10,000 – 15,000 people, this constitutes 30-40% of the adult populations of Wakhan and Ishkashim districts. The drug also assumes the role of a second currency with even teachers' salaries being paid in opium in some instances. Drug addiction plays an important role in the trafficking of heroin and is often encouraged by the involved commanders."p2 _____

D.The local inhabitants of the Afghan territory bordering Tajikistan have undoubtedly been influenced by the Aga Khan…During his visit to the Pamir mountains last year *[1995]* , he asked the local inhabitants to end their involvement with the narcotics business and not to participate in the Tajik civil war. For the Ismaili Moslems living in northern Afghanistan, the words of the imam are taken very seriously. Moreover, the Aga Khan's foundation has provided much humanitarian aid this year which has saved the lives of thousands of Pamir inhabitants on both sides of the border. The Moscow Times, Oct., 1, '96," Tajik Rebels' New Ally", Mumin Shakirov, sect: # 1058

The half-ton of opium seized is less than 1/300th of the opium produced in Badakhshan Province in the three years of the tycoon's incarceration. [491]

Q. **[*The interviewer presses the questions again.]* The narcotics control agency of the United Nations recently announced that the Taliban have ended narcotics production. But Afghanistan is still world's number one opium producer. So where does the opium come from ?**

A. **"The Taliban have sufficient supplies to continue to export for two or three years".[[EMPHASIS ADDED]] *[This caught my attention: Didn't we learn from a senior UN offical some eight months before this interview that:***

> **"local drug lords along the northern border with Tajikistan have stockpiled a supply of opium -- and its derivatives, morphine and heroin -- adequate to supply Europe and the United States for up to three years."**[492]

Didn't we also learn that 66% of the border of Tajikestan and Afghanistan is in Badakhshan Province?[493] ***Why doesn't he mention the stocks on his own territory?***[494] ***Maybe Massoud is so quick with these detailed answers because he is actually talking about himself and his own area? Massoud continues his answer.]***

"In addition, there were major traffickers, which prompted the production stop, not Mullah Omar. They wanted to keep prices up. I have enough information about the whole situation."

[We have already discussed this – zeroing out production is not a way to raise income

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E. " Individuals with links to the power structure encouraged poppy cultivation that again adversely affected the lives and development in the communities. To remedy the situation Isma'ili intellectuals launched an antiopium campaign to raise awareness about the detrimental effects of opium. The campaign achieved remarkable progress in 1968–1970 but ultimately failed when those in leadership positions in the state apparatus harassed individuals who were at the forefront of the movement, condemning them as troublemakers. Such a policy paved the road to greater poppy cultivation in the Isma'ili settled regions in subsequent years." P 180, Hafizullah Emadi, 2006

F. "Most Isma'ilis were used as mules for transporting drugs, they suffered financially and were forced to sell their property to pay off the mafias and drug lords. Russian border guards intercepted many Isma'ilis and other drug traffickers as they crossed the border to Tajikistan. According to the government of Tajikistan 35 transgressors were killed and seven wounded as a result of 40 armed skirmishes that occurred on the Afghanistan–Tajikistan border in 1998." P 184, ibid, citing: "ITAR-TASS, Dushanbe, 24/1/98. Cited in Jonathan Goodhand, 'From holy war to opium war? A case study of the opium economy in North Eastern Afghanistan', Central Asian Survey, v.19, #2, '00, p 270."

[491] "half a ton of opium " is 1/3rd of 1% of the 151 metric tons estimated to have been harvested in Badkhshan Prov. in '01 & ~1% of avg. production in ea. of the prev. 6 yrs.

[492] See footnotes 131, 132, 133 Two reports supporting this:

A. "One (seemingly) exceptional incident occurred in July 2002, just after Hamid Karzai was elected as President of the transitional government. There was a hasty move to shift drugs out of the province, perhaps in anticipation of increased interdiction efforts. Two commanders reportedly arrived by helicopter to collect 3,700 kg of refined opium (heroin) plus some dry opium. They arrived with an estimated US$ 14.8 million. From Faizabad the drugs were transported to Tajikistan."…

"Bordering Tajikistan, there is a lucrative trade in stolen luxury cars (imported from Russia), gemstones, flour, vodka, and weaponry." Pdf p 183, "The Nexus Of Drug Trafficking And Hawala In Afghanistan" *Edwina A. Thompson in "afghanistan's drug industry" edited by Budenberg and Byrd , World Bank and UNODCP , Nov ' 06 223 pdf pages*

B. "UF helicopters were used to smuggle narcotics to Tajikistan, but with the Taliban at the gates promising gold to would-be defectors, Davis pointed out that an anti-narcotics crackdown against well-entrenched local commanders 'would have been tantamount to suicide.' "How We Missed The Story" …p. 222, Roy Gutman, see footnote 387

[493] See footnote 130

[494] Just as we saw some news articles giving the impression that the stocks were in Taliban territory [see footnotes 131] so also at the time of this interview: AFP, 8/15/01, "Worried Dushanbe traffic growth Afghan drug" ORIGINE-DEPECHE: DOUCHANBE. The Taliban are given all of the blame – the NA – which borders Tajikistan is not mentioned – nor is Badakhshan province.

– and the pre-announcement price data don't show additional hoarding by anyone in anticipation of the ban.[495]]

"The large plantations are in the Taliban area, in the regions of Jalalabad, Kandahar and Helmand."

> ***[But, according to the published UN data, these three areas each had zero opium poppy growing in the spring of 2001.[496]]***

"The Taliban collect ten percent agriculture taxes for the opium fields."

> ***[As we have seen[497], they apparently abolished the tax on opium some months before they announced the ban. In any event, if nothing was being grown, 10% of nothing is nothing.]***

[Massoud coninues.] **"Then they get manufacturing tax: 180 dollars per kilo package [498], which will be officially stamped. Then follow sales tax and finally a transport tax, if the goods will be flown by plane first to Kabul, and then to Kunduz[499].**

"Without the stamp and declarations of the Taliban, no package crossed the border."

***It is not clear where this $180/kg is supposed to apply – but if we assume it's when a typical shipment – mostly heroin- crosses the Afghan border, then we have at least two independent and apparently reliable sources that support Massoud – but it is not the mostly Pashtun Taliban that are collecting the money – it is Tajiks on both sides of the Afghan – Tajikstan border*:**

> **"Even before leaving Tajikistan, the average …bribe payment per kilo of heroin is … $200 at the Afghan[-Tajikestan] border"[500]**
>
> **"Officers of the Tajik armed forces … provide Russian weapons to Afghan warlords in exchange for narcotics, then sell the narcotics to the Russian military. Russian military aircraft then move the drugs from the Afghanistan-Tajikistan border directly to Russia. The source estimates that such military shipments total ten times the amount moving along the ground routes, which the source estimates at 21 tons per year."[501]**
>
> **[EMPAHIS ADDED]**

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[495] See footnote 41 & associated discussion, pages 16-18

[496] See table 4, page 14

[497] See footnote 588

[499] The UN reported 29 Ha of opium growing in Kabul Prov. , down from 340 Ha the year before [p86], and no opium found growing in Kunduz Province in spring 2001, down from 489 Ha the previous year. [P 87] http://www.unodc.org/pdf/afg/afghanistan_opium_survey_2003.pdf In this connection see footnote **C.2** of Table / **figure 4** which shows opium growing in Andarab district – in area controlled by Massoud and hs allies.

Where does this go /come from see pdf 236 op

An Analysis of the process of expansion of opium poppy to newdistricts in Afghanistan: final report / United Nations International Drug Control Programme/Strategic study # 7 1998 06 31 * STA # 1 : An Analysis of the Process of Expansion of Opium Poppy Cultivation to New Districts in Afghanistan

http://www.unodc.org/pakistan/en/report_1998-06-31_1.html

http://www.maurizioturco.it/dossier/arlacchi_dossier/banca_dati/strategic_studies/1998_06_31_sta_1_an_analysi.html

[500] Yuriy Spirin, "Heroin Heroes;" report of Stringer News Agency [Moscow], 12 February 2002 (FBIS Document CEP20020219000161) – cited at: p. 21, [pdf 24 of 39] *Glenn E. Curtis, Federal Research Division, Library of Congress* "Involvement Of Russian Organized Crime Syndicates, Criminal Elements In The Russian Military, And Regional Terrorist Groups In Narcotics Trafficking In Central Asia, The Caucasus, And Chechnya" *Oct. 2002,* ____

[501] Ibid, same page.

This puts the Russian unofficial military shipments of narcotics from Afghanistan at about 200 tons per year. [502]

The gross revenue to the traders from exporting opium and its derivatives from Afghanistan in 2000 is reported as $1,059 million."[503] Between 1/4th [504] and 4/10ths [505] of this was going through Massoud's area[506]. If we assume that Masssoud collected tax on 20% of the total – or ~$200 million/yr and that the tax was 15%, -- the upper rate that we found for his gem taxes[507] -- it would have given him $30E6/yr.

The price of heroin after it crossed the border to Tajikestan was reported as $1,575/kg. in 2000. This would include the 15% tax and would make that tax $209/kg. Considering all of the estimating that must have gone into the $1,575 figure and that it was from a year before the interview, this is remarkably close to both the $180/kg stated by Massoud and the $200/kg given by Yuriy Spirin's source.[508]

The ~$200E6 subject to our suggested Massoud tax in our scenario is also remarkably close to the "at the border" – pre-tax-- value of the 200 tons of 'narcotics' reportedly shipped by the Russian military.

The values are even closer when we realize that a substantial fraction of the 200 tons may have been made up of morphine and plain opium. Per kg, morpine and opium were valued at ~2/3 and 1/8th of heroin. [509]

Another factor to consider in Massoud's story is the people on the other side of the

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[502] This is consistent with a report of a similar scenario that had once prevailed with the Afghan –Pakistan opium business: "Pak-Afghan Drug Trade in Historical Perspective" Ikramul Haq, Asian Survey, Vol. 36, No. 10 10/96), pp. 945-963

> "As the ISI's mujaheddin clients used their new CIA munitions to capture prime agricultural areas inside Afghanistan during the early 1980s, some guerrillas urged their peasant supporters to grow poppies, thereby doubling the country's opium harvest to 575 tons between 1982 and 1983.[12] The mujaheddin then brought the opium across the border and sold it to Pakistani heroin refiners who operated under the protection of (late) General Fazle Haq, governor of the NWFP. By 1988 there were an estimated 100 to 200 heroin refineries in the province's Khyber District alone.[13]
>
> Trucks from the Pakistan army's National Logistics Cell (NLC) arriving with CIA arms from Karachi often returned loaded with heroin - protected from police search by ISI papers. "The drug is carried in NLC trucks, which come sealed from the [NWFP] and are never checked by the police,"
> [EMPH.ADDED]

reported the Herald of Pakistan in September 1985. "They come from Peshawar to Pipri, Jungshahi, Jhimpir where they deliver their cargo, sacks of grain, to government go- downs. Some of these sacks contain packets of heroin. ... This has been going on now for about three and a half years." The Afghan mujaheddin soon discovered the financial potential of the drug trade and became self-sufficient, no longer dependent on external aid as they had been in the 1979-84 period. This helped them to establish strong private armies and buy arms in the clandestine markets."

12. U.S. Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics Matters, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (1984), p. 4. 13. Kathy Evans, "The Tribal Trail," Newsline (Karachi), Dec. 1989, p. 26.

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[503] http://www.unodc.org/documents/afghanistan/Counter_Narcotics/The_Opium_Economy_in_Afghanistan_-_2003.pdf Pdf p 72.

[504] Give ref

[505] Give ref

[506] In early 2001, the route through tajikestan was the only one mentioned by Bernard Frahi of the UNDCP. see footnote 144

[507] Give reference

[508] Ibid supra

[509] If, for example, we assume that 80% of the shipment was heroin and the remainder divided about equally between morphine and opium , the average after-tax price per kg would be $1356 and the average tax – at 15% would be $180 (.80*1575 + .10*1050 + .10*180)/1.15 *.15

border to whom the Taliban were supposedly selling. In southern and eastern Afghanistan – on the border with Pakistan, a large fraction on both sides of the border were Pashtuns. In the, north – across the northern borders of Badakhshan and Takhar Provinces, there were almost no Pashtuns[510] – but there were lots of Tajiks in Tajikistan – including many in both the Russian and Tajik military. This is important as:

> "In general, they [the cross border traders] are of the same ethnic origin as people living in Afghanistan (i.e. Pashtuns from Pakistan, Baluch from Iran or Pakistan, Tajiks from Tajikistan, etc.)".[511]

In this interview Massoud would have us believe that he knows everything important that's going on in the opium business to the extent that it is in Taliban hands:

1. He speaks confidently of the public aspects of their program – like
   a. Where it is grown, and
   b. How much the farmers are taxed.
2. He continues with confidence to talk about what would be known to the smugglers – but not well known to the public – like the taxes and tax stamps on the cross-border opium trade.

He tops off these statements by telling us with the same confidence – without any words openly suggestive of doubt – that he's privy to what only Taliban insiders would know:

3. How much opium the Taliban have in stock,

and, the ultimate inside information– presumably from a *fly-on-the-wall :*

4. Who actually made the decision to ban it.

We saw on this last point, that he had told the interviewer:

"…major traffickers…prompted the production stop, not Mullah Omar. They wanted to keep prices up."

After giving us this information – somethng only the top drug traffickers, Mullah Omar and Massoud's *"fly on the wall"* would know, he adds:

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[510] In Tajikistan, there are an estimated 36,000 Pashtuns, about 0.4% of the population; In Uzbekistan , there are an estimated 2500 Pashtuns, about .01% and Tajiks are ~5% of the population; in Turkmenistan , there are 2100 Pashtuns, ~.04% and 5,200 Tajiks or ~0.1%; there are 2.2E6 Pashtuns, ~3% and 0.45E6 Tajiks, ~0.6% in Iran. Population estimates are from the Joshua Project ___. Also see map, page 111 of general distribution of Pashtuns in the Afghanistan area.

[511] The opium economy in Afgh. 2003, p 68 pdf p 72 "Only in Badakshan, not a single Pashtun village producing opium was found in the 1994 survey. 62% of all production of Badakshan took place in Tajik villages and 22% in Uzbek villages.… Though Badakshan is the traditional centre of Tajiks living in Afghanistan, … only 28% of all opium produced by Tajik villages actually came from Badakshan. The bulk (68%) was produced by Tajik villages located in Nangarhar (eastern Afghanistan). In addition, the survey also found Tajik villages producing opium in Kunar and in Helmand province." Ibid pdf p 56

Trade

Legal exports 1999 $111E6
Legal Imports 1999 $468E6

Ibid pdf p 73 citing IMF

"I have enough information about the whole situation."

This is another example of:

אויפֿן גנבֿ ברענט דאָס היטל

"Oifen goniff brent dos hittel"

"The cap on the thief is burning."
A guilty conscience needs no accuser.[512]

Having put forward what is in reality an absurd *fly-on-the-wall* statement – after first mentioning what are probably his own local drug trafficker's stockpiles -- he goes on to tell us about the opium growing on Taliban controlled plantations. But, according to the statement that he just made, the drug traffickers have halted production on these very plantations to drive up the price! The only place it's still growing in large plantations – in some places as far as the eye can see– is in the area he controls -- Badakhshan Province.

It looks like his reference to the drug traffickers calling the shots for Mullah Omar[513] is a deeper message from the fly on his own inner wall. It's a fly that sees his own situation -- where he's following the lead of his own local drug lords – in return for a cut of their profits.

In support of this analysis of Massoud's answers to questions about opium – that he is actually talking about himself when he impugns the Taliban -- we have the following:

[CONTINUED ON PAGE 112]

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[512] Yiddish spelling from._____We'll meet this expression & stitution at least 3 more times in this book – also in connection with Massoud. [See footnote 304]

[513] A LN search found A. an article attributing the opium trade and manufacture to the Taliban and the eradication of the opium to the drug dealers. It gives details similar to Massoud's story – including the route thru Konduz—stamps on packages – every kind of evil activity 10/22/01, The Guardian (London), "Attack on Afghanistan: Drug barons: Heroin oils Afghan war machine: Taliban mullahs tap feudal state's most profitable natural resource. Ian Traynor on the Salang Pass, Afghanistan, Guardian Home Pages, Pg. 5, Check on Ian Traynor

B. Antonella Deledda, the [UN's Office of Drug Control and Crime Prevention] ODCCP's regional chief based in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, said that there are now [10/24/00] two big routes for heroin leaving Afghanistan. Yangi Qale lies on the northern end of the main one. Opium processed into heroin in laboratories in northern Afghanistan between Kunduz and Taloqan is smuggled into Tajikistan along the 120-mile front between the towns of Pjandz and Moskovskij. Typically, the loads, of up to 200lb, have an escort of 15 guards, the ODCCP says. An armed reconnaissance group moves ahead while the cargo is carried on mules by the main body of men. Behind follow five or six more fighters with heavy machineguns and rocket-propelled grenades. They cross the Pjandz River on the border in rafts and inflated tyres before handing the cargo over to groups waiting on the other side. On the second route, opium processed around Faizabad in northeastern Afghanistan is moved through mountains into southeastern Tajikistan.

Ms. Deledda gave little credibility to an edict by the Taleban leader in Afghanistan, Mullah Omar, banning the cultivation of opium poppies. "It's not the first time we have heard this from Taleban," she said. "We believe their interests linked to drug cultivation are very important to them, and a major factor contributing to the Afghan war."

She also laid the blame for trafficking on some commanders in the Masood forces. She argued that although only 4 per cent of Afghanistan's opium was cultivated in zones controlled by Commander Masood, up to 40 per cent of opium grown in Taleban areas to the south passed through his territory with the connivance of local warlords. 10/24/00 The Times, Lond., "Taleban victories boost heroin trade" Anthony Loyd, Yangi Qale, Afghan., The world's No1 drug route.

C. "Northeast Afghanistan, controlled by Massoud, produces only 3% of Afghanistan's opium today. Commanders levy ushr on opium farmers, and at least some local authorities tax opium traders as well." Barnett R. Rubin, The Political Economy of War and Peace in Afghanistan, World Development, V. 28, # 10, pp. 1789-1803, 2000 Citing "Anthony Davis and Bernard Frahi, personal communications." _____ This pdf is defective – missing 2 p. Reprinted in Afghanistan in the Post-Cold War Era, Barnett R. Rubin, p52-72 _____ For more on Taliban income from opium from this see footnote 592 E

D. Opiate Flows Through Northern Afghanistan And Central Asia: A Threat Assessment" 2012, UNODC,



IT APPEARS THAT THE PEOPLE IN THE AREA AT LEFT ARE PROBABLY ISMAILI PASHTUNS, AS SHIGNAN IS 99% ISMAILI.

THE REST OF THE ETHNOLINGUISTIC PART OF THIS MAP IS ON PAGE 51

NORTHERN ALLIANCE CONTROL

POCKETS OF N.A. INFLUENCE SEPT. 2001

The United States Army in Afghanistan Operation ENDURING FREEDOM Oct. '01-Mar. '02

IRANIAN	TURKIC	OTHER
BALOCK	KIRGHIZ	BRAHUI
AIMAK	TURKMEN	NURISTANI
HAZARA	UZBEK	
PASHTUN		SPARSELY POPULATED OR UNINHABITED
QUIZILBACH		
TAJIK		



http://www.unodc.org/documents/afghanistan/Counter_Narcotics/The_Opium_Economy_in_Afghanistan_-_2003.pdf

Pdf p 57

A MAP SHOWING THE DISTRIBUTION IN AFGHANISTAN & MUCH OF THE MUSLIM WORLD OF THE DIFFERENT SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT IN ISLAM IS ON PAGE 51

NON-ISMAILI TAJIK & OTHER DARI/FARSI SPEAKING TRIBES [LIGHT BLUE]

ISMAILI TERRITORY



http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/c/c6/Badakhshan_districts.png

"[T]he Northern Alliance was widely thought to finance itself in part through trade in heroin."[514] Anthony Davis, a reporter close to Massoud and one who saw the hand of Pakistan in effective Taliban military operations, gives this remarkable vignette of Massoud and heroin:

"UF [515] helicopters were used to smuggle narcotics to Tajikistan, but with the Taliban at the gates promising gold[516] to would-be defectors, Davis pointed out that an anti-narcotics crackdown against well-entrenched local commanders 'would have been tantamount to suicide.'"[517]

But what about in earlier years – when the Taliban were not "at the gates promising gold"?

Would a man who had no scruples in printing over a billion dollars in unredeemable official currency –and reducing its value by a factor of 20 in the space of 7 years -- really not want to dirty his hands with the money from the opium that had been a mainstay the Badakhshan economy for decades?

Would a man whose money printing exploits destroyed the savings of millions of his countrymen who held their wealth in currency, really care about taking money from opium traffickers?

What would we expect from a man who would impugn the integrity of his fellow Tajiks and put the entire burden of opium in Badakhshan on a minority religious group – the Ismailis – when the opium was not grown in the areas most controlled by those people? [518]

What would we expect from a man who repeatedly allied himself with the whisky drinking, General Dostom, who had helped the Soviets decimate the Pashtuns?[519]

We would expect him to be deriving a major share of his income by taxing the transport

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[514] **A.** 9/11 Commission Report , p. 139 citing: Rashid, Taliban 2000, Benjamin and Simon, Age Of Sacred Terror p 338-99 & interview with CIA Director George Tennet, 1/22/04 ____ This also shows the US working with Massoud and others to get Bin Laden – in 1999 etc.

B. " Most State [Dept.] diplomats saw Ahmed Shah Massoud ...tainted by his recent deals to accept arms supplies from Iran and his reliance on heroin trafficking for income " Steve Coll. Ghost Wars , p 287 _____

C. "Anyone driving from the airport to see Burhanuddin Rabbani [the President of the Northern Alliance] would have noted poppy on both sides of the road, and there were at least three heroin refineries within sight of his remote capital" p221 How We Missed the Story: Osama Bin Laden, the Taliban, and the Hijacking of ...By Roy Gutman ____

[515] Massoud's "United Front". For sense of connection between Massoud's commanders in Badakhshan Prov. & Opium, see "From holy war to opium war? A case study of the opium economy in North Eastern Afghanistan", Jonathan Goodhand, *Central Asian Survey* ('00), 19(2), 265–80. _____

[516] Perhaps 'gold' here is to be understood in contrast with the paper money North'rn Alliance had printed in Russia … With all the real money they were getting from their check-point, it's a wonder they couldn't pay their commanders and soldiers with such money – instead of opium.

[517] How we missed the story …p. 222, supra . Also: "Some opium traders reported that opium was being transported from Nangahar to Badakshan for refining and onward shipment." P. 13, David Mansfield, "The Impact of the Taliban Prohibition on Opium Poppy Cultivation in Afghanistan" 5/25/01, see footnote 46

[518] See footnotes 477, 478, 479, & table: OPIUM GROWING IN MASSOUD CONTROLLED BADAKHSHAN PROVINCE SHOWING ISMAILI AND NON ISMAILI DISTRICTS

[519] Give ref see footnote xx Hekmatyar's key demand, at least in the early stages of his siegeof Kabul, was that Dostom and his militia leave the city. "The disagreements center around the presence of the militia headed by Gen. Abdul Rashid Dostam, who rebelled against ousted President Najibullah's government and hastened its downfall last month. The militia, known as the "Gilam Jam" or "carpet gatherers," are known for their ferocity on the battlefield and their wild indiscipline off. They have been accused of widespread looting and harassment in the Afghan capital since Najibullah's ouster and the installation of a weak, ineffective interim government. Hekmatyar has threatened to continue fighting unless Dostam's militia leave the capital. But Masood and the interim government need Dostom to survive and cannot afford to have his fighters pulled out of Kabul." 5/17/92, AP, "Hekmatyar Says Demands Accepted; Government Denies It", Sharon Herbaugh, Dateline: Kabul,

of opium in his helicopters – at a modest rate of at least 10% -- for "protection".

From, at the latest, 1992 – two years before the Taliban existed as a group led by Mullah Omar– Massoud is reported to have been getting money from opium:

> "Local *Hizb* commanders, government militias, and rivals within *Jamiat* continually challenged Ahmad Shah Massoud in this area, but by 1992 he had managed to subdue or neutralize most such forces in the area, which included many sources of precious stones (emeralds and lapis lazuli) and the opium-growing area of Badakhshan, both of which ensured some income."[520]

We should also remember that part of the 'pay' for the troops of Massoud and his associates was plunder and rape – as we saw when they entered the Hazara area of Kabul[521] or when Massoud was governing the city[522]. The Taliban troops were repeatedly noted as being well behaved toward the civilian populations of the cities they governed.[523]

Massoud, the "wily guerilla commander" who understood "that in a war, the printing press is a more potent weapon than guns and rockets"[524] did more with the press than counterfeit money. He 'counterfeited' the Taliban. The Muslim scholars and students who were ordinarily seen as the moral best in an overwhelmingly Muslim society – even by those who were not so religious – were painted as fanatics to be feared and hated. These well–counterfeited Taliban cut off fingers for playing cards,[525] maimed the hands of women for using nail polish[526] and murdered Sheikh Mazari by throwing him out of a helicopter[527].

This would not only help to motivate the 'contra-Taliban' soldiers – if the counterfeit currency, plunder, rape and hashish[528] were not enough. It would also undercut the Taliban's popular support and undermine their efforts to gain international recognition. [529]

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[520] "Afghanistan: The Forgotten Crisis", Barnet Rubin, 1, Dec. 1996, http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6a6c0c.html

[521] A. See footnote 222

B. For Dostum's troops we have "Dostum and his men acquired a fearful reputation among Afghanistan's civilian population as *gelim jam*, or carpet takers because of their penchant for looting." "One extreme to another". Adrian Brooks, *The Times*, Lond, 11/23/96; p. 16[S3]; Issue 65743. (2797 words)

[522] 'Last time they were in Kabul, the men of the so-called Lion of Panjshir were famous for grabbing women and the property of ordinary civilians. A taxi driver said: "The Taliban are no good but I still have my taxi. Masood's men took some taxi drivers and killed them, then sold the taxis in market. We have no feelings for him."' The Gazette , Montreal, Ca., 7/28/97 "Peace shattered with fight for Kabul": Kathy Gannon; AP; London Daily Telegraph, ; Pg. A11m 772 words, Dateline: Kabul,

[523] Give internal ref./see footnote

[524] See footnote 394 A

[525] See footnote 644

[526] See CHAPTER 21: MAIMING THE HANDS OF WOMEN AND GIRLS FOR WEARING NAIL POLISH

[527] See CHAPTER 10: DID THE TALIBAN THROW SHEIKH ABDUL ALI MAZARI OUT OF A HELICOPTER?

[528] A. "Armed young men, hungry and penniless, sit alongside main roads, waiting to halt vehicles at rifle-point and demand money; most are stoned on hashish.", Christopher Thomas in Pul-i-Khumri, Afghanistan "Seizure of key pass puts defiant north at Taleban's mercy" *The Times*, Lond., 2/26/97; pg. 12; Issue 65823. (607 words) . B. " …along General Massood's front line …[h]is men …[were] [w]ild eyed, sweating and high on hashish …jubilant at having taken out three Taleban tanks" "Taleban battles for lost ground along eight-mile front." Michael Dynes. *The Times*, Lond., Nov. 01/96; p. 17; # 65724. (444 words). C. On rape , see footnote 222 & Appendix 18 at 10/21 "Rape, robbery & murder had become endemic & were only rarely punished under … Rabbani. John Burns, NYT 10/21-22

[529] A. We know that they openly hired a paid lobbyist in Washington: starting 2/15/01, Ottilie English [sister of then US Cong., Phil English] of the Afghanistan Information Center, 703-527-7882; e-mail: OtEnglish(At)aol.com; AfghanInfoCtr(At)aol.com U.S. Newswire, March 7/01, "Afghan-Americans Demonstrate Against Taliban Destruction Of Relics Call For Prosecution, And Strong U.S. And World Action, 396 words, News Advisory, also Ghost Wars, page 649. [footnote continues next page]

CHAPTER 17

WITH MASSOUD, IT WASN'T JUST MONEY

A thousand word obituary for Massoud in a leading London newspaper said he was a "fervent Muslim who studied the Koran daily and often led his soldiers in prayer," adding, "Massoud was nevertheless known to enjoy the occasional drink with friends."[530]

When I saw this, I thought I had the answer to why Massoud attacked the Taliban. A Moslem who drinks is not a "Good Moslem" and could be expected to side against his co-religionists. But the source of this statement – though unsigned – looked like Ahmed Rashid[531] – who is not reliable when describing the Taliban[532] – and may have an anti-religious or, at least, an anti-religious-Moslem bias. The story appears to have originated with Soviet Military Intelligence during the Afghan-Soviet war – and was noted in a book by the former commander of Soviet forces in Afghanistan[533] Still I contacted two peo-

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B. This is the same name as the outfit of Zohra Rasekh: U.S. Newswire, 9/13/96 Taliban Militia Capture Key Afghan Eastern Town; Major Showdown Expected, CONTACT: Omar Samad or Zohra Rasekh, 703-812-8411 or 202-962-2619, both of the Afghanistan Information Center, 1000 words.

C. "Omar Samad is with the Afghanistan Information Center; he joins us from Washington with what he knows." CNN, Mar. 4/01, "Taleban's Orders to Destroy Statues Raises Global Outcry", byline: Donna Kelley, Omar Samad, "Highlight: The world is waiting to hear the fate of two giant sandstone Buddhas in Afghanistan. Leaders call the statues idols, and they have vowed to destroy the ancient monuments, despite an international outcry."

D. "Rosanne Klass…. went back to Afghanistan as a reporter in the 1960s, joined Freedom House in 1980, and founded the Afghanistan Information Center, heading it from 1980 until 1991. She was one of the founders of the Afghanistan Relief Committee and knew everyone who mattered in Afghanistan before, during, and after the jihad. (She donated her papers to the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins in 2005.)" The Weekly Standard, Dec. 3/07, "Lost Kingdom; A 1964 memoir conjures old Afghanistan.": Ann Marlowe, Vol. 13 No. 12. Land of the High Flags, Afghanistan When the Going Was Good" by Rosanne Klass, Odyssey, 358 pp., $19.95

E. "Rosanne Klass collection on Afghanistan and the Soviet Afghan War" 1978-1989. http://warveteran.hypotheses.org/154 *"Inquiries about accessing the collection may be directed to Ms. Margaret Burri, (410) 516-8348. mnburri@jhu.edu." Emails sent to mburri@jhu.edu 5/25/16. CC's to Rubin and Starr. &* e.siecakozlowski@gmail.com

F. Ambassador Samad worked in the field of information technology from 1981 to 2001…In 1996, he launched Azadi Afghan Radio and ran the Afghanistan Information Center based in Virginia. [Note that it does not say that he founded the AIC.] Breaking News from globeandmail.com, May/7/07, "Ambassador Omar Samad on Afghanistan, Abstract: "Ambassador Omar Samad took your questions."

G. After the bombing of US embassies in E. Africa, summer '98, it could be expected that the US would work with the 'contra-Talban's' & help them with, among other things, anti-Taliban propaganda. See contacts with Massoud discussed in the 9/11 Comm. Rept.

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[530] The Daily Telegraph (Lond, 9/17/01 "Obituary of Ahmad Shah Massoud Charismatic leader of the resistance to the Taliban regime respected for his moderate version of Islam" P. 25. From an unsigned 1000 word obit in Ahmed Rashid's newspaper.

[531] Up to and including the day of the unsigned obituary, there are 11 articles in the same newspaper by Ahmed Rashid that mention Ahmad Shah Massoud.

[532] See Appendix 10: AHMED RASHID NOT RELIABLE ON PRE 9/11/01 TALIBAN: An exchange of letters with Prof. Barnett Rubin, at the time, President Obama's lead consultant on Afghanistan

[533] "Сам Масуд в повседневной жизни в основном придерживается законов ислама. Но нашей военной разведкой было отмечено, что в тесном кругу близких друзей он не откажется как следует выпить."

> "Massoud himself in everyday life basically adheres to the laws of Islam. But our military intelligence, it was noted that in a small circle of close friends, he will not give up as it should have a drink."

[This is the automatic Google translation as run Jan. 9/'14. Tranlations supplied by a knowledgable native speaker 1/9/14, are: ' Literally: "in a tight circle of close friends he would not refuse to drink as he ought to" Translation should probably read: "in a tight circle of close friends he would not refuse a good drink" Or: "in a tight circle of close friends he would not refuse to drink well"'

Ограниченный контингент, Limited Contingent, by Борис Всеволодович Громов [General Boris Vsevolodovich Gromov, best known for the two years as the last Commander of the 40th Army in Afghanistan] 300 p./ '94. Includes a 3000 word chapt on Ахмад Шах Масуд [Ahmad Shah Massoud].

The News International, 5/17/01, Bureau Report, Peshawar: revealed…Massoud had inked an agreement with Moscow that ensured safe passage to the former USSR troops through Salang and Panjsher valleys during the Afghan jihad.

Pictures show Ahmad Shah Massoud…(Russian puppet regime) army generals Nabi Azimi, Noor-ul-Haq Ulomi, Asif Delawar and others. According to an Afghan journalist, Sami Yusafzai,

ple who knew Massoud personally over a period of years and was told they had not known him to drink alcoholic beverages at all[534-A&B]. A third report was ambiguous[534-C]. [535]

Some months later, I came across a report that Massoud, as a young man before the war was the best pool player in Kabul.[536]

JURM DISTRICT DEVELOPMENT ASSEMBLY

Nov/ 08 Showing most women wearing Burkas in a part of Afghanistan the Taliban never contolled – but Massoud did?

http://www.mrrd-nabdp.org/attachments/article/144/Badakhshan_Summary_Jerm_Finalized.pdf

Playing pool is a very questionable pastime in Islam – because it often leads to gambling and is associated with other un-Islamic activities[537].

So why did Ahmed Shah Massoud, an ostensibly religious Moslem, attack his co-religionists – the Taliban -- when they came to the gates of Kabul in early 1995 – and keep on attacking them up until his assassination six and half years later?

Massoud was not only a Moslem. He had three other forces competing for his soul:

1. He enjoyed "the things that money can buy" – a nice home, attractive clothes, music, lots of books and a very fancy car.[538] He was also, in effect, sitting on a billion dollar emerald mine the Panjshir Valley. [539]

General Gromov has exposed many facts about the 10 year-long Soviet involvement and Afghan resistance movement in his book "Soviet Army in Afghanistan"

[534] **A.** Sent "Query on Massoud. Do you know anyone who had a "drink" with A. S. Massoud? " to Prof B. Rubin on 12/24/13. Rec. response: 7 hrs later : "No idea. Never heard this." Rec. 2nd reply 23 hrs after this – after sending the exact quote and link: "Passive voice, no source..... Not credible without more evidence."

B On 12/26/13 6:18 PM, Gary <mrgaryxx@aol.com> wrote: "If Commander Massoud had a drink, I'd be shocked if it contained alcohol. I certainly never witnessed nor heard of any of our mutual friends speak of such an occasion." I'd very much like to read your book.Aloha from Hawaii, Gary, Gary W. Bowersox "The Gem Hunter"

C On 9/24/16, I received the following response to a query sent 10/27/15 thru facebook. Marcela Grad [author: Massoud: An Intimate Portrait of the Legendary Afghan Leader ["personal stories [collected over a period of three years] told to her by those who accompanied Massoud during his struggle to liberate Afghanistan from the Soviet invasion and the Taliban, and by others from around the world who knew and helped Massoud."] St. Louis, MO : Webster University Press, '09. Also pub. In Spanish, '12 & Japanese, '14

Avroham.

I have just seen your message and it was not in Facebook. It was in my cel (in messenger). So my response is very late.

Do you still need help with information about Massoud?

About Rumi, Massoud was very knowledgeable about all the Persian poets, especially Rumi, Hafiz, Al Gazzali. He used to take the Al Gazzali book to battle. And about the drinking, I think he respected the Muslim traditions but he was very very moderate.

I hope it helps.[EMPH. ADDED, It is not clear from this if he drank.]

[535] A key figure on the information side of the anti-Soviet struggle was Prof. Sayd Bauhauddin Majrooj, head of the Afghan Information Center in Peshawar, Paksiatan .

A. His obit in the LA Times included the following; "He was a Muslim, yet he loved whiskey and champagne. ...Every ...Bastille Day, he ...traveled to Islamabad... to ...drink champagne at the French Embassy. He was also a regular at the Bamboo Bar, which French aid workers had set up at their residence, the Maison Blanche." 2/13/88, LA Times, "'Professor' Was Channel for News of Rebels : Slaying Spotlights Afghan Rifts", Rone Tempest, New Delhi.

B. "If he chose to smoke French cigarettes and enjoy an occasional glass of Scotch whiskey, that was his business, and he had no need to apologize for it." P 284, Before Taliban, *Genealogies of the Afghan Jihad*, David B. Edwards, 2002,

[536] 4/19/92, The Sunday Times,London, " Bloodbath feared as rebels tighten the noose on Kabul", John Jennings, Kabul "Many Kabul residents speak of him with respect; some said that if other rebel groups sought to capture Kabul, Masood would join government forces to defend the city. In Kabul's cafes, turbanned men delight in telling stories about him. He has not been to the capital since the war started but is fondly remembered as Kabul's best pool player."

[537] http://islamqa.info/en/b-dealings/20962

[538] He had a black Volga sedan, of the type used by Soviet officials See footnote 642 C.4

[539] See footnote 391F

2. He was ambitious – he had school children singing his praises[540] and aimed for a position of power in Afghanistan – or to become the leader of a greater Tajikistan [541]

3. He was a Tajik – with a cultural wariness of Pashtun hegemony. During the previous century of Pashtun rule – where Pashtuns made up close to half of the population– the Tajiks were usually in an unfavorable position[542]. Now, as a result of Soviet invasion, the position of the Pashtuns had been weakened with respect to the Tajiks and other groups.[543]

Also, as a Pashtun Muslim Scholar put it "they had claim this time is the Tajik Turn to be a president for a century."[544] –

He was also aware that the Soviet Union that he'd generally opposed in the 1970's and '80's[545] had been transformed. It was now a group of diverse states with different agendas -- far less threatening than its previous monolithic, communist, atheist incarnation. Some of the former Soviet Republics closest to Afghanistan had been strongly Moslem before the Soviet period[546]. Massoud could easily have seen them as potential allies.

At the same time, the former Soviet Republics and Russia itself might have seen Massoud as less threatening than the Taliban. Massoud looked more amenable to financial

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[540] Soviet military intelligence said he was vain – based on interviews with people who knew him in his college years , etc. get this file if possible. Give ref.

[541] see footnote 642
"Long live Massoud, long live the mujaheddin."

[542] Give ref

[543] A.[In Feb/89 it was reported: "According to a study by Professor Marek Sliwinski of Geneva University, 1.24m people have been killed... Six million Afghans are refugees, nearly half the pre-war population. One million refugees subsist in the swollen towns and cities while the rest have fled to the grim refugee camps of Pakistan and Iran. …the Soviet invasion …shattered the social structure and redrew the ethnic map. Before the war the Pushtuns made up 40% of the population; today[Feb '89] they make up 13%. Most of the remainder are in refugee camps. The Tadjiks, 25% of the population in 1978, are now 37%. Unlike the Pushtuns, they were spared the full Soviet onslaught and most did not flee abroad. Nobody knows how much this will shift the balance of power when the war ends; few doubt that it will change Afghanistan." The Sunday Times, Lond., F/12/89, "The nation Russia ruined; Afghanistan, John Witherow, #8583, 2277 w.

However, these figures were from before substantial numbers of refugees began to return to their homes in Afghanistan. At the time Massoud attacked the Taliban, returns of refugees may have been negligible – so the Tajiks looked like a larger % of the country than the Pashtuns. The original study is : "Demographic, Social And Ecological Consequences of the War In Afghanistan" 40 p. : maps, charts ; 29 cm, Mar/88.

B. In '03, the Tajiks in Kabul were ~1/2 the population and twice as numerous as the Pashtuns [see footnote 207] However the population of the city swelled after the Taliban were ousted and the US flooded Kabul with real money.]

[544] See footnote 548, infra "Regarding fight of Masoud and Rabbani on Taliban," paragraph 3

[545] Massoud's fight against the Soviet Union may have been more a matter of strategic collaboration than actual fighting. See footnotes 363 & 364 and discussion/map of Salang pass in CHAPTER 12: THE NORTHERN ALLIANCE & THE SALANG PASS

Bruce G. Richardson:anti-Massoud propagandist – [The public writings of former Soviet functionaries that he relies on are not necessarily reliable when it comes to their reports on their enemy, Massoud.] *Massoud and peaceful Afghanistan are incompatible, Weekend Post, By J.K. Sufi, 6/6/99*

[546] E.g.: the Basmachi movement was an uprising against Russian Imperial and Soviet rule by the Muslim, largely Turkic peoples of Central Asia. It began in 1916 with revolts over conscription of Muslims by the Russian Empire for service in WW I. After the Oct. 1917 Revolution, the violence developed into a major uprising centered in the Ferghana Valley, soon spreading across all of Soviet Turkestan. By 1936 it was defeated by a combination of military actions and targeted repression of Islam.

See also : The Birth of Tajikistan: National Identity and the Origins of the Republic, By Paul Bergne. Tajik natonal identiy was realtively new even though they spoke an old language – mostly Persian – the literacy rate was very low -- interesting book , 2007 – 207 pages, Tauris

inducements than their more spiritually motivated adversaries. Compared with the Taliban, Massoud would have been less of an inspiration to the Central Asian Moslems to adopt a more spiritual/ traditional form of Islam. As Massoud was more amenable to financial inducements, so also the people inspired by him. Moslems inspired by the Taliban would more likely reject the materialistic/non-tradtional rulers left over from the Soviet era.

There was also the possibility of a "Greater Tajikistan" –uniting the northeastern, mostly Tajik, part of Afghanistan with the newly independent Republic of Tajikistan. Massoud would almost certainly not be acceptable as the leader of a united Afghanistan – because of his Tajik background and the strong ethnic identity of the Pashtuns. He might've been a good choice for a leader of a "Greater Tajikistan". If the Taliban were successful in unifying Afghanistan under the banner of traditional Islam, a more ethnically based Greater Tajikistan would be far less likely and Massoud would probably be out of the picture.

[Ahmad Shah Massoud And The Genesis Of The Nationalist Anti-Communist Movement In Northeastern Afghanistan, 1969 – 1979 By: Peter B. DeNeufville, Thesis submitted for Mediterranean Studies King's College, University of London , May 2006] This 309 page pdf study has 95 hits for the string 'nationalis' and strongly suggests that the initial movement that Massoud would lead was primarily anti-communist and Tajik/ Persian speaking nationalist – rather than primarily Muslim[547]

The upshot was that Massoud – the ostensibly religious Moslem who may not have had even "an occasional drink with friends" – was able to be 'pragmatic' -- attack the Taliban and form an alliance with Russia. The situation with his associate, Afghan President, Burhanuddin Rabbani, was similar – though Rabbani had far greater religious depth[548].

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[547] When the Taliban captured Kabul 9/27/96, the representive of Massoud and Rabbani in the UN, "Ghafoorzai said he expected to hear the result of negotiations in northern Afghanistan between Uzbek General Abdul Rashid Dostam and other "nationalist and independent movements" concerning the possible formation of a "a strong united front against Taliban." 9/28/96, AFP, "Working women confined to the home as Taliban impose their rule", Terence White1236 words, Dateline: Kabul, Sep 28. There is no mention of even a moderate form of Islam.

[548] **A.** Religious Pashtun Scholar, N.M, offered this explanation:

> "Regarding fight of Masoud and Rabbani on Taliban
>
> Shortly we can say it was the power issue, also a little bit ethnic, actually Massoud and Rabbani want to be in Power, even they had plan that Taliban will remove other groups (Hezb e Islami Hekmatyar and those they were not with Massoud and Rabbani) later on they will attack on Taliban, it happen the same things, in the beginning Massoud informed the Jamiat Islami relative commander Mullah Naqib in Kandahar to Join with Taliban, and remove Hezb e Islami, Bcz Hez was strong in Kandahar, later on in Ghazni also Qari Baba Jamiat relative commander informed let the province to Taliban, Talban start fight with Hezb e Islami (Pashtoon Mujahedeen), Massoud had a meeting with Taliban in Maidan Shar, closed to Kabul, and he request Taliban don't enter to Kabul, fight with Hekmatyar's people and remove them, when you completely remove it, well come to Kabul.
>
> Hekmatyar knows the plan and he didn't fight with Taliban in Charasiab (Closed to Kabul), on that time Massoud attack on Taliban and used Jet and bombarded Taliban, so fight started with Taliban, and not allowed to enter to Kabul, actually in the beginning Rabbani announced he will support Taliban and he announced he will send to them money but Taliban rejected.
>
> Let's say Rabbani and Massoud want to be in Power, also they had claim this time is the Tajik Turn to be a president for a century. But all Tajik don't had the same idea, only some political people had this idea, fight with Taliban was to be in Power and joined with Dostum, supported by Russia, India, Iran and some western countries"

B "General Ahmad Shah Massoud, pledged to end Pushtun dominance when they took over Kabul in 1992. But the Tajik dream has never been realised. With the Afghan minorities, mainly Hazaras and Uzbeks, each about 8.7 per cent of the population, being the first to take up arms

CHAPTER 18:

WHERE DID THE TALIBAN GET THEIR MONEY?

– FOR GUNS, FOR SOLDIERS AND FOR THEIR 'TRADEMARK' WHITE, 4WD PICKUP TRUCKS?

This chapter should not be necessary. At the outset we learned that the Taliban were not puppets of Osama bin Laden – or anyone else - and that they had strong and deep support throughout much of Afghanistan. We learned this through the combination of the extreme efficacy of their opium poppy ban and how they achieved their almost miraculous results– without any executions, maimings or floggings. [549]

We also learned from this ban that they were not dependent on opium as a source of money. They reduced opium poppy growing by nearly 99% in the areas they controlled. So, even if the price of opium rose by a factor of 30 – which it nearly did – their income from taxing opium farmers would have still been lower by a factor of three.

In the areas where their support was strongest – in the Pashtun South – they reduced opium poppy growing to zero[550]. Here, their income from taxes on the opium harvest would have been zero even if the price went up by a factor of 100. Taxes on zero are zero. We also saw – from the low, flat farm gate prices prior to the ban – that the Taliban did not hoard opium before the ban in anticipation of a price rise.[551]

In addition, these low, flat farm gate prices showed that whatever taxes the Taliban levied on opium farmers were also low and flat. If the Taliban were interested in using opium as a cash cow, the place to tax it would have been at the farm gate – where it is most difficult to hide. The tax rate would have been high and erratic – depending on financial need and how much they could gouge the farmers in any given locale. Instead, the rate was governed by Moslem law – low, flat and predictably consistent from place to place .

So where did the Taliban get their money? In early 1995, when they were at the gates of Kabul, the Taliban themselves gave three sources. They said "We do not receive money or other support from foreign countries. Our soldiers are not paid. We are funded by traders and landowners." The same London Times article that includes this quote also elaborates on the first source "traders". The article states:

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against the Tajik-led government in Kabul." 9/30/96, The Australian, "Fall Of Kabul Stirs Up Ghosts Of History", Ehsan Azari, Pg. 7, Get source ?

C "From the outset, the young rebel leader was determined to recruit the most extraordinary and able people for the rebellion, regardless of their religious education or religious views." P 282, "engineering student at the Soviet-run Polytechnic," p 12 from fall 1972 , p 74 https://kclpure.kcl.ac.uk/portal/files/2928447/437751.pdf

D Rabbani was in Cairo when USSR was completing Aswan High Dam & the leading muslim clerics of the previously prestigious school he attended had become government functionaries. see footnote 233

E See also – on Massoud: _____ 22 page pdf saved to flash drive. "Memo from Rosanne Klass to Dan Starer For: Ken Follett Re [manuscript of novel set in Soviet occupied Afghanistan] : Five Tigers, Aug. 8, 1985." [this became the novel "Lie Down with Lions" 1st rev , NYT, 1/26/86. Follett did not make many of Klasses suggested changes. Klass really knew her stuff and was very honest in this memo _____] On " Afghan situation, Afghan culture, the Afghan Resistance, and the situation in the Panjsher Valley in 1982—1983" "I am doing this on my own time [it is not the sort of extensive analysis handled by my desk at Freedom House; it is much too lengthy for that]" "the May 1984 Soviet offensive, Which shattered Massoud's control of the lower valley "He's not the best military brain in the country. He's one of a dozen or so top ones. ...Ismail in Herat (also Jamiat) and others from other groups are as good or better. Massoud was simply the one the press discovered, and could conveniently reach. It started with Ed Girardet." [I don't understand what Klass means when she writes "the emeralds are the least of it" refering to a conversation with the CIA charachter -'Winderman'- in Follettt's book I think that she is implying that Massoud gets his money from Opium—which is not mentioned as a source of money in the book. ..."catastrophic results of *Mahsud's real life* armistice with the Russians, which they used to surround and nearly destroy him, (he thought he'd get the better of it; he did not), you'd best pick a plot peg that hasn't been undone by events since. (Mahsud has been pretty much driven out of the lower valley that debouches onto the Salang highway. The French doctors were forced out. he holds only the upper valley now, and the situation is very bad. As of 1984/85.)"

F see also John Fullerton "Fed up with a desk job in London at the end of the 1970s, Fullerton drew himself to the attention of the Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) and volunteered to work undercover for two years against the Soviets in Afghanistan." ____ Email:___ Both Fullerton and Ahmed Rashid wrote for the *"Far Eastern Economic Review"* and the Telegraph. Fullerton's book, *"The Soviet Occupation of Afghanistan"* 1983 205 p, was pub. by Far East Economic Review (1983); He covered the early years of the Afghan war for the Telegraph(London) the Far Eastern Economic Review & Reuters [added 8/29/16]

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[549] See chapter 1 B. Did the Taliban really wipe out opium poppy growing from one year to the next …?
[550] See fig. 4 , page 14
[551] See fig. 5, page 17

"The group is funded by traders in Afghanistan and Pakistan who want to open trade routes to Central Asia." [552] The third source mentioned by the Taliban is "Like mullahs of old, Taleban commanders go from house to house seeking alms. They have patiently won over the people." [553-A,B]

Before we discuss these three sources of money further, there are two very important sources of non-monetary – but usually costly – support: military expertise and weapons. There are many who claim that the Taliban must have had regular soldiers from Pakistan or somewhere else – or mercenaries of some kind -- to operate their tanks and aircraft[554] and to guide them in military strategy. It would not be expected that Madrassa students -- who made up the great majority of the Taliban -- would be proficient in such things. The same London Times article that informs us of the first two sources of money gives us the answer here as well:

> "Taleban has recruited many experienced former commanders of Mujahidin groups which fought the former Soviet Union, giving it formidable military expertise."[555]

In support of this, it is obvious that most, if not all, of the senior leaders of the Taliban were veterans of the decade long, anti-Soviet war. This includes Mullah Omar. Many of them had also sustained major permanent injuries – like the loss of an eye or limb[556].

Weapons and ammunition came primarily from the governments and gangsters that ran away or were defeated by the Taliban. We have already seen this when they came to Herat and were left with most of the military supplies of the city[557]. We also saw this when they took over the positions of Hekmatyar on their way to Kabul.[558] In the first months of their existence under Mullah Omar a supportive former Mujahidin leader opened his armory to them.[559] After that, but before they came to the city of Kandahar -- they staged a surprise raid on a very large cache of military supplies. This single operation – at Spin Boldak -- reportedly gave them enough ammunition and guns to last for years. [560]

In addition to money and military expertise, the Taliban had something of great value that accounted for much of their remarkable success in their initial efforts: moral authority.

> "Taleban's moral authority explains its evident popularity among Pashtuns …'The Pashtuns find it almost impossible to fight people with such a religious mystique' a

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[552] Kabul Shia leader killed as battle for city intensifies. Christopher Thomas, *The Times* (Lond.) 3/14/95 pg. 13;

[553] A. 'Taleban wages a moral crusade in Afghanistan.' Christopher Thomas. Supra, see footnote 263 B. After the foundational meeting of the Taliban in "late autumn of 1994", they "…sent out groups of people to the nearby villages to let them know who we were, and to collect bread and sour milk from the houses….Many of the *Taliban* were well known in the area and respected, and people were eager to help." Zaeef, "My Life…" pdf p 65

[554] "Myteriously, they repaired and flew former Soviet arircraft, despite only rudimentary experience among their leaders" p5 Ghost Wars , Steve Coll , 2004

[555] Supra:Kabul Shia leader killed as battle for city intensifies.

They could also have hired mechanics for tanks and aircraft and even pilots. Some professionally trained pilots from both in and out of Afghanistan – both expats and Muslims from other countries - may have come to fight with them without any special financial inducement.

[556] Taliban, Rashid p 17-18 gives examples of several of the most senior Taliban leaders with a missing leg or eye. He notes " The Taliban leadership can boast to be the most disabled in the world today…" p17

[557] See footnote - internal

[558] See footnote - internal

[559] See footnote /ref In addition to this specific case "Many former mujahideen commanders switched sides to join it, bringing weapons including tanks and helicopters.--Reuter." The Herald (Glasgow). 3/20/95, "Afghan troops oust student militia from stronghold", Peter Greste, p. 6, Kabul

[560] **A.** Anthony Davis, "How the Taliban Became a Military Force," p45-46 on arms depot at Spin Boldak – part of where they got their weapons.In "Fundamentalism Reborn? Afghanistan and the Taliban," Edited by William Maley, 1998

B. "The depot contained about 3,000 metric tonnes of arms and ammunition … including 80,000 kalashnikovs, and hundreds of thousands of rounds of ammunition belonging to Hekmatyar's Hizb-e Islami…" p61` Matinuddin 1999, citing: p. 269 "Interview, Mullah Shahabuddin, Consul-General of [Taliban] Afghanistan in Peshawar."

C. Ahmed Rashid says that at this "dump the Taliban seized 18,000 kalashnikovs, dozens of artillery pieces, large quantities of ammunition and many vehicles" [p28 Taliban -- revised reprint I.B. Tauris, pub. 2001] He cites as his source, Davis at A above. However, Davis doesn't mention 18,000 Kalashnikovs – and in fact gives no number. The figure of 18,000 kalashnikovs comes from p. 81 of the same multi-authored book in which the Davis piece appears—in fact the very next chapter after Davis – **"Pakistan and the Taliban"** by Ahmed Rashid.

The source of the 18k fig. in this Rashid piece is given as "Interviews with senior Pakistani military officials and diplomats" with no dates, locations or names. The same Rashid piece on the same page – 81-- has Pakistani Interior Ministry soldiers guarding the dump —on Afghanistan Territory – being "ordered to walk away when the Taliban arrived."

Western aid worker said. To shoot a Taleb would be like a Roman Catholic murdering a priest. That is why Taleban has achieved so much with so little fighting. Its rivals simply refuse to shoot.[561]

CHAPTER 19

CRYSTALS OF ISLAM

This also gives us some idea of the positive side of the Taliban. It was not only that the usual, two-bit gangsters would not shoot them.[562] The majority of the people understood and identified with them – at least among the more rural and Pashtun areas of the country where they originated. They were, in effect, like a small crystal -- a crystal of Islam -- put into a solution saturated with the same stuff the crystal is made out of. In short order, this crystal of the best of Islam in the community grew to great size and strength among the Moslems who shared its values[563].

The "social crystals" that precipitated the American Revolutionary War and led to the creation of the United States – the stories that are taught to the young students in their history courses in the American public schools[564] – look like the Boston Tea Party[565] and the Battle of Lexington and Concord[566]. The first was a major act of vandalism. The second a set of bloody battles of obscure origin -- the culmination of a series of acts of arrogance and violence that brought the then 69 year old scientist-diplomat, Benjamin Franklin, to tears.[567]

What did the "social crystals" that precipitated the Taliban movement look like – at least as taught by the Taliban themselves? Here are two of their stories about their origin:

A "… in the spring of 1994… [t]wo teenage girls from the Kandahari village of Sang Hesar were abducted by mujahedin and repeatedly raped at the local checkpoint. Mohammed Omar, a Harakat commander who had retired to become a *talib* in the neighbouring village of Maiwand, was told of their plight and summoned 30 fellow *taliban* to mount a rescue. After a brief gunfight, the girls were freed and the mujahedin commander hung from a slowly-ascending tankbarrel. Appeals for help rapidly poured in from elsewhere in the district and, thus, the movement of *taliban* was born."[568]

B On Sept 20, 1994, a Herati family, while on its way to Kandahar from Herat, was stopped at a checkpoint ninety kilometers short of Kandahar by local mujahedeen bandits. The men and women were separated. The boys were taken away and molested. The girls were repeatedly raped

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[561] Ibid , supra see footnote 263 T*he Times* (Lond.), 2/20/95, pg. 10

[562] Big time, professional, statesman gangsters – like Malik, Dostom, Kahn and Massoud -- had no such qualms.

[563] Something similar went on in Central America with 'liberation theology' oriented Catholic Priests among an overwhelmingly religious Catholic rural pop. The response of some quarters supported by the US was also similar: kill the priests. See footnote 861 on Archbishop Romero.

[564] I remember as a young boy learning about the American Revolution in an American public school. I wondered why the Canadians did not have to fight such a war. The Canadians seemed like decent people – very similar to the Americans – and they did not appear to be enslaved or oppressed. I really wanted to ask this question but somehow I sensed that it was 'inappropriate'. I raised it with a few friends – but they did not seem interested.

We weren't taught the name or ideas of a single indigenous leader of the opposition to the revolution – though we understood that ~1/3rd of the people were against the Revolution & about the same number in favor, Even today, few well educated Americans can give the name & ideas of a single opponent of the Revolution & few have heard of the hanging of the elderly Quakers, Abraham Carlisle & John Roberts at the hands of the government of the revolutionists of Philadelphia in 1778.

[565] In Boston, on the night 12/16/1773, 40 metric tons of imported tea -- equivalent to over a million dollars in today's money - was destroyed by people disguising themselves as Indians.

If these people had strong support within their society, they could've successfully boycotted the tea – but their support was weak and they wanted a war – so they committed a major act of vandalism – and got a military response.

[566] Started 4/19, 1775 by a "shot heard round the world" – but to this day of unknown origin, it left over 100 dead and two hundred wounded.

[567] "He [Benjamin Franklin] dreaded the war, and often said that, if the difference should come to an open rupture, it would be a war of ten years…The English, he used to say, may take all our great towns, but that will not give them possession of the country. The last day that he spent in England,[Mar. 19, 1775] …,we passed together, without any other company ; and much of the time was employed in reading American newspapers, especially accounts of the reception which the "Boston Port Bill,"[closing the Port of Boston to all shipping until it repaid the damages of the Tea Party] met with in America : and as he read the addresses to the inhabitants of Boston,[mostly favorable to the Bostonians] from the places in the neighbourhood the tears trickled down his cheeks." P.79 Memoirs of the Rev. Dr. Joseph Priestley to the Year 1795. Written By Himself With A Continuation, To The Time Of His Decease. By His Son, Joseph Priestley. London 1809. ____

[568] Griffin , p32 , citing NYT International, 31/12/96

until they became unconscious. Later, all of them were killed and their bodies partially burnt. It was Mullah Omar … who was the first to arrive on the scene. He is reported to have gathered some *talibs* who helped him in collecting the bodies. These were washed and given a decent burial.[569] He then gathered the students and pledged to start a campaign to get rid of such criminals. [570] Some days later [despite the rejection that he received initially from students who thought that the task was either too great for them or that it would interfere with their full time studies]…around fifty students had joined him" [571]

There was no independent – meaning Western educated -- scholar on hand to verify these stories, but they say much for the image the Taliban have of themselves and the image they are trying to convey[572]. The leaders of the Taliban here– these social crystals – are not like the images of political leaders of almost any modern country. They are images of Muslim scholars and students who act courageously to help people – not for money, power or ethnic identity – but for kindness and justice for others.[573]

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[569] Caring for & burying the body of a murder victim found in the field is so important in Jewish Law, that if the high priest were on his way to perform the most important temple rituals of the year – on Yom Kippur-- & found such a body, he would have to stop & bury the body himself – even though it would mean that he couldn't perform the temple rituals as a result of his contact with a dead body. Burying the unclaimed dead is considered Chesed shel Emes -- a true kindness – unrewarded by the recipient. Give refs to Mes Mitzvah.

[570] Matinuddin 1999 p 25-26 – citing note 38 p 268 "Interview, Colonel Imam, Head [Consul General] of the Pakistani Mission in Herat" Colonel Imam was, according to Barnett Rubin "one of the ISI officers most prominent in Pakistan's Afghanistan policy." Federal News Service, May 9/96, Barnett R. Rubin, CFR, House International Relations Com. Subcom. On Asia And The Pacific On Afghanistan

[571] Matinuddin 1999 p 25-26 – citing note 39 p. 268 "Interview, Mufti Mahomood Masoom Afghani" described [p. 276] as "Ambassador Designate of the Taliban controlled areas of the Islamic republic of Afghanistan"

[572] ***a.*** Neither of these stories is in the description of the creation of organized Taliban in Amb. Zaeef's book: "My Life With The Taliban". He writes, [page 65]: "The founding meeting of what became known as 'the *Taliban*' was held in the late autumn of 1994." However, a shorter version of the story at **B,** is noted on p. 69 – after the founding meating of the Taliban had taken place and they were aleady in process of routing a notorious local gangster – having just routed three small groups of less dangerous miscreants.

b. An official, 5300 word, biography of Mullah Omar, pub. 4/4/'15, gives the founding date of the Taliban as "15th Muharram 1415 AH (lunar) (i.e. 24th or 25th June 1994)". It adds "…more than 1500 religious scholars, convened a meeting in Kandahar city on 15th Dhul Qa'da 1416 AH (lunar) (i.e. 4th April 1996). They approved the leadership of Mullah Mohammad Umar 'Mujahid' and conferred the title of 'Ameer-ul-Momineen' (the leader of the pious believers) on him." See footnote 25 B for comments from this bio. on the Palestinians. http://jamiat.org.za/official-taliban-biography-of-mullah-muhammad-omar/

c. The following account of the origin of the Taliban by Mullah Omar in his own words is from The Giant Man by Husayn Ibn Mahmud ——— Tibyan Publications, [29/11/1426 ~12/31/2005], pdf p 16-18 of 49 page pdf from internet archive ——— Found in: Alex Strick van Linschoten: Reading the Afghan Taliban: 67 Sources You Should Be Studying 12/26/2015 in Afghanistan, Books, First Draft Publishing ———

"And this is the story of the beginning which Amir Al-Mu'minin …which came from his tongue in a recording which was broadcast by the radio (station) "The Voice of the Shari'ah" in Qandahar, …the official radio station of the Islamic Emirate. He - May Allah protect him - said,

"I used to study in a school in the city of "Sanj Sar" in Qandahar with about 20 other of my fellow students. Then corruption took over the land, murder, looting and robbery reached alarming proportions, and control was in the hands of the corrupt and wicked ones, and no one imagined that it was possible to change this condition and rectify this situation. And if I too thought that and said to myself, "Allaah burdens not a person beyond his scope." [Surat Al-Baqarah, 286] Then this verse would have sufficed me, and I would have left the matter, because nothing was in my capability. But I trusted upon Allah (with) the pure trust, and whoever trusts upon Allah with this type of trust, his hope will never be let down.

People may be wondering: When did the movement begin? Who was behind it? Who finances it? And who directs it and manages it? And I say: The beginning of the movement was that I folded my books in the school in (Sanj Sar), and I took another individual with me and …borrowed a motorcycle …then went to Talukan. …

We began visiting the students in …a study circle in which approximately 14 individuals were studying…and said to them, 'The Religion of Allah is being stepped on, the people are openly displaying evil, the People of Religion are hiding their Religion, and the evil ones have taken control of the whole area; they steal the people's money, they attack their honour on the main street, they kill people and put them against the rocks on the side of the road, and the cars pass by and see the dead body on the side of the road, and no one dares to bury him in the earth.'

I said to them, 'It is not possible to continue studying in these situations... We, the students, want to stand up against this corruption. If you want to truly work for the Religion of Allah, then we must leave the studies…we will request food and help from the people.' I said, …it will take a long time…Then no one from those fourteen accepted …

But I fulfilled the oath I had taken upon myself for (the sake of) Allah, Ta'dld, and …I went on to another study circle in which there was about seven students, so I presented the matter to them just like I presented it to the students of the first study circle, then all of them got ready for action.

Then we traveled on this motorcycle to the schools and study groups …until fifty-three People of the True Trust (in Allah) were ready. Then I returned to my school and said to them, 'Come tomorrow morning.', but they arrived at one in the night to Sanj Sar, so this was the beginning. The work started before (even) twenty-four hours had passed on the idea… …

And the next morning at ten o'clock, we asked for two cars from "Al-Haj Bishr", one of the businessmen of the area, so he gave us two cars; a small car, and a large cargo truck, then we moved those students to the area of "Kashk Nukhud", and others joined us. And when the numbers became many, we borrowed weapons from the people, so this was the beginning of this movement, until it continued." - The end of his talk "

[573] **A.** The Taliban functioned as a distinctive group over a decade before they were organized to restore order to Afghan in '94. The former ambassador of the Taliban, to Pakistan, Zaeef, described them in 1983:

"Most of the *mujahedeen* fronts were very homogeneous, with most people coming from the same background, same tribe, same family, or from the same area. The *Taliban* were different. A group of religious scholars and students with different backgrounds, they transcended

CHAPTER 20

RAISING MONEY AND SPENDING IT

With this said, how much money could the Taliban have expected to raise among the landowners and traders who supported them -- according to Moslem Law? [574]

The tax on farm produce in Moslem law is 10% for rain fed land and 5% for irrigated land. It is only compulsory from farmers who produce more than a certain minimum amount -- the equivalent to about 1 ton of wheat per year in value[575]. Most of the farmers in Afghanistan would not have had to pay any of this tax.[576]

Among the Afghans, it was the large landowners and farmers who stood to benefit the most – in monetary terms[577] -- from the Taliban. The Taliban program of clearing the roads of bandits and roadblocks would enable these farmers to sell their produce in distant markets where they could command a higher price. If they were growing specialty crops – like almonds, grapes and melons – unless they could sell them in places where such foods were in short supply, there would be little money to be made.

This same process of clearing the roads of predators -- and establishing effective courts of justice[578] -- would open the way for traders to ship goods to distant markets – both within Afghanistan and to and from neighboring countries. In this case, it wouldn't only be Afghan farm produce, raw materials and simple domestic manufactures[579] that would be shipped. Manufactures from Pakistan and the rest of the world could be shipped to nearby Central Asia – which was growing prosperous from its sales of oil and gas.

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the normal coalitions and factions. They were fighting out of their deep religious belief in *jihad* and their faith in God. *Allah* was their only reason for being there, unlike many other *mujahedeen* who fought for money or land."Abdul Salam Zaeef, My Life With The Taliban, P 22.

B 1st story of Taliban/Taleban in LexisNexis was in Dutch. [Nothing in English bef. 1/18/95] Algemeen Nederlands Persbureau ANP, Nov. 5,'94,"More than 50 dead in battle for Pakistani Convoy" Verfuss RTR UPI SECTION: ABROAD, 426 words, DATELINE: QUETTA/CHAMAN (RTR / UPI) In fighting for a Pakistani convoy with supplies for neighboring Afghanistan and the Central Asian CIS republics, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan over the past four days, at least fifty people died. Religious students save 30 trucks from the hands of guerrillas and also occupy ... Kandahar city. The convoy and its Pakistani associates were taken hostage Tuesday by two guerrilla commanders. According to the Pakistani authorities, all the leaders, including Pakistani officers and journalists, reached Kandahar safely Friday. They are relieved after a shootout four days by hundreds of students of the organization Taleban, which tries to protect travelers in southern Afghanistan in recent months. The convoy is transporting rice, corn, clothes, medicines and medical equipment. Sixteen trucks carrying relief supplies for the Afghan provinces along the route; fourteen others are intended for the Turkmen capital Ashgabat and the Uzbek capital Tashkent. Pakistan is committed to the reopening of the historic trade route. In Kandahar, Taleban took control of the city and the airport, the seat of the governor and occupied a base of the army.[modified automatic Google Transl.]

[574] In the early yrs of the Afgan-Soviet war – until 81 or 82 – the traditional sources of Ushr and Zakat provided the entire years livelihood for the mujahdin with some surplus for the poor and ulema in 7 out of 26 groups surveyed . Another 5 groups said these taxes covered about half of their needs.. "In some cases, better off farmers and flock owners, encouraged by the preaching of the ulema , contributed these taxes voluntarily to the mujahidin." P 189 Rubin frag. 2002, citing files of Swedish Committee for Afghanistan

[575] Islamic Economics: A Short History, Ahmed A.F. El-Ashker & Rodney Wilson, Brill, '06, p 185 "The tax rate was one-tenth...if the land was irrigated naturally, by rainfall or canals. "Half of that, ...would apply if the irrigation was ...by using labour and machinery," It's not known how much of the land that's called irrigated in Afghanistan actually falls into the latter category & how much is irrigated by artificial canals. The assumption is: all land that's called irrigated is taxed at 5%. In this reference a further distinction is made between perishable and non-perishable products, e.g.: p. 182 "perishable commodities, such as vegetables...herbs, aromatic plants, and similar, and wood for fuel, were all exempt from the tax." "non-perishable commodities were those which were normally measured in bushel ...,and weighed ... such as wheat, barley, maize, rice, sesame, hemp, almonds, hazel-nuts, walnuts, peanuts, saffron, olives, safflower, coriander, caraway, cumin, onion, garlic, and similar crops." [The availability of trucks to ship perishable products longer distances may alter their taxability]

[576] ~20% of the land is owned by 50% of the land owners and ~17% of the owners own 50% of the land. Estimated from chart /Lorenz curve. P36 In 1978, 2/3 of holdings were smaller than 2 ha, almost 40% of holdings had less than one ha of good irigated land. Rubin , Fragmentation '02, p34, citing Shahrani, shahrani@indiana.edu1984, Marxist revolution and Islamic resistance, p19, table in "Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan: Anthropological Perspectives (U. Cal, Berkeley)

[577] The poorer farmers are benefited through increased safety & lower costs of whatever they need to purchase – since it would cost less to ship goods on roads free of predators. Though the poorer famers would not be obligated to pay the tax on farm produce, they might be glad to pay something to help the Taliban – in the form of food, or a place to sleep. They might also encourage their own sons to join the Taliban.

[578] It is interesting to contrast the importance of establishing Courts Of Justice under the Sharia Law based Taliban and the situation under the Money and Power based Karzai regeime , where, after 4 years: "The courts and criminal justice system are inefficient and rarely used." Pdf 14, Exploiting Opportunities in an Uncertain Environment, December 2005, Finance and Private Sector, South Asia Region, World Bank

[579] 100,000+Tonnes of coal, urea, cement & timber shipped in & from Afghan./yr -- almost all of it by truck. Give details/sources

The safe roads of the Taliban would make possible the equivalent of a trans-Afghan pipeline of manufactures, raw materials and food – long before the proposed trans-Afghan pipelines for oil and gas were built. The roads could also be used for trucking fuel oil – from oil rich Central Asia – to and through Afghanistan[580].

According to Islam, this kind of trade could be taxed at around 2.5% of the gross value of shipments.[581] This very modest tax rate created another market for Afghan trucking – traders trying to bypass Pakistani ports where, for example, duty rates on automobiles destined for Pakistan, could be close to 100% [582] One of the earliest reports on where the Talban got their funding, specifically noted a "system of customs levies" as a key source[583] – in addition to two of the sources -- "civilian donations [and] traders"[584] -- that were also mentioned in the London Times.[585]

CEREALS PRODUCTION IN AFGHANISTAN '96-'02, MILL. MT SHOWING PROFOUND EFFECTS OF DROUGHT, 1999-2001									
ITEM	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002
CEREALS	3.14	3.14	3.24	3.68	3.88	3.25	1.94	2.11	3.74

FAO Statistics

It was not only roads that were safe and reliable under the Taliban. They also controlled airports that could handle heavy cargo planes. The airport in Kandahar was under Taliban control from late 1994[586]. Herat's airports came under their control a year later. Each of these airports could handle several heavy cargo planes a day.

So let's do the numbers. [587] We will focus on the year 2000 – the year the Taliban effectively banned opium. It was also the second year of what would be a terrible three year drought.

For a first approximation, we will assume that cereals in Afghanistan averaged $0.50/kg at the farmgate and that they represented half the value of all licit farm production in the country[588]. We will also assume that 60% of farm output is in areas that support the Taliban and that 60% of the value of farm output in these friendly areas is taxable – from farms that produce more than the minimum of about $500 of produce per year. We'll also assume that half of this taxable production is on "irrigated" land and that half is on rain fed land. This would make the average rate of taxation on the taxable farmgate produce 7.5%. With

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580 "About 75 big oil dealers at the wholesale oil market at Khairkhana[kabul] own nearly 500 oil tankers. Every day, nearly 10-15 oil tankers arrive from Turghundi and Nimroz carrying an estimated 2 million liters of Turkmen and Iranian oil." Japan Economic Newswire, 11/29/99, "Afghan economy thrives despite U.N. sanctions",Shahid-ur-Rehman Khan, Dateline: Kabul,/Kyodo

581 The standard customs tax in Islam is 2.5% between Muslims, 5% between Muslims & Jews, Christians & other "people of the book" & 10% with others – or, in the last case, a rate equal to that charged to the Muslims. [p 112 [pdf 130] Islamic Economics: see footnote 575]

582 IPS-Inter Press Service, 3/30/95, Afghanistan: New Factors Complicate Afghan Political Quagmire, By Mushahid Hussainm, Dateline: Islamabad, Mar. 30. "…Afghan traders use Karachi for goods that are eventually transited via Afghanistan to Central Asian states like Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. The trade is flourishing despite the fighting in Afghanistan and has tripled in volume to $ 350 million in the past year."

583 In 1977, 3/4ths of all taxes were customs duties, most of which were collected in five locations , Kabul (for trade via air freight) , Hairatan , Islam Qala , Spin Boldak and Torkham, Rubin Fragm 2002 p 163, citing:

584 "Taliban officials insist their group is a purely indigenous."The Afghan people are serious about this issue -- they are against foreign powers in their country," said Taliban spokesman Wakil Ahmad, a senior member of the group's 22-member ruling council. He said Taliban gets its money primarily from civilian donations, traders and a system of customs levies." Washington Post, Mar. 02/95, Dateline: Kandahar. That this article does not mention farmers but the later article in the London Times does, may be due to the easier implementation of the non-farmer sources and the intensification of the southern/Pashtun harvest season by the time the next story was written. see footnote xxx for full ref. [what is this ?]

585 See footnote supra 3/15/95

586 The airport was taken over when the Taliban took over the city and province of Kandahar. Give better ref on date , etc.

587 Check these sources for additional quality data

http://afghanag.ucdavis.edu/a_horticulture/nut-trees/almonds

http://afghanag.ucdavis.edu/country-info/Province-agriculture-profiles/province-overview/IS_Afgh_Kandahar.pdf

http://afghanag.ucdavis.edu/country-info/Province-agriculture-profiles

http://www.unodc.org/pdf/publications/afg_opium_economy_www.pdf

588 We are assuming that in the year 2000 there were no taxes collected on opium poppy growing or on cannabis: A. "in March 2000, the Taliban banned the collection of taxes on cannabis and destroyed 4,500 kg of the substance…" B. "The Taliban issued in September 1999 a decree calling for a one-third reduction in opium poppy cultivation during the crop year 1999-2000, a reduction of 50 per cent in certain districts in Nangarhar and a ban on illicit crops grown on land owned by the Taliban"[acreage in Nangarhar dropped from 22,990 to 19,747 = 14.1%. In Achin district it dropped 2,209 to 1,317= 40.3% [pdf p.28 of 2000 Opium Poppy Survey] It is not known yet which districts were targeted for a 50% drop. C. "In Afghanistan , the Taliban banned the collection of taxes on heroin, as well as on Cannabis in March 2000, and destroyed 350kg of heroin…" A,B&C from pars. 420,423 & 427, resp. of "Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 2000"

these assumptions, the Taliban would get $52.4E6 from such "ushr" taxes in 2000[589].

This is somewhat less than the $75-100 million per year that the UNODC estimated the Taliban garnered as "ushr" from this source[590]. Some significant part of this would go to support the local mosques and mosque centered programs[591].

For the trucking trade, we will assume that the average value is $1.00/kg[592] [593], that the aver-

[589] 1.94E9kg x$0.5x2x.60x.60x0.075 = $0.7E9x0.075 = $52.4E6

[590] p2, 'Addiction, Crime And Insurgency, *The transnational threat of Afghan opium',* United Nations Office On Drugs And Crime, 10/09 _____ A UNDP/Worldbank report from 1997 notes that the Taliban were applying ushr and zakat in districts surveyed that they controlled: Enjil District, Herat Province, 9/Apr/97, P 40; Arghandab District , Kandahar Province,9-12/Apr/97, p 60

[591] "Calculations based on UNODC field surveys suggest that Taliban insurgents receive 30-50 per cent of total *Ushr* levies." P108, Supra, footnote 272. However this was between '05&'08 when Taliban weren't a relatively stable government. Taliban % in '00 would've been much higher.

On the same p., the UNODC rept makes clear "insurgents regularly apply *Ushr* to all crops" – as we have assumed. In their calculcations for revenues derived from ushr on opium, UNODC makes no allowance for undersized farms or irrigated crops, and assumes a 10% rate on all production.

"The shares of the poor and destitute must be distributed to those entitled to receive them from the people who live in the town where the Zakah was collected, and should not be given to those of other localities." P. 192, Islamic Economics: see footnote 575 ,

[592] **A.** After writing the following note, I found detailed data : Political Economy In Afghanistan District Profiles: A Report Submitted To The United Nations Development Programme, Afghanistan, 2 Mar. -- 10 May 1997, Zareen Naqvi, [World Bank consultant] et al., p 50-1. "The average income per day of the [Tur Ghundi] port is recorded Afs. 88,190,603.[~20k tons in ~600 trucks of imports in a month – over 30 tons /truck, with ~22k af/$ market exchange rate in Kabul in this time frame , income would have been $4k/day on imports at this port. This would be $200.00/truck, -- instead of $750/30 ton truck load assumed above. Most of the import tonnage is low value /kg: Scrap metal ≤ $0.10/kg; fertilizer[urea]≤$0.15/kg; cement ≤$0.10/kg. [No fuel!] these items made up ~70% of the weight shipped.[see footnote595 L] The shipments through Tur Ghundi were a very small % of Afghan imports or exports. Many of the trucks for bulk commodities are probably double trailer/trains. No mention of rail in whole report, but: **B.** "A rail siding has been in operation for some years…at Turagundi… just across the land border from the Soviet railhead of Kushka." 5/23/82, NYT, Soviet Builds Bridge Quickly On The Afghan Border, Theodore Shabad, p. A- 18. "Over the past three years, the World Bank has utilized Post Conflict Fund Grants to support analytical and capacity building activities… These include preparation of a watching brief ($350,000), …and a United Nations Development Programme-executed program on Enhancing Knowledge and Partnership ($365,000)." Pdf p 43, p.35, Asian Development Bank, Initial Country Strategy And Program, (2002-2004) Afghanistan, May, 2002. Thus , the 'watching brief' mentioned probably covers the period 1999-2001. _____

[593] **A.** This assumes that the Taliban didn't tax drug convoys. These would almost certainly not have been traveling with large trucks along established trucking routes through regular customs checkpoints. The usual picture of a drug convoy involves heavily armed 4wd vehicles crossing relatively uninhabited /desert territory to avoid interaction with any border officials[B]. Alternatively, "camels are kept for transport (particularly for untaxed commodities travelling off-road)" Baba Kelai, Ghani Khail [also called Ghani Khel] [villages] Shinwar District: Nangarhar Province, [This district, controlled by the Taliban, also had "ushr (10 %) and zakat (2.5 %)" p 84 of 91] [Ghani Khel was a key opium market and was near the main hwy to the Torkham border crossing at the Aghan /Pakistan border] 10/Mar/97, UNDP 1997, p 82 of 91; ["Ghani Khel was generally regarded as the centre of opium trading in eastern Afghanistan. …[and…for acetic anhydride, the main precursor chemical for heroin manufacture, as well as for heroin (and hashish)" UNDCP '03 Op. Econ p .60]] This source also notes that in a village near Kandahar city there was a "Transit tax for goods" in addition to "Ushr and Zakat (minimal collection)" p64; similarly: "minimal Ushr and Zakat* road tariffs for goods passing through the district." Shiga District , Kandahar Province, Dates Visited: 8, 10 Apr/97, Pdf p 68 and "all goods have duties levies against them at fixed points on the main road; Zakat and ushr taxes are collected by local authorities and then transferred to provincial capital (Mehterlam); all provincial income is then shifted to Kabul" Qarghaie District, Laghman Province, Dates Visited: 8 -13 Apr/97 pdf 75][EMPH. ADDED]

Once the Taliban banned growing opium it would have been clear that the convoys would end when their stocks ran out – with much less loss of life to the Taliban.

B. [However, there are two apparently contradictory reports from otherwise reliable sources. The first claims: "The Taliban collected an estimated Dollars 20 million in opium taxes." [**A.** The Observer, Apr. 1/01, "World's opium source destroyed: Luke Harding in Hadda sees dramatic evidence of the war being waged on the drugs trade by the hardline Taliban", Pg. 3, 1190 wds _____]However, it doesn't say these taxes were collected from convoys or they were collected in a single yr. It's consistent with Taliban taxing farmers over a period of 3-5 yrs.

C. **1.0** The 2nd contradtictory report says: "Copies of official Taliban receipts seen by The Observer show that the regime actively raises taxes on the transit of 'white powder' (heroin), as well as opium, through the territory it controls." [**B.** The Observer, 12/12/99, "The desert village that feeds UK's heroin habit; Jason Burke reports on the secrets of Chuttu, a 'superstore' for the world's drug traffickers." Jason Burke. Pg. 21. _____] [letter of inquiry sent to J.B. et al, 3/24/14 – so far, no response.] **2.0** It doesn't say what the tax rate was per kg – the rate for heroin as "white powder" would be two to three orders of magnitude higher than the rate for white flour or several white powdery minerals and chemicals that were produced at that time in Afganistan – including gypsum based products, barites, talc and urea fertilizer. Even if only the amount were given – without the weight – the typical one ton payload of the 4WD pickups usually used[B] – would have meant a tax of over $7,000/truck – compared with $250/truck for the typical ten ton load of legal goods. But even the absolute amount is not given. Where and when this tax was collected and how much –should all have been clear in the receipt. The fact that none of this information is given in this report suggests that it is not reliable and may be a complete fabrication. For detailed mineral production data see also _____ **3.0** If the receipt was just for a truck of a given weight or type but didn't specify the value – & the receipt was not based on value – then the 'tax' could be considered a toll & the toll collectors need not have any idea of the value of the cargo. Under such conditions, the toll collectors wouldn't be taxing drug trafficking any more than toll collectors on the George Washington Bridge are taxing drug trafficking. **4.** The US DEA shows images & translations of 3 receipts for a total of 10kg of "white good"- all from the same day & same location: "29/6/76 (Afghanistan Calendar Date which is September 20, 1997"[converting Engl. date to Hijri date yields 7th Jumada Al-Awwal, 1418h, Tues. _____ , Solar Hijri date is 29 Shahrivar [6th month/ Sonbola],1376 _____] "Shinwar custom, Nangarhar Province, Shinwar Loy Wolaswal Custom Section" As noted at A, above, "Ghani Khel [in Shinwar District] was a key opium market and was near the main hwy to the Torkham border crossing at the Aghan /Pakistan border]. The receipts shown by DEA are illegi-

ble in their original languages. No amount paid is stated. From: DEA Congressional Testimony October 3, 2001 *Statement by:* Asa Hutchinson, Administrator Drug Enforcement Administration *Before the:* House Government Reform Committee Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, *Date:* October 3, 2001, *Executive Summary*. _____ Drug Trade And The Terror Network... Hearing... Committee On Government Reform, House Of Representatives... 107th Congress, 1st Session, ~120p Hathitrust Digital Library _____ This includes a report of the UNSC sanctions committee. **5.** The UNCS sanctions res. claims "Taliban benefits directly from the cultivation of illicit opium by imposing a tax on its production and indirectly benefits from the processing and trafficking of such opium". If drug convoys were taxed on the value like the crops, it would be a direct benefit, not 'indirect' claimed by UNSC. The UNSC wouldn't have any motive to claim the benefit was indirect if it was known to be direct. [see footnote 139, *p. 33, pdf p. 41* of res.]

D. In the same vein – of dubious reports of Taliban taxing drug traders – we have: "The Taliban objective of re-establishing peace and security in the countryside proved to be an immense boom to opium farming. They began to collect zakat at the rate of 20 percent of the value of a truck load of the opium from all dealers.[46]" From: "The Causes of Transit Related Pak-Afghan Cross Border Smuggling" Sayed Waqar Hussain [Assist. Prof., Inst. of Management Sci., Peshawar], Asmat Ullah [Lecturer in Econ., Govt. Col. Mathra, Peshawar. Email: asmat_ktk@hotmail.com]& Bashir Ahmad Khilji [Prof. & HoD, Econ. Dept., Preston U., Islamabad. The Dialogue, V. IX, # 1, Jan–Mar/'14, , p39-66

Their note 46 points to "UNDCP, "Afghanistan, the Dynamics of the Farmgate Opium Trade", this appears to be "UNODC Strategic Study #2: Final Report, October 1998. The Dynamics of the Farmgate Opium Trade and the Coping Strategies of Opium Traders." 21 pages, David Mansfield. http://www.davidmansfield.org/all.php A search of this document with the terms [20, zakat, truck or tax] produced nothing for zakat or truck , nothing about % or tax related to 20 and the following 3 references to tax: **A** "Indeed, in the east [12 resp. in Nangahar] and south [18 resp. in Helmand, 8 resp. in Qandahar, 8/9-19/'98] respondents indicated that improvements in the security situation over the last few years had reduced the incidence of robbery and the amount of taxes opium traders traditionally had to pay under the *mujahedin*." [p5 &19] **B.**"The majority of those interviewed in Shinwar and Achin [Nangarhar Province] reported that they had been trading in opium for 3 to 5 years. None of those interviewed indicated that taxes were imposed upon their trade." [p 14, 12 interviewed , 6/14-18/'98 **C.** These came in response to a specific interview question: "xiv. What type of financial costs does the trader incur in his work? ie tax, transportation?"

E. An interview with Mullah Omar included a specific question on the drug situation:

'La position du mouvement a été synthétisée, au début de 1997, par son chef suprême, le mollah Mohammad Omar, dans une des rares interviews accordées à la presse internationale. Les extraits suivants proviennent de l'entretien réalisé par Bizhan Torabi, de la Deutsch Press Agentur. Ils ont été repris en français par la revue *Politique internationale*. Interrogé sur les drogues, le chef taliban répond:'

"Àlong terme, norre objectif est de nettOyer complètement l'Afghanistan de la drogue. Mais on ne peur pas demander à ceux dont l'existence dépend entièrement de la récolte du pavot, de.passer du jour au lendemain à d'aurres cultures et de trouver des marchés pour leurs nouveaux produits. Une chose est claire en tOut cas: nous ne permettrons pas que l'opium ou l'héroïne soient vendus en Afghanistan même. Si des non-musulmans souhaitent acheter de la drogue et s'intoxiquer, ce n'est pas à nous qu'il appartient de les protéger [...]. **Notre but à nous est d'éliminer graduellement toute production de drogue dans le pays afin de protéger norre jeunesse. Àla question concernant le prélèvement que nous effectuerions sur les revenus de la drogue, je répondrai que notre administration applique à tOus les gains, quelle que soit leur origine, le taux d'imposition unique de 20 % conformément aux prescriptions de l'islam."**

[BELOW IS AN AUGMENTED AUTOMATIC GOOGLE TRANSLATION OF THE HIGHLIGHTED TEXT.]

"Our goal is to gradually eliminate drug production in the country to protect our youth. On the question about the tax that we would put on drug income, I would say that our administration applies to all earnings, regardless of their origin, the single tax rate of 20% as prescribed by Islam."

[The above machine readable text was taken from p 150 of Drogues et conflits: éléments pour une modélisation, Alain Labrousse [Ex-directeur de l'Observatoire géopolitique des drogues (OGD), expert de l'Association d'études de géopolitique des drogues (AEGD) et de l'Observatoire géopolitique de la criminalité internationale (OGCI), Université de Liège.] *Autrepart* (26),2003: 141-156 _____ The original source of the quote from Mullah Omar is from pages 141-2 of: Torabi, Bizhan (1996-1997). Entretien avec Mollah Mohammad Omar. Politique Internationale, v. 74, 135-143. _____ It is not clear what type of tax this 20% refers to but the IMF notes that "a Taliban decree of May 1999 seems to have reformed the personal income tax to introduce three rates of taxation (1, 8, and 20 percent) together with a series of exemptions. It is unclear if these provisions are still currently enforced." IMF '03 p 86 pdf p 87 see footnote 438

age truck carries ten tons[594] and that there are the equivalent of 300,000 taxable truck movements per year within, to and through Afghanistan[595]. With these assumptions,

[594] There were 5,942 freight vehicles in 2000 in Afghan p 12, 521 MW installed capacity, including 383 MW hydro power, 321 MKW electricity consumption, 1999. Carpets 234,000 cum, Gelims[prayer rugs] 82,000 cum, Timber 328,000 cuf, Processed sultanas[raisins] 40,000 MT. Hides 140,000 pcs, Cotton 300 MT, Economic indicators - trade volumes, (2000) first quarter, *Source: Ministry of Commerce, July 2000, p14,* Vulnerability And Humanitarian Implications of UN Security Council Sanctions... See footnote 608 A.1 for complete cit..

We do not know at this point what the average truck on the roads of Afghanistan looks like. A truck carrying one 20 foot container of wheat would have a net weight of about 20,000kg. ["Wednesday, 68 trucks each loaded with 200 sacks of wheat crossed into Afghanistan. Each sack had about 220 pounds [=100kg] of wheat." 4/30/92, UPI, "Pakistan opens land route for food supplies to Afghanistan" Anwar Iqbal Dateline: Torkham, Pakistan] Many -- if not most -- of the trucks would be 40 footers, with twice the net load. Containers carrying manufactured goods have a density half of the rate for wheat, but a value per kg an order of magnitude higher. _____

[595] This # is based on the following :[also See footnote 177-D.17.d]

A. "in 2003, there were hundreds of trucks crossing the Afghanistan/ Uzbekistan border at the northern city of Hairatan" [AFP, 5/29/03, "Afghan president attempts to neutralise old warlords", Herve Bar, Dateline: Kabul]

B. "[also in '03] 400 more passing daily through the western city of Islam Qala on the border of Iran." [AFP, 5/29/03, supra]

C. "Up to 1,000 people were crossing the border daily and the Taliban were earning tens of thousands of dollars in customs duty on the transit trade which included electronics goods as well as new or reconditioned Japanese cars arriving from Dubai and other Gulf states via Islam Qila, AIP said.AFP, 7/17/97, "Iran seals border with Taliban-held western Afghanistan: report"

D. "Nearly 100 trucks cross from Iran into Afghanistan at Islam Qila everyday, say Taliban customs officials there. The Taliban charge each truck a dlrs 150 tax, unload the goods and reload them on to

Afghan trucks, owned by private businessmen for distribution throughout the country." AP, 5/14/2001, "Arab aid group to build road in war-battered Afghanistan", Amir Shah, Dateline: Kabul [Do they charge the Afghan truckers also?]

E. "The Taleban government, to a large extent, relies on taxes levied on trade across the Iranian borders to provide some of the GBP 300 million they are estimated to need each year to fund their military campaigns. Until the crisis with Iran -sparked by the murder of eight Iranian diplomats and a journalist by Taleban troops in northern Afghanistan last month - hundreds of lorries each week carried luxury goods from the Middle East and the West to Pakistan across the country. In the western city of Herat …one Taleban official who did not want to be named, said: "This crisis is costing us tens of thousands of dollars each day. It is getting very serious." The Scotsman, 9/30/98, "Taleban Feel Squeeze As Border Crisis Hurts Trade", Jason Burke, Kabul, p. 10

F. "cross-border trade has boomed since the re-opening of an important frontier-post in November, boosting customs revenue and bringing down the price of staples in Afghanistan. Iranian authorities have insisted trade with Afghanistan does not violate UN sanctions slapped on the Taliban for its refusal to extradite Osama bin Laden" AFP, 1/16/00, Iranian foreign ministry to send mission to Afghanistan", Dateline: Tehran, 1/16

G. "Convoys of brightly painted trucks chug along the highway from the nearby border with Iran, groaning under impossible loads of rubber tires, cooking oil and sacks of grain. Some cargoes are destined for the Afghan capital, Kabul, which is desperately lacking in food and essential goods. Others are headed for Pakistan, where they will fetch much higher prices…Tehran …has just signed an agreement with Kabul to resume business.

H. "We appreciate very much that Iran is doing this good action," said Latifullah Hakkani, a senior Taliban official in Herat. "We cannot say that Iran has sympathy for the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, but if they have sympathy for the innocent people of Afghanistan, we appreciate it a lot."…traders of Herat, negotiate new deals over Japanese calculators and pots of green tea….The border closure with Iran was triggered by the unexplained slayings of nine Iranian diplomats and an Iranian journalist in northern Afghanistan, …For months, traders …had to reroute their shipments through neighboring Turkmenistan, which added hefty transit fees and many hours to each journey.", The Washington Post, 12/22/99, "Iran Opening Eases Choke Hold of U.N. Sanctions on Afghans" Pamela Constable, Pg. A25, Dateline: Herat,

I. "Some 300 to 400 trucks traverse the frontier each day, often using minor roads which avoid checkpoints, according to Pakistani customs officials in Quetta." [AFP, 5/13/03, "Rivalries unhinge Pakistan's 'Gate of Friendship' with Afghanistan", Jean-Herve Deiller, Dateline: Chaman, Pak.]

J. 5E6 are urban & get ~1kg of truck-shipped food, & other domestically produced goods – such as coal & construction materials /day.

K. We assume that in the yr 2000, the # of transborder truck shipments was ½ of what it was in '03 – with no need to supply western armies & support externally funded development programs.

L. "Taxes levied on the hundreds of trucks that drive through Herat each day provide the Taliban with the bulk of their income--and finance the war to conquer the last patch of Afghanistan not under their control…. At Islam Qila, the first stop in from the Iran border, more than 100 trucks await their turn to be loaded by gangs of laborers… By the end of the day about 200 trucks laden with imported computers, washing machines, TV sets, motor parts, wheat, cloth and even candy will have departed north and east [from Herat] [Thus clearance time is ~1/2day. This low clearance time isn't due to a preponderence of low value raw materials being shipped through this port. Islam Qila handled much higher value goods than Tur Ghundi [see footnote 592] See In Karzai's 4th year "On average it took firms nearly 10 days to clear exports last year and about 11 days to clear imports … Shipping agents report that this time could be lowered to a few hours if they are willing to pay a large enough bribe."pdf 45 12/05, World Bank see footnotes 578 & 597] along the rutted track that was once a bitumen highway circling Afghanistan… the people of Herat are treated with an unusual tolerance by the Taliban... They don't want to annoy us, says Inyatullah, a 50-year-old trader…It is a golden goose for them, says Dad Mohammad, an Afghan businessman. This city earns them everything." 5/29/'00, Time Mag., "The Taliban's Land of Milk and Honey", Ghulam Hasnain, Herat

M. We also assume that "hundreds" in item A is 250. This gives us: [RECOMPUTE USING NEW DATA AT ' L']

a. 250 [A. Hairatan] + 400 [B. Islam Qala] +350 [I. Pakistan] = 1000 trucks per day in 2003 crossing the border
b. 5 million Kg/day = 500 ten ton trucks – in 2000 for intra Afghan trucking [=1.5E6 tons/yr]
c. 1000a./2 + 500b. =1000 truck movements per day in 2000
d. 1,000 trucks/ day x 300 days/yr = 300,000 trucks /yr.

The IMF published data on "Transport of goods by road (1,000 [metric] tons)":1,887 in '00, 3,688 in '01, 5,015, '02, citing FAO/WFP; UNODC; & CSO. P 20,[see footnote 438]However, it isn't stated what is being measured or how the measures were made – particularly during the Taliban period. [See footnote 598 C for more on this]

N. Sources of funding for both Ismail Kahn & Dostom are explored by Antonio Giustozzi in some depth in Empires of Mud: War and Warlords in Afghanistan, 2009 -- e.g. chapters on the Political Economy of each. He notes import duties of $1000/ imported for ea. of 300-350 veh./day at Islam Qala- not included in above calculations. Be careful to distinguish between officially recorded numbers of the corrupt Karzai govt. and what actually went on.

the total from this source, at the 2.5%[596] tax rate, would be $250/truck movement[597] and

[596] "Based on the data from the Ministry of Finance, the avg. tariff in Afghanistan in 2000 was 3.323%, while in its surrounding countries it was around 5.902%." That the avg. % is higher than 2.5% may reflect trade with non-Muslim countries—such as Russia & Japan. This source also shows the results of a UNDP field survey of unofficial imp. & exp. pub. '01 showing a total of the 2 at $1.256E9 in '00. "According to government officials in the Ministry of Finance, "Afghanistan has 14 legal crossing points over its borders and 89 illegal ones" (most of them on the border with Pakistan)….Pashtun tribes live across the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan and the Baluch live across the border between Afghanistan and Iran. They traditionally had free exchanges, which resulted in implicit free trade of goods and services between them" p. 15 Regional Trade and Decline of Private Investment in Afghanistan, Ahmad Idrees Rahmani, 4/'08, Afghanistan's Center for Research & Policy Studies

[597] This is in contrast with the system in place today [12/13] in Afghanistan where some of the same players that the Taliban ousted from their giant checkpoints, Dostom and Kahn, are still in position to collect customs. A recent World Bank Enterprise Survey found that for businesses exporting from Afghanistan, 14% of sales was 'lost' during export -- compared with less than 4% for all of South Asian countries and less than 2% for all poor countries. This suggests that the amounts being collected under Dostom, Kahn, et al, were also close to 6 times what we have computed here – perhaps the price for avoiding delay. Also, the average time to clear direct exports through customs was about 14.5 days – 6 days longer than for South Asia as a whole. Afghanistan, Country Profile 2008, Enterprise Survey

Another study says (p23) imported used "Vehicles are taxed [for customs at the border] between 10 and 16 percent, according to model and year." (p 25) The import process [for vehicles new and used] currently allows significant opportunities for corruption and bribe-taking.

$75 million per year. However, we will assume that the Taliban were only able to collect ~2/3 of this - $50 million/yr[598] -- and the rest was in non-Taliban controlled areas, traveled on back roads or was concealed in small vehicles to avoid payment. [599]

For air cargo, we will assume that the value is about $10/kg – including consumer electronics, refrigerators, washing machines, legal pharmaceuticals, specialty clothing, cigarettes, generators and even automobiles.[600] We will also assume an average load of 20 tons and a total – for all airports combined – of 10 planes per day, 300 days per year. So, the total value of such cargo coming into Afghanistan by air would be $0.6E9/yr. [601] All of this will be trucked from the airport – so 10% of this has already been accounted for in lower-value truck movements at $1/kg. This leaves a potential source $0.54 billion to be taxed at 2.5% or $13.5 million.

"Understanding Markets In Afghanistan A Study of the Market in Second-hand Cars" Anna Paterson _____

Another study shows that the Karzai regime instituted 73 tolling stations on the roads in four provinces -- with 374 personnel -- to collect money for road maintenance and repair, but "collected tolls serve as a revenue source for the cash-strapped provinces, although there is a certain amount of leakage in the system and the full toll amount is not passed on. " and "no details were available on the amount of toll revenues being collected" Afghanistan's Transport Sector: On the Road to Recovery, Apr. 2003 Asian Development Bank _____

[598] **A** This compares with $67.8 E6 in customs revenues reported to the center for 2002-3 fiscal year. "However, only a small part of this money is remitted to the center" IMF '03, p 60 [see footnote 438 _____ The rest is kept by the collectors –to a great extent, the same people with their giant check points that the Taliban had defeated.

B The value of imports – almost all by truck -- in '99-2000 & 2000-01 was reported as $1.2E9 & $1.7E9, resp. [IMF 2003, pdf p. 33, citing the CSO – Central Office of Statistics of Afghanistan [see footnote 438]Assume $1.5E9 for 2000 Exports, excl. opium, were $0.13E9 & $0.07E9 for the same years and from the same source [pdf p 32]. Assume $0.1E9 for 2000. Apply 2.5% to the total [.025x [1.5+0.1] = $40E6. In our estimate above [see footnote 595 .K, we assumed that half of taxed truck movements were intra-country & all trucks had equal value/kg. Applying this method here, we'd have a total of $80E6 -- close to our $75E6 estimate before allowing for shipments that weren't taxed.

C "A World Bank study estimated that income to the Taliban from taxing the Afghanistan Pakistan smuggling trade amounted to U.S. $75 million in 1997." P 25 Crisis of Impunity [see footnote 672 B] citing, Zareen F.Naqvi *Afghanistan-Pakistan Trade Relations* (Islamabad: World Bank, 1999), pp. 15-16. Pdf available at _____ saved to flash drive . 22 pdf pages On p. 14 of Naqvi, this $75E6 is calc. for Afghan-Pakistan based on a 1% "Maafi" duty on $2E9 in unofficial re-exports to Paksitan [=$20E6] noting "a different rate [is charged] if goods are primarily meant for the Afghan market. The Taliban authorities also charge customs duty on goods coming into Afghanistan through air and land routes. A joint UNDP-World Bank study in 1977 [sic, should read 1997] conservatively estimated revenue collection of $ 50 million from trade-related activities in Afghanistan. Hence the Afghan authorities may be collecting approximately $ 75 million from the Afghanistan-Pakistan trade.[The World Bank, 1997, Study of Afghanistan-Pakistan Trade Relations, Consultant's report, Islamabad, Pakistan.]

D.1 Political Economy In Afghanistan: District Profiles, A Report Submitted To The United Nations Development Programme, Afghanistan, 2 March -- 10 May 1997, Research Team: Hamida Anwari, Syed Muzafaruddin Hashimi, Abdul Ghaffar Massoom, Abdul Shukoor Satarzai, Mulki Khan Shinwari, World Bank Consultant: Zareen Naqvi Team Leader: Paula R. Newberg. 91 pdf pages, saved to flash drive _____ "counted truck traffic at customs posts" etc.

D.2 This report notes [pdf p. 4] "Mr. Satarzai's interviews with regional leadership in Mazar -i- Sharif and Kabul form the background for further work with these offices by the United Nations and the World Bank." On the same page, we see that Abdul Shukoor Satarzai was tasked with studies/interviews at "Regional government offices" in the "Northern Region" & "Taliban authorities and government offices" in "Kabul". On pdf p 6 we learn: "Further uses of the data collected during this study will be undertaken by the World Bank; in particular, the information collected in the government offices of the Northern Region and in the central government offices located in Kabul will be analyzed separately after additional interviews are completed." Dostom controlled Mazar-i-Sharif at the time of the study. [This info. doesn't appear in this rept. Not known if/when published. Req. for this info addressed to WB went unanswered. A former senior staffer at WB was afraid to ask about it & called ASA a kook. See footnote 862] Abdul Shakoor Satarzai [note spell. diff] reached thru facebook 6/6/'16. Lives in Can. & says he gave rpt. to Paula R. Newberg, now, Prof. U. T. Austin. Sent email ___ req. rpt & sent cover, cont. & pref. of #337 to both. Newberg said rept given to Z. F.Naqvi, now at Simon Fraser U.,Ca. Sent req. with #337 cc&p to ZFN,

[599] The UNODC noted "In Taliban areas, such payments usually secure a stamp to allow free passage…"supra p 108, footnote 271. This was for '08, when the Taliban weren't in as much control as they were in '00.

When the Talban were in control, we know that they collected customs from, among other things, the following report : ….[I]n 1996, when the Taliban captured Kabul …[they] banned collecting and paying interest as blasphemy. With no loans and no savings accounts, the central bank only collected utility bill payments and tax and customs revenue….." The Philadelphia Inquirer, Dec. 5/01 'Afghan currency is foreign; Like the country, its money has a rough past.', Andrew Maykuth; Pg. A01, 1238 words, Dateline: Kabul, Andrew Maykuth's e-mail address is foreign@phillynews.com.

"Most of the coal mines are now inoperative and production is down to one thirtieth of pre-war levels. Cement production fell by 90% during the 1992-1996 civil war period. Raw timber has become a major export, with the exploitation of the south east Afghanistan forests (328,000 cubic feet in a quarter). Raw marble has also become a major export. Reportedly over 300 MT are exported daily from Helmand to Baluchistan, generating revenue in the order of $1.2 million annually. Several contracts have been awarded for the extraction of precious metals (for example the Kayan gold mines) and precious stones". P.11 Vulnerability And Humanitarian Implications of UN Security Council Sanctions… See footnote 608 A.1 for complete cit. Raw Afghan marble is ~$30/ton, p16 _____ Cement is ~$60/ton p34, Fertilizer 43% nitrogen $8.33/50kg sack, flour ~$0.20/kg – Pakistan , raw timber from Russia is $140/ m^3 p36

[600] Kamal Matinuddin. [See footnote 278] says the Taliban got their money from "smuggling" – p. 56 -- describes stocks of material – incl. autos - waiting to be transshipped in Kandahar airport. [citing interview with Ijlal Haidar Zaidi, "former advisor of the second Benazir Government on Afghanistan"] – doesn't quantify this in terms of totals received or amounts needed & makes no mention of most of the other sources we have cited here. In this section "Availability of Money [p56-7] he mentions only "smuggling" as a source. He adds , p56-7 " the Taliban perhaps do not believe that they are doing anything wrong as, according to them, Islam encourages trading with no regard to international borders between Muslim countries and that is what they are doing."]

[601] 20 tons/flight x $10/kg x10 flights/dy x 300 dy/yr =$ 6E8

However, in 2000, the Taliban were under sanctions and it isn't clear how much freight was able to continue moving through their airports.[602] To be conservative, we will assume that the Taliban derived nothing from this source in our study year.

The Taliban probably had an average of about 40,000 armed men in the field at any time[603]. Though they weren't paid[604], they all had to eat and sleep. Their room and board could have come in the form of additional in-kind contributions from the communities they were serving. It's very likely that much of the time they slept on the floor in the local mosques and that the local people provided them with good, nutritious, prepared food and other forms of local hospitality[605].

The total value of this support probably did not come to $1k/yr/person – or ~$40 million/year. We will assume that this contribution is what is meant by: "Like mullahs of old, Taleban commanders go from house to house seeking alms."[606]

The total from these three sources -- farming, trucking and hospitality -- comes to about $140 million per year. Of this, $100 million[607] could be turned into cash—the

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[602] "…all States are required to deny any aircraft permission to take off from, land in or over-fly their territories if that aircraft has taken off from, or is destined to land at, a place in the territory of Afghanistan designated by the Committee as being under Taliban control…" Resolution 1333 (2000) Adopted by the Security Council, 12/19/00, S/RES/1333 (2000), par 11, p4 of 7, ___ It appears from this that in 2000, only Ariana flights were banned by the previous sanctions that covered 2000.

"In 1999, Ariana operated cargo flights, serving Dubai and Amritsar, with a capacity of approximately 400 MT, each way, per month"p31 . Vulnerability And Humanitarian Implications of UN Security Council Sanctions… See footnote 608 A.1 for complete cit . This is consistent with "The Ariana Afghan Airlines freight capacity, up until 1999, when it operated scheduled flights to Amritsar, India, and Dubai, United Arab Emirates, represented approximately 0.3 per cent of the total movement of imports and exports." Par 32, S/2001/695 for full title see footnote 615 B .3 % of the 3.1E6 tons shown in the same paragraph is 10,000 Tons/yr = what is shown above "400MT each way".

However, this probably does not include cargo carried on its 3 727 Boeing passenger jets. If each of these made one round trip per day and carried full loads of 20 tons each way , they could carry 36,000 tons/yr. They are designed to fly ~3000 hrs per year. "They need a complete overhaul …every 15,000 flying hours, which corresponds to …every four to five years." Par 25, p 4, S/2001/695, ____

[603] A fig. of 50k is given by some reliable sources [p55, table 5.1, citing "source reliable" "The Taliban Phenomenon: Afghanistan 1994-1997", Kamal Matinuddin, Oxf. U. Pr, '99 . – but this was probably the peak. Many probably went home for part of the year. There were also many that served for shorter periods of time in areas closer to their homes.

[604] The question of sources of funding for the war was asked & answered – in part -by Abdur Rahman Zahid, Deputy Foreign Minister for the Taliban in the Q&A after his talk: Topic: Afghanistan's Future: The U.S., The U.N., and the Taliban, Location: The Middle East Institute, 1761 N St. NW, Wash. , D.C. Federal News Service 9/27/'00, 4643 words

Q. Stanley Kober, Cato Institute. [sent note:Faceb. Jan/12/'17] You have stressed that Afghanistan is a poor country, and no one would dispute that, but war is expensive. To be able to prosecute such a successful military offensive, you must be getting some money from somewhere to afford the -- (off mike). So what is the source of your funding?

A. MR. ZAHID: Well, actually, we have made a decision to help our people. And in that regard, one of the most important expense is the salary of the military personnel. And lots of them are volunteered, and they do not get any salary. So one good cut in expense is there.

And then, in regard to those others, president -- a lot of the personnel that work for the government, most of them do not get any salary, and we are trying to -- and so therefore, we have done a lot in regard to control the expenses. And therefore, we are able to afford it.

[605] This would be similar to the Jewish tradition of supporting Yeshiva students by the program of "Essen Tag". Each day different families would take the responsibility for a given student's room and board. This way, even relatively poor families in a community could both contribute to the learning of the students and the students could share their learning with the families that provided them with hospitality.

The madrassa students who made up the Taliban weren't used to cushy living. Most were sons of farm families or even of nomadic people who were used to simple living and offering hospitality to others.

[606] Referring to the insurgency in '08, UNODC noted p 112, supra footnote 590: "In some areas where they enjoy support and can use tribal connections, the Taliban do not pay salaries and can recruit from a pool of willing volunteers."

[607] **A.** This excludes taxes on the natural gas exported to Russia, on coal mining, and timber cutting. It also excludes [T]he Koti Bark thermal power and fertiliser plant west of Mazar-i-Sharif…theoretically state property…[which] did not cease production during the years of conflict... It] generates income of around 200,000 dollars a day, [~$60E6/yr]. …split among the three militias in the same 50:33:17 ratio."

The duties levied by Dostam at Hairatan alone came to a reported $200,000 per day in 2003. If we assume that this came from 250 trucks – it comes to $800/truck compared to the $250/truck we have assumed in our scenario. If we assume that he was getting only half as much in the Taliban period , it would have come to $30 million per year – or a total of $90 million dollars from his two "checkpoints" [AFP, 5/29/03, "Afghan president attempts to neutralize old warlords",Herve Bar, Datel: Kabul.]

The same source notes – in discussing both Dostam and Kahn "It is difficult to accurately determine the customs revenue generated by all this trade, but it estimated at between 600,000 and one million dollars a day." This would be $180 -300E6/yr. It is not clear from the article whether this applies to Kahn alone or to the combination of Kahn and Dostam. It's Ikely that it applies to Kahn alone.

B. National Review, 7/14/03, "Thievery, Treachery, Treason . . .: S. Frederick Starr, Vol. LV, No. 13 "Located at the heart of a continental network of transit trade, the country has always been able to thrive on customs duties and transit fees. During the civil war, local warlords and outright bandits picked these lush fruits…. The yield on customs duties

regular Sharia law taxes on farm produce and commerce - and the rest are direct contributions in-kind. [608]

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is enormous. At the main post on the Iranian border, $1,000 is collected on each used Japanese automobile imported from Dubai. Total revenues from that post alone reach $1 million a day, and all of it flows to Ismail Khan, the self-proclaimed "Emir" of Herat. Afghanistan's national treasury gets zero… regional warlords… control the seven main ports of entry."

C. Sunday Telegraph, Lond., 3/13/03, "Old warlord proves thorn in the side of Afghan government …", Lucy Morgan-Edwards, Herat, Pg. 32 Ismail Khan, … is reputed to be taking a slice of the pounds 500,000 per day in duties levied by his customs office in Herat on goods imported from Iran. Little of the revenue appears to be reaching either the people of the city or the cash-strapped central government."

D. "Afghan Leader, Governors to Face Off Over Taxes" Reuters, 5/15/03, Kabul, "The finance ministry estimates that the 12 provinces with customs posts earned more than half a billion dollars last year. Only $80 million went to Kabul…" _____

Compare with ICRC 2000 in Afghanistan: tonnes 22,326.6 , Swiss Francs 18,090,743 ~$ 11E6 see annual rept of the ICRC for 2000

[608] **A.1** For comparison, the UN noted: "The annual budget,[of the Taliban in 2000 was] $70.9 million..." However, this report also notes that, tax revenue was only [~$36E6/yr]. Both figures [p16 of the report] reportedly from the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan's budget for 1421[99-'00] & UNDP Human Development Report '00. "the budget [of the IEA] is well documented,… [However, there is]… separate financing of the "Tehreek e Taliban" and the Islamic Emirate and … non-reporting of locally and provincially generated resources" [This means that the data presented here do not show either the total revenue collected by the Taliban or the total expenditure and that a large amount of revenue and expenditures are not shown.] "Approximately 131,235 people are now employed in the Afghan civil service…(interview with Planning Minister)." P 18 "Vulnerability And Humanitarian Implications of UN Security Council Sanctions in Afghanistan" Office of the UN Coordinator for Afghanistan, Islamabad, Dec/00, The principal researcher: Michael Semple, UN Regional Coordination Officer for Hazarajat. _____

A.2 The report [p20] includes a table of crime statistics for Kabul. It shows official statistics of 33 reported serious crimes and no homicides per 100,000 people for Kabul as a whole and 469 serious crimes and 35 homicides/100,000 for West Kabul – based on a reported survey by the author in a community of 500 households in which he found reports of two homicides. For other countries shown in the table, the ratio of serious crimes to homicides is 895/6.6 for three of the least developed countries in the world for which data were available and 600/7.9 for India. The ratio of 469/35 for West Kabul is thus an order of magnitude smaller than what would be expected from the other countries' ratios. Applying those other countries' ratios to the 33 reported serious crimes for Kabul, would yield less than .5 homicides—which is close to the reported figure of zero. Note that West Kabul is Hazara and the author is coordinator for the Hazarajat.[letter sent to Michael Semple [m.semple@gub.ac.uk, Sent: 8 Jan./'14; no resp by 7/7/17] noting problem with West Kabul data & asking for more detail on the 500 household study: cc's to R. Rubin & B. Crossette. Reply rec. 9/Jan/14 – but no more data. See – App 18 FORMAL PUNISHMENTS IN KABUL UNDER THE TALIBAN FROM 9/27/96-9/27/97,THEIR 1ST YR IN THE CITY, & see footnote 971, incl. comparisons with NYC policing.]

About 2 years after the London Times reported on sources of Taliban support -- after they had taken control of both Herat and Kabul - Mullah Omar gave more information on their methods of fund raising. He noted:

> **"[O]ur administration applies to all earnings, regardless of their origin, the single tax rate of 20% as prescribed by Islam."**[609]

Some details of this tax were given in a subsequent report of the IMF in 2003. [610]

B An IMF report [see footnote 438] noted, p48: "After it took power, the Taliban regime (1996–2001) is reported to have initially succeeded in collecting sizeable revenues from import duties on trade, agricultural taxes, municipality surcharges, and various fees on transportation. The tax revenue base was also broadened to include some Islamic taxes, such as *zakat* (wealth tax) and *ushr* (tax on agricultural products). In the first years of their administration, the Taliban also received foreign assistance from Pakistan (about $10 million in 1998) and Saudi Arabia; the latter providing subsidized fuel and direct grants.35 In addition to these official revenues and grants, the regime benefited substantially from unofficial off-budget revenues from taxes on poppy cultivation and duties on opium exports, and on smuggling of consumer goods from the United Arab Emirates to Pakistan. In northeast Afghanistan, controlled by opposition movements to the Taliban, the main source of income came from the gem trade (lapis lazuli and emeralds) through collection of *ushr* on mine owners and *zakat* on traders. But by the end of the 1990s, the misrule and increased isolation of the Taliban regime, together with four years of drought [there were only 3] and continued fighting, had seriously hampered the collection of official domestic revenues, and the government increasingly returned to monetary financing of the budget deficit." [EMPHASIS ADDED]

The only source is:note 35, p 48 "Until the summer 1998 when this aid was stopped to protest against the Taliban's refusal to expel Oussama Bin Laden. Source: Rubin (2000)."

The taxes on opium farming and cross border trade in consumer goods are listed here as unofficial and off budget – while to the Taliban they were probably completely official and on budget. No source is given for any of this including the assertion that they had "duties on opium exports" other than the usual duties on any exports. The impression is also given that the Taliban turned to monetary financing of budget deficits – not that the opposition turned to such measures – as printing money. 3 Emails sent to IMF and editor of this publication, Thu, Jun 12, 2014 5:22 pm, avshadler@netscape.net , publicationpolicy@imf.org, abennett@plascwm.com, avshadler@yahoo.com

[609] See footnotes 593 E, 611 - 613

[610] "...a Taliban decree of May 1999 seems to have reformed the personal income tax to introduce three rates of taxation (1, 8,

This type of tax, khums[611], gave those who were prospering in monetary terms under the Taliban a formal opportunity to support them – even if they were not truckers or farmers. This group may have included, mine owners, money changers, urban property owners, and others in various professions and businesses.[612]

This type of tax is applied under Muslim Law only to what is left over after paying ones ordinary household or business expenses.[613] With this information and some knowledge of the average per-capita income and its distribution we can come up with a rough estimate of how much the Taliban collected in 2000 from this source. The result is ~$65 million per year.[614]

This brings the total cash income of the Taliban in 2000 to about $165 million in cash per year [615] The total value received – including our es-

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and 20 percent) together with a series of exemptions." [p 86, par. 145, IMF 2003, see footnote 438] Nothing further is said on the amounts collected by the Taliban thru these taxes.

[611] From the Quran: Al-Anfal,[The Spoils of War] Verse:41 [8:41] "*And know that whatever thing you gain, a fifth of it is for Allah and for the Messenger and for the near of kin and the orphans and the needy and the wayfarer…*" Similar to the Hebrew word for "a fifth" חֲמִישִׁי *chamiyshiy,* as in the sentence *"But if he will at all redeem it, then he shall add a fifth part thereof unto thy estimation." Lev. 27:13*

[612] **A.** The name 'khums' is from p 31 & note 11 of "The Laiha [Code of Conduct] For Mujahids" by The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan under the authority of Mullah Omar,2010. P 22-40, International Review of the Red Cross V. 93 # 881 Mar/11, translated from the original Pashto by the ICRC _____

B. on rev. from taxes on mining, some of idea of the potential under the Talian is given in a UN report of 2015: "Taliban exploitation of mines in areas under their control or influence and involvement in the smuggling of products abroad continue in the provinces of Ghazni, Wardak, Sari Pul, Kandahar, Paktya, Helmand, Khost, Logar and Zabul. …various Afghan officials described the income from these activities as very significant, perhaps totalling nationally at least several dozen million United States dollars annually and second only to Taliban revenue generation from narcotics. " [emphasis added] par. 45 of Sixth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2160 (2014) concerning the Taliban and other associated individuals and entities constituting a threat to the peace, stability and security of Afghanistan, S/2015/648 1 June 2015

[613] "Khums, An Islamic Tax" by Sayyid Muhammad Rizvi _____ ___ It is applicable in the Deobandi/Hanafi Schools of Islam - under which the Taliban operated- to such things as "mines and minerals, precious stones and treasure" & "spoils of war." Here's an example from '09-'10 that suggests, when combined with Mullah Omar's statement and the way it is applied in neighboring Iran, that it was almost certainly applied broadly:

"The manager of an Afghan firm with lucrative construction contracts with the U.S. government builds in a minimum of 20 percent for the Taliban in his cost estimates. …he makes in the neighborhood of $1 million per month. Out of this, $200,000 is …for the … [Taliban]. "Funding the Afghan Taliban," Jean MacKenzie, *Aug/7/09, Updated 5/30/10, Kabul, Global Post,* _____

[614] The per capita income was $171 in 2000 [from UN Data _____]. We assume it was distributed according to a typical market based 70:30 Pareto Principle- the equivalent of a Gini Index of 40 – called moderately imbalanced. This means that 30% of the people have 70% of the total income. [On land distribution, see footnote 576, but substantial income was earned by non-farmers.] This also means that the top 0.81% of the people would have 24.01% of the total income [24.01% of $4.10E9 = $0.984E9] & 30 x the avg. or ~$5.1k/person. We will assume, for lack of additional detail and ease of calculation, only this most prosperous 0.81% paid the '20%' tax; that the next 1.89% paid the '8%' rate and that the remaining 97.3% paid the '1%' rate.

With a 70:30 rule, the top 2.70% have 34.3% of the income; 0.81% of 24E6 population [based on a Taliban survey in 99-00, that found 23E6 plus some natural growth & returning refugees. Worldbank shows 20.595E6 apparently including refugees outside of the country http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?page=2]= 192E3 people; 2.7%=648E3 people; 34.3% of income = $1.406E9; Thus, the 20% rate would apply to $.984E9 = $.198E9; 8% rate would apply to [$1.406E9 -$.984E9 = $0.422E9; x .08 = $.034E9; 1% rate would apply to $4.10E9- $1.406E9= $2.694E9 = $.027E9. The total for the 3 groups would be $.198 E9+ $.034E9 + $.027E9 = $.259E9.

However, we'll assume only 60% of the people paid this tax & that as an Islamic "surplus income tax" it was applicable to a different % of the usual/western measures of income for each tax bracket. We'll assume that it applied to 60% of the income for the highest bracket, 20% for the middle bracket and 5% for the lowest bracket. This would give us [.198*.6+.034*.20+.027* .01]=$126E6; *.6=$76E6. However, we will use the Worldbank population figure – to be conservative – & multiply this by the ratio 20.586/24 = .858, x76E6 =65E6

[615] After developing this number, I found 2 reports [A & B] that support the trucking/customs related value:

A. ONE – for the UNDP -- done on the basis of a survey in the spring of 1997 [see footnote 598 D.1]– found:

A.1 in "southern region' – the part of Afghansitan that was controlled at that time by the Taliban -- "the highest (and perhaps inflated) estimate of customs duties on transit and other trade is $50 million and other sources may reach as much as half that amount again." [EMPH ADDED] [pdf p 8]

A.2 "(It was not possible to estimate the size of the northern region's revenues.)" [pdf p8] This specifically didn't incl. the Hairatan crossing or any of the truck traffic in the north of the country. It is interesting that though this study included locations in Balk Prov. – which incl. Hairatan -- & there are 23 hits on the letters 'tax' in the 91 pages "… where commanders have seized land, cultivation has declined (due to their inattention to agricultural production); where they have seized livestock as a form of tax, this production has also declined (because the informal tax is a disincentive to greater production). Other rent -seeking behavior on the part of commanders simply adds to the war coffers or personal profit rather than to economic stability." [CONT.][pdf p8]

A.3 "Where property rights are enforced, however -- regardless of the mechanism that is used to do so -- cultivation and transport proceed with greater confidence. The principle of certainty applies to other sectors as well: the teams heard few complaints about the amount of taxation or quantity of duties imposed on production, wealth or transport, but heard many complaints in areas where these seemed to be levied indiscriminately or personalistically." [pdf p 8]

A.4 In areas controlled by Dostom, the survey item "tax" was blank: Balkh Distr., Balkh Prov. "commanders have occupied land without devoting time and attention to farming", "production appropriated by military commanders" pdf p 22, "many if not most public buildings have been converted to private or business use, often by local commanders, major mechanized agricultural research station and most industrial plants are controlled by political parties of commanders ", pdf p23 taxes –blank - pdf p24; Dehdadi Distr., Balkh Prov. "variable - shop and business centres, agricultural if exported, property, when preparing documents" pdf p28; Narri Shahi Distr, Balkh Prov. "range lands often inaccessible due to disputes among commanders"pdf p32, taxes "not collected", pdf p33;

A.5 Enjil Distr, Herat Prov. "ushr and zakat"; Kushk Distr., Herat Prov. "no formal taxes yet" Taliban collects usher and zakat on agricultural products and livestock" pdf p 51; Zinda Jan Distr., Herat Prov. "none collected" pdf p 56;

A.6 Arghandab Distr., Kandahar Prov. "ushr and zakat (high quantity)" pdf p 60; Dand Distr. , Kandahar Prov. "Ushr and Zakat (minimal collection), Transit tax for goods" pdf p64; Shiga Distr., Kandahar Prov. minimal Ushr and Zakat, road tariffs for goods passing through the district , pdf p 68;

A.7 Qarghaie Distr., Laghman Prov. "all goods have duties levies against them at fixed points on the main road, Zakat and ushr taxes are collected by local authorities and then transferred to provincial, capital (Mehterlam); all provincial income is then shifted to Kabul, all local government expenses are sanctioned through the provincial capital", "there is a belief within the communities that former commanders benefitted most from emergency assistance.", pdf p75;

A.8 Momandara Distr., Nangarhar Prov. "poppy is a major crop, and its production and sale is made easier by free traffic across the Pakistan border, limited law enforcement in both Afghanistan and Pakistan, and investment in poppy cultivation and trade by local commanders and influentials." Pdf p 78, "ushr and zakat," p80; Shinwar Distr., Nangarhar Prov. "camels are kept for transport (particularly for untaxed commodities travelling off -road)", "untaxed trade" pdf p 83, "ushr (10 %) and zakat (2.5 %)",pdf p84;

A.9 Khulm Distr., Samangan Prov. [S. of Balkh, N. of Bamyan – Dostom] "all goods are subject to tariff at fixed points on the road: per truck (Afs. 5000 -500,000), shop and business centres: set fee per year, agricultural tax on exports, property, when preparing documents: set fee, transportation: buses and trucks: set fee when crossing district lines" pdf p89; Look for report "Kabul: Satarzai: Taliban authorities and government offices." Same study team.

B. Another report said: "Total imports to Afghanistan in 2000 were estimated at 1.6 million tons (valued at approximately $1,211 million). Total exports and re-exports from Afghanistan were estimated at 1.5 million tons (valued at approximately $1,227 million). In both cases, transit trade dominated the figures. In value terms, 11 per cent of the exports are of indigenous products and 34 per cent of imports are for domestic consumption (World Bank 2001)" par. 32, p 5, Report of the Secretary-General on the humanitarian implications of the measures imposed by Security Council resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1333 (2000) on Afghanistan, S/2001/695, 13 July 2001.

timated $40 million in in-kind contributions from the community – but excluding the value of unpaid services of the Taliban themselves – comes to $205 million for our study year. How does this compare with other studies of total Taliban income?

The only study of total Taliban income found so far was produced for the UN Security Council in September 2012.[616] They say:

> "The Team estimates that Taliban income for the year 21 March 2011 to 20 March 2012 (the Afghan calendar year) was around $400 million.[617] About $275 million of that reached the Taliban leadership for their disbursement while around $125 million was collected, spent or misappropriated at the local level. ISAF estimates the annual cost to the Taliban of mounting attacks during 2011 at between $100 million and $155 million;[618]

On the amount of their income coming from narcotics – including farmers, traders, refiners, etc, they note :

> "Afghan officials estimate the Taliban income from the poppy economy for 2011/12 at around $100 million;[619] this compares with an

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This would put the value of freight at $0.79/kg, compared with the $1.00/kg that we've used. However, it also has 3.1E6 tons crossing the border, which is more than twice the 1.5E6 tons crossing the border that we used in our calculations. Part of this difference may be due to the frequent use of double trailers as well as the hauling of low value materials such as cement, urea fertilizer and scrap iron.

Applying our standard 2.5% tax for all this $2.438E9 cross-border trade would give us $61E6/yr. The figure we actually used was only $25E6 – with another $25E6 collected from intra-Afghan – non border crossing truck movements. [See footnote 595 M]. This $61E6 does not allow for the "1% "Maafi" duty on $2E9 in unofficial re-exports to Paksitan [=$20E6]" instead of the higher 2.5%. [see footnote 598 C].

The upshot here is that our $50E6 collected for trucking is probably on the low side of realistic.

[616] Pub. as part of 29 p. doc., S/2012/683, in "First report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Implementation Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 1988 (2011) concerning the Taliban and associated individuals and entities" submitted 30 March 2012.

[617] Their footnote on this, # 34 , "Based on the Team's discussions with Afghan officials and on information from captured or surrendered senior Taliban finance administrators."

[618] Their footnote #35, "The Team was informed that these figures are based on a Taliban allotment of $50,000 to $200,000 for each district commander."

[619] Pdf p 29. Their footnote #41 "Briefing by Afghan officials, March 2012". They also note "According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, the Taliban raised around $155 million in 2009 from the poppy trade." Citing their footnotes 36 & 37 UN Office on Drugs and Crime, *The Global Afghan Opium Trade: A Threat Assessment* (Vienna, 7/'11),

estimated annual total value of the drug crop between $3.6 billion and $4 billion."

This is only 2.5-2.8% of the poppy business.[620] This report does not raise the question of where the rest of the drug money goes. They do note:

> "This suggests that the Taliban do not make great efforts to exploit this potential source of revenue."[621]

This percentage is actually lower than the fraction of the monetary economy collected by the Taliban in 2000. $165E6/3.53E9 = 4.67%.[622] The reported total of $400E6 collected by the Taliban in 2011 is 2.1% of the overall economy. However, in 2011 they probably controlled less than half of the territory that they governed in 2000.

In addition to these revenues from regular, in-country sources, the Taliban probably also received substantial voluntary contributions from the many non-resident Afghan Pashtuns in neighboring Pakistan and from sympathetic Moslems across the world. The report to the Security Council, says such donations in 2011-12 "constitute a major source of funding"[623]

We'll assume that these donations amounted to $35E6[624] in 2000 – about 14.6% of the total of $240E6 – including $40E6 in-kind contributions. It's also 17.5% of the cash portion of our estimated Taliban income.

If this $35E6 came only from Pashtuns in Pakistan, it would have been ~0.35% of their share of Pakistan's GDP –less than $2.00/capita for this group. It would have also been 1/100th of 1% of the combined GDP of the three countries that recognized the Taliban: Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.[625]

How does this income compare with the costs of running their operations – the tanks, the planes and the 4WD, white pickup trucks?[626] If the Taliban needed one truck for each twelve men in their largest and fastest campaign—the taking of Kabul in 1996 – that alone would require up to 2,500 pickups[627].

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p. 5 (avail. from_____ "This included taxing opium farmers, taxing and protecting drug convoys, and taxing heroin laboratory owners"

620 Important book on the internal functioning of the Taliban Government: My Life with the Taliban; By Abdul Salam Zaeef

621 See footnote 616 pdf page 14.

622 UN Afgh. GDP=$3.53E9 in '00 & $19.34E9 for same series in '11.

623 See footnote 616 par. 35, pdf p 13

624 This is probably very conservative: **A.** AP, 7/29/09. "US envoy: most Taliban funds come from overseas", Slobodan Lekic, Dateline: Brussels. Richard Holbrooke, US Special Envoy to Af. & Pak. said the Taliban got more "funding from their sympathizers abroad than from Afghanistan's illegal drug trade". At the time "NATO military officials in Afghanistan have estimated that the Taliban raise $60-$100 million a year from the trade in illegal narcotics…" At the time, Holbrooke's top expert was Prof. B. Rubin. **B.**9/27/09,Wash. Post, "Afghan Insurgents' Diverse Funding Sources Pose Challenges" *Craig Whitlock, Kabul,* "The CIA recently estimated that Taliban leaders and their allies received $106 million in the past year from donors outside Afghanistan." "The U.S. military has estimated that the Taliban collects $70 million annually from poppy farmers and narcotics traffickers." _____

625 **A.** In '00, Pakistan's GDP =$76.9E9, $534/capita; S. Arabia , $188.4E9 ;UAE, $104.3; Sum of these 3 is $369.6E9. In the 2010-15 period there were 300k Afghans living in both the US & UAE, 126k:Germany, 56k:UK, 84k in Austria, Canada, Denmark, Australia, Sweden & Qatar. There were a reported 300K Afghans in Saudi Arabia in 2015. _____ _____ ~1,160k, total. If the numbers in these and other developed countries in '00 was only 1/4 as much -- based on the figures for UK in '00, there were ~290K Afghans in these countries in that yr. If, in 2000, remittances from these relatively rich areas were $2k/capita with ~4% going to Taliban, this would come to ~$23E6. This is before including the millions expatriate Afghans in neighboring Pakistan & Iran. We will assume that the rev. from these would raise the total remittances to $0.88E9 & 4% ~$35E6 for the Taliban from this source. $0.88E9= 2.5/7.06 x $2.5E9 [Orozco estim. for remittances in 2'06 at B , below.]

B. It was estim. that ~$2.5E9 in remittances, accounting for 30% of GDP, entered Afghanistan in '06. Dr M. Orozco, S*ending Money Home: Worldwide Remittance Flows to Developing and Transition Countries.* International Fund for Agricultural Development, Rome, 2007, based on the same author's: "Estimating Global Remittance Flows:A Methodology." World Bank shows GDP for 2006 at $7.06E9 _____ The same source shows Afgh. GDP at $2.5E9 in 2000 ___However, the UN data show $3.52E9 = 20.6E6 people X$171/capita GDP.[see footnote 614]

626 Some of the Taliban's critics noticed these pickup trucks in Kabul, saying they indicated outside support. It is not suggested in these sources that the Taliban could've bought the trucks –and had them air shipped, if necessary to Afghanistan. Give ref to critics.

Not all their trucks were new. In their early days in Kandahar we learn "Nothing escapes the vigilance of the patrols driving around in general-purpose Volgas taken from the Red Army." These were probably Soviet era 4WD Jeep/SUV type trucks with ~1 ton payload – like the UAZ-469 (produced 1973-2013) or its predecessor UAZ 69. The main factory was in the Volga region – thus the popular name.

627 **A.** We don't really know how many trucks they had – or how many men they brought by truck to their largest military operation. Matinuddin, p.88, says that they had a force of 30k when they confronted Massoud's force of 10k at Kabul in fall of '96. **B.** John F. Burns of the NYT wrote "The force that took Kabul probably numbered no more than 1,000, of a total force of about 25,000." Oct 7/96 NYT. This low number may've been because their enemies had fled & most Taliban didn't enter the city but went after their fleeing enemies. **C.** Another source says "it was undertaken by up to 10,000 Taliban troops" [Afghanistan, A modern History, Angelo Rasanayagam, '03 p 152 , apparently relying on Anthony Davis of "Jane's Intelligence Review". **D.** A. Davis himself says of the eastern part of the campaign against Kabul in fall 1996 – the part most famous for its use of 4WD pickup trucks: "government intelligence estimated [Taliban forces] to number some 8,000 to 10,000 troops…" p66 [see footnote 218-B] **E.** When the Taliban issued an ultimatum to Rabbani to step down in Fall of '95, they said they had 30,000 that would come and fight. UPI, 9/24/95, "Taliban rebels set to attack Kabul" Asir Ajmal, Dateline: Islamabad, [They backed down in deference to the wishes of the people of the city not to fight in the city.]

F. K's were already in the area [They had 7-8k men "in a wide ark around southern Kabul" in the winter of 95-96 [A. Davis p 65, See foot-

However, about half the men could've been transported in slower, follow-up vehicles- mostly borrowed for the purpose - or were already in the area. Since most of the pickups would only be needed for a blitz campaign of a week of so, at least half of them could also have been borrowed. We'll assume that their standard fleet included 600 for this operation and another 400 for other regular operations throughout the country. Running these trucks would cost ~0.5$/truck mile. For 6k military service miles annually for each of 1k trucks, the cost would be $3E6. With RPG's[628] and excluding drivers, the total would amount to $5 million/year.

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note 218 –B] & K's of others could've come in slower troop transports possibly left by the retreating Soviet army– or commercial freight trucks & buses borrowed for the purpose. If we assume ~5K fighters already there & 10K brought in 200 slow trucks & buses , ~1200 fast moving, 4WD pickups could've carried the rest – with 400 left for duties elsewhere in the country. [see footnote 456-H] Of these 1,200 needed for this unique campaign, half could have been borrowed for the week or so & would not figure in the overall average yearly budget.

G. In Kabul they had 400 [See Footnote 971] men patrolling the streets in such pick-up trucks in their Dept For The Promotion Of Virtue & Suppression Of Vice. If they operated with 3 men/truck on 2 shifts/week, they'd need ~67 trucks for this operation in Kabul. Most other urban areas were much more traditional & – per capita – wouldn't have needed this level patrolling. The people in the villages & countryside would've hardly needed any. Roughly 8% of in-country population was in Kabul in 2000 & ~80% was rural. If other cities had 1/2 rate of patrols/capita as Kabul & the rural areas had 1/5th of the rate, we get 50 trucks for remaining urban areas & 134 trucks for all of the rural areas. There'd be ~250 trucks -- & 1,500 men -- used in this function

H. If there were a total of 1k Taliban trucks, most of the time they might've been used to bring farmers' in-kind taxes to market – or maybe even to just help farmers with the farmers' own market sales or farm supply operations. If avg. round trip to market for these farmers was 10 miles & avg. payload in farm produce was 1 ton & if half the mileage on these trucks was for this service, they'd move 10E6 ton miles – or 1E6 tons. This is 1/2 of all cereals produced in the whole country in '00 –& lots of goodwill generated among the farmers. Much of this might have been paid for by the farmers &/or billed to Revenue Collection Dept.

I. *For comparison* : The Afghanistan Statistical Yearbook recorded the registration of over 65k trucks in 1382 (Mar. '02–Mar. '03) – this was 60% more than the previous year. Over 37k private buses were registered during the same period, up 41% from the previous year, The Soviet Union supplies the Afghans with industrial equipment, trucks and oil products, and receive, in addition to the pipeline transmission of natural gas, substantial cotton, wool, hides and raisins.

J. Neamatollah Nojumi says "[Saudi] Delta oil directed the financing for the [trans Afghan /Unocal pipeline] operation which included several hundred Toyota pickup trucks that were converted into excellent military advance convoys" He has for this a footnote 37 "These mobile military convoys changed the balance against Isamil Kahn's forces and subsequently captured Herat in September 1995. (Author inteviw with commnader Salahuddin, Herat, summer 1995)" p102 The Rise and Fall of the Taliban in The Taliban and the Crisis of Afghanistan, Edit by Robert D. Crews & Amin Tarzi, 2008-9 Harvard Universtiy Press. Note that Cmdr Salahuddin says how the Toyotas helped his operation but does not say how he knew where the money for the trucks came from.

[628] **A.** The cost of operating a pickup truck in the US in start/stop driving in '03 is estim. at $0.236/mile. x1.25 for gravel roads & another 1.25 for steep grades = $0.369: Table 4.3, "The Per-mile Costs of Operating Automobiles and Trucks" Gary Barnes, '03, & Table A-4, pdf p 145, "Vehicle Operating Costs, Fuel Consumption, and Pavement Type and Condition Factors" J.P. Zaniewski, et al '83. If we add another factor of 1.25 for high loading/overloading, and another 1.25 for Afghan military envronmnt, we get ~$0.58/mile Very low Afghan labor costs & use of scavenged parts would reduce sum of [depreciation + 'maitenance & repair'] part of these costs [amounting to ~50% of total] – bringing the total to ~ $0.50/mile . RPG's cost ≤$100 ea.; 20k rounds = 2$E6

B. Mpg on 'Mountainous Dirt and Gravel Road with Steep Grades, Hairpin Turns and Switchbacks' is ~1/2 mpg when driving on paved 2ndry roads" and 'Maneuvering in Rough Terrain' is ~1/4th of 2ndry road driving -- for both lightweight, rear-wheel drive "dune buggy" Fast Attack Vehicle & 4WD 'Hummer'. Pdf 42-44 of 47 "Mobility and Transportation Analysis In Support of the Light Attack Battalion (Lab) Study" V. 1, James C. Emanuel, et al, 5/83, TR-374

[629] **A.1** The Taliban were said to have had 20 T-55 & 85 T-62 Tanks "at the launch of the US operation in Afghanistan". This source also gives #'s of operational planes: 8 Su-22; 6 MiG-21; 5 Boeing-727s refitted as military transport planes; 12 Mi-8/17 helicopters and 12 Stinger Missile sytems. Arms Deliveries to Afghanistan in the 1990s, Marat Kenzhetaev, Researcher, Center for Arms Control, Energy and Environmental Studies, Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology, Moscow Defense Brief, Centre for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies [after 11/11/2001] citing "*Newspaper Asharq Al-Awsat, 08.10. 2001*"

A.2 Another source, seen as reliable by the US State Dept, gives "100 main battle tanks; 250 armoured fighting vehicles." (non-subscriber extract from Jane's World Armies' Afghanistan entry) 8/Oct/01, cited in Taft-Yoo memo at pdf 22. See footnote 801B

B Assuming numbers were slightly higher in '00, it would be ~30% of the # of tanks in US armored div.. Yrly operat. costs – excl. personnel -- for US armored div.= $146E6 of which $5.7E6 is POL; $49E6 is consumables; $70E6 reparables; $21E6 indirect costs. 30% of this is ~$50E6/yr.

C Military helic. cost ~$1E6/yr., excl. personnel; [so 12 helic. =$12E6/yr] fighter/interceptor aircraft cost ~$0.8E6/yr., excl. personnel. [So 19 fixed wing aircraft =~$15E6] P36-39 "Preparing for Peace?, Syrian Defense Expenditures and Its Drive for Regional Hegemony" *Shawn Pine*, Policy Paper No. 98, in the book *Peace with Syria: No Margin for Error*, 2000 also compare and see footnotes 632 633 630. See also "The M1 Abrams tank: a case study in major weapon systems acquisition and program management" by Millspaugh, Kevin C. 1995-6, and "Abrams Tank Operating Costs More Than Expected" GAO, 1991,

[630] **A.** 320km/960liters – cross country at 25mph, 39T. **B.** "The Soviet Union…found...tanks were practically useless in the Afghan mountain passes [&]… suffered hit and run attacks by guerrilla fighters, who had been provided with anti-tank weapons by the …[US]" http://www.tanks.net/tank-history/tanks-in-afghanistan.html Get better sources.

[631] An example of sources of both functioning equipment & scavenged parts is retreat of Massoud when the Taliban took Kabul in '96; "Government tanks and armor litter the roads around Kabul, abandoned in the hasty retreat. Many tanks and armored personnel carriers fly a symbolic white flag, indicating the Taliban have claimed them for their own,

Their major military equipment was reported to include 105 tanks, 19 planes and 12 helicopters. [629] If these had yearly costs similar to the US military costs per vehicle[630-A], it would be ~$50E6/yr. for the tanks and ~$30E6/yr. for the aircraft. It's more likely that the actual costs were less than half of this – as the Taliban rarely used their tanks[630--B], probably used scavenged parts for repairs[631] and were likely to be

more frugal in their use of ammunition. Planes and helicopters were used only rarely[632] partly because they were expensive to operate.[633] Bombing inhabited areas was also not a good way to build public support. With these assumptions, we will estimate the costs of tanks and aircraft at $10E6 and $12E6 per year respectively. The total of trucks, planes and tanks would be about $27 million/year.[634]

The senior Taliban officials and diplomats were famously frugal[635] and could have been supported on a relatively modest budget. In fact, the entire budget of the Taliban in the 2000-2001 was given in a report of the Secretary General of the UN as $70 million per customs year [636] -- though this probably does not include the cost of the Taliban war effort.

The upshot is that the potential - and likely -- sources of honest funding within the limits of Moslem Law and the traditions of Afghan Society were—at about $240 million per year -- far greater than the expenses of Taliban military operations and allowed a large fraction of these resources to be used at the local level to support Mosques, the civil service and other traditional local programs. It is not necessary or reasonable to assume they were funded by the drug trade as such or by nefarious outsiders – like bin Laden,[637] Pakistani Intelligence Services or the CIA.

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witnesses said." 9/29/96, UPI, "Taliban massing for final offensive", Sarah Horner, 500 words, Dateline: Kabul, Sept. 29

[632] In '97, they were reported to have 23 fighters, 32 helicopters & 2 transporters -- compared with 21, 21 and 13 in the combined forces of Dostum & Massoud, [p 55 ref. Matinuddin at footnote 271 citing "recent information, source reliable".

[633] The operating and support costs (O&S – this excludes acquisition costs – the Taliban did not have to buy their planes) of a more up-to-date and more capable US jet, the F16, were $8,000 per aircraft flying hour. Of this about half was "mission personnel." "This number includes consumables, fuel, DLR, and depot maintenance". This source shows a Soviet built fighter the Mig 29 – a more advanced model than the Taliban's Mig23's -- as having costs similar to the US F16. However for the Mig 29, 40% of the cost was fuel while for the F16 only 25% was fuel. p138. "Modernization of the Czech Air Force", Thesis, Vaclav Vlcek, June 2001, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. Try to get better info.

If we assume that their 14 operational fixed wing fighter planes had operating costs of $6k/hr, each of 12 helicopters $1k/hr, & each of the 5 transports $12k/hr & that they were operated 100, 300 & 50 hr/yr/ea, respectively, the total would be $8.4E6 for the fighters, $3.6E6 for helicopters and $ 3E6 for transports or $15E6 total. By using scavenged parts, this would be reduced to under $12.E6 [lots of guess work]

[634] This compares with a calculated $15.6E6/yr "for the fronts" before mid Sept. '98 – based on the report of then "administrative Deputy Defence Minister…responsible for all the financial and logistics affairs of the ministry. [& for 9 months]…even acting Defence Minister" He started in this position in late '96—shortly after the Taliban took Kabul [p.85] & stayed "over one and a half years before leaving"[p.90] Mullah Zaeef. "My Life with the Taliban".

"We designed two budgets for the ministry; the annual budget was funded through the Central Bank and was spent on salary payments, administrative affairs and sometimes transitional dealings in relation to other ministries. The second budget was an independent budget submitted mostly in cash from Kandahar and was used for the consumption and supply of logistics, fuel and other requirements of the military divisions at the front lines. The *Taliban* forces trapped in Kunduz, for example, were being supplied with fuel and other necessities through airlifts each week. Other fronts closer to Kabul in Tagab and Nejrab up to Laghman, and near Jalrez in Bamyan, received supplies overland. Until the middle of September 1998 when Bamyan fell to the *Taliban*, the weekly budget for the fronts was roughly $300,000. Often, however, the amount that reached us was insufficient and we had to make do with less. Money withdrawals or transfers had to be signed for by the defence ministry, the acting minister and the Deputy Minister."

This suggests that a large fraction of the military supplies included in our calculation were actually from captured materiel at that rather early point in the Taliban campaign – rather than purchased with cash. [See footnotes 557 to 560 & 929] This is also before they were able to gain income from farms, trucking and customs in the North -- particularly the Hairatan Bridge. The terrible defeat tbe Taliban suffered at Mazar-i-Shariff in 1997 –increased some costs such as the airbridge supplying the Taliban troops surrounded in Konduz [Zaeef p. 86]. It may also have caused both a drop in revenue from reduced moralle among the Taliban's fighters and supporters. If the Taliban payed some kind of compensation to the families of dead or injured fighters, expenses would have increased. Much of the estimated $5E6/yr. costs of the 4WD pickups may've been under the Ministries for the Promotion of Virtue & Elimination of Vice, Internal Affairs/Regular Police, Agriculture & Tax Collection – particulary if taxes were collected "in-kind". See footnote 627.

[635] "The number two in the movement, Mullah [Mohammed] Rabbani, is the most powerful figure in the new six-man government [*for all of Afghanistan, seated in Kabul- Mullah Omar was not on this council].* I first met him on the eve of the final victory in Taliban's headquarters in Jalalabad. After the fall of Kabul, he sat unnoticed, cross-legged on the ground, eating a melon, among hundreds of bearded, black-turbanned fighters on the lawn of the presidential palace. There is little room for ceremony or material comfort among these men." The Observer, 9/29/96, Sud., "Kabul Victors Put Mercy To Flight" David Loyn, Pg. 17, [emphasis added]

[636] Par 9, p 2 S/2001/695 ____

[637] Steve Coll , in an article based on his book Ghost Wars, 2004, says "The Taliban had provided safe haven to bin Laden in Afghanistan in exchange for money and al Qaeda's troops." For a source he gives "These contacts contributed to intelligence about Bin Ladin's local movements, business activities, and security and living arrangements, and helped provide evidence that he was spending large amounts of money to help the Taliban." These 'contacts' were, in that context, the "TRODPINT agents" a family based group of about 30 former anti-Soviet Mujadin fighters. "[In 1998] [m]embers of the [Clinton] White House counterterrorism team …[sensed] that the TRODPINT agents were old anti-Soviet mujaheddin who had long since passed their peak fighting years and were probably milking the CIA for money while minimizing the risks they took on the ground." [Ghost Wars : The CIA and Osama bin Laden, 1997-1999, A Secret Hunt Unravels in Afghanistan, …*Steve Coll*, Wash. Post Staff Writer, Sun., 2/22/P. A01 *1st of 2 articles.*

When, in the summer of 2000, this TRODPINT group claimed to have undertaken an unsuccessful operation to capture bin Laden from his convoy – and claimed that they called it off at the last minute because there were women and children present, "the CIA['s Cofer Black, direc-

NATIVE PASHTUN AREAS IN ORANGE

Whatever outside aid was received – in the form of cash donations, expertise, volunteer fighters or even fuel and equipment, it does not mean that the Taliban were beholden to these 'outsiders' to the extent that they would do their bidding against the interests of the Afghan people.

The project of the Taliban was building – or rebuilding -- a society in Afghanistan on the principals of Traditional Islam. This was not of purely domestic interest. It would've interested religious Muslims throughout the world and particularly Muslims familiar with the situation in Afghanistan and sharing more of its religious and ethnic culture. This means that it would be natural and reasonable for such people to try to support the Taliban.

This was certainly true for religious Muslims in Pakistan– with its large Pashtun population. Many of the Pashtuns living in Afghansitan during the Taliban period were returned refugees who'd been living and educated in Pakistan during the Soviet-Afghan war. Even more of these refugees still lived in Pakistan – either in refugee camps or as more assimilated Pakistanis.

Though for those who were interested in denigrating the Taliban, aid from Pakistan or Pakistanis was considered a clear sign that the Taliban were a product of foreign intervention, the situation isn't so simple. The boundary between Afghanistan and Pakistan -- the so called Durand Line -- was created by the British in 1893. It isn't a natural expression of divisions among the people in the area.

There are more Pashtuns and Pashto speakers in Pakistan than there are in Afghanistan[638]. The areas immediately bordering Afghanistan are mostly Pashtun – a large fraction of whom don't recognize the legitimacy of the border or the justice of Pakistani rule there. Two cities, Quetta and Peshawar are just outside of the Durand Line. Both have a million or more people and are mostly Pashtun and Pashto speaking.

Large numbers of Pashtuns in these border areas are pastoralists and seasonally cross the border with their flocks and herds in search of better pasture. "The border with neighbouring Afghanistan, however, has traditionally been porous, and Pashtun tribesmen have moved between countries with little interference".[639]

Support from the Pashtuns and other religious Muslims on the other side of this artificial divide was far more natural than French help in the U.S.'s Revolutionary War[640].

At the same time, it is clear that their enemies received relatively little local support[641] and were heavily dependent on outsiders to keep their operations afloat. These outsiders included the Russians, Iranians the international heroin dealers and, in the case of Massoud in his last few years, the CIA[642].

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tor of their CounterTerrorism Center] noted that they had no independent corroboration for this incident" and there were doubts if the attempt had ever taken place. Pdf page 206 and pdf p 525 note 104, 9/11 Commission Rept. "During September and October, [2000] the tribals claimed to have tried at least four times to ambush Bin Ladin. Senior CIA officials doubted whether any of these ambush attempts had actually occurred." P145, & footnote 105, pdf p 524.

638 The CIA World Factbook – with no reason to overestimate the # of Pashtuns in Afghanistan -- says that 15.42% of Pakistan is Pashtun and 8% speak Pashto – of the total 193 million population in 2013 -- or 30E6 and 15.4E6 respectively. The same source gives the 42% and 35% as the % of Pashtuns and Pashto speakers in Afghanistan, respectively. ____ These Afghan figures are controversial . – see footnote 186.

In the areas immediately bordering Afghanistan, the percentage of Pashtuns rises sharply. In Baluchistan, 39% speak Pashto. Within Baluchistan, the northern area bordering Kandahar is mostly Pashtun. In the border province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, with over 20 million people in 2013, the Pashtuns are the largest ethnic group and Pashto is the major lagnuage.

The Federally Administered Tribal Areas is another area of Pakistan that borders Afghanistan with over 3 million people the "territory is almost exclusively inhabited by the Pashtuns"

639 Give reference on Kuchis, etc. Brittanica Online _____

640 Give ref.

641 When Mazar-i- Sharif was in the hands of General Dostom – in 1997, it was said "Taxes are still collected, but most of the revenue is siphoned off for the war effort." The Times, Lond., 8/13/97, "Cosmopolitan outpost thrives in nation torn by 18-year war" Michael Dynes.

642 A. Based on reports of interactions between the US intelligence services and Massoud in the course of efforts to get bin Laden and his

associates – 9/11 Commision Rept. There are 41 hits on the name Massoud in the 9/11 com rept. Check them out. -- done

B.1 However, Massoud is given a lot of credit for having extensive local support during the Afghan Soviet War. Afghanistan: The First Five Years of Soviet Occupation, J. Bruce Amstutz, 1986 National Defense U. p. 112. He attended the Soviet affiliated Polytechnic Institute in Kabul, [He "knew a bit of Russian and could understand more" from: "Afgantsy..."-- see footnote 360] after completing his earlier studies at a prestigious, French language HS.

B.2 p. 115 "Massoud's Panjshir organization was one of the few resistance groups that established a political structure along with a military one, to raise taxes, to distribute welfare funds and run courts and schools. To make sure of the support of the local mullahs, Massoud took pains to consult with them and obtain their backing on important decisions, at the same time he limited them to spiritual roles, rather than political or military."Citing, footnote 69, p.438, Branigan, Wash. Post 10/18/83.

C.1 However, the actual article: "Guerrillas Use Cease-Fire To Rearm" The Washington Post, 1018, 1983, Tuesday, Final Edition, William Branigin, p. A1, 3639 words, Dateline: Bazarak, Afghanistan "One of his early tests came in dealing with the Panjshir's mullahs, the Moslem clergymen who despite the common religious foundation of the jihad, or Moslem holy war, have sometimes developed a mutually suspicious relationship with the younger and better educated guerrilla leaders. Massoud has taken great pains to consult the mullahs and persuade them to back important decisions, while keeping them to a spiritual rather than political or military role."

C.2 "Besides his military organization, he has set up a political administration, financial bodies to raise taxes--notably from emerald mining in the upper end of the valley--and distribute welfare funds, a judicial system and schools." Branigin

C.3"Naturally, the curriculum in the Panjshir schools is different from what one would expect in Kabul. The children here essentially are taught to be mujaheddin. During a visit to the village of Dasht-e Rivatt recently, Massoud was entertained by a group of schoolchildren chanting, "Death to Russians, death to Andropov, death to Babrak," referring to the Soviet and Afghan presidents. Led by two 8-year-olds, they followed up with, "Long live Massoud, long live the mujaheddin." Branigin [EMPHASIS ADDED -- this song is very nationalistic/ personality cultist & lacks any Islamic character.

C.3.a.This element of personality cult & absent Islamic character is seen in the following loyalty oath required of his early recruits:

> 'If I ordered you to walk from here to Badakhshan in the snow, would you obey? If I ordered you to put your arm under a tank, would you obey? If I ordered you to explode a grenade in your hand, would you obey?

P. 252, [pdf p. 260] Ahmad Shah Massoud and the Genesis of the Nationalist Anti-Communist Movement In Northeastern Afghanistan, 1969 – 1979, PhD Thesis. U. of London, 5/'06, Peter B. DeNeufville]

C.4.a "While the truce was in effect, the same article notes: "Already his forces carry out regular operations on the Salang road, ambushing convoys and capturing supplies. The booty from one raid included Massoud's new [black] Volga [sedan]. According to aides, it was being driven down from the Soviet Union to be delivered to the Afghan minister of defense when it was stopped by the mujaheddin. They dismantled it, loaded the parts on pack horses and trekked them across the mountains to the Panjshir, where the car was reassembled by Massoud's mechanics. It had been running for a few days by the time I reached the valley in mid-August." Branigin

C.4.b [The 1983 Volga sedan is a rear wheel drive, 1400kg car – not the best thing for travel in a rough mountain valley that's snowed in in the winter – but very good to show off to a western reporter – a real status symbol. It involved a lot of work and risk of lfe and limb -- if it really was disassembled and reassembled after being carried over the mountains on pack horses. The article actually begins with this scene:

C.4.c "Ahmed Shah Massoud stepped out of his new Soviet-built black Volga sedan and was immediately surrounded by villagers. As he stopped to chat, some passed handwritten notes to him, like petitioners seeking dispensation from a ruler." Branigin]

C.4.d in the last third of the article, Branigin notes "Other vehicles operated by Massoud's forces include a couple of Soviet jeeps and several trucks--all captured in last year's fighting in the Panjshir."

C.5 In 3639 word piece it does not say what damage was actually caused by the raids , how much was captured or why he needs to drive around in a fancy car. It also says nothing about how much more the Soviets can get through the pass as a result of the truce – combined with Nedari, Dostom, etc.

C.6 Only mention of S. Afghan. is to denegerate Pushtoons – that they lay mines upside down. "In a series of extensive interviews, Massoud expressed staunchly anticommunist, prowestern and Islamic convictions, rejecting the notion put about by his fundamentalist rivals that he is a closet leftist." Branigin Note anti-comm. 1st; western 2nd; Islam 3rd

D.1 Another article notes a fuel shortage either during or soon after the truce: "Fuel Shortage: Soon the guerrillas began to attack convoys headed from the Soviet border town of Termez to the Afghan capital. Western intelligence sources say the main road became so insecure that convoys could move only with tank and armor protection. Guerrillas managed to cut the twin-tube military fuel pipeline the Soviets had laid along the same route, and an ensuing fuel shortage forced curtailment of military flights out of the Bagrame base near Kabul. Newsweek, May 7/84 US Edit., "An Afghan Valley of Death", Fay Willey with Kim Willenson in Washington & Robert B. Cullen in Moscow, Pg. 63, 1040 words, HIGHLIGHT: A new Soviet offensive starts well, but the rebels could still recover lost ground. None of the reporters are in Afghanistan.

E.1"A recent shortage of petrol in the capital - and subsequent long queues - saw the sudden arrival of a Deputy Prime Minister [at the Salang Tunnel] to check out reports that heavy fighting with rebels was choking supplies.... 'Four or five attacks a week' are routine, the colonel says, with the rebels mostly using small grenade launchers to target ammunition and diesel supplies." "As a result of the deals that appear to have been struck between the Red Army and the rebels, the Russians are left largely alone in return for allowing medical and other supplies to reach the resistance. Chief among such deals is the one with Ahmad Shah Massoud..." "But so rich are the pickings along Salang that 'outsider dushman' are now moving in. Every other day as many as 2,000 trucks, carrying such essentials as flour, sugar and fuel may head south from ...Heiraton ...to return empty from Kabul on the following day. Many, particularly the Afghan convoys, do not make the journey in one piece.[This may distinguish between fuel supplied by the pipelines to the military and other fuel supplied to the civilian pop.] The Guardian, Lond., Oct/11/88, "Guarding the highway to home: Soviet troops prepare for their final withdrawal from the Aghanistan conflict", Liz Thurgood

F None of these articles has anything about Nedari at Kayan. SOME OF THIS SHOULD GO IN THE SECTION ON THE SALANG PASS

PART THREE

MAJOR DEFAMATIONS AND SINS OF OMISSION

At this point I understood clearly that the Taliban did not hate Jews, were not a failed or puppet state, were not terrible misogynists and had a good reason for not turning over bin Laden -- even though they didn't support his hate filled program. I also saw that the 9/11 Commission had failed to understand much of this.

Then I began to notice stories published about the Taliban that were clearly false or misleading. Each of these stories gave a sense of where the venom directed against the Taliban was coming from. This section might also be called:

DEFAMING THE TALIBAN: HOW WE CAME TO HATE GOOD PEOPLE.

Other stories that were clearly defamatory but required substantial research have already been treated in earlier chapters – in PART ONE, DETERMINING THE REALITY and PART TWO: WHERE DID THEY GET THEIR MONEY? These stories include, inter alia, the accusations that the Taliban tortured the Shiite leader, Sheikh Abdul Mazari and threw him to his death from a helicopter [Chapter 10]; that they castrated former Soviet era Afghan President Najibullah [Chapter 11]; and that they routinely taxed narcotics convoys – or needed the narcotics business to finance their operations [Chapters 18-20].

לֹא-תֵלֵךְ רָכִיל בְּעַמֶּיךָ

לֹא תַעֲמֹד עַל-דַּם רֵעֶךָ

אֲנִי יְהוָה

**Thou shalt not go up and down as a tale-bearer among thy people;
neither shalt thou stand idly by the blood of thy neighbour: I am the LORD.[643]**

When Jews are careful about not spreading slander among themselves – even when that slander concerns non-Jews -- they set an example for all. Slander leads to bloodshed -- as it has in the case of the public slandering of the Taliban. If we are in a position to save someone's life by physically going into harm's way, we are required to act – by, for example, jumping into the water to save someone from drowning. How much more so when the possible harm to us is relatively small – and all we really need to do is refute the defamations and speak the truth.

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[643] **A.** ***"If you see someone drowning in the sea or being attacked by bandits or wild animals and it is possible to save him by yourself or to pay others to save him and yet you don't save him …or other such scenarios – you are violating "do not stand idly by the blood of your fellow."*** **Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat [1563-78] 426: B. ספר החינוך [Sefer ha Chinuch /Book of Education [13th Cent., Anon.] Mitzva רמד [#244], adds:**

שורש מצוה זו ידוע, כי כמו שיציל האחד את חבירו כן חבירו יציל אותו, ויתיישב העולם בכך, והאל חפץ בישובו כי לשבת יצרה

(ישעי' מה, יח). וכבר נתבארו דיני מצוה זו במסכת סנהדרין.

"The basis of this mitzva is well known because if you try and save others then others will try and save you. This is the basis of civilization and G-d desires that society be preserved."

[Translations found at _____ see also: C. Sanhedrin 73a, D. R. Moshe Feinstein, [1895-1986] (Y.D. 2:174.3) [bottom of first col. Also, on saving life on Shabbes: Igrot Moshe, Orah Hayyim 4:79 , with many additional sources, found at _____] Needs further clarification/study/checking

CHAPTER 21:

MAIMING THE HANDS OF WOMEN AND GIRLS FOR WEARING NAIL POLISH

Shortly after the Taliban took over Kabul, in the fall of '96, stories came out that the Taliban were maiming the hands of women and girls for wearing nail polish[644]. The primary source of this story appears to have been Burhanuddin Rabbani, the leader of the Northern Alliance -- the group that the Taliban had just ousted from the city.[645] This image was picked up and circulated by reputable human rights organizations[646].

Both Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch subsequently repudiated the story but, predictably, the quiet, private repudiations did not get anywhere near as much traction in the public mind as the initial horror stories.[647]

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[644] Even before this, there was a report of "fingers amputated for playing cards" by the Taliban – from a reporter who managed to get letters signed by both Pres./Prof. Burhanuddin Rabbani and his un-named Prime Minister. He also had obtained special assistance in gaining access to Rabbani from his unnamed "economic adviser and minister without portfolio". Events recounted in 3842 (4410 in Digital Archive] word piece contained not a single good word about the Taliban, who are mentioned as "at Kabul's door".

Events recounted appear to have occurred in Mar., latest month mentioned. Author also says Rabbani "had been due to resign two days after my request had been sent to him." This may ref. to 2/20 [The Independent, Lond., 2/20/95, "Koran spurs on mystery militia", TIM McGIRK in Charasyar] or 3/21[AP, 3/21/95, "Afghans Mark New Year's With Prayers For Peace" Kathy Gannon, Dateline: Kabul,] It was publ. over 2 months later: The Times, Lond., 5/27/95, "The lost children of Kabul", Nick Danziger, [Category: Feature Articles (aka Opinion)]; TM/19. Maybe N.D. received cooperation on his orphan assistance project in return for writing anti-T propaganda. No confirmed reports of T cutting off fingers for playing cards. Email sent 4/18/17 danzigerexhibitions@gmail.com. Response from assist. Yas Seelay, 5/15/17, req. copy of article. Sent Taliban book 447 + 3 pg pdf of article from Times Dig. Arch., 5/16/17.

[645] "He said the fundamentalists, who have been radically enforcing Islamic law in Kabul, recently cut off the fingers of a young girl who was wearing nail polish." Ousted Afghan leader urges talks, not force. Francois Raitberger 11/21/96, Reuters News 1996, PARIS, Nov 2.

[646] The first published Amnesty International report of the Taliban maiming the hands of someone for wearing nail polish is a June 1, '97 report "Women in Afghanistan: The violations continue"_____

"A woman in the Khayr-Khana area of Kabul in October 1996 was reported as having the end of her thumb cut off by the Taleban....because the woman was caught wearing nail varnish." Amnesty International stated in a press announcement dated 3/19/'98, for a seminar with Professor Fred Halliday, on human rights and gender in Afghanistan at the London School of Economics and Political Science, "Women who wear nail varnish could have their fingers chopped off…" _____

Human Rights Watch published the following hearsay statement from a woman interviewed Sept 3, '01 in Quetta, Pakistan: "We heard that women were beaten for having their hand out or for having nail polish." Interview conducted Sept. 3, 2001. From: Afghanistan: Humanity Denied: Systematic Violations of Women's Rights in Afghanistan , 10/01, vol 13, No. 5 (C), note 68, _____

[647] In response to an emailed query from the author ,[sent from NYC on 10/19/06],asking Prof. Halliday if he had a primary source for this, the author received a response from Prof. Halliday on 10/20/06: [F.Halliday@lse.ac.uk]."No, nor is it a claim that I have used. FH" No other stories were found in LexisNexis search.

Nisha Varia, Afghanistan/Women's Rights specialist at Human Rights Watch said:

> **"We did not document specific instances where women had their fingers cut off for wearing nail polish".**

Email to author 9 Jan/06 15:15:09 she is not aware of any substantiated stories of Taliban hand maimings connected with nail polish.

Further, and independent of these quiet refutations, one would think that if the Taliban were mutilating hands for wearing nail polish, they would have had no qualms about doing it in public and announcing it on the radio[648]

> After the 9/11 attacks, the false story of the mutilation of women and girls for wearing nail polish was promoted by First Lady Laura Bush, Senate Democratic Leader, Harry Reid and Cherie Blair, the wife of the Prime Minister of the UK. [649]

The story was also picked up by a group of Yale University alumni. They called on people to "Nail Yale" -- to send red, press-on artificial fingernails to the Yale administration as a reminder of the horrors of the Taliban – to expel a young former Taliban official who was studying as a non-matriculated student.[650]

None of the reputable anti-defamation and human rights organizations published any refutation of these stories – though by this time, they knew they were false.[651]

The Northern Alliance[652] – the people who initially promoted the fingernail maiming stories -- understood one of the key weaknesses of the Taliban. They had almost no women representing them on the world stage[653] and most western women had very little understanding of what the Taliban were about. The Northern Alliance saw that they could attack the Taliban by portraying them as misogynists. This way they could reduce the likelihood that any western country would recognize the Taliban or come to their aid. The key western country to influence was the United States.[654]

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[648] The only report that I was able to find in a Factiva search, run 10/24/06, was this 2nd hand eyewitness account of an altercation on a bus. A 24 year old woman "hiding her femininity from head to toe, so completely that even her eyes were shrouded by the thick gauze of the 'shuttlecock' burka. …[with] [h]er fingernails … still visible, coated with red varnish." was accosted by a " Talib, a thick-set man with the trademark fungoid beard". He grabbed her…took out a steel nail-cutter and snapped off a fingernail at the root so her hand was painted red … with blood. The eyewitness …was 'Shazia', an intelligent and beautiful Afghan woman whose dream of becoming a doctor can never be realized under a regime where women must spend their lives inside the four walls of their home, as chattel to their men. Shazia listed some of the things that Taliban forbid: 'No photographs, not even of children. No education for girls. No pictures. No nail polish. No high heels. No make-up. No earrings. No rings on fingers. No perfume.' What about money? 'Why have money if you cannot leave home, even to go to the market?" "…John Sweeney reports from Khyber country." 1480 words, 30 Aug., 1998 The Observer 18 . It is likely, if this event took place at all, that it involved an altercation in which a woman's fingernail was broken. The Taliban did not prevent woman from becoming doctors or going to the market, etc.

[649] Laura Bush, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/rm/2001/6206.htm Harry Reid http://reid.senate.gov/record2.cfm?id=179442, Cherie Blair http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/WO0111/S00149.htm

[650] Clinton W. Taylor Giving Yale the finger. 3/08/06 http://townhall.com/columnists/clintonwtaylor/2006/03/08/giving_yale_the_finger

[651] A LexisNexis search carried out 9/30/14 in the National Library of Israel in Jerusalem, with the terms "nail yale" and ("human rights watch" or "amensty international " or "anti-defamation" or "antidefamation" or wiesenthal or ADL or "civil liberties union" or ACLU) and "All News (English)" and "All available dates" produced no hits.

[652] The formal name of the Northern Alliance was the United Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan.

[653] The exception was Laili Helms. see footnote 7

[654] See also the comment of Prof. Rubin – denying the maiming of women and girls for wearing fingernail polish. Appendix 7 and see footnote 669

CHAPTER 22a:

MURDERING SCHOOL TEACHERS FOR TEACHING GIRLS?

In this environment – in the years between the Taliban takeover of Kabul in the fall of '96 and the events of 9/11/01-- a very unusual woman in her early thirties, Zohra Rasekh[655], went to work for Physicians for Human Rights.

[655] She was born [Feb. 7/64] in Kabul and had left Afghanistan as a young teenager with the entry of the Soviet Union in '79. She spoke English & Farsi – the language of Iran. She also spoke Dari – the language most common in the non-Pashtun areas of Afghanistan. [Dari & Farsi are said to be mutually intelligible – but with some differences in vocabulary.] She did not speak Pashto. This is the dominant language of the areas from which the Taliban had arisen and the language of the Pashtuns -- Afghanistan's single largest ethnic group. She received a Masters in Public Health from George Washington University, School of Medicine and Healthcare Sciences, Washington DC, May 1994, BA Soc. GWU, Dec. '89. _____

[Another form gives her degree in biology in the same year and her date of birth as Feb 7/69]

Her ethnic background is not stated in any of the material from PHR or in any of the publications I was able to find. However, her general appearance is strongly Hazara.

The photos above show Ms. Rasekh around the time she was working for PHR http://www.globalwatchgroup.org/about/foundersbio.html and a young man with the name Rasekh who is apparently the key person behind a website called Hazara United.com. _____A You Tube video is at:

PHR had only months before achieved international renown when they shared a Nobel Peace Prize for their participation in the International Campaign to ban Landmines.[656]

Ms. Rasekh went to Afghanistan under the auspices of Physicians for Human Rights to study the situation of women in the areas controlled by the Taliban. She was not supervised by anyone from PHR on the scene in the country. The results of her survey work and her analysis were published by PHR under the title The Taliban's War on Women[657],

She wrote, on page 32:

> **Every Friday, the Taliban terrorizes the city of Kabul by publicly punishing alleged wrongdoers in the Kabul sports stadium and requiring public attendance at the floggings, shootings, hangings, beheadings, and amputations[658].**

[656] PHR was one of 6 groups that founded the International Campaign to Ban Landmines in 1992. When the prize was announced 10/10/97, the ICBL & its director, Jody Williams, were each awarded half of the prize valued at $1E6. _____

[657] Released to Press, Aug 5'98, 132 pages. "Human rights group says Taliban brutally mistreat women in Afghanistan" Donna Bryson, 595 words, Dateline: Islamabad _____

[658] For this Ms. Rasekh has the following footnote: 38 Amnesty International reported on March 13, 1998, that over 30,000 spectators (made up of women and boys) were summoned by loudspeaker to gather at Kabul's sports stadium to watch the father and brother of a murdered man shoot an alleged murderer who had been sentenced to death by a Taliban *Shari'a* court. *Afghanistan: Flagrant abuse of the right to life and dignity . [emphasis added]* However, the source she cites says*,"* over 30,000 spectators made up of men and boys aged five and upwards were told through loudspeakers to gather at Kabul's national stadium" [emphasis added] page 3 of _____

On one occasion, PHR's researcher witnessed the public execution (stabbing and beheading) of two men convicted of murder by the Taliban *Shari'a* court at the sports stadium.[659] [emphasis added]

But there were no reports by anyone else of any beheadings in the Kabul sports stadium during the entire time that Ms. Rasekh was in the city.[660]

Ms. Rasekh's work was published almost simultaneously in JAMA, the leading medical journal in the United States[661]. It was accepted as a "special submission" without the usual peer review. Half a year later, JAMA published a letter critiquing Ms. Rasekh's study by one of the leading experts on war related emotional trauma in the United States. The expert, Prof. Joseph Westermeyer, noted "three elements of the report do not ring true." These three elements

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[659] **There is an apparently bogus report, more than two years later of the execution by beheading of a man convicted of a double murder. The execution was supposedly carried out in the Kabul stadium by the brother of one of the victims. "Finally, the third blow severed Daoud's head and it rolled on to the grass." [emph. added]** Daily Mail, Aug.4/00, The Execution, Daniel Fox, p. 27, 1192 words. Actual exec. was 7/21/00.

The LexisNexis search turned up no other reports by Daniel Fox from Kabul or Afghanistan. The story has no "dateline" but begins "From Kabul's national sports stadium, ringed by the barren Hindu Kush Mountains, the plaintive cries rang to the heavens. 'Forgive him! Forgive him!' screamed the crowd of 5,000." ~same story, w. same title, 3 weeks later, Sunday Herald Sun (Melb., Austral.), 8/20/00, p. 23, 1196 words, & "Justice a sorry blood sport for the Taliban" Aug 5 , Independent (Lond). Last story isn't in LexisNexis.

The anti-Taliban organization, RAWA, reports the event as a throat slitting -- not a beheading. They have video clips of the event – though with gaps. The clips do not show the head severed from the body. The head appears to be attached to the body as the executed man is laying face up on the ground.

The Associated Press version of the same events, datelined the day of the execution, also described it as a throat slitting "Slowly Mohasil walked toward Daoud. He came up behind him and with a knife cut his throat." Associated Press Online, July **21, 2000; Friday, Victim's Brother Executes Killer, BYLINE: AMIR SHAH, International news, 384 words, KABUL, Afghan.**

AFP also has this as a throat slitting July **21, 2000, Friday, Public throat slitting in** Kabul **for double murderer, International news, 242 words, DATELINE:** KABUL, **July 21, "A double murderer had his throat slit publicly before thousands of spectators in the Afghan capital's sports** stadium **Friday afternoon, witnesses said."**

In another story, the brother of a victim of an ax murderer asked for an ax to execute the convicted murderer – but was only allowed the use of a Kalashnikov. AP, 9/24/99, "Murderer publicly executed…" , Amir Shah,: Dateline: Kabul.

[660] **According to Ms. Rasekh's Congressional testimony, she was in Afghanistan in Jan 1998. So her three months would have ended by April of that year. See page 36, par. 3 of: Hearings Before A Subcommittee Of The Committee On Appropriations United States Senate One Hundred Sixth Congress First Session, Thurs, May 20,1999.**

However, on p. 37, par 3 of the same document, she gives the impression that she was in Kabul in May'98. That there were no reports of beheadings is based on a search using LexisNexis Academic carried out July/2011 covering all reported executions, floggings & amputations in Kabul in the 1st 7 months of 98 – during which time Ms. Rasekh was in the city for a reported 3 months.

[661] **"Women's Health and Human Rights in Afghanistan" Zohra Rasekh, MPH ; Heidi M. Bauer, MD, MPH, MS ; M. Michele Manos, PhD, MPH ; Vincent Iacopino, MD, PhD –JAMA –Aug 5, 1998;280:449-455. Non-random study of attitudes of women in Kabul presented as random sample survey in congressional testimony.**

were all in Prof. Westermeyer's area of expertise. All of the elements were in the direction of gross exaggeration of the extent of trauma suffered by the women that Ms. Rasekh supposedly interviewed.[662]

This should have given Physicians for Human Rights – and others in the human rights arena – a heads-up on possible biases in Ms. Rasekh's work. Instead, PHR's Senior Medical Consultant – and co-author of the study – Dr. Vincent Iacopino, MD, PhD, wrote a letter -- published simultaneously with Prof. Westermeyer's critique, defending the study.[663]

Four months after the appearance of the critique in JAMA, Ms. Rasekh came to Congress with one of her PHR co-authors, Holly Burkhalter. She testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee – which almost never requires an oath[664] and there was no oath recorded for Ms. Rasekh.

Her most damning testimony against the Taliban became the first Taliban atrocity listed on the Feminist Majority Foundation's website.

> "Ms. Rasekh obtained extremely distressing testimony last week from the husband of a woman who defied the Taliban's orders and continued to teach girls and young women in her home. The Taliban ordered her several times to close the school, and, she refused. Then approximately a year ago[665], seven or eight armed men entered their home, beat the woman and her husband and again ordered her to close the school. The woman teacher stood up to the Taliban, denounced them, and insisted that she would continue to teach. The armed men struck her with a rifle butt then, in front of her terrified students, husband, and baby daughter, killed her with shots through the head and stomach."[666]

In her oral presentation of the same story, Ms. Rasekh added that the teacher's baby daughter – who was a "1-and-a-half-year-old" at the time of the incident "was crying nonstop and asking for her mother…"

This struck me as very odd: would a two and a half year old toddler be "crying nonstop and asking for her mother" who had been killed a year before?[667] My impression of such very young children is that the little girl would have very little memory of her mother – and would almost certainly not be asking for someone that she hardly remembered. Also, I had done an inventory of judicial punishments under the Taliban – which included occa-

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[662] Mental Health of Women in Afghanistan" by Joseph Westermeyer, MD, MPH, PhD, JAMA Jan 20,'99, V 281, #3, p., 230, col 2, 6 refs..[date of submission not given]

[663] "In Reply" by Vincent Iacopino, MD, PhD, , JAMA Jan 20, 1999, vol. 281, #3, page, 231, col 1.6 refs. [date of submission not given]

[664] http://www.slate.com/id/2135698/
Hearings Before A Subcommittee Of The Committee On Appropriations United States Senate One Hundred Sixth Congress First Session, Thurs, May 20,1999. http://frwebgate3.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/PDFgate.cgi?WAISdocID=eSVVVF/0/2/0&WAISaction=retrieve

[665] If it had been exactly one year before it would have been mid-May of 1998.

[666] p43, par. 6 of testimony

[667] There is a Yiddish Expression "Oifen goniff brent dos hittel" The thief's hat is burning – the guilty person gives himself away . In the case of journalists who are making things up – they give themselves away by exaggerating their story beyond belief. This is what happened here – and in the story promoted by Ahmed Rashid that the Taliban banned opium to raise the price.

sional reports of extrajudicial abuses – and I did not remember seeing anything about the murder of a school teacher.

So, I went back and checked to see what I could find in the first half of '98 in Kabul – where this murder was supposed to have taken place.

> I found several reports on the situation of girls and woman and schools – some of them written by well known western journalists – but no reports of any physical abuse of any school teacher whatsoever.[668]

Then I noticed a few more unusual things about Ms. Rasekh's story of the murder of the school teacher:

- Even the first name of the murdered teacher was not given;
- The location of the school in Kabul was not given; and
- The type of curriculum -- that the teacher was willing to sacrifice her life for – was not given.

I brought this to the attention of Prof. Barnett Rubin -- then one of the world's most sought after academic experts on Afghanistan. He queried his list of a thousand Afghanistan cognoscenti. Did anyone know anything about this murder – with forty witnesses -- now – nine years later -- grown up? His query and his complete response to me are given in APPENDIX 7 [669] In short, no one knew anything about this incident and Professor Rubin doubted that it ever took place. As he put it:

> "No one has documented cutting off women's fingernails because they wore nail polish or shooting women teachers. I don't think these happened."[670]

I brought this to the attention of the Feminist Majority Foundation which, as already noted, had this at the head of their list of Taliban atrocities. As of this writing – the Feminist Majority Foundation still has this at the head of its list of Taliban atrocities -- more than four years after it was brought to their attention that it probably never happened.

Here is their quote:

> "A woman who dared to defy Taliban orders by running a home school for girls was shot and killed in front of her husband, daughter, and students."[671]

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668 See APPENDIX 6 for excerpts from some of these reports.

669 Reply includes issues of throwing acid & maiming fingernails

670 See APPENDIX 7 for full letter

671 http://www.feminist.com/activism/take_genderap_dec00.html retrieved Jul., 24, 2018, 3:43 PM Jerusalem, Israel

As of 7/24/'18, the atrocity list, in the box below, is at http://feminist.org/afghan/taliban_women.asp

The latest news on this part of the site is from 4/20/2015 http://feminist.org/afghan/AfghanNews.asp

As shown in this book, the first two atrocities listed below didn't happen [The 1st is shown to have not happened in this chapter; for the debunking of the 2nd, see footnotes 713 & 715] On the next to last item it should be clear that relatively few in Afghanistan had access to doctors and that many men, women and children were dying of curable diseases. The situation of education for health care is discussed in several reports in this work,including APPENDIX 6 & its extension on pages 265-7; Two women were reported to have been hanged for "prostitution and corrupting society"—see footnote 62. This does not appear to be a part of the "reality for women and girls" – unless they want to become prostititutes. The story of the elderly woman being beaten, considering its place in this list, is probably of the same vintage as the maiming of hands for wearing nail polish- debunked in chapter 21. FMF was given a heads up on this problem with Ms Rasekh's work- the source of the first atrocity - in email 9/21/06 to ecarmany@feminist.org see APPENDIX 8, page 212.]

Taliban Reality for Women and Girls

- A woman who defied Taliban orders by running a home school for girls was killed in front of her family and friends.
- A woman caught trying to flee Afghanistan with a man not related to her was stoned to death for adultery.
- An elderly woman was brutally beaten with a metal cable until her leg was broken because her ankle was accidentally showing from underneath her burqa.
- Women and girls died of curable ailments because male doctors were not allowed to treat them.
- Two women accused of prostitution were publicly hung.

A closer look at Ms. Rasekh's work showed a number of other similar problems.

- **In her congressional testimony she provided a long condemnation of the Taliban massacre of the Hazara people in Mazar-i-Sharif – without mentioning that the Taliban had themselves been massacred by these same people the year before.[672]**

- **A whole slew of statistics on the status of women in Kabul are cited in the testimony without any hint that the women inter-viewed were not at all representative of the woman of Kabul – let alone the women of Afghanistan. They had 12 median years of schooling – while the median for women in Afghanistan is closer to 3.[673]**

All of this should have been anticipated by PHR if they had done their homework before hiring the remarkable Ms. Rasekh. Nowhere in their publications do they say what Ms. Rasekh had been doing just prior to coming to work for PHR. As I discovered, she was part of a small -- two or three person – anti-Taliban wire service.[674]

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672 **A** p. 41,pdf p. 44, par. 2 and 3. The massacre of the Taliban by the Hazaras is cited on p. 10, same doc. by Karl F. Inderfurth, Assist. Sec. For S. Asian Affairs, "Our most recent human rights report documents violations by all sides. Taliban forces killed thousands in Mazar-i-Sharif last year, reportedly based in part on ethnicity. This is part of a cycle arising from the massacre of Taliban prisoners by northern forces in 1997."

B.1 "…at the end of May [1997] as the alliance with Malik disintegrated… the Taliban soon found its fighters trapped. Hundreds of Taliban soldiers were killed in the streets of Mazar, and some 3,000, most of whom were in Dostum's headquarters at Shiberghan, were taken prisoner by Malik. Nearly all of these detainees were then summarily executed" footnote 49 states "Human Rights Watch has conducted interviews with a range of sources familiar with the incidents in Mazar-i Sharif, including Western diplomats, journalists, and residents …For more info: see Human Rights Watch, "Afghanistan: The Massacre in Mazar-i Sharif," *A Human Rights Watch Short Report*, V.10, #7 (11/98), p. 6." p 16-17, Crisis of Impunity - The Role of Pakistan, Russia, and Iran in Fueling the Civil War in Afghanistan Human Rights Watch, 1/Jul/'01, C1303,

B.2 "Afghan forces drove the Taliban from… [Mazar-i Sharif] today after a ferocious 15-hour battle,…. The ethnic Uzbek troops, …turned on their new allies on Tuesday." NYT, 5/29/97,Th., Late Edit. – Fin. Afghan Force Ousts Taliban From City in North Byline: Reuters, 474 words, Dateline: Mazar-I-Sharif, May 28

C "In August 1998 Taliban forces opened their third assault on Mazar-i Sharif, and …massacred at least 2,000 people, most of them Hazara civilians, after they took the city, and killed an unknown number of people in aerial bombardments" p17

D "August 1998: After capturing Mazar-i Sharif on August 8, more than a year after some 3,000 of its soldiers had been captured and murdered there, Taliban troops rounded up and summarily executed at least 2,000 civilians, the majority of them ethnic Hazaras. Thousands more… were detained." P 21, **C & D** are from Crisis, supra at **B** [EMPHASIS ADDED]

E "One of [military head of the UN Special Mission to Afghanistan (UNSMA)] Capt [Peadar] McElhinney's first trips on his arrival in October 1997 was to investigate the reported slaughter of 2,000 Taliban soldiers in the north. "…Gen Abdul Rashid Dostum, was insisting that mass graves near Shebergan, …contained the bodies of 2,000 prisoners. They were[Taliban] soldiers who thought they were going to be exchanged, but were captured again by local militias and killed. "When I talked to other prisoners and checked the figures, it transpired that about 2,000 were unaccounted for." …The preliminary report found that a massacre had occurred, but that an exhumation of bodies would have to take place to confirm this. "This never occurred, because the Taliban movement then overran the north - and because of the subsequent UN suspension." "Irish officer lived through simmering Afghan conflict", Feb 1/'99, Lorna Siggins, The Irish Times [For more on massacres of/byTaliban, see footnotes 177D.3, 292,718B]

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673 29% of women 18-30 yrs had some formal educ. ; 12%:31-50 ; 6%: 50+ ; ≤l% All women ≥ 18 university educ. 2013, pdf p 66, AFGHANISTAN IN 2013 A Survey of the Afghan People, The Asia Found. In 2006 avg educ attainment was ~6.6 yrs for total M+F urban pop. ≥ 18 pdf p 88 calc. by author. 2006 survey, same title & org. About 18% of urban Afghan women 15-19 had completed 9th grade in 2007 – World Bank _____

674 SEE: WHO IS ZOHRA RASEKH? P 214 for her association with Omar Samad & anti-Taliban Afghan(istan) Information Center and how she came to work for Physicians for Human Rights. An example of the anti-Taliban character of this wire service:

"According to Omar Samad, director of the Afghan Information Center, … Michael Barry, a French scholar and researcher at L'Action Humanitaire in Paris,[says] the Taliban militia is Pakistan's proxy army whose mission is to play the Afghan ethnic card and bring about the fall of the Afghan regime led by Rabani and his military chief, Ahmad Shah Massoud. Barry and other

> **analysts consider the Taliban as the most archaic, backward-looking and reactionary force in the world today, with no regard whatsoever for modernity or women's rights.**

As the battle of Kabul intensifies, the AIC is prepared to provide information, opinion and commentary by independent experts." Afghan Information Center Reports Kabul Under Taliban Assault, 467 wds 20/10/'95, U.S. Newswire Factiva, USWIR.

With the ouster of the Taliban, Omar Samad went on to become the spokesperson for Afghanistan's new Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Kabul (12/ '01 -9/'04) and Director General of the Information & Media Division. Between 10/'04 – 6/'11, he was first, Afghanistan's Ambassador to Canada & then, from 6/'09, to France. Now, 5/'13, he's Afghanistan Senior Expert at the United States Institute of Peace – specializing in Media Conflict and Peacebuilding, Political Reform and the Rule of Law. His ethnic back-ground or period of emigration to the US are not stated. _____ He looks somewhat Hazara. _____

CV of Zohra Rasekh _____ doesn't mention work with AIC. SEE APPENDIX 8: Letter To Zohra Rasekh Requesting Clarification On Some Problematic Points…

CHAPTER 22b:

MURDERING SCHOOL TEACHERS -- WITH HOLLYWOOD AMPLIFICATION

When Zohrah Rasekh showed up to testify before Congress in May of 1999, she was not only accompanied by Holly Burkhalter, her co-author from Physicians for Human Rights. She was backed up with a prepared statement by Mavis Leno – the wife of a famous television personality, Jay Leno.[675]. Ms. Rasekh and Mrs. Leno had appeared together seven months before:

> Mavis and Jay Leno today presented a gift of $100,000 to the Feminist Majority Foundation to expand its Campaign to Stop Gender Apartheid in Afghanistan … Mavis Leno will chair the national effort. … *[She was joined by]* Zohra Rasekh, MPH of Physicians for Human Rights which has just completed an important study of the condition of women living under the Taliban [676]

This program, with its square burka [or burqua] mesh swatch symbol - shown below - spread the word of the supposed oppression of women under the Taliban to the four corners of the feminist world.

In her 2500 word prepared statement, Mavis Leno asserted:

> 'Physicians for Human Rights has amply documented the physical and psychological toll which the Taliban's brutal regime has taken on women and girls in Afghanistan. Increasing numbers of Afghan women, unable to bear the psychological and physical torture of their status, are committing suicide.'[677]

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FEMINISTS ARE THE MAJORITY
Description: Feminists are the Majority Coffee Mug -- This attractive buff-colored ceramic mug proclaims "Feminists are the Majority" in dark mauve ink, with the definition of feminism on the back. Fem-i-nism n. the policy, practice or advocacy of political,economic and social equality for women. Fem-I-nist adj. Or n. a person who advocates feminisim.
Price: $7.00
Product Key: G7

Screen shot of ~7x7 cm burka mesh patch. From Internet Archive "Wayback Machine" capture from Dec/6/'00. A pack of 20 was $45 in 2/13//'04. An ordinary Google search produced no images of this patch & it's apparently removed from the FMF website. This copy was found & inserted May 1/'18, [see lower right corner of image]. The FMF website continues to carry atrocity stories shown to be false including the top atrocity about the murder of a school teacher [see text box on p. 144]

[675] Mrs. Leno was supposed to testify in person on behalf of the Feminist Majority Foundation, but was prevented from coming by a plane delay.

[676] Feminist Wire Daily News Briefs 10/21/'98 _____
This is the official version – but is truncated and leaves out the part that says " Wear the symbol of remembrance [burka mesh patch] , sent when you call 1-93-888-WOMEN. Half the $2 contribution raised for this Symbol of Remembrance will go to the Afghan women in refugee camps, and half will help fund our Campaign" _____

[677] http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-106shrg54215/html/CHRG-106shrg54215.htm

The Physicians for Human Rights Report -- since discredited [678] -- is the only document on human rights or women's rights in Afghanistan cited in the lengthy statement of Mavis Leno. Yet the well-organized, Hollywood backed, FMF campaign led women's groups throughout the US to believe plain nonsense: that absolute horrors were being visited by the Taliban on the great majority of the women and girls of Afghanistan.

> "This is a terrible snow job," said Judy Benjamin, head of the Women's Commission for Refugee Women and Children, who'd just returned from visiting Afghan refugee camps. "It's amusing almost, but sad. With the Jay Leno connection they have struck it rich and gained Hollywood, but trust me, they're terribly misinformed…. There is suffering and poverty, but in most of Afghanistan people will say the Taliban have brought peace and security."

Jay Leno, one of the finest public entertainers in the US, appears to have had a gut feeling that something was wrong with the FMF picture:

> "They're shining a light on the problem. If this all turns out to be wrong, if it's a huge mistake -- & there seems to be an awful lot of proof in the other direction -- nobody did anything for the wrong reasons."[679]

The FMF campaign made it very difficult for the US to recognize the Taliban or to have constructive dialogues with them[680]. The leading expert on the Taliban, Ahmed Rashid, wrote:

> "The US rejection of the Taliban was largely because of the pressure exerted by the feminist movement at home."[681]

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[678] "Unveiling The Taleban: Dress Codes Are Not The Issue New Study Finds " by Sonia Shah, August 2001.

http://eap.ucop.edu/Documents/_forms/1112/china/JPIS_fall/Readings/Shah_Unveiling_the_Taleban_Dress_Codes.pdf

This paper notes that Dr. Lynn L Amowitz of PHR said of their previous report by Zohrah Rasekh

> " It was a discussion of educated Kabulese women who had abandoned traditional practices." Dr. Amowitz also noted that Ms. Rasekh's study "was not a randomized sample."

Both of these points should have been obvious to intelligent readers before the study was published.

The full report by Dr. Amowitz and her colleague at PHR, Vincent Iacopino, MD, PhD is: Women's Health and Human Rights in Afghanistan A Population-Based Assessment by, Lynn L. Amowitz, MD, MSPHC - _____ It was drafted in Aug. 2001 but only published in Dec. of that year – too late to have any effect on the juggernaut launched against the Taliban

[679] Both quotes from: "A Cause Unveiled; Hollywood Women Have Made the Plight of Afghan Women Their Own -- Sight Unseen" Sharon Waxman, Wash. Post Staff Writer, Sect.: Style; Pg. C01, : 2857 words, Date-line: L.A., Mar. 29, The Wash. Post, 3/ 30/99, , Final Ed.

[680] It is difficult to imagine how the PHR hired Ms Rasekh without knowing her background and published and defended her work when it was obviously not what it was purported to be. It requires that PHR be either extremely incompetent or – more likely-- that they had another agenda. Some insight into PHR and some other such groups comes from one of the ways the Soviet Union collected intelligence in Afghanistan during the Soviet Afghan war. "…the GRU had decided that they needed better local intelligence in Afghanistan. Technical means of gaining intelligence were proving inadequate. Aerial intelligence arrived too late. Radio listening stations did not work well in the mountains. … One solution, the GRU decided, was to imitate the French charity Médecins Sans Frontières and give selected intelligence officers basic medical skills. They would be welcomed in the villages, where they ought to be able to pick up much useful information." Afgantsy: see footnote 301

[681] Ahmed Rashid, p182,Taliban *Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism. Yale Univ. Pr., '01.* _____ *On the same page, he states: "Afghan women activists such as Zieba Shorish-Shamley* [see photo below] *had persuaded the Feminist Majority to spearhead a signature campaign to mobilize support for Afghan women and force Clinton to take a tougher stance against the Taliban." However, see also in this sefer:* **Ahmed Rashid not reliable on pre9/11 Taliban"**

Here is an good sample of Prof. Shorish-Shamley's public characterization of the Taliban:

A.....*'Women and men are stoned to death on the suspicion that they may have committed adultery and persons accused of homosexuality are also punished by death.'* Emphasis added

B....*'Alleged adulterers are punished by stoning to death. There are no trials and the punishment is swift, brutal and final.'* Emphasis added

A from the website of her organization: Women's Alliance for Peace and Human Rights in Afghanistan - WAPHA._____

B from: Testimony of Zieba Shorish-Shamley, Ph. D. Dir/ of WAPHA Before The Senate Committee On Foreign Relations The United States Congress, March 2, 1998, _____ *NOTE:* This testimony has not yet been found in a US Gov. source

CHAPTER 22c:

MURDERING SCHOOL TEACHERS - - THE STORY TELLERS' TALE

With this background, a remarkable trio of story tellers entered the scene. One told stories with words: Saira Shah[682]; one with pictures: Ms. Shah's Cameraman, James Miller. The third was Ahmed Rashid – who gave us his Consultant's tale[683A]. Together they'd make an award winning film[683B] that misinformed the world : **BENEATH THE VEIL** [684].

From that film, millions[685] learned what might happen if the Taliban discovered a

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682 For some months after writing this chapter, I wondered how Saira Shah was linked to Ahmad Shah Massoud. It was obvious this film was made to make him look good & demonize the Taliban – but why would she want to make such a film?

Her father, Idries Shah, was the "dear compatriot and friend" of the father of Massoud's long time friend, spokesman, translator & ambassador, Massood Khalili. MK was with Massoud —serving as interpreter – when Massoud was assassinated. MK was seriously injured but survived. The quote is from MK's father's introduction to the English/UK edition of his work *Quatrains of Khalilullah Khalili*, Octagon Press, '81. Octagon was founded by Idries Shah. His only novel, Kara Kush, is said to be modeled on the life & exploits of Amad Shah Massoud.

683-A As shown above, Rashid's role as 'consultant' has the #3 spot in the film's credits [49:06]. His story telling talents are noted in his analysis of the Taliban's opium poppy ban [see text boxes in Fig. 5, p17]; the Buddhist statues issue: see footnote 170 & the execution of Najibullah [see footnote 813. Also See Appendix10 Ahmed Rashid Not Reliable On Pre9/11 Taliban.] In Rashid's review of Ms. Shah's book "The Story Teller's Daughter" —[on Rashid's website 4/4/18]- there's a description of her film with no mention of its propagandistic character or who it was made for. There's certainly no repudiation. He quotes her self-description, [from p. 14 of 'Story Tellers Daughter', 2007 ed. "Two people lived inside me, "Like a couple who rarely speak, they are not compatible. My Western side is a sensitive, liberal middle-class pacifist. My Afghan side is a rapacious robber baron. It revels in bloodshed, glories in risk and will not be afraid." We'll see that she was apparently enough of a "sensitive, liberal, middle-class pacifist" to make a movie & write a book & enough of a "rapacious robber baron [who]... revels in bloodshed..." to make the content of those works weapons to demonize & murder scores of thousands of people. It's a wonder that nobody, to the author's knowledge, put this together & publicly repudiated her work – & her amicable consultant, Ahmed Rashid—& called it the blood-soaked propaganda that it is. Of many customer reviews of this book on Amazon, the one that the most people found helpful –[27 on 4/29/18]-was the most negative-by Explorer77 on 7/25/06. [check refs in book to islam, mullah]

683-B It won 4 Royal Television Society awards for 2001-[awarded 2002] "Programme of the Year" [Television Journalism], "Journalism Current Affairs International" "Television Journalist"[specifically for Saira Shah] & "Lighting, Photography & Camera - Photography, Documentary/Factual and Non-Drama Productions" [James Miller]. BAFTA Current Affairs, [for the production team] 2002; US: EMMY: Investigative Journalism (long form); International Documentary Association-Courage Under Fire Award 2001 [for Saira Shah & James Miller]
See footnote 694 -C for Peabody awards.

684 **A**. All quotes from CNN transcript, where it corresponds to video. At some points there's text in transcript not video & vice-versa. Times, [min.:sec.] are from video - available free at official website - the version seen most – after the 9/11 attacks. VIDEO : Transcript:

B. Niether the name or image of Massoud or his group-- or the word Tajik - appear in the video- quite surprising as a large part of it involves his fighters & people in his remaining area – in the NE corner of Afg. No other ethnic groups are named either. Instead, we're told: "It's a mosaic of different ethnic groups. The peoples in this area have lived peacefully side by side for centuries, it's a world the Taliban are intent on destroying."

C. Compare Sean Langan's "Langan Behind the Lines" BBC2 documentary series - covering similar material & broadcast on BBC2 starting 2/26'01 11:20PM.[rebroadcast Oct. 8&9/'01 The Times (London), Oct.12/'01, "The home front" Raymond Snoddy, Features.] "Beneath the veil was broadcast 6/26/01 BBC4 "Dispatches" & 8/26/01 on CNN in US.

685 **A**. 5E6 in US for 1 showing, seen in 40+ countries."Beneath the Veil" aired around the clock on CNN after the attacks." Daily Variety, Oct.03, '01, The Write Stuff, P. 24, 816 words, highlight: "Afghanistan, heroes rise to fore in lit deals" "Bush and the Burqa", *Christine McCarthy McMorris*, Religion In The News Spr. '02, V. 5,# 1"...on September 22 and 23, CNN aired *Beneath the Veil* a second time. Five and half million viewers tuned in, making it the network's most-watched documentary ever." _____

B. President Bush picked up on these themes and related themes addressed in this sefer & gave us a taste of his understanding of the Taliban in his book Decision Points 497 p. Crown Publishers. NYT Rev.:N/3/'10: **1.a.** "...al Qaeda was a fundamentalist Islamic terror network hosted and supported by the Taliban Government in Afghanistan" p134 [The Taliban had independent sources of money form normal Sharia law taxes on agricltural production, customs duties etc. They were also very frugal.The enemies of the Talibn were largely funded by Russia but also had some revenue from domestic sources – including gems and the drug trade. [See Part II of this sefer: WHERE DID THE TALIBAN & THEIR ENEMIES GET THEIR MONEY]; **1.b.** [The Taliban]... imposed a fanatical barbaric brand of Islam that prohibited girls from going to school, required men to grow beards of a certain length, and forbade women from leaving their homes without a male relative as an escort. [see Ch. 2: OPPRESSION OF WOMEN UNDER THE TALIBAN? & Ch. 22a-c: MURDERING SCHOOL TEACHERS FOR TEACHING GIRLS?] **1.c.** The simplest pleasures – singing, clapping, and flying kites- were banned. [See Ch 23: EXECUTING PEOPLE FOR PLAYING MUSIC?] **1.d.** The Taliban's rules were enforced by brutal religious police. [See App. 18: FORMAL PUNISHMENTS IN KABUL UNDER THE TALIBAN IN THEIR 1ST YR IN THE CITY: & App. 19: EXECUTIONS FOR ALL CAUSES UNDER THE TALIBAN JAN 1-DEC. 31, 2000] **1.e.** A 1998 State Department report described a woman struggling to carry two small children and a load of groceries on a street in Mazar-i-Sharif. When her body-length burqa slipped from her face, she was beaten with a car antenna. [This appears to come from a hearsay story in "Veil of Tears" Tim McGirk reports Kabul The Independent Tues. 8 Oct/96 23:02 BST "Farida also heard that in the market by the Blue mosque a mother who was struggling with two children and groceries had let her veil slip a fraction. She was whipped by the Taliban with a car antenna." The mention of the Blue mosque—actually Shah-Do Shamshira Mosque in Kabul – near the Kabul River – which has some distinctive blue decorations, may have led to confusion with "The Blue Mosque" of Mazar-i-Sharif. The Taliban were not in Mazar-i-Sharif in 1996. [It is remarkable that anyone would cite such a hearsay story when there were clear signs – from the actual rates of executions, other public punishments & crime statistics [see footnote 608-A.2] that the Taliban were both relatively benign & effective in the way they protected the public safety in Kabul.] **1.f.** Petty thieves were taken to the national soccer stadium to have their limbs hacked off.

Homosexuals were stoned to death, as was anyone suspected of adultery.[see Ch.4: EXECUTIONS FOR SODOMY -- where it is shown that people were executed for predatory sodomy e.g. "with young boys" & Ch.3. EXECUTIONS FOR ADULTERY UNDER THE TALIBAN where it's shown that people weren't executed when they were merely suspected of adultery – but on the basis of an extremely high standard of evidence – according to Sharia law – so that in Kabul there were no executions for adultery in the 5 years the Taliban governed that city of over a million people.] **1.g.** Shortly after the Taliban seized Kabul, they kidnapped the former president of Afghanistan from his UN compound. After beating and castrating him, they hung his body from a lamppost. [He was executed as a notorious mass murderer – but not castrated. See: Ch. 11: DID THE TALIBAN CASTRATE SOVIET AFGHAN LEADER NAJIBULLAH?]

1.h. In Bamiyan Province, home to the minority Hazaras, the Taliban massacred at least 170 innocent civilians in January 2001. [There appears to have been at least one massacre of this magnitude committed by the Taliban in this area and time. For a massacre in this area and general time frame, the Taliban commander was relieved of his command. See footnote 718. There was no Taliban policy of attacking Hazaras or Shiites: See Ch 9: DISCRIMINATION AGAINST MINORITIES. However, after the Taliban were themselves massacred by the Hazara/Shiites in Mazar-i-Sharif in 1997, including mutilation of Taliban dead [see footnote 177 D3], they retaliated against these groups in the same city. Some of this retaliation apparently extended – without authorization -- to Bamiyan – after heavy fighting.] **1.i.** Later that year, they dynamited two cherished 1,500-year old Buddha sculptures. [This actually happened – but seems to have been made possible by the tightening of UN Security Council sanctions. It appears that if the UNSC hadn't stepped on the Taliban after the Taliban's almost miracualous opum poppy ban, the statues would not have been destroyed. See Ch 8: BUDDHIST STATUES AND OTHER PRE-ISLAMIC ART, & see footnote 177-G] **1.j.** There were some who received warm hospitality from the Taliban. Shortly after taking power, the radical mullahs offered sanctuary to Osama bin Laden, the founder of al-Qaida. [He came to a province that the Taliban did not control. See TIMELINE, p 285, footnote L , and dates in summer 1996]

1.k. Between 1996 and 2001, bin Laden established camps in Afghanistan that trained an estimated ten thousand terrorists. In return, bin Laden drew on his personal fortune to fund the Taliban. By 9/11, Afghanistan was not only a state sponsor of terror, but a state sponsored by terror."p186-7 [see Ch 18: THE TALIBAN: WHERE DID THEY GET THEIR MONEY?]

2. "The British led counternarcotics campaign showed results in some areas, but drug production had boomed in fertile southern provinces like Helmand." p 211 [There is no mention of the Taliban opium poppy ban in the book – or the large increase in opium poppy growing in Badakhshan Province. See Page 14: HECTARES OF OPIUM POPPY CULTIVATION IN AFGHANISTAN BY PROVINCE & GOVERNANCE: 1994-2017, and p 13: OPIUM GROWING IN AFGHANISTAN, METRIC TONNES 1980-2017]

3. "As I climbed aboard the chopper [in Kabul in Dec. 2008] I thought back to the afternoon of October 2001 when I announced the opening of the war from the Treaty Room. A country dominated by one of history's cruelest regimes was now governed by freely elected leaders. Women who had been prisoners in their homes were serving in parliament…In 2010, the pentagon revealed that geologists had discovered nearly a trillion dollars' worth of mineral deposits in Afghanistan a potential source of wealth for the Afghan people that the Taliban would never have found." P 218-20; [Much of this was known or suspected before the Taliban existed. see footnote 391-H, including: Mineral Resources in Afghanistan, USAID,1992]

"secret" girls' class in Kabul. As their teacher put it, 'they could hang us all.'[686] Yet, as we've already seen, there were no confirmed reports at the time of Ms. Rasekh's made-up martyred school teacher story of teachers in Kabul being harmed – let alone hanged -- by the Taliban[687]. Two years later, in the time of our Story Tellers' Tale, we find:

> **"In the last few months, 13 girls' schools have opened around Kabul - a small feminist revolution in a country where the Islamist militia effectively outlawed female education three years ago by decreeing that the sexes must be separated."[688]. [Emphasis added]**

The word effectively is underscored here because, it isn't clear what the Taliban actually banned. A long list of Taliban decrees issued in Kabul from November of 1996 includes the following statement:

> **"In case women are required to go outside the residence for the purposes of education, social needs or social services they**

4. "Ultimately the only way the Taliban and al Qaeda can retake Afghanistan is if America abandons the country. Allowing the extremist to reclaim power would force Afghan women back into subservience, remove girls from school, and betray all the gains of the past nine years. It would also endanger our security. After the Cold War, the United Sates gave up on Afghanistan. The result was chaos, civil war, the Taliban takeover, sanctuary for al Qaeda and the nightmare of 9/11. To forget that lesson would be a dreadful mistake." p.220 [The US,Russia & their allies left Afghanistan saturated with weapons, landmines & organized killing groups. The Taliban returned the parts of the country that they controlled to a level of social decency, took the weapons from the killing groups and for the good of the world, effectively banned opium. They did not agree with the program of Al Qaida and had nothing to do with the 9/11 attacks.See Ch 6: THE 9/11 COMMISSION; Ch. 19: CRYSTALS OF ISLAM; On land mines: see footnote 718 B3]

686 [29:34]

687 "The Taliban allow home schooling but ban public school education for girls". [Wash. Post. 7/20/00, see page 157 and endnote 20.5 where this is discussed.

688 Suzanne Goldenberg in Kabul, The Guardian (London), 11/26/99. "Taliban relaxes its ban on schools for girls" Pg. 18. Also: "Taliban envoy…Sayed Rahmatullah Hashimi..said… medical or nursing schools for men and women had now opened in Kabul, Kandahar, Jalalabad, Herat and Mazaar-i-Sharif. A curriculum for the first seven years of general schooling had been prepared, he said, combining religious and secular subjects in separate schools for boys and girls." NY Times, 3/19/'01, 'Taliban Explains Buddha Demolition' Barbara Crossette.

should cover themselves in accordance with Islamic Sharia regulation." [689]

Thanks to the Story Telling Trio, our own coed education continues. They take us to:

"the most subversive place of all…to a secret beauty parlor. If they are caught, these women will be imprisoned, but they still paint the faces they can never show in public."

What we're not told is that there was no prohibition under the Taliban of women putting on makeup for the benefit of their immediate families or for special social occasions – like weddings.[690] They were required to cover their faces with a veil[691] when in public- not in their homes or among other women.[692] The all-women beauty parlor was not 'subversive' and if they were caught – by the Taliban – they would not have been punished, let alone imprisoned.

The *pièce de résistance* of our Trio's Tale is not their stories of fictitious threats to school teachers[693] and beauticians. It's their account of the very real execution of a woman in Kabul's largest sports stadium. Their Show actually opens with this scene:

SHAH (voice-over): "Veiled women hunched in the back of a pickup truck. Football stadium in Afghanistan, a place of entertainment turned into an execution ground. Secret pictures showing scenes the country's rulers want to keep hidden[694]. We are trying to uncover the truth behind Afghanistan's veil of terror."

We are shown in slow motion the last moments in the life of a burqa clad woman as

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[689] On Women and Families, Decree announced by the General Presidency of Amr Bil Maruf and Nai As Munkar (Taliban Religious Police), Kabul, November 1996. _____ This was the only source that Prof. Barnett Rubin could find when I queried him 8/13. I had already found the same source. It appears also as an appendix to Ahmed Rashid's book, Taliban. [But see text of Taliban decrees on women leaving home in APPENDIX 21 Taliban Rules.]

Though many authors claim a ban of this type was announced on the official Taliban radio, I have not yet been able to find the text of the such a ban. The following books may have the text. They are in Persian/Arabic script:

A. Laws formed by the Taliban supreme commander Mulla Muhammad Omar, and passed by the Vizārat-i Amr bi-al-Ma'rūf va Nahī 'An al-Munkar of Afghanistan. '03 B. Collection of fifteen miscellaneous decrees each signed: Amīr al-Mu'minīn Mullā Muḥammad 'Umar (Mujāhid). '00 C. On the life of Mullah Muhammad Omar, b. '60; founder of Taliban movement in Afghanistan; includes his speeches & interviews. '99

[690] **A** "Make-up …is worn only in front of other women and in front of one's husband and close male relatives. Even women who do not normally veil their face in public will do so if they are wearing heavy make-up for a wedding. Make-up also conveys meanings about religious piety: a woman washes her face before praying, so a pious woman will avoid daily make-up application, and because nail polish is particularly hard to remove and re-apply, many women wear it only while they are menstruating (hence barred from praying)." [Though this is based on the practices in the Gulf States & Saudi Arabia, these are usually more restrictive than Taliban Afghan.] From: Body: Female: Gulf and Saudi Arabia, Lisa Wynn, Encyclopedia of Women & Islamic Cultures, Brill online reference works. Retrieved Aug 9, 2013, N L. Israel. _____

B. Also, we've the following high level report: "[In] a private home [in Herat] in which a young woman was conducting an English class for about 20 young girls and boys… [m]ost female students …who had been informed that [the 73 yr. old U.N. High Commissioner For Refugees, Ms. Sadako] Ogata, was to visit, wore pretty dresses and makeup." [Wash. Post. 7/20/00, "Tongue-Lashing the Taliban; Grandmotherly U.N. Official Berates Afghans on Their Treatment of Women", Pamela Constable, p. A22, Datel.: Herat , see endnote 20.5 p 266-7]

[691] These veils were in effect, like low-tech, one-way mirrors or sun glasses for the face. They enable the wearer to see out, but the face was always shaded with respect to the outside – and thus relatively indistinct. A veil is also something like the face panel of a Morphsuit™—which allows the wearer to see out while remaining anonymous to 'outsiders'. _____

[692] Supra , see footnote 55.

[693] If the school was aimed at teaching the three R's, it would almost certainly not have been bothered. If it was teaching Muslim children that Islam wasn't so important and some other way of life was better, it would probably have been shut down—but the teachers would not be phys-ically harmed. In this part of the tale, we are not told anything about the program of the school.

[694] **A.** Even at this early point in the Story, its absurdity is brought home as we see that the stadium is filled with thousands of people. Yet we're told by the Story Tellers that we're taking in "scenes the country's rulers want to keep hidden"

B The Story is full of such absurdities, but a year after the 9/11 attacks – after it had been seen by tens of millions of people in about 40 countries, it won its chief Story Teller, Saira Shah, an Emmy Award. It was for 'Outstanding Investigative Jour-nalism – Long Form' – not absurdist fiction or cartoon propaganda.

C It also won a Peabody Award [together with their post 9/11 work *"Unholy War"]* and, as is standard for this award, it was "unanimously selected" by the ~16 judges of the Peabody Board for "distinguished and meritorious public service" and "Excellence On Its Own Terms."

D "[Saira] Shah's agent sold the book rights to Knopf for $650,000, to Bertelsmann for $470,000, to a British publisher for mid-six figures, and to the French publisher Laffont. Miramax bought the option to adapt the book to the silver screen, again for mid-six figures" _____This book -- "The Storyteller's Daughter: One Woman's Return to Her Lost Homeland" -- gave me the idea for the name of this chapter.

she kneels in the stadium in front of thousands of people. A white turbaned 'Taliban' walks toward her and brings his Kalashnikov to the point that it's almost touching her still–veiled head. The film cuts away before the execution – which we will see only later in the heart of the story.

On the way to that point, the Story Tellers reveal:

> "Three-quarters of Afghan children have lost a relative since the Taliban took power"

Since this statement immediately follows another in which we learn:

> "Seven out of 10 [particular, selected children in a refugee camp] had their parents killed by the Taliban." …

… we are left with the completely false impression that literally millions of adults – parents of children – have been killed by the Taliban in the past four years.

Yet the most plausible explanation of "Three-quarters of Afghan children have lost a relative..."-- if it were true at all[695] – is that the great majority of the people who were 'lost' weren't their parents and that they weren't killed but were displaced from the rest of the family by floods, droughts, earthquakes[696] and war.

As the story unfolds we see secret footage supplied by RAWA of burqa clad women begging on the streets and we're told the

> "…pictures reveal the destitution created by the world's most stringent restrictions on women. …their own government has forbidden them to go out and work. Their children go hungry. This is no ordinary third-world poverty; it's been created by the Taliban's social policies."

One would think that the "Two consecutive years of natural emergencies, including droughts, floods and earthquakes, [that] have left millions of people with little access to food"[697] would be a more likely explanation.

As we travel along the road to the football stadium, the camera of our Story Tellers picks up what is apparently an amateur volleyball game in progress [20:30-32]. Nothing is said about it. The camera leaves it blurred. The dismal-foreboding background music of the Story remains unchanged. We've already been told by our Story Tellers as we entered Kabul that this is a city "without joy".

In the middle of the tale we arrive at the *pièce de résistance.* The football stadium comes into view [20:52]. We are told that, "it's the symbol of their [the Taliban's] repression" [21:00]. We're then told by Ms. Shah, on camera, that she has "actually seen pictures of women$_1$ being shot at this penalty area here that we're just coming up to…"[21:10] I have emphasized the word women here because:

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695 Orphanhood in Afghanistan averaged 4.8% for children under 18 in 2010. It increased with age from 0.9% for children under age 2 to 11.4% for those 15-17. Orphanhood is defined as one or both parents dead. Table 2.3, pdf p 44 of "Afghanistan Mortality Survey 2010". Table 2.13, pdf p 57, shows that, in 2010, 76% of women & girls aged 12-49 had no formal education.

696 **A.** At a US State Dept press briefing, May 2001, the drought was described by the leading State expert as the worst in Afghanistan's history. [See footnote 696]

B. "Two consecutive years of natural emergencies, including droughts, floods and earthquakes, have left millions …with little access to food. The country faces an acute food crisis in 2000-2001, with the cereal deficit exceeding 2.3 million tons, more than double that of 1999. The World Food Programme … listed Afghanistan as one of the countries facing the greatest problems in 2001. It is estimated that nearly 4 million people are on the brink of starvation." "The Situation Of Women And Girls In Afghanistan" Vol. 4, Encyclopaedia of Women in South Asia: Afghanistan , 2004, Sangh Mittra, Bachchan Kumar [This is not a very reliable source and gives few references in this area—find better material.]

C. The WFP's efforts to feed war widows in Afghanistan garnered a lot of publicity, but along with similar programs, had the unintended effect of alienating the women and children from their families who were released from their traditional responsibility to help. Sliwinski, p12. Pdf page 15 "Demographic, Social and Ecological consequences of the war in Afghanistan" Geneva , March 1988, 40 pdf pages

697 See footnote 696-B supra. In contrast, Jason Burke noted that in Kabul , "the beggars are no worse than in Calcutta or Karachi." The Independent (Lond.) 8/15/98

> there was only one woman executed in that stadium in the five years the Taliban controlled what went on in it. [698]

The use of the plural for this very singular case is not a one-off slip of the tongue. At each point where the plural could be used, our story tellers use it: [22:48-23:08]

> "…the women$_2$ who they executed here were$_3$ not allowed to take off their$_4$ veils$_5$. So, they$_6$ must have had hardly any idea of what was happening. They$_7$ must have been very confused. They$_8$ must have been hearing the crowd screaming. They$_9$ were pushed up to the penalty line and made to kneel down." [Emphasis added, both here and below.][699]

After using plural words nine times for this singular event, our story tellers wax philosophical:

> "Just the concept that you can pack a stadium with people baying for the blood of another human being, and then shoot them on the pitch."[23:33].

So, according to our Trio, the Taliban were not only horrible murderers in their own right, they brought out the worst in others.

But this is fiction. It wasn't like a soccer game.

> There was no "baying for blood" in this scene and the crowd wasn't screaming.

This is how the same event was described in a contemporaneous reports by British journalist, Jason Burke, with a front row view.[700]

"For the first time in Afghanistan a woman, a self-confessed murderer, is to be executed [701]. The family of her victims have refused to forgive her so, in accordance with the Islamic legal principle of an eye for an eye, she must die.

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[698] Several news reports of this event show that the woman executed in this film – Zarmina -- was the first woman executed in Kabul for anything since the Taliban came into the city in late Sept. '96. App. 19 shows that there were no executions of women in Kabul in '00. A check using LexisNexis showed no executions of women anywhere in Afghanistan between this execution in 11/99 & May 1, '00 & no executions of women in Kabul in '01.

So far, I have not found any reports of women being executed by shooting under the Taliban anywhere else in Afghanistan during the years they ruled the country. Several women were stoned to death for adultery – usually with their male paramours -- and at least two were hanged for "prostitution and corrupting society" – while their clients were flogged . Check more thoroughly on this.

[699] This video segment with its multiple plurals was also shown on the Larry King Live Show in prime time on Christmas Day "12/26/01 - 21:00 ET. _____Also see footnote 706 for more of the clip included in the King show.

[700] I've combined quotes from 2 stories by Jason Burke. 1. The Scotsman, 11/19/99, "Afghans Revel In 'Theatre' Of Death", p. 14, 754 words. [Note contrast between title & contents – there's nothing about 'reveling' in the story.] Material from this story is in Times Roman bold. 2. The Observer, 11/ 21/99, "Death in the penalty area"; p.26, 755 words. [Also in 'The Guardian' _____] Material from this story is in Arial Narrow bold. Both of these articles are in the LexisNexis data base – together with several reports from different wire services. Though there are several minor differences between and among the reports, none of them have the audience screaming or baying for blood.

There is one report of baying for blood at this event – but it is a highly laudatory and completely uncritical pre-review for the Soon to be Televised Story of our story telling trio. "A bullet ends the life of a mother in front of baying masses...This is taliban justice; inside the terrifying world of women under afghanistan's religious fanatics" Anton Antonowicz, Features; p.22-3, 1186 words, The Mirror, 6/23/01, Sat.

There is also a report not directly related to "Beneath the Veil" that notes "Amnesty International says unfair trials at Afghan courts can lead to public executions, flogging and amputations -often in former sports stadiums in front of baying crowds." Oliver Harvey, The Sun, May 2, 2001,"I Was Set To Go Home But My Parents Said I Would Be Killed If I Returned To Afghanistan", 834 words. [emphasis added] No such AI report turned up in a Google search 5/28/14

[701] This is the first time in Kabul under the Taliban that a woman is being executed. It's also the first time under the Taliban that a woman is executed for murder. [check more carefully] It is not the first time that a woman is executed under the Taliban for all causes as several had already been executed for adultery – usually together with their paramours.

As the crowds slowly mass on the terraces[702], boys walk among them selling eggs and sweets and tea[703]. …On the edge of the football pitch a mullah in a white turban and cream cloak stands before a microphone. For an hour before the condemned woman was brought out to face her death, clerics explained to the all-male crowd[704] why she had to die. ...the mullah's tone is almost plaintive. … He knows, and the spectators know, that there has to be a very good reason for shooting dead a middle-aged woman in the centre of a stadium[705]. He is trying to give them one.

'Where once there was crime and anarchy, there is now order,' the mullah says. …Here no-one thieves any longer and your women are safe to walk the streets. It is only because of the implementation of justice according to the sharia (Islamic law) that there is this security. Life is given by Allah and so is His mercy.'

…A red pick-up truck bounces into the middle of the pitch[706]… the condemned woman is helped down. She walks unsteadily and seems old. [O]ffering no resistance, [s]he is led to the edge of the penalty box and kneels down, then starts to rise again but seems to change her mind and kneels once more. Then, like a shy, unsure child on stage for the first time looking for her teacher, she looks around her uncertainly.

Over the microphone the mullah reads from a page of notes: 'This woman is Zarmina, daughter of Ghulam Haznat of Parman province of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. She is a mother of seven children and has confessed to killing her husband Alauddin with a heavy hammer five months ago. The sentence of death has been upheld by three courts.'[707] The mechanical rasp of the breech being worked on the Kalashnikov can be heard[708] clearly from where I am sitting near the touchline. It is somehow extremely loud and is followed by a long moment of utter silence and calm[709] during which

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[702] "There were around 100 female onlookers among at least 4,000 other people, mostly Taliban soldiers." Agence France Presse – English, 11/16/99 13:32 GMT," Taliban publicly execute woman murderer", 330 words, Dateline: Kabul, 11/16. mbr/sha/jd. This means that most of the stands were empty – as the stadium had a reported capacity of 25-30,000. The RAWA video shows some sections of stands completely empty [check more carefully] Beneath the Veil shows scenes of women and children and refers to the event as "A family outing" [22:20 not in transcript]

[703] Our story tellers have them selling cigarettes [22:11, not in transcript] – but the Taliban banned tobacco products at sporting events more than two years before. All the more so they'd be banned at what is essentially a religious event: "Afghanistan's ruling Taliban movement yesterday announced a new Islamic code…[that] orders players and spectators not to use tobacco product…." The Australian, 6/23/97, Monday, We think the agency sent him, Ma'am / Melba Jonathan Este:; Pg. 12, 336 words

[704] Others report there were ~100 women and children – out of ~4K. Perhaps these were not visible from the reporters position.

[705] Ms. Shah says, at [21:27] "This stadium was actually financed by the international community to try to raise the spirits of the people of Afghanistan after the Taliban took power." The stadium was actually built in 1923. International funds were used to clear the stadium of landmines in the year after the Taliban came to Kabul. She also states [at 21:35] "Instead of using it for football, this is now their public execution ground."]

This, and the general tone of the film around the stadium, gives the impression that its primary, if not its only use was for executions. Yet, we have stories like: Disabled sportsmen compete in Kabul to promote land- mine ban campaign, AFP 7/14/97 Terence White.

We also learn: "The national stadium -- battered by more than 17 years of civil war and only recently cleared of landmines -- is currently hosting a number of events, including martial arts fights, football and volleyball." AFP, Stefan Smith, Kabul, 8/16/97.

5 PM, Fri., was still the starting time for the stadium's soccer games. 8/15/98, Independent, Jason Burke, Kabul.

[706] Beneath The Veil imagines out loud that the people in the stands are "shouting and screaming, and the Taliban drive their victims in through the entrance and do a parade around". There was no shouting noted by Burke or audible in the RAWA video. There was no "parade around" described by Burke or evident in the video. The red pick-up stood still with Zarmina and her two guards for a good part of the time.

[707] The complete video of this event on the RAWA website at http://www.rawa.org/zarmeena.htm includes sound but no sound of any speeches is audible – only what sounds like the voices of women and traffic noises – until the gun is fired.

[708] This is not audible on the RAWA video, supra. The video appears to have been taken at a much greater distance from the site of execution.

[709] There is no moment of quiet in the video, supra.

the breeze gently ruffles the pleated hem of the woman's blue burqa.

Then three shots crack out. They are less than a second apart, but with each one there is a spurt of dust from the ground in front of the woman's crumpling body. On the third shot, a shard of skull flies through the air and lands on the grass before the blue burqa, now darkening, falls heavily across the spattered stain on the ground. …there is no triumphal cheer[710], just a low muttering of 'Allahu Akbar' that rises almost imperceptibly, then falls like a muttered blessing, or an excuse, or a curse, into the still, cold air."

How could two accounts of the same event be so different? The story tellers may have borrowed elements from one or more other executions in recounting, reconstructing or, more likely, just telling the story they wanted to tell of what went on here.

The consultant – Ahmed Rashid – had previously written in detail of another execution that he personally witnessed. It was the execution of a young man for murdering another man and it took place in the football stadium of Kandahar[711] more than two and half years before.[712] It's in this earlier work of Rashid that we find the "baying crowd" – like the imaginative expression used by our trio in the description of Zarmina's execution. But in Rashid's earlier work, it's also imaginative. He wasn't there – but writes:

> *"…in a village near Kabul, a woman was stoned to death by a baying crowd after being sentenced for trying to flee Afghanistan with a man who was not her blood relative."*[713] [EMPH. ADDED]

Any ordinary person reading this would think that the woman was all but completely innocent – that she had just picked the wrong man to flee with – presumably both of them running from the 'terrible Taliban'. And the "baying crowd"[714] – what a disgusting society – if it can even be called that.

A contemporaneous report by another British reporter gives a completely different – and more plausible – picture:

> "The Taliban …stoned a young woman to death for adultery, according to the official Radio Shariat in Kabul. [It]…said the woman, …Jamila, had been caught trying to flee with her lover from her

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[710] In the article, Jason Burke had contrasted this occasion with a previous event in the same stadium. "On a Friday afternoon in August last year, a few days before the Americans launched their missile strike against guerrilla camps in eastern Afghanistan linked with the terrorist Osama Bin Laden, I heard the same man addressing a similar crowd. It was a hot day and the atmosphere was very different. Then the spectators cheered as one man was shot and two others had a hand and a foot amputated."

There was actually no mention of any cheering in Burke's original, 8/15/98 story: "Half an hour after the executions, Kabul stadium opens for football", J. B. Kabul, The Independent(Lond), 8/15/98, p 17, 853 wds.

[711] The Kandahar stadium was reportedly repaired by the international community. They could've borrowed from stories where the crowd & clerics plead for mercy – [See Append 19, #9] but the trio didn't.

[712] The Gazette (Montreal, Apr. 1, '97, Harsh justice on a soccer field: Under Taliban supervision, a killer is executed by his victim's family, by Ahmed Rashid; London Daily Telegraph; p. B1 / 614 Words.

[713] Taliban , on p3-5. The same story – but without "baying crowd" is given in an article by Rashid written at the time: "On Saturday, a woman was stoned to death in a village near Kabul for trying to flee Afghanistan with a man who was not a blood relative." The Gazette (Montreal.), Apr/1/97, 'Harsh justice on a soccer field: Under Taliban supervision, a killer is executed by his victim's family" Kandahar,

[714] Another fictitious story of "men who have been hanged in public spectacles before baying crowds [and] youths whose hands and feet have been roughly amputated by vigilante squads" under the Taliban, was written by Mark Baker, 4/13/96, The Age (Melb.). Late Edit. "A law unto themselves" Pg. 3, 2694 words. However, the only execution noted in the piece is one where: "Two months ago, a youth accused of killing two men was hanged in a public ceremony at the stone-walled sports stadium beside the city offices. [in Herat] An estimated 20,000 people were rounded up to view the spectacle." [A similar Baker story appears on the same day in another paper: Sydney Morning Herald, 4/13/96 , Late Edition, "Terror behind the veil" p.8, 2108 words]

On 2/17/96, there was a public hanging in a stadium in Herat of a young man found guilty of murdering two Taliban. An eye-witness report states: "The crowd [of 30,000 that packed the stadium] was very quiet. No women were allowed to come, just men and boys, but there was no cheering." After he was hanged, the same witness wrote "The crowd was completely silent" The witness was a 24-year-old educated Herati translator, "whose wife, a student of English, was forced to leave university. He hates the Taliban." [The Observer, 6/16/96, "God's Dealers", Pg. TT17, 5826 words, Maggie O'Kane]

Mark Baker is responsible for a dubious hand maiming story in the same paper – when Taliban took Kabul half a year later. SEE APP. 18

home in a village in the eastern Laghman province by her husband, Aminullah. [Her husband]… shot dead his rival, Abdullah, and was sentenced to 12 years in prison, said the broadcast."[715]

The rest of Beneath the Veil is similar to what we have here. It presents a deeply negative picture of the Taliban with all women as their victims and no voices – except the Taliban themselves – who say anything favorable about them. The enemies of the Taliban – the Northern Alliance -- are shown as beleaguered good guys. No mention is made of what RAWA thinks of them -- though RAWA is the source of so much of the insight and footage for this film. It's no secret. An article on RAWA's anti-Taliban demonstration – shown in the first part of or film [6:11-8:41][716], tells us: RAWA "also protests against the opposition [the Northern Alliance], who they say has been party to the destruction of their homeland and the oppression of women."[717]

The Taliban did have some bad people in positions of leadership and it's good the film highlights one of their darker crimes. There really was a massacre by the Taliban in Yakawlang [31:42-33:36] -- but this was an exception, not the rule. The Taliban commander who was responsible, an ideological ally of OBL, was relieved of his duty. [718]

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[715] The Vancouver Sun, 3/31/97, fin, 'Woman stoned to death for infidelity" Alex Spillius; p. A12, New Delhi.

[716] It is interesting that most of the signs shown in the demonstration – that we see in Beneath the Veil – are in English. Could it be that our story tellers, in cooperation with RAWA – staged the protest & – as suggested in articles covering the demonstration, provoked the religious people into attacking them ? "Some of the protesters, many of whom were women, threw stones at a Pakistani religious group when they started shouting slogans in favor of the Taliban, witnesses said." [see footnote 717, infra]

"Witnesses said the clash started after someone set fire to a camp collecting donations for the anti-India Kashmiri mujahedin at the site of the demonstration…"Deutsche Presse-Agentur, Anti-mujahedin demo by Afghan women ignites rioting in Islamabad,12/10/00, 11:31 Cent. Euro. Time, Islamabad

[717] Sunday Protest by Afghan women leads to violence in Islamabad, AP Int., Dec/10/00; Dateline: Islamabad, (az/kg)

[718] **A.1** There was heavy fighting in Yakawlang – back and forth – into 2001. "Yakalong, [is] an important communication center that has an airport used for bringing supplies to Hizb-e-Wahdat forces." Japan Economic Newswire, May/3/'01, "Taliban claims gains in offensive near Bamyan" Dateline: Islamabad, M/3, Kyodo; **A.2** "Control of Bamiyan and the local airport might also result in Tehran resuming its flights of weapons into the area," one western analyst said.' AFP, 4/22/99, "Afghan opposition securing lines around Bamiyan: report" **A.3** " [The]… Taliban …claimed yesterday to have captured one of the last opposition strongholds, …Bamyan [P]rov…with its crucial airstrip." The Independent, Lond., 9/14/98, "Taliban 'storm last stronghold', "Jason Burke in Islamabad" P. 13, 192 words **A.4** With all other airstrips of the N. Alliance in T hands by '01, [ex. Faizabad, Badakh. Prov. The Sunday Herald, Mar. 4/01, "People are dying while we worry about statues…" David Pratt, Pg. 16, 2275 words] the Yakawlang airstrip in the otherwise very mountainous area became particularly crucial for the N.A.'s resupply. **B.1** Mullah Dadullah: The Military Mastermind of the T Insurgency, by Omid Marzban, Terrorism Focus, V. 3, # 11 (3/21/06) _____ "Dadullah appeared on al-Jazeera television announcing his link and support to al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden (al-Jazeera, 2/13/06) … he was not … considered an important character during the first years of the regime's creation. After he was accused for a bloody genocide in the central Bamyan province, Dadullah was disarmed according to Mullah Omar's order in 2000. He was later re-armed since the Taliban needed his aggressive command against Northern Alliance troops." **B.2** Detailed analysis of Mullah Dadullah, his OBL links & how the more sr. Taliban leadership related to him, is also found in: An Enemy We Created: The Myth of the Taliban/Al-Qaeda Merger in Afghanistan, 1970-2010, A. Strick van Linschoten & F. Kuehn, Oxford, 2012. They say [p276] "In Jan 2001, around 300 unarmed men and some women and children were killed by T forces in Yakawlang (Bamiyan province). Dadullah has since been tied to this massacre in a supervisory role." He was killed by the ISAF/US forces in 5/07. **B.3a** To put this massacre in perspective – the total killed by both sides in the 'Taliban War' was probably ≤18K – incl. both military & civ. [See APPEND. 24: WAR RELATED KILLING IN AFGHANISTAN DURING THE TALIBAN PERIOD 10/'94 -9/11/'01,] This is based on avg. killed/month for the first 24 months & yr 2000 applied to all 7 years of Tal. rule,-- asside from massacres in Mazar 97-98. The total would've been ~18k= ~12K +~6k massacre victims at Mazar '97-98. It's likely however that kill rate/month went down sharply after Mazar'98 – as much of the carnage came from use of aircraft to attack the T. A substantial, but as yet unknown, fraction of the 12k were result of prolongation of the war -- in large part, by the belief in the lie that the T had tortured & murdered Sheikh Mazari. [See CH. 10 Did The Taliban Throw Sheikh Abdul Ali Mazari Out Of A Helicopter?] [get better refs]. **B.3b** For comparison, ~12k civilians were killed in Afg. by landmines, 1/'95-10/'01, [based on taking landmine deaths per month for 95-99: (189+152+147+150+92)*12=8,760; +[155*4=620 for jan-apr 2000]; [120* [8+10]=2,160 for 5/2000-10/2001 [120 is my estim. – assuming decling rate]=11,540 ["Approximately 80 percent of the land mine casualties are civilian…" U.S. Dept of State Afghanistan Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1998, Bur of Dem., Hum. Rights, and Labor, 2/ 26/99 _____ See these reports yr by yr for other civilan and military casualty repts. .] [based on "Table 5.1: Mine victims 1995-2000, Calculated …based on ICRC and SEIS information."p14 [pdf p 30]; ~100km² of ~700km² of landmined area in Afgh was mined in '96-7,~80 in '96 alone,the rest during the Soviet yrs. Fig 3.1, "The Socio-Economic Impact Of Mine Action In Afghanistan: A Cost-Benefit Analysis", William A. Byrd & Bjorn Gildestad, Dec/10/'01, part of the "World Bank/UNDP Afghanistan Watching Brief Project."[Much of 96-7 mining may've been due to Massood when he left Kabul: 12/16/96, The Globe and Mail (Canada) "Afghanistan in thrall to land mines…"John Stackhouse P. A12, 1007, Dateline: Kabul 'The ousted Kabul government appears to have discarded land mines in its retreat, while militiamen staying behind dumped their mines to avoid the T's house-to-house sweeps for weapons.' "The Taliban …adopted a principled stand against the use of mines as 'unislamic',[10/'98] while [Rab/Mas]… continued to use landmines …"p. 932, Kristian Berg Harpviken, 'Breaking New Ground: Afghanistan's Response to Landmines and Unexploded Ordnance' Third World Qtrly,v.23,#5,10/'02),p.931-43,See: "description of how the T disarmed the part of the country they came to control"App 16 _____ _____ _____

B.3c 2000 Afghanistan Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey (MICS2), Vol. 1, Situation Analysis of Children and Women in the East of Afghanistan, Sept 2001 [fieldwork 6-8/2000]. 0.18% childr 0-17.9yrs, disabled by landmines, Table 36. Based on Survey of 8 prov's: _____
Ghazni, Paktia, Paktik, Loghar, Nangarhar, Konar, Laghman, Wardak
1040, 369, 468, 332, 1262, 508, 378, 506=4,863E6;
childr <18 =60.3% of pop.[table 2 pdf p 19]; 0.0018*0.603*4,863k=5,278k; 34% of injured persons in reported mine accidents are <18; So total inj. for this group would be 5,278/34= 15,524. Total mine deaths for this group, using 31% death rate; .31*15,524 =4,812 deaths due to landmines in 8 prov's. [using "The Socio-Economic Impact Of Mine Action In Afghanistan: A Cost-Benefit Analysis" at 718-**B3b**] These ~5k deaths would've been contemporaneous with the injuries to the children – eg prev.18 yrs.& to a 1st approximation, would've followed popul. growth – higher in more recent years.

0-4.9yrsold:4.0+2.4+3.8+4.1+3.2=17.5%; 5-9.9yrsold:4.6+4.8+4.5+5.0+2.9=21.8;

10-14.9 yrs old: 4.2+2.1+4.0+2.1+2.7=15.1; 15- 17.9 yrs old: 2.3+2.5+1.1=5.9; 17.5%+21.8%+15.1%+5.9%=60.3% of 6,646 people surveyed.

B.3d Sum of 8 prov's =4,863k~1/5th of tot. Afg pop,at time of survey; so, tot. killed in 18 yrs is ~35,000 or ~2k/yr. – noting that (3.3%) "Injury due to landmine" for Nangarhar[**B.3f**]~same as for whole Afg.[**B.3f**] [[(5.0+1.5)/2]*7+8.1]/8=3.86—where it's assumed 1/8 is temporarily or permanently disabled—as a result of the definition used, the number in the sample & the alternative defintions & percentages used in [**B.3i**] ~ 50k in the national survey [**B.3i**] – which would only be ~2% is based on a "very severe difficulty or inability".

0.008*0.111*0.175=0.016=% inj. by l.m. 0-4.9 yrs old when interv.; 1 victim
0.017*0.120*0.218=0.044=% inj. by l.mines 5-9.9 yrs old; 3 victims
0.016*0.063*0.151=0.015=% inj. by l.m. 10-14.9 yrs old; based on 1 victim
0.023*0.222*0.059=0.030=% Inj. by l.mines 15- 17.9yrs old; 2 victims
Combined result is based on just 7 child- victims injured by mines

B.3e See pdf 35 on % of arable land not usable due to land mines by region to show how the Eastern region compares with rest of Afg. Afghanistan 1997 MICS_English unicef. Afghanistan 2003 MICS_English, pdf 28. found 2.5% of 1-4 yr[12-59 months] olds and 2.9% of 7-17 yr olds "had some kind of disability or impairment."pdf 29 data on child amputees 167 hits on HIV -- nothing on land mines. In '14 alone, there were 1,296 recorded mine/ERW casualties (575 klled/721 injured) _____ citing "Landmine Monitor 2015." *Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor* (May 2015). Accessed 3/516. __.; The ICRC recorded 1,286 new landmine/UXO casualties in 2002, although it is believed that many casualties are not reported _____ UN MACA est. that there continues to be around 150 new mine cas/month in AfgICRC, "Annual Rept '02," Geneva, 6/03, p. 148.

B.3f Inj. due to landm. tot N=1011, 35 (3.3); m N=469, 22 (4.4); f N=542, 13 (2.3)Mental Health Symptoms Following War and Repression in Eastern Af… [Nangarhar Prov.], W. F. Scholte, MD JAMA, Aug 4/'04—V 292, No. 5 585

B.3g Injury due to landmine #(%) nondisabled 29[of 699] (3.7); disabled 12 [of 100] (8.1) disabled includes temporarily disabled. Mental Health, Social Functioning, and Disability in Postwar Afghanistan, B. Lopes Cardozo, MD, MPH , et al, (bhc8@cdc.gov) . JAMA, Aug 4, '04—V 292, # 5 p. *575-84* national multistage, cluster, population based mental health survey of 799 adult household members aged 15 years or older conducted from 7-8/02; Injury due to land mine 423 women 15 (5.0); 272 men 14 (1.5) [severity of inj not stated – could've been minor; sample excl "disabled – see above] Mental Health of Women in Postwar Afghanistan J. Of Women's Health, V 14, No. 4, '05, B Lopes Cardozo "We defined the term *disability* as any restriction or lack (resulting from impairment) of ability to perform an activity in the manner or within the range considered normal for a human being. Disability summarizes many different functional limitations occurring in any pop. Such impairments, conditions, or illnesses may be permanent or transitory in nature."

B.3h Sep 1,/'00, AP, Lack of money forces UN to reduce mine clearing operations', Kathy Gannon, 412 Words, Dateline: Islamabad, 'Saying it has no money, the United Nations announced Friday it would be sharply reducing its land-mine clearing operations in Afghanistan -- one of the heaviest mined countries in the world….This is certain to mean more land mine victims in a country that already sees at least 300 people hurt by land mines every month, said the statement."Civilian mine and unexploded ordnance casualties already estimated as at least 300 per month can be expected to increase," Polly Brennan, Mine Awareness Advisor to the program said in the statement. Estimates of the number of land mines in Afghanistan vary from five million to as many as 10 million. Earlier the United Nations said it would take 30 years to clear the land mines in Afghanistan. Millions were laid by invading Soviet soldiers during the 1980s and millions more by Islamic rebels who took power when communist rule in Afghanistan ended in 1992. Despite international protests, land mines continue to be laid in Afghanistan. Opposition spokesman Mohammed Abil said that an offensive by the country's ruling Taliban in northern Afghanistan was repulsed because of the freshly laid mines laid by opposition soldiers. Kabul, the capital of Afghanistan, is one of the world's heaviest mined cities. The mines were laid by warring Islamic factions who ruled the country from 1992 to 1996 when they were thrown out by the hardline Taliban rulers.

More typical of how the Taliban related to communities that were culturally different from them is seen in their treatment of the people of Kabul.

"Taleban's impeccable behaviour with the general population since occupying Kabul …is in startling contrast to the tradition of Pashtun plunder. For all its philosophical extremism, Taleban is mostly welcomed for bringing a rare taste of law and order.."[719]

B.3i "[Of 25E6 Afg. pop.]123,000…were affected by war and its consequences; of these almost 50,000 are landmine or UXO survivors." National Disability Survey in Afghanistan, 2005, Handicap International '06, p 13, pdf 29 "One option is to take into consideration the answers 'very severe difficulty or inability' to any one of the dimensions. In this configuration, the rate of prevalence is 2.2%. If we add people with the score of 'severe difficulty' to any of the dimensions, the rate of prevalence increases to 10.8%. Then, if we add people scoring a level of 'moderate difficulty', the rate becomes 36.7%."

B.3j 18% of landmine/UXO victims are 5-14.9 yrs of age.[20.0% of those whose ages are known. This is consistent with 4/7 injur. children in 0-17.9 in range 5-14.9 & 34% of inj. persons <18 in B3c] [36.9% of pop in MICS2 B.3c] Landmine Impact Survey of Afghanistan: Results and Implications for Planning. Patrick Fruchet, *U.N. Mine Action Centre for Afg*h. & Mike Kendellen, *Survey Action Center*, *Journal of Mine Action*, Issue 9.2/Feb 2006. Victims of mine incidents. "In the LIS, "recent victims" are defined as persons who have been killed or wounded within the 24-month period prior to the survey. The survey recorded 2,245 recent mine/UXO casualties (922 killed, 1,323 injured), which ~1,100/yr over the 2-yrs covered by the survey. Of the 2,245 casualties, 90% were m & 7% f. gender of 3% is unknown. Fatality rate is m. (41%) f. (42%)." Data collection began 5/03 ended 6/04.

B.3k In '03, UNMACA recorded 846 new cas from landmines, UXO & cluster munitions, 184 were killed & 662 inj.; at least 80 were f.., ICRC recorded 847 mine/UXO cas for same period, incl at least 384 children; 772 were civilians. However, key actors in mine action est. that there are currently ~100 mine/UXO cas/month in Af. Many …die before reaching medical assistance…not recorded in stats. The Landmine Impact Survey data on casualties from '01-'03 shows 654 (38%) of 1,714 landmine cas. died from their injuries. Mine cas continue in '04. The ICRC recorded 423 new mine/UXO cas. to the end of 6/'04, incl 47 killed & 376 inj. The # of est. new mine cas. has declined over time. In '00, it was est. casualties could be as high as 150-300/month, a decrease from 300-360/month in '97 & est. of 600-720/month in '93 _____

B.4 "The fighting [in decade-long war in Af. against USSR] killed…[~]1.5 million Afghans…severely disabled 500,000 [&]destroyed 10,000 villages...In Kabul …fighting by rival factions … killed tens of thousands of civilians in the last three years [before the Taliban]… achieved their triumph at Kabul as Government soldiers abandoned their defenses without firing a shot." [John F. Burns, NYT, Oct 7/96 pA8, 2090 wds. Total direct deaths in US Civil War -- both soldier & civ. was ~1E6, ~3 % of the pop. of the US at the time. See APP. 23 The Number of Casualties in the Soviet Afghan War for more on numbers.

B.5 Film's Transcript has an interview with the Taliban Foreign Minister on the issue of the report of a massacre – but his comment isn't included in the video that most people saw:

[TALIB. FOR'GN MNSTR] "Motawakil (through translator): I don't accept this, that except for wars that Taliban are killing women and children. The reason we don't accept this is because Taliban commanders are religious figures. You know that except for someone who is fighting a war, be it a woman or a child or regular folks, that they are human beings. They have livelihoods. We believe in judgment day."] [Cont. next p.]

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Had it not been for the ground work of prejudice and misinformation laid by Zohra Rasekh and the Feminist Majority Foundation and their Hollywood amplifiers, it's likely that this film would have been seen by more people -- perhaps most people -- as the propaganda cartoon that it is. It wouldn't have been so effective in ginning up the public for the drive to war against the Taliban after the 9/11 attacks. It even helped to goad our soldiers into attacking the "brutal Taliban" [720] At least some reviewers saw the film more as what it was – but they were published months after what might be called "the First Feminist War" was in full swing.[721]

B.6 Amb. Zaeef writes "...without ...[Dadullah] the six thousand *Taliban [trapped in Konduz in '97 in the aftermath of the debacle at Mazar]* would have faced certain death as they had done in Mazar-e Sharif."[My Life...", p 87]] search dateline Mazar-i-Sharif -e-Sharif. Lots in '97, ~0 after – all the way to 8/01? Recheck with urdu, etc? [See footnotes 177 D.3 & D.4 & 292]

[720] Times[L], 9/30/96, Militants bring a veil down on battered Kabul: Christopher Thomas. 680 words. In comparison with this we have the following desriptions of how the non-Islamist Pashtuns behaved when they entered Kabul with a more narrowly focused materialist/ethnic motives in 1929 to depose another Tajik ruler:

> **"With no money in the treasury to compensate the tribes for bringing him to power, Nadir spent his first weeks on the throne watching his subjects loot the capital and surround-ing bazaars. Andre Viollis, the only foreign correspondent to witness the mayhem following the Tajiks' overthrow, wrote that "the [Pashtun] tribesmen consider-ed Kabul an enemy capital."**

[p 55-56 "Ahmad Shah Massoud And The Genesis Of The Nationalist Anti-Communist Movement In Northeastern Afghanistan, 1969 – 1979" Peter B. DeNeufville _____

> Also in contrast to the Taliban – but like many of their more materialist/ethnically oriented forebears, we have: "On Saturday in Kabul, pro-Rabbani forces led by Ahmed Shah Massoud, ...drove ...the [largely Shiite Hazara] Hizbe Wahadat, out of Karte Seh [the Shiite Hazara part of Kabul]. They then went on a rampage, looting whole streets....More than 100 people were killed and 1,000 wounded in last week's battles for Karte Seh, hospitals said."The Guardian, Lond. 3/14/95, Peter Greste, Kabul. Pg. 12, 654 words.

Beyond hanging the former Pres. Najibullah, & 3 close associates for mass murder the day they entered the capital, the Taliban executed only one person – for murder – in their 1st yr in the city. See Appendix 18.

[720] See : Chapter 12 : A CONTRIBUTION OF THE CIA

[721] Bush and the Burqa *by* Christine McCarthy McMorris, Religion In The News, Spring '02, V. 5, #. 1 _____ The Camera and the Burqa, Martin Kramer. *Middle East Q.*, Spring '02, pp. 69-76 _____

HOME SCHOOL PROJECT , KHOST

UNOCHA MISSION

GARDEZ-KHOST, PAKTIA PROVINCE, EASTERN AFGHANISTAN

21-24 JULY , 1997

Objectives : To visit women and homeschool projects in Taliban area
To attend ACBAR Southeast Coordination Meeting in Khost

Prepared by: Ms. Eveline Viehboekh
OIC, UNOCHA Peshawar

"Visit to CARE home school project in Khost city: CARE, with support of UNICEF and Canadafund, is currently implementing a pilot project for 39 community based homeschools with a total of 1,400 students in Khost area. The mission visited a homeschool which is located in a tent in front of an Afghan family compound outside Khost city. 33 girls and 12 boys attend the class normally which is conducted by a female and a male teacher who live in the nearby compound. Children are [taught] Mathematics, Pashto and Islamic studies. The textbooks they use are produced by GTZ BEFARe, originally meant for Afghan refugee children in Pakistan. Calculations are for instance carried out in Pakistan Rupees (PRS). Each homeschool is administered by a committee comprising one local elder and two educationalists who decide on curricula and conduct of teaching. Parents pay for each child 20 PRS schoolfees. The classroom is made of a big military tent, contains one blackboard, a teacher's desk and chair and [mats] on the ground on which children sit. During winter, classes are given indoor. Classes are usually held at a time when children are not busy with other family duties such as collecting water or tending cows. During the hot season, classes are conducted in the late afternoon. The one we visited was an ad hoc arrangement in the early afternoon but kids seemed not to mind and eagerly presented reading and calculating skills. (At some stage children simply could not refrain from examining the OIC's pair of glasses, a strange thing they have never before seen in their life.)

It was explained that Khost has always been a traditional center for learning. That is why the homeschool project was encouraged by Taliban authorities. (The Director of the Dept. of Foreign Relations invited mission members during the ACBAR meeting to visit a local homeschool.) Regarding the relationship between project staff and Taliban authorities, a CARE national staff replied:"We know who we are and who are they." Relationships are good, was explained. But to be cautious the homeschool committee employed a female and a male teacher together, in case Taliban authorities start object against female teachers. CARE intends to expand the homeschool project to the neighbouring provinces of Paktika, Logar and Ghazni. *Text from pdf p 6 & 7, OCR'd at* __ [see p. 84 for more photos from this rept]

CHAPTER 23:

EXECUTING PEOPLE FOR PLAYING MUSIC

The Secretary of State, Dr. Condoleezza Rice, on Meet the Press, 3/26/06, was asked about the case of a man in Kabul who was on trial for his life for converting from Islam to Christianity. She responded by saying:

> **"…I would just remind people, that four years ago the Taliban was executing people wantonly in stadiums for playing music."**

The interviewer, Tim Russert, just went on to the next topic.

As a result of my efforts to quantify Taliban judicial punishments, I was confident that there had been no credible reports of any executions by the Taliban for playing music.[722] [Also see footnote 947G on tolerance of the Taliban for religious music of non-Moslems][cont. next p.]

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[722] There is no mention of anyone executed for playing music in the Taliban period in a scholarly treatment of the subject. "Music censorship in Afghanistan before and after the Taliban" John Baily p 19-28 in Shoot the Singer!: Music Censorship Today, M. Korpe , Editor, FreeMuse, '04. "Punishments for playing music or being caught with cassettes seem to have varied greatly, from confiscation of the goods and a warning to severe beatings." [p.22]

The worst case of suppression of music noted in this paper occurred in an area near Kabul in October 2002 – when the Taliban were no longer in charge and the author of the paper was in Kabul. "Musicians from Kabul city were invited to play at a wedding in a village in Kabul province, towards the Shamali Plain. During the wedding local police arrived to stop the festivities, and the host and two musicians were arrested and taken to the local police station. There they were severely beaten at the order of the local police chief. The next day elders from the village came to ask for their release. They were freed and warned never to return.' [p27]

In contrast, the Taliban rule on the subject – promulgated in Kabul was: "To prevent music and dances in wedding parties. In the case of violation the head of the family will be arrested and punished."

The general prohibition did not mention private listening in private homes. It said: "To prevent music... In shops, hotels, vehicles and rickshaws... …If cassette found in the vehicle, the vehicle and the driver will be imprisoned. If five people guarantee, the vehicle will be released and the criminal released later."[p19] There is no mention in these rules of beatings or privately listening to music in ones home in connection with this ban..

In another paper, Baily gives an account of two mul-lahs stopping the amplification of music at a wed-ding party in the '80's in a poor section of Peshawar, Pakistan, full of Afghan refugees. It wasn't the music as such that the mullahs were so strongly opposed to but the imposition on others of loud, amplified music which was actually or potentially disturbing the neighbors. The mullahs said:

> **"…turn it down! Because other people may be offended…If you play too loud, the whole neighborhood will stay up late and will miss their morning prayers …we understand it is a happy occasion, we're not going to stop you but cut the speakers off completely … cut the speakers!"**

This exchange was recorded on tape by Baily. The only exclamation points in the exchange were where a mullah spoke about cutting the volume, not the content – though' Baily does not notice this in his comment. The mullahs did not leave until the amplification was turned off. [p150-1] [Music and censorship in Afghanistan 1973-2003, p143-64, in Music and the Play of Power in the Middle East, North Africa and Central Asia, L. Nooshin, ed.'09

Amplified music in homes & cars -- with or without parties -- was a major problem in NYC in the same time period – continuing into the 21's century. It drove many of the most productive people out of the city. There were no mullahs – and often no police – to get the neighbors or car drivers to turn down their sound systems. [For more on this issue, see: 'Sound-Space: Local Pastures With Global Impacts', part of "Love Thy Neighbor: Antidote To "The Tragedy Of The Commons, Gateway To Global Ecology" in the author's sefer: שבעים אומרים "THEY SAY SEVENTY"]

Taliban didn't ban the *dayereh* …a medium-sized frame drum with jingles, used to accompany both popular & classical music. P 20 "mainly played by women to accompany their domestic singing and dancing". Instrumental Music – other than this drum and electronic & other sound effects --& women singing for mixed company were banned. The paper notes many major restrictions on music were in place in Herat under Ismail Kahn before the Taliban came – & under Hekmatyar in Kabul in the few months he served as Prime Minister in Mid '96..

The tape archive of the radio station -- with 5,000 hours of recorded music and the video archive – and studio equipment -- of the TV station survived the Taliban. A show was made of destroying a limited amount of Iranian popular music and Indian film music. P.20 [These were also the kinds of things that could easily be replaced from their source countries.]

Instrumental music literally went underground – using the basements of homes that were designed as refuges from the heat of the summer – and also had naturally good acoustic isolation from the public streets.

The ban on kite flying & pigeon flying from rooftops was to prevent people from spying on the courtyards of their neighbors [p. 25-6].

Curiously, the author doesn't mention "police have not interfered with music played privately in worship by the Hindu and Sikh minorities." AP, 3/17/01, "Are Afghanistan's Buddha-smashing Taliban following Islamic teachings?", Kathy Gannon, Richard N. Ostling, Dateline: Islamabad

I called the State Department and Meet The Press and left messages that there had been no reports of any executions by the Taliban for playing music. I also sent emails with the same message to journalists and public intellectuals across the world.

Despite this "heads up" a LEXIS-NEXIS search carried out on 5/02/06 – more than a month later-- found no comment on the apparent discrepancy between Dr. Rice's assertion and the readily discoverable reality. This was particularly note-worthy as Dr. Rice at the time was almost a center of a cottage industry of criticism. It seemed that almost every day there would be some critic finding fault with something that she said.

Still, when questioned about this apparent discrepancy on 4/25/06, State Department press officer, Nancy Beck, said that, before me, her office had not been asked about this. She added that I must remember that Dr. Rice was formerly – at the time of the events in question – the National Security Advisor, and would have been privy to information that is not in the public domain.

I reminded Ms. Beck, that Dr. Rice had said that these punishments had been carried out "in stadiums" and that the Taliban were not averse to carrying out punishments in stadiums that they felt were called for by their interpretation of Sharia Law. ____ She said: " I think we have given you enough time." And that was the end of our conversation.[723]

CHAPTER 24:

CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE CIA

What interest, if any, did the CIA and other similar US 'intelligence' services, have in defaming the Taliban?[724] It's clear that, after the attacks on the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in the summer of '98, the US saw bin Laden and his associates as the most likely suspects. When the Taliban showed little interest in physically handing him over without a real trial under Muslim Law, the US would've sought other possible ways to get him.

A good possibility would be to hire the intra-Afghan enemies of the Taliban to do the dirty work of bringing him out. The pay would not only be money and weapons to fight their war. It might also include anti-Taliban propaganda – to convince the public not to support or recognize the Taliban. This would mean, initially, promoting the view that they were terrible misogynists and barbarous murderers.

In late 2000 and the pre-9/11 period of 2001, it would also mean twisting their opium poppy eradication program to make it look like yet another scheme for the 'vicious, hypocritical' Taliban to make money to fund their 'horren-dous, oppressive' regime. It wouldn't matter much, in the context of this narrow goal of "get bin Laden", that the people they were funding --the "Northern Alliance"-- were doing much of what the Taliban would be falsely accused of. [725]

After the 9/11 attacks, when the Taliban were targeted for overthrow and suppression, the CIA helped to promote hatred – to make it easier for the public to support killing them. A key 'open to the public' CIA theme had already been promoted by others—with or without CIA covert support: The Taliban had targeted women for public execution -- for nothing. In the CIA book, "Jawbreaker: The Attack on Bin Laden and Al Qaeda… "[726] we have:

> *"My mind raced ahead. The brutal Taliban was waiting. I'd seen film footage of how they treated their own people. Women driven in the back of pickups into stadiums packed with cheering Islamic fundamentalists. They were taken out and Forced to their knees in the center of the stadium and shot through the back of their heads one by one."* [727]

[Also See Footnote 879 on the CIA & drug money in SE Asia and Afghanistan]

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[723] Also , see APPENDIX 21 Taliban Rules III.2 To prevent music: [Note that there is nothing here about prohibiting music in private homes or offices.]

[724] Interesting book on the CIA & seemingly ordinary publishers & artists: The Cultural Cold War: The CIA and the World of Arts and Letters Frances Stonor Saunders,'13

[725] According to Steve Coll in his book Ghost Wars, the CIA was actively engaged in getting Northern Alliance leader, Ahmed Shah Massoud, to capture bin Laden.

[726] *A Personal Account by the CIA's Key Field Commander* by Gary Berntsen & Ralph Pezzullo, '05. See also First In: How Seven CIA Officers Opened the War on Terror in Afghanistan, Gary Schroen, '05. Schroen was CIA chief in Islamabad, Pak., '96-'99. & ran operations to get bin Laden. He renewed his links with anti-Soviet commanders – & particularly befriended Ahmed Shah Massoud.

[727] Supra footnote 228 at p. 57, & partic. p. 98, par. 5:[check these references] (Film actually shows one woman executed for murder. However, in the film "Beneath The Veil" the same footage is shown twice. (see, in this sefer, CHAPTER 2: Oppression Of Women Under The Taliban?, partic. See footnotes 50 & 51 & Chapter 22c: Murdering School Teachers -- The Story Tellers' Tale.))

Relate case of murder of reporters on p.215 of CIA book with case of commander Zardad/Zardat -- including Taliban tip-off and Guardian coverage.

CHAPTER 25:

SINS OF OMISSION BY MAJOR AMERICAN MEDIA ORGANIZATIONS

25a NYT/The Freshman,

a 13 page, 8,694 word article by *Chip Brown in the* New York Times Magazine. [2/26/06. p. 54 _____] on the former roving ambassador of Taliban -- then at Yale – makes no mention of the Taliban's eradication of opium. This is particularly surprising as opium is twice mentioned by the former ambassador: first, as one of the concerns of the US in 1997[728], and then again, as one of the ambassador's own concerns after the US ousted the Taliban.

On this second point, we learn the former ambassador is

"…increasingly dismayed… by the return of the warlords, the rise of opium trafficking, the lawlessness and the violence that have plagued his country. [emphasis added]

The interviewer than asks:

'Would things be better if the Taliban were still in power?"

In that part of the ambassador's response that got past the editor's cut, there is no mention of opium at all. Note also that the author of the article speaks of the return of the warlords, but the rise of opium trafficking – not the return of opium growing. This gives the reader the false sense that opium continued to rise from an already high level – not that it returned after having been eradicated by the Taliban. Yet the eradication of opium poppy growing was the Taliban's signature constructive achievement as far as the four stated interests the US -- interests given previously in the same article.

For an uncut video and transcript of what the former Ambassador, Syed Rahmatullah Hashimi, was actually saying when he was representing the Taliban in the US in March of 2001, see APPENDIX 16 of this sefer:

[728] **"U. S. officials had O.K. relations with the Taliban at that time, and they wanted to talk about four issues. The first was stopping the fighting with the Northern Alliance. The second was drugs and opium growing. The third was human rights The fourth was Osama bin Laden." [EMPHASIS ADDED]**

25b. CBS/ 60 Minutes piece on the opium problem in Afghanistan — mentions that opium poppy growing had increased by 2000 % since 2001 – but doesn't say how it had gotten so low.

"Afghanistan: Addicted To Heroin, Steve Kroft Reports On Afghanistan's Booming Heroin Trade" Oct. 16, '05.

"One and a half tons of pure heroin is much larger than the biggest shipment ever seized in the United States, and once cut and repackaged it is worth hundreds of millions of dollars on the streets of a western city. Yet the seizure is less than one percent of all the heroin produced in Afghanistan last year, production which has increased more than 2,000 percent since 2001." [From p. 1 of _____]

This means that the seizure was more than twice as great as the entire production of heroin in 2001—though this is not noted or commented upon.

Azeem Ibrahim –

25c PRESS RESPONSE TO THE RECORD BREAKING OPIUM CROPS OF 2013 & '14

Cont. from footnote 29

[Kathy Gannon, of the AP] In her shorter 500+ word piece, filed ~12 hrs earlier, she makes no mention of the Taliban ban and leaves out Lemahieu's quote. There is also no mention that "a total of 143 people were killed and 93 people were injured during the poppy eradication campaign, whereas 102 were killed and 127 were injured in 2012."[from p. 18 of the UNODC 13/11/13 report] There had been "killings of Taliban officials" in the Taliban opium ban [see COMMUNICATIONS WITH JAMES CALLAHAN, APPENDIX 2, p. 197].

There is also no mention that Afghanistan had gone from near zero in 2001 to "the world's biggest producer of hashish, estimated at between 1,500 and 3,500 tons a year." p5, *Afghanistan Cannabis Survey 2009* _____

The Times (London) noted "In their final year in power in 2001, the Taleban outlawed the crop, using public executions to convince people that it was illegal and against Islam." This gives readers the impression that people were executed for growing opium – which never happened - & which the Taliban never threatened. It also gives no sense of how successful they were. 11/14/13, "Opium crop hits new high as troops leave Afghanistan", Jeremy Kelly, p. 40

The BBC showed an official UNODC chart of the area devoted to opium in Afghanistan -- going back to '94 – but made no mention in their text of what the ~90% drop in 2001 -- shown in the chart -- indicated. 'Afghanistan opium harvest at record high – UNODC' ___

The NYT added "The American government alone has spent more than $6 billion to curb opium production since 2001, including crop

eradication programs and subsidies for alternative crops." It made no mention of the Taliban eradication program. Instead, it noted that the Taliban were taxing opium at 10%.

This non-exhaustive list of news sources made no mention of the Taliban ban in their reports on the 2013 opium crop: Reuters _____; AFP _____; New Yorker _____ ; Washington Post _____ ; PBS NewsHour; NPR; Xinhua; Al Jazeera, UPI, LA Times

In response to the announcement of a further increase with the Nov 12 2014 report, the following news services Mentioned – or Did not mention the Taliban's success in eradicating opium:

Reuters D 11/12, "Afghan opium crop at fresh high as foreign troops withdraw", Jessica Donati, KABUL **AFP, D,** 11/12, "Afghanistan opium poppy cultivation at record high: UN' 605 words, DATELINE: KABUL, "Heroin addiction levels in Afghanistan have also risen sharply -- from almost nothing under the 1996-2001 Taliban regime, to more than one million heroin addicts today, according to UN figures." **New Yorker** nothing **The Times, Lond.** D, 11/13, "Tall tale of a true Freeman; TMS, Pg. 15. 516 words **Eurasia Review, M,** 11/17, "Afghan Opium Production Hits All-Time High – OpEd", 2090 words "Readers who follow events in Afghanistan will recall that the Taliban had virtually eradicated poppy production before Bush and Cheney launched their war in 2001. The Pentagon reversed that achievement by installing the same bloodthirsty warlords who had been in power before the Taliban" **Washington Post** -- nothing PBS NewsHour; nothing – see **NPR** Philippines News Agency D 11/13 NPR; D 11/12, "All Things Considered 08:00 PM EST, "Afghanistan's Opium Harvest Sets New Record", Sean Carberry. Jean-Luc Lemahieu, Ibrahim Azhar. 462 words **Xinhua;** D 11/12/14 'Afghan opium production rises 17 pct in 2014: report', 325 words; D 'Feature: Afghan drug farmer falls prey to drug'486 words, by Abdul Haleem, KABUL Nov. 12 **Al Jazeera,** D 11/12/'14, "Afghanistan sees rise in poppy cultivation"452 words. **UPI, M** 11/12, "Afghan opium production increases, despite interventions" Ed Adamczyk, 247 words, Dateline: Kabul, "The opium economy was eliminated in the 1990s, when the Taliban ruled Afghanistan," **LA Times,** nothing **ITAR TASS** D 11/12/'14 "The Unites States has spent $7.6 billion to combat opium production in the war-torn country since 2001" "Opium poppy harvest in Afghanistan record high in 2014" 156 words, Dateline: Abu-Dhabi **NYT,M** 11/13/'14, "Afghan Opium Cultivation Rises to Record Levels", Rod Nordland. Sect. A; Pg. 18, 1070 words, Dateline: Kabul, "The Taliban in the late 1990s were the only Afghan government to completely eradicate opium cultivation, but the militants now both tax and actively participate in the drug's production." The main ban was in 2000-2001—not in the "late 1990s" A correction to this article , published 11/17 states "An article on Thursday about a United Nations report that found a sharp rise in opium cultivation in Afghanistan misstated the increase in cultivation in 2013 over the year before. It was 36 percent, not 49 percent." There is no correction to the error noted in red above.

25d MALALA YOUSAFZAI'S NOBEL PEACE PRIZE & THE PESHAWAR ARMY PUBLIC SCHOOL ATTACK.

[THIS SECTION IS STILL BEING RESEARCHED]

After nearly all of this book was written, two events occurred --one right after the other -- that led most thoughtful observers in the world to think more negatively of the Taliban: Pakistani girls' education activist, Malala Yousafzai, won the Nobel Peace Prize for 2014 [announced 10/10/14] and a suicide/mass murder attack on a Pakistani boys' school that resulted in the deaths of over one hundred children. Though both stories were far more connected with the Taliban in Pakistan than with their Afghan counterparts, the distance between the two groups in the public mind – and even in reality – is not that great.

The focus of this book has been on the pre-9/11 Taliban in Afghanistan – the group that came to govern over 90% of that country and that wiped out opium poppy growing in their domain in less than 6 months. With the US led invasion in the fall of 2001, the Taliban in Afghanistan were targeted for murder and began to fight back. Their fellow Muslims in neighboring Pakistan saw their coreligionists being attacked – often with the active assistance of the Pakistani government – and began to come to their aid. This aid often involved seeing the government of Pakistan as an enemy of Islam and acting accordingly.

A war broke out within Pakistan between the nominal – UN recognized - Pakistani Government and large elements of the religious Muslims in the regions of Pakistan bordering Afghanistan[729]. These same religious Muslims on the Pakistani side of the border were targeted by the US with unmanned drone at-

[729] As has already been noted in this book , the boundary beteeen Afghanistan and Pakistan in this region – the Durand Line - was imposed by the British and not recognized by a large fraction of the largely Pashtun people in the area see footnote 638

tacks[730]. Tens of thousands of religious Muslims in these areas of Pakistan were killed[731] in what amounted to a combination of civil war and US led war on religious Muslims in Pakistan. Thousands of those killed were children under 15.[732]

The boys' school that was attacked by the Pakistani Taliban wasn't just any boys' school. It was "the Army Public School and Degree College … [with] about 1,100 students and staff, most of them sons and daughters of army personnel from around Peshawar…"[733].

A Wikipedia article on the incident claimed the Pakistani Taliban had killed "132 schoolchildren, ranging between eight and eighteen years of age."[734] But the two news sources cited for this don't claim any children killed below the age of 12[735]. One of the sources – the NYT – notes the students in the school "ranged in age from roughly 5 to 17". It even gives an account of a seven year old who witnessed "how the militants sprayed bullets as they rushed into his classroom. "They killed our teacher,"…But there is no reference to any of the young children being killed.[736]

The Afghanistan based Taliban –led by Mullah Omar and the main subject of this book –said the attack on the school was un-Islamic.

> "The intentional killing of innocent people, children and women are against the basics of Islam and this criteria has to be considered by every Islamic party and government," Afghan Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid said in a statement soon after the [attack on the school]…]"[737]

Shortly after this, Ehsanullah Ehsan. a representative for what may be the majority of the Taliban in Pakistan[738], came out with a similar statement:

> '"We consider Mullah Mohammad Omar our supreme leader. When he and his Taliban condemned the attack on [the] school, there is no other way for us except to strongly condemn the attack on the school and the ruthless killing of innocent children there,"…[They also] expressed their sympathies and condolences to the families of the children who died in the siege…' [739]

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730 http://justsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/Special-Rapporteur-Rapporteur-Emmerson-Drones-2014.pdf
http://www.amnesty.org/ar/library/asset/ASA33/013/2013/en/041c08cb-fb54-47b3-b3fe-a72c9169e487/asa330132013en.pdf
see table - page 13 on children vs total killed

731 ~31K people are estimated to have been killed in these areas betw. '05 and early '14 –of which ~1/10th were Pakist. Gov. security forces. See footnote 3 D.5 for more details, sources and links. [as of 10/18/15, from 2003, estim. = 39.3K fof which 10.7% security forces == see calculations and sources below.] Deaths in FATA 2008- 3/15/ 2015 =26,822 , of which 2,192 are security forces , 4,375 civilians and 20,255 militants http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/Waziristan/index.html Deaths 2011-10/18/2015 in KP 1206+656+936+617+221=3,636; FATA 3034+ 2901+ 1716+2863+ 1700=12214, Total Pakistan 6303+6211+5379+5496+3221=26610; FATA+KP = 15,850 =59.6% of Total Pakistan & KP=29.8% of FATA in this time period. 1.298*26822=34815= estimated FATA+KP in 2008-2015; total pakistan 2008-2010= 6715+11704+7435=25854; +26610 =52464= tot pakistan 2008-2015; 34815/52464=66.36%= estimated % of total casualties in pakistan in 2008-2015 period that were in FATA+KP area; 59233= tot. pak 2003-oct 2015 =1.129 * 2008-2015; 1.129*34815= 39.3K estimated tot. casualties in FATA+KP area 2003-oct/2015, of which 6320/59233= 10.7% =4.2K=security forces http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/database/casualties.htm

732 In the Lancet/Burnam cluster sample survey study of excess violent deaths in the Iraq war , 26 of the 298 excess violent deaths -- 8.7%-- were of children 0-14 years. Half of these deaths of children were attributable to air strikes . 8.7% of 31K =2.7K. From Table 2, "Mortality after the 2003 invasion of Iraq: a cross-sectional cluster sample survey, "*Gilbert Burnham, et al. Correspondence to: Prof. Gilbert Burnham,, Johns Hopkins Bloomberg, School of Public Health,, Baltimore, MD 21205, USA* gburnham@jhsph.edu http://brusselstribunal.org/pdf/lancet111006.pdf

733 "…though others attend as well." CNN, 12/17/14, In Pakistan school attack, Taliban terrorists kill 145, mostly children" Sophia Saifi & Greg Botelho

734 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2014_Peshawar_school_massacre [retr 12/28/14.]

735 The only age data for the victims given in the 2 articles cited is "Most of the dead were 12 to 16 years old" in the CNN article

736 **A.** 12/16/14, NYT, "Taliban Besiege Pakistan School, Leaving 145 Dead", Declan Walsh, London, _____ **B.** 12/15/14, Tues, Pakistan Press Internation-al , "List released by LRH of dead and injured." 532 words. A list of the dead & injured released by the nearby Lady Reading Hospital, showed 12 as the youngest age of the 20 discharged, 13 as the youngest age of those hospitalized & 14 as the youngest age in an ICU. The ages of the 31 received dead were not shown. **C.** 12/26/14, Right Vision News, " Pakistan: APS attack: Three-year-old girl reported missing", 261 words, Peshawar. Most of those who died were sent to the Combined Military Hospital – which has not yet released a list of names or ages

737 12/19/14 NBC NEWS, "Peshawar School Massacre Splits Afghan, Pakistani Militant Groups", Mushtaq Yusufzai, Peshawar, Pakistan _____

738 12/19/14 NBCNews, "Peshawar School Massacre Splits Afghan, Pakistani Militant Groups" Mushtaq Yusufzai, Peshawar, _____

739 Ibid supra 737

The remaining large Pakistani Taliban group is led by Maulana Fazlullah – who is said to have ordered the attack on the school, justifying it "by saying that their [the murder victims'] parents were soldiers in the Pakistani Army, which was "behind the massive killing of our kids and indiscriminate bombing in North and South Waziristan," …"To hurt them at their safe haven and homes—such an attack is perfect revenge." [740] Maulana Fazlullah is also said to have ordered the attempted murder of Malala Yousafzai two years before[741].

There is a remarkable, initially positive, connection between Malala and Fazlullah recounted in her book, "I AM MALALA":

> **"People …liked his [Fazlullah's] talk of bringing back Islamic law as everyone was frustrated with the Pakistani justice system, …Cases …which used to be resolved quickly[742] now took ten years to come to court. Everyone wanted to see the back of the corrupt government officials…."[743]**

They also appreciated the assistance given by his group, TNSM, in the aftermath of the 2005 earthquake[744] and were attentive to the message of his radio program where he preached that more careful attention to the precepts of Islam – and the rejection of drugs and Western Decadence – would prevent such disasters in the future. [745]

> **"Within six months people were getting rid of their TVs, DVDs and CDs. Fazlullah's men collected them into huge heaps on the streets and set them on fire…. Hundreds of CD and DVD shops closed voluntarily and their owners were paid compensation by the Taliban."…**
>
> **"Fazlullah was particularly popular in remote areas where people remembered how TNSM volunteers had helped during the earthquake when the government was nowhere to be seen. On some mosques they set up speakers connected to radios so his broadcasts could be heard by everyone in the village and in the fields. The most popular part of his show came every evening when he would read out people's names. He'd say, 'Mr So-and-so was smoking *chars* but has stopped because it's sinful,' … He told them they would have their reward in the hereafter."[746]**
>
> **"Fazlullah's men patrolled the streets looking for offenders against his decrees just like the Taliban morality police we had heard about in Afghanistan. They set up volunteer traffic police called Falcon Commandos, who drove through the streets with machine guns mounted on top of their pick-up trucks."[747]**

SUFI MOHAMMAD
GET PERMISSION

"…Fazlullah became more aggressive…. [after h]is brother Maulana Liaquat, along with three of Liaquat's sons, were among those killed in an American drone attack on the madrasa in Bajaur at the end of October 2006. Eighty people were killed including boys as young as twelve, [748] some of whom had come from Swat.

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[740] According to "Sami Yousafzai, a reporter for the Daily Beast, [who] spoke to Jihad Yar Wazir, a Taliban commander, on the phone after the attack. 12/16/'14, The New Yorker, "Massacre in Peshawar", Basharat Peer, http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/massacre-peshawar

[741] Give sources

[742] The area was relatively independent and operating largely under Sharia Law, until 1969. See "Swat State (1915-1969): From Genesis to Merger" by Sultan-i-Rome, Oxford U. Press, 2009

[743] Pdf p 60, I AM MALALA, The Girl Who Stood Up for Education and was Shot by the Taliban, Malala Yousafzai, with Christina Lamb, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London _____

[744] Ibid, pdf p 55-57, The earthquake of 8 Oct. '05, killed >70,000 in a nearby part of the Pakistani mountains.

[745] Ibid, pdf p 59

[746] Ibid pdf p 60

[747] Ibid pdf p 63. see footnote 971 on Taliban patrols in Kabul and comparison with NYPD marijuana arrests

[748] [Emphasis added- note lower age limit identical with confirmed deaths in Peshawar School Massacre.] 10/31/06, Washington Post, "Pakistan Strike Called Response To U.S. Reports" *Pamela Constable and Kamran Khan,* _____

On 2 October [*sic, should read November*] 2006, Amnesty International publicly expressed its concern that at least 82people in a *madrassa* (religious school) may have been killed in an aerial attack at dawn on 30 October in Chingai, Bajaur Agency, _____

We were all horrified by the attack and people swore revenge. Ten days later a suicide bomber blew himself up in the army barracks at Dargai, on the way from Islamabad to Swat, and killed forty-two Pakistani soldiers. At that time suicide bombings were rare in Pakistan – there were six in total that year – and it was the biggest attack that had ever been carried out by Pakistani militants."[749]

"When[, in 2001,] President Musharraf agreed to help America in the 'War on Terror', the [Red M]osque [in Islamabad, near the Parliament] broke off its long links with the military and became a centre of protest against the government."[750]

"It was after the Red Mosque siege that the Swat Taliban changed. On 12 July [2007] – which I remember because it was my birthday – Fazlullah gave a radio address that was quite different to his previous ones. He raged against the Lal Masjid [Red Mosque] attack and vowed to avenge the death of Abdul Rashid. Then he declared war on the Pakistani government."[751]

The siege also involved an attack on what was probably the largest girls' school for religious Muslims in Pakistan – with over 2000 girls enrolled. The girls had arrested some Chinese women in a nearby massage center – claiming these women were actually prostitutes[752]. This arrest set off what became a murderous attack on the mosque and girls school in which on the order of a hundred people – mostly students – were killed by Pakistani security forces and the residential parts for the girls – almost all live-in students -- were torn down.

TALIBANISATION. OF PAKISTAN. From 9/11 to 26/11 and Beyond. Amir Mir. ____

"I showed them the uniform I couldn't wear and told them I was scared that if the Taliban caught me going to school they would throw acid in my face as they had done to girls in Afghanistan."[753] [EMPHASIS ADDED]

"Living Under Drones: Death, Injury and Trauma to Civilians from US Drone Practices in Pakistan" 9/25/'12, James Cavallaro, Stephan Sonnenberg, and Sarah Knuckey, Stanford, Calif.: International Human Rights and Conflict Resolution Clinic, Stanford Law School; New York: NYU School of Law, Global Justice Clinic, 182 pages

" The best currently available public aggregate data on drone strikes are provided by *The Bureau of Investigative Journalism* (*TBIJ*), an independent journalist organization. *TBIJ* reports that from June 2004 through mid- September 2012, available data indicate that drone strikes killed 2,562-3,325 people in Pakistan, of whom 474-881 were civilians, including 176 children." Pdf p 10, citing *"Covert War on Terror",* The Bureau Of Investigative Journalism, _____(last visited Sept. 12/'12).

The BOIJ document contains a Pakisani Gov. document based on field work by government agents in the area of the missile attacks. It shows 80 children and one adult – all civilian -- killed int the Bajaur Madrassa attack.

Evenso, BOIJ's table of all drone attacks shows 82-83 killed of which 68-70 were children 0-17 innclusive and one of the remaining victims was an adult non-civilian. Accessed Jan 11/15 _____

[749] Ibid pdf p 63
[750] Ibid pdf p 66
[751] Ibid pdf p 67

"The UN rapporteur on extra-judicial or arbitrary executions Philip Alston recently sent a six-point questionnaire to the country's permanent representative at the international organization, Masood Khan, seeking explanation of the July 10 operation at the Red Mosque that killed 102 people, said the Daily Times newspaper citing sources….The mosque administration claimed that more than 1,000 people, including many women and children, died in the military strike in contrast to the official figure of 100" 10/22/07 Deutsche Presse-Agentur, "Report: UN probes into Pakistan's radical mosque operation, 417 words, DATELINE: Islamabad

Letter requesting info and response of the Gov. of Pakistan are given in A/HRC/8/3/Add.1, 30 May 2008 "Allegations received from other sources suggest that the number of dead may have been much higher, perhaps in excess of 300."

[752] A. Foreign prostitutes go to work as Pakistan closes for Ramadan , Peter Popham in Islamabad, 10 Jan. 1999
3/29/07, Tulsa World (Oklahoma),

B . DateLine Briefs: Pakistani Islamic students abduct alleged brothel owner, BYLINE: Wire Reports, Islamabad, Pakistan -- Female Islamic students on an anti-vice drive have abducted an alleged brothel owner and have locked her up at their fundamentalist seminary in the Pakistani capital, police said Wednesday. Authorities have arrested four of the seminary's teachers in connection with the abduction. With jihadist songs playing on the loudspeakers of a neighboring mosque, about 200 students staged a protest at the school Wednesday demanding their release. Late Tuesday, a group of 30 female and 10 male Islamic students broke into the alleged brothel in Islamabad after the owner, known as Aunty Shamim, ignored their warnings to close it.

One of the students, 20-year-old Seema Zubair, said they were holding Shamim, her daughter, her daughter-in-law and her 6-month-old granddaughter inside their Jamia Hafsa seminary. She said they were not being maltreated and would be freed if they promised to close the brothel.

"I began to think that …maybe I could ask our teachers to form a secret school in our home, as some Afghans had done during Taliban rule."[754]

"I spoke of the irony of the Taliban wanting female teachers and doctors for women yet not letting girls go to school to qualify for these jobs."[755]

"What I didn't know was that Hai Kakar[756] was holding secret talks with Fazlullah and his commanders. He had got to know them in interviews, and was urging them to rethink their ban on girls' education…The pressure from the whole country worked, and Fazlullah agreed to lift the ban for girls up to ten years old – Year 4. I was in Year 5 and some of us pretended we were younger than we were. We started going to school again, dressed in ordinary clothes and hiding our books under our shawls."

The girls' schools were closed for 25 days – including the normal 18 day winter break. They were supposed to reopen on Feb 2. Both boys and girls schools reopened on the same day – Feb 9th – so they had one week extra winter vacation. [757] Shortly after the start of this break Malala wrote:

"After my school closed down I continued to write the blog. Four days after the ban on girls' schools, five more were destroyed.[758] 'I am quite surprised,' I wrote, 'because these schools had closed so why did they also need to be destroyed? No one has gone to school following the Taliban's deadline. The army is doing nothing about it. They are sitting in their bunkers on top of the hills. They slaughter goats and eat with pleasure.'

She doesn't tell us, as the contemporaneous news article quoted below relates, that 4 of the 5 schools destroyed were boys' schools, that they were all government schools and that the Taliban was doing this as an attack on the government, not an attack on children learning.

""""Four boys' schools and one girls' school were blown up by militants," Anwer Khan, a district police official in the town of Mingora, said on Monday….Followers of Maulana Fazlullah, …have destroyed 173 schools, 105 of them for girls, since [Pakistani Gov.] security forces launched a military operation in the region in 2007, according to Sher Afzal, an education ministry official. Local pro-Taliban fighters see the schools as symbols of government authority and have accused the army of posting soldiers in them."[759]

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[753] Ibid p. 82. Story of acid being thrown in face of girls by Taliban looks like confused account of acid throwing that Taliban's enemy Hikmatyar was accused of – when he was a college student more than 15 years before the Taliban came into existence under Mullah Omar. Professor Barnett Rubin noted "those women would still be alive and do not seem to be talking, I retain my doubts about these incidents." SEE APPENDIX 7.

Several of the most negative points about the Taliban in Afghanistan in Malala's book – such as the acid throwing noted here and 4 witnesses to prove a young pregnant girl was raped [p 21] -- are echoes of and may have been taken-- directly or indirectly -- from the stories of Dr. Sima Samar, [born Jaghori, Ghazni [see footnotes 212 & 213], Afgh., 3 Feb. '57] a Hazara, Kabul U. educated, MD '82, and anti-Taliban propagandist. 8/14/97, The Ottawa Citizen, "The women behind the veil: 'Let them die' is the Taliban response to women who reject medieval code" Sally Armstrong; Citizen Special, Section: News; Argument & Observation; Pg. A13

In LexisNexis search with terms [(((taliban or taleban) and acid and face and (girl or woman or women) and afghan) and Date(leq (september 10, 2001)))] and all english news produced only Dr. Samars report & the following two (21) 1. "Gulbuddin Hikmatyar, the recipient of the largest amount of American military aid, who first made his name throwing acid in the faces of unveiled female students in Kabul." 3/25/96, The New Republic, "The Un-Great Game", Fred Halliday, Pg. 38, 4646 words; 2. "Mr. Hekmatyar established his reputation for ruthlessness 25 years ago, when his followers were known to throw acid in the faces of women who refused to wear veils." 2/16/95, NYT, "New Afghan Force Takes Hold, Turning to Peace", John F. Burns, A; P 3; C 1; 1222 w'ds, Dateline: Islamabad

[754] Malala pdf p 83. Apparently she was not aware of the many girls schools openly operated under the Taliban in Afghanistan. See Swedish Committee etc. The red Mosque school for girls was closed by the government of Pakistan when it attacked the mosque.

[755] Ibid –same page – but the Taliban in Afghanistan did open schools to teach women to be doctors and health care workers – the argument appears to be against western oriented education of young girls – not professional education of older girls and women.

[756] Abdul Hai Kakkar was BBC Urdu language reporter that got Malala's thought into the news[under heading "diary of Gul Makai"] when "in early 2009" she was an "eleven-year-old …seventh-grade student"[sic, Mulala in the following text , above, says that she was 11 years old and in year 5 – in Jan-Feb 2009]10/10/12, The New Yorker, "The Girl Who Wanted to Go to School", Basharat Peer, _____

[757] The schools closed "Wednesday 14 January" [2009] for "winter holidays" Malala, pdf p82; the boys schools also closed at the same time for "winter holdiays" pdf p 83;. "Monday, Feb. 2: School Closed On Taliban Orders. I am upset because the schools are still closed here in Swat. Our school was supposed to open today." "Monday, Feb. 9: Precarious. Boys' schools in Swat have reopened and the Taliban have lifted restrictions on girls' primary education – therefore they are also attending schools. In our school there is co-education until primary level."Oct 9, '12, Globe and Mail, "In her words: Malala Yousafzai's chronicle of life under the Taliban" _____

[758] Emphasis added. This quote is from her book . In her original diary/blog, she does not give this false impression that it was girls schools that were destroyed. The quote from the diary that appears in the book actually begins with the words "I am quite surprised". The quote in the diary/blog is "Five more schools have been destroyed, one of them was near my house. I am quite surprised…" The material before this is from a different day and is about a boys' school. See footnote 757.

[759] 1/19/09, AlJezeera, "Blasts destroy Pakistan schools: Pro-Taliban fighters in Swat valley carry out threat, putting government on the defensive", "No one was injured in the bombings, but the school buildings were badly

> **"[O]n 16 February 2009… [a] peace deal had been struck between the Taliban and the provincial government, …[and] on 22 February, a 'permanent ceasefire' was announced…. The government also agreed to pay compensation to the families of victims. The Taliban said girls could go to school after the peace agreement but they should be veiled and covered."[760]**

She does not tell us who the victimizers were – but leaves us with the impression that it was the Taliban. However, a contemporaneous NYT article – otherwise highly critical of the Taliban -gives a different picture:

> **"From 2,000 to 4,000 Taliban fighters now roam the Swat Valley, …the Pakistani military has …12,000 to 15,000 men in Swat, officials say…When the army does act, …[i]ts usual tactic is to lob artillery shells into a general area, and the results have seemed to hurt civilians more than the militants, residents say."[761]**

Apparently Fazlullah's youth and inexperience[762] combined with the on-going US led, Pakistan abetted, murder of the Taliban in Afghanistan – led to Fazlullah's fighting the Pakistani Gov. and an escalation of intracommunity violence. Fighting the Pakistani Gov. was opposed by the Afghan Taliban[763]. The US suppression of the older, more experienced, responsible and well respected Afghan Taliban leadership[764] reduced their ability to guide people like Fazlullah away from destructive, fratricidal attacks.

Ultimately the attempted murder of Malala and the murder of the children at Army Public School were just among the more widely publicized side effects of the US attack on the Afghan Taliban. Over 100,000 people have been killed in that war – including close to ten thousand children. Thirteen years of murder and terror have been visited on the people of Afghanistan by seemingy civi-

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damaged." There were no pupils at the schools at the time of the attacks as they were closed for the winter holidays. The Swat valley has more than 600 state-run schools and about 400 private schools but many have been closed since anti-government fighters began a campaign of attacks against the local authority." http://www.aljazeera.com/news/asia/2009/01/2009131941512884410.html

[760] Malala, pdf p 85 -86

[761] 1/25/09, NYT, "In Pakistan, Radio Amplifies Terror of Taliban", Richard A. Oppel Jr., Pir Zubair Shah; Ismail Khan contributed reporting. P. A1, 1751 wds, Peshawar

[762] He was 28 years old when he began his radio-ministry shortly before the earthquake of '05. His much older, white bearded & more broadly respected father in law –Sufi Mohammad -- had led thousands into Afghanistan to aid the Taliban in the wake of the US assault in October 2001 – and had been jailed by Pakistan on his rerun in 2002. He was released from jail in 2008 to help broker a peace deal in the SWAT Valley. The truce was apparently broken by the Pakistani govermnet-- reportedly under pressure from the US -- and with the help of a video supposedly showing the Taliban flogging a 17 year old girl. "They [the Pakistani Military] announced over megaphones that all residents should leave." [Malala, pdf p. 89] "We did not know if we would ever see our town again. We had seen pictures of how the army had flattened everything in an operation against militants in Bajaur and we thought everything we knew would be destroyed. … Almost two million of us were fleeing Swat… " [ibid pdf p. 91]

[763] 10/22/09. NYT, "Insurgents Share a Name, but Pursue Different Goals" , Scott Shane, "In an interview this week, …an Afghan Taliban commander expressed sympathy for the Pakistani Taliban, but said, …"Our aim was, and is, to get the occupation forces out and not to get into a fight with a Muslim army,""

Another important difference between the Afghan Taliban and the group in Pakistan led by Fazlullah and the Afghan group led by Mullah Omar is that the latter has generally supported Polio vaccination of children and the former has opposed it. "The Pakistani Taliban's Campaign Against Polio Vaccination" August 27, 2014. Author(s): Animesh Roul, CTC Sentinel

""If we have a look at the history of resistance against the polio campaign, it was started back in 2005 when the current Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) Chief Mullah Fazlullah banned the vaccineation in Swat [district, where the Taliban militants were powerful]. However the resistance campaign against the polio vaccination became violent and attacks on the polio workers started after the U.S. forces killed Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad on May 2, 2011."

"*The conspiracy theories against polio vaccination gained steam after it emerged that the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had used a polio vaccination camp run by Dr. Shakil Afridi to collect information leading to the 2011 military operation in Abbottabad in which Al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden was killed."The News (Pakistan),1/22/'14*

"Three years after the CIA used an immunization survey as a cover in its hunt for Osama bin Laden, the White House has promised that the agency will never again use a vaccination campaign in its operations, an official said Monday. Responding to a letter from the deans of 12 U.S. public health schools, …[who] wrote to President Obama in January 2013 to protest the precedent set when the CIA used Shakil Afridi, a Pakistani surgeon, to seek information about bin Laden under the guise of conducting a hepatitis immunization survey in the northwest city where the al-Qaeda leader was later killed in a raid. …"This disguising of an intelligence-gathering effort as a humanitarian public health service has resulted in serious collateral consequences that affect the public health community," the deans wrote." 5/20/'14, Wash. Post, "CIA won't use vaccination campaigns" Lena H. Sun, Pg. A09

However, according to Seymour Hersh in a 10,000 word piece, "The Killing of Osama bin Laden" in the London Review of Books, [Vol. 37 #10, 5/21/'15, p. 3-12], the report that Bin Laden's DNA was obtained through this was a cover to protect the doctor who had actually obtained the DNA proof more directly. However Hersh also claims – on the basis of the testimony of an un-named informant – that "The plan was to use vaccinations as a way to get the blood of terrorism suspects in the villages.' Hersh claims, primarily on the basis of a report from this same un-named "retired senior intelligence official who was knowledgeable about the initial intelligence about bin Laden's presence in Abbottabad" that the Pakistanis had had him under arrest for some time and that he was killed without a fight for the reward money and more aid to the Pakitani military.

[764] Mullah Omar – the leader of the Afghan Taliban since 1994 -- has had a $10 million price on his head – from the US State Dept.—since 2001. retrieved 1/1/15] The ambassador of the Taliban to Pakistan – Zaeef – was arrested by the Pakistani Government and held for years by the US in Guantanamo bay – before being released without charges. [see My Life with the Taliban; By Abdul Salam Zaeef] The father –in- law of Fazlullah, Sufi Mohammad, was imprisoned by the Pakistani government upon his return from Afghanistan in 2002 – He had gone there with thousands of his followers to help the Afghan Taliban fight the US. [MALALA, pdf p. 56]

lized, decent people in the US and Europe -- people who think they are fighting terror and doing good.

12/29/14 Sent email to author of "Kids Shot Point Blank One by One in Pakistan School Massacre", By Kamran HaiderDec 18, 2014 5:58 To contact the reporter on this story: Kamran Haider in Peshawar at __ _____quote from M. Yousafzai, book: Pakistan is "world's first Muslim homeland"

"The Malala machine really grew in November 2012 when the PR agency Edelman, whose clients include Starbucks and Microsoft, started working for her family…" 10/10/'14 17:19 IST. She was shot 9 Oct/'12.

25e THE BOWE BERGDAHL-GUANTANAMO TALIBAN PRISONER EXCHANGE[765]

BACKGROUND OF BOWE BERGDAHL

[see Statement of charges against Sgt. Bowe Bergdahl Mar. 25 2015, 24 page pdf.[766]]

"Rather than put their kids in the local school system, Jani and Bob [Bergdahl] home-schooled[767] Bowe and his sister. Devout Calvinists, they taught the children for six hours a day, instructing them in religious thinkers such as Thomas Aquinas and St. Augustine. "Ethics and morality would be constant verbiage in our conversations," his father recalls. "Bowe was definitely instilled with truth. He was very philosophical about perceiving ethics." … "By the age of five, Bowe had also learned to shoot a .22 rifle and to ride horses." [768]

…..

"On June 27th,['09] he sent what would be his final e-mail to his parents. It was a lengthy message documenting his complete disillusionment with the war effort. He opened it by addressing it simply to:

"mom, dad."

"The future is too good to waste on lies," Bowe wrote. "And life is way too short to care for the damnation of others, as well as to spend it helping fools with their ideas that are wrong. I have

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[765] A. "Qatar had agreed to take in the five Taliban leaders and monitor their contacts while prohibiting them from traveling outside Qatar for one year. The deal to keep the Taliban Five from leaving Qatar was set to expire this week.' … Qatar 'has agreed to maintain the current restrictive conditions on these individuals as we continue these discussions,'the Washington Post reported. … NBC News reported Monday that the five Taliban prisoners are: [1] former Taliban deputy minister of defense and Taliban Army chief Mohammad Fazl, [b 1967, held without charges since Nov. 2001 "detainee was implicated in the murder of thousands of Shiites in Northern Afghanistan during the Taliban reign…[and] did not express any regret and stated they did what they needed to do to establish their ideal state" p 6 *[This 'murder of thousands was probably the retaliatory strike against the Shiites/Hazaras of Mazar-i-Shariff – in response to the massacre of a similar number of Taliban in that place by those people the year before.* See footnotes 294 & 295] '…[Fazl] and Dadullah Lang were allegedly responsible for massacres at Yakawlang, Bamyan Province, AF, in which several hundred civilians were killed.' [see: "Report on the situation of human rights in Afghanistan submitted by Mr. Kamal Hossain, Special Rapporteur, in accordance with Commission on Human Rights resolution 2000/18 Addendum"E/CN.4/2001/43, 9 March 2001 _____ _____ _____] [2] senior commander Mullah Norullah Noori,b 1967 "wanted by the United Nations (UN) for possible war crimes including the murder of thousands of Shiite Muslims." [*see note above in this color italics*] held without charges since Nov. '01 [3] senior Taliban official Mohammed Nabi, b. 1968, held without charges since Sept '02 [_____] [4]Taliban military commander Khairullah Khairkhwa, [b. 1967, held without charges since 2/16/'02 _____] *["A former secretary at the Interior Ministry named Ghias, told Newsday that the Torah [from the Flower St. Shul in Kabul] was no longer in the ministry and was last seen in the hands of Taliban Interior Minister Mullah Khirullah Khairkhwa, who has since vanished.*[see footnote 13] Blood Feud in Afghanistan / Bitter rift over Torah divides Kabul's two remaining Jews, Newsday - Long Island, N.Y., Letta Tayler. 12/31/'01, p A6 _____*]* and [5] the Taliban's deputy intelligence chief Abdul Haq Wasiq.[b 1971, held without charges since Nov. '01 https://wikileaks.org/gitmo/prisoner/4.html] "Travel ban extended for Taliban leaders swapped for Bergdahl Idaho Mountain Express, Jun 3/'15, Tony Evans, _____Email the writer: tevans@mtexpress.com

B. "Taliban Appoints Ex-Guantanamo Prisoners To Be Afghan Peace Negotiators." The Taliban says it has appointed five militants who spent more than a decade in the U.S. military prison in Guantanamo Bay to be members of its political office in Qatar, where they will take part in any future Afghanistan peace talks. The five former Taliban commanders -- Mohammad Fazl, Mohammed Nabi, Khairullah Khairkhwa, Abdul Haq Wasiq and Noorullah Noori -- were settled in Qatar following their release from the U.S. detention center in Cuba in 2014, but until now had not been directly involved in political activities, Taliban spokesman Zabiullah Mujahid said on October 31.The men were released as part of a prisoner exchange in return for former Taliban captive, U.S. Army Sergeant Bowe Bergdahl.The Taliban announcement came amid gathering momentum for talks to end the 17-year war in Afghanistan. Qatar has emerged as a principal contact point between the Taliban and the U.S. government. Earlier this month, Taliban officials met the recently appointed U.S. special envoy for Afghanistan, Zalmay Khalilzad, in the Qatari capital, Doha, where the militants have a political office that serves as a de facto embassy. They met there earlier this year with U.S. Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Alice Wells. Taliban officials said the five Taliban commanders were close to the militant group's late founder, Mullah Mohammad Omar, and are also close to its current leader, Haibatullah Akhundzada. One Taliban official told Reuters that as former Guantanamo prisoners, they had been subject to restrictions on their movements, but they are now free to travel and attend peace negotiations. The appointments follow the release by Pakistan last week of senior Taliban figure Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar [a co-founder of theTaliban]. A Taliban official told AFP the group had requested the release of Baradar and several others at the meeting with Khalilzad. Based on reporting by AP, AFP, and Reuters [Nov. 01, 2018 03:18 GMT Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty Voice of Amreica
https://www.rferl.org/a/taliban-appoints-ex-guantanamo-prisoners-to-be-afghan-peace-negotiators/29576316.html

[766] http://go.bloomberg.com/assets/content/uploads/sites/2/Bergdahl-03252015-Press-Statement.pdf

[767] His home, built by his father, was "a simple cabin that eventually housed about 5,000 books, but for years had no phone." NYT, 5/15/'12, "Idahoan's Unlikely Journey to Life as a Taliban Prisoner" Elisab. Bumiller.

[768] The previous & following quotes are from : "Americas Last Prisoner Of War", Michael Hastings Rolling Stone, 6/21/'12, *#1159: Date of # is Jun 7,'12*

seen their ideas and I am ashamed to even be american. The horror of the self-righteous arrogance that they thrive in. It is all revolting."

"The e-mail went on to list a series of complaints: Three good sergeants, Bowe said, had been forced to move to another company, and "one of the biggest…[sh--] bags is being put in charge of the team." "His battalion commander was a "conceited old fool." "The military system itself was broken: "In the US army you are cut down for being honest... but if you are a conceited brown nosing shit bag you will be allowed to do what ever you want, and you will be handed your higher rank... The system is wrong. I am ashamed to be an american. And the title of US soldier is just the lie of fools."

"The soldiers he actually admired were planning on leaving: "The US army is the biggest joke the world has to laugh at. It is the army of liars, backstabbers, fools, and bullies. The few good SGTs are getting out as soon as they can, and they are telling us privates to do the same."

"In the second-to-last paragraph of the e-mail, Bowe wrote about his broader disgust with America's approach to the war – an effort, on the ground, that seemed to represent the exact opposite of the kind of concerted campaign to win the "hearts and minds" of average Afghans envisioned by counterinsurgency strategists.

"I am sorry for everything here," "Bowe told his parents. "These people need help, yet what they get is the most conceited country in the world tell-ing them that they are nothing and that they are stupid, that they have no idea how to live."

"He then referred to what his parents believe may have been a formative, possibly traumatic event: seeing an Afghan child run over by an MRAP[769]. "We don't even care when we hear each other talk about running their children down[770] in the dirt streets with our armored trucks[771].

"We make fun of them in front of their faces, and laugh at them for not understanding we are insulting them."

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[769] Emphasis added. As we will point out in what follows, Bowe Bergdahl does not actually say that he or anyone else in his group had actually seen anyone run over by an MRAP or any other US military vehicle. An MRAP in this context is a "Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected" military personel carrier, typically weighing 9 to 18 tons, and costing $0.5E6 - $1.0E6.

[770] The most likely reported incident where civilians – including a child – were killed in an accident involving heavy NATO/US military vehicles in the context of the Afghanistan war was in April '09, about a month after Bowes platoon arrived. Bowe arrived in May – some weeks after this incident.

BBC Monitoring S. Asia, 4/18/'09, "NATO lorry rams into car; seven dead in Pakistan's Baluchistan" "…due to failure of brakes while descending the Khozak Mountain near Old Chaman…[T]he trailer had badly pressed the car… Police said four out of seven victims belonged to Quetta while a couple and their child were killed in the accident." The distance between the place where Bowe Bergdahl was stationed, Yahya Kheyl, Paktika Province, and the scene of this accident is about 190 miles.

[771] Emphasis added. This expression found no hits in JSTOR. In LexisNexis – all Engish News, it is found 25 times: Rolling stone is not in this data base.

The only attempt shown in LexisNexis to substantiate or refute this claim occurs two years later - after Bowe Bergdahl was exchanged for 5 Taliban held in prison in Guantanamo Bay. This apparent refutation will be discussed below and is cited in the following footnote.

The earliest report in Lexis Nexis is **#25** **The NYT Blogs**, (IHT Rendezvous), **6/13/'12** Wednesday, New Report Says Captive U.S. Soldier Left His Post Willingly **Byline:** Mark Mcdonald, **Section:** World, 980 Words. The Next 4 Hits**#24-21** similar to each other and are about a year later: **Mail On Sunday (London)**, **6/30/'13,** The 'Homeland' Prisoner Of War, 1398 Words, Caroline Graham. The nest two hits **#20-19** ~1 yr. later than the above: **NYT, June 1, 2014** Sun , Late Edi – Final, Lesson for a Prisoner's Father: Men Sometimes Do Come Back, **BYLINE:** Elisabeth Bumiller, Michael S. Schmidt And Andrew W. Lehren; Helene Cooper contributed reporting from Singapore. S. A; Col 0; Nat. Desk; Pg. 1, 1296 words The next hits come on the heals of this one**:** **#18** **The Guardian (London) - Final Ed., June 2, 2014** Monday, 'This is a guy who went through hell for the past five years' - US PoW heads home: Bergdahl having trouble speaking in English: Republicans attack Obama for deal that frees Taliban, **By:** Emma Graham-Harrison, Kabul And Rory Carroll, Los Angeles, **section:** Guardian Home Pages; Pg. 3, 936 words. **#17** **Fox News Network, June 2, 2014**, **Show:** The Kelly File 9:00 PM EST, Five Gitmo Prisoners Released in Exchange Pose Serious Threat to America; Sources: Bergdahl May Have Been Corroborating with Enemy; Judge: President's Team May Have Provided Assistance to Terror Organization, **By:** Megyn Kelly, Trace Gallagher, **Guests:** Cody Full, Gerald Sutton, James Inhofe, Andrew Napolitano, Buck Sexton, Mark Jacobson, NEWS; Domestic,**:** 7137 words; **#16-15 &12** **MailOnline, June 3, 2014** Tuesday 1:09 AM GMT , Freed hero or traitor? As the only U.S. soldier held by the Taliban is released, the doubts over his story and its unsettling echoes of a controversial TV thriller, **By:** Tom Leonard, **15 & 12, same author, same day; #14-13** **Human Events Online, June 3, 2014**. Bergdahl: an Obama scandal in less than 48 hours, **By** John Hayward, 3091 words **Highlight:** The Administration's ham-fisted efforts at spin are making things worse by the hour # 13 same author, etc.

#11,10, 9 **Associated Press State & Local, June 7, 2014** Saturday 4:31 PM GMT "From prayers to fury: The journey of Bowe Bergdahl, **By:** Martha Mendoza, AP National Writer, 2410 words.**This report has the statement "He said an Army vehicle had run over a girl" The Rolling Stone article says "child" not "girl". It also does not say Army but "our" and it does not say that this actually happened – only that the people were talking about it** #8 **Sunday Tribune (South Africa), June 08, 2014** , E1 Ed., US traitor or young idealist?, **Secti:** News; P. 14, 1270 words, #7 **The Sunday Independent (South Africa), June 08, 2014** , E1 Edit, Is this soldier a hero or a traitor?, **Byline:** Tom Leonard, **Section:** Dispatches; P. 19, 1478 words [similar to #8] #6 &5, similar. see footnote below. #4, 3, 2, 1 – similar. **AP State & Local, 3/25/'15**, A timeline of Bergdahl's Army service, potential charges, **Section:** State And Regional, 461 Words, **Dateline:** Fort Bragg, N.C."Days earlier, Bergdahl told his parents in an email that an Army vehicle **had run over a girl**, but "we don't even care when we hear each other talk about **running their children down in the dirt streets with our armored trucks**." **[As noted & discussed in the main text above, the actual quote in Bowe Bergdahl's email that appears in Michael Hasting's Rolling Stone Article of 6/20/'12 doesn't refer to actually seeing anyone run over.]**

[INTRA-TEXT NOTE by ASA] ***Bowe Bergdahl does not say here that he saw any child run down with "our armored trucks" – only that he heard people talking about such things in what, from the imme-diately following con-text, was a callous manner – as though it would be some kind of a joke or irrelevancy if it happened. Bowe Bergdahl's statement is seemingly refuted two years later by one of his former military colleagues:***

"Another war story that Bergdahl told in an email to his father stated: "We don't even care when we hear each [word 'oth-er' is missing here in recorded text] talk about running children down in the dirt streets with our armored trucks..." This is completely false. Our unit did NOT run over a child. In fact, we didn't run over anyone at all."[772]

[INTRA-TEXT NOTE by ASA, CONTINUED] This states that there were no people – chil-dren or adults – run over by trucks in "our unit". As already noted above, Bowe Berg-dahl does not say either that he or anyone else had actually seen such an event and does not limit the talk he describes to ac-counts of trucks of "our unit". The phrase in Bowe Bergdahl's statement is; **"our armored trucks"***, which, in the context of his overall discussion, could refer to any of* **"our"** *-- meaning US- armored trucks anywhere in the environment of the Afghan war.*

All this should've been obvious to those conduct-ing the hearing – suggesting that the hearing was more of an opportunity to attack Bowe Bergdahl – and the Presi-dent who had arranged his release – than to understand the reality of the situations—of the soldiers and of the war. **[CONCLUSION OF INTRA-TEXT NOTE BY ASA]**

[Rolling Stone article continues] "Bowe conclud-ed his e-mail with what, in another context, might read as a suicide note. "I am sorry for every-thing," he wrote. "The horror that is america is disgusting." Then he signed off with a final mes-sage to his mother and father. "There are a few more boxes coming to you guys," he said, referring to his uniform and books, which he had already packed up and shipped off. "Feel free to open them, and use them."

On 6/27/09 at 10:43 p.m., Bob Bergdahl responded to his son's final message not long after he re-ceived it. His subject line was titled:

OBEY YOUR CONSCIENCE!

"Dear Bowe," he wrote. "In matters of life and death, and especially at war, it is never safe to ignore ones' conscience. Ethics demands obedience to our conscience. It is best to also have a systematic oral defense of what our conscience demands. Stand with like minded men when possible." He signed it simply "dad."

"Dad" -- Bowe Bergdahl's father, Robert "would say, [in connection with a question of how his son's opinion had apparently dark-ened on the war] only that he himself had be-come disillusioned by the military's doctrine of counterinsurgency, aimed at winning over the Afghan population by building roads, schools and good governance while protect-ing them from insurgents. …'The doctrine is fallacious,' Mr. Bergdahl said. 'It doesn't achieve what they say it's going to achieve. It's a biometric data-gathering device — send the rabbits out there to get I.E.D.-ed so you can figure out who to kill at night. How ethi-cal.' His son, Mr. Bergdahl contended, was frustrated by what he saw."[773]

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[772] CQ Congressional Testimony, 6/18/'14 Bergdahl Exchange And National Security; Com.: House Foreign Affairs; Subcom.: Middle East & N. Africa, Sect.: Capitol Hill Hearing Testimony, 2248 words [This is] Testimony-By: [Spc.=Specialist] Cody Herbert Full, Honorably Discharged 11/11/11, Affiliation: US Army, Com on, Subcom. on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade, 6/18/'14, "Chairman Royce, Members of the Foreign Affairs committee, thank you for allowing me to share my first-hand account of my experiences serving in Afghanistan…"

Also available at the official government website as: _____ & as a CSPAN video at _____ The testimony is read by Cody Full from a document in front of him on the lecturn. Several sentences – incl. the statements quoted above-- in the published written testimony aren't in the video. This video does not appear to have been cut at these points during the actual testimony. This could be because his Cody Full's testimony may have been limited to 5 minutes. The video clip – which includes a short introduction and the beginning of the next witnesses testimony, runs 5:45.

[773] NYT, 5/15/'12, See footnote 767 _____

CHAPTER 26:

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

WHO REALLY RUNS THE TALIBAN

EXPEL THE FOREIGN RULERS AND LIVE IN PEACE

Eighteen million psychological warfare leaflets were reportedly dropped on Afghanistan in the first two months of the war -- the work of "the 4th Psychological Operation Group at Ft. Bragg, …whose weapons are words and images." "the truth is the best propaganda," says Col. James Treadwell, the 4th Group's commander. Otherwise, "you lose credibility," he explains, and the audience tunes out." A team of 35 civilian analysts, two-thirds of which are Ph.D.'s, spends weeks crafting the 4th Psyop's messages. "It's vastly more difficult to influence a hostile foreign audience than it is to introduce a soft drink into the market," says Robert Jenks, who heads the group's research arm. '[774]

One can only imagine how much effort was put into propagandizing the people of the US, NATO and other countries that participated in the attack on the Taliban[775].

Here are a few of the artworks that were used to 'inform" the people of Afghanistan.

"The front of the leaflet [above left] depicts Mullah Mohammed Omar as a "kuchi", a dog of nomads, chained at the heel of Osama bin Laden. Tha [*sic*] back of the leaflet [right] depicts Osama playing Chess with Taliban pawns on a game board map of Afghanistan. This leaflet was almost rejected by approving authority until it was exlained that chess is immensely popular in the region and the image would instantly connect with the target audience."[AFD51c ___] A more authoritative source says: "This image was chosen because chess was once a popular Afghan pastime before the Taliban banned the game."[776]

The only on-the-scene-report of such a ban found in a LexisNexis English language search is very instructive: "children are prohibited from playing soccer or chess and watching television because the ruling council has declared such activities un-Islamic." There is nothing in the 1471 word, Dateline Kandahar, Washington Post article[777] about adults being banned from these activities.

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[774] Douglas Waller, "Using Psywar Against the Taliban," *Time Online*, 10 December 2001. _____ [12/18/13.] cited by Wright see footnote 776

[775] See, for example, the supposed documentary "Beneath The Veil" described in Chapter 22c

[776] p66, A Different Kind of War, Donald P. Wright, Ph.D. et al. _____

[777] Mar. 2/95, "Afghans Say City Is Calmer Under Militants; Once-Lawless Kandahar More Secure, but Control Maintained Through Strict Islamic Rules" John Ward Anderson, Pg. A23

More importantly, we learn in the next paragraph:



"Yet nearly everyone says life here is a vast improvement over what it was just a few months ago, before [the]…Taliban -- or Islamic students -- rose up to liberate Kandahar, Afghanistan's second-largest city, from violent militias and tribal gangs that preyed on civilians….

Still, as religious students with few administrative skills struggle to govern Kandahar, most people consulted give Taliban fairly good grades and credit it with a willingness to be flexible…"A lot of rules have been relaxed because of pressure from the population," said Olivier Van Bunnen, who coordinates medical programs for Medical Emergency Relief International. Noting initial reluctance of Taliban to allow women to work as health-care providers, he said that "by discussing and explaining why we wanted to do it, they finally accepted it." [emphasis added]

Another leaflet tells us: "Mullah Omar is a Murderer, a Coward and a Traitor to the freedom loving Pushtun people. As the leader of the Taliban he made millions of dollars selling evil drugs to Muslims. He did not use his fortune to help the Pushtun people. He used his fortune to help Osama bin Laden murder innocent civilians. Now Omar the coward and traitor hides in safety while Pushtuns suffer." TF11RP07b ___

Another has the same first sentence but ends with. "He let Osama bin Laden's foreign murderers come to Afghanistan to hide. Now Omar the coward and traitor to the Pushtun people hides in safety and comfort while his people suffer." TF11RP07A

Still another, shown above, has: [Front] "Get wealth and power beyond your dreams. Help the Anti-Taliban Gorces [*sic*] rid Afghanistan of murderers and terrorists" [BACK – HAS TEXT ONLY] "You can receive millions of dollars for helping the Anti-Taliban Force catch Al-Aaida [*sic*] and Taliban murderers. This is enough money to take care of your family, your village, your tribe for the rest of your life. Pay for livestock and doctors and school books and housing for all your people." TF11-RP09-1 ___ EMPH. ADDED.

In contrast to this, the same Washington Post Article has: Observers here said Taliban infiltrated opposing groups and frequently persuaded their members to defect."They said, 'Please don't fight us, we're students of the Koran,' " said an international aid worker in Kandahar.

"Soldiers would say, 'How can we fight a Talib? We can fight everybody, but we can't fight the mullahs.' ""No one wants to pull the trigger on a Talib," a Western diplomat said. "They're like an army of nuns." [EMPHASIS ADDED]

The website has a toal of 43 pages of Psyops leaflet images. Not one had any connection to the religions the people of Afghanistan, or any reference to God at all.

PART FOUR

SUMMARY

TOOLS FOR DETECTING PROPAGANDA

CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND REACTION TO THESE FINDINGS

Including:

WHAT DID THE U.S. GAIN AND LOSE FROM ATTACKING THE TALIBAN?

The reactions of leading journalist, public intellectuals, Muslim leaders, experts and members of the public were not at all what I would have initially imagined. But I soon recognized a clear pattern. That pattern tells us something about the strengths and weaknesses of our society and where we should go from here.

CHAPTER 27.

SUMMARY

The information and analysis presented in this book did not require any special expertise, equipment or financing. Without any sense of false modesty, it did not require exceptional brilliance either. What it appears to have required was something that is terribly lacking in modern American society: an understanding that a person who is a deeply religious Jew or Moslem can be – and often is – a very good, kind and caring person of exceptional integrity -- sometimes with substantial scientific competence. With this basic understanding it would've been easy to question the negative images of the Taliban.

A. **It would have been easy to see when they came into Ghazni in early '95 and Herat later that year, that they were not attacking people of a different religion – the Shiites – who have a substantial presense in both areas.[778]**

B. **It should also have been clear from these same early contacts in Ghazni – and later in the Fall of '96 when they entered Kabul -- that Hazaras – who make up a significant percentage of the people of both areas – were not being targeted by the Taliban for persecution.[779]**

C. **From the conclusions of A & B , it should've been apparent that the Taliban probably didn't torture Sheikh Mazari and throw him to his death from a helicopter. If, at this early point, it was possible to learn the results of the expert examination of Sheikh Mazari's body, it would've confirmed that the nature of his injuries wasn't consistent with the "thrown to his death from a helicopter" story. It would've also been clear that those who were promoting this story were misleading the people. The blood baths in Mazar-i-Sharif –in '97 and '98 might have been prevented.**

D. **From 1996, when the Taliban entered Kabul, it should've been clear they were careful in observing Muslim law -- that they weren't arbitrarily killing and maiming people and that their rate of judicial punishment was very low and relatively light handed.[780] It should've been obvious that they weren't maiming hands of women and girls for wearing nail polish – that such allegations of misogyny[781] - together with the supposed castration & jeep-dragging of Najib[782] - were just their enemies' anti-Taliban propaganda. We should have seen -- particularly after the Najib castration story -- that their anti-Taliban propaganda, like their currency[783], was part of Russian aid. This very effective propaganda – aimed at making global secular society and 'modern' Muslims[784] -- loathe the Taliban -- was the Russian equivalent of the stinger missiles the US had given to the mujahedeen in the Afghan–Soviet War.**

E. **The Taliban's care in preserving and protecting the pre-Islamic Art in the Kabul art Museum, should also have shown that they were not bent on 'breaking idols'[785] and were not puppets of those who would urge such things.[786]**

F. **By the summer of 1998 – when the East African Embassies of the US were bombed –it should've been clear the Taliban were sticklers for Muslim law – that they really required four reliable male witnesses to convict men and women of adultery[787]. From this it should have been understood that they really had a very high standard of evidence to convict people of capital crimes. Without such evidence, they would not turn someone over for execution. This was why they were not turning over bin Laden – not because they were against the US, were puppets of ben Laden, or favored his particular ideas.**

G. **The failure of key policy makers to see this and the failure of UN sanctions to produce results may've led to an increased effort to get bin Laden through some of the key enemies of the Taliban – particularly Ahmad Shah Massoud.[788]**

H. **By late '98 it should have been clear that the Taliban had done much to restore the largely agricultural economy of Afghanistan.**

> **"Wheat production rose by 1998 to levels close to those existing prior to the outbreak of the war in 1979/1980. Livestock increased, taking advantage of unutilized grazing lands, and horticultural production grew based on the restoration of orchards." [789]**

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[778] See Chapter 9a ____

[779] See Chapter 9b & APPEND. 7 Prof. B. Rubin on Hazara relations.

[780] See, in particular, APPENDIX 18. Formal Punishments In Kabul Under The Taliban From 9/27/96-9/27/97,Their 1st Yr In The City

[781] See: CHAPT. 21: Maiming The Hands Of Women And Girls For Wearing Nail Polish, & APPEND. 7 Prof. Rubin On…Fingernail Polish…

[782] See CHAPT. 11: Did The Taliban Castrate Soviet Afghan Leader Najib..?

[783] See CHAPT. 14a: Massoud & Co. Printing Money In Russia

[784] Muslims would also be appalled by reports of Najib's castration.

[785] See CHAPT. 8: Buddhist Statues And Other Pre-Islamic Art

[786] See Chapt 18-20: where the Taliban got their support.

[787] See CH. 3: Executions For Adultery…, particularly see footnote 59

[788] See CH 24: The Contributions Of The CIA

[789] p.21, The Opium Economy In Afghanistan, An International Problem, United Nations *Office on Drugs and Crime, 2003* _____

Much of this was due to the Taliban's elimination of the highway robbers and checkpoints that routinely stole from anyone who would venture out upon the roads. It also came from their elimination of the cleptocratic "commanders" of Dostom, *et al*, who routinely stole the people's land and animals[790]. It became more worthwhile for the farmers to invest in their land and to grow produce that could be sold outside of their village. "…interregional trade resumed in areas controlled by the [Taliban] regime."[791]

This increased value to the farmers and the perceived justice received by litigants in Taliban Sharia courts combined to make the farmers amenable to paying the 5-10% tax on farm produce that is standard in Sharia Law. Such a tax in Taliban controlled areas would've yielded ~$50 million/yr. [792]

I. Freeing the gateways of Afghanistan from warlord dominated checkpoints would have also brought support for the Taliban from the traders and long haul truckers. These traders and truckers handled manufactures and raw materials – in addition to the agricultural products taxed at the farm gate. The standard 2.5% tax applicable to them under standard Muslim Law would have been seen by most as a reasonable price to pay –particularly when combined with the short customs clearance times under the Taliban compared with the long delays associated with their predecessors[793].

Beginning in late 1994 – when the Taliban took over the gateways to Afghanistan near Kandahar -- and continuing with their efforts in Herat in the west in 1995, Jalalabad in the East in '96 and Hairatan in the North in '98, it should've been clear how much the Taliban were able to derive from these sources.

J. By late 98 – early '99, it should have been clear that the reasonable, Sharia-law-based taxes on farmers and trader/truckers were bringing in a combined total on the order of $100E6/yr.[794]

K. By 2000, it should have been clear from the Taliban's revised khums-income tax system, that it could bring in ~$65+E6/yr.[795] The dramatically improved business climate -- the result of factors noted at H & I above – combined with the dramatic reduction in crime in Kabul[796] –would make such taxes look like a bargain – particular-ly to those who would be paying the most and who could most afford to pay – businesses, property owners & professsionals[797].

Together with voluntary donations from those outside of the country who wanted to support the Taliban, available cash funds in the year 2000 would have been ~$200 million/yr. [798]

To put this in perspective, this is ~40X what the Taliban might've collected from a Sharia Law farm gate tax on opium growing – if opium had been grown that year. Just as they eliminated this tax in early 2000 -- months before they announced the opium poppy ban -- they would not need --or miss -- the financial support of the likes of OBL.

L. By the time the results of the Taliban's poppy ban began to seen in early Dec. 2000[799], Massoud was probably being protected in return for his cooperation in tracking and capturing bin Laden. Recognizing the reality of the Taliban's efforts to eradicate opium would have meant reducing support for Massoud, 'recognizing' the Taliban and giving them Afghanistan's seat in the UN.

M. By early 2001, the US appears to have been so committed to using Massoud to get bin Laden and defeat the supposed anti-US Taliban, that they were prepared to ignore the stockpiles of opium in Massoud's control and try to twist the image of the Taliban in the public eye.[800]

N. After the 9/11 attacks, misunderstanding[801], combined with embarrassment, anger, impa-

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790 See footnote 615A.2 & A.3

791 See footnote 789.

792 Total agriculture and forestry products in all of Afghanistan were estimated at $ 2.4E9 (for 2001 – a drought year.) In 1998 – before the drought – but also before the Taliban controlled much of the northern agriculturally rich areas, the national output would have been closer to $3.5-4E9. However, much of this was either not subject to taxation – because the output of the farms was too small or the farmers were, for whatever reason, not supportive of the Taliban. Irrigated areas were subject to a lower – 5% tax - so the total collected by the Taliban from this source would be closer to $50 million. See footnote 589 & see Chapter 20]

793 See footnote 595 L

794 See footnote 607 A

795 See footnote 614

796 See footnote 970 and608 A par. 2

797 It would have been more of a bargain if the drought ceased, UN sanctions were removed and the Massoud's hyperinflated/ counterfeited money was replaced by the currency the Taliban were in process of introducing when the sanctions resulted in these plans being shelved. See footnote 459 [green text]

798 See footnote 623

799 See the remarks of Pino Arlacchi, the leader of the UNDCP and the comments of Barbara Crossette. Page 38, particularly footnotes 130 -134

800 See page 41 , particularly footnote 147

801 A. A key misunderstanding was that Afghanistan was a 'failed state'- promoted authoritatively by Prof. Barnett Rubin on the basis of the situation after the fall of Najib in '92.. [The Search for Peace in Afghanistan: From Buffer State to Failed State, Yale U. P, 1/1/95, 190 p, Cong. Test. May 9/96] Tho' by 12/'00, the Taliban's opium poppy ban showed they'd built an effective social system – the 'failed state' idea & associated need for 'nation building' continued to prevail. See footnote 18. By mid '00, Prof. Rubin, et al, saw them as "despotic, reactionary and obscurantist" [codewords to denigrate the Taliban in the eyes of the human rights, socialist &

tience and geopolitical opportunism led the US to ally with known criminals to 'get bin Laden' and defeat the Taliban for 'harboring' him. [802]

These failures to appreciate the potential virtues of religious Muslims and a government operated under their law, have led to the murder of scores of thousands of people who had no interest in attacking the US. It has also led to more than a decade of war, to the support of thousands of deeply corrupt people and the expenditure – the plain waste -- of over $2 trillion[803].

CHAPTER 28

TOOLS FOR DETECTING PROPAGANDA

Our findings on sources of support for the Taliban and their enemies[804] actually give us another important set of tools for understanding the general situation during the Taliban period. We now have a group of criteria to detect low credibility reports: reports that are intentional propaganda, sensationalist, or just sloppy/ deadline journalism. Here's a non-exhaustive list of the indicia of low credibility reports:

A. They show Taliban receiving money and support from various outside and nefarious sources but don't tell us at the same time about:

1. The Durand line & the refugee situation [805]
2. Legitimate sources of funding – such as taxes on farmers and trucking – or as mentioned by Mullah Omar in '97 -modest income taxes. [806-A]
3. Local community aid with food & lodging.[806-B]

anti-religious groups respectively] Afghanistan: Reconstruction and Peacebuilding in a Regional Framework, 6/'01,p. 12 [written in collab. w' Ashraf Ghani, William Maley, Ahmed Rashid, Olivier Roy] **B.** See also Jan/11/02 Memo of William H. Taft, IV, Legal Advisor, US State Dept., to John C.Yoo, USDJ, pdf p 19-21, where State Dept. experts show that the Taliban was an effective State. Eg: they /effectively controlled 90% of Afghanistan's territory/…operated…institutions of government/…[had] a system of taxation based on the ushra [sic] principle/…maintained a functioning system of Islamic courts/…suppressed the patchwork of gangs and warlords that dominated the country/…put an end to roadside kidnapping, extortion, robbery, rape [etc.]… that had long plagued the Afghan people. And, when the international community demanded it…, in 2000-2001 they declared and enforced with great effectiveness, a ban on growing opium poppies….[etc.]" [EMPH. ADDED.] In conjunction with this, Taft refers to its various aspects as "pre modern /abhorrent/ draconian /incompatible with modern standards and sensibilities / [having a] terrible cost to Afghanistan and its people" pdf 21: "…Arabs and non-Afghans…may have included 4,000 soldiers to the Taliban's 45,000."

[802] The US knew who was stockpiling opium & the massacres the 'Northern Alliance' had been involved in. See footnotes131 274 and 672 A & B

[803] **A** "The direct costs of the war are already $700bn… Now, with much higher survival rates, more generous benefits, and new, expensive treatments, the eventual costs of caring for veterans of the Afghanistan war will exceed $1tn" Financial Times, 1/23/13, "There will be no peace dividend after Afghanistan", Joseph Stiglitz and Linda Bilmes. This does not include non-US costs. **B.** "The share of total Costs [to the US Gov] attributable to Afghanistan/Pakistan…will be $2.15 trillion including future costs of veterans care to 2054". P.11 U.S. Costs of Wars Through 2014:…" 25/6/2014, Prof. Neta C. Crawford, Boston U. **C.** The total for all countries is at least 1.2 x this. "Assessing the cost of military operations in Afghanistan and juxtaposing them to the assessed costs of humanitarian assistance (2008-2012)" 482.242/[410.100+2.491] =1.169 = ratio of total US+ISAF HQ costs to total ISAF costs 2008-2012 – afghan war =See Table 1.1, etc. Carina Solmirano And Jakob Hallgren. Draft. Do not use without the authors' permission. See also icasualties 2008-2012. 2495/1699= 1.469; 2001-2014: 3484/2356= 1.479; Average of ratios for Carina costs and icasualties in 2008-2012 = 1.32. These costs don't include costs in life, limb and property to the people of Afghanistan. .

[804] Discussed in detail in Part Two: Where Did They Get Their Money?

[805] **A.** Ahmed Rashid, for example, mentions the Durand line twice in his best selling book Taliban… -- the first time on page 12. However, he waits for another 175 pages to tell us that it was not recognized by any Afghan government [p187] . in the interim , he forgets about it and tells us: **a.** "Omar gave an urgent call for students in Pakistan to come and help the Taliban. Once again Pakistani madrasahs were closed down as 5,000 new recruits -- both Pakistani and Afghan -- arrived to enlist with the Taliban." p.59 **b.** "More than one third of the 15000 strong Taliban force which captured Taloqan was made up of non-Afghans, which included 3000 Pakistani militants, 1000 fighers from the IMU[Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, several hundred Arabs under Bin Laden as well as Kashmiris, Chechens, Philipinos and Chinese Muslims." P. 80

B. In numerous newspaper articles, he tells of their "Pakistani" fighters, militants, extremists, etc - but makes no mention of the Durand line. eg: **a.** 7/17/97, The Gazette (Montreal) , "Taliban refills front line with teens", Dateline: Kabul; **b.** Sep 11/01, The Daily Telegraph(London), "Afghanistan resistance leader feared dead in blast", , Pg. 11 "An estimated 25,000 Taliban troops, including some 10,000 Arab, Pakistani and Central Asian Islamic militants";**c.** Sep. 6/01, The Daily Telegraph (London), "Aid workers trial judge wants a guilty verdict Taliban hardliner talks of death sentence, reports Ahmed Rashid in Lahore"; **d.** Aug 7/01, The Daily Telegraph(London), " Aid women face execution by Taliban", "The Taliban force of some 25,000 men include some 8,000 non-Afghans, among them Arabs under the command of the Saudi terrorist Osama bin Laden, thousands of Pakistani extremists, Central Asians, Chinese and Filipinos." **e.** Jun 6/01, The Daily Telegraph(London), "Afghanistan accuses Jewish and American women of UN conspiracy", [Actual quote on article related to **Jews** is "…Muttawakil, the Taliban foreign minister, told reporters in Kabul that the breakdown in relations with UN relief agencies was because "the UN could have been influenced by some women's organisations in America that are against the Islamic emirate . . . **including Jewish ones** and possibly from Afghan women with links to the opposition"." "…Mullah Mohammed Omar, the leader of the Taliban, is surrounded by a clique of hardline advisers, including Arab and Pakistani militants determined to oust foreign influences and set up what they say will be the purest Islamic state in the world."; **f.** Feb. 7/01, The Daily Telegraph,Lond., "Taliban fighters 'massacre 300 Shia Muslims'" "The witnesses said Pakistani Islamic extremists belonging to virulent anti-Shia groups and Arab militants who are loyal to the wanted Saudi militant Osama bin Laden also took part in the killings."; **g.** Sep 8/98, The Gazette, Mont., "Iran backs off Afghanistan: UN wants meeting to avoid clash; envoys may be dead" "…Taliban troops or Pakistani zealots fighting alongside them…";

C. 60 hits [21 pre 9/11] in LexisNexis for [pakistani & taliban & by-line("Ahmed Rashid")] & [all English news] sources &['01 & before] – none when Durand is added. No hits for Durand when the search doesn't requ. word "Pakistani" of 179. No hits for byline Ahmed Rashid & Durand – w/o either Taliban or Pakistani. See also Appen. 10 Ahmed Rashid Not Reliable

4. Weapons captured or confiscated.[806-C]

B. They tell us about taxes on opium in the 2000-2001 period but don't also tell us that the Taliban effectively banned opium in this time frame while their enemies increased it

C. We're told of specific amounts of money that the Taliban received from nefarious sources – such as OBL –but we are not told how the reporter knows this -- or the reported source of this information is unverifiable.

D. Our investigation of the relations between the Taliban and the Hazaras and Shiites gives other insignia of the propagandist:

1. The report notes the massacre of Hazaras in Mazar-i-Sharif in '98 but doesn't mention -- or belittles -- the massacre of the Taliban by the Hazaras in the same town the year before, or
2. The report cites the Taliban torturing Sheikh Mazari and throwing him to his death from a Helicopter – without noting that this was uncharacteristic of the Taliban and may not be true or at least including the Taliban account of the same events.

E. Our study of Massoud shows that a supposedly substantive report on him is unreliable if it:

1. Fails to mention his use of massive counterfeiting –bankers call it 'monetary financing' -- to pay his soldiers and government workers – with the money printed for him in Russia and with the value of the official currency reduced by at least a factor of 20 as a result;
2. Mentions his truce with the Soviets on the Salang Pass[807], but fails to note the effects of this truce in supporting the Soviet war effort;
3. Shows his successful & cinematographically dramatic attack on a fuel truck in a Soviet convoy thru the Salang Pass but fails to say that the attack had relatively little effect on Soviet deliveries of fuel because of the piplines running thru the same road that delivered the equivalent of ~100 tuckloads of fuel a day.[808]
4. Fails to mentions his cozy relationship with the opium growers of Badakhsan Province -- the last province that was left in his hands.

F. They suggest the Taliban were routinely murdering women. In particular, if they say or suggest execution of women in Kabul was routine – and don't tell us that only one woman was executed by the Taliban in that city in their five years of governance – for beating her husband to death with a hammer as he slept. [809]

G. If they say the Taliban executed people for sodomy, but don't say it was predatory sodomy 'with young boys'.[810]

H. They report the Taliban castrated Najib – and/or jeep dragged him– but don't say, in the case of jeep dragging, no evidence of this was found in contemporaneous news photos or in either of two reports of examination of his body & was, in the case of castration, both "not confirmed" in one of those reports & promoted in the context of a Northern Alliance anti-Taliban propaganda blitz,[811] Here's the report on the death of Najib from 'unreliable #1', Ahmed Rashid[812]:

> "The Taliban walked up to Najibullah's room, beat him and his brother senseless and then bundled them into a pick-up and drove them to the darkened Presidential Palace. There they castrated Najibullah, dragged his body behind a jeep for several rounds of the Palace and then shot him dead. His brother was similarly tortured and then throttled to death."[813]

If a report is clearly unreliable on the basis of any of these criteria, it should be considered unreliable with regard to most things that they say if they are adverse to the Taliban. We should, in any case, look closely at who is doing the reporting and try to understand why they may be distorting the story.

We should also note that most of the anti-Taliban stories have a common pattern: They take a real story, like the deaths of Mazari[SEE CH. 10], Nejib. Zarmina, the sodomists & the opium ban & spin it into a horror tale. This common pattern suggests a common method and primary source—most likely, Russia. [See footnotes 342 & 343]

The post 9/11 story -promoted primarily by the US & UK-- of the Taliban maiming the hands of women & girls for wearing nail polish, is based on an unconfirmed report published by Amnesty International. [See CH 21:MAIMING THE HANDS OF WOMEN AND GIRLS FOR WEARING NAIL POLISH.]

806-A See footnote 553, 806-B See footnotes 593-E,609-614
806-C See footnotes 557-560 [See, in general, Chapters 18-20]
807 See CH 12:The Northern Alliance & The Salang Pass
808 See footnotes 368 & 369

809 See CHAPTER 2: OPPRESSION OF WOMEN UNDER THE TALIBAN; & CHAPTER 3: EXECUTIONS FOR ADULTERY UNDER THE TALIBAN
810 SEE CHAPTER 4: EXECUTIONS FOR SODOMY
811 See CHAPTER 11 WAS THE FORMER PRESIDENT OF SOVIET OCCUPIED AFGHANISTAN TORTURED AND CASTRATED BY THE TALIBAN?
812 See footnote 329 & App.10: Ahmed Rashid Not Reliable..: An exch. of letters w. Prof. B. Rubin, then, Pres. Obama's lead expert on Afgh.
813 P.49, "Taliban: Islam, Oil and the New Great Game in Central Asia", cites no source in any edition seen. But see footnote 325 B & C

CHAPTER 29

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The broad failure to understand the Taliban--and our consequent fears and attacks upon them-- is largely a fault of our educational system. Yet we all know that our schools – at least in the U.S.A.--promote 'freedom of religion'. We would expect a high level of understanding and tolerance to result. What's gone wrong?

It's true that, at almost every level, our schools go out of their way to teach that we have 'freedom of religion'. The mistake is that we mis-define religion. We confine it to such things as how and where we pray and what God or gods we do or don't believe in.

The schools also teach that we live under a constitution and that our 'freedom of religion' is guaranteed by the constitution and its system. The schools don't teach that the belief in this particular constitution and its guarantees is itself a kind of religion – a 'civil religion' or 'civil idolatry.'[814] They don't teach that there might be other social systems that could, conceivably, produce comparably good or even better results.

The schools also fail to teach the very real contradiction between the freedoms that students are told they have in the U.S. and the system of "free" public schools. They aren't taught that education is not a natural monopoly – but that the "free" public schools are effectively an unnatural monopoly that promotes the civil religion of the power elites.



INFORMATION MEDIA AREA MAP

SHOWING EDUCATION [SOLID BLUE ARROW] AS AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE MEDIA WITH NEWSPAPERS, BROADCASTING, LETTER WRITING, TELEPHONE, ETC [815]

They're also not taught that education is an integral part of our communications system – as shown so clearly on the above diagram. They're not taught that a school monopoly effectively stifles all the other freedoms.

Outside of the religious Jewish, Moslem and Catholic communities, few notice -- and almost none feel -- the contradiction between the professed freedoms of religion, press, speech, assembly and business development and the reality of a monopoly school system. With such a system, parents are given the choice of paying for what they want -- or sending their children to "free" schools that teach other people's values - which the parents have to pay for anyway.

At the college and university level the situation appears to be very different. There, seemingly, there is competition. There are many private colleges and universities –

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[814] E. g.: **a.** George Washington, in his farewell address, hoped "that the free constitution, which is the work of your hands, may be sacredly maintained." [emphasis added] _____ **b.** 'Civil Religion in America' Robert N. Bellah, *Dædalus, 1967, v 96, #1, p. 1-21. This paper set off a still ongoing discussion of the government of the United States as a religious entity.* _____ **c.** John Milton, [1608 – 74] English scholar, poet & political activist, "believed that the disposition to attach divinity or special sanctity to …any human institution…, was idolatrous." [emphasis added]. p.214 'Milton and Idolatry', B K. Lewalski, Studies in English Literature, 1500-1900, '03, v 43, # 1, 213-32. "He described monarchy in particular as a "civil kinde of Idolatry" *Eikonoklastes*, 3:343. _____

[815] From: Tetsuro Tomita, 'The New Electronic Media and Their Place in The Information Market of the Future' 1980, In Anthony Smith, ed., Newspapers and Democracy… p. 49-62. MIT Press. [This image from p533, Hiroko NOJIRI & Youichi ITO, "The impact of new communication technologies on the media industry in Japan" p.505-42, in: "Electronic Mass Media in Europe. Prospects and Developments" E. de Bens, Manfred Knoche, editors, 1987, for the Commission of the European Communities. The author, ASA, has added the area for houses of worship/study in religious communities – not incl. in Tomita's original. In geographicaly compact communities, it covers [blue dotted line] much of the "blank area for new media". The author has also extended the range of education –to incl. large state education systems & very small schools.[blue dashed line]. Auto mounted loud speakers are similarly effective for short messages, eg: announcing funerals in Jerusalem.

including many that apparently operate under religious auspices.[816] However, their academics receive substantial grant support from government at all levels. They also receive money from wealthy benefactors who may not identify too closely with a school's religious program. The result is that academics are afraid to publish what may jeopardize their government grants or the benefactions of the non-religious supporters of their work.[817] Similarly they are afraid to allow unusual programs at school clubs: clubs that get school funds and have faculty supervisors.[818]

This broad based social failure has led to an acute shortage of people in media, academia and government who are prepared to recognize a different form of religious governance.[819]

To safeguard our society – and the people of the world in general – we should seek to insulate our schools from the dictates of government. Even departments that teach seemingly uncontroversial subjects – like math – should avoid government funds [820].

In both the religious Jewish community and in Islam, the potential for government subsidies -- or the money of the weakly religious wealthy -- to corrupt religious teaching has long been recognized.[821] A

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[816]. E.g.: Yeshiva University and Fordham University. The former is known as the flagship institution of the 'Modern Orthodox' Jews. The latter is, renowned as a Jesuit, Roman Catholic institution. Both however, are legally secular institutions with affiliated religious seminaries. Both transformed themselves into secular institutions in 1970 – in order to get more money from the Federal Government. [NYT, 12/14/1970, p. 16, for Yeshiva Univ., NYT, 11/22/1970, p. 41, for Fordham Univ..] A good part of the reason for this transformation was the new "open admissions" policy of the free public colleges in New York City. It became even more difficult for the private universities to compete with 'free' ones.

[817] To keep the money flowing, senior religious leaders at Yeshiva University, didn't look too closely, looked the other way or just kept silent while the Torah Law that they publicly espoused was routinely violated in the anatomy department of their medical school -- the Albert Einstein College of Medicine.

[818] No school club would invite the author to speak on the subject of this book. The supervisor of the Asian Students Club at a prestigious public high school understood very well that the students would benefit from hearing a presentation on this work. But he told me "I like my job."

[819] This helps to explain why almost nobody among public intellectuals and in media understood what the Taliban were really about and were able to write about it. It also helps to explain the peculiar work of the "story tellers" Ahmed Rashid & Saira Shaw – aside from any question of encouragement from the likes of the CIA and Ahmed Shah Massoud. Prof. Noam Chomsky wrote on this:

> "If you're properly educated at the elite schools, you internalize the understanding that there are certain things it wouldn't do to say. That's the effect of a "proper education." This doesn't mean just schools, but the whole system. The higher the education you receive, the more internalized the values are, and this leads to voluntary censorship."

Prof. Chomsky, himself largely a product of such an elite education, was clearly also a victim of it. In this interview, he favors getting rid of the Taliban – but not by bombing the country. He says:

> "Certainly, overthrowing the Taliban was a very reasonable approach and we should have listened to the substantial and credible part of Afghan opinion that was talking about how to go about doing this".

U.S. intervention from Afghanistan to Iraq, Noam Chomsky interviewed by David Barsamian, *International Socialist Review*, Sept–Oct. '02.

Prof. Chomsky received much of his early education from his parents [both Hebrew educators], from a private elementary school with a very diverse student body and at a kibbutz in Israel. This, combined with his native genius, gave him the ability to question and see what others were mostly blind to. [The author, mostly an autodidact, didn't go to college or finish high sch'l.]

[820] William Whiston, protégé of Isaac Newton and Newton's handpicked successor to his prestigious chair in mathematics, was expelled from his Professorial Chair and from the university for his religious views. Closer to our day, a very capable mathematics teacher at a prestigious public high school restricted what his students could hear about the subject of this book, saying 'I like my job' .[noted supra in connection with school clubs, see footnote 818]

[821] לֹא-תַטֶּה מִשְׁפָּט, לֹא תַכִּיר פָּנִים; וְלֹא-תִקַּח שֹׁחַד--כִּי הַשֹּׁחַד יְעַוֵּר עֵינֵי חֲכָמִים, וִיסַלֵּף דִּבְרֵי צַדִּיקִם.

"Thou shalt not wrest judgment; thou shalt not respect persons; neither shalt thou take a gift; for a gift doth blind the eyes of the wise, and pervert the words of the righteous"[Deut. 16:19]

century and a half ago, the religious heart of Islam in South Asia – the Darul Ulam Deoband – deliberately insulated its funding from government and private secularists[822]. They were able to say – at the push for the creation of Pakistan – "How can someone who doesn't offer prayers and smokes cigars be the leader of a Muslim state?"[823]

They were the spiritual wellspring of the Taliban – not the state sponsored religious schools of Arabia and Egypt.

Religious Jewish schools in Israel – under Rabbi Dovid Soloveichick and others – were able to criticize the State of Israel -- even the need for its existence – because they had systemically refused to take any money from <u>any</u> government or any individual who was not a religious Jew.[824]

In a society where there is real choice of education, we'd expect the development of a real diversity of social leadership. The natural differences between people and groups would give us a much broader range of perspectives. We'd appreciate that, by talking with those of diverse views, all would be able to see better – to grow in wisdom and be counted among the wise.

איזהו חכם?
הלומד מכל אדם:

Who is wise?
One who learns from everyone...[825]

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[822] "The day of Thursday, 15th Muharram, A.H. 1283 (May 30, 1866), was that blessed and auspicious day in the Islamic history of India when the foundation stone for the renaissance of Islamic sciences was laid in the land of Deoband…. One of the principles that Hazrat Nanautavi (may his secret be sanctified) proposed for the Darul Uloom and other religious Madaris is also this that the Darul-Uloom should be run trusting in Allah and with public contributions for which the poor masses alone should be relied upon." <u>A Brief Introduction</u> ___

In contrast to this, the schools where the most persistent enemies of the Taliban among those who were ostensibly religious Sunni Muslims were educated -- Massoud and Rabbani – were heavily subsidized by secular governments. [See footnote 233 on Al-Azhar University in Cairo]

[823] **A.** I have not yet found the exact source of this quote, but the following provides a similar idea.

'Maulana Husain Ahmad Madani, who was … principal of Darul Ulum Deoband opposed the idea of [Pakistan]… He … said: "all should endeavor jointly for such a democratic government in which Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs, Christians and Parsis are included. *Islamic Pakistan: Illusions & Reality*, *Abdus Sattar Ghazali*, 1997-9 ___

B. Many among the Taliban had seen the direct effects of schools funded by outsiders with agendas at odds with the local community, eg: "…during the reign of King Mohammad Zahir [1933-73] the government introduced two projects … roads and schools. …

'Advised by a great mulla, the people of our valley opposed the two projects of schools and roads. Thus, neither Khalqis nor Parchamis [socialist-communist oriented political groups in Afghanistan] appeared among us. But from among the schools of other valleys there emerged Khalqis and Parchamis who later, as pilots, bombarded their own people and villages, while the Russian tanks, which arrived along the roads, did much the same. But the people of our valley were immune to such destruction. May God bless the great mulla. He was so right.'"

"*The Jehad of Afghanistan:…*(In Pashto.)" by: Zahir Ghazi Alam, MD. Manuscript , Ch. 2, sect. 8, subsect 'Inhabitants' [or p 140 of paperback] of: Kakar, M. Hassan *Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982.* Berkeley: U. of Cal. Press, c1995 1995. ___ Free ebook at : ____

C. Much of the conflict over closing schools in Kabul and many other areas in Taliban controlled Afghanistan – as well as a good part of the conflict in the North West part of Pakistan bordering Afghasnitan -- centered on what the school curricula should be. The curricula in the Kabul schools – and a large part of the teaching faculty – were a holdover from the days of Soviet occupation. The Pakistani Government funded schools in NW Pakistan had prgrams that were considered unacceptable to al arge parts of the community. [See Chapter 25d MALALA YOUSAFZAI'S NOBEL PEACE PRIZE & THE PESHAWAR ARMY PUBLIC SCHOOL ATTACK.

[824] Some of these schools even refused to use the subsidized bread that was available in almost every grocery store in Israel.

[825] … *As is stated (Psalms 119:99): "From all my teachers I have grown wise"* ' from ben Zoma, [student / contempory of R. Akiva 50-135CE]; Perkei Avos 4:1, [a tractate of the Tamud in the Order of Nezikin]



ELEPHANT AND THE BLIND MEN [826]

[SEE POEM, BELOW

It was six men of Indostan , To learning much inclined,[827]
Who went to see the Elephant(Though all of them were blind),
That each by observation, Might satisfy his mind

The First approached the Elephant, And happening to fall
Against his broad and sturdy side, At once began to bawl:
"God bless me! but the Elephant, Is very like a wall!"

The Second, feeling of the tusk,,Cried, "Ho! what have we here
So very round and smooth and sharp? To me 'tis mighty clear
This wonder of an Elephant, Is very like a spear!"

The Third approached the animal, And happening to take
The squirming trunk within his hands, Thus boldly up and spake:
"I see," quoth he, "the Elephant , Is very like a snake!

The Fourth reached out an eager hand, And felt about the knee.
"What most this wondrous beast is like, Is mighty plain," quoth he; "
'Tis clear enough the Elephant, Is very like a tree!"

The Fifth, who chanced to touch the ear, Said: "E'en the blindest man
Can tell what this resembles most; Deny the fact who can
This marvel of an Elephant, Is very like a fan!"

The Sixth no sooner had begun, About the beast to grope,
Than, seizing on the swinging tail, That fell within his scope,
"I see," quoth he, "the Elephant, Is very like a rope!"

And so these men of Indostan, Disputed loud and long,
Each in his own opinion. Exceeding stiff and strong,
Though each was partly in the right, And all were in the wrong!

[826] Drawing is from a Jain Website. Check on copyright issues. http://www.jainworld.com/literature/story25.htm

[827] Blind Men and the Elephant, By John Godfrey Saxe (1816–1887). A much earlier version of this story appears in the work of one of the great Muslim poets of Afghanistan, Hakim Sanai, in his classic "*The Walled Garden of Truth".* He lived in Ghazni, Afghanistan and died in 1150CE. The story predates Islam and is found in other religious traditions of South, Central and East Asia.

CONCLUSION

FROM THE TORAH

The idea that a diversity of independent schools is a bulwark against tyranny and oppression is not new. It goes back four millennia -- to the time of

אברהם אבינו

Avroham Avinu - the Biblical Abraham. [828]

In Avroham Avinu's early years in Mesopotamia – before he came to live in what would be called –

אֶרֶץ יִשְׂרָאֵל

the 'Land of Israel', he was engaged in an epoch struggle with the world's prototypical murderer-dictator. That murderer-dictator was נִמְרוֹד -- Nimrod. Nimrod used the information technology of his time –

שָׂפָה אֶחָת, וּדְבָרִים, אֲחָדִים...

"uniform language and common words"[829]

to galvanize the people to build a great tower – מגדל בבל - the Tower of Babylon [830]. By today's standards, this might have been a worthwhile project. But the Midrash[831] tells us that there was a very serious problem with it. We learn from our sages what the Bible doesn't say explicitly: that the people building the tower were so focused on their project that they were dehumanized. Part of the image of God in the Human being - חֶסֶד- kindness - was erased. If a brick fell off the scaffolding the people would cry – but when a person fell

[828] Some of the basic insights presented in this conclusion were first published by the author in 4/15/91. See: 'THE MIGDOL BAVEL OR 'TOWER OF BABYLON' The 70 Languages And A Possible "Hidden Mitzvah" To Create A "Censorship Resistant" Information Environment' in the author's Sefer Chidushei Torah: שבעים אומרים /They Say Seventy.

[829] Gen 11:1

[830] Gen. 11:1-9

[831] The Midrash is a body of interpretations of the biblical text – often filling in details that are only hinted at in the text itself. They were generally compiled by the sages of the Talmud but are understood to predate the time of compilation.

to their death, they wouldn't even turn around.[832]

While this was happening, Abraham was trying to teach the ways of God – the ways of Kindness & Truth. Instead of gaining disciples, he gained the wrath of Nimrod. Nimrod tried his best to get rid of Abraham – to kill him.

God saw the problem and gave us the solution for all time: Take the 'uniform language and common words' that allowed Nimrod to focus the people on this one great dehumanizing project – and turn it into '70' languages. With the 70 languages, the people could no longer coordinate their efforts. They started arguing and left off building the tower -- to spread out to fill the world.

It was only then that Abraham could be heard. It was only then that we find תּוֹלְדֹת שֵׁם the generations that seek to know the Name and Ways of God.[833]

We learn that Abraham was able to communicate in all 70 languages[834]. The 70 languages enrich Kindness and Truth[835] and give us 70 perspectives. They give us ways to see around corners – to see solutions to difficulties that we wouldn't otherwise see.

In contrast, the tendency that almost all possess in some degree -- to run after nonsense – or to run from things we fear -- is defeated. It's reduced to the level of background noise. Nimrodian programs – like the terrible war in Afghanistan -- will be ignored – shunned --- by almost everyone. We won't be suckered into fear of false demons. They'll call a war and nobody will come. We'll be able to devote ourselves to building bridges between and among people for a World of Peace.

בַּקֵּשׁ שָׁלוֹם וְרָדְפֵהוּ. [836]

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[832] Pirḳê de Rabbi Eliezer, transl. …by G Friedlander, 1916, p. 176

[833] Gen 11:10. The literal meaning is "the Generations of Shem" – where Shem is ordinarily understood to mean Shem, the son of Noah. However, Shem also means name and Hashem "the name" is one of the ways we refer to God.

[834] **A**. [SOTAH 36b] This Talmudic reference is about Yoseph -- who "looked like Abraham"-- being able to speak 70+ languages. Also Moshe, Mordechai [MEGILLA 13b], R. Akiba & members of the Sanhedrin [SANH 17a,b] were able to speak 70 languages.

Though I've yet to find an explicit traditional source that says Abraham spoke 70 languages, if Yoseph – who "looked like Abraham" could do this -- & we believe that descendants are less capable than their forbears [ירידת הדורות SHABBOS 112b] -- then certainly Abraham could speak 70 languages as well.

For those who say *"…it is impossible for one man to know all these languages …"* [Soncino Talmud in English, note 39 to SANHEDRIN 17a ____], Cardinal Giuseppe Mezzofanti, 1774-1849 CE, Custodian-in-Chief of the Vatican Library, knew 38 languages perfectly & was able to speak well in 70+.

B. After writing nearly this entire book, I realized something that is all too obvious to some of my religious friends. There really are those in the world who want to attack religious people as such – not because they don't know them – but because they do—or, at last they know something very special about them. Genuinely religious people – like the Taliban – are very difficult to bribe.

To those whose life is centered on wealth & power, like the Biblical Esau [Gen 25:30-34] – people, like the Taliban, whose life is centered on doing good and who can't be readily bribed, appear to be a real threat and must be physically controlled or eliminated.

This may've been a key motivation of some in Russia, the US & other more materialistic societies in their efforts to destroy the Taliban –as historically, it's been a key motivation, to destroy religious Christians & Jews.

The challenge for the religious community is to make the materialists aware that the "do gooders" are not actually a threat to their material wellbeing – as long as this wellbeing is achieved by just means.

In the Biblical narrative, at Gen 33:4, Jacob & Esau meet after many years—and we learn:

… וַיִּשְׁתַּחוּ אַרְצָה שֶׁבַע פְּעָמִים עַד-גִּשְׁתּוֹ עַד-אָחִיו.
וַיָּרֶץ עֵשָׂו לִקְרָאתוֹ וַיְחַבְּקֵהוּ וַיִּפֹּל עַל-צַוָּארָו וַיִּשָּׁקֵהוּ וַיִּבְכּוּ.

[And Yaakov] bowed himself to the ground 7 times, until he came near to his brother. And Esau ran to meet him, & embraced him, & fell on his neck, & kissed him; & they wept.

Shimon bar Yochai, one of our greatest Rabbis of the Talmud, who hid in a cave for 13 years to escape a Roman death sentence, comments on this. He says that the dots that are found in the Sefer Torah over each letter of the word for "and he kissed him" tell us something very special: "Though there's a known rule that Esau hates Yaakov, in this case, Esau kissed his brother with a full heart."

The author(ASA) notes that when Yaakov bowed 7 times – & stood 8 – he was giving Esau honor in the material world – symbolized by 7 - while claiming the spiritual covenant of our father Abraham – represented by 8. Esau, who's traditionally known to have been clever & capable, got the message. For more on this, see the author's Sefer "THEY SAY SEVENTY" at "BOWING SEVEN TIMES BUT NOT EIGHT"

[835] Still, when the choice is between- חֶסֶד -kindness, or אֱמֶת --Truth–& these words, Kindness and Truth, are paired 20+ times in Torah -- Kindness is always first. Though we struggle for Truth our whole life, it's only reached in the Olam HaEmes – the World of Truth – beyond the grave. On the way to Truth, be Kind. See page 224 for "The essence of Torah is kindness…"& other teachings of the Chofetz Chaim .See footnote 903

[836] " Depart from Evil and do good. Seek Peace and Persue it" from Ps. 34:15. See p 223-4

1. WHAT DID THE U.S. GAIN FROM ATTACKING THE TALIBAN? [837]

a. Expanded bases in the Caspian Basin and Central Asia

b. Dismantling of Pakistan's nuclear proliferation program.

c. Closer tactical alliance with Russia and China?

d. Raising the temperature of the American People's blood to prepare them for an attack on Iraq?

e. A theme for a perpetual war?

f. Another government – in Kabul --that is, unlike the Taliban, amenable to bribery?

g. A show of military "muscle" to intimidate others who might otherwise resist the demands of the US.

2. WHAT DID THE U.S. LOSE BY ATTACKING THE TALIBAN?

a. A large fraction of any residual moral legitimacy they may have had in the eyes of religious Moslems throughout the world—the result of killing scores of thousands of people and installing a puppet government in Afghanistan

b. A potential ally in the effort to obtain peace in Israel?

c. A potential ally in the effort to confront characters like OBL

d. An example of a legitimate Moslem government -- that is not a puppet of a great power, the plaything of a small group of corrupt oligarchs or an oily sinecure.

e. Cleaner hands and a better position, morally, to criticize others -- such as the Russians in Chechnya.

---

[837] All of these Gains and Losses (except f. and g.) were listed in an email from vantran613 (the author) to Barbara Crossette, Wednesday, September 15, 2004 1:00 AM, with cc's to Ethical Culture of Riverdale-Yonkers, LA Times and Christian Science Monitor.

CHAPTER 30.

REACTIONS OF PEOPLE IN THE PUBLIC EYE

***

Not yet in order.
In process of being written

Spozhmai Maiwandi, head Pashtun Language Programming at Voice of America for two decades :

כָּל הַכָּבוֹד "kol hakovod"

Literally : "All the honor" for – a job well done. She said this after I described to her how the Taliban had wiped out opium from one year to the next without any executions maimings or floggings – and how they treated the last two Jews in the country with exceptional respect. This was at a very early stage in this research – before I realized that nobody else was publishing such things in English.

Bernard Frahi, Chief ,Partnership in Development Branch,Division for Operations
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
Tuesday, May 8, 2007 3:12 PM

What you wrote in your mail is extremely encouraging.
Best regards,[838]

Nobelist

emailed me saying what they saw and heard was:

"very interesting"

but didn't have the time just then to study it in greater detail. This was based on just a few minutes face to face converstation & looking at what is now the cover of this book [without comment H] on their own time.
[Ask permission to use full name]

Kurt Collier, Ethical Culture.

"I don't want to hear anything about the Taliban. They executed people for sodomy."

Buddhist Priest from Japan

"Only love-and-compassion dispels hate" [839]

Elizabeth Holtzman said:

"I know all that I need to know about the Taliban." Then she refused to take anything from me --even a page that had nothing to do with the Taliban.

Spring (5/05/08) at a Manhattan benefit for Rep. Wechsler of Fl.. She was promoting her book "The Impeachment of George W. Bush" . More than half a year later I was able to write: "I am glad to report that Elizabeth Holtzman took the pages from my hand." From a letter written , 12/4/08. 11:37PM [see below at Luke Mitchell, Senior Editor, Harper's Magazine for others at the same event and their reactions.

WBAI Feminist broadcaster, Fran Luck, at a benefit for *accused* librarian /attorney Lynne Stewart & free speech activist Geoffrey Blank. She refused to look at the maps of opium growing in Afg. – the maps that appear on the cover of this book –& then said to me– a religious Jew:

"Listening to anything good about the Taliban is like listening to a holocaust denier."

Douglas Feith, former Deputy Sec. of Defense for Policy.

I asked him what evidence he had that the Taliban had been "state sponsors" of terrorism[840]. He responded saying the Taliban

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[838] In a subsequent email, June 19, 2007, in response to draft 6.46cpdf, he provided information– on the donors assessment mission. : see footnote 43

[839] See CH 8 destruction of Buddhist statutes– partic. see footnote 182

[840] A. This phrase comes from a document declassified by Feith in connection with the publication of his book, War and Decision. The phrase is shown highlighted in context below in a reconstructed version of the first page of the 3 p. document. A pdf of the original is at: _____

B. Based on this assumption of "state sponsorship", Feith calls for USG to *"terminate the rule of the Taliban leadership to make an example of them" adding "The USG should not allow concerns about stability* [of Afghanistan Society] *to paralyze US efforts to oust the Taliban leadership."*

C. Detailed account of my encounter with Feith:

s adler <vantran613@yahoo.com> , 10/13/08 at 6:01 AM

To: Tracey Keij-Denton / DFNYC [Democracy for NYC]

CC Barnett R. Rubin , ef25@columbia.edu fletch@law.columbia.edu , rubinbar@netvision.net.il, rwb3@columbia.edu, bcrossette@aol.com , nadine berg , Spozhmai Maiwandi BCC Michael Radow

B"H

Dear Tracey and correspondents

I had a brief one-on-one conversation with Douglas Feith which was very revealing :

were – in 2001- allied with al-Qaida in a common struggle against the Northern Alliance. He didn't allude to any secret information against the Taliban[841]. [842]

Conversation with Douglas Feith, former Deputy Sec. of Defense for Policy, 9/18/08, at the Women's National Republican Club, 3 West 51st Street , re. memo on Afgan Strategy of Oct 11,'01. He said that because the Taliban were allied with al Qaida in a common struggle against the Northern Alliance , that was enough "to make an example of them [and overthrow them] (as State sponsor)[of terrorism]. The USG should not allow concerns about stability to paralyze US efforts to oust the Taliban leadership." He did not allude to any secret information against the Taliban. Quotes taken from: http://www.waranddecision.com/docLib/20080420_AfghanistanStrategy.pdf

He was familiar with the opium poppy growing maps for 2000 and 2001 but was not prepared to agree that they had eradicated opium without executions, maiming or flogging.

Thus, by the ordinary understanding of being a "state sponsor", The Taliban were not sponsoring al Qaida -- which was more than amply supplied with its own funds -- mostly from Saudi Arabia and Egypt. The action against the Northern Alliance was also not generally understood as Terrorism..

Feith is saying that the war against the Taliban was not based on secret information that they actually supported or approved of the attacks on the US or that they were "harboring" terrorists. The FBI also does not view the head of the Taliban -- Mullah Omar -- as being wanted or indicted for any crime -- though aiding and abetting in the commission of a felony or harboring a fugitive are both crimes under US law.. As far as the FBI is concerned, he did not "aid and abet" and he did not "harbor".

SECRET
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
2000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2000

INFO MEMO

I-0I/012368-USDP
11 October 2001 4:00 P.M.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Douglas J. Feith, Under Secretary of Defense (Policy)

SUBJECT: Afghanistan Strategy

For your PC meeting this afternoon, Thursday, October 11,2001.

I. Goals re: al-Qaida

- Principal goal is to eliminate leadership and forces.
- Al-Qaida's main asset is people.
- Use Afghan forces from whatever faction to eliminate □□□□
  US needs a strategy of incentives--rewards for success – for those Afghan forces.
- [redacted] and SOF should coordinate on implementing the incentives strategy and equipping and financing the Afghan forces to achieve this goal.

II. Goals re: Taliban

- Goal is to terminate rule of current Taliban leadership to make an example of them (as State sponsor) and to undercut al-Qaida.
- Creating a stable, post-Taliban Afghanistan is desirable but not necessarily within the power of the US. The USG should not allow concerns about stability to paralyze US efforts to oust the Taliban leadership.

Professor Harvey Cox, Reverend and Prof. of Theology at Harvard, leading Protestant theologian, "had not seen those maps -- until I showed them to him in person last week." From a letter dated : Thursday, November 26, 2009 1:10 AM. Subsequently, Fri. 12/4/2009 12:06 AM, I sent him what I had written thus far on the Taliban together with A Sign Forever, and They Say Seventy – all under the heading Understanding the Taliban/ Ending the War in Afghanistan/Speaking at Harvard/. He replied the same day, 3:47 PM

Dear Mr Adler:

I am grateful for this important information, especially now that the president seems intent on widening and deepening the conflict, and no one seems to know much about the Taliban. I will look into the possibility of a presentation here. Keep us [sic] the good work.

Best, Harvey Cox

Nothing further was heard from him – despite numerous emails.

Nisha Varia, Human Rights Watch. Afghanistan/Women's Rights specialist.

"This guy is kind of crazy—apparently thinks the Pashtuns are one of the lost tribes of Israel and is trying to prove that the Taliban weren't really all that bad to women. He harassed Gil for about 45 minutes yesterday and then me on the phone today until I firmly ended the call…
Nisha"[843]

---

[841] It was my impression that Feith understood that he may have made a serious mistake in attacking the Taliban – but could not say so in so many words. Both of his parents are Jewish, his father, a Holocaust survivor.

[842] Consistent with this, the FBI also does not view the head of the Taliban -- Mullah Omar -- as being wanted or indicted for any crime -- though aiding and abetting in the commission of a felony or harboring a fugitive are both crimes under US law.. As far as the FBI is concerned, he did not "aid and abet" and he did not "harbor"..

Turns Out Mullah Omar Was Never on the FBI's Top Terrorists List Dino Grandoni, Dec 27, 2011 "We phoned the FBI's press office, and FBI spokesperson Paul Bresson confirmed that Omar was never initially on the list (though he is on a State Department list offering a cash reward for his capture, Bresson noted)."

[843] This was very surprising and disconcerting as she had responded quickly and concisely to my request [sent: Wed., Jan. 04, 2006 1:21 AM] for documentation on the reported maiming of women and girls for wearing nail polish:

RE: Taliban/women's hr question
Monday, January 9, 2006 3:15 PM

Dear Mr. Adler,

Thanks for your query. Human Rights Watch documented cases of women who were publicly beaten or detained for infractions of the dress code imposed by the Taliban. These included beatings with wires and batons with metal studs. You may refer to the following link for a copy of the 2001 report with these interviews : http://www.hrw.org/reports/2001/afghan3/

We did not document specific instances where women had their fingers cut off for wearing nail polish. [emphasis added]

I am forwarding an article about the organization RAWA, in which they reported the case of a woman who had the tip of her thumb cut off for wearing nail polish. I don't have any additional information about that particular case, so would not be able to comment on it.

Best,
Nisha Varia
Women's Rights Division
Human Rights Watch

In response to this, I sent her two messages on 1/10/06. The first spoke about RAWA and the Swedish Committee for Afghanistan. In it I pointed to particular pages in the then latest version of my work on the Taliban adler 4.76 12/15/05 that I would send her as a separate email. The attachment was sent Tuesday, January 10, 2006 8:35 PM. This was only two minutes after the letter that pointed to its contents: Tuesday, January 10, 2006 8:33 PM.

It could be that she didn't receive either message. They were sent without copies to anyone else. I did not receive any response from her on them. If she read this material, she would have known that my interest in the Taliban had nothing to do with thinking that they were Jewish. The reasons given in that attachment were very similar to what I have written in the introduction to this book.

The above "crazy" quote was her internal response [03/01/06 7:30 PM, to vantran613@yahoo.com, Kenneth Roth rothk@hrw.org, Iain Levine levinei@hrw.org, Janet Walsh walshj@hrw.org , elipses in original.] to my letter to HRW reporting that she had hung up on me. The internal memo was accidentally sent to me at the same time that it was sent to the key people at HRW.

After calling several times that afternoon to make an appointment, I just went to their offices in the Empire State Building. It was just after five and I was told by the receptionist "Gil" that everyone was busy and that nobody was immediately available to talk with me. I said that I would wait and while I was waiting, I showed the receptionist the maps of opium poppy growing and tried to explain them – this was the harassment!!! When , after more than half an hour of waiting, nobody came out to see me and the receptionist showed no interest in talking with me, I left.

Below is the letter that I had written:

From: s adler [mailto:vantran613@yahoo.com]
Sent: Wednesday, March 01, 2006 12:05 PM
To: Nisha Varia; Ken Roth; Janet Walsh; Iain Levine
Subject: jawbreaker-new CIA book on afgh./ serious errors

B"H
Rosh Chodesh Adar, 5766

3/01/06

To: Kenneth Roth, Exec. Dir. HRW
Iain Levine, Prog. Dir. HRW
Janet Walsh, Acting Exec. Dir. Women's Rights, HRW
Nisha Varia, Researcher, HRW

[Not spell checked]

The book "Jawbreaker..." by Gary Bernsten, CIA, ret., contains a statement about the execution of women under the Taliban that is almost certainly false:

page 98, paragraph 5,

" My mind raced ahead. The brutal Taliban was waiting. I'd seen film footage of how they treated their own people. women driven in the back of pickups into stadiums packed with cheering Islamic fundamentalists. They were taken out and led by leashes attached to their bound hands. Forced to their knees in the center of the stadium and shot through the back of their heads one by one."

Below is a copy of a BBC News report that mentions what is almost certainly the same "footage". I have highlighted the relevant section in yellow. As far as I know, from the description of the event, this is the singular case of the woman who was executed for beating her husband to death with a hammer as he slept.

The War Resisters League: left maps, no response.

Sunsara Taylor and other leaders of "The World Can't Wait" / Drive Out The Bush Regime," at a Columbia University Teach-in in Spring '06,.

> They would not look at the maps or take copies from my hand.

No response to subsequent emails.

Daniel Berrigan: took some material from me in person – but subsequently heard nothing

Abid Ulla Jan, author "The Genesis of The Final Crusade" [Pragmatic Publishings, 2006 - - 354 pages], requested permission to publish a quote from "Torah and the Taliban" in his then forthcoming book. He wrote to me Jan. 2006, saying that he was a journalist/development spec-ialist who had worked in Afghanistan under the Taliban. He said that he was "a direct witness of the Taliban rule". He commented:

> Yours is a great work, well researched and well written.[844]

I was not able to find any similar stories using Lexis Nexis.

I called Nisha Varia, one of your experts on women's issues, to get her take on this. She told me that all of your information on this subject is on your web site and hung up on me.

[Some corrections of typographical errors.]

[844] A. On what is now [Nov/4/'15] pdf p. 153 of the downloadable version of his book:_____ he quotes and credits ~230 words from what are now the last 2 paragraphs of p. 20 of this book – on the question of women wearing burkas. He also quotes me on pdf p. 12 & 13 of his book – on what the Taliban were about. A pub. date for the book, May 10/'06, is at : _____

Apparently, when he saw that I was slow to publish what I had written [as of Nov. 4/'15, the now book length version of Torah & the Taliban is still not finished or formally published] he sent the relevant pages to a library in Afghanistan where they were catalogued under the title "As thou goest by the way: Torah and the Taliban", & scanned 2013 . The document includes the title page, dated 8/31/05, draft 4.62, [the version that was sent was labeled [adler 4.76 12/15/05] & sent in vatran613@yahoo.com to abidjan@tanzeem.org Jan/12/06 1:25 AM], incl. Introduction[p2] , the text of Sec. G "Torah and the Taliban" & Ap. G. – in B&W – including the maps & charts of opium production, the Callahan letter, the DEA material & "Mullah Omar in his own words". No author is shown in the cat. – though my name is on the title pg. The cat. # is Pamphlet DS 371.3 .A88 2005 and the URL is http://184.73.243.18:8080/jspui/bitstream/azu/3262/1/azu_acku_pamphlet_ds371_3_a88_2005_w.pdf

B. I don't agree with his basic thesis that the wars in Afghanistan & Iraq were primarily intended as attacks on Traditional Islam. They're probably more about access to oil & gas. However, to the extent that Traditional Islam is misunderstood as obstructing such access, these wars are also against Traditional Islam.

C. Some have also joined the juggernaut of war in the mistaken belief that Traditional/Taliban style Islam is misogynistic & 'anti-human rights'. For them, this might be 'The First Feminist War.'

D. In 11/'15, after writing most of this book, I began to see that this war may be much more of an attack on Tradtional Islam – and on "do gooders" in general, than I had imagined. See footnote 834 B.

Imam A. From Indonesia. gave maps and spoke in person – one on one -- in office connected with Mosque. Listened thoughtfully. Not aware of extent and methods of Opium poppy eradication program. Subsequently sent email with "Torah and the Taliban" as part of "As thou goest by the way." No further response

Imam B. From Egypt – who had studied in Iran. gave maps and spoke in person in mosque building – with one other, older person present. Not aware of extent and methods of Opium poppy eradication program. Listened thoughtfully. Subse-quently sent email with "Torah and the Taliban" as part of "As thou goest by the way." No further response. He had twice invited me to speak before the worshippers in the mosque – without first checking on what I would speak about. I did not speak to the public about Afghanistan on these occasions.

Howard Zinn: gave maps – heard nothing

Daniel Ellsberg: gave maps – heard nothing

Amy Goodman: gave maps and printed report of more than 20 pages, sent emails, heard nothing. [In addition to handing her a multipage document , I sent an email to her assistant march 24, 2005: denis@democracynow.org from vantan613@yahoo.com

Rachel Maddow: gave maps – heard nothing

Randy Roads gave maps – heard nothing.

on radio – she asked me:~"So why didn't they turn over Osama bin Laden" – and then cut me off before I could give any response .

Tom Hayden: showed color maps – which he hadn't previously seen – at event at Unitarian Church where he spoke about Afghanistan. No response to subseq. emails

Rolling Stone Magazine: nothing

Bloomberg News: nothing

Professor Barnett Rubin:
lots of substantive, thoughtful, knowledgeable feed-back – much of which is quoted at length or copied in full in the body and appendices of this work.

Barbara Crossette:

lots of substantive, thoughtful, knowledgeable feed-back – much of which is quoted at length or copied in full in the body and appendices of this work.

Seymour Hirsh: gave maps – heard nothing

Noam Chomsky: no response. Many years later,[2/17] he actually read at least the 1st page & wrote "intriguing"[get more info 2/17/17]

Aryeh Neier – this good man was completely taken in by Ahmed Rashid & publicly defended Rashid at an OSI event January 21, 2010. He had not seen the maps or price chart –which I left with him. He declined a briefing on this material that I offered at the time I gave these to him. At least part of this conversation was recorded by OSI. No response to subsequent emails. See letter to him & communications with George Soros in Appendix 13 & 14 respectively. Also see letter to Prof. Rubin dated Jan 22, referring to this event -- in Appendix.

Congressman Nadler, General Teguba, Michael Ratner & Dennis Kucinich hadn't seen the maps until I showed them at an event Dec/4/08. " After Torture: A Forum on justice in the post-Bush era." Lipton Hall, N.Y. U.

Luke Mitchell, Sr. Edit, Harper's Magazine. No response to my letter: "Murdering the Taliban while condemning Bush" 12/18/'08. He was at the above event & took a copy of the maps of opium growing.

At the "After Torture…" mtg, mentioned above, I met & spoke with each of the following: *Elizabeth Holtzman*, Author of "The Impeachment of George W. Bush"; *Scott Horton*, Contrib. Ed., Harper's Mag.; *Jerrold Nadler*, Chair, House Subcom.:Constitution, Civil Rights, & Civil Liberties; *Burt Neuborne*, Legal Dir., Brennan Center for Justice, NYU; *Michael Ratner*, Pres., Center for Constitutional Rights; *Antonio Taguba*, Major Gen. (U.S. Army Ret.); *Luke Mitchell*, Sr. Ed., *Harper's Mag.* I showed each the UNDCP maps of opium poppy growing in Afg. in '00 &' 01. Only Prof. Neuborne said he'd seen the maps before -- just recently. The others had never seen them. It was interesting how wide the eyes of some of them grew as they realized what they were looking at. I gave each … [copies of the] the above mentioned maps and data on opium growing by province and Taliban/non-Taliban control from 1994-'08. …

Michael Ratner,

thinking to show that he was at least somewhat knowledgeable in this area, noted that the Taliban had reduced opium poppy growing "by 90%".

[I found the following exchange while looking for emails I may have sent to Ahmed Rashid ahmed.rashid04@gmail.com – who was among the experts cc'd]

Agha Amin, Afghanistan Research Associates, President: Afghan Toll Think Tank, Security and Verification Consultants, Kabul, Tel-93-79-9010128, 93-79-9202076 afghanistan-research@gmail.com, strategicus@technologist.com

I received an obituary for Prof. Rasul Amin written by Agha Amin, forwarded to me & others by Prof. Rubin, Nov/5/09, 9:01 PM.[vantran613@yahoo.com]Text not directly related to this book has been reduced to 8 point Arial Narrow,

non-bold type and spaces between paragraphs eliminated. The words of Agha Amin are in Blue. *My responses are in green italics.* **From: Barnett Rubin <barnettrrubin@gmail.com> Subject: [brrafghan] Fwd: Fw: OBITUARY PROF RASUL AMIN, Date: Thursday, November 5, 2009, 9:01 PM, I received this obiituary of Professor Rasul Amin, whom I am sure many of you knew. We will miss his wisdom and his wit. Barney Rubin---------- Forwarded message ----------**

From: **AFGHANISTAN RESEARCH ASSOCIATES** <afghanistanresearch @gmail.com>

A great friend of mine , more than a father , more than a teacher,guide, mentor,confidant died in Australia yesterday.Rasul Amin was not a man but an instiution and his death is a loss not only for his friends , family and relatives but for Afghanistan, Pakistan and the entire West and Central Asian region. A renowned Afghan political thinker and at a later stage of his life ,politician , a word that he did not like ,Rasoul Amin breathed his last yesterday morning in Australia. He was 72. Born on May 10 1939 at Watapur in Kunar Province ,Rasul Amin was son of a prominent Khan and his mother was from Chitral.He got his primary education from Kabul and joined the Islamia College Peshawar in 1956.He did his B.A. from Islamia College, Peshawar, was elected as a General-Secretary of the students union, named Khyber Union,a unique , unprecedented honour for an Afghan student and got the colour of best debater in 1963. He completed his MA in political science from Peshawar University in 1966 and then pursued an illustrious career in teaching at the Kabul University where he rose to the post of chairman of department of philosophy and social sciences in May 1976.His illustrious academic career was interrupted in 1979 when he sought refuge in Pakistan.Many of his close relatives were Khalqi leftists and he also is said to have leftist sympathies but all this changed when he was placed under arrest by Hafeezullah Amin regime in May 1979 for a short time.He crossed into Pakistan from a remote mountain pass on foot on 4th January 1980 alongwith his family members , he told me in June 2004. In Peshawar his political affiliation was Professor Gillanis National Islamic Front of Afghanistan. He initially worked with renowned Afghan intellectual Professor Majrooh in the Afghanistan Information Centre. He founded WUFA , writers union of free Afghanistan on 21 March 1985.The idea was intellectual warfare against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. Konard Adenauer Foundation (Germany), USIS, Asia Foundation (USA) Royal Ministry for foreign Affairs, Denmark financed all the WUFA and ASC activities. Director of Afghanistan Study Centre. In order to meet the requirements of new circumstances the Executive Body of Former Writers Union of Free Afghanistan (WUFA) drastically changed the wartime manifesto of the WUFA and replaced it by Afghanistan Study Centre (ASC) with a new Charter. Minister of Education in Interim Administration of Afghanistan, representing the Rome process initiated by H.M the Former King of Afghanistan. His blunt views were not liked by many in the Afghan Government and his President Karzai was no exception to this.In 2002 he resigned his post of minister of education and decided to devote himself fully to the intellectual regeneration of Afghanistan and to Afghan Pak friendship.

Every evening and many times after lunch we met without a day of absence from 29 June 2004 till 15th April 2008 unless he was out of Kabul or in Australia. saw in him a combination of Jamaluddin Afghani ,Francis Bacon and Mirza Ghalib .As the evening transformed into darkness Rasul Amin became somber and somewhat gloomy and the discussion always centred around the epic tragedy of Afghanistan. One day he told me he wanted to be buried next to Jamaluddin Afghanis grave in Kabul University.We differed over the Soviet and American invasions of Afghanistan. I thought that the American sabotage of Afghanistan sponsored by tinpot Zia and later Pakistani regimes was the real cause of the tragedy of Afghanistan and he differed.His first cousin Professor Dr Qasim Jamdar was a diehard Khalqi and so was his brother ,an accomplished Mig 21 pilot of the DRA.

Finally when all was concluded with last drops of Stlichnaya or Grants*[Stolichnaya vodka]* or Grants *[blended Scotch whisky]* drowned in we departed as immortal and eternal friends. I state with immense pride that he selected me as editor of Journal Of Afghanistan Studies in June 2004.[Oct 2/'17, added note from ASA—only 4 issues were published from 6/ '04, when in started, to6/'05 when it ceased. [illegible] **Afgan Analysts Network obit. says Agha Amin is a son of R. Amin.** https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/prof-rasul-amin-passed-away/ **]**

Rasul Amin saw Afghanistan and Pakistan as conjoined twins and realised that friendship was the only way out of the Afghan Pak quagmire.His views were not liked by many at the highest position .However it appears that after many years now Afghan politicians realise that Afghan Pakistan friendship is the only way out of the present crisis.Let this be a vindication of his views and all he stood for. Rasul Amins mortal soul has gone but his ideas are immortal and a source of inspiration for all who knew him or read him.May Allah bless his soul. Man would indeed be in a poor way if he had to be restrained by fear of punishment and hope of reward after death." --Albert Einstein !!!

A.Amin, President, AFGHAN TOLL (Afghanistan Research Associates), Think Tank ,Security and Verification Consultants, Kabul, Afghanistan, Tel-93-79-9010128, 93-79-9202076, afghanistanresearch @gmail.com, strategicus@ technologist. com- Barnett R. Rubin. +1-917-250-1103. BarnettRRubin@ gmail.com

In response, I wrote to Prof. Rubin, Bernard Frahi, Prof. Richard Bullett & Agha Amin [Nov/6/09 9:40 am]
From: s adler <vantran613@yahoo.com>
To: brrafghan-owner@yahoogroups.com; afghanistanresearch@gmail.com; strategicus@technologist.com; rwb3@columbia.edu; Bernard FRAHI <bernard.frahi@unodc.org>, **Sent: Fri, Nov 6, 2009 9:40 am** Subject: Re: *[brrafghan] Fwd: Fw: OBITUARY PROF RASUL AMIN,*

B"H

Dear Scholars,

It is difficult to imagine how people who would conclude the day "with last drops of Stlichnaya or Grants drowned in" would be [sic] also be in close touch with the needs and aspirations of the people of Afghanistan. *It is also difficult to understand why the attached maps of opium growing in Afghanistan in the spring of 2000 and the spring of 2001 have not been widely republished. How do you explain what these maps show so plainly? How do you explain why they have not been republished -- or have they? If you would like a 20,000 word study of the the pre 9/11 Taliban -- please let me know. With prayers for Peace/Salaam/Shalom, A. S. Adler, PS. Do you have a good estimate of the population of Dara-i-suf (Darae Souf) in Samangan province in the spring of 2001? What percent of the population at that time was Uzbek, etc?. You can see why am interested in this district by taking a close look at the footnotes to the table that comes with the maps.*

I received the following response:[11/8/09, 6:35 AM]
From: strategicus@technologist.com <strategicus@technologist.com>
Subject: Re: [brrafghan] Fwd: Fw: **OBITUARY PROF RASUL AMIN,**
To: vantran613@yahoo.com, brrafghan-owner@yahoogroups.com, afghanistanresearch@gmail.com, rwb3@columbia.edu, bernard.frahi@unodc.org Date: Sunday, November 8, 2009, 6:35 AM

Adler , THANKS FIR YOUR NAIEVE AND MYOPIC VIEWS. NOTE THAT TALIBAN DELIBERATELY CLAMPED ON DRUGS PRODUCTION TO INCREASE THE RATE WHICH HIT RECORD HIGH IN 2001. ALSO NOTE THAT THE REAL BENEFICIARIES OF PRESENT DRUG TRADE ARE THE TALIBAN AND PAKISTANS SECURITY INSTITUTIIONS. AS FAR AS WHAY ANY ONE DRINKS OR NOT , I SUGGEST YOU KEEP YOIR DIRTY NOSE OUT OF THAT. I AM SURPRISED THAT CONSTIPATED CHARACTERS LIKE YOU STILL EXIST IN THE WEST. CHEERS
AGHA AMIN

11/8/09,1:05 PM, I responded in detail with cc's to leading experts, incl. comments on opium ban & the following:
From: s adler <vantran613@yahoo.com> Subject: Re: [brrafghan] Fwd: Fw: OBITUARY PROF RASUL AMIN, To: strategicus@technologist.com, "Barnett Rubin" <barnettrrubin@gmail.com>, afghanistanresearch@gmail.com, rwb3@columbia.edu, bernard.frahi@unodc.org, "ashley bommer" <bommeraf@state.gov>, "nadine berg" <nadine.berg@mail.house.gov>, info@darululoom-deoband.com, "James CALLAHAN" <james.callahan@unodc.org>, "Spozhmai Maiwandi" smaiwand@VOANews.COM, Date: Sunday, November 8, 2009, 1:05 PM, A. S. Adler, B"H

To: Agha Amin and Colleagues, Dear Scholars.
You wrote: "NOTE THAT TALIBAN DELIBERATELY CLAMPED ON DRUGS PRODUCTION TO INCREASE THE RATE WHICH HIT RECORD HIGH IN 2001." If you look at the farmgate price data for opium published by the UN, "Opium Survey 2006 Executive Summary" Sept., 2006, 5 MB. Pdf pg 29. Darker marks are for Nangarhar, lighter marks are for Kandahar. Sold line is unweighted avg. http://www.unodc.org/pdf/execsummaryafg.pdf you will see that the price remained extremely low and flat in the year leading up to the ban. If the purpose of the ban was to raise the price and make more money for the Taliban, they would have horded some in anticiption of thier own ban . If such hording had been significant, it would have

*resulted in an increase in the price before the ban. The data showing that the price remained low and flat before the ban is part of the measure of the integrity of the Taliban. The same general data shows that Badakshan Province increased the area devoted to opium poppy growwing by nearly 160% even as the area contolled by the Taliban reduced opium poppy growing by 98.7% . Did the people in Badagkshan province increase opium poppy growing in order to lower the price -- as an act of charity toward the drug mafia? Did the Taliban reduce opium poppy growing in the south to zero in order to incease their income? The overall new supply available in Taliban controlled provinces was reduced by a factor of fifty -- but the price rose by only a factor of ten. Was this a way for the Taliban to make more money? Shortly **before-** the attacks of 9/11/01, the Taliban announced that the ban would be continued another year -- and the price rose by another factor of two. With a twenty-fold increase in price, were the Taliban making more money with new supply reduced by a factor of 50? Further, most of that small amount of new supply was produced in areas that the Taliban did not fully control -- where they were probably geting almost nothing from it. In the south -- where their control was almost complete --like Kandahar and Helmand -- , production dropped to near zero. A twenty fold increase in price with zero supply is zero income for the Taliban from the growing of opium poppies in that area. The real benefiiaries of the present drug trade include key people involved in the supply chain wherever it runs -- all the way to London and NYC, etc. Most of the money is made outside of Afghanistan and Pakistan.*

As far as drinkiing,* [sic] *I was suggesting that people who drink on a regular basis may not be sensitive to the realtiies* [sic] *and perceptions of religious/tradtional Moslems. It is easy to imagine that a person who drinks regularly and who comes from a Moslem background, may have a tendency to reject Islam with even more force than they would if they drank and did not come from a Moslem background or if they came from a Moslem background and did not drink. I was not saying anything about whether you should or should not drink.

I'm not sure what you mean by "constipated characters" but if you mean someone who will take the time to study something carefully and not be quick to condem and kill people who are far different from myself - I'm guilty of being such a character and I hope that there are many more like me.

Meanwhile, since you are, presumably, sitting there closer to the scene, perhaps you can tell us which issues of the Islamic Emirate -- the Taliban's official monthly magazine -- were actually published and where they might be obtained. I have a pdf scan of one complete issue and would be glad to send it to you. If you would like a pdf or ms word version of my draft study "Torah and the Taliban" -- of over 20,000 words -- please let me know. It is part of a book that I am wriiting on apllying Torah in Public Life. Salaam/Shalom/Peace

[11/8/09, 4:16 PM] I received the following response – with cc's to the people I had cc'd in my note:

From: AFGHANISTAN RESEARCH ASSOCIATES <afghanistanresearch@gmail.com>, Subject: Adler, To: vantran613@yahoo.com, barnettrrubin@gmail.com, afghanistanresearch@gmail.com, rwb3@columbia.edu, bernard.frahi@unodc.org, bommeraf@state.gov, nadine.berg@mail.house.gov, info@darululuoom-deoband.com, james.callahan@unodc.org, smaiwand@VOANews.COM,Date: Sun, Nov 8/09,4:16 PM

u r a mad man adler. the taliban were a creation of the pakistani and saudi establishment designed to control afghanistan. they may be useful asset against iran . the maximum fruits of drug trade are enjoyed by the taliban , groups inside pakistan (with backing of pakistani big shots) the drug mafia in UAE , an alliance of arabs and brits etc.

ur bull shit is good light reading but has no scholarly value so i am putting u on the spam mail.

the UNODC has no credible sources in the drug areas.all they do is enjoying the cushy jobs , drawing heavy salaries and doing nothing.if they did indeed go in the heart of darkness they would know better.you dont know where heart of darkness is though .yes there are two drug producing mafias the pashtuns and the tajiks in badakhshan . neither are angels. as far as US officials are concerned they were summed up by my friend Doug Scherer second secretary as wet pussies.and your torah role model talibans are mad dogs. the future is chaos.not that muslim victory is inevitable . but sheer chaos. agha amin

I responded 11/9/09 at 7:43 AM with thoughtful comments & questions

On Mon, Nov 9, 2009 at 7:43 AM, s adler <vantran613@yahoo.com> wrote: B"H, To: Agha Amin and Colleagues , Dear Scholars., You wrote: ":the taliban were a creation of the pakistani and saudi establishment designed to control afghanistan". This is very often stated -- but the opium poppy eradication program -- carried out on the basis of consensus of the elders connected with the mosques throughout the Taliban controlled territory -- shows that they had broad and deep indigenous support --across ethnic religious and geographic lines. They not only eliminated the opium poppy growing , but they did it without any executions, maimings or floggings. Though they received support from many groups outside of Afghanistan -- including groups in Pakistan and Saudi Arabia -- their strength -- as reflected by the opium poppy ban -- was overwhelmingly indigenous. They were not puppets of anyone. Do you think that the information from the US DEA and the UNDCP in the pre 9/11/01 period is false? These two agencies used two completely different methodologies -- aerial reconnaissance and on-the-ground surveys, respectively -- to come up with very similar results. Do you think they both got it wrong? Do you think that the emissaries from US, Canada, Belgium, Netherlands, UK, Germany and the European Commission got it wrong in the spring of 2001 as far as how the Taliban accomplished this remarkable ban? Do you think that Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International failed to notice large numbers of executions, etc? In my study , I don't present the Taliban as "a Torah roll model" as you state. The Torah requires that before we condemn someone, we investigate the accusations made against them in an honest , impartial way. I am not a Taliban and I don't think that I have ever met one. I am not an Afghan and I am not a Moslem. I am a Human Being -- and as such , I am concerned about what goes on in the world that affects Humanity. If I see that people are being murdered on the basis of what are demonstrably false accusations , I have an obligation to try to do something about it -- to stop the murders -- if I can. Could you tell us anything of the background of Ms. Zohra Rasekh -- who was so instrumental in planting anti-Taliban sentiments in the hearts of the Feminist community here in the US? It is remarkable that a seemingly reputable organization, like Physicians for Human Rights, would hire someone directly from an anti-Taliban wire service to do an impartial study of the human rights situation in Afghanistan. It is remarkable that such an organization would hire someone without knowing her ethnic background -- or at least without publishing it -- to do a study in a country so riven with long standing ethnic tensions. Have you seen the periodical "The Islamic Emirate"? Do you know what issues were actually published? Did they manage to publish one after the 9/11/01 attacks? I would still be glad to send you a copy of my study. It is often very helpful to see something familiar through from a different perspective. I think that we could agree that our perspectives are very different . Salam/Shalom/Peace, A. S. Adler, PS. Did you ever meet any religiously observant Jews from Afghanistan? In Israel today, there are thousands. I am from Israel -- and will be returning there shortly. I did the study of the pre 9/11/01 Taliban while caring for my mother, Z"L, in NYC. It was "funded" out of my pocket.

to which he responded the same day 11/9/09 with cc's to the same group of experts:

From: AFGHANISTAN RESEARCH ASSOCIATES afghanistanresearch@gmail.com Subject: Re: pre 9/11/ taliban / dialogue?/ Re: [brrafghan] Fwd: Fw: OBITUARY PROF RASUL AMIN, To: "s adler" vantran613@yahoo.com Cc: strategicus@technologist.com, "Barnett R. Rubin" <barnett.rubin@nyu.edu>, "Bernard FRAHI" <benard.frahi@unodc.org>, "ashley bommer" <bommeraf@state.gov>, "Spozhmai Maiwandi" <smaiwand@voanews.com>, "nadine berg" <nadine.berg@mail.house.gov>, rwb3@columbia.edu, "jeffrey sachs" <sachs@columbia.edu>, "ahmed rashid" <ahmed.rashid04@gmail.com>, jonathan.steele@guardian.co.uk, ecarmany@feminist.org, nraymond@phrusa.org, sct@amnesty.org.uk Date: Monday, November 9,'09, 1:17 AM

some real assorted nonsense from a mad man .
so US policy from 2001 till 2009 is all [b]ull shit and taliban killing US soldiers are pious and good men.
you need to see a psychiatrist man.
yes i have met the last jew in kabul.

agha amin

There was no further response from Agha Amin – or any of the other experts – to my subsequent thoughtful note of 11/09/09 at 5:24 PM.

***From: s adler vantran613@yahoo.com To:** AFGHANISTAN RESEARCH ASSOCIATES <afghanistanresearch@gmail.com> **Cc:** strategicus@technologist.com; Barnett R. Rubin <barnett.rubin@nyu.edu>; Bernard FRAHI <bernard.frahi@unodc.org>; ashley bommer <bommeraf@state.gov>; Spozhmai Maiwandi <smaiwand@voanews.com>; nadine berg <nadine.berg@mail.house.gov>; rwb3@columbia.edu; jeffrey sachs <sachs@columbia.edu>; ahmed rashid <ahmed.rashid04@gmail.com>; jonathan.steele@guardian.co.uk; ecarmany@feminist.org; nraymond@phrusa.org; sct@amnesty.org.uk **Sent:** Monday, November 9, 2009 5:24 PM **Subject:** Re: pre 9/11/ taliban / dialogue?/ Re: [brrafghan] Fwd: Fw: OBITUARY PROF RASUL AMIN, **B"H**, To: Agha Amin and Colleagues , Dear Scholars., You wrote:, " so US policy from*

2001 till 2009 is all ull shit and taliban killing US soldiers are pious and good men." As I understand it, the US/NATO forces attacked the Taliban -- not the other way around. Are the Taliban supposed to let themselves be murdered and allow their country to be occupied by people who want to transform in some unknown way? If the last Jew in Kabul is Mr. Shemtov -- as far as I know , he is not religious -- but he may have undergone a transformation. A century ago there were between 10,000 and 40,000 Jews in Afghanistan. Most of them came from families that had been living in the area for centuries . Most of the time the Jews and Moslems in the area got along reasonably well -- particularly in comparison with what was going on in Europe in the same time frame. One of the most obvious differences between the Taliban and bin Laden was brought to my attention through the story of Mr. Shemtov and his former housemate Kabul, Isaak Levin. while the Taliban were treating these two Jews with respect and allowed them to continue to occupy a large synagogue complex with a courtyard and an iron gate -- bin laden was calling for the murder of Jews --- men , women and children -- anywhere in the world. when bin Laden put out his "Jihad against Jews and Crusaders" in Feb. of '98, he was in Afghanistan. The only other person in Afghanistan who signed that Jihad was his doctor friend from Egypt. No Taliban -- not even Dadulla, had anything to do with bin Laden's call for Jihad against Jews.... After the 9/11/01 attacks, I checked with the Anti Defamation League and the Wiesenthal Center. -Both had large files on bin Laden. Neither had anything from the Taliban directed against Jews or Israel. That the Taliban let Shemtov and Levin continue to occupy that huge synagogue was even more remarkable because , at the time , there were scores of thousands of people in the area of Kabul who were desperate to have a roof over their head. The Taliban could have claimed "eminent domain", given the two Jews a few dollars and sent them packing. They let them stay. Meanwhile, what about Zohra Rasekh? What was the last issue of the Islamic Emirate and where can a copy be obtained ? If you can't answer these questions, perhaps you can refer me to someone who can. Salaam/Shalom/Peace, A. S. Adler

From: Saad Mohseni saad.mohseni@gmail.com
Subject: FW: Fw: Let's take a closer look at Ahmed Rashid.
To: vantran613@yahoo.com
Date: Wednesday, January 6, 2010, 6:57 AM
Who is this please? (please identify yourself)

No response to my prompt, thoughtful reply of Jan 7.

["After the removal of the Taliban government …Mohseni and his brothers returned to Afghanistan to participate in the country's reconstruction and launch MOBY Group. They entered the media arena in 2003 by establishing …the country's first privately owned radio station [playing]…Western and Afghan pop music,... In 2004, MOBY Group launched TOLO TV, which airs international soap operas, The Voice Afghanistan, Afghan Star, and locally produced dramas. In addition to TOLO TV, MOBY also owns TOLOnews and Lemar TV, a Pashto-language channel. MOBY channels are viewed by over 60 percent of Afghans [from Wikipedia Oct 2/'17]

CHAPTER 31

REACTIONS OF PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS IN VARIOUS WALKS OF LIFE.

My mother, Z"L. **Strong encouragement – despite risks that she might lose her son --the person who was taking care of her.**

My sister: **Initial doubt then encouragement**

A Feminist friend of the Family: very positive.

A Local Rabbi who's known me for years:
"Don't talk about Afghanistan."

A College English Instructor at a well-known Jesuit University:

He invited me to give a talk on the Taliban to his students – so that they might write an essay on a controversial subject.

He prepared copies of Ahmed Rashid's two versions of opium price in '97 & other info. – from the UN. I was asked to lead the students to "contrast & compare" the various sources & statements & engaged them in active discussion – for 90 min.[845]

A very capable, conscientious teacher in a large public HS

Wouldn't invite me to speak at student club that he supervises – though he knew the students would benefit from my talk.

He thinks I'm correct but said "I like my job."

Highly respected, widely traveled scientist.

Listened attentively; completely fearless. Asked good questions. Thought that he knew a publisher who'd like to bring the book out – & brought it to their attention.

Terrorism Expert [Modern Orthodox, no Yarmulke] I had a 90 min. consultation with him–in his office.

He insisted that the Taliban were terrible – that they'd butchered & beheaded many– but couldn't show me any evidence.

I had expected that he'd at least buy me a cheap kosher lunch. He didn't even offer me water.

A young, married Rabbi - fluent in Arabic.

Praised me to congregants; encouraged them to speak with me re: Taliban - tho' none did.

A 50-ish single Rabbi – no beard.

Didn't want to hear anything about the Taliban – thinks they're obviously horrible people.

A Young Rosh Kollel in Manhattan -- with a wife and family. Listened thoughtfully – concerned about my safety.

~"Aren't you afraid that someone will shlug you?"[846]

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[845] The idea of writing such an essay was the instructor's – not part of the curriculum. He didn't receive any negative response as a result of this program & went on to receive his PhD and continued teaching in a more prestigious position at an Ivy League U.

[846] In 13 years in NYC speaking out freely on many subjects, riding the subways in the middle of the night & walking in what are considered dangerous neighborhoods – where many on the street look like Hollywood extras for gangsters -- the only attack against me that left a physical mark on my body came at the hands of the New York City Police.

On the 4th anniversary of the 9/11/01 attacks, I was on my way to give a talk on the pre-9/11 Taliban at a teach-in at a Mosque in NYC.

I was dressed in a nice dark suit -- looking like some combination of a rabbi, professor and businessman. After trying repeatedly to use my valid, unlimited-rides fare card on a subway turnstile that the police knew was defective, I jumped the turnstile to catch a train. I was immediately approached by two plain clothes police and asked to show some ID. I told them that I had my driver's license in my pocket and would be glad to show it to them after they checked my fare card to see that it was valid. I explained to them that jumping a turnstile was not an offense, "theft of service" was. I said that I had not stolen anything and had no such intention either. [continued next page]

A young Chasidish businessman with a wife and young family.

Strong encouragement – including encouraging me to talk with customers about what I had discovered.

He made a CD of my conversation with Prof Barnett Rubin[847] and played it while driving me ~120Km from the Bronx to Lakewood, NJ. This was on an erev Shabbes afternoon in winter – so he had to drive another 120km to be with his wife & family for Shabbes in Williamsburg NY.

Religious Moslem website. Webmaster/editor

"Following is an excerpt from a book[848] by a Jewish American author, A.S. Adler, regarding his research into the Taliban and the media coverage they received. Unlike professional Zionist Islamophobes, such as Daniel Pipes,

Adler deflates the media hysteria surrounding the 'evil Taliban' with cool, calm research.

He even comes from a religiously Jewish perspective.

In my estimation, the Taliban may have been the most demonized government in recent history. There are several factors I can think of for this: Firstly, they were an impediment to the upcoming invasion of central Asia, and part of the propaganda preparation before 911 was demonising the Taliban to pit public opinion against even before the terror spectacles. Also, they didn't have the means to defend themselves in the international media. Lastly, their very nature of being a Sharia-enforcing government helped the propagandists, as attacking them would be part of the ongoing demonization of Islam that started earnestly in the 90s after the red peril flustered, to be replaced by the rising green peril the Zionists saw as their enemy number 1.

Needless to say, the propaganda was so good that even many (if not most) Muslims fell for much of the propaganda. Adler looked into the media reports regarding the Taliban pre-911, and uses human rights, UN, and news sources to show how the Taliban were maligned in relation to many of the accusations leveled against them:"

This website had ~80 items dealing with Afg. when I first found it. It also allowed sorting items by number of hits. When I found my work on their site, it had received the highest number of hits of any item on Afg. & had ~4X the # of hits of the next highest item.

This remained true for more than a year – until the website was taken over /changed – and it was no longer possible to sort items by number of hits. [The site has apparently been hacked and now responds with emails from "the company' – American slang for the CIA. Links to the site shown in this book have been broken .]

Around the same time that this excerpt was posted on this website, it was also posted on several other websites – often with the editorial comments shown here. The initial posting was almost certainly due--directly or indirectly -- to the following:

They put handcuffs on me so tight that the marks were clearly visible ~16 hrs later -- the next morning when I came to shul. They held me in jail for ~8 hrs, took a photo of me & took my fingerprints twice. None of the ten or so officers that I encountered showed any interest in checking my fare card. These officers included at least two black men and two white women. One of the white women may have been Jewish. The report that the policemen wrote up did not indicate that they saw me trying to use my fare card or even that I claimed to have one.

It turned out, as reported to me by David Goldenberg, special council in the law dept of NYCT (9/14/'05) that the police were scamming the public across the city. They were issuing tickets to regular customers who were stuck trying to use turnstiles the police knew to be defective.

I had the presence of mind when I was released 8 hrs later with a time-stamped desk appearance ticket, to use my fare card to get back into the subway – showing that I had it with me all the time. The jail was actually in the subway & I didn't need to reenter to go home. The result was that, after ~24 hrs of combined jail time & court appearances, the charge was dismissed. It would've taken ≤24 sec. to check my fare card. No penalties befell the police. There was no substantive response from the police dept – no apology from anyone. The papers I contacted about this were not interested enough to publish anything. One reporter said "Unless they draw blood, it's not news" .I don't think that this abuse had anything to do with the content of my intended talk—but it does have something to do with the opium situation that I have discussed at some length in this sefer.

It is probably a commonplace that security forces established for seemingly respectable purposes – like Police or CIA – often take on a life of their own & become important sources of the predations they were intended to curtail.

[847] See. APPENDIX 1 TRANSCRIPT OF THE AUTHOR speaking on the The Brian Lehrer Show, WNYC Radio, with BARNETT RUBIN, now, (4/'13) US Pres. Barak Obama's lead expert on Afghan., then, 6/05/06, Dir. of Studies & Sr Fellow: Center on International Cooperation, NYU

[848] They and others posted a 3700 word version of "Torah and the Taliban" with links, graphics and contact information stripped out – but otherwise not edited. They posted it April 18, 2008, with the link :http://www.pureislam.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=81&Itemid=37 Now, 7/14/2020, at Internet Archive where it was captured 60x betw 4/23/2008 [when there were only 3 items listed under News – Afghanistan-& 12/29/ 2011 when there were 93 items under news –Afghanistan. Altogether the website was captured ~105 times – the ten last captures – for a total of 115- show a single page reading:

"This domain is temporarily unavailable. www.pureislam.co.za

https://web.archive.org/web/20080818072830/http://www.pureislam.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=81&Itemid=37

I found the link Aug. 8 2010, while preparing a letter to the editor of Time Magazine, [See: APPENDIX 12 VIRULENT HATE SPEECH HIDDEN IN PLAIN SIGHT]. I Googled my own citation to the NYT, Burns article on execution for adultery in Kandahar – expecting to get the Pulitzer Prize site as a source. Instead, I got "Torah and the Taliban" -- my own work – as the source – on the Pureislam web site. This didn't occur because my work was more renowned on the net than Pulitzer. I had put Robert Burns – the famous Scottish Poet - instead of John Burns, as the author of the piece. My father paraphrased the poet:

Would to God the gift He gi'e us,
To see ourselves as others see us ____

Based on lines from "To a Louse" 1786. Had I not made this error, I would not have discovered that my work had been posted on the web—at multiple sites – and was often very well received.

Another Moslem Website, "Suni Forum"[849] posted a link on 11-09-'07, 01:43 PM, to an earlier posting on "Wake Up From Your Slumber"[850] The title of the Post is

"A Jew defends the Taliban, by telling the truth." [851]

"Suni Forum" shows 18 posts connected with this – with the 1st, by a 'senior member' with 176 posts in ~7 months, saying :

"You have to read this book…"

The next post on this, 55 minutes later, 11-09-2007, 02:38 PM, is from a "moderator" with nearly 6K posts in a year:

"Good read over all. =)".

The next, clocked just 12 minutes later, from another 'senior member' with a loc-ation given as UK, and 256 posts in a year :

"a very enlightening read."

Still another senior member, with 370 posts in 18 months responded on 26/12/'08, Translations of Arabic phrases are in brackets:

'A Jew Defends The Taliban' ..... subhan'Allah ! *["Glorious is God."]*

I wonder how many 'conforming muslims' feel about a Jew, may Allah Azza wal Jal *[the Mighty and the Majestic]* guide him, defending our brothers and sisters regarding the slander and evil propaganda being thrown at them.

la hawla wa la quwatta ilah billah.*[there is neither power nor ability save by God]* Has it come down to this?

"The real prisoner is someone whose heart is imprisoned from his Lord and the true captive is someone captured by his passion" Ibn Taymiyyah[852] [853]

Just after this, another 'senior member' from the UK, with 1549 posts in 4.5 yrs, notes that the book from which "Torah and the Taliban " came "is not yet published." But contains

" mouthwatering stuff" [854]

The same senior member cites the full text of the speech of Syed Rahmatullah Hashimi, (Senior Advisor to Amir ul-Mu'mineen, Mullah 'Umar, Afghanistan[855]) Mar. 10, '01, USC, LA, Cal.[856]

Response #7, 9 & 10 ref. to UK's Mirror newspaper as the source of a statement that:

> **The Taliban *"will allow bin laden to be tried in an open court in a neutral country"*[857].**

None of the rest of the total of 18 comments on this thread are negative. Last comment is dated 18/04/13, 06:01 PM and asks only "is this book available?"

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849 http://www.sunniforum.com/forum/showthread.php?26097-A-Jew-Defends-The-Taliban&highlight=Defends+Taliban at 7/16/2020 this link is dead and not found at internet archive – tho' http://www.sunniforum.com/forum is, it isn't searchable. There is some other material under "a jew defends the Taliban" https://www.islamicboard.com/world-affairs/52653-jew-defends-taliban-telling-truth-5.html Citing http://www.wakeupfromyourslumber.com/node/2412[/PIE] ; also, from 28-10-2007 ,https://www.ummah.com/forum/forum/misc/comparative-religion/149993-torah-and-taliban-defended-by-a-jew

850 http://www.wakeupfromyourslumber.com/node/2412 published by MonkeyZerg on Thu, 2007-07-05 17:30. Found on internet archive for Nov 12 , 2007, [this is the earliest that I have found so far 7/14/2020]at https://web.archive.org/web/20071112050051/http://www.wakeupfromyourslumber.com/node/2412 copied 15 times on Internet archive to Nov 12/2013– last 3 : 2016, 17 & 19 are dead

851 The text, quoted above at the Moslem website Pure Islam, actually originated at this website. Wake Up From Your Slumber says that the text of Torah and the Taliban was "found via Dawood at Crusade Watcher" This link is dated 2007/06 with the title "Truth Regarding Taliban"– is not working as of 5/27/13. The full link is : http://crusaderwatcher.blogspot.com/2007/06/truth-regarding-taliban.html Not found on internet archive 7/14/2020.

852 Ibn Taymiyyah [661-721 AH, 1263–1328 CE] was an Islamic scholar from Harran - חָרָן - the city associated with the Biblical city of the same name in what is now South-Central Turkey. It is where Abraham lived temporarily on the way to what would become the Land of Israel. [Gen. 11:31-32, & 12:4-5]

853 This quote immediately follows the personal comment of this 'senior member' – as part of his contribution to the discussion. It is reminiscent of , the words of Chazal – our sages of the Talmud:

איזהו גבור? הכובש את יצרו. שנאמר (משלי טז), טוב ארך אפים מגבור ומשל ברוחו מלכד עיר.

'Who is mighty? One who conquers passions. As is stated [in Proverbs 16:32] *"Better one who is slow to anger than the mighty, one who rules his spirit than the captor of a city."'* [Perkei Avos 4:1]

854 He cites a now dead link: http://www.deenport.com/main/messages/viewtopic.php?t=23166&highlight= and the following quote from that link:

"The book has not been published yet. I have a pdf of the draft version of the book which is so far about 94 pages, but I don't think it would be fair on the author if I start spreading it around. The book is basically about the application of Torah concepts to public life. If you saw a pic of the author you would tell straight away he is a Jew with the long beard and the small hats the Jews wear (what are they called again).

"Torah and the Taliban" is a chapter in the book, about 20 pages long, and I don't think most of the other chapters will be of too much interest to most muslims, although it will be worth buying the book just for the Taliban chapter. But there is enough mouth watering stuff from the excerpts (I can never spell that word) in the link I gave." [emph. added]

855 He was the most senior Taliban official allowed into the US as a result of UN that resulted in the expulsion of more senior staff. [See page 26] At the time of this speech in March of '01 he was a few months over 22, based on his turning 27 in Nov 2005 (NYT Mag Feb 26, 2006) However, another article refers to him as 24 at the time he gave this talk. Overture by Taliban Hits Resistance Afghanistan: An envoy from Afghanistan's Islamic regime, speaking in Beverly Hills, meets a tough crowd. 3/16/'01, Teresa Watanabe, Los Angeles Times. 24 is also age he gives himself in his own talk in 3/01. Syed is an honorific title used for males accepted as descendants of Mohammed.

856 The full ~9000 word text of this presentation is at **Appendix 16**

857 The actual quote in the Mirror is:

"The Taliban authorities in Afghanistan are clearly worried. To start with they apparently said they would be prepared to hand over bin Laden for trial in a Muslim court."

Sunday Mirror, 916/'01, AMERICA AT WAR: AMERICA IS SET TO RISK ITS SOLDIERS' LIVES AT LAST, Col. Bob Stewart, Dso Ex-head British Forces In Bosnia; p. 4, 480 words.

Religious Moslem Women students from Turkey at a prestigious univ. :

Listened very attentively with thoughtful comments. Not aware of what the Taliban had done until I told them.

People standing on line at a teach-in against the just started war in Iraq – at Columbia Univ. Low Memorial Lib. 3/26/03

Almost physically attacked by jackbooted skin head – who tried to shout me down and was not interested in either saying anything about the subject or allowing me to be heard by others.

Columbia Security asked me if I had anything better to do when the commotion attracted their attention. I said I was on my way to the library & they suggested I continue on my way. None of the others waiting on line who saw this altercation came to my defense.

People at a book signing event/ concert for Howard Zinn.

Accosted by one the people on line and accused of the murder of Rachel Corrie – a young USA woman who was killed in Israel while attempting to be a human shield for people in Gaza whose homes were about to be bull dozed.[858]

"Occupy Wall Street" People at Zuccotti Park & Union Sq. –

Generally very open & positive on what I said – tho' none had heard it before. People also readily gave me email add to send more on subject.

Several videos were made of my talking about the Taliban & other subjects – though only one videographer – at an Occupy Union Square event, sent me a link to the videos.

Someone who saw an interview of me streaming live on the internet:

Your story of the Taliban is most intriguing. I will have to watch video's again to let it all sink in… I feel privileged to have spent my evening listening to a real true genius![859]

A feminist at DFNYC [Democracy For NYC] mtg.

Screamed at me and wouldn't take a piece of paper from my hand –

The paper had copies of the maps of opium growing in Afghanistan in 2000 and 2001.

Leader of the DFNYC – Mar. '12. When she noticed the woman – in the previous note – screaming at me, she said ~ "Didn't I tell you not to talk about gay rights."

An Older Quaker woman at the Rutherford Place Meeting House.
Very thoughtful and attentive .

The Professional Peace Activist Women in the same Meeting House. Not interested in Afghanistan – only wanted to talk with me about how Jews were oppressing Palestinians.

Professional Peace activists at Unitarian churches. Not interested – no reply to emails.

Owner of a book store specializing in radical/leftist material.
When asked if he'd seen those maps before, he said ~"Yes. You were holding them at Columbia University" at an event several years before. Otherwise, he hadn't seen them.

A Security Guard who had fled Afghanistan as a young teenager at the time of the Soviet invasion.

He understood that the Taliban were good people and most of what was said about them was nonsense. He was not afraid to discuss this with me even though he was on the job in a prestigious location.

Bronx Science Students-outside of the school:

Very attentive, thoughtful questions and comments - asked for a copy of my book by email.

A Senior Prof. of Political Science at a well-known university. suggested that he would like to invite me for Shabbes – but

I never heard anything more from him after I sent him what I had written about the Taliban.

A Former Dean of A Well Known Law School.
At an event largely organized by this professor on a major free speech issue, I gave him color copies of the maps of opium growing in Afghanistan in '00 & '01 – 1 page/map. I showed him the maps & asked if he'd like them. He said yes & took them. A few days later, I saw him in the school unexpectedly & asked him if he'd had an opportunity to look at the maps. He said: "No. And don't send me any emails."

He then grilled me on what I was doing in the building – he'd always been friendly to me before.

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[858] Subsequently, I looked into this & found that she had died as a result of trying to balance on the pile of rubble being pushed by the bulldozer. Because the rubble pile included odd shapes of wood/stone/and/or concrete – mixed with lose sand – it was a near certainty that a gap would open under where she was standing and she would fall in. Apparently nobody around her realized the extreme danger of what she was doing and she was crushed by the bulldozer before the driver could stop it.

[859] This was part of a very laudatory message from a woman who watched the live video from Calif. while I was speaking in Union Sq. It was received 3/29/'12 2:30 AM, NY time. The videos viewed were probably items DEFGHI – live-streamed. The email came ~45 min. after the end of the last listed video. See APPENDIX 15 for an annotated list of links to web accessible videos recorded live & unrehearsed by Racai Iskander in Union Sq., NYC, 3/29-30/'12 incl. some audience interaction.

Some weeks later, I was expelled from the building…[860]

A young US military man working in "intel" in Afghanistan -- not on duty.

Referred to the Taliban with very derisive language – putting them on a subhuman level and said that the UN maps – which he had never seen before – were probably fake.

Students at Jesuit University

Very attentive with thoughtful comments. One related the situation to the murder of Roman Catholic Priests in El Salvador[861] **and asked me to email the draft book.**

These were students I spoke with privately-mostly one-on-one – not part of a formal class – mentioned previously in connection with their teacher. Some wanted email version – most would not give email.

A Jewish student at Hebrew U, Jerusalem, studying political economy-philosophy & not obviously religious: "I have read the book. I found it absolutely fascinating. I would like to congratu-late you again for the courage & love for truth manifested in this work." This comment was spontaneous – after the student had read much of a draft of the book

Senior Editor of Orthodox Jewish Weekly Newspaper –

invited me to write a 3,000 word piece on what I had found

– but requested that I leave out anything about sodomy because of the family nature of the readership. I sent them whatever I had written already & suggested they rewrite it however they want & publish what they like. As far as I know, nothing was published.

A Young Moslem Cleric from Saudi Arabia. He was aware that the Taliban had eradicated opium from one year to the next and that they reduced it by ~90% (it was closer to 99% in their domain) – but

thought that they had used "harsh measures" i.e. killing people, etc.

Two very capable, English speaking students at a prestigious Charedi Yeshiva in Jerusalem: Bought 1st 2 printed copies of this sefer- before it was finished. They were very interested in what I'd found & didn't have good computer access.

A Very Well-Known Rabbi & Leading Authority On The History Of Jewish Law—[R H. b Y.D. S. at NLI] after being shown the maps of opium growing in Afghan. in 2000 [A] & 2001[B], the opium price chart [C] and told how the ban was carried out, said, of the Taliban:

~ "They should have been given the Nobel Peace Prize."

More than a year later, he said that when he related the substance of my analysis to his learned friends, they remarked:~

'Why didn't we see it: Of course they wouldn't turn over [OBL] without a trial – they are religious Moslems [*who believe in real courts of justice*]'

10/27/16 saw me on the Campus of HU in Jerusalem – asked me how the Taliban are doing and said that my book ~"removed the scales from [his] eyes" and that he was able to see that the Taliban were ~"like us – like Orthodox Jews" and that ~"they will be around after the US and other countires that are attacking them no longer exist."

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860 …on a claim by the security staff that my photo ID—which had admitted me to the building hundreds of times before over the course of a year – was no good. The ID actually had the phone number of the security office at the school printed on the card.
My ID was subsequently renewed – four times at this writing – and is good at that Institution and at cooperating institutions – as it had been for years past. The current Dean of that Law School, did not respond to my emails on the issue of reinstatement.

861 **A.** The most famous of the murdered priests was Óscar Arnulfo Romero y Galdámez, the Archbishop of San Salvador, a courageous & kind supporter of the poor—but not a promoter of "liberation theology". He was assassinated while conducting a Catholic Mass on 3/24/'80. The Archbishops funeral was considered the largest ever in the history of the region – attended by people from all over the world.

B.1 On the basis of Archbishop Romero's special devotion to the poor & his martyrdom in the course of that devotion, Pope Francis, 1st Latin American Pope, declared him a martyr, killed "in hatred of the faith". He was beatified 5/23/'15 in San Salvador before a crowd estimated at 260,000. Wash. Post, 5/24/15, El Salvador Celebrates Archbishop's Beatification, Any Cabrera & Marcos Aleman, P.A21,908 words, Dateline: San Salvador. **2.** Pope Francis canonized him 10/14/18. The night before he was murdered while celebrating Mass, Archbishop Romero said on the radio:

C. "I would like to appeal in a special way to the men of the army, and in particular to the troops of the National Guard, the police, and the garrisons. Brothers, you belong to our own people. You kill your own brother peasants; and in the face of an order to kill that is given by a man, the law of God that says 'Do not kill!' should prevail. "No soldier is obliged to obey an order counter to the law of God. No one has to comply with an immoral law. It is the time now that you recover your conscience and obey its dictates rather than the command of sin… Therefore, in the name of God, and in the name of this long-suffering people, whose laments rise to heaven every day more tumultuous, I beseech you, I beg you, I command you! In the name of God: 'Cease the repression!'" https://www.franciscanmedia.org/saint-oscar-arnulfo-romero/

D. The "Report of the UN Truth Commission on El Salvador,1Apr/93, S/25500, Belisaric Betancur, Chairman, Eng.,p. 131"found: "There is full evidence that:…Former Major Roberto D'Aubuisson gave the order to assassinate the Archbishop and gave precise instructions to members of his security service, acting as a "death squad" to organize and supervise the assassination."_____ [D'Aubuisson]… had died the year before."AP,F/3/15."In the fall of 1981 he formed Arena, & in 1982 was elected president of the Constituent Assembly."NYT obit, R Severo 2/21 '92.

E. At the time of these murders, the author was working at the Latin American Scholarship Program of American Universities – a division of Harvard Univ. Among my colleagues was an "almost" Jesuit Priest (& his 'almost' nun wife). He'd been a colleague in El Salvador of the Jesuit priests murdered during this time frame.

A Well Respected Rabbi,Bne Braq, Israel, after seeing maps opium of growing [A,B] & chart of opium farmgate prices [C] & hearing a summary of this sefer:

The U.S. should give you lots of money for saving billions of $ by helping them end the war sooner.

[APPROXIMATE TRANSLATION FROM THE YIDDISH.]

A.. Similar to Fig 1, Page 12 B. Similar to Fig 2, Page 12
C. un-anotated version of Figure 5, page 17

Hashimi (pseud.) Member of Japanese website "Gaijinpot" posted a section of this book about how the Taliban treated the last two Jews of Kabul – that the Taliban were "trying to be genuinely and visibly just and kind and that they recognized that traditional Jews are not a threat to traditional Moslems."

"If the "most extremist" muslims, the Taliban, were so kind to the Jews, how would be the ordinary muslims?" [IN RED IN ORIGINAL POSTING]

The post goes on to give quotes in Hebrew from Rambam – & says that the poster lived in the area of Israel, was taught Arabic and taught to hate the Jews.
http://gaijinnot.com/archive/37-latest-international-news/58757-hamas-wants-a-fight-page9.html

Scholar/-Expert Associated With The World Bank wrote that he was:

"reluctant to spend political capital asking…[his contacts at the Bank about the status/content of a report to World Bank from Abdul Shukoor Satarzai – openly carried out with the cooperation of the Taliban in '97 [862]] because I would not be able to explain why I want to know."

The writer also said [7 Sept.,/'14]that I was:

"hung up over this stuff…[and] a kook"

This is an example of the chilling effect on ordinary decent people – who are reluctant to even ask about public information from their own present or former employer.

Dutch Muslim website: 2/17'10, 20:25

http://forums.marokko.nl/archive/index.php/t-3095349-taliban-maken-gebruik-van-menselijke-schilden-p-15.html

"... [citing:]... A Jew defends the Taliban by telling the truth (http://wakeupfromyourslumber.com/node/2412) ...Zelfs moslims zijn in die propaganda getrapt. Dit is dus een jood waar ik heel veel respect voor heb. Moge Allah(swt) hem, ondanks dat hij joods is, belonen voor het verkondigen van de waarheid."

"Even Muslims fall into this propaganda.This is a jew I have enormous respect for. May Allah (swt) to him, even though he is Jewish, reward for proclaiming the truth." [automatic Google translation 10/19/15]

A Moslem Scholar familiar with the different schools of Islam & the history of both the Wahabi movement in Arabia & Taliban in Afgh-Pak.

"…it is worth singling out for mention, Avrom Shlemer Adler, an honest Jewish American man, who had, almost inadvertently, embarked on a thorough investigation and research of the Taliban, after having been taken aback at some of the lies he found the major so-called respectable media outlets to have been fabricating for the eager consumption of masses worldwide. His book, "Torah and the Taliban" which contains literally hundreds of pages of documentary evidence supporting every single assertion, is currently awaiting publication."

He then goes on to quote part of this book :

"I suspect that there were not very many people at either DEA or State who were prepared to think of the Taliban as what they claimed to be – and almost certainly were — genuine religious Moslems trying to fashion a society consistent with normative Afghan/Deobandi Moslem beliefs…

The 4 Madhabs

[Part 1] TALIBAN vs ISIS; INTRODUCTION 2015 מאי 19
https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=609820555788191&id=152472378189680&substory_index=0

A much longer series of excerpts ~2800 words] by the same author begins:

Excerpts From Forthcoming Book, "Torah and the Taliban", Authored by an Honest Jewish American; A. S Adler introduces the subject of his book as follows: "This is a history of a case of false accusation and mass murder of tens of thousands….[excerpt cont [see p5]

found at: http://reliablefatwas.com/taliban-vs-isis/

THE EARLIEST VERSION OF MY WORK that I've so far found on the internet is from Jun 8/'04 & includes 38 p. "draft 3.51" of sefer "As thou goest by the way" & a one p. press release on the transportation issue – connected with the development of a new transit station complex at Fulton St., Manhattan.

Chapter G of this document is "Torah and the Taliban" -- mentioned on the title page & introduction and covering pages 22-26 & endnotes on pages 36-38 – starting with letter G. There was no response rec. to this material. The comments on transportation were dismissed as irrelevant [see exact language , below] .[Comment letter 9]http://web.mta.info/capital/fc_docs/feis/appendices/appendixp.pdf

[*MTA New York City Transit Fulton Street Transit Center FEIS and Section 4(f) Evaluation*. CHAPTER 25: RESPONSES TO COMMENTS ON THE DEIS

"Comment/Response 156: Steven Adler distributed a press release with his spoken testimony at the public hearing on June 8, 2004. Specific comments on the FSTC project and environmental document are not readily discernable in the press release. Therefore, it is acknowledged and no specific responses are warranted. *L9-I-1*. _____ _____]

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[862] See footnote 598 D.1 & D.2 which gives details on contents of rept.

APPENDIX 1

COVER: PHOTO OF THE AUTHOR,

A. S. Adler, speaking in Union Square, near 14th Street, in NYC, Summer, '05, holding an earlier version of this page. [863] For links to more audio & videos of the author speaking out on Afghanistan related issues, **SEE FOOTNOTE 912 & APPENDIX 15.**

TRANSCRIPT[864] OF THE AUTHOR

speaking on the The Brian Lehrer Show, WNYC Radio, with Barnett Rubin, now, (4/'13) US President Barak Obama's lead expert on Afghanistan, then, 6/05/06, Dir. of Studies and Senior Fellow at the Center on International Cooperation at NYU [865] & author of a then new report for the Council on Foreign Relations "Afghanistan's Uncertain Transition From Turmoil To Normalcy"[866].

L: Brian Lehrer, host of the radio program.

A: The author, A. S. (Steve) Adler

R: Prof. Barnet Rubin

L Steve in the Bronx, you're on WNYC[867].

A Good morning Professor Rubin. The difficulty in Afghanistan is a long standing one with regard to Bin Laden and the Taliban. It appears to be that the Taliban were trying to tell the United States from '98 onward and before that they were a legitimate Islamic society and that they couldn't just grab people and turn them over unless they had a trial under Sharia Law.

So they couldn't grab Bin Laden -- whatever he's accused of -- and turn him over - and the United Sates didn't have – didn't recognize them or have an extradition treaty with them. So we were essentially telling them, or appear to have been telling them, as far as Islamic Law is concerned, to go into the public square and eat a pigs nose and pick up some billions of dollars -- and if you don't do the, we'll blow you to Hell.

So the Taliban, who looked upon themselves – or apparently looked upon themselves – as upholding God's law in the world said: "We're not going to do anything like that."

And so it led to an impasse – which led to Bin Laden being able to continue his activities – and ultimately we went in there and overthrew a legitimate government and replaced them with essentially a band of criminals.

L Do you see it that way, Barnett Rubin?

R Well first...This is Shmuel Adler, I believe. Is it?

A Yes.

L Oh. You know each other. Do you?

R Yes. Is he off the line now?

L Well, he's here.

R Can I just verify that's who it is?

A Yes, it is[868]

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[863] This photo is the 4K version of Stock Photo/Image #724750, Co. Jonathan Feinstein. As of 6/07/06, the larger, 58K version was the first image that came up on Google Images when the words -- stock orthodox Jewish man -- were entered as separate words in the Google search box. [Check on permission to use image. The descriptors associated with this photo at the photographer's website are supplied by the photographer and aren't necessarily true.]

[864] Transcript prepared by the author from the recording available at the link below on 4/24/'13—in the National Library of Israel, in Jerusalem.

[865] Kabul'ed Together [13.1MB, 32:51 minutes. The author is between 8:42 and 11:54.] http://www.wnyc.org/story/23637-kabuled-together/

[866] 56 pages, CSR NO. 12, MARCH 2006, pdf available at: http://www.cfr.org/afghanistan/afghanistans-uncertain-transition-turmoil-normalcy/p10273 Though Professor Rubin makes no mention of the Taliban opium eradication program in this report he does say:

> "The UN estimates that in recent years nearly 80 percent of the income from narcotics went not to farmers but to traffickers and heroin processors, some of whose profits corrupt the government and support armed groups"

Citing: *Afghanistan: Opium Survey 2005*, p. 9, UNODC & Gov. of Afgh. Counter Narcotics Directorate , http://www.unodc.org/pdf/afg/afg_survey_2005_exsum.pdf.

A reviewer of Rubin's CFR report in the June 22,'06, New York Review of Books says: "Rubin, the best of a handful of American scholars on Afghanistan before September 11, still knows Afghanistan better than anyone else." The reviewer was Ahmed Rashid. He makes no mention of the Taliban opium poppy eradication program in his six thousand word piece.

[867] I was not aware of the topic of this program in advance and just tuned in as I often did in the morning. I called without any preparation and without having had anything to eat or drink before calling. I was also the first caller put on the air.

[868] I did not correct him – to say that my name was not Shmuel – but Avrom Shlemeh Adler– so as not to cause embarrassment/ I was impressed that he remembered something close to my Hebrew name.

L He said yes.

R Well, Ok. Good day to you, sir.

A Shalom.

R Shalom. Shmuel Adler . I just want to introduce this gentleman to your guests. Shmuel Adler is, I believe, an Orthodox Jewish Scholar, who had devoted quite a bit of time in the past few years to trying to gain a very deep and empathetic understanding of the Taliban and even if I don't one hundred percent agree with all of his interpretations, I would like to salute him for that – and I wish more people would put that kind of effort to trying to understand people who are very different from themselves.

L So, Steve or Shmuel, give me thirty seconds on why you see the Taliban as having been a legitimate government and the ones who they were replaced with as – How did you put it?

A A band of criminals.

L Yes

A Right

L Because?

A I didn't know anything about the Taliban after 9/11. I just began researching it because some of the things didn't make any sense.

I was told, for instance, that they're just like Bin Laden, but Bin Laden called for killing Jews, as such, anywhere in the world whereas the Taliban, as far as the Anti-Defamation League and the Wiesenthal Center were concerned, never put out anything against Jews and only milk toast statements about the Palestinians and Israel.

Then I heard that the madrassas are just places to train people to be terrorists, whereas I knew that madrassas are places to train people to be religious Moslems.

And then I heard that the Taliban had wiped out Opium. I heard it on WNYC. I really wasn't paying any attention but I said, "If they really did that, that's something special. So I checked and, sure enough, they reduced opium poppy growing in the areas that they controlled, particularly Helmand and Kandahar Province, to zero. And of course, if they had done that by murdering people , chopping off their hands or flogging large numbers of people, that would be reprehensible even if they were successful.[869]

L So, Barnett Rubin, I mean you gave him some credit there in your previous remark. How much do you want to credit those statements?

R Without going full into the analysis of the past, it's certainly true. And it's not just relevant to the past but relevant to the situation now that the Taliban are not the same as Al Qaeda, and, we make things much worse than we need to for ourselves – we meaning the United States -- not only in Afghanistan , but all around the world, by treating all kinds of Islamist movements that have some kind of national or local grievance as if they were a part of this massive terrorist movement . For instance, the Taliban now are much more closely affiliated with Al Qaeda but when they first came to power they had no relation to Al Qaeda at all. I even heard one of their spokesmen say at Columbia University in January 1997 that he would help the United States in the struggle against international terrorism. I don't know how serious he was, but he did say that.

But they have found that to some extent, Al Qaeda was willing to support them on their own terms, whereas the International Community was demanding things from them. Now, the situation is different. They're closer to them but if you speak to people who are or have been close to the Taliban, they emphasize that there is a difference between them. And if we just look at what Al Qaeda did in 2001. On the ninth of September – that is, when they killed Masud -- Ahmed Sha Masud -- the Head, the Military Head of the Northern Alliance – Al Qaeda did the greatest service for the Taliban – killed their biggest enemy. And then two days later, September eleventh, they destroyed the Taliban. Because the Taliban's goal was not— as Mr. Adler says – was not to attack the United States, kill Christians Jews or anybody outside. Their goal was to establish a kind of regime, a regime that we don't like, but nonetheless a regime in Afghanistan.

L We'll continue in a minute with Barnett Rubin and his report on Afghanistan. We'll ask him why he reported that Afghanistan and the Arab World have now switched places. Stay with us.

My exact name did not appear to me to be critical to the flow of the conversation.

[869] Note that the host, Brian Lehrer, cut off the author's remarks before he was able to say how the Taliban eradicated opium poppy growing -- largely by consensus—and that there were no reported executions, maimings or floggings in connection with the ban. This leaves the audience with a completely false impression that the ban was enforced with such punishments. For details of how the ban was actually enforced, see James Callahan's letter in APPENDIX 2.

APPENDIX 2

COMMUNICATIONS WITH JAMES CALLAHAN, LEADING EXPERT ON OPIUM IN AFGHANISTAN DURING THE LAST YEAR OF THE TALIBAN, FORMERLY WITH THE STATE DEPARTMENT

[LETTER FROM JAMES CALLAHAN TO A. S. ADLER]

Re: Torah and the Taliban/ opium in Afghanistan

Wednesday, August 25, 2004 1:13 AM

From: "James CALLAHAN"
james.callahan@unodc.org

To: "s adler" vantran613@yahoo.com

Cc: aric@brain.net.pk, bcrossette@aol.com, "Barry Zulauf" bzulauf@leo.gov, info@acbar.org, james.carroll@globe.com,jason.steinbaum@mail.house.gov, Mabidn@yahoo.com, mv2038@columbia.edu, ruleoflaw@usip.org, Thomas.A.Schrettner@usdoj.gov

Dear Mr. Adler,

I regret that I could not reply to you before.

When I visited Afghanistan it was as an official of the US State Department's Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement. I would have written a trip report after the mission but do not recall writing any other reports on the mission. I was one of several officials from the US (State and DEA), UK, Germany, Beligium and the UN who took part in the mission.

In regard to what I observed and learned during the 8-day UNODC mission to Afghanistan in 2001 to access the Taliban poppy ban, I can say that the ban was highly successful. We conducted numerous meetings with farmers, opium dealers, Taliban officials, etc. All our meetings with farmers were done out of earshot of the Taliban security detail and I am confident that they were telling the truth. They universally said that - were it not for the ban - they would return to poppy cultivation because they could not support themselves and their families with wheat cultivation. Although the Taliban had previously announced bans to placate the international community, until 2001 they made little or no effort to convince the farmers not to cultivate or to enforce the bans. In 2000, according to the reports we received, the Taliban decided to announce and enforce a new ban. They sent leaders to all the villages and meet with village councils, leaders, etc, to explain the ban in religious terms and to indicate that they meant to enforce it. It appears that most farmers took this to heart and did not cultivate. In some cases, when farmers violated the ban, the Taliban plowed the fields, or made the farmers themselves pull up the plants, and jailed the offending farmers for a few days. I did not hear reports of serious physical coercian, torture, executions, etc, although I did hear that the Taliban had to employ heavy shows of force - including tanks - in some of the northeastern tribal areas where affinity for the Taliban was not high and where there was the strongest resistance to the ban, including killings of Taliban officials.

The Taliban, as you know, had taxed farmers at 10% of the value of the crop, and usually received the tax in opium. While they gave up this source of income, they continued to tax refiners and dealers, a point that our group debated with Taliban officials. They also, at least as of the time we were in Afghanistan, did not ban traffic in opium. We visited opium markets in the northeast and in Helmand province where sales were continuing although stocks were low. We constantly heard that there were large stockpiles of opium from the bumper crops of prior years but it was not clear if these stockpiles were held inside or outside Afghanistan or who held them. As you know, the price of opium skyrocketed during the ban which would imply that if there were stockpiles they were being withheld from the market to drive prices up.

My impression was that some of the Taliban officials genuinely believed in the ban and supported it for religious reasons, and possibly as an olive branch to the international community. I think others, however, continued to profit from the sales of stocks. It is not at all clear to me if the Taliban (except on an individual, ad hoc basis) engaged in direct trafficking to support their military activities or if they relied on taxation and contributions from the major, mostly Pakistani trafficking families that had moved their operations from Pakistan into Afghanistan to take advantage of the heavy cultivation. Whether or not the Taliban used the ban to drive up prices is a major point of contention. 9/11 meant that there would be no opportunity to test the Taliban for a second year and even then the Taliban had an excuse if they wanted to allow the farmers to resume, since food and development aid to Afghanistan from the

international community was far from sufficient to fill the gap in incomes left by the ban.

However, the ban did demonstrate what could be done through religious appeals and careful work with the communities. The fact that the Taliban had established their authority and provided security in much of the country also gave them the ability to enforce a ban - with a minimum of physical coercion - which was highly unpopular.

I hope this information is helpful to your research and feel free to quote from the above. Please note, however, that while I have ambassadorial status in Uzbekistan as head of the UNODC mission here, I do not have the title of ambassador.

Best regards,

James Callahan
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
Regional Representative for Central Asia

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[THE LETTER ABOVE FROM JAMES CALLAHAN WAS IN RESPONSE TO MY EMAIL LETTER – BELOW – WHICH WAS COPIED IN JAMES CALLAHAN'S RESPONSE TO ME.]

sadler vantran613@yahoo.com

Thu, 19 August 2004 04:08

To: Barry Zulauf <bzulauf@leo.gov>, james.callahan@unodc.org, Thomas.A.Schrettner@usdoj.gov, bcrossette@aol.com, james.carroll@globe.com, Mabidn@yahoo.com, aric@brain.net.pk,info@acbar.org, jason.steinbaum@mail.house.gov,ruleoflaw@usip.org
cc:mv2038@columbia.edu

Subject: Re: Torah and the Taliban/ opium in Afghanistan

B"H

8/18/04

To: Ambassador James P. Callahan, UNODC, Vienna

From: A. S. (Steve) Adler, author, researcher, inventor, ?NYC, 718-295-3510

cc: Dr. Barry A. Zulauf
Acting Special Assistant, Intelligence Division
Drug Enforcement Administration
(202) 307 – 3607 (202) 307 - 3637 FAX (202) 437 - 7452 cellular
(800) 401 - 4189 pager

cc:Thomas A. Schrettner, Special Agent, US DEA
cc Barbara Crossette, author
cc: James Carroll, author
cc: Prof. Nancy Hatch Dupree, Director, ACBAR-ARIC, Afghan resource and information center, Peshawar and Kabul
cc:: Mati ullah Abid, author/ Afghan media
cc: Jason Steinbaum, aide to Rep. E. Engel, US House
cc: USIP :curious report cited by 9/11 Comm dealing with rule of law in Afghan.

Re: Your investigation of the Taliban ban on opium in 2001

Dear Ambassador Callahan and Associates,

As I hope you will see from the attached draft, I am writing a book entitled "Applying Torah in Public Life" in which I plan to include a substantial chapter entitled "Torah and the Taliban". Part of this chapter has already been written or outlined and is included in the attachment. I think that you will find it worth reading, even in its present incomplete form.

I would like to include a statement from you and or your associates from the US and other countries who visited Afghanistan in the early months of 2001 on how you understand the Taliban to have accomplished their remarkable ban on opium growing.

You are quoted by Barbara Crossette in the New York Times and other papers to the effect that farmers had told you that the ban was brought about by consensus -- presumably of the elders connected with the mosques in the communities where the ban took effect.

I would like to quote you directly on this rather than quoting the reports of what you had said. Is there a report on this that you and/or others prepared on the subject that I may quote? If I were given a document number, title and number of pages, I might be able to obtain a redacted version of it under the Freedom of Information Act. A direct quote from you and your colleagues on that trip would also be of great value -- particularly considering subsequent events in the region.

Nearly all the pundits continue to refer to Taliban Afghanistan as a "Failed State", yet it is obvious that a government that can succeed in wiping out opium growing on the basis of some kind of consensus – without the executions and chemical spraying so often associated with drug eradication programs -- has achieved a success most ordinary governments would be hard pressed to duplicate.

I believe that your report would also be of special value to Harold D. Wankel, the US DEA's new intelligence chief, who is expected to leave for Afghanistan this coming Friday. The new people at the Afghanistan Desk of the State Department,

such as Tim Wilder? (202-647-5267) would also probably like to see it -- or to hear from you in person.

I am sure there are many others -- including my local Representative, Congressman Engel -- who would do well to be more familiar with your observations and thoughts on that remarkable event.

I hope to hear from you soon.

A. S. (Steve) Adler

Below is a relevant message that I sent to DEA recently that some of those on the present list did not yet receive.

[THIS WAS ALL ATTACHED TO JAMES CALLAHAN'S RESPONSE TO ME.]

I do not have such convenient access to a computer and did not have a chance to read the references that you sent to me before sending you and special agent Thomas Schrettner my questions and a copy of the latest draft
of my book.

The UNODC has, in the meantime, sent me James Callahan's direct email address, and I expect to be contacting him directly after sending you these
comments.

The Afghanistan country brief, excerpted below, was among the very first things that I found -- not long after 9/11/01 -- when I did a search on opium and the Taliban. It confirmed that there had been an extremely sharp drop in opium growing as a result of the Taliban ban. It also led me to the UN documents on the subject, which by that time were also available on the web.

The UN documents led me to see, district by district, how the ban had effected opium growing from one year to the next. It showed opium growing in Taliban controlled areas and in the areas controlled by the people who still retained their seat in the UN. The most remarkable thing was that in
the areas controlled most strongly by the Taliban -- like Kandahar province -- opium growing dropped to zero form a high level the previous year. In areas most under the control of the President of Afghanistan -- Mr. Rabbani's' home province of Badakhshan? -- opium growing increased by a factor of three in the same time frame.

It was very interesting to see how this truly remarkable situation was described in DEA document-- such as the ones you were kind enough to refer me to. A 98% drop is referred to as "substantial" and "significant" which
intuitively might better apply to drops of 20-40% in the case of "substantial" and " 10-25%, in the case of significant. It is then immediately suggested that this was a ploy to raise the price rather than an effort to bring their actions more in line with both Islamic Law and International Law. Does one completely eliminate the growing of a crop in one's home territory in order to raise the price of inventories held mostly by others? Did Rabbani and his associates increase growing in order to do an act of kindness?

As I understand it, the Taliban taxed opium as a regular agricultural crop. Once they banned it, it was no longer taxed. If it was found growing, they made the farmers destroy their own crops.

If you look at the behavior of the Taliban when it came to alcoholic beverages and grape vines, you can get a better idea of whether they banned opium merely as a ploy to raise the price of inventories or whether they were trying to bring the behavior of the Islamic Society they were attempting to create -- a society that was to be an example for Moslems everywhere -- more in line with the tenets of Islam.

I suspect that there were not very many people at either DEA or State who were prepared to think of the Taliban as what they claimed to be – and almost certainly were -- genuine religious Moslems trying to fashion a society consistent with normative Afghan/Deobandi Moslem beliefs.

As I understand it, they were not only not a threat to the US, but were probably more inclined to appreciate the US? -- for the aid they had received in their fight against the Russians and for the humanitarian aid they had received in more recent years - than almost any other Moslem
country in the world.

At the same time, as genuine religious Moslems, they were not likely to succumb to the usual carrot and stick approach that may characterize most US relations with such countries.

I see that I am almost out of time on this computer, so I will leave off here.

I look froward [sic] to your assistance in tracking down James Callahan's report and hope you find my chapter on Torah and the Taliban of value.

Sincerely,

A.S. (Steve) Adler

[APPENDIX 3, [SEE NEXT PAGE] WAS ATTACHED TO THE LETTER FROM JAMES CALLAHAN, BELOW THE REMARKS IMMEDIATELY ABOVE. THE ACTUAL ATTACHED PORTION BEGAN WITH THE WORDS "BARRY ZULAUF"]

APPENDIX 3

COMMUNICATIONS FROM BARRY ZULAUF , THEN OF THE US DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION.

[THE MESSAGE IMMEDIATELY BELOW UP TO THE ROW OF *** WAS RECEIVED BY THE AUTHOR TUESDAY, AUGUST 17, 2004 10:13 AM -- AND WAS NOT INCLUDED IN THE MESSAGE SENT TO JAMES CALLAHAN. IT IS INCLUDED HERE FOR COMPLETENESS AND INTEREST]**

Barry Zulauf <*bzulauf@leo.gov*> wrote:
http://www.dea.gov/pubs/cngrtest/ct100301.html
"Taliban Profits from Drugs" -- Hutchinson

Below please find a forwarded e-mail from Mr. Steven Adler, a private author. He makes reference to a "Callahan Report," which was mentioned in press by Ms. Crossette. He is, for some reason, asking me for a copy of this report. I do not have it. I am asking Ms. Crossette, and – I am guessing from the e-mail address – Mr. Callahan at the legal and treaty affairs office in Vienna, for a copy of the report.

I have looked at the UNODC website, found no such report posted, and asked the listed unodc e-mail address for a copy.

Please send to me the file, or the link, and be sure to copy Mr. Adler – cc-ed above – since he is the one asking for it in the first place
.
THANKS

Dr. Barry A. Zulauf

Acting Special Assistant, Intelligence Division
Drug Enforcement Administration
(202) 307 – 3607 (202) 307 - 3637 FAX
(202) 437 - 7452 cellular (800) 401 - 4189 pager
****

Monday, August 16, 2004 3:00 PM
From: "Barry Zulauf" <bzulauf@leo.gov>
To: vantran613@yahoo.com
http://www.dea.gov/pubs/cngrtest/ct100301.html
"Taliban Profits from Drugs" – Hutchinson
http://www.dea.gov/pubs/cngrtest/ct052003.html **Narco-terrorism: A Dangerous Mix – Casteel**
http://www.dea.gov/pubs/intel/intel0901.html
Afghanistan Country Report,
note that the ban was enforced by eradication program. I do not see anything about consensus. I will try to find traces of the Callahan report.

Barry A. Zulauf

Acting Special Assistant, Intelligence Division
Drug Enforcement Administration
(202) 307 – 3607 (202) 307 - 3637 FAX
(202) 437 - 7452 cellular (800) 401 - 4189 pager

[THE EXCERPTS BELOW ARE TAKEN FROM THE REPORTS CITED AND LINKED TO BY BARRY ZULAUF IN HIS LETTER IMMEDIATELY ABOVE.]

[BOLD EMPHASIS ADDED BY ASA 7/21/11]

Taliban Profits from Drugs / Hutchinson

In 2001, Afghanistan produced approximately 74 metric tons of opium, a substantial reduction from the 3,656 metric tons produced in 2000.

Despite this significant decrease and the Taliban's claims of lab destructions, DEA has seen no decrease in availability, and no increase in the price of Southwest Asian Heroin in the United States and European consumer countries. This indicates that significant amounts of opiates still remain available. According to the United Nations, up to 60% of Afghanistan's opium crop is stored for future sales.

Since the Taliban's opium ban of July 2000, the kilogram price of opium has skyrocketed from US $44 to over US $400. This price increase, which was limited to the immediate region and did not resonate to international markets, appeared to be a means for the Taliban to capitalize on a rise in the price of a commodity over which they exercise nearly total control.

http://www.dea.gov/pubs/cngrtest/ct052003.html
Narco-terrorism: A Dangerous Mix. Casteel

Afghanistan is a major source country for the cultivation, processing, and trafficking of opiates, producing 59 percent of the world's supply of illicit opium in 2002. Because of the country's decimation by decades of warfare, illicit drugs had become a major source of income. Through the taxation of illicit opium production, the Taliban were able to fund an infrastructure capable of supporting and protecting Usama bin Laden and the Al-Qaida organization.

Accordingly, drugs and terrorism frequently share a common ground of geography, money, and violence.

Illicit opium production increased each year in Afghanistan during the 1990's, surpassing Burma as the world's leading producer of illicit opium in 1998. By 2000, Afghanistan produced more than 70 % of the world's supply of illicit opium, with more than 3,656 metric tons produced. This equaled a potential heroin production of 365 metric tons. An estimate conducted by INTERPOL suggested that ninety percent of the heroin consumed in Europe originates in Southwest Asia, particularly Afghanistan. Afghanistan's neighbors in the Central Asian States may also be candidates for exploitation by traffickers. Drug trafficking groups could potentially utilize their existing smuggling networks within the region to move product to markets and precursor chemicals to the clandestine laboratories.

Presently, the situation is fluid and constantly changing. Until the situation in Afghanistan stabilizes, the future of drug cultivation and production within that country or within the region itself will remain uncertain. However, the ingenuity and tenacity of drug traffickers in Southwest Asia will continue to present substantial challenges to western law enforcement.

http://www.dea.gov/pubs/intel/intel0901.html

Afghanistan Country Report,

AFGHANISTAN COUNTRY BRIEF

Drug Situation Report

September 2001

map of the Mid-East *{deleted}*

STATUS IN INTERNATIONAL DRUG TRAFFICKING

The Islamic State of Afghanistan is a major source country for the cultivation, processing and trafficking of opiate and cannabis products. Afghanistan produced over 70 percent of the world's supply of illicit opium in 2000. Morphine base, heroin and hashish produced in Afghanistan are trafficked worldwide. Narcotics are the largest source of income in Afghanistan due to the decimation of the country's economic infrastructure caused by years of warfare. Afghanistan was invaded by the Soviet Union in 1979. Following the withdrawal of the Soviets ten years later, civil strife ensued in Afghanistan. There is no recognized national government in Afghanistan and opposing factions continue to battle for control of the country. The Taliban, a fundamentalist Islamic group, now controls over 90 percent of Afghanistan, while a loose coalition of opposition forces (referred to as the Northern Alliance) maintains control of portions of northern Afghanistan.

DRUG CULTIVATION AND PROCESSING

Opium: According to the official U.S. Government estimate for 2001, Afghanistan produced an estimated 74 metric tons of opium from 1,685 hectares of land under opium poppy cultivation. This is a significant decrease from the 3,656 metric tons of opium produced from 64,510 hectares of land under opium poppy cultivation in 2000.

The United Nations Drug Control Program (UNDCP) also estimates opium production in Afghanistan. The UNDCP estimated a reduction in 2000 opium production from 1999, pointing to a 10 percent reduction in land under opium poppy cultivation and the impact of a protracted drought in the area as the causes for the smaller opium production. Estimates for 2001 have not been released. [For comparison, see p. 10-11 of this Sefer for the UN data on tons & area under cultivation, for these y'rs. Added by ASA]

AFGHAN OPIUM PRODUCTION:

METRIC TONS, US. DEA

	2001	2000	1999	1998	1997	1996
USG	74	3,656	2,861	2,340	2,184	2,099
UNDCP	N/A	3,276	4,581	2,102	2,804	2,248

APPENDIX 4

http://www.guardian.co.uk/g2/story/0,3604,558076,00.html

Mullah Omar - in his own words

Wednesday September 26, 2001, The Guardian
This12-minute interview with Mullah Omar Mohammad, the Taliban leader, was conducted in Pashtu for the publicly-funded radio channel Voice of America. The broadcast was pulled last Friday, following objections from the US deputy secretary of state and senior officials of the National Security Council.

[8/03/05 A different version was obtained from VOA, purporting to be the complete text of the interview. However, it contains no introductory or concluding salutations, the name/s of the interviewer/s or any official document number.

Words that appear in the Guardian but not in the "complete" text from VOA are shown in underscored italics. This includes differences in capitalization, spelling and punctuation. Words that appear in the VOA "complete " text but not in the Guardian, are in boldface reddish type.

A facsimile of the VOA "complete" text will be provided as an attachment, available upon request, or printed as pages [ ] of this document. As of 8/10/05, the text of the actual VOA broadcast, "Mullah Omar Replies", DATE=9/25/01, SLUG: 5-50203, Background Report, Byline=Ed Warner, Dateline = Washington] may be found at: http://www.voanews.com/english/Archive/a-2001-09-25-8-Taleban.cfm (including audio and photos) ("Unable to open – could not be found" – as of Apr. 23, '12) http://www.kimandrewelliott.com/Cw/omarreplies_2001-09-25.txt (not at this link as of Apr. 23, '12) and http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2001/09/mil-010925-2a6145cc.htm]

Voice of America interviewer: Why don't you expel Osama bin Laden? **America and the international community want him. Why do you protect him?**

Omar: This is not **just** an issue of Osama bin Laden. *It* **This** is an issue of Islam. **Islam throughout the world**. Islam's prestige is at stake. *So* **; so** is Afghan*istan's* tradition. **Whether Afghans uphold their tradition and protect their honor is another issue.**

VOA: Do you know that the US has announced *a* war on terrorism?

Omar: I am considering two promises. One is the promise of God**;** the other is that of Bush. The promise of God is that *my* **"My** land is vast. If you start a journey on God's path, you can reside anywhere on this earth and will be protected**."**.. **That is the promise of God.** The promise of Bush is that *there* **"There** is no place on earth where you can hide that I cannot find you." We will see which one of these two promises is fulfilled. [870]

VOA: But aren't you afraid for the people, **for** yourself, **for** the *Taliban* **Taleban?** *, your* **The United States is a powerful** country?

Omar: God Almighty says that " Almighty God*...* **is a friend of the believers" and he** is helping the believers and the Muslims. **And** God says *he* **He** will never be satisfied with the infidels. In terms of worldly affairs, America is very strong. Even if it were twice as strong, or twice that, it *could* **would** not be strong enough to defeat us. We are confident that no one can harm us if God is with us. **And if God is not with us, there is no need for anyone else. Someone right here can shoot us and kill us.** [871]

VOA: You are telling me you are not concerned**,.** *but* **But** Afghans all over the world are concerned.
Omar: We are also concerned. Great issues lie ahead. But we depend on God's mercy. **This may**

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[870] **The VOA commentator paraphrases this section as:**

> **"The Taleban leader sought to explain his decision by saying he is pondering two promises. One is the promise of God; the other is that of Bush. God, he says, promises the Taleban will be protected anywhere on earth if its members stay true to their religion. Bush, he says, promises to find us no matter where we hide. We will see, said the Mullah, whose promise is fulfilled."**

Note that the VOA commentator, Ed Warner, gives the impression that Mullah Omar is speaking of a promise to the Taliban while it is clear that Mullah Omar is speaking of God's promise to all who go in God's ways. The expression "my country is vast" appears to be a quote from the Quran at 29:56:5-6.

[871] **It is particularly curious that these last two sentences are missing in the Guardian's text, as they were actually in the VOA's broadcast version. [A.S. A. 8/10/05] The Tsadikim -- the righteous aren't absolutely certain of their own righteousness. They strive to do God's will, often not knowing where exactly they're going or what exactly they must do. This cultivates humility & modesty among the descendants – spiritual & physical -- of Avroham Avinu.**

It also made me think that Mullah Omar had genuine humility – that he was likely a real spiritual leader and not just another political opportunist. [Based on Midrash Rabbah Bireshis on each of the two occurrences of the expression '...לְךָ-לְךָ... -...*get thee*...' at Gen. 12:1 and Gen 22:2.] See comment on this in the author's 'Akedus Yitschok: As I Will Tell You' in the sefer אומרים שבעים. [added 11/15/13]

appear to be a moment of certainty for us, but God's mercy is with the Muslims. Consider our point of view: if we give Osama away today, Muslims who are now pleading to give him up would then be reviling us for giving him up... The very same people would be asking : "Why did you sacrifice the prestige of Islam? Why did you bring shame on Muslims?" Everyone is afraid of America and wants to please it. But let me tell you something. Americans will not be able to prevent such acts like as the one that has just occurred because America has taken Islam hostage. America has done that in the Islamic world and especially in the Arab countries. If you look at Islamic countries, the people are in despair. They are complaining that Islam is gone. Secular law has replaced Islamic law. But people remain firm in their Islamic beliefs. In their pain and frustration, some of them commit suicide acts. They feel they have nothing to lose. If the US really wants to end this evil, it knows how to do it. It should end its virtual grip on Islam. It should let go. Then it will be relieved forever, and the rest of the world can go about its business.

VOA: What do you mean by saying America has taken the *Islamic* Muslim world hostage?

Omar: I mean that America controls the governments of the Islamic countries. America keeps after them until they do its bidding. But they are very distant from their own people. The people ask to follow Islam, but the governments do not listen. The people are powerless against their governments because they are in the grip of the United States. In that way, they become corrupt and ignore the people. If someone follows the path of Islam, the government arrests him, tortures him or kills him. This is the doing of America. If it stops supporting those governments and lets the people deal with them, then such things won't happen.

America has created the evil that is attacking it. The evil will not disappear even if I die and Osama dies and others die. This is US policy. The US should step back and review its policy. It should stop trying to impose its empire on the rest of the world, especially *on* in Islamic countries. In the name of humanitarian aid, Americans brought thousands of bibles to Afghanistan and were propagating Christianity. If they dare do that here can you imagine what they have been doing in Arab countries. The Muslims understand that. They also know they can't do anything about it. So they kill themselves in suicide attacks. They no longer want life on this earth.

VOA: So *you won't give* it means you are not giving Osama bin Laden to the US *up*?

Omar: No. *We* , we cannot do that. If we did, it means we are not Muslims... , that Islam is finished. If we were afraid of attack, we could have surrendered him the last time when we were threatened and attacked. So America can hit us again, *and this* . This time we don't even have a friend.

VOA: If you fight America with all *your* its might - can the *Taliban* Taleban do that? *Won't* Don't you think that America could beat you, and *won't your* the people would suffer even more?

Omar: On the surface, it looks as if that is the case. But *I'm* I am very confident that it won't turn out *this* that way. Please note this: *there*. There is nothing else, nothing more, we can do except depend on *almighty* Almighty God. If a person *does,* really depends on God, then he is assured that the Almighty will help him, have mercy on him and he will succeed. Another point: Osama was here in Afghanistan even before us, but nobody wanted him. They forced him out of Sudan, and he came to Afghanistan. We didn't even exist then. Our movement was not here. So why did they not pursue him then? Either they didn't want him or no one was ready to turn him in. If no one was willing to turn him in, then why should we? Are we cowards to bring upon ourselves a great shame? This whole thing is an excuse. We will not turn him in. [872]

[SEE APPENDIX 16 for transcript and video of Taliban Ambassador explaining their situation and answering questions – Mar.10/'01.]

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[872] **The text of the interview as published in the Guardian has a word count, using MS Word tools, of ~600, or a talking speed of only 50 words/minute for the 12 minutes the interview is said to have taken.**

Average talking speed in serious conversation is close to 100 words per minute, suggesting how much of the interview is missing. Average talking speed for the US presidential inaugural addresses from 1989 to 2001 is reported as 108 words per minute, with a range of 99 to 114 wpm. This data found at : ___

The text as given by VOA, has an additional ~385 words, based on a hand count. Allowing for 14 pauses between questions and answers, there is an equivalent total of just over one thousand words. This suggests that there is an equivalent of about 100-300 words that may still be missing. Part of this would be made up by the beginning and ending salutations.

APPENDIX 5

An Academic/Professional Response to the Taliban Ban on Opium Poppy Growing

In March '05, The International Journal of Drug Policy, published an entire issue, V. 16, #2, dedicated to "The Taliban and Opium Cultivation in Afghanistan". This was more than three years after the UNDCP published its 30 page report, "Annual Opium Poppy Survey 2001", which showed the near total elimination of opium poppy growing in the Taliban domain. Still, it appears to have been the first peer reviewed, academic/scholarly publication on these events. The lead paper, by Farrell & Thorne (App. 5a) establishes that the opium poppy growing was actually stopped & that the Taliban were primarily responsible for stopping it -- that it wasn't the result of a drought, fungus or reduction in demand.

Farrell and Thorne then go on to suggest that the Taliban employed "inhumane and draconian policies" (p90, col. 2, par.1), without citing any references for this assertion.

Earlier in the paper they do cite three sources that are apparently intended to show that the Taliban were particularly strict (page 85, col. 2, par 3, copied at Appendix 5a.1) The first source, **Komarow**, 2001 (reproduced in part at Appendix 5a.4), actually describes events in non-Taliban controlled territory. The next two sources, **Bearak** 2001 and **Gannon** 2000 (reproduced in part below as Appendices 5a.2 & 5a.3, respectively), actually show that the Taliban were quite lenient with violators, though **Farrell and Thorne** cite them to suggest the opposite.

Even so, Farrell & Thorne state "…an explicit record of specific acts of punish-ments [for violating the ban on growing opium poppies] remained elusive…" (p. 85, col. 2, par. 3).

The next paper, a response by **David Macdonald**, is more problematic. It's full of generally unsourced & unverifiable assertions suggesting that theTaliban were particularly vicious. Characteristic of this is the statement: "As with all repressive totalitarian regimes, a terrorized populace understood that summary justice and severe punishment, including the destruction of property, torture and death would await any transgressor of Mullah Omar's total ban on opium cultivation." (page 94, col. 1, par. 3).

At one point, Macdonald cites "Western intelligence sources" to the effect that on September 2, 2001, the Taliban broadcast that the ban was lifted. Meanwhile, two independent, contemporaneous wire service stories say that on Sept. 2, 2001, the Taliban broadcast that the ban would be continued.

These wire service stories are reproduced below (see Appendices 5b.3, 5b.4). This citation by **Macdonald** is even more astonishing, as **Farrell and Thorne** provide an annotated chart of opium farmgate prices in Afghanistan from 1997 to 2003. Their chart shows a sharp peak before September 11, with roughly double the price of the previous several months. This is consistent with the Taliban broadcasting on September 2, 2001, that the ban on opium poppy growing would be continued. A more detailed version of the chart of farmgate prices for opium in Afghanistan is at Fig 5, page 14 .

Figure 5, page 14, and the discussion on page 13 are helpful in understanding one of **Macdonald's** more striking – though oft repeated -- assertions: that Taliban insiders, with prior knowledge of the ban, bought up a substantial part of the opium in Afghanistan – Macdonald actually says "most" (see Appendices 5b.5 and 5b.6) – in order to profit from the subsequent shortage. Yet this completely unsubstantiated claim is belied by the fact that the farmgate prices in two widely separated regions remained both level and extremely low up until the ban was announced.

Any significant insider attempt to corner the opium market would have shown up as an increase in price prior to the ban[873].

Of the remaining 5 papers in this issue, a very different and refreshing perspective is provided by **Moruf Adelkan**. (p. 110–111, **Response "Very effective but draconian and unacceptable": paradox in the evaluation of a unique drug control effort in a non-western country.**) He makes clear (P 110, col.2, par. 2) that, **far from being "draconian and unaccepable", "the Taliban method was linked to a highly acceptable socio-cultural practice and concept"**

5a Where have all the flowers gone?: evaluation of the Taliban crackdown against opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan

Graham Farrell , John Thorne, International Journal of Drug Policy 16 (2005) 81–91

Abstract: This study presents what we believe to be the first formal evaluation of the Taliban crackdown against

[873] See p 12-14, above & p 83 for a discussion of the opium farmgate price data & what they show about the Taliban, commodities speculations & the local society. See also opium production chart, fig. 3, p. 10.

opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan. Afghanistan was the main source of the world's illicit heroin supply for most of the 1990s. From late 2000 and the year that followed, the Taliban enforced a ban on poppy farming via threats, forced eradication, and public punishment of transgressors. The result was a 99% reduction in the area of opium poppy farming in Taliban-controlled areas. The evaluation uses multiple comparison areas: the non-Taliban area of Afghanistan, neighbouring countries, the non-contiguous comparison area of Myanmar (Burma), and, the rest of the world. Alternative possible causes of the reduction such as drought, migration or changes in global opium markets are reviewed and excluded. It is concluded that the reduction in Afghan poppy cultivation was due to the enforcement action by the Taliban. Globally, the net result of the intervention produced an estimated 35% reduction in poppy cultivation and a 65% reduction in the potential illicit heroin supply from harvests in 2001. Though Afghan poppy growing returned to previous levels after the fall of the Taliban government,

this may have been the most effective drug control action of modern times.

5a.1 **Pg 85 , col. 2, par. 3 of Farrell & Thorne, IJDP 16:, 81-91** "The proactive enforcement combined prevention and punishment to trigger specific and general deterrence and incapacitation effects. Many farmers in violation of the prohibition were forced to destroy their own crops before completing a prison term of 2 years or more concurrent with various forms of corporal punishment including whipping and public beatings (Komarow, 2001)

However, as can be seen at 5a.4, below, Komarow is discussing a place that was controlled by the enemies of the Taliban]

An August 10, 2000 edition of *The Economist* states that the Taliban was also known to possess a "fondness of public executions and dismemberment".

[There were no reports of executions or dismemberment in connection with this ban , though this is the implication of the citation to this reference]

Others had their faces blackened and were immediately taken to jail, remaining until destruction of their poppy harvest was defrayed (Bearak, 2001; Gannon, 2000).

[However, as can be seen at 5a.2 and 5a.3 below, for Bearak and Gannon respectively, there is no story where face blackening was combined with jail. Jail terms in both sources are described as short – a few days -- in the Bearak report.] [874]

Some violators were paraded through the streets with blackened faces carrying several heavy sacks of heroin or wearing poppies while a "town crier" informed the village (via megaphone) of the *fatwa* violation.

[This story –which is from Komarow at 5a.4 below - concerns a location correctly noted in the report as under the control of the enemies of the Taliban. No such report has be found concerning the actions of the Taliban.]

If a poppy farmer was caught by higher ranking Taliban, village elders had their heads shaved and shared the violator's "walk of shame" through the streets and bazaars, giving local communities an incentive to ensure that the whole population complied.

[Note: No source is given for this.]

While an explicit record of specific acts of punishments being utilized on ban violators remained elusive, it is wholly within the realm of possibility that their use, or threat of use, would have been a powerful motivator to comply."

Bearak, B. (2001, May 24). Taliban ban on drug crops is working, U.S.concludes. *New York Times*.**[See 5a.2, below, for relevant text from this source]**

Gannon, K. (2000). Afghanistan's Taliban ban poppy farming. *Lexington Area Muslim Network*. 16 November 2000. Available: http://www.dailysouthtown.com/southtown/dsnews/1612nd1.htm (accessed c.November 2002). **[See 5a.3, below for relevant text from this source]**

Komarow, S. (2001, October 18). Afghan drug sellers punished with humiliation. *USA Today*. **[See 5a.4, below for relevant text from this source]**

5a.2 **Bearak [emphasis added]**

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"We used a soft approach," said Abdul Hamid Akhundzada, who heads the Taliban's anti-poppy program. "When there were violations, we plowed the fields. At most, violators spent a few days in jail, until they paid for the plowing."

*****

"Generally, the authorities released those that violated the ban after only a few days on the understanding that they would eradicate their opium poppy crops themselves."

P7, par 2, **The Impact of the Taliban Prohibition on Opium Poppy Cultivation in Afghanistan, May 25 , 2001, 29 pages, available at http://www.davidmansfield.org/data/Policy_Advice/DONOR_MISSION/Final_Draft_Team_Report.doc retrieved may 5, 2013—still not officially published as a UN report! [Oct 17, 2013]**

[874] **This is consistent with the report of James Callahan and his associates – that just a few hundred people were jailed for short periods of time – out of over a hundred thousand farmers who had grown opium the previous year. See Appendix 2 for James Callahan's report. It is also consistent with the report of the Donors Assessment Mission To Afghanistan -- which stated:**

"No one dared disobey," said Saleh Muhammad Agha, a farmer with seven children and a meager wheat field. "If they catch you, they blacken your face and march you through the bazaars with a string of poppies around your neck."

The ban was carried out through the chain of command. The wisdom of the Holy Koran guided Mullah Omar. He in turn communicated with his provincial governors, who informed their district administrators. The administrators then explained the ban to local mullahs and tribal elders, who passed the news to the farmers. **Violators were few**. In the village of Loay Bagh, one elderly man tried to conceal his poppies in a patch of onions. The camouflage proved inadequate. **"He apologized, and we plowed his field and did nothing else,"** said Mullah Shah Wali, the administrator in Nadali District**.**

5a.3 BYLINE**: KATHY GANNON [Emphasis added]**

Copyright 2000 Associated Press , **Nov.** 16, 2000; Thursday, SECTION: International news, LENGTH: 713 words, HEADLINE: AP Photos ISL102-106, DATELINE: KHOGIANI, Afghanistan

******

"I tell you, I think it can be done," said Shams-ul-Haq Sayed, an officer of theTaliban drug control office in Jalalabad, capital of the eastern opium-growing province of Nangarhar.

He pointed to the Taliban's success in controling the number of weapons openly carried in the streets.

"Twenty years ago I would have thought it impossible to take weapons away from people," he said. "But look in every city where the Taliban are in control: people don't carry guns," though there is no ban on weapons possession.

******

The Taliban have threatened to jail anyone who defies the ban and already 22 farmers have been arrested in Nangarhar province alone, according to Sayed. The Taliban are keeping farmers in jail until they agree to destroy their crop, he said, and if they refuse, the crop will be destroyed and the cost of its destruction charged to the farmer.

Stories circulate about farmers unsuccessfully defying the edict. **A farmer who bragged of challenging it is said to have been arrested and paraded around his village with his face blackened to humiliate him**.

In the village of Mimla, the headman and Muslim cleric have been warned they will be jailed if anyone in their village is caught growing poppies.

Sher Gul, the headman, said he sends out patrols each dawn to make sure the edict is obeyed.

Many opium farmers are deeply in debt to businessmen from whom they borrow against their poppy crop. Khan, for instance, said he owes about dlrs 850.

The Taliban says the outside world should help prevent impoverishment of the farmers. "We have done what we can. We have banned poppies. Now, ... if they really want to combat drugs and if they are really honest, they will help," said Sayed.

"Whether they like or they don't like the Taliban, it doesn't matter. It is the people. They can give through the United Nations," he said.

But the ban unhappily coincides with the United Nations' decision to close its drug control program in eastern Nangarhar province, citing lack of funding.

"Now our credibility with the people is under question," said Zalmi Sherzad, a program official. "They will say to us, 'You have no right to tell us not to grow. You give us nothing.'"

5a.4 Afghan drug sellers punished with humiliation, Steven Komarow,

http://www.usatoday.com/news/sept11/2001/10/17/drug-dealer.htm#more

10/18/2001, KHOJA BAHAUDDIN, Afghanistan.

Justice and the news both get delivered here by a man with a bullhorn. This was the scene Wednesday in this dusty crossroads town, just south of the border with Tajikistan: Hakeem, a 29-year-old father of three, is being marched through the market square. On his back is a 55-pound bag of heroin. Following behind is Abdul Mumim, the town's version of a news anchorman. "This man is a drug seller!" Mumim growls into the portable public-address system that serves as his broadcast station. "What is your name?" he asks. Hakeem refuses to say. "He says his name is drug seller!" Mumim exclaims, according to an interpreter. "He must be shown to the people!"

****

But all the while, there is Hakeem who, like many people in Afghanistan, uses only one name, bearing his load. He was caught, it is said, trying to deliver the heroin to contacts across the border in Tajikistan.

Hakeem is forced to walk down the streets with hundreds of local men and children trailing behind. He grimaces as Mumim repeats his message into the microphone of the bullhorn. Finally, he's told to climb into the back of a four-wheel-drive and is whisked away.

In a joint interview later at the town prison, Hakeem and the prison warden agree that sentences can vary widely. **This part of Afghanistan is under the control of the Northern Alliance, a loosely knit federation of groups opposed to the ruling Taliban government[875]. [Emphasis added]**

Hakeem, from the village of Yang Qale just north of here, will be allowed to plead his case before the local gover-

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[875] Also spelled Khvajeh Baha Od Din [in Google Maps, located at N. Lat. 37° 20' 48.0006", E. Long 69° 32' 2.0004"] A city of about 3km². It was near the center of the border between Darqad and Yangi Qala Districts in Takhar Prov. 12 flat km. east of the Tajikistan border, [See District map of Takhar Prov. on p. 25.] It was the HQ of Ahmed Shah Massoud when he was assassinated 9/09/01. [National Geo-graphic Adventure "Sebastian Junger on Afghanistan's Slain Rebel Leader" _____

nor. The prison will carry out the sentence. It could include whipping or other corporal punishment, plus imprisonment of perhaps 2 years, they say.

******

He hoped to earn $200 to $300 for his efforts ?for smuggling drugs he says are worth about $20,000 in Western drug markets. Instead, by the end of the day, Hakeem is in a mud-walled prison patrolled by young men with rifles, bayonets, and whips made from broken automobile fan belts.

5b Response, International Journal of Drug Policy, 16 (‘05) 93–7Blooming flowers and false prophets: the dynamics of opium cultivation and production in Afghanistan under the Taliban. David Macdonald.

ds_macdonald@yahoo.co.uk
Counter Narcotics Directorate, Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan, Kabul Received 29 October 2004; received in revised form 29 November 2004; accepted 17 January 2005

5b.1 Page 96, col. 1, par. 2

“According to Western intelligence sources, the Taliban controlled Voice of Shariat radio, on 2 September 2001, little more than a year after the total ban, announced that the ban had been lifted by the Taliban (**Lintner, 2001**).

[See 5b.2, below for relevant text from this source & 5b.3 & 5b.4 for more reliable contradictions to this source from Deutsche Presse-Agentur & AFP, respectively]

Although this was only nine days before September 11th and the terrorist attack on New York, this appeared to be coincidental. As the poppy planting season in most parts of Afghanistan starts around late September, farmers would need such advance warning in order to buy seeds and obtain necessary credit, so the timing of the lifting of the ban effectively gave the green light to farmers to resume poppy cultivation.”

5b.2 Lintner, B. (2001). Afghanistan Taliban turns to drugs. *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 11 Oct.

URL: http://www.mapinc.org/drugnews/v01.n1754.a10.html

******

In fact, according to a Western intelligence source monitoring Taliban-run Voice of Shariat radio, the Taliban has already scrapped a ban on poppy cultivation, clearing the way for renewed opium and heroin production after little more than a year's break.

The source says the move was announced on September 2--nine days before hijacked airliners slammed into New York and Washington.

*****

5b.3 HEADLINE: Taliban warn Afghan farmers against growing opium poppy

Co. 2001 Deutsche Presse-Agentur, **Sept.** 2, 2001, Sun., BC Cycle 16:40 Central European Time**, SECT.:** International News, 146 words, **DATELINE:** Islamabad

Afghanistan's Islamic Taliban regime on Sunday warned farmers against defying a ban on growing opium poppy in the country, the Afghan Islamic Press (AIP) agency reported.

AIP quoted a broadcast of the regime's Radio Shariat as saying that the Taliban supreme leader, Mullah Mohammad Omar, issued the warning at the start of the sowing season for the banned crop.

Afghanistan used to be the world's largest producer of opium and its derivates until 1999 when the Taliban banned the cultivation of poppy, which was the mainstay for a large number of Afghan farmers.

Western countries, where the illicit product was smuggled to, shun the Islamic Taliban for their ultra conservative policies. But they reluctantly recognized its success in implementing the ban and are considering helping the farmers to keep them from resuming poppy cultivation. dpa am ms

5b.4 HEADLINE: Taliban chief renews ban on poppy growing in Afghanistan

Agence France Presse, Sept. 2, 2001 , KABUL,

The chief of Afghanistan's ruling **Taliban** militia Sunday renewed his ban on the cultivation of poppies, a lucrative source of narcotics, as the new sowing season arrived, state run **Radio** Shariat reported.

Taliban supreme leader Mullah Mohammad Omar in a statement broadcast over the **radio** said Afghan farmers should strictly obey the decree which last year banned the production of **opium** throughout Afghanistan.

The statement said that no Afghan farmer was permitted to produce **opium** plants on their land, adding that in case of violation the **Taliban** authorities would destroy the crop.

Those violating the decree will be given severe punishment, it said but gave no details.

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5b.5 Macdonald, p95, col.2, par. 2

Even within the inner *shura* or council of the Taliban there were those involved in drug trafficking who would benefit from a total ban on opium, thus substantially increasing opium prices and allowing the Taliban to sell their existing stockpiles for high profits. Perhaps the most infamous was Haji Bashir [**Noorzai**] [876] who was considered by Western Intel-

[876] Haji Bashir isn’t mentioned in Ahmed Rashid’s book “Taliban” -- published months before the opium poppy ban was announced [reviewed in the London Independent , 2/29/’00]. The first article with his name in a Lexis Nexis search on May 1,’13 in Jerusalem, was from 1994, where he’s named as a spokesperson

ligence agencies to be largely in control of drug trafficking in Afghanistan, although how far he achieved this with the collusion of other top Taliban leaders is unknown. It has been alleged[877] that in the months before the ban was announced he purchased most of the opium in the country then profited when prices rose dramatically from under US$ 100 at the end of 2000[878] to nearly US$ 700 per kg by early September 2001.

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for an Afghan political group Ittehad-e-Islam. [Deutsche Presse-Agentur, Afghan group warns Pakistan against forcible eviction, 7/15/'94, Islamabad]

In 1995 he's listed as one of three reps of the Taliban in Islamabad.[BBC: IRNA, Tehr., 11,30,'95, Frac-tious Afghan opposition reportedly faces further splits.]

The next is post 9/11. It says he was a big help to Mulla Omar in '94 – & otherwise makes no mention of him. "The Taliban; A Primer", Defense & Foreign Affairs' Strategic Policy, 10/'01, THE WAR ON TERRORISM; Pg. 6, Christopher D. Kondaki, Contrib. Ed.

Noorzai is presently serving a life sentence in the US after his 4/'05 arrest in NYC on charges that he enabled $50 million of heroin to enter the United States. His lawyer, Alan Seidler, said that Noorzai shouldn't have been convicted because he didn't arrange for the drugs to go to the US. He said he will appeal, if necessary, to the US Supreme Court. [AP, 5/23/'11, "NY conviction of Afghan tribal leader upheld", Larry Neumeister],

$50E6 is ~0.1% of street market value of 1 yr's output of opium from Afghanistan. See footnote 41, supra. The amount was also given as ~500kg of heroin [AP, 4/ 25/'05, "U.S. says alleged Afghan drug kingpin has been arrested" Tom Hays] ~ the output of one Afghan province declared "Poppy free" by the UN. [see page 14, note ## in table]

[877] Note that no source is given for this allegation. If someone had tried to buy up most of the opium in the country before the ban was announced, it would've driven up the price before that date, as others would try to maintain their position in the market & prevent someone else from cornering it. The opium farmgate price data -- as already discussed on p/ 12-14, above- -- show no increase before the ban was announced.

[878] In Dec. 2000, the price was already over $100 –triple what it was just before the ban was announced 7/28/'00. If the purchases had been made before this announcement, the more dramatic increase – from ~$30 should have been noted. See Chart/table, p. 14.

By early Dec., 2000, any clever person with money anywhere in the world who had read the preliminary assessment of the Taliban's opium poppy ban, (NYT Dec 10, 2000, recounted on p, 25) could've guessed the price would continue to rise and that buying up a large amount of it close to its source of production might lead to high monetary gains in the short run.

The reality is that these laws provide vast slush funds to people who might first imagine they're doing real good for a public cause. Then they realize - up close - the anti-drug laws are a mix of confusion, misinformation & hypocrisy. In this morally toxic environment, it's easy for them to see their own personal 'cause' as the most important cause of all.

5b.6 Note shift from "many officials" in the Kaufman piece, 5b.6.1, to "most experts"in the Congressional Research Service report. 5b.6.2 [emphasis added].

5b.6.1, Marc Kaufman, Washington Post, 12/25 /'01; P A22 **** Although the Taliban was effective in greatly reducing poppy planting, **many officials** believe the leadership maintained stockpiles of opium and used the ban to limit the supply and increase the drug's value. Assistant Secretary of State Rand Beers said earlier this month that the Taliban did not ban opium farming "out of kindness, but because they wanted to regulate the market: They simply produced too much opium."

****

This, in turn, is cited in:

5b.6.2 Afghanistan: Narcotics and U.S. Policy, Dec 7, 2004, Christopher M. Blanchard, Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division, **Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, [Pdf 12 of 39],** _____

See, for example: Alfred W. McCoy, The politics of heroin; CIA complicity in the global drug trade. Rev. ed.. '03, ~735 pp.[pdf of original 1972 edit _____] Rev. by Greg Bankoff, Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde, V. 163, No. 1,'07, p. 146-8, Pub. by: KITLV, Royal Netherlands Institute of Southeast Asian and Caribbean Studies Stable URL: ___

McCoy notes: "the world's total legal heroin production plummeted from its peak of nine thousand kilograms … in 1926 to little more than one thousand kilos in 1931." Citing p. 11-12 of "Bulletin on Narcotics", Vol. V, No. 2 April-June 1953, United Nations, Department Of Social Affairs. The chapter on history is at this link on the UNODC website -- at resources-data and analysis – including the chart from which McCoy took his data. _____ The actual chart is at this link. _____ It claims that the numbers for the years 1925-1930 are"incomplete estimates". This compares with ~4E3 tons of opium produced in Afghanistan alone during most of the past 15 years. [see fig. 3 p 13] This equivalent to about 400 tons of heroin. 9 thousand kilos – reported by Mccoy, above , citing UN 1953 -- is only 9 tons!!!

For an early medical/scientific evaluation of alcohol and opium in the late 19th century – when both were freely available to consumers in the US, see, for example: The Disease Of Inebriety From Alcohol, Opium And Other Narcotic Drugs, Its Etiology, Pathology, Treatment And Medico-Legal Relations. By: The American Association For The Study And Cure Of Inebriety. NY, 1893, ~400p

For comparison in 2010: tobacco smoke – incl. 2nd hand smoke 6.3E6 deaths, 157E6 DALY's; Alchohol use 2.7E6 deaths, 97.2E6 DALY's Drug use .16E6 Deaths 23.8E6 DALY's ; Total DALY's 2.5E9 in both 1990 & 2010. GBD Lancet , V. 380, No. 9859, p2224–60, 15/12/'12 _____

and in the version of the same report, same author "Updated May 26, 2005" [Pdf 14 of 47]

"Although U.S. and international officials initially applauded the Taliban policy shift**, most experts** now believe that the ban was designed to increase the market price for and potential revenue from stocks of Afghan opium maintained by the Taliban and its powerful trafficking allies within the country.

In the Sept 26, 2006,pdf 12 of 49 _____ ; Dec 6, 2007 pdf 12 of 53 _____ & 2009 pdf 28 of 53 _____ issues of the same report, by the same author, the phrase **"most experts"** was changed to **"many experts"**, with the footnote citing the same source that stated **"many officials"** .

An interesting comment on the connection between opium in Afghanistan and the CIA – during the Mujahedeen period:

"When the Carter Administration began to ferry arms to the mujahedeen in Afghanistan, there was immediate opposition form Dr. David Musto…White House advisor on drug policy. He asked "are we erring in befriending these tribes as we did in Laos when Air America (chartered by the Central Intelligence Agency) helped transport crude opium from certain tribal areas "There were two reasons why Musto's concerns went unheeded. First, precisely because Afghans drug lords were in open rebellion against the new Soviet supported regime, the CIA counted on them as readily available and dependable allies. Second, as the CIA knew too well from experience, nothing could rival the drug trade as a source of big money for covert warfare."[879] [EMPHASIS ADDED]

[879] **P 140-141 "Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: Amrerica, the Cold War and the Roots of Terror" Mahmood Mamdani, Three Leaves Press Doubleday/Random House, 2004**

APPENDIX 6

THIS APPENDIX SUPPLEMENTS CHAPTER 22a-c: MURDERING SCHOOL TEACHERS FOR TEACHING GIRLS

REPORTS ON THE EDUCATION OF WOMEN AND GIRLS IN KABUL IN THE FIRST HALF OF '98

THE INTENSE FOCUS ON "GIRLS' SCHOOLS" IS SOMEWHAT LIKE INSISTING THAT A STARVING CHILD BE TAUGHT TO READ THE WORD 'FOOD' WITH RESOURCES THAT COULD BE USED INSTEAD TO PROVIDE THE CHILD WITH FOOD TO EAT. ASA

[Also: See footnote 229-B on schools being closed for 3 years before the Taliban came to Kabul in 1995]

All other reports found from time of the reported murder – first half of 1998 – show no murders or any other physical abuse by Taliban (or others) of teachers at scores of home-schools in Kabul. See for example, Jonathan Steele, AP, AFP, Reuters. [See also Prof. B. Rubin in Appendix 7]

"Taliban close down girls' schools in private homes", Mohammad Bashi, Kabul, 270 Wds, 16/6/98, Agence France-Presse: 'Qalamuddin said the Taliban authorities were working out a programme for female education. "We are not against education of girls, but its control is a must," he said.';

"Taliban Closes Schools for Girls" Zaheeruddin Abdullah,663 Wds,16/6/98,AP Online "…survey conducted in January by several humanitarian aid groups … said at least 107 schools, it labeled home schools, were operating in Kabul teaching 6,500 children, half of whom were girls…"

"Taliban closes girls' school. Supporters of the home-based schools say the classes are vital to rebuilding Afghanistan". NATION/WORLD, ZAHEERUDDIN ABDULLAH, Kabul, Associated Press, 319 Words, 17/6/1998, York Daily Record , A; 03 "Under the new rules, the Taliban will issue licenses to schools, but only after scrutinizing their objectives. Schools will not be allowed to teach girls older than 8 and will be limited to lessons about the Koran, the Muslim holy book. The schools on the closure list, the government said Tuesday, violated those rules. "…."There was no immediate word on how the closing order would be enforced."

"Afghan girls learn how to beat the ban". JONATHAN STEELE IN KABUL. 643 words,9 April 1998, The Guardian, p 18: "Every day 350 girls…[attend a in shifts]... Although the school is unofficial, "the Taliban are well aware we exist," says Hafizi Azimullah, a former civil servant who runs the school on behalf of a non-governmental organisation, called the Association for Construction and Development. "Some of these girls have parents who are Taliban themselves."

"When Women Are the Enemy Afghanistan's Taliban fighters have taken the war between the sexes to a new extreme." Carla Power , 1053 words, 3 August 1998, Newsweek, 37, Vol. 132, No. 5, "And last month the Taliban closed 10 home schools for girls, fearing that they were a front for communists or Christians….. earlier in the spring they had signed an agreement to work with the United Nations to open 11 girls' schools and allow more women to work in aid programs."

Afghan Women Demanding End To Their Repression by Militants, Barbara Crossette. New York Times. (Late Edition (east Coast)). New York, N.Y.:Apr 6, 1998. p. 1, *JALALABAD, Afghanistan, April 3* , 2169 words.

No mention of any physical abuse of schoolteachers in very long article that deals extensively with education of women and girls, including home schools.

The following is a good expert summary of the general situation of girls schools in Taliban territory, in late 1997.

There is no indication of any abuse of teachers working in any of the hundreds of girls schools operated by the three different non-Afghan agencies consulted for this study.

The expert, Ralph H. Magnus, was former assistant cultural attaché of the American embassy in Kabul and Coordinator of Middle East Area Studies in the Department of National Security, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, Cal. He is also author, with Eden Naby, of the book: " Afghanistan Mullah, Marx and Mujahid", rev. ed. 2002.

"The Taliban regime has attracted the most attention in the area of women's rights, but the record is mixed.

The general rule is that the Taliban are willing to bend their edicts when there is sufficient local support. [Emphasis added]

The head of CARE Afghanistan, Paul Barker, noted that the Taliban had opposed the education program in Khost, which has an enrollment of 30%-40% girls out of 1,500 students, a higher rate than in Pakistan. The program had the strong support of the local people and took account of local customs, and so the Taliban authorities reversed their stance and deferred to local opinion, continuing the program intact.[CARE News (Atlanta), info@care.org]

Similarly, the Swedish Committee for Afghanistan, which began supporting rural schools in the country during the war against the Soviets, is currently supporting 640 rural schools with 164,000 students of whom 32,000 are girls. Nearly 8,000 of these girls are in Taliban areas, about a tenth of the students or the same rate as in pre-war rural Afghanistan. "The situation is much like that of Afghanistan in former days, the government tries to rule the cities with an iron hand but the countryside does as it pleases." [Telephone conversation with a spokesman, Swedish Committee for Afghanistan (Stockholm), Dec. 10, 1997.]

The Center for Afghanistan Studies at the University of Nebraska at Omaha supports a number of technical training and education programs in both Taliban and non-Taliban controlled regions, including teacher's training for seven girls schools in the heart of the Taliban area at Kandahar. [Thomas Goutierre, director, Center for Afghanistan Studies, telephone interview, Dec. 11, 1997.]

The oil consortium led by UNOCAL, seeking to build a gas pipeline from Turkmenistan to Pakistan, announced that their technical training program for workers, contracted to

the University of Nebraska, has enrolled 140 men in Kandahar and plans to add courses in administrative skills for women as well, with no objection from the Taliban. [BBC News, World, West Asia, Dec. 4, 1997.]"

From "Afghanistan in 1997: The War Moves North", Asian Survey, Vol. 38, No. 2, Feb., 1998, quote is from pp.112-113 of pp. 109-115.

See also: ENDNOTES 20, 20.1, .20.3, 20.4

APPENDIX 7

LETTER FROM PROF. BARNETT RUBIN ON THE MURDER OF A SCHOOL TEACHER IN KABUL, FINGERNAIL POLISH, ACID THROWING AND RELATIONS WITH HAZARAS

Five years after the overthrow of the Taliban, Prof. Rubin, one of the most sought after experts in the US on the situation in Afghanistan, put out the following query to his nearly 1,000 member internet group:

Barnett R. Rubin" Barnett.Rubin@nyu.edu, Mon, 29 Jan 2007 16:45:56 –0500,

Query: Myths about Hikmatyar and Taliban,

Amid all that is going on, perhaps this will seem to be trivial, but I would like to conduct some fact checking. The following are charges commonly leveled at Hikmatyar and the Taliban:

Hikmatyar threw acid in the faces of unveiled women. The Taliban killed women for wearing makeup or teaching girls.

The Taliban cut off the fingers of women who wore nail polish.

I know that Hikmatyar killed a Maoist student leader, Said Bahauddin Majrooh, and thousands of other people, and that he ruthlessly rocketed Kabul (a distinction he shares with many others, including some members of the Afghan parliament).

I know that the Taliban killed thousands of people in Mazar-i Sharif, carried out a scorched earth and forced expulsion policy iun [sic] Shamali, carried out executions in stadiums, cut of the hands of convicted thieves, stoned adulterers, crushed homosexuals under brick walls, and banned girls' educations, with some exceptions.

But I don't know of any evidence for the charges listed above. Does anyone have any?

Thanks,

Barney Rubin

Barnett R. Rubin, Director of Studies and Senior Fellow, Center on International Cooperation (www.cic.nyu. edu), New York University, 418 Lafayette Street, Suite 543, New York, NY 10003, Tel. 212-998-3680, Fax:212-995-4706, Mobile: 917-250-1103, E-Mail: Barnett.Rubin@ nyu.edu

Tuesday, March 27, 2007 4:46 PM
From: "Barnett R. Rubin" <barnett.rubin@nyu.edu>
To: "s adler" vantran613@yahoo.com

Dear Mr. Adler,

> **No one has documented cutting off women's fingernails because they wore nail polish or shooting women teachers. I don't think these happened. [Emphasis added]**

They executed one woman in the Kabul stadium for murder after a trial of some sort. People who were in Kabul in the 1970s claim that "everyone knew" that Hikmatyar (or his people) threw acid at women wearing skirts or something like that, but since those women would still be alive and do not seem to be talking, I retain my doubts about these incidents.

They did carry out massacres in Mazar-i sharif, Kunduz, Yakawlang, and some other places, mostly against Hazaras. Also Uzbeks. There is even testimony from former Taliban about that. They also carried out an amazing scorched earth policy in Shamali, cutting down trees, uprooting vines, burning houses. I saw it myself. They used Hazara prison labor to do it. A friend of mine who was in prison at the time saw it.

In killing people, they were not worse than various groups of the Northern Alliance, but they weren't better either. Nobody in the NA carried out a scorched earth policy like I saw in Shamali.

But they did not behave this way in Pashtun areas. They also mostly left the Hazaras alone as long as they did not rebel, though some of their soldiers harrassed them in Kabul. But they were ruthless with them at any sign of disobedience.

I am interested by what you say about Dadullah. I have heard that his relations with Mullah Umar had been damaged, that Mullah Umar rebuked him for the killings in Yakawlang. What evidence do you have for what you say?

What am I doing about it? Let's just say that if your scholarship has enabled you to open up any channels of direct communication with anyone in the Taliban, I would be interested in hearing about it. There is more than enough dam re'im[880] that has been shed.

Best regards,

Barney Rubin

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[880] Dam re'im is Hebrew: דם רעים -for "blood of friends" A.S.A.

APPENDIX 8

LETTER TO ZOHRA RASEKH

REQUESTING CLARIFICATION ON SOME PROBLEMATIC POINTS IN HER WORK

(sent 9/21/06, no response as of May 2, 2018)

B"H

28 Elul,5766 ,
[28 Sha'ban, 1427] [Shahrivar 29 1385]
[9/21/2006]

To: Mrs. Zohra Rasekh, Director of Human Rights and Women's Affairs:
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Afghanistan, Kabul, Afghanistan
Mobile: +93-70-281980,Phone: +93-70-104005 Phone: +93-20-2100366 , Fax: +1-866-890-9988, Fax:+1-801-459-2967 ,
E-Mail: contact@afghanistan-mfa.net

CC: Erin Carmany,
Feminist Majority Foundation,
1600 Wilson Blvd. Ste. 801
Arlington, VA 22209,
703.522.2214 (ph), 703.522.2219 (fax) http://www.feminist.org, ecarmany@feminist.org

From: A. S. Adler, Researcher/Author,
Jerusalem & NYC,
718-295-3510 (in NYC, USA)

Re: Your report of a woman school teacher murdered by the Taliban in 1998.

I am doing a study of the antecedents to the attacks of 9/11/01 with a focus on the nature of the Taliban -- particularly quantifiable aspects of their activity.

One of the most dramatic quantifiable aspects was their eradication of opium growing throughout their domain. In connection with this very dramatic event, I have not been able to find any credible reports of executions, maimings or floggings. The U.S Dept. of State's emissary to Afghanistan, James Callahan, reported that the ban was carried out largely on the basis of consensus of the elders connected with the mosques. I would be glad to send you a copy of his report on the subject.

I have also found no credible reports of executions in Kabul for adultery during the five years that the Taliban ruled the city. This is important because it supports the idea that the Taliban tried to be careful in observing traditional Muslim law -- which, as I understand it, requires four reliable male witnesses who testify before a court that they saw the accused actually engaged in the act in question. Once it became known that the Taliban were actually executing people for adultery -- they executed about a dozen throughout the country during their five+ years of rule -- the more sophisticated adulterers of Kabul stopped doing it on roof tops, etc.

The first execution of a woman in Kabul under the Taliban occurred three years after they took power -- and that woman, Zarmina, was executed after being convicted of beating her husband to death with a hammer as he slept. There are several reports of this execution -- and none that I have found thus far mention a woman school teacher murdered about a year and a half before.

There are also several articles by different authors on the issue of "home schools" in Kabul during the period in which the murder you report takes place. None of the articles that I have found thus far mentions such a murder -- or any other physical abuse of a woman schoolteacher.

I am sure that you are aware, that during times of conflict, stories enter the public realm that, for whatever reason, have little or no basis in fact. Only half a year ago, on March 26th '06, the very able Dr. Condoleezza Rice, claimed that the Taliban executed people in stadiums for playing music -- yet there are no contemporaneous reports of such executions, in or out of stadiums -- nor was the State Dept. able to supply any other reports when contacted.

There are several other such stories -- concerning the maiming of the hands of women and girls for wearing nail polish -- which appear to have originated with a statement from a diplomat of the "Northern Alliance" -- and the following report that appears in a recent CIA

book offering: "Jawbreaker" , page 98, par 5.*"[see page 52, col 2 of this sefer for this quote]* (Film actually shows one woman executed for murder -- the same Zarmina, mentioned above.)

I hope that you will be able to shed some light on your report. For example:

Were you able to determine the name and age of the school teacher who was executed -- your report states that in addition to her husband, there were 40 young women -- her students -- who saw the event -- and 6 or 7 accomplices of the man who pulled the trigger?

Do you have the address of the school, or the subject matter that she taught, or contact information of the person that gave you the story?

Is the photo that you mention of the man who gave you the report -- the husband of the teacher and witness to the murder -- available for publication?

I would be glad to send you what I have written thus far-- with more detailed references and links. My as yet unfinished article, "Torah and the Taliban" is part of a book that I am writing on the application of Torah -- Jewish traditional law -- to public policy questions. The current draft (5.23) is 77+ pages, 65,000+ words and ~2MB in MS Word format. Much of the memory is devoted to some maps of opium growing in Afghanistan by province and year.

With prayers for Peace/Salaam /Shalom and best wishes for the new year.

A. S. Adler

PS: Below are some quotes from your oral and written testimony before the US Senate in which you present the report of the murdered woman school teacher. [from page 76 of my draft 5.23} [see page 42, col. 2, this sefer.]

PPS: In your much cited JAMA paper: Women's Health and Human Rights in Afghanistan, Zohra Rasekh, MPH ; Heidi M. Bauer, MD, MPH, MS ; M. Michele Manos, PhD, MPH ; Vincent Iacopino, MD, PhD ,*JAMA.* 1998;280:449-455. http://jama.ama-assn.org/cgi/content/full/280/5/449[881]

You say:"All interviews were conducted during a 3-month study period in early 1998 by 1 of the authors (Z.R.) in Farsi."

What percentage of all women in Kabul, at the time of your study, were not sufficiently fluent in English, Farsi or Dari, to be interviewed by someone -- like yourself -- who was not fluent in Pashtun, etc?

One would expect that those women who were most comfortable in Pashtun -- including a large percentage of those women with less formal education (who were so under-represented in your sample) -- would also have been more appreciative of the Taliban.

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Non-random study of attitudes of women in Kabul: " Women's Health and Human Rights in Afghanistan" **Zohra Rasekh, MPH ; Heidi M. Bauer, MD, MPH, MS ; M. Michele Manos, PhD, MPH ; Vincent Iacopino, MD, PhD – JAMA –1998;280:449-455. http://jama.ama-assn.org/cgi/content/full/280/5/449 presented as random sample survey in congressional testimony. Locations of communities in subsequent survey of urban and rural women in Taliban and non-Taliban controlled areas not given – long after the fall of the Taliban. Questions not asked: Religious orientation etc. See: Afghan Women's Health and Human Rights Survey, including questionnaires in appendices A&B**

http://www.phrusa.org/campaigns/afghanistan/Afghan_report_toc.html
http://www.phrusa.org/campaigns/pdf/afghan_pdf_files/03_womens_health.pdf.
http://www.phrusa.org/campaigns/pdf/afghan_pdf_files/04_womens_rights.pdf
http://www.phrusa.org/campaigns/pdf/afghan_pdf_files/07_appendixa.pdf
http://www.phrusa.org/campaigns/pdf/afghan_pdf_files/08_appendixb.pdf

However the published, peer reviewed version of this is substantially improved. See: **: "A Population Based Assessment of Women's Mental Health and Attitudes Towards Women's Human Rights in Afghanistan**", 47 refs, in Journal of Women's Health, p 577-587, V 12 #6, 2003, by Lynn L. Amowitz, MD, MSPH, MSc (Lamowitz@phrusa.org), Michelle Heisler, MD,

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[881] **Letter sent 7/27/14 to co-author Michele Manos, PhD, MPH, requesting info on ethnicity of Ms. Rasekh, noting that she looked Hazara, had been working for an anti-Taliban wire service before PHR, that her testimony about the 7 or 8 Taliban that murdered a school teacher was fabricated and that Beneath the Veil was a propaganda film. http://www.michelemanos.com/contact.html**

MPA, and Vincent Iacopino, MD, PhD; This study took place in 2000 in rural and urban areas centered on two cities: Taliban controlled Jalalabad, capital of Nangarhar and , Faizabad, the leading city of the opposition to the Taliban, in Badakshan province.

Curiously, they found " … very few woman (6%) and men(8%) considered freedom from punishment for dress code infractions to be 'very important' or 'extremely important'" (p 583, par3.)This finding is not shown in any of the figures or tables.(The question is #1-I, PDF page 1 of survey appendix B and is answered on page 59 of the non-peer reviewed version with "Very few women (28%)and men (22%) considered freedom from punishment for dress code infractions to be important.") This report also mentions no participation from Ms. Rasekh.

"Mental Health of Women in Postwar Afghanistan", Report from the CDC, 25 refs, Journal of Women's Health, V. 14, #4, 2005, p285-293, Barbara Lopes Cardozo, MD, MPH, (bhc8@cdc.gov), et al, (This 2002, nationwide study with 699 respondents, is a potential goldmine.)

CV of Zohra Rasekh

http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cedaw/docs/memberscv/ZohraRasekh.pdf **makes no mention of work in anti-Taliban wire service.**

WHO IS ZOHRA RASEKH?

Association with Omar Samad and the anti-Taliban Afghan(istan) Information Center, from 9/1996 "Taliban Militia Capture Key Afghan Eastern Town; Major Showdown Expected" 771 words 12 Sept '96 U.S. Newswire English (Co. 1996) WASHINGTON,.

Left Kabul at age of ~13 in 1979. "… the 35-year-old public health worker continued to share her story with those who would listen…. She's a slight, soft-spoken woman with a writer's eye for detail and an expatriate's heartache. She grew up in a devout Muslim family in Kabul, the capital of Afghanistan. Her family fled after the Soviet invasion in 1979…. [This account omits any mention of her association with the AIC in 1996, noted above.] In 1997, she learned the new ruling power, the Taliban, had forbidden women to work or go to school. She heard they had decreed that women could be treated by only women doctors, but she also heard that women could not practice medicine. Rasekh, who holds a master's degree in public health, said she needed to know what was going on. She persuaded the Boston-based Physicians for Human Rights to sponsor her project: a public health survey of Taliban Afghanistan." Afghan native trying to give sisters hope , Robert L. Smith; PLAIN DEALER REPORTER, Arts & Life , 765 words, 17 October 2001, The Plain Dealer Cleveland, OH, Final, E1

APPENDIX 9

Other topics to be covered, time and resources permitting

9.1 Mullah Omar/ Michael E. Malinowski telephone contact with of State Dept. 8/22/98 – after cruise missile strike, probably translated by S. M. of VOA; http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB134/Doc%202.pdf

9.2 The Case Of Abdus Salaam Zaeef, the ambassador of the Taliban to Pakistan, imprisoned without charge in Guantanamo Bay: Article by Zaeef in Nov 19, 2001 Frontier Post, Peshawar Pakistan http://www.robert-fisk.com/mullah_abdussalaam_zaeef_nov2001.htm [This is now [8/26/14] a dead link. This is a good link from Internet Archive: http://web.archive.org/web/20021119062742/http://www.robert-fisk.com/mullah_abdussalaam_zaeef_nov2001.htm;

Comparison of this article with Mullah Omar –VOA telephone conversation –anti-Israel reference and failure to refer to God or mercy in Zaeef piece; Zaeef released and returned home after nearly four years in prison without charges, New York Times 9/27/05, Carlotta Gall, http://www.cageprisoners.com/articles.php?id=9757;

9.3 New "Reconstructed Taliban Web Site from August, 2001" by "Afghan Historical Society" http://www.geocities.com/afghanistan_ie/. Apparent contradiction with statements that Taliban websites were taken down by US State Department in April of 2001;

9.4 5 Murdered Doctors Without Borders staff in Baghdis province in June 2, 2004 – murdered by "local commander" allied with Kabul Government – not Taliban see: NYT, FOREIGN DESK | April 10, 2005, "Afghan Aid Killings: Suspect, No Arrests" By CARLOTTA GALL (NYT) Late Edition - Final , Sect. 1 , P. 13 , Col. 1, _____

9.5 History of Jews in Afghanistan, particularly in Kandahar; Pashtuns and Jews; Afghanistan Geniza – documents purchased by the National Library of Israel--contrast with "Saudi Arabia";6/10/2005 3715 word article on Jews in Afghanistan Copyright 2005 The Jerusalem Post , SECTION: FEATURES; Pg. 16, "Remains of the day", BY Orly Halpern, Herat Afghanistan, "Herat once the heart of the Afghan Jewish community still provides a nostalgic portal to the past. Box at end of text."

9.6 HINDUS IN KANDAHAR. – INCLUDING STORY OF HINDU DOCTOR UNDER THE TALIBAN.

9.7 Mullah Omar Not On FBI's Terrorist-most wanted list – FBI offers no reward for him, conversation with James Margolin of FBI, Counter-Terrorism office, not wanted for any crime. http://www.fbi.gov/mostwant/terrorists/fugitives.html . Contrast with State Dept. "Rewards for Justice" $10 million reward: "Mullah Omar remains at large and represents a continuing threat to America and her allies." http://www.rewardsforjustice.net/english/index.cfm?page=MullahOmar

9.8 Document in NATIONAL SECURITY ARCHIVE where Taliban mention Jews.

This document has not been found.

Taliban + jew =0 hits
Taliban + jews = 1 hit "Jihad against Jews and crusaders" (not a Taliban document)
Taliban + jewish +2 hits – not Taliban documents
Taleban = 2 hits – not Jewish related

[I remember seeing a document where Taliban in Kandahar mention Jews in Kabul]

Also not found on this site: any document in the Taliban period concerning opium and Afghanistan!!!

opium = 9 hits , none related to the Taliban period in Afghanistan: 1994-2013

poppy or poppies = 4 hits, none related to the Taliban period in Afghanistan: 1994-2013

This suggests that the National Security Archive is highly selective in what it includes -- excluding entirely, materai that may reflect well on "enemies" or badly on "allies"

APPENDIX 10

On Jan 2, 2010, I received an email from Prof. Barnett Rubin with the subject **"History of war in Afghanistan 2001-2005."** It announced the availability of **A Different Kind of War**, the first installment of the Army's official history of the war in Afghanistan[882]. On Jan 3, I wrote to Prof. Rubin about what I had read in the report:

> I read the chapter on the Taliban period in the "History of war in Afghanistan."
>
> It is remarkable that it makes no mention of the phenomenal Taliban opium poppy eradication program. Nor does it attempt to quantify the amount of "punishment" the Taliban actually inflicted.

I also noted that Rashid appeared to be the primary source for much of what the authors of the official history had written. He is cited dozens of times in the report – particularly in the first chapter on the background before the 9/11 attacks.[883]

In my letter to Professor Rubin, I pointed out that Ahmed Rashid had been the key correspondent covering Afghanistan for the Far Eastern Economic Review [FEER] when that periodical published a spurious story on the opium poppy ban. I noted that FEER had written:

"...according to a Western intelligence source monitoring Taliban-run Voice of Shariat radio, the Taliban has already scrapped a ban on poppy cultivation, clearing the way for renewed opium and heroin production after little more than a year's break.

The source says the move was announced on September 2 --nine days before hijacked airliners slammed into New York and Washington." [884]

This was enough for me to take a closer look at Ahmed Rashid's work – something that I had not taken the time to do previously since what I had seen of it appeared to be unverifiable. The following lays out what I found *[885]

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[882] This email was sent to one of Prof. Rubin's lists of people with a special interest in Afghanistan – not specifically to me. The report cited in the email was available at: _____. Now it's out as an 18MB, searchable pdf with color maps & pictures. _____

[883] There are 60 hits for his name in a pdf search & none for Michael Griffin, who wrote a bestselling book on the Taliban "Reaping the Whirlwind" [UPI, Oct/1/'01, Bestsellers, 1st noted in the press: The Spectator, 5/19/'01, p.36-7. Philip Hensher] [The book appears in the British Libr cat. in 3 editions., 1st,'98, 192 p. _____; 2nd,'01,283+xxi p._____;3rd,'03, 435+xxiv._____All pub. by Pluto, Lond.] [Full text pdf _____] It was listed/reviewed several times together with Rashid's "Taliban" & was considered a work of comparable worth, e.g:

"The books under review are well written and contain extensive notes.... Overall, as journalists, Michael Griffin and Ahmed Rashid have produced two timely and informative books on a topic that is certain to fire the imagination of both scholars and elements in the news and entertainment media." Review by: M. Jamil Hanifi, Middle East J., v. 56, #2 (Spring, 2002), pp. 329-32. ___

In the same vein, in the weeks following the 9/11 attacks, Rashid's work was promoted by the US State Dept., UK Prime Minister, Tony Blair & German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer , e.g:

a.. "...Ahmed Rashid's book "The Taliban," an excellent book..." Federal News Service, Oct/4/01, special State Department briefing, subject: U.S. Humanitarian assistance to Afghan refugees.

b.. "Taliban: Islam, Oil and the New Great Game in Asia, a book which Tony Blair and various associates such as Alastair Campbell are said to be reading." The Guardian (London), 10/10/01 "Tony Blair is reported to have swotted up on Afghanistan from a bestselling book. So what does it say?, Giles Foden, Guardian Features, Pg. 9.

c.. "Tony Blair has a well-thumbed copy[of Rashid's book] and it has been cited in public by Joschka Fischer, the German foreign minister." The Herald (Glasgow), 10/22/01, Cameron Simpson, Pg. 1

d... "since September 11 [Rashid's]... book has sold a staggering 230,000 copies - helped not least by the revelation that it is Tony Blair's current bedtime read. Before the attacks, it had sold just 6,000." O. Burkeman, J. Borger, Feat., p. 2, Guardian (Lond.) 10/31/01

Griffin's work wasn't mentioned by any of them. Tho' his 2001 book includes a chronology ending Jan 3/01, it has no mention of the opium poppy ban. [Most of this note added Oct 1-6/'13.] His much larger, 2003 edition does mention ban [p236-7] but does not dispute reports that they did it to raise the price. Whole book avail. as pdf, at

[884] See Append. 5b, 5b.1-.4 for details on this false rept & sources of accurate news on same events. This rept could've led to major profits on opium by large scale Far East opium buyers. Between Sept. 2 & 9/11, Far East wholesale opium sellers who saw this rept -- & didn't see the accurate repts on the subject – would've unloaded their opium stocks at a much lower price than otherwise – in anticipation of a price collapse following the reported lifting of the ban by the Taliban.

In the days after 9/11, the opium price collapsed in Afghanistan- see Fig 5 & 6, supra -- as OBL & the Taliban were quickly accused of involvement & many anticipated a US attack. With all of this, the false report was published in the FEER in its Oct. 11 issue, long after the 9/11 attacks. It may have been just another report to make the Taliban look bad – like much of the rest of the article-- or just some kind of ordinary mistake. It remains curious – if it was an ordinary mistake -- that the author/editors of the article were not aware/made no note of the wire service stories that the Taliban had in fact extended the ban. For an extremely anti-Taliban article on the opium poppy ban, see footnote 100, [most of this note added Oct 7/13]

[885] The text up to this * was added on the 1st day of Chanukah, 5771.[12/01/'10]. It's based mostly on an email to Prof. Rubin & others -- of 1/03/2010. What follows is adapted from an email to Prof. Rubin & others, sent 1/08/'10. For much more on Rashid's unreliable work see:

A. Chapter 22c – where he's #3 in the credits of a film made by a friend of the family of Ahmed Shah Massoud to bash the Taliban. [cont. next page]

Ahmed Rashid has written several widely acclaimed books on the situation in Afghanistan, Pakistan and neighboring Central Asia.[886] He's become a highly respected consultant on the situation in Afghanistan and on the Taliban. His access to sources in the region far surpasses most others writing in English on these subjects.

With all of this, it's difficult to gauge how reliable his presentations of facts are -- or how good his analysis is of those facts. With most of it, almost all of those reading his books would be hard pressed to refute anything he says. We were not there. We didn't speak with the people he says he spoke with. We have no other sources to rely on[887].

When it comes to his reporting on the phenomenal opium poppy ban implemented by the Taliban between the summer of 2000 and the fall of 2001, we do have several other very reliable sources.

First , let's see what he has to say about the ban in his ~500 page, 2008 book: **Descent Into Chaos…**[888]**.** On page 320 of the Google preview edition, he has the following paragraph -- less than 200 words -- on the ban.

> "The Taliban were repeatedly told by the United States and the UN that if they banned poppy cultivation, it would win them international sympathy and perhaps even political recognition. After three consecutive bumper crops, the Taliban suddenly banned poppy cultivation in 2001. Harshly imposed on farmers, the ban was highly effective --- opium production that year slumped to just 185 tons – and was termed "the most effective drug control action of modern times." **[5]** However, the Taliban did not prohibit trafficking in existing stocks, and it later became clear

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B. He doesn't mention the use of counterfeiting by Massoud & in his story of the robbery of the money changer's market – he makes up details to make the Taliban look bad. See: Ch 14 a: Massoud & Co. : Printing Money In Russia; c: The Physical Integrity Of The Kabul Money Market …Under Massoud & The Taliban.

He writes "On …[1/13/'00], the money market in Kabul was robbed by its Taliban guards who stole the equivalent of some US 200,000 dollars. The money market shut down in protest for several days as the 'Afghani' plummeted against the US dollar." [p79-80 '02, I.B Tauris, Taliban: Islam, Oil and the New Great Game in Central Asia.

Contemporaneous reports from Kabul give a different story: AFP, 1/13/00, "Kabul's money market burgled" DATELINE: KABUL, Jan 13, "Burglars broke into Afghanistan's main money market in the capital Kabul and stole more than 200,000 dollars, money changers said Thursday. Shopkeepers blamed soldiers from the ruling Taliban militia, who had been posted inside the market as guards overnight. …The market was locked until lunchtime Thursday when the Taliban authorities assigned new guards to the market. …The market was last looted six years ago, when it was set on fire in January 1994 [before Jan 8th when it was still in flames, 1/9/94, NYT, "Diplomats Escape Afghanistan as Brief Truce Stills the Guns", BYLINE: Reuters,KABUL, Afghanistan, Jan. 8, A1; p 4; Col. 3 – it is not clear from this article if the fire was deliberately set or resulted from the general bombing and chaos.] by supporters of Afghani ex-president Burhanuddin Rabbani, who was dislodged from the capital by the Taliban two years later.

[EMPHASIS ADDED] There's no mention here or in subsequent articles dateline Kabul in the next few days of the market remaining closed or change in the value of the af around the time of this crime. [This partly duplicates material in Ch 14c]

C. The following year, there was another story about the Afghan currency that was missed in Rashid's updated book: AFP, 1/20/01, "Afghan currency plunges to all-time low" DATELINE: KABUL, Jan 20 `Afghanistan's currency Saturday plunged to an all-time low a day after tough UN sanctions took effect [Jan 19 2001] on the expiry of a deadline for the Taliban to surrender suspected terrorist Osama bin Laden…."The opposition is playing a great role in the depreciation of the afghani value," head of the market said.'

[EMPHASIS ADDED] [This partly duplicates material in Ch. 14a]

D. He says that the face of one of the Bamyan statues was blown off in 1998 – when it hadn't had a face for 100+ years. See footnote 118.

E. He uncritically & openly promotes the story of the enemies of the Taliban that the Taliban destroyed statues in the Kabul Museum & Bamiyan to cover the sale of 40 Museum pieces that were otherwise not accounted for. At least 300 pieces in the KM that were smashed by the Taliban were subsequently restored – incl. many of the most valuable. [See footnotes 177 E.12a, B0l.4,E5a,E7.2,E.11m]

F. He promotes the false story that the former president of Afghanistan was castrated and jeep dragged by the Taliban [see footnote 813 & see CHAPTER 11 Was The Former President Of Soviet Occupied Afghanistan Tortured, Cas-trated & Jeep-Dragged By The Taliban?]

[886] 'The Resurgence of Central Asia: Islam or Nationalism?' (Politics in Contemporary Asia),'95; ' Taliban - Militant Islam, Oil And Fundamentalism In Central Asia,' Yale U. Pr., 1st review, 2/21/'00, The Evening Standard, Lond., p. 56, 801 Words, James Buchan; revised edition, 2010; 'Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia' 2002; 'Silk Road to Ruin: Is Central Asia the New Middle East?' with Ted Rall, 2006; `Descent into Chaos: The United States and the Failure of Nation Building in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia', 2008.

This last work was first reviewed in the NYT, in a biographically oriented piece of 1216 words on p. A8 of the news section: "Frontier Years Give Might to Ex-Guerrilla's Words" by Jane Perlez, 05 July 2008: A.8. The article begins with: " FRESH out of Cambridge University in the late 1960s, and steeped in the era's favorites -- Marx, Mao and Che -- Ahmed Rashid took off for the hills of Baluchistan, a dry, tough patch of western Pakistan. He stayed for 10 years." There's no indication here or elsewhere that Ahmed Rashid had a religious conversion & can now be considered at least tolerant of religious people.

In the preface of his book "Taliban…" [p xviii-xvix] – Rashid says "…Hekmatyar sentenced me to death for being a communist sympathizer…" but doesn't say if this was or had ever been true. He adds that he was interrogated by the Afghan KGB – when Najib headed it – but then won the confidence of Najib when he became president. Curiously, in his denials of bias & stories of being attacked by both sides, he says nothing about his sympathies for Che & Co, the USSR, or accusations that he was working for the US/CIA. [added 1/18/16.] also see footnote 548 F

A month after the biographically oriented article, the NYT published a full length, 1289 word piece by Raymond Bonner in the Book Review Section: "War in Progress" (Aug 10/'08)BR.18. There's no mention of opium or poppy in either piece. [This paragr. was added Oct. 11, '12]

[887] With some of his widely quoted statements, he doesn't even claim to have been there – & cites no sources for what are presented as fact. E.g, see, footnotes 118-A 325 & 813 for his specious reports on the death of Najib.in '96 & dynamiting the face of a Buddhist statue in '98.

[888] Here is a link to the Google preview version of the book: http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=JFCAgmVdwcYC&oi=fnd&pg=PA1&dq=%22descent+into+chaos%22+ahmed+rashid&ots=

that the ban had been the result of overproduction and a slump in opium prices, which had collapsed from $600 to just $30 a kilogram. The ban promptly pushed the price up to $650 a kilogram. Nevertheless it had devastated many farmers, who were left with large unpaid loans to drug dealers and no source of income. The ban led to anger against the Taliban on the eve of 9/11 and increased opposition to the regime. The collapse of the Taliban regime coincided with the poppy planting season, and farmers immediately planted poppy to pay off their debts."

[5] *What follows is the source of the quote found in a Google search. The actual reference used by Ahmed Rashid is not visible in the Google preview edition.* Farrell G; Thorne J.: "Where have all the flowers gone?: Evaluation of the Taliban crackdown against opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan." International J. of Drug Policy 16(2):81-91,'05. (31 refs.) ***The quote is in the abstract, on p. 80.*** **[abstract is copied on p. 204 of this book, at 5a.]**

The first thing to note is that Rashid says that opium production "slumped to just 185 tons." In the source cited for the quote at the end of the same sentence, it states -- based on UN data -- "**The result was a 99% reduction in the area of opium poppy farming in Taliban-controlled areas." [ibid, page 80, abstract]** Rashid does not take the trouble to point out that almost all of the 185 tons was in the area controlled by the Northern Alliance.[889] For a man as gifted in the use of the English language as Ahmed Rashid, "slumped" is the wrong word -- unless you are trying to understate what actually happened.[890]

Before this, Rashid writes of "three consecutive bumper crops" after which "the Taliban suddenly banned poppy cultivation in 2001" This statement contains three problematic points.

1. The ban on opium poppy growing was announced in the summer of 2000 -- not in 2001.[891]

2. The Taliban had announced and partly enforced a 1/3 reduction in opium poppy growing between 1999 and 2000.[892] This was most effective in Kandahar province -- the home base of the Taliban. In Kandahar, the area devoted to opium poppy growing dropped from 5,522 hectares to only 3,034 hectares between 1999 and 2000[893].

For the country as a whole, in the provinces controlled by the Taliban, the area devoted to opium poppy growing dropped from 88.000 to 79,000 hectares between 1999 and 2000. At the same time, the two provinces that were controlled by the Northern Alliance -- Badakhshan and Takhar -- increased their area devoted to opium poppy growing from 2,885 to 3,105 hectares.

So the complete ban announced in the summer of 2000 was part of an on-going process. Though its timing and extent were not predictable, it was not a 'bolt from the blue' – as suggested by Rashid's term, "suddenly."

3. Based on what has been stated in #2 -- 2000 was not a "bumper crop". In the years 2004 to 2009 -- under the auspices of US occupation- the area devoted to opium poppy growing has exceeded by far anything that obtained under the Taliban -- giving us a sense of what a true "bumper crop" might be.

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889 **86% by acreage was in Badakhshan & Takhar provinces. See Tables on p. 11 & 25. 150.7 of the 185.5 MT, ~81%, was in Badkhshan alone with another 1.7MT in Takhar, for a total of ~82% of tonnage. [pdf p 22 & 24 of _____] The US DEA, using aerial reconnaissance, found 74 MT for all Afg. See p 76.**

890 **[added Nov. 9/'15] Similarly, the Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 2001, publ. 01/Jun/'02, par. 441, has . "In Afghanistan, as a result of the prolonged drought and the ban on opium poppy cultivation issued in July 2000 for the implementation of provisions of a drug control law promulgated in 1998 by the Taliban, such cultivation was significantly reduced in the areas controlled by the Taliban." One might think from this that the primary reason the cultivation was "significantly reduced" was the drought. In par. 443 , we learn that "In Afghanistan, the harvest in the crop year 2000/2001 is estimated to be less than one tenth of the harvest in the previous crop year." There is no mention that the prior 2 years were also afflicted with terrible drought. [See footnote 36 & App. 5] Though there is a mention in this paragraph of illicit stocks, there is no mention in the report of where in Afghanistan these were.[see footnote 131] _____**

891 **Broadcast by Taliban Radio Shariat,[TRS] Fri., 7/28/'00, Kabul, AFP; TRS cited by Amir Shah, Kabul, AP; Afghan Islamic Press cited by Japan Economic Newswire in Islamabad.**

892 **AFP – English, Oct 06, 1999 09:09 'Afghan Taliban orders opium crop to be cut by a third', 325 words, KABUL, ""Since the season for poppy sowing has arrived again, we are announcing to all poppy growers to decrease by a third their poppy cultivation," 'Taliban Supreme leader Mulla Mohammad Omar said in a Radio Shariat broadcast. "Violators will be given legal punishment."' [This AFP note added Oct 4/13]**

'Omar said in return for announcing the cut in opium production, he hoped the world community would help fund public projects in Afghanistan and help improve its dire economic situation." If they helped …[in the above ways] in return for the elimination of poppy cultivation, the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan would continue its efforts for the complete elimination of poppy cultivation," Omar said.'

893 **Data from table , p 14, -- which gives primary sources.**

Rashid says that the ban was "Harshly imposed on farmers" but gives no evidence of that harshness. In fact, there are no reports at Amnesty International or Human Rights Watch of any executions, maimings or floggings in connection with a ban that eliminated nearly 70% of the non-official opium poppy growing in the world.

The same sources give us some insight into the "harshness" of the Taliban in general. Their rate of judicial executions per capita per year in their last year as a nearly nationwide functioning government -- 2000 -- the year that included the ban -- was about half of what it was in Texas under Bush and about a sixth[894-A] of what it was in Saudi Arabia in the same year. This is even more remarkable as the Taliban at the time were at war; they were the pariah nation of the world; they were under UN sanctions -- and they were governing a country that was being devastated by years of drought. They were the functioning government of provinces that included 94% of the in-country population. These provinces included several very different ethnic groups and religious cultures – people that were often in conflict with each other and had a very recent history of civil war.

A public report by James Callahan of the U.S State Department, says they implemented the opium poppy ban by consensus of the elders connected with the mosques throughout their domain. They actually wiped out opium poppy growing across ethnic, religious and geographic divides. They even reduced it by 99.9% in Balkh province -- the former home territory of their enemy, General Dostom. This was not the work of a "failed state" or a puppet of bin Laden or the Pakistani intelligence services. This was the work of an effective government with broad, deep indigenous support.

Rashid then refers to how the price of opium "collapsed from $600 to just $30 a kilogram". He does not say what his source is for the initial $600 figure or in what year the price stood so high[894-B,C,D]. The impression given by Rashid is that the three supposed bumper crops he refers to brought on this "collapse".

However, the UN program for monitoring farmgate prices of opium in Afghanistan goes back to the spring of '97[895] and shows a maximum price of $116 in Jan of '99 in Nangarhar. At the same time the price was only $59 in Kandahar -- the Taliban stronghold. For Kandahar, the highest price in the

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894-A Based on A.I. data alone, it was 1/3rd & 1/10th for Texas and Saudi Arabia, respectively. Additional reports of executions under the Taliban were found in a LexisNexis search. See footnote 35 & assoc. tables. [This Footnote added Jul/5/'16]

894-B He might have consulted his own, extremely successful book "Taliban" now ('12) in a 2nd, updated, English edition. In his chapter: "HIGH ON HEROIN: DRUGS AND THE TALIBAN ECONOMY", he provides an interview with a Kandahari opium poppy farmer "in the spring of 1997" -- the year before the three years of "bumper crops". He says of the farmer:

> **"...Wali Jan produces 45 kilograms of raw opium every year and earns about US $ 1,300 – a small fortune for Afghan farmers. Wali Jan knows that refined heroin fetches 50 times that price in London or New York, but he is more than happy with what he gets."**

The 1st edit. pub. in '00, 1st noted in the press, Feb. 8 [Guardian leader pages, p 22 "A warning from Stansted..."], reviewed NYT 4/26/'00. 2nd rev. edit. went to press more than 9 yrs later – well after "Descent Into Chaos..." has no changes in the above quoted text. $1300/45kg=$28.89/kg – consistent with UN sources for Kandahar in that period – nowhere near $600/kg.

He might have also cited the UN report "Statistics And Analysis On Supply Of And Trafficking In Narcotic Drugs And Psychotropic Substances" '96. On pdf p39 farmgate prices of opium in Afghan are shown for '86-96 at $17-$50. http://www.unodc.org/pdf/technical_series_1998-03-01_1.pdf [footnote added and revised Nov. 3,''10]

894-C Gretchen Peters accompanied Rashid when he interviewed the farmer, Wali Jan, in above quote in "spring of 1997"– & gives the district "Arghandab – a fertile suburb of Kandahar"p 73, Seeds of Terror, 2010, Picador/Pan Macmillan in UK&Australia/Georg von Holtzbrinck Pub. Gr'p.

She also writes: "UN Officials believed the Taliban, al Queda and allied drug lords possessed more thatn 2,800 metric tons of opium. ... If processed into crystal heroin and smuggled to the West, the deadly harvest could keep every addict there high for more than three years "p 106, citing Ch. 3 footnote 114. "Another Powder Trail" *Economist*, October 18, 2001

The Economist had written " UN officials believe that 2,800 tonnes of opium, convertible into 280 tonnes of heroin, is in the hands of the Taliban, the al-Qaeda network of militant Islamists, and other Afghan and Pakistani drug lords... UN officials say the current Afghan stockpile is enough to keep every addict in Europe supplied for three years. " the same article claims "According to UN officials, the current food shortage partly reflects a conscious decision by the regime to promote the cultivation of opium rather than wheat." The ony UN offical named in this article is The UNODCCP'S director Pino Arlacchi – but he is not quoted in connection with thse statements.____ There is no hint in this article or in the book by Peters that the stockpiles are on the Tajikestan border – or in the hands of farmers and traders – and that realtively little was thought to be I nthe hands of the Taliban. Massoud/Massood is not mentioned in the book or article in connectio with drugs.

894-D [added 9/28/17] It would be interesting to see if any of the translations of Descent into Chaos that were produced substantially after this analysis of Rashid's errors was written, contain any revisions in the direction of truthfulness on the points raised – such as the 600$/kg. The German edition, Sturz ins Chaos, was reviewed in Der Spiegel, Aug. 2, 2010 "Fegefeuer des Fundamentalismus" p. 104-108, #31, http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-72462709.html & is listed by the publisher, Weltkiosk, as coming out in July. http://weltkiosk.net/sturz-ins-chaos . The Descent Into Chaos (Persian/Dari Translation) سقوط در هرج و مرج by Shah M Book Co,Kaabul, is listed as coming out in 2011 and noted by Rashid on 13/02/11.

895 This is true for the chart found in the paper by Farrell & Thorne [see Append. 5a.1, supra]. After writing this, the author found UN data going back to '86 – cited above and shown on p. 17. The price also remained low in this pre-97 period. [Footnote added May 6, 2013]

period covered by the UN data was $67 in Aug. of '98 -- when the price in Nangarhar was only $55. It is interesting to see that the average price in Kandahar for the last five months of '97 was $33 and never exceeded $34.

It is also interesting that when the area devoted to opium poppy growing in Kandahar was reduced by 45% from spring 1999 to spring 2000, the price in that area dropped by more than 30%.

Rashid gives the impression -- promoted by the Northern Alliance -- that the Taliban implemented the ban to boost slumping opium prices. Yet he begins this paragraph by saying. "The Taliban were repeatedly told by the United States and the UN that if they banned poppy cultivation, it would win them international sympathy and perhaps even political recognition."

He then goes on to say "The ban promptly pushed the price up to $650 a kilogram." Actually the price gradually rose over the course of a year. In Kandahar it rose from $31 per kg in June of 2000 -- before the ban was announced -- to $288 in July of 2001. By September 10, 2001 it had hit $650 in Kandahar. If the purpose of the ban was to raise revenue for the Taliban, reducing production by close to 99% while increasing the price even by a factor of 20 would result in a reduction in revenue by a factor of five -- not an increase. The opium that continued to be sold in Kandahar after the ban was all from old stocks. Farmers in the region actually bank opium. If there is a large crop, they save up to 60% in anticipation of possible shortfalls in future years -- or just to save the equivalent of money. Farmers who did this would have been able to pay off their debts with higher priced opium saved from previous years.

But Rashid says that the ban "devastated many farmers." Many is not the same as most or even a substantial fraction. Most farmers were not involved in opium in the first place and most of those who were involved in previous years were probably able to take care of their debts by selling at a high price the opium they saved from recent high production years.

As long as we are looking closely at the opium price data, the farmgate prices in two widely separated regions remained both level and extremely low up until the ban was announced. Any insider attempt to corner the opium market would have shown up as a significant increase in price prior to the ban.

If the Taliban had held on to their opium stocks prior to the ban – including stocks from "ushr" and stocks they may have had from in-kind taxes on cross border traders – it would have signaled an impending price increase to those they usually sold to. This would have led these traders to buy up more stock from other sources – both to satisfy their ongoing demand and on speculation of a price increase. This increased demand would have driven up the farmgate price - but the farmgate price remained very low and flat – clearly indicating that the Taliban continued selling their stocks in their normal way prior to the ban.

This price pattern also shows that the Taliban not only didn't engage in significant speculative hoarding themselves, but that they were also very good at preventing the kind of leaks that would have led others to hoard. It also shows a high level of social stability and the absence of banditry: taxes on opium farmers and traders were low, fair and predictable; opium poppy caravans were not being robbed. [896]

The absence of significant speculative hoarding and reasonable taxation indicated by the low, flat farmgate prices prior to the ban, were probably important elements in convincing the farmers that the Taliban were not corrupt and could be relied upon to treat all farmers fairly.

Rashid then concludes his piece on "the most effective drug control action of modern times." by telling us:

> **"The ban led to anger against the Taliban on the eve of 9/11 and increased opposition to the regime. The collapse**

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[896] **A. See note F, fig. 5 , p. 17, comparing implications of prices in the pre-ban period & 5 yrs later – after the Taliban was replaced by US supported military forces. [note added 8/22/13].**

B. This data, combined with the data on production on p 13, also shows that a drop in production of ~1/3 –after crop disease &/or drought -- led to a more than doubling of price -tho' a multifactor analysis should be applied for a more reliable result. Still it suggests a ≥$10/kg pre-announcement price incr. should've resulted if the Taliban horded opium in anticipation of the ban. The "Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 2000" notes the elimination of taxes on cannabis & heroin – not farmgate opium. [see footnote 588C] but this may be a reporting error & it may have meant farmgate opium – not heroin.[note added Aug 4/'15]

of the Taliban regime coincided with the poppy planting season, and farmers immediately planted poppy to pay off their debts. "

Wouldn't it be more reasonable to believe that the farmers planted opium in anticipation of a long war and insecurity -- and that the money from opium would enable them to survive in a war environment by buying the food, transportation and weapons they thought that they needed?

Rashid makes no mention here of what happened to the promise of international recognition -- or what the people in the Northern Alliance were doing during the time of the ban -- or after the collapse of the Taliban.

While the Taliban used consensus of the elders throughout their domain to reduce opium poppy growing in the provinces they controlled by nearly 99% -- to help win the international recognition they wanted and to lift the sanctions -- the Northern Alliance -- the people with the seat of Afghanistan in the UN -- increased opium poppy growing by over 100%.

With this, the Northern Alliance kept the seat of Afghanistan in the UN – though it was the UN itself that collected and published the data that showed who was doing what with respect to opium.

When the US began soaking the Northern Alliance with money to get them to fight the Taliban – these new American Allies in the "War on Terror" sank much of that bribe money into opium growing. Official UN data for 2002 show that in Badakhshan Province – the home province of the Northern Alliance – the only province that the Taliban never controlled -- opium poppy growing increased to more than three times what it had been in any of Rashid's "three consecutive bumper crop.." years of 1998-2000.

It continued to increase dramatically in Badakhshan Province in subsequent years. It was not to "pay off their debts" as Rashid suggests of the farmers he says hated the Taliban. It was to invest American money – and make a lot more.

All this should at least begin to suggest that the Taliban were not a Failed State, a Rogue State or the puppets of anyone. It should also show that when we compare what Ahmed Rashid says about a very important issue to other, usually reliable sources that provide data on the same issue, Rashid comes up short on both facts and analysis. We should not rely on his facts or analysis in other areas.

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A key Torah issue in connection with the Taliban is not condemning people until the accusation against them has been properly evaluated by a judicial process and they have been found guilty. It should be obvious, but in the case of the Taliban, it appears that in the U.S. one can accuse them -- falsely -- of really horrible things and the false accusations will be believed-- almost without question-- by most people.

There is real irony here. The Taliban were sticklers for Moslem law. They would rather see the guilty go free than see their courts corrupted by bribes, bullying or a rush to judgment. They understood that the Court in Heaven will punish the guilty even if the courts of men – following their rules of evidence – can't. The U.S. and NATO – in the name of their own supposedly superior concepts of law and justice -- attack and kill them by the tens of thousands without a trial and hire drug dealers and mercenaries to do their dirty work.

From: Barnett Rubin <barnettrrubin@gmail.com>
Subject: Re: ahmed rashid not reliable on pre9/11 taliban

To: "s adler" <vantran613@yahoo.com>
Date: Wednesday, January 13, 2010, 1:44 PM

steve,

Please leave my friend ahmed alone. Like anyone who writes a lot, he makes some mistakes, but he is a very honest, sincere and hardworking guy who does not deserve to be targeted.

Best,

Barney Rubin
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On Thu, Jan 14, 2010 at 2:45 AM, s adler <vantran613@yahoo.com> wrote:

B"H

Dear Prof. Rubin,

I don't know how or why Ahmed Rashid came to write the things he wrote in his earlier books but one would think that by 2007, scholars like yourself might have pointed out the errors in his work. The stuff about the Taliban banning opium poppy growing to increase the price is the line of the Northern Alliance and is not supported by the facts. The line about "harsh" measures being used for enforcement of the ban is also bunk. Why don't you ask Ahmed Rashid why he wrote that stuff in his 2008 work? Why don't you ask yourself and your colleagues why almost none have publicly recognized these errors or the peculiar work of Zohra Rasekh?

Tens of thousands of people have been murdered based in part on these errors -- a society has been flooded with money in the hands of mercenaries based in part on these errors.

This is not the fault of Ahmed Rashid. Something broader and deeper is going on here than a capable journalist making a few glaring errors.

I still don't know if President Obama has seen those maps -- or even if Ambassador Holbrooke has seen them. Do you know? Can you tell us?

Very sincerely,

A.S. Adler

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From: Barnett Rubin <barnettrrubin@gmail.com>
Subject: Re: ahmed rashid not reliable on pre9/11 taliban
To: "s adler" <vantran613@yahoo.com>
Date: Wednesday, January 13, 2010, 7:39 PM

Holbrooke has not seen the maps. But we all know that Taliban successfully banned opium cultivation for one year. Lots of mistakes have resulted in ltos of deaths on all sides. some of us are trying to stop this, including ahmed rashid, with whom I discussed this yesterday. Many many people have violated al teileich rachil be-amecha.[897] There are killings and suffering and lies on all sides. Two days ago my taxi driver in Abu Dhabi was a Hazara Afghan from Kabul whose grandfather was killed by the Taliban in Bamiyan. Plus thousands of Taliban were killed in Mazar-i sharif. and then taliban killed thousands of Hazaras and uzbeks. We can go on and on, and everyone has his own selective version of the facts. I have only one motto right now: bakesh shalom ve-ridfuhu[898]. No one can think clearly about complex truths in the middle of a battle. Ahmed is an ally in the quest for peace. He is suffering a lot right now because of all the killing and oppression. He is not campaigning for more of it but to end it. Please show midat ha-rahamim[899] toward him and leave middat ha-din for th kadosh baruch hu[900].

Best,

barney Rubin

From: s adler <vantran613@yahoo.com>
Subject: Re: ahmed rashid not reliable on pre9/11 taliban

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[897] **ASA: Prof. Rubin is quoting from Lev. 19:16:**

לֹא-תֵלֵךְ רָכִיל בְּעַמֶּיךָ, לֹא תַעֲמֹד עַל-דַּם רֵעֶךָ: אֲנִי, יְהוָה.

"Thou shalt not go up and down as a talebearer among thy people; neither shalt thou stand idly by the blood of thy neighbour: I am the LORD."

[898] **ASA: Prof. Rubin is quoting the highlighted part of Psalms 34:15:**

סוּר מֵרָע, וַעֲשֵׂה-טוֹב; בַּקֵּשׁ שָׁלוֹם וְרָדְפֵהוּ.

"Depart from evil, and do good; seek peace, and pursue it."

[899] **the character of Mercy .**

[900] **"…leave the character of judgment to the Holy One, blessed be He."**

To: "Barnett Rubin" <barnettrrubin@gmail.com>,

"LauraTisdel" <Laura.Tisdel@us.penguingroup.com>, harvey_cox@harvard.edu, "Spozhmai Maiwandi" <smaiwand@VOANews.COM>, bcrossette@aol.com, rwb3@columbia.edu, "Bernard FRAHI" <bernard.frahi@unodc.org>, "nadine berg" nadine.berg@mail.house.gov

Cc: "ahmed rashid" <ahmed.rashid04@gmail.com>,

hrwnyc@hrw.org, "brian griffey" <hrwpress@hrw.org>, levinei@hrw.org, "kenneth roth" <rothk@hrw.org>, "Nisha Varia" <varian@hrw.org>, walshj@hrw.org

Date: Friday, January 22, 2010, 12:38 AM

B"H

Dear Professor Rubin,

Please excuse the delay in responding to your very thoughtful note!!

This is not about Ahmed Rashid. He is an excellent writer and I hope that he goes on to write other important books -- in good health for many years. God willing, he will include some convincing explanations of how the mistakes I have pointed out got into his earlier works. It would be a good lesson for all of us. If he puts these observations into a cogent magazine article and has it published in the coming weeks, it would be that much better.

The opium poppy ban is not so well known. That opium poppy growing was reduced by almost 99% in the areas controlled by the Taliban -- including Dostom's home province where those massacres took place - is known by very few. That their enemies increased opium poppy growing in the same time frame by over 100 % in the area they controlled is also known by [even[901]] fewer. That the Taliban did what they did without any "harsh" measures -- without executions, maimings or floggings -- is known by even fewer and that the farmgate prices remained so low and flat prior to the ban being announced is know[n] by almost none. I spoke to Aryeh Neier about the Taliban opium poppy ban this evening at an OSI event and it was my impression that even he had not seen that price data.

How do you think the public would react if they knew these things? How do you think they'd react if they knew that the well known stories of attacks on women -- like maiming the hands of women and girls for wearing nail polish; murdering a woman school teacher in front of her students; lining up women to be shot in stadiums as some kind of macabre religious sport and stoning large numbers of woman adulterers to death while letting their male paramours go free-- are all bunk?

The atmosphere of public opinion about the Taliban has been poisoned by this bunk -- including much of it from the mellifluous pen of your friend Ahmed Rashid. The atmosphere has been so poisoned that honest scholars like yourself are hesitant to stand up and tell the truth.

It is true that there has been a lot of killing all around and that the Taliban were responsible for massacres of Hazaras in Bamyan. It is also recognized that those massacres were much more of an aberration than a rule -- just as the Taliban leader of that campaign -- Mullah Dadulah -- was an aberration among the Taliban. He was among the few Taliban leaders who were intensely anti-Jewish and intensely pro bin Laden. Mullah Omar relieved him of his command because of his massacre of Hazaras and he and his brother have now gone on to the Olam ha Emes – they're both dead.

Whatever the reality of the reports of massacres and counter massacres at Mazar e Sharif, the Taliban established their governance in that area -- Balkh Province -- and were able to show the world a reduction in opium poppy growing there of 99.9%. That they did this -- as elsewhere in their domain - without executions maimings or floggings, is a clear testament that their governance was -- by that time -- received favorably by the people there.

Your motto

"bakesh shalom ve-ridfuhu" [sic]

סוּר מֵרָע, וַעֲשֵׂה-טוֹב; **בַּקֵּשׁ שָׁלוֹם וְרָדְפֵהוּ**

[901] **The original letter had a mistake/typo here. The word very appeared instead of the word even. Corrected 2/23/12.**

comes from the psukim/ verses in the 34th Psalm from which the Chofetz Chaim took the title of the book that became his "book name."

מִי-הָאִישׁ, הֶחָפֵץ חַיִּים; אֹהֵב יָמִים, לִרְאוֹת טוֹב.
נְצֹר לְשׁוֹנְךָ מֵרָע; וּשְׂפָתֶיךָ, מִדַּבֵּר מִרְמָה.
סוּר מֵרָע, וַעֲשֵׂה-טוֹב; בַּקֵּשׁ שָׁלוֹם וְרָדְפֵהוּ.

Who is the man that **desires life**,
and loves days, to see good?
Keep thy tongue from evil,
and thy lips from speaking guile.
Depart from evil, and do good;
seek peace and pursue it.

Here are three things that I learned in the name of the Chofetz Chaim from his last personal secretary, Rabbi Yitschok Poupko -- over 23[902] years ago:

1. "The essence of Torah is kindness. If something is not done in a kind way, in a nice way, it's not Torah. It's like the seal of authenticity of a Torah act -- like the stamp that says something is 24ct. gold."[903]

Rabbi Poupko added that, though there are things in the Torah that do not appear to be kind -- like the slaughter of the Midianites -- nonetheless, this is the basic principal.

2. A true teacher of Torah encourages his students to ask questions and is not afraid of apparent contradictions. [904]

3. The purpose of prayer is not to beg God, but to come closer to God. When we daven (pray) we should say every word clearly -- as though someone is listening to what we are saying. Rabbi Poupko added that when the Chofetz Chaim was the sheliach tsibor (the prayer leader), he would daven more quickly -- not to keep the people waiting.[905]

Just this past Shabbes Vaera/Rosh Chodesh Shevat, in Lakewood, New Jersey, I met one of the former students of Rabbi Aryeh Leib Poupko, a son of the Chofetz Chaim by his first wife. Aryeh Leib was also the main assistant of the Chofetz Chaim in writing the Mishneh Brura. This former student from Radin -- and former partisan -- Chone Kletsky, said that the Chofetz Chaim davened more quickly when he davened b'tsibor -- not only when he was the prayer leader. If he was davening with a minyan, the others would wait for him. Reb Kletzky told me that the Chofetz Chaim's words were "like pearls."

Reb Kletsky also said that the well-known picture of the Chofetz Chaim that some are saying is actually a picture of his driver, is a colorized version of the real thing. This was also the view of Rabbi Yitschok Poupko and Dr. Shoshana Poupko. The latter was a daughter of Aryeh Leib. She was nifter in Boston over 23 years[906] ago. She had been a biophysicist in Moscow before immigrating to Israel in ~'78. There is also an unlabeled picture that may be the Chofetz Chaim in a photograph of a conference of rabbis in Warsaw in 1917. This pic-

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[902] **This should have said "21 years" as the events in question took place in the second half of 1988.**

[903] **[note added 8/22/13] In the first half of 2013, years after this letter was written, some people asked me if, according to Torah Law, it is proper for me to put myself at risk to help the Taliban. I said that it was as though I was the only one at the scene of an accident who knows first aid. To apply my skills to help would be a Kiddush Hashem. To walk away because of a relatively small risk of harm to me, could easily be the opposite.**

When a question of this nature arises, it is good to remember what the Chofetz Chaim said and do what's kind. In this case the obvious kind thing to do is to apply my research and communication skills to help the Taliban – just as I have applied my first aid skills in medical emergencies.

[904] **see footnote 9 for the importance of noticing such contradictions / סתירות - in writing this sefer.**

[905] **[note added 8/23/13] When we do מִצְוֹת [mitzvahs] with כוונה [kavana] –with clear spiritual intention, the mitzvah becomes a kind of prayer and, like prayer, it creates the possibility of דבקות - attachment to God - as we learn from Deut. 11:22**

כִּי אִם שָׁמֹר תִּשְׁמְרוּן אֶת כָּל הַמִּצְוָה הַזֹּאת אֲשֶׁר אָנֹכִי מְצַוֶּה אֶתְכֶם לַעֲשֹׂתָהּ לְאַהֲבָה אֶת יְהוָה אֱלֹהֵיכֶם לָלֶכֶת בְּכָל דְּרָכָיו וּלְדָבְקָה בוֹ:

"For if you keep all these commandments which I command you to do them, to love the Lord, your God, to walk in all His ways, and to cleave to Him "

[906] **This should have said "21 years."**

ture may be found printed in the older edition of the Encyclopedia Judaica -- in the article on Warsaw. The Chofetz Chaim is in the front and center. I can send you a scan of that photo if you like.

I hope that you will show the maps and price data to Ambassador Holbrooke very soon -- if you have not done so already.

Shalom,

ASA

PS. Where can I get a copy of Amb. Zaeef's new book?

On Wed, Feb 10, 2010 at 1:39 PM, as adler <avshadler@yahoo.com> wrote:

B"H

Dear Prof. Rubin,

I hope that you will ask your friend Ahmed Rashid one small question for me, for your own information -- and for his millions of readers: What is his source of his $600/kg figure for the farmgate price of opium in Afghanistan before the price "collapsed from $600 to just $30 a kilogram" , " the result of overproduction" "[a]fter three consecutive bumper crops"?

Sincerely,

A. S. Adler

PS. The quote is from :Descent into chaos: how the war against Islamic extremism is being lost in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Central Asia. The Google preview edition is at: _____
page 320 of this edition,:

"The Taliban were repeatedly told by the United States and the UN that if they banned poppy cultivation, it would win them international sympathy and perhaps even political recognition. After three consecutive bumper crops, the Taliban suddenly banned poppy cultivation in 2001. Harshly imposed on farmers, the ban was highly effective --- opium production that year slumped to just 185 tons – and was termed "the most effective drug control action of modern times."[5] However, the Taliban did not prohibit trafficking in existing stocks, and it later became clear that the ban had been the result of overproduction and a slump in opium prices, which had collapsed from $600 to just $30 a kilogram. The ban promptly pushed the price up to $650 a kilogram. Nevertheless it had devastated many farmers, who were left with large unpaid loans to drug dealers and no source of income. The ban led to anger against the Taliban on the eve of 9/11 and increased opposition to the regime. The collapse of the Taliban regime coincided with the poppy planting season, and farmers immediately planted poppy to pay off their debts.

From: Barnett Rubin <barnettrrubin@gmail.com>
Subject: Re: one small question for Ahmed Rashid
To: "as adler" <avshadler@yahoo.com>
Date: Wednesday, February 10, 2010, 2:02 PM

He was confused. The price had never been that high. There is no single price for opium, but the price had been about $40-$60/kg. After the ban it rose to $400-$600, so the traffickers and the government/Taliban who taxed them still did fine. But there was no "price collapse."

From: as adler <avshadler@yahoo.com>
Subject: Re: one small question for Ahmed Rashid
To: "Barnett Rubin" <barnettrrubin@gmail.com>
Cc: "aryeh neier" <aneier@sorosny.org>, "Spozhmai Maiwandi" <smaiwand@voanews.com>, "ashley bommer" <bommeraf@state.gov>, "nadine berg" <nadine.berg@mail.house.gov>, rwb3@columbia.edu, "Bernard FRAHI" bernard.frahi@unodc.org

Date: Sunday, February 14, 2010, 3:33 PM

B"H

Re: The Taliban did not ban opium poppy growing in the summer of 2000 in response to a price collapse following three years of bumper crops. The price collapse did not take place -- according to official UN data that have been publicly availabe [sic] since 2002 or before. Ahmed Rashid "was confused."

Dear Professor Rubin,

Thanks for the clarification.

The reality is that there was no price collapse -- yet this was the main story of the Northern Alliance -- that the Taliban banned opium poppy growing in response to a price collapse.

Ahmed Rashid is giving the straight line of the Northern Alliance -- more than five years after the detailed price data of the UN was public information on the internet. Is that just ordinary confusion?

Now look at what you just wrote(below) : that with the price increase following the ban "the traffickers and the government/ Taliban who taxed them still did fine" This is true.[907-A] But the farmers who routinely held on to their stocks -- who in practice were "banking" raw opium paste -- also did OK. Ahmed Rashid tries to give the impression that the farmers generally were hurt by the ban. Some farmers could have been hurt-- if they owed opium in-kind. But any Taliban court, as I understand it, would have nullified such a contract and required that payment be made according to the market -predicted value at the time of the contract. Those very few farmers who did not heed the ban and grew opium poppies anyway were definitely hurt if they were caught before they were able to sell their harvest.

Most of the stocks were held by the farmers and traffickers -- not by the Taliban. The Taliban did not tax the sales of farmers' stocks of opium that were saved from previous years. The tax was presumably levied on the farmers at the time of the original harvest. The Taliban also did not hold on to the stocks that they collected from the farmers or traffickers before the ban. Otherwise the price would have begun to rise before the ban was announced.

The upshot of this is not only did Ahmed Rashid give us the straight Northern Alliance line on the opium ban -- but, apparently none of your thousand experts called him on it - - until I came along.

If this were just a minor issue, it might be excusable -- but it is a really a big deal -- it reveals so much of what the Taliban were really about. How did it happen that so many scholars missed this -- or am I mistaken here? Do you know of any scholar who has looked at the price data in the years before the ban was announced and said clearly that this price data does not support the contention that the Taliban banned opium poppy growing in response to a price collapse -- that there was no price collapse?

Let's see how long we have to wait before Ahmed Rashid -- or you for that matter -- put in "print" a clarification of this issue? Considering that people are being murdered because of this sort of confusion -- putting out such a clarification in the next 48 hours would not be too short a time.[907-B] Chodesh tov -- It's Rosh chodesh Adar -- marbeh b'simcha -- increase joy-- across the World -- from[908] Hodu to Cush -- including Afghanistan!

A.S. Adler

[907-A] Footnote 588 shows that the Taliban banned collection of taxes on cannabis and heroin starting in March 2000 – possibly also on opium. – I assumed in my analysis of Taliban income that they did not tax the opium in 2000 and after. [added 10/27/'00]

[907-B].. In the October 2006 issue of the New York Review of Books, Ahmed Rashid corrected his own error – one that had appeared in the June 22, issue of the same publication. No correction of his $600 mistake had been forthcoming.

> *To the Editors*: In my article "Afghanistan: On the Brink" [*NYR*, June 22], I stated that Creative Associates International, Inc. had received a contract from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) to build schools in Afghanistan. This is not true and I regret the error…The contract for school reconstruction was made with another company. Ahmed Rashid

[908] Typos corrected. Original letter had 'form'. In the expression in the paragraph above "the Taliban banned opium" the original expression had a typographical error " "the the Taliban …"

Sunday, February 21, 2010 8:09 PM

Re: [brrafghan] Khalilzad: The Taliban and Reconciliation

From: "s adler" vantran613@yahoo.com

To: brrafghan-owner@yahoogroups.com, "Bernard FRAHI" bernard.frahi@unodc.org

Cc: aschwartz@csis.org, "ahmed rashid" <ahmed.rashid04@gmail.com>, rwb3@columbia.edu, "nadine berg" <nadine.berg@mail.house.gov>, "ashley bommer" <bommeraf@state.gov>, "Dr Talib Mujahid" <alemarah1@gmail.com>, "Spozhmai Maiwandi" <smaiwand@VOANews.COM>, harvey_cox@harvard.edu, luke@harpers.org, "Helge Lurås" <hel@nupi.no>, "pachouvy@geopium.org" <pachouvy@geopium.org>, "LauraTisdel" <Laura.Tisdel@us.penguingroup.com>, "paul rieckoff" <info@iava.org>

Message contains attachments

B"H

CC: Dr. Zalmay Khalilzad,, CSIS Counselor c/o H. Andrew Schwartz , aschwartz@csis.org, (202) 775-3242

Dear Prof. Rubin and Correspondents,

I read Dr. Zalmay Khalilzad's piece, copied below [*February 19, 2010, I.H.T. Op-Ed Contributor*], on the Taliban and reconciliation and believe he is swimming in his own soup.

He says:

"Reintegration would then allow the coalition and Afghan security forces to stop fighting against local Taliban commanders by bringing them back into Afghan society."

One wonders what he means by Afghan society!! It is little more than a sink hole for money from the "coalition". Without that money -- and the foreigners, mercenaries and sociopaths that are ready to do almost anything to get it, there would be hardly anything left to that "Afghan society"

The Taliban are not insurgents, They are the actual government in the areas where they govern -- where their courts are the courts of choice of the local people.

The "clear, hold and build" policy might be appropriate for reclaiming wetlands from the sea but not to parts of Afghanistan that are governed by the Taliban. Why should we want to clear out the Taliban and replace them with bands of foreigners, mercenaries and sociopaths?

Dr. Khalilzad writes:

"It is possible that they [the Taliban] might pretend to distance themselves from Al Qaeda, but we should recognize that the partnership with Al Qaeda has been part of their formula of success."

He is correct in saying that "partnership with Al Qaeda has been part of their formula of success." But how much of a part? What is the time frame and cause of this "partnership". Did the Taliban need Al Qaeda -- or the Pakistani's -- to implement their extremely successful ban on opium poppy growing? If the few hundred or so Al Qaeda fighters had disappeared from the scene in the Spring of 2000, would the Taliban have failed to implement that ban? Would they have failed to establish reasonable governance in so much of the country? Al Qaeda provided only a small and non-decisive percentage of Taliban strength and a very large fraction of their headaches. It should be clear to anyone that the Taliban were not the professed enemy of the US, of Jews or of Israel - while Al Qaeda was and is the professed enemy of all three.

Meanwhile we have one of the leading writers on the subject of the Taliban –your friend, the prolific Ahmed Rashid --

claiming that his false story of collapsed opium prices following bumper crops was just a matter of his being "confused". Perhaps he can send us a copy of his notes on the subject so that together we can figure out how he came to make such a mistake -- and all of the other mistakes that make his story look like it was written by the Northern Alliance? Still, it's more important to figure out why his errors – and similar errors made by others -- have not been more widely noted.

I hope that by now, Ambassador Holbrooke has seen those maps of opium growing in Afghanistan in 2000 and 2001 and the associated price data -- and that he has been thoroughly briefed on the subject. If you do not feel that you are in a position to do this --if you have not yet done it -- I would be glad to meet him and show him what he should have been shown long ago.

With prayers for Peace, Salaam Shalom,

A.S. Adler[909]

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[909] This entire exchange of emails with Prof. Rubin took place before I had any awareness of Ahmed Rashid's part in the production of "Beneath the Veil" [**See chapter 22 c**] or his interview with an opium poppy farmer in Kandahar in 1997 – where the farmer gives Rashid data on how much he sold and how uch he earned – and the price was $29:

"Ahmed Rashid might've consulted his own, extremely successful book, "Taliban", [Yale Univ. Press, 2nd Eng. ed. 2011] His chapter: "HIGH ON HEROIN: DRUGS AND THE TALIBAN ECONOMY", provides an interview with a Kandahari opium poppy farmer "in the spring of 1997" -- the year before the 3 yrs of "bumper crops". He says of the farmer: "…Wali Jan produces 45 kilograms of raw opium every year and earns about US $1,300 – a small fortune for Afghan farmers. Wali Jan knows that refined heroin fetches 50 times that price in London or New York, but he is more than happy with what he gets." The 2nd, revised ed. went to press more than 9 years later – well after "Descent Into Chaos…" and contains no changes in the above quoted text. $1,300/45kg=$28.89/kg." [copied from figure 5 , page 17 of Torah and the Taliban]

This note added 7/24/18

APPENDIX 11

WHY RELIGIOUS JEWS HAVE A SPECIAL PLACE IN THIS SITUATION

From a letter to Ashley Bommer, Chief of Staff of Ambassador Richard Holbrooke [10/16/'09]

There is another factor that gives a Religious Jew a special place in this situation. Unlike Muslims, we are not assumed to be interested in aiding terrorists like OBL. However obvious it may be to religious Moslem scholars, if they are within reach of the power of the US and would rather live a long and peaceful life, they have reason not to speak too loudly in favor of the Taliban. This is all the more true for religious Muslim scholars in the US. It is a very sorry state of affairs – but the climate of fear and the extensive persecution of ordinary Muslims in the wake of the events of 9/11/01 -- has made many reluctant to speak in public. As a religious Jew, I am concerned that I may be misunderstood, but I must speak out in this case because the lives of many are at stake. If there were others saying what I know, I would return to my other work. But I appear to be unique in this case. I did not aim for this position – but this is what my inclination to ask good questions and do good research has brought about.

APPENDIX 12

VIRULENT HATE SPEECH HIDDEN IN PLAIN SIGHT

B"H

To: Peter Molnar,
Senior Research Fellow,
Center for Media and Communication Studies
Department of Public Policy
Central European University,
Budapest, Hungary

CC: Colleagues and Friends,

Dear Peter,

Just last night -- after seeing you in the library at Cardozo [School of Law of Yeshiva University] -- I realized something that should be obvious about hate speech:

> **You can have massively deadly hate speech without those who are saying or hearing it realizing that it is hate speech at all.**

We usually think of hate speech as being something like : person or group X is _____ (fill in the blank with something really terrible) If, on the other hand, someone said that a sewer rat is dirty, we would not regard it as hate speech. Everyone knows that sewer rats probably are dirty and we wouldn't want them sitting with us at our dinner table.

People who say and promote hateful speech about others often think that what they are saying is obviously true, even though, given better information, they would understand that it's false.

Here's an example from the Aug. 9, 2010, issue of Time Magazine -- an issue that was probably read by tens of millions of people:

The cover shows a young Afghan woman with her nose cut off. The cover story is: Aryn Baker/ Kabul

> **"What Happens If We Leave Afghanistan/ Afghan Women and the Return of The Taliban"**
>
> **[LINK ADDED:** http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2007238,00.html **]**

On page 23, col. 3, the author writes:

"Under the Taliban, who ruled Afghanistan from 1996 to 2001, women accused of adultery were stoned to death."

The plain sense of this is that it was only necessary to accuse a woman of adultery and she

was summarily stoned to death – that men were not punished and that there were no trials or rules of evidence to speak of. If this were said about Jews or Blacks or Americans or Hungarians – we would understand that it is hate speech. In the case of the Taliban we assume that it is true -- that women were singled out for persecution and publicly murdered for nothing. So it's not hate speech. It's just like saying sewer rats are dirty.

This kind of speech has primed the people of two continents – North America and Europe – to make war against the Taliban and kill them by the tens of thousands.

We, who are concerned about hate speech, and its consequences have not taken notice. We think that what we heard about the Taliban – particularly when it comes to the abuse of women – is true. But it's not. Most of the bad stuff that we've heard about them is demonstrable nonsense and our bigotry is so intense and so refined that we don't even bother to check.

The Taliban did execute people for adultery – by stoning them to death in public - but a more accurate – and less hate-filled statement would be:

Under the Taliban, who, in the summer of 2001 were ruling provinces with close to 95% of the in-country population of Afghanistan,

a man and woman found guilty in a court of law of committing adultery were publicly stoned to death togeth-er. However, this was only done after a trial in which four reliable male wit-nesses testified in court that they saw the two accused physically going at it.

As a result of this extremely high standard of evidence, there were only about a dozen people – half of them men and half women – who were found guilty of adultery and executed[910]. There were no executions for adultery of men or women in Kabul – the relatively cosmopolitan capital city (where the Time Magazine reporter is writing from) – which the Taliban controlled for five years. There were also no executions for adultery in Shiite dominated Herat – which the Taliban controlled for 6 years. These two cities together had 13 million person-years under the Taliban – with no executions for adultery.

Once it became known that the Taliban were actually executing habitual adulterers, the more sophisticated adulterers who wished to continue – and preserve their lives – stopped doing it in a way that could be readily observed by four reliable male witnesses.

The overall rate of judicial executions under the Taliban was ~1/3 per capita/yr of what it was under Bush in Texas.

This was also about 1/10th the rate in Saudi Arabia – in the year 2000 – the year that the Taliban wiped out opium poppy growing without any executions maimings or flog-gings—and without anticipatory hoarding.

[This segment – on executions for adultery – was posted at Small Wars Journal _____ on the first night of Chanukah, 5771, with a link to a Muslim website where an early, ~3,500 word, version of Torah and the Taliban had been posted for more than two years: http://www.pureislam.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=81&Itemid=37 At that time, there were 2,858 hits for this item, "Torah and the Taliban , on this site, compared with 647 hits for the next most popular piece – of 80 pieces under the heading Afghanistan.[911]]

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[910] Subsequent research by the author shows that the number is closer to 20 – still equally divided between men and women. [added May 8/14]

[911] **A** As of the latest record I have found -3/19/12 -there were 4133 hits for 'Torah and the Taliban' [still #1 on the site] – first posted on the site 18/4/08 & 1046 hits for the next highest item 'Usamah bin Laden martyred? UNCONFIRMED', first posted 02 May/11. The next highest item posted at or near the post date of T&T was 'Pentagon reveals Afghan jail abuses' & had only 712 hits. [There were a total of 94 items in this category: "Afghanistan: News and Opinion relating to Afghanistan"The latest item in the catefgory was 12/23/2011 "Red Cross: Taliban bodies do not decay!" and had 366 hits] [When first noted, 8/8/2010, while writing a letter to the editor of Time about the cover story of their Aug 9, 2010, issue, there were 78 news items on Afghanistan, #1 ,with 2388 hits, was Torah and the Taliiban; #'s 2 & 3 got 624 & 479 respectively.] [Notes in brackets added Nov.10/'15.]

B The website was subsequently converted to what looked to me like a trap for easily excitable people -- with flashing banners & pictures of OBL, etc. The ability to sort the articles by number of hits appeared to have been removed – so readers couldn't see what other readers considered important. [It may've still been there but I didn't find it at the time. Later, I found a way to do it by going through their search process & sorting by most popular– but # of hits didn't show. Torah and the Taliban is now the next to the last item – on p. 6 of a list of items on Afghanistan that isn't searchable using the "control f" procedure. Most of the articles near the top are about OBL. The very last item: "Pentagon reveals Afghan jail abuses" had been # 6 on the 3/19/12 list.] [Notes in brackets added Nov.10/'15.]

C [When I wrote to them and told them that I thought they had reduced the value of their website, I received a reply from another email

We learn from our sages that the Temple in Jerusalem was destroyed because of baseless hatred and improper speech – including hate speech -- directed by Jew against Jew. An obvious question is:

Why would sane people hate other sane people for nothing?

The answer is that the people doing the hating didn't think that they were hating for nothing.

They thought that the people they hated and denigrated were worthy of such abuse – but they were mistaken. They were too quick to assume the worst of others based on inadequate evidence. Our sages from that era say:

... והוי דן את כל האדם לכף זכות.

"Judge all people favorably"*.

PERKEI AVOS 1:6

Before we condemn someone, we must give them a good opportunity to defend themselves and prove their innocence. We must assume they are not guilty until proven otherwise. Most people will turn out to be just like us.

Sincerely,

A.S. Adler

PS. The attached draft book has a new piece on p. 126-129: Judging People Favorably: Antidote to Baseless Hatred ח Gateway To Statistics.

Apropos this weeks parsha, Chayei Sarah, Genesis 23,1-25,18, there is also a nice piece about self-perpetuating acts of kindness on p. 20-21: GEMILUS CHASADIM – "CAMEL KINDNESS"ח Gateway to Life Sciences and Sustainable Living

*. The original had a typo with 'Just" instead of 'Judge'

On Sun, Oct 31, 2010 at 10:38 PM, s adler <vantran613@yahoo.com> wrote:

B"H

Dear Peter,

I forgot to mention the most obvious element of "massively deadly hate speech hidden in plain sight " was the cover picture of the young woman with her nose cut off. There were no reports of the Taliban under Mullah Omar cutting off any noses -- of men or women. There is a single report of an Islamic court in Pakistan ordering a man's nose to be cut off as the punishment for that man for cutting off another man's nose.

ASA

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APPENDIX 13

TWO LETTERS:

TO:

ARYEH NEIER,

PRESIDENT, OPEN SOCIETY INSTITUTE

AND HIS COLLEAGUE,

ANTHONY RICHTER,

ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR OF OPEN SOCIETY FOUNDATIONS

Taliban opium poppy ban 2000-2001
as an indicator of what they were about/
A Rope and a Prayer

Saturday, January 1, 2011 9:29 PM
From: "as adler" <avshadler@yahoo.com>
To:"aryeh neier" <aneier@sorosny.org>, "anthony richter" <arichter@sorosny.org>,"Barnett R. Rubin" <barnett.rubin@nyu.edu>
Cc: "zev harvey" <zharvey@yu.edu>
B"H

To : Aryeh Neier,
President, Open Society Institute,

From: A. S. Adler, researcher/author , Bronx, NY

Dear Prof. Neier,

I've been a strong supporter of you and your human rights/civil liberties work for more than 30 years.

In the case of the Taliban though, I think that you -- and almost all other observers in the US -- are seriously mistaken.

address [Your Company your@email.com] and the respondent was called "Your Company" –"The Company" in the US for the CIA. I don't know if this was actually the CIA or someone who just thought it was a good way to disguise who they were. – or some kind f computer glich. The website has been transformed to a jihadi look, items can no longer be sorted by number of hits. A response to this email the same day yielded: Remote host said: 550 5.1.1 [Modified Nov.10/'15.]

At the talk with David Rohde and Kristen Mulvihill you made a point [of] publicly backing Ahmed Rashid[912] -- who has been the source of a large amount of uncorroborated information on the Taliban.

In the course of my research on the pre-9/11 Taliban, I came across Ahmed Rashid and his work but made no use of it until recently because I saw that it was largely uncorroborated. I relied instead on corroboratable information on such things as their opium poppy ban, their judicial punishments and their public attitude toward Jews. Using multiple corroboratable and usually quantifiable measures, I was able to develop a picture of what the pre-9/11 Taliban were about that was not only robust but could be used to refute the uncorroborated statements of others.

Only a year ago, I took a close look at Ahmed Rashid's work in an area in which there were multiple corroboratable sources -- the 2000-2001 opium poppy ban - and found that his data and analysis were highly propagandistic, easily refutable nonsense. I brought this to the attention of Professor Barnett Rubin -- and Ahmed Rashid.

Professor Rubin told me that Rashid told him that his -- Rashid's -- report on the opium poppy ban was "a mistake" and that he -- Rashid - had been "confused." They admitted that the price collapse before the ban -- that Rashid had described with numbers -- never happened. Rashid had written that the Taliban had banned opium poppy growing to raise the price after the price had collapsed from $600/kg at the farm gate in 1997 to $30/Kg in 2000 after three years of "bumper crops." UN data published before and after the 9/11 attacks show that the price was around $30 in 1997 and did not vary much from that in readily accessible public records going back to 1985. It was also reported as about $30 in Ahmed Rashid's own book "Taliban" for the 1995-7 time frame -- based on his own interview with a Kandahari opium poppy farmer.

In fact, in those years, any reporter worthy of the name that was reporting from "on the scene" in rural Afghanistan would have quickly realized how little the farmers were getting for their hard won sticky gold.

There has been a campaign of disinformation about the Taliban that has led to the murder of tens of thousands. Ahmed Rashid -- for whatever reason -- has been an active and highly significant participant in that campaign.

If this campaign has succeeded in misinforming you -- and George Soros -- imagine how effective it has been in misinforming others who have less opportunities for independent data collection and review.

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[912] The 1:08:47 audio of this talk, from 12/16/'10, incl. 63MB, mp3 download, is at https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/events/rope-and-prayer. David Rhode was kidnapped Nov.[10,] 2008 [06:00 – minutes into recording of event. The exact day is from "A Rope and a Prayer"] in Logar Prov., Afghan. [06:29] & held in N. & S. Waziristan [09:00 & 13:40] for a total of 7 months [15:40] under the auspices – as he states -- of the Haqani network [06:56-08:00].

The author's comments [as 'Steve Adler'] & related responses are at 45:53 - 54:10, including responses from both David Rohde & Aryeh Neier – the latter focusing on the Iranian belief that the Taliban were making a huge amount of money by smuggling heroin into Iran. No mention by either of the Taliban opium ban –Rhode suggesting Rashid's $600 figure -- which I quoted from Rashid's book, Descent Into Chaos - was just a simple mistake. [48:50]. No follow up by David Rhode was found on Lexis Nexis and no response from him to emails on the subject.

[Rohde had mentioned the Taliban opium poppy ban in 10/28/02, NYT, , late , final ed. , "Afghans Lead World Again In Poppy Crop", David Rohde, Sect. A; C. 1, Pg. 8, 437 words, Dateline: Kabul, 10/27/'02. He noted that the crop had dropped to 185 MT under the Taliban in 2000 [-2001] and risen to 3700 tons in 2002 and had been 5,070 tons in 1999. He gives the 2001 data as being from 2000 and leaves out 2000. Actual data reported by the UN show 3,276 MT in 2000, 4,581 MT in 1999. The 5,070 figure is presumably in short tons – converting the rounded number 4,600 published by the UN in their 2002 report. _____ In a 2007 report on the opium situation in Afghan. – based on UN data, he makes no mention of the Talban opium poppy ban. NYT/ 8/28/07 , Late Ed. – Final, "2nd Record Level for Afghan Opium Crop", David Rohde, Sect. A; Pg. 6, 842 words, Dateline: Kabul]

Rhode, though, mentioned that his Taliban captors had shown him an article in a Taliban magazine in which the Taliban accused Rashid of being a CIA agent.[49:04] [There is no mention of this article or Rashid's possble CIA connection in Rhode's book "A Rope And A Prayer" – though Rashid figures significantly in the book and the story.] Rhode countered that Rashid had written bitter attacks on US policy and that his book "Descent into Chaos", attacks "them". There are 85 hits on a search for "CIA" in "Descent into Chaos" [See footnote 886 & 888 for more on this book—& link] The most revealing, as far as Rashid's interests may be:

> "The CIA focus was on bin Laden and the threat of the Pakistani military supporting causes that were deemed to be terrorist by the outside world. Yet the CIA refused to support the anti-Taliban, Northern Alliance and mistrusted its leader, Ahmad Shah Massoud."

No source is cited by Rashid for this statement.

I would like to discuss this with you as soon as possible -- at your convenience.

With great appreciation and Prayers for Peace in the world

Very Sincerely,

Avroham Shlomo Adler, researcher/author

PS. Below is a copy of a letter that I sent to you about a year ago. I don't think that you ever saw it. I never received a reply. Attached is a letter written two weeks ago on the same subject to your Associate Director Anthony Richter. To date, no response has been received from him or anyone else at OSI.

[As of 10/18/'15, no response has been received to any letter to Aryeh Neier or his associates. I have not included the letter sent "about a year ago" because it repeats what has already been written in other letters included in these appendices. However, George Soros, the employer of both, did respond to something I wrote on the subject – as can be seen in APPENDIX 14]

--- On Thu, 12/16/10, as adler <*avshadler@yahoo.com*> wrote:

From: as adler <avshadler@yahoo.com>
Subject: Fw: Laura Wickens/A Rope and a Prayer
To: arichter@sorosny.org, lwickens@sorosny.org, vantran613@yahoo.com
Cc: "Barnett R. Rubin" <barnett.rubin@nyu.edu>, "zev harvey" <zharvey@yu.edu>
Date: Thursday, December 16, 2010, 5:45 PM

B"H

</SPAN>12/16/2010 5:39:54 PM

To: Anthony Richter
Associate Director of Open Society Foundations
/ Director of CEP/MENA

CC: Luara Wickens,

I attended the talk by David Rohde, Kristen Mulvihill and Aryeh Neier this afternoon and left color copies of the attached material on the Taliban opium poppy ban with the speakers. I also had the opportunity to ask a question and to follow-up on my question both at the mike and at the desk after the public session was finished.

David Rohde said that his captors appeared to be living in an "alternate universe"[35:54 of recording. [for details of recording, see footnote 912] -- a place where things that we understand to be complete nonsense were understood by his captors to be clear truth. I asked him if his captors had made any mention of the Taliban's program of opium eradication between 2000 and 2001. To my surprise, they apparently hadn't mentioned it. I then went on to point out that with respect to that program, we are living in an "alternate universe". In the alternate universe in which we live -- a world made possible in part by people like Ahmed Rashid -- the Taliban banned opium to raise the price after the price had collapsed following some years of bumper crops. I pointed out how Rashid claims that the price fell from $600/kg at the farm gate to $30/kg at the farm gate between 1997 and 2000. I then showed the UN data on opium farm gate prices in that time frame -- where there was no such collapse -- where the price remained low and flat in the months before the ban and had not collapsed at all since 1997. I added that Ahmed Rashid contradicts his own interview in his own book, "Taliban", where he says the price in 1997 and before was about $30/kg.

Aryeh Neier, who is one of the most well informed people in the world and a person who has done and is doing a lot of real good, responded to what I said by saying that he believes what Ahmed Rashid said about the opium poppy ban -- that the Taliban banned it to raise the price and that the price had collapsed, etc (If I understood Aryeh Neier correctly).

At the table after the public session, I told all of the speakers that Ahmed Rashid had admitted to Prof. Barnett Rubin -- and to me -- that he had been mistaken about the collapse in price and that that he had been "confused." This was as of nearly a year ago. When Rashid

admitted his error -- an error that has misled millions of thoughtful, well intended people across the world and has helped to demonize the Taliban -- I suggested that he publish a correction. As far as I know, he has not published any such correction -- and neither has Professor Rubin.

I am the only one that brought this "mistake" to professor Rubin's attention -- though this mistake has been sitting out in the public domain for years. I was drawn to look closely at Ahmed Rashid's work by the frequency with which his uncorroborated statements were cited in an official history of the US military's first five years in Afghanistan – published just a year ago.. I tied this together with an unusual false report on the Taliban opium poppy ban that came out of the Far Eastern Economic Review when Ahmed Rashid was their key correspondent on Afghanistan. The false report would have led some readers to believe that the price of opium was collapsing even as it was increasing -- so people who were buying opium might benefit from the slight reduction in the Far East opium selling price that such a false report would lead to.

I would like to brief you on what I have found about the pre-9/11 Taliban .

I have a draft of a book chapter that I am working on -- so far over 35, 000 words -- that demonstrates that the Taliban who ruled Afghanistan before the US led invasion were not guilty of most of the bad things they are accused of.

In an "Open Society", those who are accused of wrong doing should have an opportunity to make their case -- to defend themselves. The Taliban used the opium poppy ban to make their case to the community of nations that they wanted to cooperate with other peoples -- to the extent that it was consistent with their understanding of Sharia law. They also wanted to show that they were not a failed state, that they were not puppets of anyone and that they had broad and deep support across religious, geographic and ethnic lines. They wiped out opium poppy growing from one year to the next without any executions, maimings or floggings -- by consensus of the elders throughout their domain. They did it while those with the seat in the UN doubled opium poppy growing in the same time frame. They did it without any increase in the price prior to the ban being announced -- showing that there was no anticipatory hoarding and that the Taliban were not corrupt. They did this -- knowing that the UN was monitoring opium poppy growing and opium prices. When they applied for the seat of Afghanistan in the UN, they were rebuffed.

It is ironic that the monthly periodical that they put out from the summer of 2000 --- to explain their position to the English and Arabic speaking peoples of the world -- was put under sanctions. The result is that even the Library of Congress can't say what issues were actually published and has only a few of them. The periodical is called "The Islamic Emirate". It was published during the opium poppy ban, the statues issue, etc.

I would be glad to try to answer any questions about me or these issues that you may have.

Sincerely,

With prayers for Peace

A.S. (Steve) Adler, researcher/author

PS. In responding to my question from the mike, Aryeh Neier went on at some length about the injection based heroin situation in Iran. I suspect that the combined alcoholism and injection based heroin rate in Iran is probably not so far different from what it is in the US. Alcohol is forbidden to Moslems – and is much more difficult to conceal than injection based heroin – which is also forbidden to Moslems. In the days before opiates were banned from the legal market in the US – close to 90 years ago,-opiates were a medically indicated substitute for alcohol – particularly in cases where a chronic alcohol user was suffering from liver damage, etc. "Clean" injected or snorted heroin may actually be less damaging than the alcohol necessary to produce a comparable psychological effect. I don't recommend the regular use of either and have never used any illegal drug.

APPENDIX 14

An exchange with George Soros on Human Rights and the Taliban

Aryeh Neier and Anthony Richter, to whom the letters in APPENDIX 13 were addressed, were ultimately employees of George Soros. He is the Founder / Chairman of the Open Society Institute/ Open Society Foundations of which Neier and Richter were the President and Associate Director, respectively. This exchange was posted on the website of the Open Society Foundations- starting on Oct 4, 2012 – and may be seen at the following link:
http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/voices/introduction-open-society-foundations [As of 6/20/19, this link does not lead to the following conversation with Geroge Soros. It may be reached through the Internet Archive links below.
The earliest is:
https://web.archive.org/web/20121017013110/http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/voices/introduction-open-society-foundations
the last is:
https://web.archive.org/web/20170203000807/https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/voices/introduction-open-society-foundations /

A. S. Adler
posted on Oct 4, 2012

B"H

I believe Prof. Soros has good intentions but he is focused on the "human rights" model of human relations. Such rights are between individuals and political-military powers: "states". An alternative, much more ancient and widely respected model focuses on relations between individuals and relations between the individual and an ultimate ideal -- God. Prof. Soros's apparent rejection of this model has led him and his associates -- with the best of intentions -- to blindly condemn the Taliban for "human rights violations" while failing to see that most of the accusations -- most of the atrocity stories pinned on them -- are readily demonstrable nonsense. We -- the self-conceived benevolent, modern nations of the world -- have murdered them by the tens of thousands on the basis of these false accusations. We are the murderers and the terrorists in Afghanistan -- We are the wreckers of that society -- We, in our arrogance and ignorance, are horrors almost beyond words -- and almost all of those who see it are afraid to speak. Readers are invited to look for "Torah and the Taliban"

Shalom.

George
posted on Oct 10, 2012

Thank you for a thoughtful statement on human rights and human relations. I disagree with your thought that "human rights" exist only between people and their governments.

This forum is an example of people cooperatively exercising their right of Free Speech without relationship to any one government. We decide what we will read, think, and reply. The Open Society Foundation provides this forum. We can create our own forum or participate in another forum.

In this context, Free Speech means acknowledging that each person here has the right to be heard, participate, and influence thought. No government action is involved.

[Note that 'George' -- Prof. Soros -- did not respond to what I say about the Taliban. However, as can be seen below, 3 of the 4 others who responded to what I wrote did mention the Taliban. Of these 3, Thomas and JC Wandemberg Ph.D, were unaware of the material that I had sent to Prof. Soros and were not publicly apprised of it by him. They also make no mention of anything they may have found by searching for "Torah and the Taliban" on the internet.

The 3rd, Helle Nyberg, thanked me for my "eye-opening contribution" but made no mention of the Taliban.

The 4th respondent (Angus Cunningham) made no mention of what I wrote about the Taliban. All of these comments are as posted on the Soros website—without changes in spelling, etc. Of the over 100 comments on this video, my comment is the only one that Prof Soros directly responded to. – as of 4/14/13]

Helle Nyberg, D...
posted on Oct 10, 2012

Thank you, Professor Soros, I feel so grateful for the fact that people like you are here to defeat our many moments of desillusion. [sic] But also thanks to mr. A. S. Adler for an eyeopening contribution.

Thomas
posted on Oct 10, 2012

Mr. Adler, your [sic] are entitled to you opinion but not to your facts, as it is said. If you have ANY facts that would support your statement "to blindly condemn the Taliban for "human rights violations" while failing to see that most of the accusations -- most of the atrocity stories pinned on them -- are readily demonstrable nonsense" please share it with us, If you do not have anything to prove this statement then please be honest and state that this is your belief or opinion devoid of factual support.

Angus Cunningham
posted on Oct 11, 2012

Thank you George. I enjoyed the smile of love on your face and also the looks of determination on the other people in this video. I have no fear of anyone in posting this. That does not mean I do not have to, or more accurately feel I must, 'watch my words'. So I do not have pure freedom. Yet acknowledging that each person has a right to be heard, participate, and influence thought is not always, in my opinion, a right that is exersized[sic] in ways that are adequately watchful by my sense of what might be adequate.

This has bothered me for many years: how to find the line between Free Speech -- such as this forum makes possible, for me and other posters here at least -- and wise censorship that does not oppress.

I think most people here know that, ultimately, healthily watchful free speech cannot be finally brought about by laws or their enforcement. Yet for some time to come, those institutions will remain necessary to protect both watchfully free speakers and unwatchfully free speakers, because refractory states are still today a part of human nature, and will be for at least the forseeable [sic] future.

Yet my experience is that, in the measure one can learn and pass on, in moments before a refractory state erupts, I-statements of the form "I have 'X emotion' now", where 'X emotion' is limited to a noun or noun phrase, the forces of refraction are moderated, and in some cases entirely transformed into vital and vitalizing ideas and action.

I hope this will be useful to you and your OSF colleagues, and invite anyone reading this to be in touch by email.

JC Wandemberg Ph.D.
posted on Oct 14, 2012

Very well put Thomas. I'm afraid Mr. Adler may not want to open his eyes out of fear.

JC Wandemberg Ph.D.
posted on Oct 14, 2012

Dear B"H,
I believe you have a belevolent [sic] heart yoruself [sic] and surely are partly right in your statements, particularly about the ultimate ideal i.e., transcending the mundane. However, you cannot ignore the many atrocities committed in the name of the Torah and the Taliban.

Shalom.

APPENDIX 15

ANNOTATED LIST OF WEB ACCESSIBLE

VIDEOS[913] OF THE AUTHOR SPEAKING ABOUT AFGHANISTAN

I. International Peace Institute[914]

12/14/12,COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM. PREVENTION AND LESSONS LEARNED [title on video] 1:08:04
http://www.ipinst.org/2012/12/anne-wu-empowering-youth-in-countering-violent-extremism

The video of the author begins at 53:57. Author starts speaking at 54:17—mostly with back to camera -- ends at 56:16. Still pictures of all participants with names and affiliations-- the author's picture is the ninth – counting from the left -- are found at http://www.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/videos/extremism_12-14.swf

"My name is Steve Adler and I am the author of a book "Torah and the Taliban" which will be coming out soon, God willing.

I'm glad to hear Anne Wu[915] …[916] – give a reference to Lau-Tze [917]-,[at 19:00-19:35] if I heard her correctly – a traditional approach to society that wasn't invented yesterday. But more than 1500 years before Lao Tze , there were the 7 laws of Noah. The 7 Laws of Noah include, among other things, establishing courts of justice. When people have disputes, whether between individuals, villages or continents, according to the 7 Laws of Noah, they are supposed to go to a court of justice, where the most just people in the society are supposed to adjudicate the case.

So the Taliban, who are among the most reviled groups on the face of the Earth, established a system of courts of justice based on Islam and they actually did a very good job. Their overall rate of judicial executions was about one third per capita per year of what it was under George Bush in Texas – in the year that the Taliban wiped opium from one year to the next.

Chair, Warren Hoge, interjects: ["I just have to ask you to move to the question, if you please."[918]]

If you want to prevent what you call terrorism -- and nobody mentioned the term War – because war is very much a matter of terrorism for the victims of the war—you should try to establish courts of justice and not step on courts of justice that are established in frameworks that are different from your own—so that if they are Islamic courts of justice, you shouldn't begin with the assumption that they are bad. Look carefully at them. Before you start killing people because they call themselves Muslims look and see whether the accusations against them are actually true. In most cases – and in the case of the Taliban – they're demonstrable nonsense."

At least partly responded to by Naureen Chowdury Fink[919], Starting at 1:00:13)

II. In Union Square, NYC

Large capital letters refer to letter labels of stills from videos in a list of all videos of the author – incl. those that do not relate to the subject of this sefer. Titles immediately following the phrase "ows occupy union square" are as supplied by the videographer, Racai Iskander.

D. 3/29/'12, 12:42am,ET,10:40min. [shown as "14 views" 6/6/'16]
http://www.ustream.tv/recorded/21436897
Ows Occupy union square taleban opium.

Includes comment on Ahmed Rashid toward the end.

E. 2012/03/29 00:53 ET 20:14min. [shown as "9 views" 6/6/'16]
http://www.ustream.tv/recorded/21437019
Ows Occupy union square adultery

Continued discussion of Rashid's mistake. Also includes discussion of Pino Arlacchi and the stockpiles of opium on the Tajikistan border and the UN report on the results of the ban – and the response of the community -- going into the Buddhist statues. Mentions Ahmed Rashid calling for a Russian invasion and what the Taliban did to protect pre-Islamic art before they changed to destroying them. Linking this destruction of statues to the failure of the community of nations to recognize their ban and instead putting them under sanctions. This is followed by a discussion of misogyny – Time magazine article with woman who had her nose cut off – then discussion of adultery.

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913 For links to AUDIO of the author speaking out on Afghanistan, see Appendix 1 and see footnote 912

914 777 U.N Plaza , Church Center building, across from the UN, NYC. Funded & Founded by Ruth Forbes Paine Young in 1970, it has been presided over by Terje Rød-Larsen, Norwegian sociologist, diplomat & a principal architect of the Oslo Peace Accords (between the PLO & Israel) , he has served the UN as its senior envoy in the Middle East.

915 Special Political Advisor, Office of the of the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF) and a career diplomat with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China.

916 The word "say" has been deleted at the elipses for smoothness. No other changes have been made in the text as spoken extemporaneously.

917 Chinese philosopher and poet -- known as author of the *Tao Te Ching* and the founder of Taoism, usually dated to around the 6th cent. BCE, a contemporary of Confucius, but some historians contend that he actually lived during the Warring States period of the 5th or 4th century BCE

918 IPI Senior Advisor/VP for external relations, since 2008, formerly, 2004-8, NYT 's foreign correspondent at the United Nations bureau.

919 Formerly at the International Peace Institute. At the time she spoke she was Sr. Analyst at the Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation (CGCC). As of 10/15/15, she was Head of Research and Analysis for the Global Center On Cooperative Security –successor to CGCC. These, in turn, are projects of the Fourth Freedom Forum, founded in 1982 by agricultural equipment manufacturer, Howard S. Brembeck "to advance the ideal that we can preserve and defend our national security more effectively by working together through commerce and diplomacy to uphold international laws, rather than depending on weapons of mass destruction." Inspired by Roosevelt's "four freedoms" -- where the 4th was "freedom from fear of war". Howard Brembeck passed away on December 5, 2010, at age 100.
nfink@globalcenter.org http://www.fourthfreedomforum.org/our-history/

F. March 29, 2012 1:03am ET, 10:22 min [13 views 6/6/'16]
http://www.ustream.tv/recorded/21437147

Ows Occupy union square adultery
Zohra Rasek and the execution of a school teacher including the response of Prof. Rubin and the Feminist Majority Foundations. Why it is so easy to spread such venom – bigotry against religious people – particularly against religious Moslems. Why did I get involved in this – the story in the Forward about Mr. Levin and Mr. Shemtov.

Contradiction with view that the Taliban are just like Osama bin Laden. Mention of ADL and the Wiesenthal center . Also contradiction between Opium ban and "failed and puppet state" mention of book – Torah and the Taliban. Mention of Sodomy and the leader of the Ethical Culture in Riverdale – includes audience response to "with young boys". Mention of Jonathan Steele of the Guardian interview with the Gov. of Kandahar province.

G. March 29, 2012 1:13am ET, 8:25 min. [9 views 6/6/'16]
http://www.ustream.tv/recorded/21437279
Ows Occupy union square afghanistan

Gives email address & transaction where I get $0.55 from a member of the audience . Why we went into Afghanistan – Douglas Feith – harboring terrorists --- subsequent interview with. Taliban response to request for OBL in connection with the bombings of the East African Embassies. Come to our courts & show the evidence – example of executions for adultery – two systems of courts – in Heaven & earth. High standards of evidence. Mention of Al Capone

H. March 29, 2012 1:22am ET, 10:05 min. [11 views 6/6/'16]
http://www.ustream.tv/recorded/21437372
Ows Occupy union square [untitled]

More on Feith and why we went into Iraq. Most of this video is on other subjects.

I. Recorded live 3/ 29/'12 1:32am ET 1:02:14 [12 views 6/6/'16]
http://www.ustream.tv/recorded/21437505
Ows Occupy union square [untitled] [This link not working properly as of 6/'13 connects to video that is shown as being 01:02:14 long – over 62 minutes –starts loading but does not finish loading and does not start video] [working 6/6/'16]

[The first part of this video is about transportation] Torah and the Taliban online – 3700 word piece but no links to me – on multiple websites. Maps shown to Amy Goodman, Rachel Maddow, Seymour Hirsh, Victor Nevasky. – nothing . Mention of Prof. Rubin praising me on WNYC. SEE APPENDIX 1 FOR TRANSCRIPT OF THIS INTERVIEW. [End of this video is about other subjects] .

U. Recorded live, 3/ 0/'12 1:02am ET 9:34 min. [5 views 6/6/'16]
http://www.ustream.tv/recorded/21459087
Ows occupy union square Israel
[first part not closely related to this sefer]

Non monopoly public school system in Bne Braq – competitive school system -- parents can chose what school they send their child to - some people don't send their children to schools that take money from the government – some schools will not even except the subsidized bread .

This is related to India- – the Islam of the Taliban comes from Darul Ulam Deoband in India – where half of the people in the city are Hindus and half Muslims and they get along -- this school has a principal of not taking any money from anyone who is not a religious Muslim . at time of creation of Pakistan by Jina – sages of Islam in Deoband said how can someone who doesn't offer prayers and smokes cigars be the leader of a Muslim state . [last part of this video is not closely related to the sefer]

V. Recorded live, 3/30/'12 1:11amET 11:09 min. [7 views 6/6/'16]
http://www.ustream.tv/recorded/21459209
Ows occupy union square israel [not working properly as of 6/13 connects to video that is shown as being 01:40:21 long – over 100 minutes –starts loading but does not finish loading and does not start video] [working 6/6/16]

[First part of this video is about Rachel Corrie]

Osama bin Laden put out jihad against Jews and crusaders – his teacher was Azam – a refugee from Jenin . Audience member off camera starts criticizing Israel and justifies terrorists. I defend the people of Israel .

W. Recorded live 3/30/'12 1:23am ET [109 views 6/6/'16]
http://www.ustream.tv/recorded/21459322
Ows occupy union square Israel
Total Views: 101 | Length: 09:58 This is number 20
Email address vantran613@yahoo.com given at end.

War in Iraq – audience member cites 4000+ Americans dead – I mention a million Iraqis dead . Israel is not a monolith controlled by a hand full of people – the people in Israel are not bloodthirsty – they are interested in not being killed – 40 % of the Jewish adults in Israel 16 and over would not take a car or bus or listen to the radio on the Sabbath – according to a survey of the government of Israel 21 years ago. If we do the right thing we live in peace if we don't do the right thing we get in trouble. Ariel Sharon going on the Temple Mount – about a year to the day before the 9/11 attacks. Ritual purification with ashes of red cow. 9/11 attacks came about a year to the day after Sharon went on the Temple Mount . We don't say those guys are the bad guys and we are the good guys – However good we are we have to try to be better -- not pointing a finger at others. A gift blinds the wise -- most political processes run on gift giving with power and votes – blinding the wise . The blind leading the blind – don't be surprised if you have a big mess.

The following two links show 7 and 3 ustream videos of the author, respectively, talking primarily about Afghanistan.

X. http://www.ustream.tv/channel/ows-occupy-union-square/videos/864
http://www.ustream.tv/recorded/21436831 2:28 8 views 6/6/'16
http://www.ustream.tv/recorded/21436713 11:41 4 views "

Y. http://www.ustream.tv/channel/ows-occupy-union-square/videos/863
http://www.ustream.tv/recorded/21437754 Steve Adler Inventor 4:02 min 118 views "
http://www.ustream.tv/recorded/21437660 " 8:59 13 views "

APPENDIX 16

IN THE NAME OF ALLAH, THE MOST COMPASSIONATE, THE MOST MERCIFUL

LECTURE: Taliban in Afghanistan

By: SYED[920] RAHMATULLAH HASHIMI
SENIOR ADVISOR
To: AMIR UL-MU'MINEEN, MULLAH 'UMAR, AFGHANISTAN
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CAL., LOS ANGELES

MAR. 10, '01,[921]

[--] Indicate words that were not heard clearly in the recording.

SYED RAHMATULLAH HASHIMI
PICTURE TAKEN FROM VIDEO

*Video begins with introduction by young man who functions as the primary MC of the meeting -- designated below as **MC1.** The green chalkboard behind the lectern has the initials MSA and MSU[922] written on it. The video starts in the middle of a sentence.*

MC1 …why this should be destroyed. So [in fact today] we shall, Insha'Allah[923], find the reason for this edict and will -- shall find out many other information[924] that will help us better understand the situation in Afghanistan and after the lecture we will have a question and answer session and we'll pass out some pieces of paper if you want to write it down and there [is] a microphone if you would like to come and ask the question yourself. Now I would like to call up Syed Rahmatullah Hashimi the roving spokesperson the Ambassador from Afghanistan.

Ambassador . I was just coming from a meeting with a group of scholars, and the first thing we started there was the statues. And the first thing we started here was also the statues[925]. It's very unfortunate how little we see and how little we know. And it really confuses me, if people really know that little or not. Nobody has seen the problems of Afghanistan; nobody saw their problems before. And the only thing that represents Afghanistan today are the statues.

The problem of Afghanistan was not new. As you know that Afghanistan is called, The Crossroads of Asia. So, we are suffering because of our geo-strategic location. We have suffered in the 18th century, 19th century, and we are still suffering in this century.

We have not attacked the British. We have not attacked the Russians. It was them who attacked us. So the problems in Afghanistan

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[920] The name Syed, is given to the lineal descendents of Mohammad's daughter Fatima, on the male side. In the photo, note: "green turban is …the well-known badge of the descendants of Muḥammad" Encycl. of Islam -2 , Brill _____

[921] Five days later, Thurs, March 15, 2001, Ambassador Hashimi gave a similar presentation at the Beverly Hills Hilton. To get some flavor of how poisoned against the Taliban the environment had become and where this poison was coming from within American society, we have the following comment recorded at that event:

> "I just can't begin to put into words how evil, how truly, truly horrific evil, the Taliban militia is," Sarah Bradshaw of the Feminist Majority Foundation told him before a lunchtime crowd at the Beverly Hilton Hotel. "It's as if we've invited Hitler here."

'Overture by Taliban Hits Resistance: Afghanistan: An envoy from Afghanistan's Islamic regime, speaking in Beverly Hills, meets a tough crowd.' 3/16/01, by: Teresa Watanabe, , Los Angeles Times

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The title up to and including the word Afghanistan is in the same color and font that it was on an archived version of the Muslim Students Association website, at:_____

The site offered a two part downloadable video of the lecture, a video cassette of the lecture ($30 for non-students, $20 for students) an audio recording and a transcript. It says that money from the purchase of the video would "go directly to help the people in Afghanistan" The text below is taken from a posting in senior member's comments numbered 5 & 6 on 21-07-2004 _____originally taken from: _____ A Google search of this address in quotes showed 27 hits – but the address was apparently non-functional. A video of the speech talk is also shown: _____ A Google search showed this link on only one website: _____ but the original link is also is not functional – both as of Jun. 2, '13, from a computer in the National Library of Israel. The first part of the video --41.5 min. -- is available today at: _____ There are several videos of Syed Rahmatullah Hashimi at the following website. _____ and see also _____

Some typos found in the text by MS Word 2010 have been corrected for this sefer – mostly missing apostrophes on words like 'I'm" and some transcription errors – like *capit*ol when *capital* was meant by the speaker.

Other corrections have been made based on the video – where the video differed clearly from the transcript – mostly due to what were probably inadvertent errors in the original transcription process. Otherwise most spellings -- of names, for example -- have been left as in the transcript. Some paragraph breaks have been added to increase readability.

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[922] The MSU or Muslim student Union of USC was contacted by email at muslimsu@usc.edu on Jun 11'13 with a request for a recording -- audio or video -- of the full program . They were also sent draft #123 of this sefer –the latest available on that date. So far, 5/09/18, no response has been received. The MSA or Muslim Student Association of University of Southern California (USC), is described as 'inactive'. USC is a private university and should not be confused with UCLA – a public university of the University of California system.

The Center for Muslim Jewish Engagement at the same univ. was contacted by email cmje@usc.edu for the same purpose on 6/19/13. They were formed in '02 and have taken over some of the functions of the MSA – as far as offering an extensive on line archive of key documents in Islam.

[923] Arabic for 'God willing' – a common expression in Islam.

[924] Grammatical irregularities of the speakers have not been corrected in this transcript . the transcripts of the MC's and the questioners are entirely the work of the author.

[925] See CHAPTER 8: BUDDHIST STATUES …

you see is not our creation. That reflects the image of the world. If you don't like the image in the mirror, do not break the mirror; break your face.

The problems in Afghanistan started in 1979. Afghanistan was a peaceful country and it was doing its own job. The Russians, along with their 140,000 troops attacked Afghanistan in the December of 1979, just 21 years ago, stayed there for a decade, killed one and a half million people, maimed one million more people, and six million out of the eighteen million people migrated because of the Russian brutalities. Even today, our children are dying because of the landmines that they planted for us[926]. And nobody knows about this.

After the Russians left -- during the Russian occupation, on the other side, the American government, the British government, the French, the Chinese, and all of the rest, supported the counter-revolutionaries called the Mujahideen; There were 7 parties only in Pakistan and 8 parties in Iran who fought the Russian occupation. And after the Russians left, these parties went into Afghanistan. All of them had different ideologies, a lot of weapon[s]. And instead of having a single administration, they fought in Afghanistan. The destruction that they brought was worse than the destruction the Russians brought. 62,000[927] people were only killed in the capital, Kabul. Seeing all this chaos, and the complete destruction of our country, and I don't have to forget that after the Soviets left, another million people migrated because of the lawlessness that existed in Afghanistan – so, 7 million people.

So seeing this destruction and lawlessness, a group of students called the Taliban -- Taliban is the plural word of students in our language; it may be two students in Arabic, but in our language it means students. So a group of students started a movement called the Movement of Students. It first started in a village in the southern province of Afghanistan, called Kandahar. It happened when a war-lord, or a commander abducted two minor girls, raped them, and the parents of those girls went to a school and asked the teacher of the school to help them. The teacher of that school, along with his 53 students, finding only 16 guns, went and attacked the base of that commander. After releasing those two girls, they hanged that commander, and so many of their people were also hanged.

This story was told everywhere; and this was called the terrorist story of the Taliban, or the Students. The BBC also quoted this story. Seeing or hearing this story, many other students joined this movement and started disarming the rest of the warlords, who were worse than these. I will not prolong this story. So far, this same students' movement controls 95% of the country; they captured the capitol, including the four major cities. And only a bunch of those warlords are remaining in the northern corridor of Afghanistan.

So our achievements are as follows. We are in the government for only five years, and the following things that we have done, and many of you may not know:

* **The first thing we have done** is reunify the fragmented country. Afghanistan was formerly fragmented into five parts. The first thing we have done is to reunify that country. The United Nations, the United States, everybody was confused as to how to reunify that country, and nobody could do it. First thing we have done is to reunify that country.

* **Second thing we have done**, which everybody failed to do, was disarming a population. After dealing [with] the war of the Russians, and the Americans I would say, every Afghan got a Kalashnikov, and even sophisticated weapons such as stinger missiles[928], and they even got fighter planes and fighter helicopters. So disarming these people was impossible. The United Nations in 1992 passed an appeal asking for 3 billion dollars to repurchase that arms, to start a process of repurchasing those arms. And suddenly, because of its impracticability, that plan never materialized, and everybody forgot about Afghanistan. So the second thing we have done is to disarm 95% of that country.[929]

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[926] "It is estimated that 4,730 minefields affecting 1,655 communities across 33 provinces remain. The first six months' work on a 10-year plan to clear all hazards by March 2023 has proceeded on target. Estimated to cost $618 million, by the end of July $66 million had been committed." Par. 44 of: The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security Report of the Secretary-General, A/67/981–S/2013/535 , 6 Sept 2013 _____

[927] Text said 63,000. Video said clearly 62,000. These numbers may be high by over 20,000. see footnote 226.

[928] It is interesting to see that while the "civilized world" was concerned about "blowback" with stinger missiles – that they might end up being used against civil aviation in the US, for example, there appears to be little voiced concern about the Kalashnikovs and other local weapons and how they might be used to abuse the people of Afghanistan. It is against these Kalashnikov wielding criminals that the Taliban arose – and were highly effective in disarming them.

[929] Here is a description of how the Taliban disarmed the part of the country they came to control.

"What was unusual about the Taliban's strategy is that they were relatively successful in avoiding direct fighting with other potential rival groups. They adopted a simple strategy that was markedly different and peaceful. When approaching an unconquered territory, the Taliban would first send a delegation of *ulama* (clerics) to talk to any local militia commanders. The *ulama* then invited them to implement Islamic law and establish peace by handing over their arms and ammunition. These clerics argued that the weapons belonged to the Bait-ul-Mal (National treasury) under the rule of a single government.

If the local militia commander agreed to the request by the delegation, then there was no fighting. In case that the delegation of *ulama* failed to secure a peaceful surrender, the Taliban then would send a second delegation including elderly pious people of the area along with a Taliban representative. If the second delegation failed to secure a surrender to their demands, then the Taliban would take up arms against the hold-out militia." A

"The removal of small arms and heavy weapons from public view is an accomplishment of immense proportions as weapons were everywhere and used indiscriminately." B

They entered the capital, Kabul, "with little resistance from government troops" "…after two days of fierce fighting" on the city's "eastern flank". 'During the night, Taliban forces moved into the capital from all directions." C

D See page xxx &xxx and see footnote xxx & xxx, ...which at least partially duplicate what is given in this footnote

A p. 468, B p 469 "The Taliban and the Civil War Entanglement In Afghanistan", Nasreen Ghufran, Asian Survey, V. 41, # 3 (May/Jun. '01), p. 462-87, Univ. of Calif. Press, _____ C "Afghan Rebels Seize Capital, Execute Ex-President Najibullah" Kathy Gannon, Dateline: Kabul, AP , 9/27/96; Friday 04:40 Eastern Time

***And the third thing that we have done** is to establish a single administration in Afghanistan, which did not exist for 10 years.

* **And the fourth achievement** that we have that is surprising to everybody is that we have eradicated 75% of all world's Opium cultivation. Afghanistan produced 75% of all world's Opium. The drug, you know that Opium? The Narcotics business? And last year we issued an edict asking the people to stop growing Opium, and this year, the United Nations Drug Control Program, UNDCP, and their head, Barnard Frahi, proudly announced that there was 0% of Opium cultivation. Not at all. [930]

And this was not a good news for UN itself because many of them lost their jobs. In the UNDCP, 700 so called experts were working there and they got good salaries and they never went into Afghanistan. So when we issued this edict, I know that they were not happy. And this year they lost their jobs. And this was our fourth achievement.

* **The fifth achievement** that we have, but it's a little controversial, some of our friends will not know is the restoration of Human Rights. Now, you may think that is a violation of Human Rights, but from our perspective that is the restoration of Human Rights. Because we believe that the fundamental rights of a human being is the right to Live. Before us, nobody could live peacefully in Afghanistan. So the first thing we have done, given to the people is a secure and peaceful life.

The second major thing that we have restored is to give them free and fair justice; you don t have to buy justice, unlike here. You will have justice freely. And you have criticized us for violating women's rights; now, who knows what happened before us. Only some symbolic schools, or symbolic posts were given to some women in the ministry, and that was called the restoration of women's rights.

I can see some Afghans living here, and they will agree with me, that in the rural areas of Afghanistan, women were used as animals. They were SOLD actually. The first thing we have done is to give the self-determination to women, and it happened not in the history of Afghanistan. Throughout the history of Afghanistan, during all the so-called civilized kings or whatever, they didn't give this right to women, so women were sold.

They didn't have the right to select their husbands, or to reject their husbands. First thing we have done is to let them choose their future. And you will know that throughout south Asia, women are killed under the title of honor killings. It happens when a woman's relation is detected with a man, whether or not the relations are sexual, they're both killed. But now this is not happening in our country. [931]

And the third thing that happened only in Afghanistan, was women were exchanged as gifts; this was not something religious; this was something cultural. When two tribal tribes were fighting among themselves, then in order to get their tribal issue reconciliated,[sic] they would exchange women, and then would make, or announce reconciliation. And this has been stopped.

So these were the fundamental rights of woman, we had to start from zero; we couldn't jump in the middle. Now you've asked me about the rights of women's education and the rights of women's work. Unlike what is said here, women do work in Afghanistan. You're right that until 1997, I mean, in 1996 when we captured the capital, Kabul, we did ask women to stay at home. It didn't mean that we wanted [them] to stay at home forever, but nobody listened to us. We said that there is no law, and there is no order, and they have to stay at home. They were raped before us, every day.

So, after we disarmed the people, and after we brought law and order, and now women are working. You are right that women are not working in the ministry of defense, like here. We don t want our women to be fighter pilots, or to be used as objects of decoration for advertisements. But they do work. They work in the Ministry of Health, Interior, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Social Affairs, and so on. So, and we don t have any problem with women's education. We have said that we want education, and we will have education whether or not we are under anybody's pressure, because that is part of our belief. We are ordered to do that.

When we say that there should be segregated schools, it does not mean that we don't want women to be educated. It is true that we are against co-education; but it is not true that we are against women's education. We do have schools even now, but the problem is the resources. We cannot expand those programs.

Before, our government there were numerous curriculums that were going on; there were curriculums which preached the kings for the king, and there were curriculums which preached for the communists, and there were curriculums from all these seven parties. So, the students were confused as to what to study, and the first we have done today is to unify that curriculum, and that's going on.

But we are criticized, and we say that instead of criticism, if you just help us once, that will make a difference. Criticism will not make a difference. If you start criticism from New York, thousands of miles away, we don t care. But if you come there and help us, we do care.

So actually there are more girls students studying in the faculty of medical sciences than boys are. This is not me who is saying this, it is the United Nations who announced this. Recently we reopened the faculty of medical science in all major cities of Afghanistan and in Kandahar, there are more girl students than boys. But they are segregated. And the Swedish committees also -- they have also established schools for girls.

I know they are not enough, but that's what we can do. So, that is what I say that we have restored. I don t say we are 100% perfect, and nobody will say that they are 100% perfect. We do have shortcomings, and we do need to amend our policies. But we can't do everything overnight.

* **And the sixth problem**, that we are... is it sixth or sev-

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A similar story is given in: "The Taliban Phenomenon: Afghanistan 1994-1997' p.60. by Kamal Matinuddin, Oxford University Press, 1999,

[930] **See Page 8: How Could A "Failed State" Wipe Out Opium Poppy Growing From One Year To The Next?**

[931] This is supported by : *"... the imposition of Taliban control in rural areas resulted in reduced incidents of rape, kidnaping, and forced marriage."* U.S. Department of State Afghanistan Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1997, Bur. of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, 1/ 30/98 http://www.afghanistannewscenter.com/news/1998/february/feb3c1998.htm

enth? Seventh I think the seventh problem that we are accused of is Terrorism, or the existence of terrorists in Afghanistan. And for Americans terrorism or terrorist means only bin Laden. Now you will not know that Afghanistan, or bin Laden was in Afghanistan 17 years before even we existed. Bin Laden was in Afghanistan, fought the Soviet Union, and Mr. Ronald Reagan, the president of America in that time, and Mr. Dick Chaney called such people freedom fighters or the Heroes of Independence, because they were fighting for their cause. So Osama bin Laden was one of those guys who was instigated by such media reports, so in that provocation by these countries to go to Afghanistan and fight the Soviets there. And now when the Soviet Union is fragmented, such people were not needed anymore, and they were transformed into terrorists. From heroes to terrorists. So exactly like Mr. Yassir Arafat was transformed from a terrorist to a hero. So we don t know as to what is the definition of Terrorism.

We do admit that the terrorists were actually horrific acts and they were terrorist acts. But if they are terrorist acts, what is the difference between those terrorist acts and the attacks on Afghanistan when in 1998 attacks, cruise missile attacks on Afghanistan. Neither of the two were declared and both of them killed civilians. So we are confused as to what is the definition of Terrorism. If it means killing civilians blindly, both of them killed civilians blindly.

And the fact is, I'm not going to be offensive or rude, or rude about this, I'm going to be frank. And I think it's sometimes honest to be rude. If the United States says that it has acted for its defense, let's see. The United States government tried [to kill a man[932]] without even giving him a fair trial. In 1998, they just sent cruise missiles into Afghanistan and they announced that they were trying to kill Osama bin Laden. We didn't know Osama bin Laden then. I didn't know him; he was a simple man. So we were all shocked. I was one of those men who was sitting at home at night, I was called for an immediate council meeting and we all were told the United States have attacked Afghanistan -with 75 cruise missiles and trying to kill one man. And they missed that man; killed 19 other students and never apologized for those killings. So what would you do if you were in our status; if we were to go and send 75 cruise missiles into the United States and say that we were going to kill a man that we thought not believed that we thought was responsible for our embassies, and we missed that man, and we killed 19 other Americans. What would the United States do? An instant declaration of war. But we we're polite. We didn't declare war. We had a lot of problems at home. We didn't want further problems [933].

And since then, we are very open-minded on this issue. We have said, that if really this man is involved in the Kenya/Tanzania acts -- if anybody can give us proof or evidence about his involvement in these horrendous acts, we will punish him. Nobody gave us evidence. We put him on trial for 45 days and nobody gave us any kind of evidence. The fact is that the United States told us they did not believe in our judicial system. We were surprised as to what kind of judicial system they have. They showed us as to what they are doing to the people. They just tried to kill a man without even giving him a fair trial. Even if one of us is a criminal here, the police is not going to blow his house. He must go to a court first. So, that was rejected. Our first proposal, despite all these things, was rejected. They said they did not believe in our judicial system, and he must be given to to New York.

The second proposal that we gave after the rejection of this first proposal we gave was, we are ready to accept an international monitoring group to come into Afghanistan and monitor this man's activities in Afghanistan. So that he does nothing. Even that he has no telecommunications equips. That proposal was also rejected.

And the third proposal we gave, six months ago, was that we were ready, that we were ready to try or accept a third Islamic country's decision, or the trial of [--] in a third Islamic country, with consent of Saudi Arabia and Afghanistan. That was also rejected. So we don t know, as to what is the problem behind. If bin Laden was the only issue, we are still very open minded, and for the fourth time, I'm here, with a letter from my leadership[934] that I'm going to submit to the State Department hoping that they will resolve the problem. But I don't think so they 'll resolve.

Because we think, and I personally think now that maybe the United States is looking for a Boogy Man always. Remember what Gorbachev said? He said, that he's going to do the worst thing ever to the United States. And everybody thought that he's going to blow the United States with nuclear weapons. But he said, "I'm going to remove their enemy"[935]. And then he fragmented Soviet Union. And he was right. After he fragmented Soviet Union, a lot of people lost their jobs in the Pentagon, in the CIA, and FBI, because they were not needed anymore. So we think that maybe these guys are looking for a Boogy Man now. Maybe they want to justify their annual budgets, maybe they want to make their citizens feel that they are still needed to defend them.

Afghanistan is not a terrorist state. We cannot even make a needle. How are we going to be a terrorist state? How are we going to be a threat to the world? If the word terrorism is really derived from the word terror, then there are countries making weapons of mass destruction, countries making nuclear weapons, causing deforestation, causing air, and water pollution. They are terrorist states. We are not. We cannot even make a needle. How are we going to be a threat to the world?

So as I said in the beginning, the situation in Afghanistan is not our creation. The situation in Afghanistan reflects the world's image. If you don t like the image in the mirror, do not break the mirror; break your face.

Now, we are under sanctions. And the sanctions have caused a lot of problems, despite that we are going under so many problems, the 22 years of continuous war, the total destruction of our infra-

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[932] There is a sound gap in the video. The words in brackets appear in the MSA transcript.

[933] See TIME INDEX: 1998/8/20 for other cites to this event.

[934] Emphasis added at each appearance of this word in this talk. "Leadership" appears four times in this talk. The name of any leader, other than the foreign minister who is named by a questioner, does not appear. Mullah Omar is not named in any way – though the story of his leadership in initiating what became the Taliban movement is given in some detail, it is given without his name.

Perhaps it is related to the absence of his picture – that there is some understanding that broadcasting a name or promoting a picture diminished the humility of the person named or depicted.

[935] Email sent Wed, 6/5/13 to Gorbachev Foundation for confirmation/ source of this quote. No response received as of Sept/2/13.

structure, and the problems of refugees, and the problems of land mines in our agricultural lands, all of a sudden the United Nations, with the provocation of Russia, is imposing sanctions on Afghanistan. And the sanctions have been approved. We are under sanctions.

Several hundred children died a month ago, here it is (holds up pamphlet). Seven hundred children died because of malnutrition and the severe cold weather. Nobody even talked about that. Everybody knows about the statues. For us, we are surprised. If the world is destroying our future with economic sanctions, then they have no right to worry about our past. Everybody is saying that they are destroying their heritage -- they don t have any right to talk about that. They are destroying the future of our children with economic sanctions, how are they going to justify to talk about our past?

I know it's not rational and logical to blow the statues for, for retaliation of economic sanctions. But this is how it is.[936]

I called, after this announcements, I called my headquarters, and I found out, I was really confused, I asked them, why are they going to blow the statues, and I talked to the head of the council of scholars and people who had actually decided this. He told me that UNESCO and NGO from Sweden, or from one of these Scandinavian countries Norway, Sweden, one of these they had actually come, with a project of rebuilding the face[937] of these statues, which have worn by rain[938].

So the council of people had told them to spend that money in saving the lives of these children, instead of spending that money to [the] statues. And these guys said that, No, that this is only for the statues. And the people were really pissed-off. They said that, if you don't care about our children, we are going to blow those statues.[939]

[Person from the Audience yells, Takbeer!][940]

[Audience responds, Allahu Akbar!][941]

I don't say that he's right or wrong[942] . The decision is yours. Think of yourself. If you are in such problems, what would you do? If your children are dying in front of your eyes, and you are under sanctions, and then the same [943] people who have imposed sanctions and are coming and building a statue here? What will you do? So, I talked to my headquarters today, and they said that the statues have not been blown so far. But the people are so angry. They're really angry. They want to blow them.

And there is Kofi Annan is going, you know Kofi Annan, the Secretary General of United Nations? He went to [--], to Pakistan, and he said he's going to meet our representative there. This man never bothered to enter, to talk about these children, he never bothered himself to talk about six million refugees, and he never talked about [the] poverty of Afghanistan. He only goes to that region because of these statues. [944]

And the OIC[945] is also -- they've also sent a mission to go to Kabul and talk about the statues. So we're really confused --that the world is really caring about the statues, and then they don't care about human beings.

I don't say we have to retaliate in blowing the statues; we have not done that. But if we were to destroy those statues, we would have destroyed them three years before now, because we captured those areas those areas three years before now[946]. We didn't want to blow them. And now the situation has come, and it's not our decision. This is the decision of the scholars and the people. And that decision has been approved by the Supreme Court. We cannot reject this decision.

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[936] Emphasis added. The statues issue was ultimately the proverbial "straw that broke the camel's back". See CH. 8: BUDDHIST STATUES AND OTHER PRE-ISLAMIC ART, particularly, p, 47.

[937] Probably meant surface – not face –as the statues really had no faces above the chin. See photos, Ch. 8: BUDDHIST STATUES

[938] [See footnotes 177B.12 f, 117 & 126] The faces of both statues – above the mouth --were missing & may never have been carved in stone.

[939] **A.** Emphasis added. This story was given in at least 3 different times & places by Amb. Hashimi. This is the 1st – 3/10; 2nd: interv., B. Crossette, NYT, (NYC?) 3/16 – pub. by NYT, 3/19; 3rd: interv., Wash. DC, Knight Ridder Newspapers, pub by Edmonton Journal, 3/ 22, p. E11. Part of this argument is also given in: The Washington Post, 3/23/'01 Final Ed. Nora Boustany,; Pg. A21; 7 min. talk on Charlie Rose show, with Amb. Hashimi, Prof. Barnett Rubin & Charlie Rose. 3/15 – Youtube: A conversation between Taliban Spokesman Sayed Rahmatullah Hashimi and Charlie Rose - Part 3/3.- starting at 13 sec. ____ Also NPR: Talk of the Nation starting at 8:16 –9:40 & 39:27-39:57 . ____ These last 3 don't specifically mention UNESCO but cite "Western Diplomats" offering to repair the statues, etc. The 2nd segment in the NPR program mentions "the United Nations and some foreign visitors…"

B. In an interview with Mercury News Washington Bureau "Hashimi accused the United States and other Western countries of creating the situation that led to the statues' destruction. He said the Taliban had protected them, as well as many other Hindu and Buddhist treasures, until a Western delegation visited the site this year, proposing repairs. The Islamic authorities "asked them to provide food instead for the children in the area who are dying of malnutrition. They refused," Hashimi said. "They said the money was for the statues alone, not for children." The response so angered the authorities that they ordered the statues destroyed, he said." San Jose Mercury News, 3/22 Morning Final Ed., Joyce M. Davis, Mercury News Washington Bureau, Pg. 5A, Dateline: Wash.DC [EMPHASIS ADDED]

C. When US State Dept. Spokesman, Boucher, was asked about this – the afternoon after it was reported in the NYT, he did not deny that such an offer had been made. [see footnote 175-A]

D. "It is too soon perhaps to discern the Taliban leader's true intentions in all this, an act of revenge perhaps against the inhabitants of the Bamiyan valley who have long opposed him, or of defiance aimed at those in the West who refuse to offer diplomatic recognition or relax sanctions. One thing is clear though. Afghan leaders of all political and religious persuasions seem shocked that the plight of the Bamiyan Buddhas has attracted more international sympathy than that of their compatriots who continue to suffer the effects of prolonged drought and chronic war."[EMPH ADDED] *Neil Brodie, Editorial, p3, Culture Without Context*, Issue 8, Spring 2001, Illicit Antiquities Research Centre, Camb. Engl. ___

[940] The Arabic term for the phrase Allāhu Akbar. The phrase is usually translated "God is Great".

[941] Arabic phrase in Islam, like above, means "Allah is the Greatest."

[942] The Ambassador makes no noticeable visual or verbal response to these interjections from the audience.

[943] The word *same* is stressed by the speaker.

[944] As was reported in this sefer see footnote 136 , Kofi Annan was publicly opposed to the latest intensification of sanctions before they were enacted. Amb. Hashimi may not have known this – or made the distinction – that Annan, as Secretary General, was required to uphold what the Security Council passed.

[945] Organization of the Islamic Conference. [Since Jun. 2011, Organization of Islamic Cooperation.] With 57 member states. It says it is "the collective voice of the Muslim World" and works to "safeguard and protect the interests of the Muslim world in the spirit of promoting international peace and harmony".

[946] For more on timing of statues destruct.. see footnote177E & CHAP. 8

So these guys are there, the OIC and some, even I think some ministers from different countries are there to save the lives of the statutes. I think they will not be blown because of the concerns of these people. But it is really, really ridiculous. These people do not care about children, about people who are dying there, about the foreign interference that still exists; they only care about the statues[947]. And I'm sure they don t care about our heritage.

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[947] **A.** An extreme example of the concern with statues in comparison with people is shown in the following : http://www.icomos.org/risk/world_report/2000/appeal.htm

"PRESS RELEASE - 1 MARCH 2001

SAVE THE CULTURAL HERITAGE OF AFGHANISTAN
APPEAL BY ICOMOS AND ICOM

ICOMOS (International Council on Monuments and Sites) and ICOM (International Council of Museums) learned with great shock of the new decree issued by the Taliban leadership of Mullah Mohammad Omar ordering the systematic destruction of all statues in the country. This decision breaks the commitment made by the Taliban leadership in 1999 to protect all cultural heritage in Afghanistan and in particular the giant Buddha figures at Bamiyan.Adding to the dishonour of breaking a commitment to preserve the ancient and diverse heritage of Afghanistan as part of that of the whole of mankind, such an act of destruction would be a total cultural catastrophe. It would remain written in the pages of history next to the most infamous acts of barbarity…." [EMPHASIS ADDED]

B. So destroying statues is like the holocaust? This is even more remarkable as, at the time - & for yrs thereafter, the Pres. of ICOMOS, Prof. Dr. Michael Petzet, was German. This press realease is a good example of 'culture community' 's cultural insensitivity --- noted by in-country, Afghan Museum expert CG For more re: CG, See below & see footnotes 177B.2. & 960 & figs p. 245.

C. The Australian, Nov 7/'01, Concern for ancient treasure trove - WAR ON TERROR, SOURCE: The Times, Byline: Dalya Alberge, Alison Beckett and Daniel McGrory, Section: World; Pg. 11, 718 words. "Carla Grissman, [note variant spelling of her name, d. Gustave Grissmann _____] who has spent years cataloguing Afghanistan's disappearing cultural history, believes that the Taliban has resisted the temptation to loot the Treasure of Bactria. [She was right, see D., infra] Mrs Grissman, who is also with SPACH, helped to salvage what she could from the Kabul museum with the Taliban's help. But she was worried by the regime's change of heart in March when it blew up the Buddhas and smashed what little remained in the Kabul museum as "infidel idols". She agrees that "the Taliban could parade the Bactrian treasure and destroy it as a confrontational gesture to the West, but I hope not". Mrs Grissman says that nothing from the Treasure of Bactria has so far been offered for sale on the black market."

D. 6/24/'04, NYT, 2,000-Year-Old Heritage Narrowly Escaped the Taliban, Carlotta Gall, p E-1m c.5; The Arts/Cultural Desk; A Hoard of Gold That Afghanistan Quietly Saved; 1578 words, Dateline: Kabul,6/23 [Note double title, 1st smears Taliban; 2nd doesn't.] "Carla Grissman, [note variant spelling of her name] an American who has been working with the Kabul museum since 1973 and saw the gold when it was first discovered, said she had known all along the gold was safe, but for her the moment was no less moving. "I held a lot of the objects in my hands at that time, so in a way for me now it was an emotional experience, thinking back to the time when the museum was intact (and everyone was happy)," she wrote in an e-mail message after completing the inventory. "The museum staff are the heroes," she said in an interview. "They kept it intact by keeping it dead quiet. The world was shouting that the museum was plundered and everything stolen, but the Afghans never said that." Nancy Dupree…said that whenever anyone asked the museum workers what was in the safes, "they just said there was nothing important in there."…[After] the monthlong inventory process Prof. Frederik Hiebert of Oxford University, [who] was leading the cataloging… found every single one of 20,600 gold pieces -- some as small as a fingernail -- as they were left by the …archaeologists and museum workers who packed them in 1979."

E. Jun 3/'05, States News Service, [U.S. State Dept.] U.S. Partners With Afghanistan To Preserve Ancient Gold Collection, 772 W'ds, Dateline: Washington "On his recent trip to Washington, Karzai visited the Freer and Sackler galleries where he was presented with two gold coins dating from the period of Alexander the Great…the two coins were part of the 30,000 other coins stolen from the Kabul Museum when civil war broke out [Note: under Massoud.] after the departure of Soviet troops in 1989 and later recovered by the U.S. government." [EMPH. ADDED]

F. 3/21/'01, AP, Kathy Gannon, 711 words, Dateline: Kabul, "According to the Italian-funded Society for the Preservation of Afghanistan's Cultural Heritage a large portion of the museum's collection -- 250 trunks and 25 unpacked statues -- were moved to the four-story information and culture ministry building in 1996 after the Taliban took conrtrol in Afghanistan. Historians and museum workers say the worst ravaging of the Kabul Museum was done between 1992 and 1996 by rival Islamic groups, who were at war in Kabul during deposed president Burhanuddin Rabbani's rule. During those four years, 80 percent of the artworks were stolen and sold on the open market, bought by art dealers from around the world and are now scattered in museums and private collections in several countries, they say.The last time the museum was opened to the public was in August 1999.[This is a mistake – should be 2000, see footnote 177 B.1 & D.4] At that time the most priceless of the artifacts, a 2,000 year-old[N.H-D & C.G. say 4th cent.CE] seated bodhisattva, made of baked clay…[n]aked but for an earring, armband and necklace,[Note: not naked! see photo. p.245 &–see footnote 177 B.1] …enraged the Taliban leaders, [according to]… several people who had attended the opening. The Taliban apparently slapped the statue around the head and shoulders, causing the museum workers to buy a glass case to protect it. "It is one of the most beautiful, ethereal Buddha statues," Carla Grissmann, who had catalogued and inventoried the Kabul Museum collection, said earlier. "It was in superb condition." In Buddhism, bodhisattvas are people of great spiritual awareness who help others reach enlightenment. At other sites, like Ghazni, 200 kilometers (120 miles) southeast of Kabul, a reclining Buddha was destroyed by troops using pickaxes. Taliban soldiers in pickup trucks roared up the mountainside to a 2nd to 7th century Buddhist monastery and stuppa and demolished the unbaked clay statues." [EMPHASIS ADDED] Taliban had protected this site:– see G, infra & see footnote 120-B

G. 3/13/'01, AP, Kathy Gannon, 816 words, Dateline: Ghazni, "At least two weeks before Afghanistan's supreme ruler ordered all statues in the country destroyed, zealous Taliban soldiers wielding pickaxes hacked an ancient Buddhist complex to rubble … [T]he soldiers spent several days swarming over the complex, built in tiers up the side of a hill from the second to seventh centuries, said Mullah Saeed Jan, a Taliban guard at the site. An ancient baked clay statue of Buddha, beheaded decades ago, was hacked into small pieces, among the relics destroyed at the complex at Ghazni, 120 miles …[from]… Kabul." Dupree said the Ghazni ruins were a rich mix of Buddhist and Hindu traditions...[She said that] [s]ome of the chambers contained Hindu statues, long since lost, destroyed or sold… "There's an unbroken cultural history of 50,000 years," said Carla Grissmann, who spent several years inventorying the thousands of artifacts, most of Buddhist in origin, at the Kabul Museum. The Taliban's Foreign Minster Wakil Ahmed Muttawakil said Sunday they had all been destroyed. For Afghans, Ghazni is considered an Islamic cultural mecca because religious leaders are buried there, Jan said. Some of those leaders shared the same version of Islam that is followed by today's Taliban. Take Afghanistan's 12th-century ruler, Sultan Mahmood Ghaznavi, [Turkish origin ruled:998–1030, Enc. Iranica_____] who rampaged across most of northern India converting Hindus to Islam and smashing Hindu statues.[See footnote 15C.1 on forced conversion of Jews by this ruler]… Afghanistan still has a relatively large Hindu and Sikh population, although hundreds fled between 1992 and 1996 when warring Islamic factions, who threw out the communists, destroyed much of Kabul. The Taliban took control in 1996 and have allowed Hindus and Sikhs to practice their religions. A Sikh temple in Karte Parwan neighborhood is a giant marble hall where the soft melodies of Indian music can be heard. Despite the Taliban's ban on music, they have not interfered with music played by other religions. [see footnote 722]"At the moment, we have no difficulties. But no one can guarantee the future," said a Hindu resident of Kabul…"We don't want to talk politics," said a nervous …Sikh. "Everything for the moment is calm and normal." An estimated 450 worshippers come daily to a Sikh temple in Kabul… Dupree clings to the hope that some of the statues may have been …sold, despite the Taliban's repeated denials that any artifact was sold. 'It is as wrong to sell as it is to have" the statues, said Mullah Mohammed Hassan, deputy administrator of Kabul.' [EMPHASIS ADDED]

H. Kathy Gannon attributes episode to specific senior Taliban: Def Min, Obeidulluh & Dep. Prime Min., Mullah Hassan. I is for Infidel, p 79-81. C. Grissman isn't mentioned or hinted at in the 186 p, '06, Public Affairs, book [see footnote 177-D.12]

I. "…during the inauguration ceremony of Kabul Museum in 2001 [Note: should be 2000.] Mullah Mohammad Hassan Akhund (acting Chairman of the Ruling Council inKabul) [& others]… were infuriated that international aid was being spent on repairing…statutes in Kabul Museum while international …sanctions was causing hundreds of children to die of malnutrition. [Email from SRH Aug 4, '16, get perm.]

J. Proceedings of the Doha Conference of 'Ulamâ On Islam and Cultural Heritage Doha, Qatar 30-31 December 2001, 138p UNESCO, _____ It's interesting that the words Deoband , poppy, poppies, drug, opium and opiate don't occur in the 138 p. doc. However , the following , on p 54, includes a tacit reference to such issues – by Imam J.M.Butt, who studied in Deoband & lived among the Pashtuns:

> "It might be possible that considerable responsibility for hardening of opinion within the Tâlibân lies with the international community. On many outstanding issues the Tâlibân felt isolated, ignored and misunderstood by the outside world. Perhaps if the Tâlibân had been treated with more respect by the international community, they would not have responded with so much defiance."

"The Buddhas of Bamiyan: Saving Other Possible Cultural Targets" p 53-56 [sent email thru his website , Sep 6/'16 http://afghanjamiya.org/support-mahadad-dawa-institute/

They don't care about our heritage; they only care about their picnic site one time. Maybe they'll have a good picnic sometime there, seeing those statues. They don't care about our heritage, I'm sure. If they were to care about our past, they wouldn't destroy our future.

And I'm sure these sanctions which are imposed on our government will never change us, because for us, our ideology is everything. To try to change our ideology with economic sanctions will never work. It may work in the United States, where the economy is everything, but for us, our ideology is everything. You can't change us with that. And we believe that it is better to die for something than to live for nothing.

We are still open-minded. We are still, we have still opened our doors for negotiations, but our offices are closed everywhere. Our office was closed in New York a week ago. They are trying to shut our offices in other countries, trying to isolate us, and they don't know that isolation is counter-productive. Because they don't have experts; the only experts they have are those people who speak English. They don't even speak the language. Those experts who are advising the sanctions -- or the sanction committee -- have not even been to Afghanistan. And they are setting benchmarks for us to achieve.

I'm prolonging this speech, I'm sorry, because I have been repeating it everywhere, so I may have left something in it, and I will let you ask me questions.

[Applause from Audience]

MC1 Regarding the questions , there are two ways to ask the questions. One way is that you can come up to the microphone or you can write them down on a pieces of paper that I think are being handed out right now. So after they are written down. [-] So if there is any question for the microphone you can come up right now .. [-] *[Questions were offered in both oral and written form. The first question was offered orally and is clearly audible.]*

Questioner One [*at the mike.*] Salaam Aleichem

[*not clear who said this*] Aleichem salaam

I have actually several concerns and some contradictions in the speech that I would like to point to. The last issue – of Buddhists -- I don't like to talk about it because I don't like the issue myself – but there are some things just coming out of Afghanistan and we have to talk about that. [-] the foreign minister of the Taliban –Mutawakkil had an interview with the BBC -- the Pashtu service -- and he had also interviewed some foreign journalists and he indicated that the statues had been started – to destroy them started to destroy them -- they have done half of job – the reason they are destroying this that because of the belief system people are going there and praying there to the statues.

The concern that I had that there are statues of Hindus and Sikhs in Afghanistan which are practically and actively prayed to. If this matter is really of concern to the Taliban that the Buddhas are a matter of prayers then those are of course there why not destroy them first and come up after to the Buddha – something which is just there and nobody is making a prayer on it. Now he said that it was retaliation to the proposal after Sweden and other people . Now the question that I have -- would the retaliation save our children?

MC1 *intervenes* [indistinct]

Questioner One. Now this is part of the question -- Would the retaliation – would it save our children?

MC2 *intervenes.* Rather than having the questions turn into statements, if we could please ask everyone who has questions to formulate their statements in the form of a question in order for us to facilitate as many questions as possible.

[indistinct from different people]

Questioner One. Sorry to take your time but these are some of the reasons – if we just ask simple questions you don't get information that could be easily [---] the reason that I brought this interview -- this is not a product of the western media it is Pashtun and I'm an Afghan I speak by Pashtun, Farsi, English, Urdu[948] and all the languages I listened to that interview and I read that interview also so that is why saying there are facts coming out and I'm concerned about Afghanistan--I've been to Afghanistan last year and there are some other issues that I would like to talk about [--]

Ambassador [*returns to the lectern – after taking his seat when MC1 came up to introduce the question answer session.]*

Thank you very much and unfortunately again, the first question is the statues. So the statues as I told you, have not been destroyed so far. And I have contacted my headquarters there, and if they were destroyed, then people would not bother going there; as I told you Kofi Annan is there, OIC is there, and there are some Ministers is there. And for us, as he [the questioner] said that Mutawakkil, Saab[949], has said that [that the statues have been destroyed], I don t think he has said that they are destroyed. He said that [that the statues have not been destroyed]. And I don t reject this. They raised an edict which says these [the statues] should be blown. And we are not against Buddhists; absolutely wrong. We are not against any religion. There are Hindus living in Afghanistan; there are different religions. There is one man who is a Jew[950] living in Afghanistan.[951]

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THE NATIONAL MUSEUM OF AFGHANIATAN,
AN ILLUSTRATED GUIDE, NANCY HATCH-DUPREE, LOUIS DUPREE & A. A. MOTAMEDI, 1974, FIG 45.
A, B & C MATCH C. GRISSMANN'S DESCRIPT. [SEE FOOTNOTE 177B]. ONLY "POSTERIZED" A & JOSEPHINE POWELL PHOTO[SEE P. 48], MATCH PHOTO GIVEN BY NHD IN HER '96 PAPER. ONLY A [HERE & P 48] HAS ARMBAND NOTED BY K. GANNON[SEE FOOTNOTE 177D12]



STATUE C FOUND HEADLESS BY ARCHAEOLOGISTS [1933-40] & REJOINED WITH HEAD. B IS ACTUALLY A 'RESTORED VERSION OF C AFTER C WAS BROKEN BY THE TALIBAN IN FEB-MAR, 2001.FOR B IN EARLIER STAGES OF RESTORATION, SEE PDF P 22-24 IN ABDULLAH HAKIMZADA: "CONSERVATION AT THE NATIONAL MUSEUM, AFGHANISTAN" ~06. FOR MORE PHOTOS & DESCRIPTIONS OF A & C SEE ALSO P343-4, FRANCINE TISSOT, UNESCO CATALOGUE OF KABUL MUSEUM 1931–1985, 2006

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[948] Urdu is the most common language of Pakistan . Pashtun is the most common language among the Taliban in the south. Farsi is very similar to Dari – the next most common language spoken in Afghanistan.

[949] This word, an honorific, missing in MSA trans. –but clearly audible in the video

[950] One may wonder that he says "one man who is a Jew" – when there were, somewhat famously, two. [see p. 7 THE LAST TWO JEWS OF KABUL –RESPECTED BY THE TALIBAN?]. The mystery is solved by an article from the immediate period of the Ambassador's talk: Kabul's last Jew shrugs off fear of persecution, 5/24/01, The Times (London),Stephen Farrell, Kabul, 571 words.

It begins with the statement that "The only practicing Jew left in Kabul…[is] Zibollon Sementa".[sic] It includes a claim that the Muslim neighbors say "the [unnamed] long-term custodian of the Flower Street synagogue, a former practicing [sic] Jew… has em-braced Islam". The article also notes that these neighbors call this un-named supposed convert "Mullah". They also "say both have spent years leveling [sic] a variety of accusations at each other." This un-named other man, we learn elsewhere was Ishak Levin

Similarly, on Apr. 1/01, we find: "the only known Afghan Jew is a rabbi who is allowed to maintain Kabul's sole synagogue," acc'ding to Pamela Constable, in her : Religious Minorities Tread Carefully Under Taliban Rule The Washington Post.

It appears that, as a result of accusations the two made against each other, they took turns in jail and claiming to be the only Jew left in the country. In August of the same year, it was Isaaq Levy's turn to be out—and not mention the other's name. AFGHANISTAN: Kabul's last Jew appeals for help. KABUL, 6 Aug. '01 (IRIN).

[951] This was said in a serious tone—with emphasis and with a smile on the word Jew. The moderator also smiled at this point. The "laughter" was somewhat muffled – not loud -- and sounded as much like murmuring as laughter. This was the only obvious smile by Ambassador Hashimi in the first 41.5 minutes of the talk -- which is all that I have had the opportunity to view/listen to and so far. I am still searching for an audio or video recording of the remainder of the talk.

[Audience "laughs"]

So we are not against any religion. And there is no Buddhist in Afghanistan, this I can say. In our religion, if anything, you can leave anything until it is not harmful to you. If these Buddhas were not harmful to us, so far. But now when the money is going to Buddhas reconstruction, and the children are dying next door, we think it's harmful now. Not we think, the people think. And I told you that this decision is taken by the council of scholars and the council of people and has been approved by the Supreme Court.

And the media is saying everywhere that it is an edict by our leadership. Have you ever seen our leadership on TV? Have you ever seen or heard him on international radio? He has never been on radio, so it's absolutely wrong that he[952] has issued an edict.[953] I do agree that there is an edict, but by the council of people and the scholars, and has been approved by the Supreme Court, but has not been executed so far[954]. Is it enough? You know, really, I am asked so much about these statues that I have a headache now. If I go back to Afghanistan, I will blow them.

[Audience laughs]

[[955]*Questioner asks about the infighting between Mujahideens now. He asks, in the past we knew that there was one common enemy (the Russians) and it was easy to support the Mujahideen but now it's the groups of Mujahideens fighting between each other. How do you explain this?*]

They [the different Mujahideen groups] killed so many people, and there were so many problem[s]. And that's why we started our movement. It's all in these people. They didn't t fight for Shari'ah, or they didn't fight for Afghanistan, they only fought for their future post in power. So we, as I told you that, we finished that. And only now, we have one opposition headed by Ahmed Shah Masood. And we don't have much problems with him. We had talks with his representative in Ashkabad in Ramadhaan this year, and I was there. So, we say that he failed in bringing about a constitution, a unified government; he could not even unify the capital, Kabul. So we did all these things.

So we asked him, despite that he controls nothing, except 5% in the mountains, and we have said we are still open-minded. We agree that he should have a post, because he has fought the Russians. And in `98, we agreed on a joint government; actually, I was also there, so we agreed in giving them three ministries and accepting their judicial system merging with our judicial system, and giving them three or four district or provincial governors or something like that. And they agreed on that.

Our, on our part, we asked them to give us their weapons, because the problem in Afghanistan is not political differences. The problem in Afghanistan is the weapons. Everybody has had weapons, and now if they are fighting us, it is not because of our very much ideological differences; it's because of weapons. There were a lot of weapons before, and you know, the Afghans will know that so many times they tried to have one government and then after a week or so, they fought, because all of them got different defense ministries, and they would fight. So now we have said that the problems in Afghanistan is not the political problem; it is the arms which exist. We are, we will accept them to be in our government if he accepts to give his arms to the Ministers of Defense. We have no problem however.

[A questioner asked, As Salaamu `Alaykum wa Rahmatullaahi wa Barakaatuh[956]. Brother, Afghanistan is now supposed to be a Muslim country, Insha Allah[957]. And these statues are just like the statues in Makkah, when Rasoolillah [958](saws) [959]came to Makkah, and it was the very first thing that he did was to destroy the statues. What is taking us so long? Why aren't they destroyed already?]

[Audience laughs, some say Takbeer]

So, I don t know what to say. We don t have any Buddhists as I told you; we have to look at the problems of the Muslim minorities in some countries. So we do not want to create problems for them, that' s why we are still waiting, and we hope that we will resolve this problem.

[A written question read, What is your opinion about killing the Iranian officers in Herat in 1998?]

So, there is this story about seven, nine, nine Iranians, one of them was a journalist, and the rest of them were called diplomats. It happened in `98 when we were capturing a city in the north of Afghanistan called Mazar-e-Shareef when we were, we announced before our campaign in liberating that city, we announced that all diplomats of organizations, including the UN, the diplomatic missions, and NGOs to evacuate because of the possible fighting that may happen in the city too. So, all of them evacuated, the United Nations, the NGOs, and even those people who actually bombed them, they also evacuated, so the only people who remained there was some seven, or eight, nine Iranians, who were actually not diplomats, who were actually military advisors to their puppets in Afghanistan.

So, and we didn't kill them in diplomatic mission; they were killed on their way to Bamiyan; Bamiyan is another city in central Afghanistan, so they were and we didn't want to kill them; they just died because of the shelling that happened. And we issued an edict, and we declared that we were sorry for what happened. And now the Iranian government has also sent their mission, and when I was coming there, three of their villages were in Afghanistan; they reopened their consulate here and I think they have re-thought their policies now and maybe they will have a new chapter of friendship with us and I hope it will happen.

[Question asked about how people, especially Muslims, need to be educated about the situation in Afghanistan. He went on further to ask about whether or not he would be under a physical threat if he were to shave his beard and walk into Afghanistan, or if a sister would be under a physical threat if a sister were to wear Hijab according to the Islamic standards, not wearing Burqah.]

You say that all the Muslims, or all the people, must be educated on the situation in Afghanistan. And now I am thinking that first they must be de-educated to try to understand what we are saying. There are not [--], they are really trying how to approach, and you are right, and I agree that you must have Public Relations, in teaching people, or at least, letting them know what we say. But as I told you that we have other priorities. Our priority is to save the children. Our priority is to de-mine our country. Our priority is to reunify our country. Our priority is to stop the foreign interference. Our priority is to fight the [--] that is already operating in our country. So for us to talk about Public Relations, it is important, but it cannot… What would you do if you were in this status? And it is not easy to do Public Relations. You have to spend a lot of money.

This statement shows that the senior Taliban officials were aware of the remaining one or two Jews in Kabul and may have been particularly careful – so that they could point to this as an indication of their tolerance – as opposed to the image of them being like OBL.

952 The MSA transcript says 'we', video clearly has 'he'.

953 see footnote 934 for comment on leadership

954 1st video ends here after 41min 30 sec. It includes ~9/16ths of words in transcript – but the video is listed on the MSA website as two hours.

955 The transcript supplies paraphrases of the questions instead of quotes – saying at the outset that recording of the questions was too indistinct to make a transcript – but It was good enough for this author to make a transcript for the first question recorded in the available video.

956 Arabic Islamic greeting meaning *: May the peace, mercy, and blessings of Allah be with you*

957 Arabic Islamic expression, meaning: *God willing.*

958 Arabic Islamic expression, meaning: Messenger of God and, in the context of Makkah [also spelled Mecca] it refers to Mohammad.

959 saws is an acronym for the Arabic expression : *salla Allah alaihi wa sallam*, meaning "may Allah's peace and blessings be upon him." It is a standard Muslim expression of love and respect for Mohammad.

I will tell you a story of CNN. CNN was in Afghanistan interviewing bin Laden, in `98. You have to be careful in listening to this. I was there, and they asked bin Laden as to what was the thinking about the killing of civilians in Iraq. After three hours of formal conversation, and the camera was rolling. He said, that if all American citizens and if all British citizens are willing, or supporting, to kill all Iraqi civilians, then all American citizens and all British citizens deserve the same thing or to be killed.

CNN cut everything. Three-hour conversation was not there, only thing they put was and it was not complete the only clause that they said was, the independent clause of what he said, they said that, all American and British citizens must be killed. This is what came on the air. But he didn't mean this. And I know that all Americans do not support the killing [of] civilians there. Not even a quarter of that. That was impossible. But now what they taught their people was that bin Laden is saying that all American civilians must be killed. That is the story of media, and the media here is very irresponsible. They are commercialized, and they'll do anything for selling advertisements.

He [the questioner] talked about the beard and the veil. First of all, for all non-Afghans, this rule does not apply. So there are many non-Afghans who are working there; there are actually Americans who are working there in the UN, there are many people from different parts of the world. And they do whatever [--], they don t care. And we don't have a law for them. But Afghanistan is a country that has gone through 23 years of war, and there is still war, and the military is mixed with the people. Then you must have some sort of strict law, in order to insure security and peace in Afghanistan.

So, maybe it is ridiculous for you that we ask people to grow beards, but this is what, it is in Afghanistan, and the Afghans do leave beard, whether or not you tell them. And it's something natural, and it's something [--]. And regarding the veil, or the Burqas, or the Islamic dress code, that is something that exists in Afghanistan for centuries. And it does exist in Iran, it does exist in Saudi Arabia, it exists in many Islamic countries. It has nothing to do only with Afghanistan. And it does even exist here. So you can't force people not to have Burqas, and we do have that constitution that at this time, women should cover up. For us because our priority is that they should be safe.

[Questioner asks about what Afghans living in the US can do for Afghanistan. She also gives a brief account of her experience in Afghanistan, when she traveled there recently, and gave proof that schools existed there, and that the situation there is much better, more peaceful than it was six years ago. She traveled alone, all over the country.]

Thank you very much. I'm very happy that at least I found a proof! *[Audience laughs*]

I'm thankful to you [for] what you say, and I really appreciate the emotions you have for your country. I myself, I'm 24, and serving my country. I could play football now, and I could even play here, and I could stay in the United States, but I don't do any of those things I serve my country. So I agree that whatever, all those things that exist in Afghanistan, maybe there are many things that we don't want, but they do exist. So we are not a sponsor for that. They did exist for two decade[s]. So the best thing to do for Afghanistan is to have an association of Afghans to raise funds, and the best thing I would say [is to] educate people. Instead of criticism, they can come there! and open a school. They can open a school for girls, for boys. But that would be the best thing. Unfortunately some of our Afghans are sitting in their air-conditioning rooms here, play their TV's, and when they have nothing to do, then they criticize us because we can't make Europe for them. We can do it, we have a lot of problems, but the first thing they should do is to stop harming us. They have to come and help us, in all the sectors. We do need all the Afghans from here. If they really criticize our policies, they should come there and criticize our policies, not from here. So the best thing for ! you is for you people to raise funds, do NOT give it to us, one of you should come there, help the people.

[Questioner: Do you respect our right to tell you that if you didn't believe in PR, you wouldn't be here right now. [--] Actually I'd like to ask you, does your version of Islam preach hate? I don t know, I'm asking you; do you believe in the religion of hate? Because I was very disgusted when that lady got up and asked you why don t you blow those idols, because that boy right there (points to a boy in the audience) laughed. MSA Representative interrupts, Please ask your question. Questioner, I'm asking you, are you preaching hate? MSA Representative, Is that your question? Questioner. That is the question. He continues to argue.]

Enough? I don t know what to say but you only expressed your emotions. Islam means Peace. First you have to understand. And a peaceful religion will never preach for Hate. And we do not preach for Hate. And you said that if we didn't believe in Public Relations, I wouldn't be here. It's my first time here, and I've waited for an American Visa for a long time, and I'm not used to doing these things. I brought a letter from my leadership that I explained before that I will be submitting to the leader of the administration here, and hoping that they will re-think their policies. So I do believe that, I say that we must believe in Public Relations because they are very important. But I say that Public Relations needs a lot resources, and at this time we have resources for the [--] for the plight of our people.

[Questioner: I actually agree with you about the western media; they are very biased [--], but looking at people like him (the young boy who laughed) at such a young age [--].]

[Small dispute in the Audience]

[Father of young boy: He is my son, ok, and you have come here to accuse him..[--]. MSA Representatives calm both parties and rest of Audience, and apologizes to audience.]

[Questioner asks about women being required to have a male escort whenever they go out. She also questions whether or not if she were to go into Afghanistan wearing what she was now (a jilbab and hijab) would she be under any physical threat.]

You [the questioner] said, told me about whether a woman was allowed to go without a male escort. I'm here, and my wife is shopping in Kandahar now. So they don t have to be escorted, this is absolutely wrong. Yes, they were, in those cities that we captured first, because that was for their safety. Now, they don t have to. And I don t have any problem with whatever you wear, and women do wear the same thing that you do wear, and they don t have any problems. And I say that those cities, which are close to the frontline and there is military operations going on close, there are thousands of military soldiers of ours, we do ask women to avoid the social areas. Now you're not understanding what I mean, but some of our friends here do understand. In a country that is in a war, the military is mixed with the people, and there are certain limitations. So I can't go beyond that, and I say that women does not have to be escorted. I'm here now and my wife is shopping maybe in Kandahar.

[Questioner asks What is Afghanistan's priority in regards to establishing an Islamic state for all Muslims, not just for Afghans?]

He'd like to destroy us.

[Audience laughs]

We have our first headache in Afghanistan, and that's a big headache. We have a full-time job there. If we were worked 24 hours a day, we will hardly ever be able to re-construct an [--] Islamic system in our

own country. And we have no intention of going beyond our borders, and neither we can. So, all these people who exist in other countries, or their policies, they have nothing to do with us. We are only concerned about Afghanistan. And please do not try to make assumptions. Ask me questions. I was asked in... I was in Bay Area just yesterday, a journalist asked me, Why do you hate women? And I told him, Why do you beat your wife? And he said, I don t beat my wife. I said, I don t hate women.

[Audience laughs]

So you have to ask me questions. You just make assumptions. You just make an assumption. Like he said, you explain for one hour, for five minutes saying the same thing again and again, you've made an assumption. You didn't ask me whether a woman must be escorted or not this is an easy question. But if you say, Why are you doing this , Why are you doing... We're not doing it. The question is, here, you don't have to make assumptions.

[Questioner: My country (Iran) is suffering from drug-trafficking from Afghanistan; you said that you [--] drugs from your area, but how can you explain this contradiction? You have said that you cannot even make a needle, what does it mean..?]

I would like to answer this question first and then I will not forget. I said Afghanistan produced 75% of all worlds Opium, 75% of all worlds. And we eradicated it last year. And this was announced not only by United Nations, who rejects this? All of them know it was announced by Iranian government [--]. I don t say it was we eradicated five years ago [it was] this year. United Nations announced ...

[Questioner: You mean 2001? So that s two months ago?? But our country is still suffering from that?! He continues to argue]

Please, please try to hear what I'm saying.

[Questioner continues to talk and argue, MSA representatives try to calm him down.]

[Quest'r goes on], I know, but this is the question I wanted to ask…

My brother, listen to me. You say that your country is still suffering from Opium from Afghanistan. I do not say that we eradicated it five years ago. This year, the United Nations Drug Control Program, announced that there was 0% Opium cultivation; Iran, too, admitted that. So if you don t know that, your problem. New York Times announced this; it was in a New York Times editorial. So if you don't know this, then it's your problem. I do admit that there are still some piles of Opium that exists from the years before the last cultivation that may [have been sent] to your country. But we will admit, that we have, and I told you that, there are missions for us, across Afghanistan, to Iran, to our country, and they are trying to eradicate the already existing Opium; it was not produced this year; it was produced the year before last.

[Questioner asks whether or not they have asked for a loan from the World Bank or IMF]

Not yet. We have not asked IMF neither the World Bank to help us. But if they do help us, we will not reject it. So we are not asking because we are not being recognized so we can't ask them for loans.

[Questioner : is a Political Scientist and is asking whether or not Bureaucrats and Technocrats are needed in Afghanistan because, according to him, the Taliban are not smart enough, suitable to be governing Afghanistan.]

We never say that we are perfect. The question is, Who could do more than we do? These seven parties? The Communists? Or the King? Who did this? The things that we have done? Who could do more than that? It's very easy to say, to criticize from here, Do this, do this, do that.. But it's very difficult to do that. You said that the Taliban are not Bureaucrats and Technocrats, and we're not going to change that. I'm sorry to say, you know what the old king of Afghanistan, he was 88 years old, and he spent seven years living in Rome, he had bought an island there, and now this man wants to come back to Afghanistan and head the government. The old, rotten knucklehead.

[Audience laughs]

So, we were very surprised as to what did he do in 43 years of his government? He didn't do anything. He only knew how to decorate his palace. I'm sorry to say this. And now the same man, after 43 years Sorry, 27 years, is willing to go back and govern; he cannot even take a flight back to Afghanistan. He's too weak. So how's he going to? So we do need professionals. We don t say that we are perfect. And I repeat it again; we cannot come here, and ask everybody to come help us. We have asked so many times. Anybody willing to help their country, come and help. And many people come and ask me, Well, how do we go? ..How did you come here?!

[Audience laughs]

And yeah, go there if women can go there, what is the problem? But if you ask us to give you the government, then that's difficult. So I agree with you that we need Technocrats, but we don't need politicians [END OF SESSION][Note below continues comments on CG[960]

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[960] Comparison of CG & KG stories of what happened in Museum—hypothetical effects of exaggeration in transmission:

CG semi-draped → half naked →naked KG

CG 4th century AD→1500-2000 year old →2000 year old KG

[see footnotes 177E.3b.4, & E.11c.1 for sources of this confusion]

CG 50 Rural Mullahs [may have actually been a bus load of Pashtun Mullahs from Southern Provinces – including Kandahar – perhaps recognized by CG by their accent -- brought to the museum in one bus from the center of Kabul or airport. Details of Southern Provinces and Pashtun may have been left out by CG as not necessary to story told by CG to the two English authors at the time]→Kandahar→incl. two senior Taliban officials from Kandahar: Defense Minister Obeidullah and Deputy Prime Minister, Mullah Hassan. KG

Once these two senior Taliban officials are positioned—in this exaggerated version -- in front of the naked statue, they take action. But CG says they were then ushered into another part of the museum by Museum staff. Would senior officals have allowed that? Would senior officials have attacked the statues with their hands – if they'd intended to attack them from the start? Why not bring a small wooden club—which would've gotten past any metal detectors & would've been appropriate for such senior officls to carry – or to be carried by aides attending them. They could've used the club to damage the statues on the spot – as the mullahs may've tried to do. More importantly , why not do this in front of the cameras & reporters – if they really had the support of MO for this?

The suggestion that these two officials, both of whom were senior leaders of the Taliban – a the latest from the time they took Kandahar in late 1994, [Zaeef, p 75] were venal & conniving suggests the charachter of the accuser more than the accused. As already noted in connection with the accusations against the Taliban made by Ahmed Shah Massoud:

וכל הפוסל פסול
ואמר שמואל במומו פוסל

"Samuel[388] said: 'Those who regularly make false accusations against others are themselves guilty of the very evils they accuse others of[389]

PUNISHMENTS FOR **SODOMY** AND RELATED OFFENSES UNDER THE TALIBAN 1994 *to* 2001

RESULT OF A LEXISNEXIS SEARCH USING THE TERMS "TALIBAN AND SODOMY AND NOT MALAYSIA"
THERE WERE 51 "HITS". MOST WERE REDUNDANT, SOME WERE IRRELEVANT. [Redo this search with 'bugger' and 'homosexual' added. 12/24/96 story was missed]

YR	Mon. & day	Province, City where punished	# Pun-ished	# who died	Accused of what crime	Method/s of punishment	Source/s	Comments
'94 -97		All Taliban territory	2	0	Sodomy	"…homosexuals should merely be put on public display for a few hours with blackened faces. This was the Taliban's favoured solution". Jonathan Steele The Guardian (Lond.), Jan. 6, 1997, pg. 11. See story in next table from 12/24/96 in Kabul where Old man 'buggered' youth .		
'98	Feb. 25	Kotal Morcha north of the city of Kandahar	3	2	Sodomy with young boys	*battle tank was used to topple the wall on three men in front of thousands of spectators*	Nov 1, 1999 "AFGHANISTAN: Cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment"	Amnesty International introduces these three events with the heading *"A new form of cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment was introduced in Afghanistan by the Taliban in early 1998" They make no mention in this piece that the men were found guilty of sodomy with young boys. However, AAP, citing Reuters, citing " a news agency" has "Fazalur Rehman, Ahmad Shah and Abdul Qahir had all been convicted by an Islamic court of committing sodomy with young boys."*
	Mar. 22	city of Herat	2	2	Sodomy/buggery [with young boys?]	*placed under a wall of dried mud in the sports stadium and the wall was bulldozed upon them*	as above +BBC +*AFP—Eng., 10:03 GMT, AAP, Sayed Salahuddin*	*"Abdul Sami, 18 and Bismillah, 22 …accused of buggery. …the two were executed by having a wall pushed on top of them, …[Radio Shariat] said…The Taliban last month gave a similar punishment to three Afghans accused of buggery in southern Kandahar." Some words in the radio broadcast were unintelligible/indistinct.*
	April 30	Kabul	2 [5]	0 [5]	Sodomy between consenting adult millitiamen. sodomy	*"tied up and driven around the city in the back of a pickup truck with their faces blackened by engine oil…. [Followed by] beating… with a thin stick… then thrown into a fountain for "a purifying bath" in front of tens of enthusiastic militiamen who joined in the beating."*	*AAP NEWSFEED, TALIBAN PUBLICLY BEAT TWO MILITIA HOMOSEXUALS, KABUL, April 29 AFP*	*"… the punishment for sodomy is execution by having a wall pushed on top of the guilty. So far five people convicted of sodomy have been killed in this manner this year. The two culprits are likely to be handed over to a military court which is empowered to pass such a sentence." No mention of sodomy with young boys. There is no report of these two militiamen being executed.*
	Oct. 29 and before	Throughout Taliban controlled Afghanistan	[>8]	[>6]	Homosexuality	*mud or brick wall, …is collapsed on top of them, … if they are alive when the debris is removed [after 30 min.] their sentence is commuted.*	AP *Thursday 02:56, ET "Taliban leader wants young boys off the battlefield" BY: KATHY GANNON*	*"Omar also expressed concern about reports that young boys were being forced into homosexual relationships and threatened to impose Islamic justice on anyone found guilty of having a homosexual affair. …Such a punishment has been applied to at least eight men accused of homosexuality, and two are reported to have survived the ordeal." The reporter makes no mention of "with young boys."*
'99	*Jan 15*	Kabul [crime was in hotel in Maidan Shahr, ~ 30 km from Kabul]	1	0	Sodomy, sexually attacking a boy. [man, 60, attacked boy, 12.]	*tank toppled a 4.5-meter (15-feet) brick wall, Thousands of people watched, Friday*	*AMIR SHAH, KABUL, Afghan. A.P, Jan. 15, 1999; Friday 08:39 Eastern Time, and AP Jan 16, Sat.*	"survived with serious head injuries, doctors said today"[report of 1/16]. Initial report by same source [1/15] said man was found dead when the rubble was cleared after 30 minutes. "first time this type of execution was performed in Kabul. "
	Before Mar 1	Kandahar prison	2	2?	Sodomy between military commander and boy ~16.	*Torture of boy, method of execution of boy and commander not stated. Execution not observed.*	AI, Mar. 1, '99 "AFGHANISTAN :Detention and killing of political personalities"	Report is based on "one former detainee in Kandahar prison" It is inconsistent with other reports that the two would not have been executed in public and reported on the radio.
	Mar. 2	Kandahar	2	2	predatorysodomy	*tank pushed a mud wall on top of them*	AFP—Eng. 3/03, 07:26 GMT	"Radio Shariat [reported] …Wali Jan and Khair Ullah, …sodomised two fellow Afghans, Rozi Mohammad and Khiali Khan in separate incidents"
	June 15	Jauzjan [crime said to have occurred in "Aqcha district of the province"]	2	2?	*'two men … accused of sodomizing each other"*	"an 'old' wall pushed on top of them… in front of thousands of spectators" *["The station did not say whether the victims died."]*	*AFP English, June 15, 1999 11:00 GMT, in Kabul, citing Radio Shariat*	The report names 2 accused as "*Rozi and Mohammad Aref". If Aref is the last name of both, it may have involved some form of incest*. Report is incomplete: It said another man received 100 lashes for adultery without saying what happened to the woman.
2000 TO 2001		All Taliban Afghanistan	0	0	*Sodomy AND related*			From July '99 to the fall of the Taliban in late '01, no further punishments for sodomy found cited in LexisNexis.
TOT.		All Taliban Afghanistan		6 [8-10?]				Taliban newspapers, radio recordings and Taliban officials should be checked

APPENDIX 18

FORMAL PUNISHMENTS IN KABUL UNDER THE TALIBAN : 9/27/96-9/27/97,THEIR 1ST YR IN THE CITY [961]

A

DATE OF INCIDENT	TYPE OF OFFENSE # PUNISHED
	MM=MASS MRDR
	M= MURDER
	A= ADULTERY
	C- CROOK, D- DRUGS
	HR-HWY RBR
	S – STEALING,
	SD -SODOMY
	B- BOMBS, O- OTHER
	? NOT KNOWN
		NAME(S) OF THOSE PUNISHED
		AKA = ALSO KNOWN AS
		NG = NOT GIVEN
			LOCATION OF PUNISHMENT WITHIN THE CITY OF KABUL
			NG – NOT GIVEN
				METHOD/S OF PUNISHMENT	SOURCE(S)
					AP - ASSOCIATED PRESS
					AFP -AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE
					AIP – AFGHAN ISLAMIC PRESS, NEWS AGNCY
					BIA - BAKHTAR INFO. AGENCY. DPA – DEUTSCHE PRESSE-AGENTUR ORS -OFFICIAL RADIO SHARIAT
					ORK - OFFICIAL RADIO KABUL REU- REUTERS
					NYT - NEW YORK TIMES VOS –VOICE OF SHARIA
					RADIO EEI - 'ETEFAQ-E ISLAM', TALIB. NWSPAPR
					OTH- OTHER SEE COMMENTS/ FOOTNOTE
						COMMENTS
						AAM= AFTER APPROV. OF MULLAH OMAR
						A3C = AFTER APPROVAL OF 3 COURTS,
						E= EXECUTED OR EXECUTION,
						H=HUNDRED, K= THOUSAND,
						M=MOSQUE,
						R=RELATIVE,
						S=STADIUM or SPORTS FIELD,
						SP= SPECTATORS,
						T=TALIBAN, V=VICTIM
							ITEM #, SOURCE ITM #

9/27	4 MM	NAJIBULLAH, HIS BROTHER SHAHPUR AHMEDZI, BODY-GUARD, GENERAL JAFSAR, & AIDE, TOKHI. THE LAST 2 WERE HANGED ~ A DAY AFTER THE FIRST 2.	OUTSIDE THE PRESIDENTIAL PALACE	HANGING IN PUBLIC FOR~ 2 DAYS, LESS FOR OTHER 2	AFP AP BBC REU	NAJIB. & BRO. WERE FORMER PRES. & HEAD OF THE SECRET POL. UNDER USSR /FSR . ACCUSED OF MURDERING K'S 962 . GIVEN SANCTRY IN UN COMPOUND ~4.4 YRS. THE T REMOVED THEM FROM SANCT. W/O HURTING OTHERS & W/O STEALING OR DAMAG-ING PROPERTY. NAJIB. WAS BEATEN & SHOT BEF. HANGING – PERHAPS WHEN HE PUT UP RESISTANCE. OTHERS HANGED ALIVE. SEEN BY K'S. REP'TS THAT NAJIB WAS CASTRATED WERE NOT CONFIRMED. 963 NAJIB. FAMILY WAS GIVEN SAFE PASSAGE BY TALEBAN TO GARDEZ, FAMILY ANCESTRAL HOME STH OF KABUL, FOR FUNERL 9/30.	1 28
9/29	[9 S]	NG	NOT KABUL- BUT IN ALL OTHER TALIBAN AREA	HANDS CUT OFF	OTH	NINE MEN HAVE ALREADY HAD THEIR HANDS CUT OFF FOR STEALING IN TALIBAN AREAS. THE MOST VISIBLE SIGN OF CONFIDENCE THAT TALIBAN WILL BRING STABLE GOVERNMENT COMES FROM KABUL'S MONEY-CHANGERS. THE RATE OF THE AFGHANI TO THE DOLLAR, 18,000 A WEEK AGO, IS NOW LESS THAN 8,000. THE OBSERVER KABUL VICTORS PUT MERCY TO FLIGHT: DAVID LOYN	1
9/29	1 C	NG	A BUSY STREET	PUBLIC HUMILI-ATION	AP TIMES	A SMALL-TIME CROOK. PARADED W. FACE PAINTED BLACK & W. BILLS OF THE LOCAL CURRENCY SHOVED UP HIS NOSE AND INTO HIS EARS AND MOUTH. A HEAVY WEIGHT WAS STRAPPED TO HIS JAW. ANNOUNCEMENTS FROM A LOUDSPEAKER PROCLAIMED THIS TO BE A WARNING TO OTHER THIEVES	2/7
9/30	2 ? 3 ?	TWO WOMEN, NG AT LEAST THREE WOMEN [THESE MAY BE THE SAME WOMEN]	NG IN MARKETS	WHIPPING W' CAR RADIO ANTENNA THRASHED	AP AFP	NOT CLEAR WHY THE WOMEN WERE ATTACKED, AS BOTH WERE DRESSED ACCORDING TO THE RULES. NO ONE ATTEMPTED TO INTERVENE, AND THE FIGHTERS EVENTUALLY LET THE SOBBING WOMEN RUN AWAY TOLD TO GO HOME TO DRESS THEMSELVES IN "PROPER ISLAMIC WAY," RESIDENTS REPORTED.	2 17
	? ?	MEN IN GOVERNMENT AND MILITARY WITHOUT BEARDS	[NOT KABUL]	SHAVING HEAD		ALL MILITARY & GOV. MEN SHOULD ... GROW BEARDS IN NEXT 45 DAYS. VIOLATORS WILL BE PUNISHED. CLEAN-SHAVEN MEN IN THE REGION AROUND HERAT, WHICH THE T HAVE CONTROLLED FOR SOME TIME, ARE COMMONLY FORCED TO HAVE THEIR HEADS SHAVED, TOO, IN A MARK OF SHAME.	2
9/30- 10/05		ALMOST EVERYONE	WHOLE CITY	FREEDOM FROM CRIME/FREEDOM FROM FEAR OF CRIME	TIMES AFP	"T'S IMPECCBLE BEHAV. W. THE GENRL POP. SINCE OCCPYNG KBL ON THURS. IS IN STARTLING CONTRST TO THE TRADITN OF PASHTN PLUNDR. FOR ALL ITS PHILOSPHICL EXTRMSM, T IS MOSTLY WELCMD FOR BRNGING A RARE TASTE OF LAW & ORD. THO. IN 3 DYS, UP TO SAT., AN EST. 250K FLED THE CAPTL." "KBLIS NOW LEAVE THEIR BICYCLES UNCHAINED OUTSIDE KEBAB RESTAURANTS OR MOSQUES & WAN-DER THE STR'TS FREELY EVEN AFTER DARK. MANY PEOPLE HAD BEEN AFRAID TO MOVE AT NIGHT FOR FEAR OF BEING ROBBED OR HAVING THEIR UNATTENDED HOMES BURGLED." ""MY CHILDREN CAN NOW GO TO BED KNWING NO ROCKETS WILL FALL ON OUR HOUSE & THAT NO SOLDIERS OR CRIMINLS WILL BREAK IN & SCARE THEM," CIGRT SALESMAN MOHAMMED AHMED SAID. "THIS IS A BASIC NEED, THERE-FORE THE FACT THAT MY WIFE CAN'T WORK & THAT I HAVE TO GROW A BEARD IS NOT GOING TO WORRY ME AS MUCH AS IT SEEMS TO B'THER OTHR PEOPLE."MARC LAVINE, KBL [ALSO SEE FOOTNOTE , P 269]	7 23
9/29- 10/01	VEIL	WOMEN , NG, NO NUMBER	NG	BEATEN	OTH	U N OFFICIALS RECEIVED RPTS SOME WOMEN WHO APPEAR'D IN PUB. W/O FULL-LENGTH VEILS HAD BEEN ATTACKED & BEATEN & A MALE THIEF HAD HAND AMPUT. YESTRDAY. [MON. 9/30] THE AGE (MELB.) MARK BAKER, KABUL[WRIT. 10/1, PUBL. 10/2.] SR. TOFFICIAL, GHIASUD. , TOLD AFP 9/30 "...WE HAVE NOT HEARD OF ANY AMPUTATIONS ...YET," .GHIAS. & AID AGENCIES SAID ...THIEF CAUGHT 9/29 HAD HIS FACE BLACKENED, MONEY STUFFED IN MOUTH & PARADED AROUND CENTRAL KABUL "HE DID NOT HAVE HIS HAND AMPUTATED AS THE THEFT WAS NOT THAT SERIOUS... SHOULD SERVE AS A WARNING..." 964 / RAPE, ROBBERY & MURDER HAD BECOME ENDEMIC & WERE ONLY RARELY PUNISHED UNDER ... RABBANI. BUT SUCH CRIMES HAVE VIRTUALLY VANISHED FROM KABUL SINCE 1ST ACCUSED THIEF'S HAND WAS AMPUT. IN 1ST DYS OF T. RULE & HE WAS DRIVEN WITH A BLACKENED FACE..... JOHN BURNS, NYT 10/21-22/	8 17 19 9
	1? S	MAN NG THIS MAY BE THE SAME PERSON AS SHOWN ABOVE AT 9/29	NG	HAND CUT OFF/ NOT CLEAR IF THIS HAPPENED. SEE FOOTNOTE CITED IN COMMENT	OTH AFP NYT		
10/01	o	ALL WOMEN GOVERNMENT EMPLOY-EES	WHOLE CITY	ORDERED TO STAY HOME –	OTH	ORDERED TO REMAIN AT HOME UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE. THE AGE, MELB., AUSTRAL., OCT/ 2/96 : MARK BAKER. [THESE WOMEN CONTINUED TO RECEIVE THEIR SALARIES-GIVE SOURCE] "IN 1996 WHEN WE CAPTURED ... KABUL, WE DID ASK WOMEN TO STAY AT HOME. IT DIDN'T MEAN ... FOREVER... WE SAID THAT THERE IS NO LAW, &... ORDER.... THEY WERE RAPED BEFORE US, EVERY DAY".[T. AMB. SEE P. 115]	21
10/4 11/25	?	ALMOST ALL STUDENTS OF REGULAR SCHOOLS – BUT THEY CAN STUDY AT HOME	WHOLE CITY	STUDENTS NOT ABLE TO GO TO SCHOOL	OTH AFP	"WITH THE SCHOOLS CLOSED, ALL HER CHILDREN ARE AT HOME...THE BOYS' SCHOOLS HAVE BEEN SHUT WHILE A NEW "ISLAMIC" CURRICULUM IS PREPARED. THE UNIVERSITY WAS SHUT AT THE WEEKEND, AND THE RECTOR DISMISSED, FOR THE SAME REASON." JONATHAN STEELE IN KABUL, THE GUARDIAN . "...THE EDUCATION OF GIRLS WAS NEITHER PROHIBITED UNDER ISLAM NOR BY THE TALIBAN, MERELY THAT BOYS AND GIRLS OVER THE AGE OF NINE COULD NOT ATTEND MIXED SCHOOLS."	6
10/21	2 S	JAWAD 13 YRS OLD, OTHER BOY 19	MIDDLE OF MAIN ROAD	STRESS + EMBARRASSMNT	TIMES NYT	STANDING ON CHAIRS FOR 4 HRS HOLDING STOLEN PIECES OF SCRAP METAL.. CALLED 'THIEF" BY OTHER CHILDREN. THE MUSLIM CLERIC WHO ORDERED THE BOYS' PUNISHMENT SAID HE HAD BEEN LENIENT BECAUSE OF THEIR AGE. CHRISTOPHER THOMAS & JOHN F. BURNS IN KABUL	9
10/24		SEVERAL HUNDRED	WHOLE CITY	BEATEN & RELEASED	OTH	ICRC: # DETAINED, BEATEN & RELEASED BY T FOR SIMILAR SECRTY-RELTD REASNS AT SEVERL H. CUM-ULATIVE, IN NIGHTLY SEARCHES FOR MEMBERS OF ARMED OPPOSITION. J. STEELE, GUARDIAN, ; PG. 14	18
11/06	2 M	MEN NG	[NOT KABUL]	EXECUTED	AFP/ORS	SEXUALLY ASSAULTING & MURDERING A BOY & A GIRL IN KANDAHAR	11
	1 D	NG	NG	beaten	AFP	MAN SUSPECTED OF POSSESSING OPIUM & SEVERELY BEAT HIM WITH MACHINE GUN BUTTS & STICKS	26
11/13	1 S	KADAM	NG	HUMILIATION & HAND CUT OFF? NOT CLEAR IF HAND WAS ACT-UALLY CUT OFF	TIMES	HUMILIATN: FACE BLACKENED, BOOTS, WATERING CAN & SMALL KNIFE AROUND NECK. AFGHAN RUP-EES STUFFED INTO HIS SHIRT ..., . T WHIP HIM WITH RIDING CROPS ... JEERING CROWD OF ~ H... AROUND . "I AM A THIEF," T MAKES HIM CALL OUT. "DO NOT STEAL LIKE ME OR YOUR PUNISHMENT WILL BE EVEN WORSE." CAUGHT ...WITH ... COPPER POTS ...MONEY...DURING HIS 3RD TRIP TO RAID...EMPTY HOUSE, ...WAS DETAINED & QUESTIONED... FACES 3 CT APPEARNCES BEFORE T AMPUTAT. HIS RIGHT HAND.	12 27
12/18	1 M	GHULAM MOHAMMED 965	AMANI HIGH SCH'L PLAYING F'LD [29,30] CENTRAL KABUL,	EXECUTED	AP DPA AIP ORK OTH	STRANGLING WOMAN & 3 CHILD. DURING BURGLARY IN 12/95,[BEF. T. CAME TO KABUL] SHOT 3:30PM WITH KALASH. BY R OF V, MOHAMMED ALIF, ~1-2K [MOSTLY T SOLDRS] SP. SUPR. CT OK'D 1st EXECT'N UNDER ISLAMIC LAW OF RETRIBT'N. S. GOLDENBERG, GUARD. 12/19&/21 / R.KAMPEAS-KABUL-12/18, AP	14 29 30
PRE 12/21	? ?	250 WOMEN IN ONE DAY FOR NOT WEARING CHADEREI	NG	BEATING WITH SMALL STICKS	OTH ORS	NO ADULTERERS HAVE BEEN APPREHENDED AND NO WOMAN HAS SUFFERED THE OFFICIAL PUNISHMENT OF 29 LASHES FOR SHOWING HER FACE IN PUBLIC. "SO FAR WE HAVE NOT GIVEN REAL PUNISHMENT, ONLY BEATING WITH SMALL STICKS...FOR EXAMPLE, VIOLATING A BAN ON APPEARING IN PUBLIC WITHOUT WEARING CHADEREI ," 966 SUZ. GOLDENBERG, GUARDIAN 12/21	14

961. LEXISNEXIS SRCH: KEY WORDS (TALEBAN OR TALIBAN) AND KABUL AND (STADIUM OR EXECUT* OR STONE OR HANG) AND ALL ENGLISH (359)+ (TALEBAN OR TALIBAN) AND KABUL AND THIEF AND HAND (26) RECHECK THESE 26

962. "WE KILLED HIM BECAUSE HE WAS THE MURDERER OF OUR PEOPLE," NOOR HAKMAL, A TALIBAN COMMANDER TOLD REUTERS.

963. 'NOT CONFIRMED' FROM: M. GRIFFIN, *REAPING THE WHIRLWIND*:..., '01, P 3, #8, CITING "A DOCTOR WHO EXAMINED HIS BODY"/'PERSONAL INTERVIEW, JAN. '97'. "NAJIBULLAH KILLED THOUSANDS ...OF OUR PEO-PLE. HE WAS ONE OF THE PEOPLE WHO BROUGHT THE RUSSIANS TO OUR COUNTRY, SO EVEN IF HE DIED A THOUSAND DEATHS, IT WOULDN'T BE ENOUGH. BUT IF HE WAS MUTILATED, I CAN TELL YOU ONLY THIS: THERE IS NOBODY AMONG THE TALIBAN WHO COULD HAVE DONE THIS.,...." MUL. M. HASSAN, GOV. KANDAHAR PROV. NYT, 11/ 24/96, SUN., LATE ED. – FINAL, SECT. 4; P. 9 , , DATELINE: KANDAHAR, AFGH. NO CON-TEMPORANEOUS RPRTS FROM KABUL NOTE CASTR. SEE CHAPTER 11: WAS THE FORMER PRESIDENT OF SOVIET OCCUPIED AFGHANISTAN TORTURED, CASTRATED & JEEP-DRAGGED BY THE TALIBAN?

964. VERY UNLIKELY THERE'D BE MULTISOURCED REPORTS ON SAME DAY THAT THE THIEF'S HAND WASN'T CUT OFF WHILE ANOTHER THIEF'S HAND WAS CUT OFF THAT DAY – WITH NO RPRT BY THESE SAME S'RCES. UNLIKELY AMPUTATION IN OBSCURE PLACE– WHEN A KEY PURPOSE IS TO DETER POTENTIAL THIEVES, ETC. PUBLIC 'BEHANDINGS' ELSEWHERE ARE DETERNT IN KABUL. RUMOURS OF ISLAMIC-STYLE BEHAND-INGS OF THIEVES WERE ALSO RUNNING RIFE THROUGH THE NERV'S CITY...NO IMMED. CONFIRMAT'N OF THE REPRTS. AFP -19. J. BURNS ADDS 'LEFT HAND CUT OFF' TO 9/29 THIEF STORY. NYT 10/1/96. MARK BAKER , WHO'S RESPONS. FOR U N OFFIC'LS REC'VED RPTS OF AMPUTATION, WOMEN BEATEN & ORDERED TO STAY AT HOME STORIES IS ALSO SOURCE OFA FALSE BAYING CROWDS AT T EXECUT'N STORY. SEE FOOTNOTE 714

965. CRIME URGED BY 15 YR OLD GIRL, ROYA, SEEKING $ FOR WEDDNG TO TEEN-AGE BOYFR'ND. SHE SAID ~$1,000 CASH WAS IN VICTIMS' HOME. ROYA TOO Y'NG FOR EXECUT'N.

966. "MANY ARE PREPARED TO COMPROMISE WITH THE TALIBAN WHOSE HARSH REGIME HAS SPARED THEM FROM THE EXCESSES OF THE MARAUDING TROOPS OF THE PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT, WHO COMMITTED ATROCITIES AGAINST WOMEN AND ROBBERIES." "IT'S NOT SUCH A BAD SITUATION. ON FRIDAYS, THEY ASK ME TO COME TO PRAYERS, BUT THEY HAVE NOT PUNISHED ME AND I DON'T MIND HAVING TO GROW A BEARD," SAID MALANG SHAH. "IN THE PAST RABBANI'S SOLDIERS USED TO JUST TAKE WHAT THEY WANTED. AT LEAST THE TALIBAN DON'T DO THAT."

FORMAL PUNISHMENTS IN KABUL UNDER THE TALIBAN FROM 9/27/96-9/27/97,THEIR 1ST YR IN THE CITY, PT B

DATE OF INCIDENT	TYPE OF OFFENSE # PUNISHED
	MM=MASS MRDR
	M= MURDER
	A= ADULTERY
	C- CROOK, D- DRUGS
	HR-HWY RBR
	S – STEALING,
	SD -SODOMY
	B- BOMBS, O- OTHER
	? NOT KNOWN
		NAME(S) OF THOSE PUNISHED
		AKA = ALSO KNOWN AS
		NG = NOT GIVEN
			LOCATION OF PUNISHMENT WITHIN THE CITY OF KABUL
			NG – NOT GIVEN
				METHOD/S OF PUNISHMENT	SOURCE(S)
					AP - ASSOCIATED PRESS
					AFP -AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE
					AIP – AFGHAN ISLAMIC PRESS, NEWS AGNCY
					BIA - BAKHTAR INFO. AGENCY. DPA – DEUTSCHE PRESSE-AGENTUR ORS -OFFICIAL RADIO SHARIAT
					ORK - OFFICIAL RADIO KABUL REU- REUTERS NYT - NEW YORK TIMES VOS –VOICE OF SHARIA RADIO EEI - 'ETEFAQ-E ISLAM', TALIB. NWSPAPR
					OTH- OTHER SEE COMMENTS/ FOOTNOTE
						COMMENTS
						AAM= AFTER APPROV. OF MULLAH OMAR
						A3C = AFTER APPROVAL OF 3 COURTS,
						E= EXECUTED OR EXECUTION,
						H=HUNDRED, K= THOUSAND,
						M=MOSQUE,
						R=RELATIVE,
						S=STADIUM or SPORTS FIELD,
						SP= SPECTATORS,
						T=TALIBAN, V=VICTIM
							ITEM #, SOURCE ITM #

12/24	2 SD	2 NG	CENTRAL CITY MARKET	HUMILIATION BLACKENING FACES	AFP	OLD MAN, & YOUTH PARADED THROUGH BUSTLING PART OF CITY W. ANNOUNCMNT OLD MAN 'BUGGERED' Y'TH. [NOT Y'NG BOY – APP'RNTLY CONSENSUAL] BLACKENING FACES OF 2 MEN WAS MINIMAL[967]	15
Apr. 5, '97	S	YOUTH ~12 YEARS OLD, NG	CENTER	PUBLIC HUMILIATION	AFP –WITNESSED	FOUND GUILTY OF STEALING [3 LAKHS} ABOUT $13, FACE BLACKED WITH SOOT, SLAPPED WHILE PARADED THROUGH CITY CENTER FRONT OF MORE THAN ONE HUNDRED ONLOOKERS, ". PUBLIC HUMIL. FOLLOWED BY A SHORT JAIL TERM & BEATING IS CONSIDERED HARSH ENOUGH IN A CONSERVATIVE COUNTRY WHERE INDIVIDUAL DIGNITY IS CLOSELY GUARDED.[968]	35
4/20	O	14 ADULT WOMEN	KABUL?	BEATING	OTH	"TALIBAN RELIGIOUS POLICE ON SUNDAY, THEY BEAT 14 WOMEN FOR NOT WEARING THE BURQA. SEE SOURCE AT #43 BELOW – NO BYLINE, DATELINE OR PRIMARY SOURCE.	43
4/21/ '97	O	MOHAMMED ZAHEER	PUBLIC BUS IN KABUL	DRAGGED OFF BUS AND BEATEN	OTH	CLEAN SHAVEN MAN , VISITING FROM PAKISTAN. TALIBAN RELIGIOUS POLICE BEAT HIM WITH AN ELECTRICAL CABLE.THE HERALD-SUN (DURHAM, NC), 4/ 21, 1997 MONDAY , FINAL EDITION, PG. A3. NO DATELINE , AUTHOR'S NAME OR PRIMARY SOURCE	43
7/12/ '97	O O	TEN KILLED EACH DAY	ALL OF AFGHANISTAN	LANDMINES	AFP	FIRST-EVER KABUL MARATHON.10KM MINI-MARATHON. DRAWS ATTENTION TO LANDMINE PROBLEM. "…AN ESTIMATED 20-25 CIVILIANS ARE MINE VICTIMS EVERY DAY. HALF OF THEM DIE DUE TO LACK OF PROPER MEDICAL FACILITIES". RACE ENDED IN THE NATIONAL STADIUM. 100 RUNNERS . " OFFICIALLY RECOGNISED SPORTS IN AFGH.INCL. FOOTBALL, VOLLEYBALL, WRESTLING, CYCLING & MARTIAL ARTS, WHICH ARE COORD. & SPONSORED BY THE FLEDGLING AFGHAN OLYMPIC COMMITTEE"[969]	44
7/29/ 97	O	60-100	KABUL	ARREST– HOME SEARCHED /BEATEN	AP, OTH	"…TAKEN FROM THEIR HOMES IN THE PAST FEW DAYS AND THROWN IN JAIL ON SUSPICION OF AIDING THE ARMED OPPOSITION OR OF PLOTTING AGAINST THE TALIBAN, WHICH IS DOMINATED BY ETHNIC PASHTUNS.[970] THIS WAS DURING HEAVY ATTACKS CLOSE TO KABUL BY NORTHERN ALLIANCE. ALEX SPILLIUS; THE DAILY TELEGRAPH /AP, Pg: 494 words, DATELINE: KABUL	37
7/31/ 97	O	700 TRAVELERS. +AT LEAST 2 WOMEN MD'S	KABUL TO KANDAHAR HWY	ISLAMIC PUNISHMENT BEATEN	REUTERS	700 MEN TRAVELING ON THE KAB. –KAND. HWY RECEIVED PUNISHMENT UNDER ISLAMIC LAW – OTHERWISE NOT STAEDED – FOR TRIMMING THEIR BEARDS . AT LEAST 2 WOMEN MD'S BEATEN -- REASON NOT SPECIFIED. THE NATION - JUL 31, 1997	47
8/16/ '97	O	WHOLE CITY	KABUL NATIONAL STADIUM	SPORTS UNDER ISALMIC LAW	AFP	"THE NATIONAL STADIUM -- BATTERED BY MORE THAN 17 YEARS OF CIVIL WAR AND ONLY RECENTLY CLEARED OF LANDMINES -- IS CURRENTLY HOSTING A NUMBER OF EVENTS, INCLUDING MARTIAL ARTS FIGHTS, FOOTBALL AND VOLLEYBALL".	48
8/27 '97	O	WHOLE CITY	KABUL	400 RELIGIOUS POLICE	AFP	MULLAH QALAMUDDIN., THE CHIEF OF THE DEPT FOR THE PROMOTION OF VIRTUE & SUPPRESSION OF VICE , SAID HIS 400 RELIGIOUS POLICE WHO CRUISE KABUL IN JEEPS SEARCHING [971] [CONT. IN NOTE]	49

SUMMARY OF RESULTS FOR JUDCIAL PUNISHMENTS IN KABUL IN FIRST FULL YEAR UNDER THE TALIBAN
Sept 27, 1996- Sept 27 1997

# OF PEOPLE	JUDICIAL POLICY OR PRACTICE	ITEM IN TABLE ABOVE
4..	executed by hanging for the reported commission of thousands of murders under the Soviet occupation. ……	… 1
1..	executed with a Kalashnikov by a senior member of the murder victims' family. This is the only execution …… under the Taliban in Kabul in their 1st yr – other than the 4 above. Both the actual murders for which this person was executed and his initial arrest, took place before the Taliban came to Kabul	….14
2..	old man and youth punished for sodomy by public humiliation……	… 15
Several	severe public humiliations for theft ……	..8,9,12,35
0..	no confirmed cases of amputations of any body parts in Kabul. Unlikely that any took place……	…8,12
0..	no reports of any cases of anyone punished for adultery or prostitution in Kabul	
0..	no reports of the use of the Kabul Sports Stadium for the punishment of any criminals -- even after it was cleared of land mines	
100's	beatings, detentions, for violating Islamic appearance code – beards for men, burkas for women……	……2

967. SO THEY'D BE RECOGNZED. T PREVIOUSLY PARADED MANY ALLEGED OFFENDERS THROUGH KABUL STREETS -- FOR GAMBLING & ADULTERY -- WITH THE ADDED INDIGNITY OF HAVING FACES… BLACKENED.

968. "…DESPITE INVITING OUTRAGE FROM WESTERN OBSERVERS AND RESIDENTS OF THE RELATIVELY LIBERAL CAPITAL, FEW DENY THE SECURITY SITUATION HAS IMPROVED IN A CITY ONCE EMBROILED IN DESTRUCTIVE FACTIONAL FIGHTING FOR MORE THAN FOUR YEARS."

969. "MINI-MARATHON RUN IN KABUL TO HELP CAMPAIGN FOR BANNING LANDMINES", TERENCE WHITE, 760 WORDS, DATELINE: KABUL, JULY 12 [ALSO, SEE FOOTNOTE 718B.3]

970. "THE TALIBAN TACTIC IS SOMETIMES TO ARREST & BEAT PRISONERS & ASK QUESTIONS LATER. ONE TAJIK WAS BEATEN IN PRISON BEFORE HIS HOUSE WAS SEARCHED FOR THE WEAPONS HE WAS ALLEGEDLY HIDING. HE WAS SOON RELEASED BY THE TALIBAN WITH AN APOLOGY & MONEY FOR MEDICAL TREATMENT."

971. FOR VIOLATORS OF ISLAMIC LAWS, IS A NECESSARY MEDICINE FOR A RELATIVELY-LIBERAL CAPITAL CITY POLLUTED BY COMMUNISM.."OUR DEPT IS LIKE PREVENTATIVE MEDICINE. OUR JOB IS TO PREVENT THE PEOPLE FROM CONTRACTING DISEASES," HE EXPLAINED."IF THEY ARE AFFECTED THEY GO TO A SPECIALISED DOCTOR. THE SPECIALISED DOCTOR IS THE SUPREME CT, THE SAME AS IN OTHER COUNTRIES."DESPITE MOST PUBLICITY GOING TO REGULAR ROUND-UPS OF BEARD-TRIMMERS & WARNINGS TO UNCOVERED WOMEN, QALAMUDDIN SAID THE BULK OF THE DEPT'S DAY TO DAY WORK IS SPENT NABBING DRUG USERS, THIEVES & MURDERERS."90% OF THE POP. OF THE COUNTRY FOLLOW ISLAMIC PRINCIPLES, BUT THERE ARE A NUMBER OF UNFORTUNATE PEOPLE IN THEIR MID-20'S WHO WERE ONLY YOUNG WHEN THE COMMUNIST COUP HAPPENED," HE SAID."IT IS OUR JOB TO INVITE THEM TO SHUN EVIL & EMBRACE VIRTUE." THIS FIG. OF 400, MAY BE COMPARED WITH ~3E4 POLICE IN NYC WITH A POP. 4-8 X AS LARGE. THE # OF POLICE/CAPITA IN NYC WAS ~10X HIGHER THAN IT WAS UNDER THE TALIBAN IN KABUL. SEE FOOTNOTE 608 A.2 FOR THE MURDER RATE IN KABUL DURING THIS TIME PERIOD BASED ON SEMPLE REPORT OF OFFICIAL KABUL CRIME DATA – COMPARED WITH NYC? [SEE COMMENT OF JOHN BURNS, NYT 10/21-22 ABOVE ON DISAPPEARANCE OF ORDINARY CRIME IN KABUL AT 9/29-10/01. THERE WERE ~4E4 ARRESTS/ YR FOR "MARIJUANA POSSESSION ONLY[NON-FELONY ARRESTS] IN NYC IN 2002-12. THE ARRESTEES SPENT A TOTAL OF ≥ 5E5 HRS IN JAIL WITH 1E5+ HRS OF POLICE TIME JUST TO PROCESS THESE ARRESTS. "ONE MILLION POLICE HOURS" DRUG POLICY ALLIANCE, 2013, _____ THERE WAS ALSO A POLICY IN NYC OF "STOP AND FRISK": IN '12, 533k PEDESTRIANS WERE STOPPED BY THE NYPD, OF WHICH 474k …WERE INNOCENT, E.G. - NOT ISSUED A SUMMONS OR ARRESTED. 53.7% OF THE INNOCENT PEOPLE (254k) WERE FRISKED & 15.0% (71k) HAD FORCE USED AGAINST THEM. 26k STOPS WERE FOR SUSPECTED MARIJUANA-POSSESSION OFFENSES. 5.3K OF ALL STOPS WERE ARRESTED FOR MARIJUANA OFFENSES & 2.8K WERE ARRESTED FOR CRIMINAL POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE – INCL. SOME OF THE 5.3K "STOP-AND-FRISK 2012 NYCLU BRIEFING" _____ FROM 2005-2012 THERE WERE AN AVG. OF OVER 500K SUCH NYPD STOPS /YR IN NYC – A TOTAL OF OVER 4 E6 STOPS . THERE WERE A TOTAL OF 200K ARRESTS/YR IN NYC BY NYPD IN 2008-2012. MISDEMEANOR MARIJUANA ARRESTS/YR IN NYC WENT FROM 2K UNDER KOCH TO 1 K UNDER DINKINS TO 24K UNDER GIULIANI TO 40K UNDER BLOOMBERG[2002-11] _____

APPENDIX 19

JUDICIAL EXECUTIONS UNDER THE TALIBAN FOR ALL CAUSES

JAN. 1, 2000 TO DEC. 31, 2000

BASED ON LEXISNEXIS ACADEMIC POWER SEARCH: (TALIBAN OR TALEBAN) AND (EXECUT* OR "CAPITAL PUNISHMENT"), JUL. 11, '13; (TALIBAN OR TALEBAN) AND ADULTERY, 7/22/07; BOTH: ALL 'ENGLISH NEWS' NATIONAL LIBRARY , ISRAEL

DATE OF INCIDENT	TYPE M= MURDER, A= ADULTERY, R= ROBBERY B= BOMBS # EXECUTED OR REPRIEVED		NAME(S) OF THOSE PUNISHED AKA = ALSO KNOWN AS NG = NOT GIVEN	LOCATION OF PUNISHMENT	SOURCE(S) AFP -AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE AIP – AFGHAN ISLAMIC PRESS, NEWS AGNCY ORS -OFFICIAL RADIO SHARIAT VOS –VOICE OF SHARIA RADIO BIA - BAKHTAR INFORMATION AGENCY AP - ASSOCIATED PRESS EEI - 'ETEFAQ-E ISLAM', TALIB. NWSPPR	COMMENTS AAM= AFTER APPROVAL OF MULLAH OMAR, A3C = AFTER APPROVAL OF 3 COURTS, E= EXECUTED OR EXECUTION, H=HUNDRED, K= THOUSAND, M=MOSQUE, R=RELATIVE, S=STADIUM or SPORTS FIELD, SP= SPECTATORS, T=TALIBAN, V=VICTIM	ITEM #
THR 1/6	M	2E	2 BROTHRS: AZIZULLAH & SHER AHMAD	NANGARHAR	AFP, ORS	SENTENCED TO DEATH BY THE NANGARHAR MILITARY COURT AND AAM E BY THE R'S OF THEIR V, SAYED HAKIM, IN FRONT OF K'S OF SP AT MOSQUE.	1
THR 1/6	M	1R	ABDUL MOBIN	NANGARHAR	AFP, ORS	PARDONED BY RELATIVES OF WOMAN VICTIM, BIBI MAHTAB, JUST BEFORE HE WAS DUE TO BE EXECUTED AT THE SAME MOSQUE. [PARDON DOES NOT SAY AAM]	2
WED 1/19	M AR	1E	MOHAMMAD ALI	MAZAR-I-SHARIF	AFP, ORS	E BY THE HEIRS OF THE V, JUMA MURAD, BEFORE K'S IN SINA SPORTS STADIUM. AAM	3
SUN. 2/13	M	1E	MOHAMMAD HASHEM RESIDENT OF NESH DISTRICT , KANDAHAR	KANDAHAR	AFP, WITNESSED BY AFP JOURNAL-IST	K'S IN S SAW 10-YEAR-OLD, HEIR E HIS FATHER, KHALEQ DAD'S MURDERER, WITH ASSISTANCE OF 2 WOMEN, 1 YOUNGER BOY & A TALIBAN SOLDIER WHO HELD THE AK-ASSAULT RIFLE FOR THE BOY AND HELPED HIM SHOOT 3 SHOTS INTO THE BACK AND HEAD OF THE CONVICT WHILE THE SP WATCHED QUIETLY.	4
SAT 4/22	M	1E	MOHAMMAD AYUB	MAZAR-I-SHARIF	AFP, ORS	MURDER OF ABDUL BAQA IN NORTHERN SAR-I-PUL PROVINCE. K'S CROWDED THE S TO WATCH ONE OF THE V'S R'S DO THE E. AFTER LOCAL MILITARY COURT & AAM	5
MON 5/1	A	1E	SURIYA OR SURAYA, DAUGHTER OF MOHAM-MAD HASHEM	MAZAR-E-SHARIF, BALKH	AP, BBC, BIA, ORS	SOURCES DIDN'T SAY WHAT HAPPENED TO MAN, ABDUL JABBAR SON OF RAMADAN. STONING AT S BEFORE K'S SP. A3C & AAM. PREV. E OF A WOMAN BY T WAS 11/99 AFTER SHE WAS FOUND GUILTY OF KILLING HER ABUSIVE HUSBAND WITH AN AX.	A
SAT 6/17	M	1E	GHULAM GHAUS	HERAT	AFP, ORS, BBC	5 MEMBERS OF ONE FAMILY MURDERED, K'S OF SP IN S TO WATCH THE V'S' HEIR E MURDERER, WHO'D BEEN ARRESTED 4 MONTHS BEFORE. METHOD NOT STATED, BUT THE COMMON PRACTICE IS FOR THE PRISONER TO BE BLINDFOLDED AND SHOT 3 TIMES IN THE BACK. CONVICTED BY A PROVINCIAL COURT IN HERAT.	6
THR 6/29	M	1R	SHAH MOHAMMAD	MAZAR-E SHA-RIF, BALKH	BBC, BIA, VOS	MURDERED HIS FATHER, HAJI JUMMA KHAN, PARDONED BY HIS BROTHER AND HEIR, WHILE MOTHER, AN ACCOMPLICE TO MURDER, GETS LIFE IN PRISON.	7
TUE 7/04	M	1E	MOHAMMAD (?ERSHA), SON OF SAYD MOHAMMAD	KANDAHAR	BBC, VOS, BIA	MURDERED (?MAMOR), SON OF ?BAHAR. A3C & AAM & EXECUTED IN THE MAIN S	8
FRI 7/21	M	1E	MOHAMMAD DAUD	KABUL	AFP, BBC,VOS, WITNESSES:AMIR SHAH, AP WRIT-ER	MURDERED NASIMULLAH & SAMIULLAH, IN PARWAN PROV. 40 DAYS BEF. SENTNCED TO E BY A MILITRY CT & AAM BLINDFOLDED OFFERED HIS AFTERNOON PRAYERS FOR 10 MIN., BEFR 4K – INCL. H'S OF WOMEN IN BURQAS -- IN S, LAID DOWN ON THE GRASS, HELD BY T SOLDIERS. MAULVI MOHASIL, FATHR/AP SAYS BROTHR/ OF SAMIULLAH, SLIT THROAT IN A SEC. W. LARGE SHARP KNIFE, WITNESSES SAID PLEAS FOR MERCY FROM THE CROWD & SOME T, INCL. DEP. PREM. AKHOND, WERE DENIED.	9
WED 7/ 26	M	1E	MOHAMMAD ASHRAF	NANGARHAR	AFP, ORS	MURDERED BIBI LALPURA. SENTENCE ANNOUNCED BY HEAD OF KABUL MILITARY COURT & AAM E BY A HEIR IN THE S OF THE PROVINCIAL CAPITAL JALALABAD. THE E, THE 2ND WITHIN A WEEK, WAS WITNESSED BY K'S, [PREVIOUS E WAS IN KABUL]	10
SAT 8/26	M	1E	NAJMA, TALIBAN SOL-DIER	QABR-I-QAZI DISTRICT, TAKHAR	AFP,ORS	MURDERED 3 WOMEN AND ABDUCTED ANOTHER IN BAHAARAK REGION OF TAKHAR PROVINCE. MAN WHO 'MANIPULATED THE PURE NAME OF T & HAD RECENTLY KILLED 3 WOMAN…' IN TAKHAR WAS PUBLICLY HANGED. SENTENCED BY T CT & AAM	11
MON 8/28	M	1E	ABDUR RAHMAN	KANDAHAR	BBC, VOR,BIA	E BY HIS OWN BROTHER FOR SOME TIME AGO KILLING SARFAZ SON OF AHMAD, IN THE PRESENCE OF H'S OF SP IN THE S – A3C AND AAM	12
MON 8/28	M	1E	BADSHAH SON OF GO-LAB	ZARMAL DISTR, PAKTIA PROV.	BBC, EEI, BIA	MURDERED AN INNOCENT PERSON SOME TIME BEFORE. E BY THE V'S R'S IN FRONT OFMANY, AT THE CENTRE OF THE DISTRICT, A3C AND AAM	13
TUE 9/23-26	4B	4E	ABDOL QAIUM AKA AHMAD ZAKI, GUL AHMAD AKA FARID, MIAGOL, SON OF KHIALI, & MER ABDOL SAMAD, AKA AMIR SARDAR, SON OF MOHAMMAD MUSIN	KABUL	BBC, AIP	ACCUSED OF SETTING OFF 3 EXPLSNS & FIRING MISSILES AT THE AIRPRT IN KABUL, HANGED ON 2 DIFFERENT DAYS IN THE PRESENCE OF SP IN GHAZI S [NO STATEMNT GIVEN ABOUT THE # KILLED OR INJURED BY THE EXPLOSIONS – OR OTHER DAMAGE. PART OF A GANG OF 7 ALL OF WHOM HAD BEEN APPREHENDED 4 OF THEM HAVE BEEN E & THE REST WILL FACE THE SAME FATE AFTER INVESTIGATIONS HAVE FINISHED ." NO FURTHER REPORTS FOUND ON THE OTHER 3] A3C & AAM	14
TUE 9/26	2A	1E	MUSE, SON OF (?RAH-MAN KOL), (?HALEMA), DAUGHTER OF (?SAYD JAFAR	MAYMANA, CAPITAL, FARI-AB PROV.	BBC, BIA, VOS	CARRIED OUT AT A PUBLIC MEETING. ADULTERER STONED TO DEATH, ADULTERESS, SENTENCED TO 100 LASHES. BECAUSE OF HER PREGNANCY, THE SENTENCE WILL BE CARRIED OUT LATER. (?FATEMA), WHO ARRANGED THE ACT OF ADULTERY, GIVEN 39 LASHES. THE ACCUSED WITHOUT ANY PRESSURE CONFESSED TO THE CRIMES. A3C & AAM	B
MON 10/2	3MR	3E	NG	KANDAHAR	AIP, AP, BBC	CONFESSED TO KILLING & ROBBING SEVERAL PEOPLE ON KANDAHAR-HERAT HWY, ARRESTED SEVERAL WEEKS BEFORE. R'S OF V'S HANGED THEM. LEFT HANGING IN S FOR 3 DAYS AS A WARNING TO OTHERS. K'S OF SP WATCHED. A3C & AAM	15
THU. 10/19	M	1E	NAJIBOLLAH SON OF ABDOL GHAFAR	KONDUZ	BBC, BIA, VOS	BEFORE H'S OF SP IN S, A3C & AAM , NAME OF V & METHOD OF E NOT STATED	16
SUN 10/22	M	1E	DAD MOHAMMAD SON OF DINDAR	KANDAHAR	BBC, VOS	MURDERED ALEPH KHAN SON OF GHOLAM HAIDER, METHOD OF EXECUTION NOT GIVEN , K'S OF SP IN S, A3C AND AAM	17
SAT 11/25	2M	2E	MOHAMMAD ZAHIR SON OF AMIR BOY AND SUFFI AZIZ SON OF MURAD ALI	MAZAR-E SHA-RIF	BBC, VOS	USED AN ADZE AND AN AXE TO KILL 5 RESIDENTS OF EASTERN BAGHLAN PROV. & ROBBED THEM . E IN PUBLIC AT (?SENA) S, VERDICT PASSED BY THE COURT OF LITIGATION AND THE MILITARY COURT OF THE NORTHERN ZONE & AAM	18
TOTAL **TOTAL** EXCLUDING CRIMES OF MILITARY OPPO-SITION	25E 2R OUT OF 25 SENTENCED TO BE E, 2 WERE REPRIEVED 21E 21 EXCLUDES THOSE CONVICTED OF BOMBING 25E INCLUDING THOSE 4 SHOWN AT RIGHTAT D. FROM DATA BASE OF ALEX STRICK VAN LINSCHOTEN, BUT EXCLUDING 4 "BOMBERS".			9 DIFFERENT PROVINCES 11 DIFFERENT PROVINCES INCL. THOSE SHOWN AT RIGHT AT D		A. ITEM # 9 NOTES THAT "THERE WERE ALMOST WEEKLY E'S OR AMPUTATIONS OF CRIMINALS IN THE KABUL S BEFORE 11/99, WHEN A WOMAN WAS E FOR HACKING TO DEATH HER ABUSIVE HUSBAND. DEP. PREM. MULLA HASSAN AKHUND ATTRIBUTED HIATUS IN PUBLIC E'S TO A DECLINE IN CRIME IN THE CAPITAL" B. ALSO, TOT. NUM. OF EXECUTIONS MAY'VE BEEN LOWER IN 2000 THAN IN EARLIER YRS AS BACKLOGS THAT HAD NOT BEEN ADJUDICATED UNDER EARLIER AUTHORITIES MAY'VE ALREADY BEEN CLEARED. C. TABLE ON PAGE 15 NOT YET UPDATED WITH ADULTERY ITEMS IN RED – A & B. OR 4 ITEMS IN D. BELOW D. AN INTERACTIVE TIMELINE OF TALIBAN PUNISHMENT 1996 -2001 ALEX STRICK VAN LINSCHOTEN IS AVAILABLE AT LINK REC. FROM SRH AUG 4/'16, EXECUTIONS UNDERLINED IN COLUMN 3, ABOVE WERE NOT MENTIONED IN THIS LINKED DATA BASE. NO EXECUTIONS NOTED IN THE DATA BASE FOR JAN, FEB MAR 2000 COMPARED WITH 4 IN THIS TABLE. TIMELINE HAS THE FOLLOWING THAT ARE NOT IN THE ABOVE TABLE: APR 7 M E – PACTIKA; APR 12 M E FARYAB; JUL 5 M E BAGLAN; AUG 15 M E BALKH . THUS THERE WERE 10 IN THIS TABLE THAT WERE NOT IN DATA BASE AND THERE WERE 4 IN THE DATA BASE THAT WERE NOT IN THIS TABLE .http://www.alexstrick.com/talibanexecutions/?rq=taliban%20executions	19

APPENDIX 20 Sample page from The Islamic Emirate

This is a facsimile of the 3rd page of issue #2, Aug., 2000CE, ~60% of the 27cm linear size of the original. The 1st page is the cover – which gives the Islamic date as Jimadi-ul-Ula 1421 1. This is the 5th month of the Moslem calendar and was Aug. 2 in 2000. The 2nd page is un-numbered [dated 6/5/1420 AH – ~1 yr before] with a decree banning the cultivation of cannabis and ordering the destruction of all harvested crops and processing plants in Afghanistan. It is 'signed':

Servant of Islam
Amir-ul-Mumineen
Mullah Muhammad Umar Mujahid.

In an interview with Mullah Omar (p 12-14), he cites Decree #19, of 26/4/1421 AH [~7/28/'00] through which, he says:

"we have now completely banned production [of narcotics].

However, narcotics are a global problem and can only be solved by global efforts. Along those lines, there is a need for the UN and the nations of the world to provide assistance to farmers in order to replace material losses resulting from their abandoning the cultivation of narcotics. But thus far, the international community has done nothing. **[p.12, col 2-3]**

In the end, we decided to bear the responsibility and consequences alone and ban the cultivation of narcotics."

The cover, probably printed in color, shows a photograph of a Mosque & some of the key subjects covered in the issue.The lead subject on the cover is a quote from Amir-ul-Mumineen: "WE DO NOT PROHIBIT WOMEN FROM EDUCATION:. RATHER WE WANT EDUCATION TO BE REGULATED ACCORDING TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE SHARI'AH".

#2 is the most complete issue received from the US Lib. of Cong.[9/24/'07] Other issues had missing p.'s. All mat'l was from LOC Islamabad. The page copied here shows the stamp of ARIC[972] In col. 2 some text is whited out on the 2nd & 3rd lines. It may have been copied in Peshawar, Pakistan – a city of ~3E6 people near the Afghanistan border. Currently [9/2/13] the LOC lists nothing from this periodical in its collection.

It was published in both English & Arabic [as *al-`Imarah al-Islamiyah*] and, as can be seen on this page, it had contacts for distribution centers in 4 major cites: London, Frankfurt, NYC & Islamabad. It also listed subscription prices in 5 currencies – for 12 issues per year. Still, no library found so far can even say what issues were actually published.[973]

It was published from 7/00 [974] to, maybe, 9-10, 2001[975] with the Taliban views on the opium poppy ban, UN sanctions, Buddhist statues, the trial of the 8 Christian missionaries & OBL.

The World's free speech was curtailed by US efforts to limit the speech of the Taliban – even as US promotes free speech as a basic right.



ARIC

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The Islamic Emirate

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Despised Fanaticism

The mention of terms like *al-Ta'assub* (fanaticism or narrow-mindedness), and *al-Jamood al-Fiqhiyyah* (juristic stagnation) brings to mind dark images of degenerative diseases that kept eating away at the very structure of the Muslim *Ummah* (nation) for centuries on end.

Numerous scholars, reformers, and leaders of Islamic work made appreciable efforts towards treating these maladies and freeing the Muslim mind from all domination save the domination of truth, the truth that is supported by the evidence and clear proof.

To a considerable extent, much of their labor bore fruit. New generations of youthful Muslim activists and preachers were born who had as their goal the propagation of truth and the search for its evidence (from the sources - the Holy Qur'an, Sunnah of the Prophet, and agreement of the *Ummah*).

While this is doubtlessly a pleasing development, there is cause for concern in the error that has been made by many Sheikhs, leaders of Islamic work, and established Islamic movements. These individuals, famous for combating fanaticism (and even *al-Tamadhhab*, acceptable adherence to one of the schools of jurisprudence) themselves fell into a form of fanaticism and *Tamadhhab* uglier and more dangerous than what is found among the average people (whose biases might be due to ignorance or other factors

Continued next page

In This Edition

FROM THE EDITOR: *Despised Fanaticism*.....2
EDITORIAL: *Taliban and the Islamic State in Afghanistan*....4
EVENTS: *World News*.....6
INTERVIEW: *Amir-ul-Mumineen*.....12
CURRENT AFFAIRS: *Western Hostility*.....15
FEATURE: *Trials and Tribulations*.....19
INTERVIEW: *General Hameed Gul*.....23
ANALYSIS: *Terrorism Or Jihad?*.....29
FEATURE: *The Judicial System in Afghanistan*.....31
PERSPECTIVE: *Why Are We Concerned About Differences*.32

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[972] ACBAR Resource and Information Centre, Peshawar, Pak.: "Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief," founded in '88 by 55 international NGO's, working in Afgh.

[973] **A** Subscribing would've aided the Taliban, prohibited by UN 1267 Sanctions Regime. See footnotes 86A, p 280. In '15 the news was "British Library rejects Taliban trove fearing terror laws" AFP, 8/28/15, Eric Randolph, Paris. "Academics have criticised the British government for creating a "climate of fear". A. S. v. Linschoten, F. Kuehn, et al, "created the database digitising the estimated two to three million words and translating everything into English." Prof. J. Fitzgerald, Dublin City U. called decision, "rediculous".

B The largest # of issues was held by UCLA: "we just have a few issues. it is dead as a doornail. we have 3, 5 and 6 from 2000 in English and 3,5,6 (2000) and 7(2001) in Arabic." from: David G. Hirsch, Librarian for Middle Eastern Studies, UCLA, LA, CA, [rec. by ASA, 4/26/06] Cat shows # 5 & 6 were combined. U. Neb/Omaha has #1,2&3, Jul, Aug, Sep. '00.

C Part of #1, 7/27/'00, [Guardian, Lond.7/28/00, Rory McCarthy, Islamabad] [p. 1,2, 21-28] has 8 p. Taliban interrog. of A. A. Razak Al Ginco, spring '00. Rings true?—reportedly associated video. [pdf p.157-166 of 257, 9/20/'06. Incl. cat. info on cover Afghan. Coll. DS 350 I 846 [cat. # of U. Neb., Omaha, which holds this item http://unomaha.worldcat.org/title/islamic-emirate/oclc/48626613;

UCLA does not hold #1 & has cat # DS371.3 .I432 _____] No. 1, July, 2000] Richard Beckett, p162, col. 3[also called Richard Picket,pdf 168. Par 2 (Arabic only has the *B* sound, *P* is unfamiliar to them.)]See also 454 pages of exhibits on this case.June 2, '09, Later, Ginco claimed that his confession of spying for the US & conversion to Jihadi were result of torture by Al Queda.

[974] #1 pub. 7/27/00. & reviewed by Kathy Gannon, Islamabad, Pak. "Taliban launch media offensive with new magazine"

[975] The last LexisNexis ref. to mag: UPI, 6/14/01, "Note from Afghanistan: Taliban's America", Arnaud De Borchgrave, UPI Edit. at Large. Dateline: Kandahar, cites only 1 piece in mag:

'Under the headline "*American history bloody and getting bloodier...With civil unrest commonplace...experts agree ... countdown to America's destruction has begun...[they] point to the collapse of the...[USSR] after its defeat in Afghanistan and say that a defeat ('another Vietnam') for America could be the straw that broke the camel's back, and lead to the breakup of the already fragile 'Union.*"'

APPENDIX 21 Taliban Rules

From last part of: Final report on the situation of human rights in Afghanistan submitted by Mr. Choong-Hyun Paik, Special Rapporteur, in accordance with Commission on Human Rights resolution 1996/75, 2/20/97, E/CN.4/1997/59

APPENDIX I

Notice of Department for enforcement of right Islamic way and prevention of evils:

The Department for enforcement of right Islamic way and prevention of evils for the implementation of legal Islamic orders and prophet Mohamad tradition in order to prevent evils which cause serious dangers and problems for Islamic society requests from all pious sisters and brothers to seriously follow 8 articles mentioned below to prevent occurrence of evils:

1. No exit and travelling of sisters without escort of legal close relative (Mahram).

2. Those sisters are coming out of their homes with legal escort should use veil (burqa) or similar things to cover the face.

3. Sitting of sisters in the front seat of cart (gadi) and Jeep (vehicle) without legal relative is forbidden. In the case of appearance serious measures will be carried out against the vehicle and cart rider/driver.

4. Shopkeepers do not have right to buy or sell things with those women without covered face, otherwise the shopkeeper is guilty and has no right to complain.

5. Cars are strictly forbidden to be covered with flowers for wedding ceremony and also is not allowed to drive around the city.

6. Women's invitations in hotels and wedding party in hotels are forbidden.

7. Sisters without legal close relative with them can not use taxis, otherwise the taxi driver is responsible.

8. The person who is in charge of collecting fares (money) for sisters in buses, minibuses and jeeps should be under 10 years old.

The professional delegates of this department are in charge to punish violators according to Islamic principles.

APPENDIX II (Translation of Order)
Taliban Islamic Movement of Afghanistan

Rules of work for the State hospitals and private clinics based on Sharia principles

1. Female patients should go to female physicians. In case a male physician is needed, the female patient should be accompanied by her close relatives (mahram).

2. During examination, the female patients and male physicians both should be dressed with Islamic hejab.

3. Male physicians should not touch or see the other parts of female patients except the affected part.

4. Waiting rooms for female patients should be safely covered.

5. The person who regulates turns for female patients should be a female.

6. During night duty, in the rooms where female patients are hospitalized, a male doctor without the call of patient is not allowed to enter the room.

7. Sitting and speaking between male and female doctors are not allowed. If there be need for discussion, it should be done with hejab.

8. Female doctors should wear simple clothes, they are not allowed to wear stylish clothes or use cosmetics and makeup.

9. Female doctors and nurses are not allowed to enter the rooms where male patients are hospitalized.

10. Hospital staff should pray in the mosque on time. The director of hospital is bound to assign a place and appoint a priest (mullah) for prayer.

11. Staff of (Amri Bel Maroof Wa Nai Az Munkar) Department are allowed to go for control at any time and nobody can prevent them. Anybody who violates the order will be punished as per Islamic regulations.

-Amirul-Mominin Mullah Mohammad Omer Mujahed

-Mofti Mohammad Masoom Afghani
Acting Minister of Public Health

APPENDIX III

Islamic State of Afghanistan
General Presidency of Amr Bil Marof Wa Nai Az Munkir (religious police), Administration Department

To: The received letter from the Cultural and Social Affairs Department of General Presidency of Islamic State of Afghanistan No. 6240 dated 26.09.1375 states that:

The role and regulation of Amr Bil Marof Wa Nai Az Munkir is to be distributed via your office to all whom it may concern for implementation.

1. To prevent sedition and uncovered females (be

hejab): No drivers are allowed to pick up females who are using Iranian burqa. In the case of violation the driver will be imprisoned. If such kinds of female are observed in the street, their houses will be found and their husbands punished. If the women use stimulating and attractive cloth and there is no close male relative with them, the drivers should not pick them up.

2. To prevent music: To be broadcasted by the public information resources. In shops, hotels, vehicles and rickshaws cassettes and music are prohibited. This matter should be monitored within five days. If any music cassette is found in a shop, the shopkeeper should be imprisoned and the shop locked. If five people guarantee, the shop could be opened and the criminal released later. If a cassette is found in a vehicle, the vehicle and the driver will be imprisoned. If five people guarantee, the vehicle will be released and the criminal released later. [Note that there is nothing here about prohibiting music in private homes or offices. See Chapter 23, EXECUTING PEOPLE FOR PLAYING MUSIC]

3. To prevent beard shaving and its cutting: To be broadcasted by the public information resources. After one and a half months if any one is observed who has shaved and/or cut his beard, he should be arrested and imprisoned until his beard gets bushy.

4. To prevent not praying and order gathering prayer at the bazaar: To be broadcasted by the public information resources that the prayers should be done on their due times in all districts. The exact prayer time will be announced by the Amr Bil Marof Wa Nai Az Munkir department. Fifteen minutes prior to prayer time the front of the mosque, where the water facilities and possibilities are available, should be blocked and transportation should be strictly prohibited and all people are obliged to go to the mosque. At the prayer time this matter should be monitored. If young people are seen in the shops they will be immediately imprisoned. If five people guarantee, the person should be released, otherwise the criminal will be imprisoned for ten days.

5. To prevent keeping pigeons and playing with birds: To be broadcasted by the public information resources that within ten days this habit/hobby should stop. After ten days this matter should be monitored and the pigeons and any other playing birds should be killed.

6. To eradicate the use of addiction and its users: Addicts should be imprisoned and investigation made to find the supplier and the shop. The shop should be locked and both criminals (the owner and the user) should be imprisoned and punished.

7. To prevent kite flying: First should be broadcasted by the public information resources advising the people of its useless consequences such as betting, death of children and their deprivation from education. The kite shops in the city should be abolished.

8. To prevent idolatry: To be broadcasted by the public information resources that in vehicles, shops, room, hotels and any other places pictures/portraits should be abolished. The monitors should tear up all pictures in the above places. This matter should be announced to all transport representatives. The vehicle will be stopped if any idol is found in the vehicle.

9. To prevent gambling: In collaboration with the security police the main centres should be found and the gamblers imprisoned for one month.

10. To prevent British and American hairstyles: To be broadcasted by the public information resources that people with long hair should be arrested and taken to the Amr Bil Marof Wa Nai Az Munkir department to shave their hair. The criminal has to pay the barber.

11. To prevent interest charges on loans, charges on changing small denomination notes and charges on money orders: All money exchangers should be informed that the above three types of exchanging money are prohibited in Islam. In the case of violation the criminal will be imprisoned for a long time.

12. To prevent washing clothes by young ladies along the water streams in the city: It should be announced in all mosques and the matter should monitored. Violator ladies should be picked up with respectful Islamic manner, taken to their houses and their husbands severely punished.

13. To prevent music and dances in wedding parties: To be broadcasted by the public information resources that the above two things should be prevented. In the case of violation the head of the family will be arrested and punished.

14. To prevent the playing of music drums: First the prohibition of this action to be announced to the people. If anybody does this then the religious elders can decide about it.

15. To prevent sewing ladies' cloth and taking female body measures by tailors: If women or fashion magazines are seen in the shop the tailor should be imprisoned.

16. To prevent sorcery: All the related books should be burnt and the magician should be imprisoned until his repentance.

The above issues are stated and you are requested, according to your job responsibilities, to implement and inform your related organizations and units.

Regards,

Mawlavi Enayatullah Baligh
Deputy Minister
General Presidency of Amr Bil Marof Wa Nai Az Munkir

APPENDIX 22

What the Soviets could ship through the Salang Pass during a 15 month truce with Massoud.

"Three-month reserves of ammunition, fuel and food were also transferred to the DRA at Kandahar, Gardez, Kabul, Konduz, Herat, Faizabad and Shindand. The three-month reserves constituted over 85,000 tons of material including 13,269 tons of artillery rounds, 3,570 tons of aviation fuel, 24,320 tons of vehicle fuel and 27,074 tons of food." Of this, we may assume the 28 k tons of fuel was transferred via pipeline [A] --leaving 58k tons to be transferred by truck and plane. We will assume that 50k tons was transferred by the much less costly truck routes and 8k tons by plane [B]. We will also asume that a minimum of 15k tons of this was transferred to places -- Konduz, Herat, Faizabad and Shindand-- that did not require traversing the Salang Pass [C]. This left 35k tons/qtr or 140k tons/yr. If we assume 10 tons/truck, 1k trucks/day [D]; and 200 drivable days/yr, then 2.5 million tons could be transferred in 15 months – or 18 years supply for the DRA. If we further allow that during the war the combined DRA and Soviet forces used the supplies at 3 times this rate [E], 6 years supply could have been shipped through in that 15 months truce. [At this point, we don't know how much was actually shipped in this period]

A.1 p15 Breaking Contact Without Leaving Chaos: The Soviet Withdrawal From Afghanistan, Lester W. Grau, 26 pages citing p 85 of My last war [Moya poslednyaya voyna] Makhmut A. Gareev, , Moscow: INSAN, 1996, General Gareev was the last Soviet senior military advisor to Afghanistan. He served after the departure of the 40th Army.

B.1 "Every day since early March, except when the Kabul airfield is closed because of bad weather or rebel attacks, between 25 and 40 IL-76's, each carrying up to 45 metric tons of supplies, have flown into the Afghan capital." "…planes bringing in as much as 10,000 tons of supplies a week… the airlift is costing more than 300 million rubles a year, equivalent to more than $490 million." [The flour shipments were scheduled to end by June 1 '89– so the arilift was scheduled for about 3 months.] NYT, 5/24/89, "In Kabul, Huge Soviet Airlift Brings Everything From Bread to Weapons', John F. Burns.

B.2 If we assume 8k tons /week x50 weeks this would be an annual supply rate for the air bridge of 400k tons or ~$1,200/ton. Between 1949 and 1989 the value of the dollar declined by a factor of 5—see next note.

B.5 For comparison, the famous Berlin airlift in 1948-49, with much smaller planes, achieved the following: "The tallies for 321 days of operation were a total of 227,655 passengers flown either in or out of Berlin; 2,323,067 tons of mostly food and coal delivered at a cost of $345 million to Americans, 17 million pounds to the English, and 150 million Deutschmarks to the Germans. There was a greater price, however. Seventy-five American and British lives were lost in the operation." Berlin Airlift: Operation Vittles

C.1. Soviet Logistics In The Afghanistan War, Lieutenant Colonel Charles A. Russo, Jr., OD, 1991 "The third …major road begins in the western part. of the country near tne Soviet town of Kushka. This road travels south through the major towns of Herat and Kandahar, moving north then to the capital. of Kabul. …It also harbored a major Soviet supply depot near' Herat." C.2 There were 2 convoy escort battalians for the eastern corridor – including Salang and 1 for the western corridor – through Herat and Shindand p. 320 Soviet Afghan War, '02; C.3 "…through which half of the soviet truck tonnage into Afghanistan had to pass(in the period 1980-1989 tranportation units of the OKSVA moved 8,000,000 tons of supplies through it)…" [probably includes fuel & traffic both ways] p179 Afghanistan: The Soviet Union's Last War, Mark Galliotti.'95 [Primary sources aren't given!]

D.1. "…thousands of trucks which cross the pass every day…" Ambush! The Road War in Afghanistan, by Dr. Graham H. Turbiville, Jr., Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

D.2 "The high mountain roads can handle only 500-1000 trucks perday" . P 139, V.F. Yashin, translated, L.E. Grau, in: The Soviet Afghan War How A Superpower Fought And Lost, 2002 transl & ed by Lester Grau & Michael Gress.

D.3. An 800 veh. DRA convoy moving through the Salang pass from Pul i Khumri -- about 50km north of Doshi on the Salang hwy -- to Kabul, in Oct 1988 stretched over 50km in length [p146 The Soviet Afghan War, supra D. 2 Attacked at the approach of the N Salang Tunnel w. loss …of 22 veh. before reaching Kabul.

E.0 "The average daily …was some 2,000 to 3, 000 tons of which 60-65% was POL, 7% was ammunition, 20% was food and 8-13% was other cargo.[Assume 1.2kTon/day not in pipelines] An insignificant part of perishable goods (5-8%) was flown on military transport directly to the forces. Thus truck transport …[carried] 75-80% of the [nonPOL] cargo….[thus ~1kTon/day or 360kTons/yr in trucks. This compares with the 200kTons/yr estim. for the DRA] The[re] …were …two dual main pipelines that paralleled the road [from Hairaton …- Baghran and Turagundi-Shindand] On each route one pipeline was …[for] aviation fuel and the other, diesel." P262 The Soviet-Afghan War –supra D.2

APPENDIX 23

THE NUMBER OF CASUALTIES IN THE SOVIET AFGHAN WAR



Those in the camps were not directly representative of the regions they came from. The author, Prof. Marek Sliwinski, himself notes: "The rate of war deaths among the refugee's cohorts rises according to the distance crossed inside Afghanistan." pdf p 19.

He doesn't suggest that death in a family is a great motivator to seek refuge – & go further -- to a refugee camp. The areas that were further away had much lower representation in the camps. For example: the mostly Tajik Badakhshan & Takhar provinces, with 1.08E6 people in 1978-9 or 7.8% of the total pop., had only a total of 0.41% respondents in Pakistan refugee camps. [pdf p 21-2]. Helmand & Kandahar –which are both mostly Pashtun & close to Pakistan had a total of 1.09E6 = 7.9% of pop. & 10.05% of refugees in Pak camps.

The author notes the ethnic distribution in the Pakistani refugee camps: 84.6 % Pashtun, 6.0 Tajik, 0.1 Hazara, .5 Uzbek, 1.0 Turkmens, & 7.8 other – in '87- compared with 39% Pashtun, 26% Tajik, 10% Hazara, 10% Uzbek , 3% Turkomens, 12% Other, pdf p 32.

The study is critiqued by Thomas H. Eighmy, Ph.D, USAID Rep., Afghanistan Affairs, Islamabad /Peshawar/Quetta, "Afghanistan's Population Inside and Out , 5/90/ 249p http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNABF575.pdf [this report is on my flashdrive and is searchable]– detailed data by district & age based on estimates and projections. Estimates a much lower death rate based on what he says are negative local district populations if the Sliwinski's data are linearly applied to them.

He writes: pdf p 6, ***"In short, zero percent is too low, 10% appears too high, and 5% is what has been used in this study. For whatever it is worth statistically, this equals 795,258 incremental war deaths. A higher number is possible, in fact likely in contested districts. The nation's war dead may indeed be over 1,000,000, but there is no way of knowing."***

It may be possible to use the original interview data for Pakistan to develop a more reliable system of projection to the population of Afghan. if the combination of distance from the camp and impetus to flee are included in the model. These data may be combined with data now available for the Afghan refugees in Iran at the time to come up with an even better understanding of the impact of the war on the Afghan people.

See also: Population Development In Kandahar Province Estimation Of The Total Population Number, The Present And Absent Number Of Families, …, Olaf Verheijen. MCI Farmer Management Advisor, Feb. 1/93, 15 p .

A USAID document from 6/1986: p6 "The magnitude of damage that the Soviets have inflicted upon Afghanistan has resulted in the emigration of an estimated four million Afghans into neighboring Pakistan and Iran. An estimated half million civilians have been killed since the invasion of December 1979. Some 15,000 villages or hamlets have been destroyed or damaged. As a result, well over one million school-aged children have been deprived of the opportunity to attain an education for the last seven years." http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDABA098.pdf AN UPDATE AND RECOMMENDED IMPLEMENTATION ARRANGEMENTS FOR AID CROSS-BORDER EDUCATION ACTIVITIES FOR AFGHANISTAN Submitted By Thomas E. Gouttierre A. Moqim Rahmanzai June 27, 1986

Sliwinski study shows 69% of war deaths in Afghan war were between april 78 and april 86 – pdf page 8. Peak year was between apr 84 and apr. 85 with 16 % of deaths .

ENDNOTES

DETAILED SOURCES ON EXCHANGE RATES OF THE AFGHANI IN KABUL 1987-2003 [In date order]

Most of this can be deleted, incorporated in table notes or table can be redone with official market data from the money changers in Kabul

[11/15/82] &12/28/82, **AP, "Inflation Put At 200 Percent", Richard Bill, Dateline: Islamabad, Pakistan, "They also said the value of …the afghani _ against most major foreign currencies had "dropped drastically" and that the central bank in Kabul had resorted to printing vast sums of money without reserve backing to pay its bills….Although the official exchange rate is still 55 afghanis to the dollar, the sources said the black market rate is now 85 to 1, up 16 percent from mid-November when dollars were being bought in city bazaars at 73 to 1.**

10/20/86, **Mon., AP, "Soviet Tanks Patrol Ancient Bazaar In Afghan Capital" Carol J. Williams, Dateline: Kabul, "The afghani goes at 55 for a dollar at the official rate, which even officials shun, and about 150 at the street rate.**

1/14/87, AP, "Afghanistan Flies Journalists in for Cease-Fire", Andrew Rosenthal, Dateline: Kabul, "280 afghanis for two cans of beer, about $5 at the official exchange rate but only about $2.75 at the rate given by unofficial moneychangers".

1/26/87, NYT, "Russians Hold Key To Power, But Not To Afghanistan's Soul", Philip Taubman, p1-A; Dateline:Kabul, "Money changers in the Kabul bazaar [offered]…Afghan money at triple the Government exchange rate."

Feb/05/87, The Globe and Mail (Canada), "Afghanistan tries to woo private business people", Patrick Worsnip; Reut, Dateline: Kabul, "In one possibly related move, the Government last month authorizedbanks - all state-run - to buy and sell foreign currency against the localcurrency, the Afghani, at the market rate, which is about three times morefavorable to the U.S. dollar than the official rate.

5/13/87, The Washington Post, "Kabul Life Difficult for Russians ; 9,000 Civilian Advisers Live With Afghans, but Shun Bazaars", Richard M. Weintraub, P. A31, Dateline: Kabul, The afghani is valued at 55 to the dollar on the official exchange but gets three times that on the legal, open market.

6/13/87, Sat, "The Xinhua General Overseas News Service', "prices rise in Afghanistan" islamabad, june 13; ITEM NO: 0613015, " afghani, the afghan currency --printed in the soviet union --registered a 10 percent decline against major world currencies. it is now 168 afghani to one u.s. dollar."

12/30/87, Hobart Mercury, BYLINE: AAP "The official rate is about 56 Afghanis for one US dollar. In the blackmarket's jammed courtyard, a dollar buys about 175 Afghanis"

1/26/88, Tues, AP, "Kabul Officials Reportedly Buying 'Escape Currency' And Passports", Bryan Wilder, Dateline: Islamabad, Pak., "They said apprehension about the future in addition to worsening economic conditions in Kabul have driven the Afghani, …down to 217 to the dollar."It represents 2 percent decline in one week and 5 percent in two weeks, diplomats said.

5/5/88, AP, "Afghan President Seeks New Image Abroad As Soviets Withdraw", Earleen Fisher,, Dateline: Kabul, "Kabul moneychangers operate openly, soliciting dollars and offering exchange rates more than three times the official rate"

1/29/89, The Washington Post, 1/30/89, Mon.,Afghan Troops Fight Rebels for Key Road; Kabul Assails Closing of Western Embassies, Richard M. Weintraub, p. A11, Dateline: Kabul, 1/29/89, "…the price of fuel has risen from 30 afghanis, …to more than 100 for a liter, …less than a dollar a gallon [more than 380/$]

2/15/89 [4/24/92] AFP,"Afghani defies peace pessimism, Annil Penna Dateline: Kabul "the currency sliding constantly since the 1978 communist coup.A dollar bought 40 Afs then, 250 by the 1989 withdrawal of the Soviet troops [15 February 1989] that came in to prop up the communists and after that it continued to soar until last month.

2/17/89,Fri, Australian Financial Review, "Pravda Leads Attack On Soviet Involvement; Afghanistan", Source: Financial Times, P. 48, "In Kabul, the beleaguered capital, the end of the occupation passed virtually unnoticed and bazaars and the black market currency rate for the Afghani remained stable at 225 to the US dollar - a sign, dealers said, that nobody was panicking yet."

1/30/90, Tues, The Times (London), "Ankle-deep in mud and awash with Afghan cash; Money Market", Christopher Thomas, Kabul, Issue 63616. "There are 500 'AFS' to the pound, and it is almost impossible to get notes of denominations of more than 50AFS…These few hundred grubby shops are said to handle dollars 200,000 dollars (Pounds 119,000) a month.[[119/200]X500 = 297.5 afs/$] "The money trade is conducted with an astonishing lack of security, as though nobody had respect for cash any more. Customers sit on steps surrounded by piles of notes being laboriously counted and recounted after a transaction."

2/2/90. AP, "In Kabul's 12th Winter of War, People Hope for a Spring of Peace" BRYAN WILDER, DATELINE: KABUL, "It took 525 afghanis to buy a dollar on Jan. 1 and by the end of the month it took just 500."

6/26/90 [data from 6/26/91, AFP] 550 Afghanis to the dollar.

6/26/91, AFP, "Skyrocketing prices hit Afghans", "A year ago the exchange rate on the free market was 550 Afghanis to the dollar. Nowadays it is fluctuating at between 925 and 950 Afghanis."…

Jul/9/91, AFP, "Pepsi and Insh'allah, Kentucky Fried Chicken, in Afghanistan", Pratap Chakravarty, Dateline: Kabul, "the Afghani slid further to a record low of 1,020 against the dollar"

Nov 10/91, AFP, "Kabul doles out fuel as winter falls on Afghanistan" Dateline: Kabul "…around 100,000 Afghanis (120 dollars) for 200 litres (44 gallons)"=833af/$

11/21/91, AP. "Feeding Kabul: Tougher Than Fighting The Muslim Guerrillas" Sharon Herbaugh, Dateline: Kabul, "…the value of the Afghani has tumbled from about 150 to 1,100 to the dollar in the last three years."

12/15/91 [see entry for 5/20/92, AFP ,[also less exact number at 4/24/92 AFP- not used]

12/24/91,[Tues] AFP, "Afghan president calls emergency meeting, dollar demand soars", DATELINE: KABUL, "The Afghani on Tuesday was priced at 1,800 to the dollar, an upswing of some 200 Afghanis since Monday, and sources said the meeting was taking stock of the economic as well as the military situation.Market sources have attributed the phenomenon to panic buying of hard currency by big importers as well as individuals from the free market where the dollar was pegged at 1,100 Afghanis last week. State-owned banks were offering 1,360 Afghanis to the dollar on Tuesday in an effort to compete with the influential money market which also sells to the government.

12/26/91[thurs], AP, "Kabul ends blockade of highway, rocketing of capital continues", Dateline: Kabul, "The local currency, the Afghani, crashed earlier this week and reached a record 2,100 to the dollar because of panic buying by private importers and individual purchasers, but market sources Thursday said hard currency sold for 1,500 as reports came in that the blockade has ended.

APR/8/92, The Independent (London), "Survival and hope in Afghan endgame", Raymond Whitaker, P 17 , "dollar now fetches only 1,250 Afghanis, down from 1,400 last week"

[NAJIB OUSTED /TOOK SHELTER IN UN/ 4/17/92]

4/24/92 NYT , Fri., Late Ed. – Final, "Afghans in Kabul Hope For Peace Amid Anxiety", Edward A. Gargan, P. A8; Column 5; Dateline: Kabul, 4/23, "Just one month ago, $1 brought 1,450 afghanis; today, the same dollar fetches 850 afghanis."

[4/24/92] AFP, "The day before [4/23/92] the weekly holiday Friday, the Afghani was 850 to the dollar in Kabul's money exchange,... only four months ago had bought a record 2,300 Afghanis.

4/25/92, [sat.] AFP. "Kabul welcome mujahedeen government, scattered fighting around city", Kate Webb, Dateline: Kabul, In the money bazar, the Afghan currency, the Afghani, soared in value as optimism that the war was over spread, selling at 650 to the U.S. dollar as compared to 850 at close Thursday [4/23/92].

4/30/92, [not used due to unreliability of historical figures] Thur., UPI, "Reports of violence as Masoud tightens grip on Kabul", Natasha Singh, Dateline: Kabul, "Afghanistan's economy already has begun to improve. For the first time in 13 years, the local Afghani currency has risen in value to 400 Afghanis per dollar from 3,000 Afghanis to the dollar last week. [This report is unreliable on the historical data as in jan 1990 it was 298 and below 400 in all years in this data base – extending to 1986. Further it says that it hit 3,000 the previous week but the report from the previous week said the record was 2300, 4 months before. This report is further contradicted by the following report that says the market was shut at the time this report says it was 400afs/$. The following report also says that it was 1500afs/$when it was shut.]

5/20/92. AFP, "Kabul money market opens, dollar down", Dateline: Kabul, Afghanistan's main exchange market opened here Wednesday amid tight security 24 days after it shut, citing security fears, traders and witnesses said. The money market, a barometer of the Afghan economy, pegged the U.S. dollar at 500 Afghanis against 1,500 when it shut last month.... The Afghani had hit a record 2,224 to the dollar in mid-December due to political uncertainies in the country, but began gaining as the mujahedeen started capturing one city after another beginning in March."

afghani and dollar and not "Globe and Mail" betwe 1992 and 1993 all English news lexis nex. 26 hits -- not finished

5/21/92, **[data from this article not entered yet]** AFP, "Kabul's economy dances to the euphoria of liberation" DATELINE: KABUL, Foreign currencies have tumbled in value against the Afhgani as the euphoria of the victory of the Islamic revolution boosts the once-shunned local currency for the third consecutive week. Hundreds of millions of brand new Afghanis appeared in the money exchange market on Wednesday when it opened for the first time since the takeover, but the flood of new banknotes failed to stem the unit's rise. The new paper money in the market was from a consignment of three planeloads of currency sent to Kabul from Russia prior to the April 28 ousting of Afghanistan's Soviet-installed regime, sources said. Kabul's paper money has long been printed in the Soviet Union, and much of it was used to pay soldiers salaries....The U.S. dollar which was pegged at around 1,500 Afghanis during the last year of deposed president Najibullah's rule, has lost one third of its value within a month, while the British pound and the German mark were trading at 40 percent less than in April."

Dec. 1/92, "Afghan central bank adopts free market exchange rates", Dateline: Kabul, "The rate for new 500 and 1,000 Afghani bills is slightly lower than for used currency as they are easier to count and carry. On its first day of trading at free market rates, the central bank was offering 1,045 Afghanis for one U.S. dollar, about 130 Afghanis less than the [1175] free money market.

June 4/93, AFP, "Your money or your life! Highway robbery in Afghanistan", DATELINE: PUL-I-KHUMR, [a city in northern Afghanistan, capital of Baghlan Province],... "For the most part these gun-toting ex-communist regime soldiers or local mujahedeen had demanded a nominal sum, usually 1,000 afghani (about one dollar) per vehicle, enough for a packet of cigarettes to smoke after some bread and a pot of tea.

10/20/93, AFP, "Kidnapping of children and teenagers on the rise in Kabul", DATELINE: KABUL, "If you are young and unarmed you walk in fear near the Balai Hissar fort in the ancient centre of Kabul....Ruhatullah had already had one grim experience with an Uzbek commander, Siddique, from the National Islamic Movement,[*Dostom]* who kidnapped him and kept him for eight nights in the military castle, releasing him only when his family paid 800,000 Afghanis (about 470 dollars.)" == 1702 af/$

10/31/93, AFP, "Kabul's last power lines fall victim to family feud", DATELINE: KABUL, "We sell electricity for only one Afghani per Kilowatt," he said. "Even in neighbouring Pakistan the equivalent rate is 115 Afghani." The U.S. dollar is equal to around 1,700 Afghani. Ayub said prices were kept low because electricity was necessary for winter heating, although a spokesman at the Kabul municipalilty said deliveries of charcoal and firewood were now arriving in the capital from outer provinces.

12/17/93, AP, "Another Afghan Dispute: Who Controls the Money?", John Jennings, Dateline: Kabul, The feuding president and prime minister have another dispute ...who gets to control the money? President Burhanuddin Rabbani... handles the money, which is printed in Moscow and flown to Kabul.... Prime Minister Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, ..., says he should be in charge of ...the Afghani... Rabbani's top military commander, Ahmad Shah Masood, is widely believed to be paying various commanders to fight on his side....Afghanistan's money supply does not appear to be closely controlled by the coalition government, which is made up of the various warring parties and barely functions. Finance Minister Kareem Khaleeli[976] said this year's government budget is about 380 billion Afghanis (dlrs 200 million). But there's no evidence that the government is able to collect any taxes due to the civil war which has crippled the economy. ...Inflation is over 100 percent a year and the currency is rapidly losing its value. One U.S. dollar will now buy about 1,900 Afghanis at the informal money market....Khaleeli, who is allied with Hekmatyar, said the central bank, and not the president, has traditionally controlled the money printing contracts and distribution of the currency. Also, many Afghans object to having their money printed in Moscow due to the 1979-89 Soviet occupation. "Since Russia was responsible for so much of the destruction of our country during their invasion, the Afghani will not be printed there any more," said Khaleeli. However, Rabbani's spokesman Abdul Azeez Murad said the president has the final say over who prints the money. Also, the money-printing contract already has been renewed in Moscow, and it would cost dlrs 10 million to break the agreement and sign a new one in another country, he added. Afghanistan's communist government, which was overthrown by the Islamic factions in april 1992, signed the original agreement that allowed a Moscow firm to print the Afghani....

a, b & c below are from: Economy, xi. in Modern Afghanistan, last updated Dec. 8, 2011, Originally Pub.: Dec. 15, '97, M. Siddieq Noorzoy., http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/economy-xi-in-modern-afghanistan Extensive bibliog. does not show likely source for the above data

a.. in October 1994, after the announcement in Kabul that notes in denominations of 5,000 and 10,000 afghanis were being introduced, the exchange rate against the dollar dropped from 3,700 to 4,500 afghanis in the Kabul money market

b.. In late 1995 it plummeted further, to 8,000 afghanis to the dollar

c.. In early 1995 the Ṭālebān re-established security in southern and eastern Afghanistan, and trade routes were reopened. The immediate results were a drop in commodity prices and a rise in the currency-exchange rate in the *bāzār*s, from 4,500 to 2,900 afghanis to the dollar.

[976] Karim Khalili ...Vice President of Afghanistan in the administration of President Hamid Karzai. Khalili was appointed first time as Vice President in 2002 and was elected as running mate of Hamid Karzai in 2004. Since 1989 he has been one of the main leaders of the Wahdat political party of Hazara.] Khalili was born in Wardak Province and attended a religious school. He participated actively in the Afghan resistance during Soviet Invasion. He also served as Minister of Finance of Afghanistan during the Mujahideen government in the early 1990s. [from wikipedia 5/30/14] [See in connection to death of Mazari in 1995]

Dec. 9/94, The Herald (Glasgow), "Kabul in currency crisis", Alistair Lyon, p14, Kabul, Moneychangers...in a government-held area offer... 3450 afghanis/$. Before this year's devastating battles...a dollar fetched only 1500 afghanis. ...The banknotes are printed in Russia ...No-one knows how much reaches the central bank and how much is diverted to pay guerrilla commanders or to bolster the loyalty of pro-government provincial leaders.[The time in 1993 or early 1994 is not clear – don't use]

11/14/95, AFP, "UN peace envoy makes flying Afghan visit" 1000 words, Dateline: Kabul, 11/14 "The Afghani was worth 5,100 to the dollar this morning, but after we heard Mestiri was arriving it immediately dropped to 5,500..." [The various groups looked upon Mestiri's mission as a falure ...]

Feb.7/96,[Wed.] AFP, "Food arrives in besieged Kabul, Iran launches fresh peace drive", Herve Clerc, 894 words, Dateline: Kabul, Feb 7, "The afghani, the local currency, which had been losing value against the dollar, firmed, but the tendency had begun before the road reopened.The dollar was changing hands for 6,500 afghanis on Wednesday, compared with 7,500 on Sunday [2/04/96] ."

8/27/96, AFP, "Food equals peace as challenge for Kabul leadership", Terence White, 686 words, DATELINE: KABUL, Aug 27, "Kabul money-changers blame the runaway inflation on "the excessive printing and distribution" of the local currency called the afghani, currently 22,000 to the US dollar. Both the government and rival factions print money as required, and what is regarded as "counterfeit" in Kabul is legal tender in many of the provinces. Inflation in neighbouring Pakistan is acknowledged as a contributing factor to inflation in Afghanistan, but even senior government officials concede that flooding the local bazaar with truckloads of afghani is the main reason prices have skyrocketted. Against army regulations some frontline commanders speculate in the money-market, purchasing large sums of dollars with their afghani budget. Government contractors often have their payments witheld until a planeload of freshly printed money arrives from Russia, after which a new flood of afghani hits one or other of the two money-markets in Kabul. None of these affairs has much to do with the civilian population - they just suffer the consequences."Things are so tough the middle class has all but been wiped out. Now there are the poor and the very poor," commented a long-time expatriate aid worker in Kabul....Sadly, but accurately, a government official observed: "The government has no real source of income but is obliged to fight a costly war, so this mess will continue".

9/28/96, Sat., The Globe and Mail (Canada), 'Taliban rebels proclaim strict Islamic rule in Afghanistan" Alistair Lyon Reuters News Agency; REUT, Pg. A18, 634 words, Dateline: Kabul, Life appeared normal in the shattered capital, which government forces abandoned hours before the Taliban entered around 1:00 a.m. yesterday. The Taliban described Mr. Rabbani, prime minister Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and Mr. Masood as national criminals for not surrendering and accepting a Taliban amnesty. Witnesses said Kabul's streets were bustling with pedestrians, cyclists and cars. Shops and markets were open despite an Islamic holiday. Militia tanks had pulled back to side streets, although fighters were still visible at key points...The country's currency, the afghani, surged to 11,000 to the U.S. dollar from the 18,500 level it was trading at before Kabul fell....A Taliban commander named Musa said an amnesty had been declared for all government soldiers and officers who surrendered."Taliban will not take revenge. We have no personal rancour. If the people find someone responsible for crimes in the past we will judge him according to Islamic law," he said.

[9/28/96, Sat.] AFP, "Kabul women punished for not meeting Islamic dress code", KABUL, Sept 29 [Sun.](AFP) "The rate of the afghani Saturday was 15,500 per dollar and 370 per Pakistan rupee, while it was 19,000 and 450 respectively on Thursday[9/26/96] before the fall of Kabul.

9/29/96, Sun, The Observer, "Kabul Victors Put Mercy To Flight", David Loyn, Pg. 17, 2000 words, "The most visible sign of confidence that Taliban will bring stable government comes from Kabul's money-changers. The rate of the afghani to the dollar, 18,000 a week ago,[9/22/96] is now less than 8,000. Every night and morning since Taliban arrived there has been heavy shellfire from the mountains north of here. But trade has quickly resumed."

SEPT 30- OCT 6/96, [Guardian Weekly, Oct. 6/96, "Afghan victors put mercy to flight", The Observer; p. 7] "The most visible sign of confidence that Taliban will bring stable government comes from Kabul's money-changers. The rate of the afghani to the dollar, 18,000 a week ago, is now less than 8,000. Official data on the supply of money circulating in Afghanistan were not available, even from the International Monetary Fund."

Oct/2/96 [Oct/3/96, thur.] The Washington PostThursday, Final Edition, "Conquered Afghan City Takes Good With Bad; Harsh Militia Rule Restores Order", Kenneth J. Cooper, Pg. A01, 1343 words, Dateline: Kabul, Oct. 2, "... the national currency rose nearly 40 percent in value against the dollar on the day of the Taliban takeover. In the five days since, it has lost about half its gains, leaving the Afghani trading unofficially at roughly 15,000 to the dollar.

[Oct 10, thur.]Oct.11/96, Fri, The Times, "Money men fix price of war" Christopher Thomas, 402 words, "The Afghani soared to 10,000 for a dollar when it was felt that Taleban would impose nationwide peace, then plunged to 20,000 when it was feared there would be prolonged fighting in the north, possibly overflowing into Kabul. Yesterday, with nobody sure which way events were going, it hovered nervously around 15,000."

Dec/3/96, AP, "Afghanistan's Central Bank Says Most 10,000 Afghani Notes Worthless", Srecko Latal, Dateline: Kabul. When the Taliban took over Kabul in '96, counterfeiting was used as a weapon against them and hyper-inflation of over 400% /year set in.

[2000, 2002 and DEC. 1996] "The exchange rate at the time of Ehsan's announcement [Dec.3/96] was 21,000 Afghani to the U.S. dollar. The Northern Alliance then had banknotes produced in Russia which were sold on the markets of Kabul at half their value.

Jan/4/97, AFP, "Taliban crackdown includes ban on kite-flying, homing pigeons", Terence White, DATELINE: KABUL, "The price of homing pigeons at the bazaar ranged from 10,000 to 30,000 afghani (45 cents to 1.30 dollars)." [10,000+30,000]/[.45+1.30] =40,000/1.75=22,857 afs/$

2/17/97, AFP, "Iranian support lends sharp increase to Afghan currency value in north", Terence White,Dateline: Kabul, 2/17, "Financial support from Iran has spectacularly increased the value of Afghan currency used by northern opposition leader General Abdul Rashid Dostam, travellers reaching Kabul said Monday." "The afghani, which had decreased in value to over 120,000 to the dollar, is now worth around 18,000," a Western traveller told AFP. The dramatic increase in value of the afghani over the past two days has been attributed to a huge buying operation by a bank in

Dostam's northern capital of Mazar-i-Sharif. The massive influx of United States dollars -- which unconfirmed reports from both Kabul and Mazar-i-Sharif say comes from Iran -- have been used to stem the nose-dive of Dostam's rapidly depreciating afghani. In Taliban-controlled Kabul, the afghani is currently traded at around 22,000 to the dollar.

Dec. 11/97, AFP "Afghan currency slides as mystery bank notes pour in", Stefan Smith, Financial pages, 440 words, Dateline: Kabul, 12/11, "Afghanistan's currency, the afghani, is tumbling in value after an influx of mystery new banknotes flooded the Taliban-held capital, money traders told AFP Thursday". In less than a week, the afghani has plunged from 24,000 to 28,500 to the US dollar, ...Throughout the year, the afghani remained stable at between 20,000 and 22,000 to the greenback, but traders are now puzzled over who is printing bundles of crisp new banknotes. "The notes used to be printed by the former regime, but there are reports the Taliban are now also printing," said Mohammad Haidari, a dealer in Kabul's bustling but bombed-out money market. He said confidence in the currency is falling as Taliban administered ministries in the capital have begun paying their staff with fresh banknotes delivered in freshly sealed plastic wrapping. Many civil servants have not been paid since the Taliban seized the capital in September 1996, while women -- who are banned from work -- were promised they would still be paid in absentia, although cash was seldom given out. Now, even women civil servants have been requested to sign in at work to receive their salaries, which at an average of 250,000 per month are fast losing value."The Taliban have definitely got their hands on a lot of new notes, but they are flooding the market and stability definitely needs to be restored," another currency trader added. Officials from the state bank and finance ministry were not available for comment, ...According to money dealers, cash printed by the former government of President Burhanuddin Rabbani has found its way across frontlines into Taliban areas, but the money supply has remained stable. "Some traders say the Taliban have started printing money in Dubai, which would account for the new notes, but only Allah knows where they come from," the dealer said. To complicate Afghanistan's already mystifying fiscal system, the anti-Taliban held northern third of the country uses the same currency but with a slight difference in letter spacing on the bills. The northern currency -- dubbed the "Dostami" in reference to ethnic-Uzbek warlord Abdul Rashid Dostam -- exchanges to the dollar at 66,000 but is worthless in Kabul. sas/sha/sjc [The new money used by the Taliban here could be the money left in the bankvaults in Kabul when Massoud fled -- mentioned by the IMF 2003 report – which see – or, less likely, money captured from Massoud. There are no reports of the Taliban printing money in the IMF report or elsewhere – other than this article.

12/15/98, AFP, "Afghan currency hits all-time low as opposition prints cash", Mohammad Bashir Dateline: Kabul. "The Afghan currency has plunged to an all-time low after high-denomination notes printed by the opposition in Russia swamped the local market, traders and moneychangers said Tuesday. They said 1000-denominated afghani bills, printed by the anti-Taliban strongman Ahmad Shah Masood, have been smuggled in unusually high amounts by traders into the capital's main money market in recent weeks...., prompting a sharp rise in the prices of prime commodities. "One month ago one dollar fetched 36,000 afghanis whereas it is around 44,000 to the dollar nowadays," said a major moneychanger .... Masood regularly prints high-denomination notes to pay his frontline fighters ... reprinting bills which carry the same serial numbers as those already in circulation....The Taliban militia does not print its own currency . ...because bills with the same serial number were essentially being copied, the [Taliban] militia has no means of calculating how much cash is actually washing through the economy....mbr/lh/sz/sm

7/30/99,[Fri] AP, "Offensive changes little in Afghanistan's war-weary capital", Amir Zia, Dateline: Kabul, "...Traffic police are about the only official presence; weapons are rarely seen...."At present, people are not buying on the hope that the Taliban will gain more ground and the prices of daily commodities will come down," said shopkeeper Abdul Hadi. "But if the opposition inflicts losses on the Taliban or advances, then there will be uncertainty and prices will shoot up and our currency will slide." So far, the country's currency, the afghani, has benefited from the fighting, jumping to 41,000 to the dollar Thursday from 43,500 two days ago, before the Taliban launched the summer offensive.

Mar., 5/00, Sun., NYT, "Theft Under the Taliban? Perish the Thought", BARRY BEARAK, Page A.3; Col.1; 1350 words, DATELINE: KABUL, "... In the cold predawn of Jan. 13, thieves made off with more than $200,000 in cash from Kabul's main money bazaar. The brigands were methodical in their noisy work, dismantling the metal shutters and jimmying the locks on 10 stores. They met no opposition from the Taliban soldiers who stand watch over the deserted bazaar at night. Indeed, come morning, those guards, like the money, were gone. "It appears to have been an inside job," said a currency trader, Haji Amanullah, who lost $165,000..."I'm not saying the Taliban did this. I completely trust the Taliban. It was probably done by people in the clothing of the Taliban, impostors from the opposition." ... Not only has the money bazaar been hit twice, but several homes have also been burgled in the last two months by armed ruffians who work in the wee hours, seemingly untroubled by a 9 p.m. curfew enforced at the Taliban militia's checkpoints. "Obviously, our enemies have become active in Kabul, infiltrating people into the city for the purpose of besmirching our reputation," said Mullah Ghulam Haider, a white-bearded.... "Our security forces will leave no stone unturned until we catch these people and end this rash of robbery." ... while many Afghans complain about Islamic strictures that seem medieval, they have praised the Taliban for eliminating crime. "I know a doctor who was stabbed and his money taken," said Muhammad Naseem, a jeweler. "If someone comes into this shop and says, 'Stick your hands up,' how can I resist? The Taliban have forbidden people to have guns." [notice that there are no mentions of any murders in a two month period] ...the crime victim, Mr. Amanullah, after initially naming the Taliban as suspects in taking his $165,000, was not finished in his heedful exoneration of them. "We are very happy with the Taliban," he said. "I have been personally assured that their supreme leader, Mullah Muhammad Omar, is sorry for my loss, and if the money is not recovered, the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan will stand liable for the full amount."... In a bizarre bit of banking, Afghanistan's currency is printed by the Taliban's remaining opposition, the government of Burhanuddin Rabbani, who unceremoniously fled Kabul in 1996. Most nations still recognize the old government, which faces high costs in keeping up its end of the civil war and prints excessive amounts of cash to pay the bills. Of course, as such things always go, the more money that is manufactured the less it is worth. Ten years ago, the Afghani was trading at about 50 to $1 ;[This is a mistake] five years ago 3,000 to $1; last year 40,000 to $1;[this is close] now, about 54,000 to $1... According to the Taliban, Koranic law prohibits the payment of interest. "In Islam, banks may loan a customer money for a specific project, but only if there is an arrangement to share in both the profits and losses," said Abdul Manan Deobandi, the third deputy governor of the national bank. Most people with a sizable amount of cash keep it with a currency trader like the recently looted Mr. Amanullah. He is one of the bazaar's leading fig-

ures, though his shop, one of the nicer ones, is but a single narrow room with a badly cracked teller's window…."

[A lexis nexis search 5/28/14 did not turn up any reports of what happened to the thieves]

[In April, 2000, the Afghani traded at 6,400 AFA per USD. By 2002, the Afghani was valued at 43,000 AFA per USD" Daily Outlook Afghanistan,10/19/10,"The Story of Afghani (AFN)" Mohammad Ahsan. [THIS 6400 LOOKS LIKE A TYPO in original story – see 4/25/2000 – don't use this number in table]

Apr. 3/00, Mon., AFP, "Afghan currency nosedives amid reports of Opium crop damage", Mohammad Bashir, Dateline: Kabul, "The Afghan currency Monday hit an all-time low, pushing prices up amid reports of damage to the country's opium crop ….One US dollar could fetch around 59,000 Afghanis, whereas it was traded for 56,000 last week in the capital's main money market, … money changers… said the worrying downslide followed an increase in the supply of Afghanies recently on the markets in Kabul and in the southern province of Kandahar. Some dealers, requesting anynomity, said that the Afghani started losing value after reports that opium poppy crops in southern Afghanistan were damaged by the current drought."The Afghani will lose more and more value if the reports prove true," one dealer feared. "The poppy money is the biggest support for the Afghani," he said. Afghanistan, which has been at war for 20 years now, lacks other revenue resources apart from opium production and fruit exports."

4/18/00. Tues, AP, Afghan currency slides, food prices soar", AMIR SHAH, DATELINE: KABUL, …The Afghani was selling today for 64,000 to the dollar, down from 58,000 four days earlier…. It wasn't immediately clear why the currency was dropping, but the Taliban …blame Russia, who they say are still supplying local currency to the opposition, led by former president Burhanuddin Rabbani. That currency is flooding into Taliban territory and weakening the Afghani.

4/19/00, Wed., AP, "Taliban shut down money market to stop freefall of Afghan currency", Amir Shah, Dateline: Kabul, …According to World Food Program figures the Afghani was selling for 55,075 to the U.S. dollar on March 31. On Wednesday it traded at 75,000 and many money dealers in Kabul have begun refusing to exchange the Afghani. Before the Taliban ordered the money market shut, people were seen lugging bags of Afghani notes trying to find a money dealer who would exchange the currency. The Taliban have blamed the weakening currency on a flood of paper money coming from opposition territory and finding its way into Taliban-held areas. The opposition, led by ousted president Burhanuddin Rabbani, still receives shipments of currency from a Russian currency printer. The Taliban say a drought in south and western Afghanistan has further weakened the currency…."Everyone is trying to sell their Afghanis, but there just aren't any buyers," said Mohammed Amin, a currency dealer. "Everyone is after dollars or the Pakistani rupee.""I think everything has gone crazy here," said Mohammed Jabbar, a flour dealer in the beleaguered Afghan capital.

4/19/00, Weds. , AFP, "Taliban shut money market after Afghan currency sinks", 934 words,[much duplication – possible virus in lexisnexis database at this article] Dateline: Kabul, 4/19, "Afghanistan's Taliban authorities closed Kabul's main money market Wednesday after the afghani fell by 10 percent in an uprecedented early morning slide, money changers said. The dollar traded at 65,000 afghanis when the money market opened amid growing concern that the local currency will continue nosediving, they said. After a few hours, it jumped to 75,000 afghanis, recording a decline of 10 per cent in its shrinking value, currency dealers said. "If some proper measures are not taken, it will lose more value," one dealer said before the closure of the city's Shahzada market, which plays the role of the country's central bank.The market's iron gate was shut and money-changers, were told to leave, they said. The afghani started losing its value in late March after reports that the current drought hitting southern Afghanistan had damaged poppy crops, which provide vital support for the local currency. Money changers said the afghani had shed more than 20 per cent its value in one month, causing a widespread concern among the city's impoverished population. However after several hours interval, the market was reopened and the afghani regained slightly. Dealers said one dollar fetched 70,000 afghanis in afternoon trade. "That was a panicky situation in the market. The closure brought some sort of stability," money changer Atiqullah said. However he said the local currency had lost its reliability…. The Taliban regime blamed the Afghan opposition for the currency crisis saying it was flooding Kabul with billions of afghanis, printed "illegally" in northern Afghanistan to destabilise the economy, the Pakistan-based private news service, Afghan Islamic Press, reported. Quoting a Taliban spokesman, it said the ruling militia has decided to crackdown on the smuggling in of afghanis from abroad. The authorities are also considering closure of the Shahzada money market for an unspe[c]ified period to stabilise the afghani, it said.

[4/19/2000],[weds],Xinhua General News Service, 4/20/00, Thurs, "Afghan Taliban Order Halt to Kabul's Open Currency Trade", Dateline: Islamabad, 4/19, "The decision was taken when the Afghani fell to all-time low. On Wednesday, one U.S. dollar was being changed for 75,000 Afghanis in Kabul's Sara-e-Shahzada market, forcing the Taliban authorities to halt the business. AIP said the Islamic militia also banned carrying Afghani from opposition-held northern Afghanistan and from neighboring countries into Taliban-controlled areas.The report quoted an unnamed Taliban official as accusing the opposition of having been pouring in billions of fake Afghanis into Taliban-ruled areas to destabilize the currency.

4/25/2000 [tues.] , AFP, "Taliban ban use of foreign currency in local trade", 475 words, Dateline: Kabul, "Afghanistan's supreme chief of the ruling Taliban Mulla Mohammad Omar has banned the use of foreign money in local trade because of the falling value of the local currency, officials said Tuesday. Omar, in a decree carried by the official Radio Shariat, banned dealing in foreign currency, particularly the Pakistani rupee, which has almost replaced the local currency, the afghani, in major transactions. "Since the country's monetary unit is afghani and not foreign currency, it is announced to all the authorities, governors and countrymen that transactions and trade in foreign currency, especially the rupee, is totally banned as of Tuesday," the annoucement said. It also warned that violators and those who refrain from accepting the local currency would be punished. People prefer to deal in rupees and dollars in major transactions such as buying property and in wholesale purchases all over Afghanistan, where the afghani keeps shedding value. Locals said the announcement, if implemented fully, would help the afghani regain its lost value. "This is good. Last week, I bought some sugar and matches in our village. I was asked to pay rupees. It is a shame. We are Afghans but our money is Pakistani money," said resident Imamuddin. Money changers echoed the same sentiment, but said the people would be still reluctant to fully restore use of the afghani. "If you buy a house. Do you prefer to carry 10,000 dollars in your pocket or a sackful of afghani," said Ahmad Farid, a money changer in the city's Shahzada money market, which virtually plays the role of a central bank. He also said that because of afghani's fluctuations, it

would be difficult for shopkeepers to give a fixed price for commodities. Abdul Qader, another money dealer, said that Omar's decree would definitely be implemented. "They can enforce it easily like they forced people not to trim their beards," he said. Last week, the afghani lost 20 per cent of its value in a matter of days after reports that the current drought hitting southern Afghanistan had damaged opium poppy crops, which provide vital support for the local currency. It was traded against the dollar recently at 75,000 [SEE 4/19/00] afghanis. On Tuesday, one dollar could fetch only 62,000 afghanis, a 13 per cent appreciation for the local currency following increased demand. [note 75/62=1.21] Taliban Finance Minister, Aghajan Mutasem recently accused the opposition forces led by Ahmad Shah Masood of trying to devalue the local currency by printing abroad container-loads of afghani and smuggling them into the Taliban-held areas.''

[1/20/01] AFP, "Afghan currency plunges to all-time low" DATELINE: KABUL, Jan 20 `Afghanistan's currency Saturday plunged to an all-time low a day after tough UN sanctions took effect [Jan 19 2001] on the expiry of a deadline for the Taliban to surrender suspected terrorist Osama bin Laden. One US dollar fetched around 79,000 afghanis..."The sanctions have panicked the people," said Haji Amin Khosti, head of the market, which acts as the country's central bank.... Rabbani, still recognized internationally as head of the country's state, prints bulk amounts of afghani in Moscow only to convert them into hard currency at the money markets in the Taliban-held areas, Khosti said. ...."The opposition is playing a great role in the depreciation of the afghani value," head of the market said.' [EMPHASIS ADDED]

[Oct 3 2001] AP, "With no attack for three weeks, Afghan cities return to business", Amir Shah, Dateline: Kabul, The currency is getting stronger. Food prices are down. Customers are hailing Mohammed Ibrahim's taxi again. And those who live in Afghanistan's cities seem just a little happier.In the United States, the talk everywhere is of war with Afghanistan, or at least with its Taliban leadership. But on Kabul's streets, life is edging toward normal - or, at least, what "normal" is for a land that has been locked in warfare for nearly a generation."Why is everything better?" wondered Abdul Qayyum, selling vegetables Wednesday in Kabul, the Afghan capital. "For me, it's a surprise."For Afghans, though, impression can be far from reality. American strikes against Afghanistan's ruling Taliban and the man they call their "guest," suspected terrorist Osama bin Laden, seem likelier than ever, though U.S. officials say they are targeting primarily terrorist installations.Afghans streamed out of their cities after last month's terrorist attacks in the United States, pouring into the countryside to flee what many feared would be swift and punishing American retribution.Two weeks ago, Afghans fleeing southern Kandahar, the headquarters of the ruling Taliban, said the arid desert town was deserted. One businessman, Ghulam Shah, said at the time that barely 20 percent of shops were open and attack fears were high.This week, people returning to Kandahar said much of the town's business center had returned to normal.The occasional store was still closed, they said, but most had reopened. Food was plentiful, wheat prices were low and farmers were bringing fruit to the market for sale.In Jalalabad, the rickety wooden shops that line the main street have reopened. "Slowly, slowly people have been returning," said Abdul Razzak, a Jalalabad resident who travels freely across the border into Pakistan.And in Kabul, the local currency, the Afghani, has strengthened in recent days from 73,000 Afghanis[Assume Sept 30] to the U.S. dollar to 50,000. "This means a lot to us," said Mohammed Wali, a Kabul resident.That means imported goods -- cooking oil, flour, tea and sugar -- are cheaper.Abdul Shakoor, a Kabul fruit seller, said his sales have increased fivefold in recent days. "Once again, life seems to be returning to normal," he said. "There are now more people on the roads."And Ibrahim, a taxi driver and father of eight children, said his business, too, has picked up again since the week began. But one group of clients, he says, has vanished: those with enough money for long trips."All those who could afford to have left Kabul," he said. "Now nobody asks me to drive them to (Pakistan) border. I am driving inside Kabul."There are other signs that conditions in the country -- if not improving -- are not getting any worse.At one point last month, the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees said 5,000 people were camped in the open in southeastern Afghanistan trying to flee into neighboring Pakistan. Others were trying to reach Iran.Women were giving birth on the ground where they lay; children were weak from hunger. The United Nations pleaded with countries neighboring Afghanistan to open their borders. A massive international appeal for help has been launched with the Untied Nations seeking more than dlrs 500 million in aid.Now, as international aid agencies tentatively resume shipments into the country - 11 trucks of food and supplies arrived in Kabul on Wednesday morning - the people of Afghanistan's cities try to go about their routines.And those accustomed to war and uncertainty try, too, to exist through this odd limbo and ponder why, at such an unusual time, things can seem at least a bit normal."It is not that people are now no more worried about the attacks. They are afraid," said Ibrahim, the taxi driver. "But they have no choice other than to remain where they are. I don't know where to go with my family."

[10/06/01, India Today, "War Zone: Destination Kabul", Raj Chengappa, Pg.24] A day before the war broke out the exchange rate was 80,000 Afghani to a dollar and now [10/11/01] it hovers around 50,000 to a dollar.

[Oct 7, '01] The Australian, Oct 11, Thursday, "Cashing in on the 'Afs' and have-nots" - War On Terror, Source: Matp.: Ian MacKinnon * Peshawar, SECTION: LOCAL; Pg. 2 "Immediately after the first salvo on Sunday night [Oct 7'01], local time, it slid to the point where it took nearly 80,000 "Afs" to buy one dollar, but it quickly strengthened to the point where only 22,000 "Afs" were required as people were buoyed by the assumption the Americans were about to eject the Taliban. With a quick political fix now some way off, the "Af" has started to slide again to around 40,000 to the dollar.[oct 11,]"

Oct/7/01, AFP, "Afghanistan: An isolated and impoverished target". Luke Hunt, Dateline: Islamabad, "Afghanistan's currency, the afghani, is another indicator of the country's decline. Before the Soviet Union's 1979 invasion one US dollar bought 45 afghanis. In recent weeks it has fluctuated between 58,000 [est oct 7] and 79,000 [estimate 3 weeks Sept 16?]Afghani to the dollar."

11/13/01, AFP, "Opposition troops receive joyous welcome in Kabul", SAID MOHAMMAD AZAM, DATELINE: KABUL, ...local afghani currency, worth around 50,000 to the dollar. ...[Compare with when Taliban entered the city in 96 and when Massoud entered the city in 92] see footnote 456 for additional details on the $3 million+ burglary of the money market that took place with the coming of the Massoud & Co. troops

Jan 11/03, The Daily Telegraph(London), "Kabul lights bonfire of the currencies" Lucy Morgan Edwards, Pg. 19, 453 words "Previously 50,000 afghanis were worth one US dollar. With the new currency, a dollar is worth 50 afghanis."... "The official Afghan notes, known as daulati afghanis, were printed at a press in St Petersburg but multiple currencies exist because in the past Afghan warlords needing cash simply engaged printers and ran off wads of their own.... Some 18 trillion afghanis have been handed in under the programme since it began in October. At least four trillion of those are thought to have been warlord or counterfeit currency.

[my note: there is no mention of how the value came to be so low—50,000 /$ and no mention of Massoud's counterfeiting. At 50,000 afs/$, 18E12 Afghanis is only 360E6$. This is the only article in the Telgraph – for which Rashid wrote on Afghanistan -- that mentions counterfeiting.

If we assume, very conservatively, that 18E12 is the total printed from 1992-2002 and 14 trillion is official Afghan currency of which 7E12 is from 1996-2001 [see May/2/02,NYT] an additional 1/6 of this -- of 1.2E12 was printed in 2002 and the remaining 5.8E12 in 1992-1995 and that the prevailing official exchange rate for 96-2002 was the official exchange rate of 4750 afs/$ and for 92-95 it was 2400 afs/$ and the remaining 4 trillion had a value per afghani of half of the average official rate for the whole period then : [8.2E12/4750 +5.8E12/2400 = $1.73E9 +$2.42E9 = $4.14E9 official value; 14E12//4.14E9=3382 afs/$ for whole period. 4E12/[3382X2] =$.59E9" in unofficial money. Total =$4.73E9 value of money printed at official exchange rates. Of this, perhaps 10-25% could have been cashed at the official exchange rates by the insiders – close to a billion dollars. [see IMF Country Report No. 03/299, next page , for better detail]

4/23/02, AP, " Money mystery: Afghan currency plummets", Niko Price, Kabul, ""Last Thursday at least 20 billion new afghanis were brought to the market -- brand new bills," he said. "They were not authorized by the central bank, but they were printed." The Russian company contracted to print afghanis during the government of Burhanuddin Rabbani in the mid-1990s still holds the contract -- and in fact printed 7 trillion afghanis for Rabbani after he was ousted by the Taliban, according to Ahady. During that period,

Rabbani was still recognized as Afghanistan's president by the United Nations. Since Rabbani handed over power to a new interim government in December, the central bank has had the company print 900 billion Afghanis -- but Ahady says much more has been entering the market." http://staugustine.com/stories/042302/wor_664213.shtml

May/2/02, Thurs. NYT, "In Afghan War, Top Exiles Printed Themselves a Fortune", Dexter Filkins, p. A-12, 974 words, Dateline: Kabul, Apr. 29. [Note 3 day spread between dateline date and publication date] "Anwar Ahadi, an Afghan native who quit his job as a professor at Providence College in Rhode Island to become the governor general of the central bank [of Afghanistan under Karzai] ...[said]....Appleline printed seven trillion afghanis for the Northern Alliance... between 1996 and 2001." At the start of 96- and through the Taliban period, the official exchange rate was ~3500 Af/$ -- so 7E12 Afs would be ~$2E9. "In Switzerland, Appleline said in a statement that it has been supplying currency to the official governments of Afghanistan since 1992..." http://www.nytimes.com/2002/05/02/international/asia/02CURR.html Nothing is said in this article about the amount supplied between 1992 -96. Also, the people who "printed themselves rich are referred to as "exiles" but many were in the Karzai govt. at the time. Appleline is listed as a subsidiary of fidexaudit . A request for additional info was sent to info@fidexaudit.ch, and also to Prof Rubin , B. Crossette and the New Yorker – where Dexter Filkins is now working May 18/14.

Though Ahmed Rashid is the reporter for the Far Eastern Economic Review for news on Afghanistan, he has no reports in LexisNexis on the exchange rate of the Afghani. Based on a search carried out 4/30/14 in the National Library of Israel using the search: [pub(Far Eastern Economic Review) AND Afghanistan AND counterfeit], the FEER carried nothing on the Afghan currency counterfeiting story.

1/31/03, XINHUA GENERAL NEWS SERVICE, "Currency change project ends in Afghanistan" KABUL, Jan. 2 [note discrepancy between dateline date and publishing date] (Xinhua)"According to the central bank, a total of 18 trillion Afghanis in the old currency had been collected across the country since the currency change project launched in last October. The figure surpassed by nearly one third the estimated amount of old currency circulating on the market. The bank, which earlier estimated there were 13 trillion old Afghanis in circulation, said the statistical error was due to its lack of accurate money issuing records during the last decade."

Islamic State of Afghanistan: Rebuilding a Macroeconomic Framework for Reconstruction and Growth September 2003, IMF Country Report No. 03/299,[140 pdf pages]

Prepared by a staff team comprising Messrs. A. Bennett (ed.), B. de Schaetzen, R. van Rooden (all MED), L. Dicks-Mireaux (PDR), F. Fischer (MFD), and T. Kalfon (FAD), Approved by the Middle Eastern Department, Sept. 5/03 http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2003/cr03299.pdf

p 100 text box V.1 Introducing the New Currency

"Including the various counterfeits, the face value of the old Afghanis in circulation was initially estimated at about Af 16 trillion. For political reasons, it was decided that two types of unofficial notes would be eligible for conversion, but at a 50 percent discount (close to the actual discount at which these counterfeits traded in the Kabul money market). Taking this discount into account, the total value of old Afghanis to be exchanged was estimated at about Af 13 trillion. The authorities realized, however, that running out of new bank notes before all old ones would be converted would fatally undermine the public's confidence in the new currency. Because of this, and to be able to accommodate an increase in money demand at least in the first year following the new currency's introduction, the authorities ordered a total value of the new notes of Af 27.9 billion (with 1 new Afghani replacing 1,000 old ones), equivalent to almost 800 million notes or about 500 tons. The first deliveries were received in August 2002 and the last shipments arrived in January 2003. The five smallest denominations make up almost 90 percent of the total volume of notes ordered, but only 15 percent of the total value (Figure 1)....

"Af 13.9 trillion worth of old official notes were exchanged during the conversion process for new notes, plus Af 3.3 trillion in unofficial notes at a 50 percent discount. Thus, Af 15.6 billion of new notes were issued in exchange. An additional Af 2 trillion in old official notes were absorbed through the foreign exchange auctions **[WHAT ARE FOREIGN EXCHANGE AUCTIONS?]** during the conversion period. All in all, some Af 19 trillion [face value = 13.9+3.3+2 = 19.2] in old notes were collected, equivalent to some 5 billion banknotes or over 2,000 tons, almost 20 percent more than the estimated face value of banknotes based on the information received from the printing companies. This difference may reflect inaccurate or incomplete information received from the printers, "last minute" printing of counterfeits, or round-tripping of old notes during the currency conversion process.

Agence France Presse -- EnglishJune 10, 1995 09:01 Eastern Time, Kabul government accuses Uzbekistan of printing fake Afghan currency DATELINE: KABUL, June 10The Afghan central bank Saturday accused Uzbekistan of printing large amounts of Afghan currency notes and transferring the "counterfeit" to northern Uzbek warlord Abdul Rashid Dosta"For the past two months, the Uzbek government has been printing millions of packages of forged I,000 (Afghanis) notes at the request of General Dostam," said Abdul Qadeer Fitrat, the bank's deputy manager. A formal complaint has been lodged with the Uzbek government about the printing of Afghan currency, the Afghani, and the United Nations has also been informed, he said.He showed reporters a brick-size plastic wrapped wad of forged Afghanis, allegedly printed in Uzbekistan.The official said Uzbekistan authorities had printed and supplied millions of such packages to the ex-communist general, whose militia have been fighting pro-Rabbani troops in the north.Fitrat said Dostam used the "ethnic card" to pursuade Uzbekistan to print fake currency for him.The forged notes have appeared in Kabul markets too, but not in plenty, locals said, despite the government's warning of severe action against those who try to circulate the counterfeit currency.

Data below not yet entered

k There is an official exchange rate of Afg3000 for 1 US-$. However, drug operators cannot rely on the official exchange rate, which is hardly used at all for business transactions. When the Taliban seized Kabul in 1996 they began organizing their own currency. The result was two sets of Afghani, the northern and the Kabul one which had different black-market exchange rates. The Kabul Afghani turned out to be the stronger currency (EIU *Country Profile Afghanistan* 2001, p. 64).

l UNDCP informants for opium prices also collected exchange rate data. They reported that in May 1998 the average black-market exchange rates were almost identical in Kandahar and Jalalabad (Afg33,443 and Afg35,000 for US$1, respectively), but twice as weak in Faizabad (Badakshan) (Afg70,000 for US$1). Similarly, in July 1998 the black-market exchange rates were Afg41,180 in Kandahar, 40,000 in Jalalabad but Afg79,000 in Faizabad.

m By December 2000, the northern Afghani traded at around Afg 72,000 while the Kabul Afghani fell to Afg79,500 in January 2001 following the implementation of the UN sanctions. (The Kabul Afghani had traded at around $73,000 in April 2000). It recovered slightly in subsequent months to about Afg75,000 prior to September 11 2001. (EIU, *Country Reports Afghanistan*, Feb. 2001-May 2002 and EIU *Afghanistan Country Profile* 2000 and 2001)

[There are mistakes in the above reports – check carefully -- partic EIU reports] .

From

http://www.unodc.org/documents/afghanistan/Counter_Narcotics/The_Opium_Economy_in_Afghanistan_-_2003.pdf

Pdf pag 63, page 59 – notes at bottom

Notes 20 to 20.4 below, are from the end of :

APPENDIX 6 [of this sefer]

REPORTS ON THE EDUCATION OF WOMEN AND GIRLS IN KABUL IN THE FIRST HALF OF '98

20. **See in particular the references at the bottom of page 8 to UN documents [the following ref. is found as the 2nd footnote on page 3, possibly pdf p 8 in another version] of the Executive Summary of PHR 2001, Women's Health and Human Rights in Afghanistan _____,], such as: "THE IMPLEMENTATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS WITH REGARD TO WOMEN: Report of the Secretary-General on the situation of women and girls in Afghanistan," submitted in accordance with Sub-Commission resolution 1999/14, particularly paragraphs 18,19,21,22,29 and 34. According to the World Health Organization, cited in par 21, for example, despite the many difficulties of life for both men and women in war torn and drought ridden Afghanistan, the life expectancy of women was 45 years, compared with 44 for men.**
http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/0/4f3b6f16c0088a70c125694d0053823a/$FILE/G0014356.pdf

Life expectancy is reported at 46 years in paragraph 19 of "Commission on the Status of Women: The situation of women and girls in Afghanistan **(E/CN.6/2001/2/Add.1, 25 Jan. 2001)**
http://ods-ddsny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N01/229/91/PDF/N0122991.pdf?OpenElement.
[dead link as of 7/21/11] It is not mentioned that this is an increase from a life expectancy for women of 45 noted in the previous year's report -- despite the continuation of the war and the worst drought in three decades.

Paragraph 22 of this report mentions nursing schools - with female students -- opening or to be opened in Kandahar, Herat & Jallalabad & continuing education programs for women doctors & other female health care providers. It also mentions that two of the larger women's hospitals in Kabul & Kandahar were rehabilitated. Paragraph 24 states 5.3 million children under the age of 5 were vaccinated against polio -- the highest coverage, it says, since 1994.

Paragraph 26, under the heading "Education", states: "The situation of women and girls has been further aggravated by discriminatory policies that ban female students from all levels of education and that ban female teachers from working". In paragraph 27, however, we are told, that in Taliban controlled areas , which in par. 9, is stated to be 95% of the country, "NGO's such as the Swedish Committee for Afghanistan, Save the Children-USA and Care International, provide the majority of education services, in coordination with UNICEF and WFP." No info. is given in the report of the extent of any of these programs -- such as the number of girls enrolled or the number of female teachers. A good review of the over-all situation of education in Afghanistan can be found in :"Islamic and Modern Education in Afghanistan _ Conflictual or Complementary?" by Pia Karlsson & Amir Mansory, Institue of International Education, Stockholm University, 2002? 24 p.
http://www.netreed.uio.no/articles/Papers_final/Karlsson_Mansory.pdf

The most recent report is: **Report of the Secretary-General on the situation of women and girls in Afghanistan** (E/CN.6/2004/5, 19 December 2003)
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/osagi/pdf/AfghanRprt04.PDF

See also: VOA NEWS 10/20/01, slug 2-282056, last par."Ms. Karlsson says …the Swedish Committee's schools …are continuing to operate throughout Afghanistan. She says 170-thousand children, including 39-thousand girls, are still attending schools, mostly in rural areas where the Taliban exercises little or no control."
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2001/10/mil-011020-2cc93640.htm
["Exercising little or no control" is not the same as having little or no ability to control. The Taliban program of eradication of opium poppy growing showed that their control in rural areas was both extensive and impressive. Rural communities, in contrast to more Russified or westernized cities like Kabul, were probably understood by the Taliban to be very unlikely to send their children to coed or otherwise anti-Islamic schools.]

See also – for much greater detail: "An Afghan Dilemma: Education, Gender and Globalisation in an Islamic Context" Pia Karlsson & Amir Mansory, Stockholm U., Fac. of Social Sciences, Dept of Education, 2007, PhD thesis, piakarlsson@outlook.com
http://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:197642/FULLTEXT01.pdf

> **[page 10, pdf p 36 of 407] "However, during the five years of Taliban rule, the number of girl students in SCA supported schools increased every year. New girl schools were established in many parts of rural Afghanistan and in places where they had never existed before. In 1996, SCA supported schools had 13 per cent girl students and in 2001 this had increased to 30 per cent' (Swedish Committee for Afghanistan, 1997 and 2002). This fact was, however, nearly impossible to get through to donors, to media and even to Afghans in exile. Afghanistan was the country where girls were not allowed to go to school and any infor-**

mation that contradicted this 'fact' was of no interest. That SCA (and a few other NG0s) succeeded in establishing girl schools was due to a number of factors, some of which include: a curriculum that included Islam; female teachers for older girls; the good reputation of the organisation; and, long, well established contacts with rural elders and village shuras.

We found, already then, that access to education is crucial but far from enough for parents to send their daughters to schools. Today schools have opened all around the country and the number of students has increased by 500,000 to 1 million annually since 2002. However, there is a big difference between boys' and girls' enrolment rates and as recently as in 2006 girls still only constituted 33 per cent of all students and even less in rural areas (Ministry of Education, 2006)."

20.1 **Also, personal conversation with Afghanistan expert Prof. Barnett Rubin, of New York University, who stated that the Taliban had opened several centers in different parts of the country to train women to be doctors and other health care professionals. Barnett R. Rubin, Director of Studies, Center on International Cooperation, 418 Lafayette St., #543 , New York, NY 10003 , Telephone: 212-998-3680, Fax: 212-995-4706, Email: barnett.rubin@nyu.edu , Webpage**: http://www.nyu.edu/pages/cic/index2.html

[There is no 20.2]

20.3 **United Nations, Economic and Social Council, Commission on Human Rights, 54th session, march 12, 1998 , Situation of human rights in Afghanistan, Report of the Secretary General. Section on Kandahar,**

paragraph 1: "The Special Rapporteur spoke upon arrival with an international United Nations staff member who had attended the meeting of a district council in Kandahar province which was attended by the local Governor and Chief Justice. The district judge reportedly read out a letter by the Taliban supreme leader, Mullah Mohammad Omar, which stated that: (i) all villages should have a mosque; (ii) that people should pray five times a day; and (iii) that all families should send both their male and female children to school up to the age of 12. Girls were to be sent to school in order to learn how to read and write. It was reported that the judge had subsequently asked the United Nations when the girls' schools would be opened"
http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/TestFrame/0a09f1f5ab09ab0cc12566170045f6aa?Opendocument

20.4 **Fifty-fourth session,** Agenda item 116 (c), **Situation of human rights in Afghanistan**, **Note by the Secretary-General,** A/54/422, 30 Sept 1999.
http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/TestFrame/a43d9492a397fb058025681c00571eb5?Opendocument

The following numbered paragraphs are copied directly from this report:

51. The Special Rapporteur on violence against women visited Afghanistan in September 1999. She will be presenting a separate detailed report in due course. She was informed that only primary education was available to girls aged 5 to 10 and was dispensed under the aegis of the Taliban Ministry of Religious Affairs. She was informed that there was no plan yet for further education. She visited a girls' primary school housed in a mosque in Kabul. Representatives of the Taliban authorities indicated that female attendance in educational institutions was conditional on segregation.

52. School attendance of girls in central and southern parts of Afghanistan, in particular in rural areas, has always been low. The Taliban authorities have allowed support of home-based schools for girls. Schooling for both boys and girls has been affected considerably by the destruction of the educational infrastructure as a result of the protracted armed conflict.

53. **With regard to employment, Afghan women are currently allowed to work in the medical sector, as doctors and nurses. A restricted number of Afghan women are allowed to be employed in agencies headed by women. Afghan women employed by international agencies are not allowed to come to their offices but go directly from their homes to the project sites on which they work. Growing destitution is evident among a growing proportion of urban families, with a consequent increase in public begging. The Taliban authorities issued an edict in 1999 allowing needy widows with no other means of support to seek employment.**

54. With regard to health, the Special Rapporteur on violence against women was informed that a number of hospitals in Kabul admitted women. She visited the Rabia Balkhi women's hospital in Kabul which provides the full range of health services to women. There is only one maternity hospital in the whole country.

20.5 [More on women's education.] The Washington Post. 7/20/00, "Tongue-Lashing the Taliban; Grandmotherly U.N. Official Berates Afghans on Their Treatment of Women", Pamela Constable, Pg. A22, DATELINE: HERAT, Sept. 19 "…[A] petite, 73-year-old Japanese grandmother …Sadako Ogata, the U.N. high commissioner for refugees, …the most senior U.N. official to visit Afghanistan since the Taliban seized control of almost all of the country in 1996, was on an official two-day visit to support the return of Afghan refugees from Iran and Pakistan.

"Our talks were extremely frank," Ogata said. "I said the issue of women's rights is very high on the international agenda. . . . They talked about Afghan traditions. I said, 'Okay, you have tradition, but this is the 21st century. Come up with concrete results.' "

Anxious to assuage their guest's concerns, Taliban officials said their efforts to educate women had been held back by Afghan customs, according to which villagers often refuse to let their children attend school…

"Before, women were used in revenge for tribal killings; now that is totally forbidden," Khairullah Khairkhwa, the governor of Herat province, said as he sat next to Ogata. "Before, widows had no right to choose a new partner; now they are fully free." He invited Ogata to visit a girls' school and asserted that women are now employed in health and education services and with the police.

On Monday, Ogata briefly toured a women's nursing college of 120 students, which was reopened in 1998 after having been closed by the Taliban when they seized power. The students said they were grateful to be there and that many of their friends wished they, too, could study. They said their dream was to become doctors but that it was "not possible at this time."

The next stop was a private home in which a young woman was conducting an English class for about 20 young girls and boys. The Taliban allow home schooling but ban public school education for girls. The teacher said she was not hindered by the government but that she received no public financial support and that very few families could afford the nominal tuition of less than $ 1 a month.

"It means that most poor students cannot come," said the teacher, Nafisa Nashmendi, 27.

Ogata's chief concern, however, was the impact of the Taliban's policies toward women on the repatriation of refugees, especially those who have been living in Iran, where women have far greater rights and are not required to wear a full face veil. Last year, Iran began forcibly deporting thousands of Afghan refugees.

Ogata toured the main border checkpoint 100 miles northwest of Herat, where hundreds of returning refugee families were loading their belongings onto trucks after crossing from Iran. Many of the arriving women wore black chador veils, in the Shiite Muslim style, that did not cover their faces.

Taliban officials who work with returning refugees said the families are given written passes so that police will not harass them because of their appearance. Just as many women crossing from Iran this week were not veiled, many men wore jeans and had no beards. The Taliban require men to wear long beards and traditional Afghan baggy trousers and shirts.

Moreover, most refugees from Iran are returning to the Herat area, where many people are Shiite Muslims and the Taliban do not enforce Islamic dress code as strictly as in other regions. Gov. Khairkhwa is also regarded as a progressive member of the Taliban leadership who values modern education and who may have relatively liberal views about women.

According to U.N. aides who attended the meetings with Ogata, she devoted 90 percent of her agenda to the issue of women's rights and that the governor replied repeatedly that he was committed to providing more opportunities for girls to attend school and women to work.

DATE YY/MM/DD	LOCATION PROVINCE POPUL'T'N [K] C	TOWN/ DISTRICT	NUMBER TALIB. FORCE[K]	KILLED D A	T	O	C	SOURCE CODE A TABLE NOTE SEE ALSO B		
94/10/12	KANDAHAR	SPIN BOLDAK		8	1	7		D-45	E	
94/11/2-4	KANDAHAR	KAND. /CONVOY		48	8	12-40		M-66	F	
94/11/5	KANDAHAR	KANDAHAR		50				M-68-9	G	
94/11/	KANDAHAR 990	KANDAHAR		60	9			D-48-9	H	
94/11/20	KABUL			[20K+]				ICRC	I	
95/1/	ZABUL 258	WHOLE PROV.		0	NC	NC		D-50-1		
95/1/	URUZGAN 688	WHOLE PROV.		0	NC	NC		D-50-1	J	

DATE YY/MM/DD	LOCATION PROVINCE POPUL'T'N [K]	TOWN/ DISTRICT	NUMBER TALIB. FORCE[K]	KILLED A	T	O	C	SOURCE CODE TABLE NOTE SEE ALSO		
94/11/?	HELMAND	LASHKARGAH		0	NC	NC		M-69	K	
94/12-5/1	HELMAND 782	WHOLE PROV.		75	NS			D-51-	L	
95/1/18-2/2	GHAZNI 1040	WHOLE PROV.	0.6	150		150		M, UPI,	M	
95/1/22	KABUL	KABUL		22			22	UPI	N	
95/1/END	WARDAK	SAYDABAD+		80		80		D-53	O	
95/2/5-10	WARDAK 506	MAIDANSHAHR		360				D-53, UPI	P	
95/2/13+	LOGAR 332	LOGARVALLEY+		0				D-53	Q	
95/2/13+	KABUL	CHARASIAB	10	0				D-53	R	
95/2/15	KHOST 487	WHOLE PROV.		0				UPI	S	
95/2/19	PAKTIKA 369	WHOLE PROV.		0				UPI	T	
95/2/19	PAKTIA 468	GARDEZ		0				UPI		
95/3/6-8	KABUL	KABUL		125		125		D-57	U	
95/3/08	KABUL	KABUL		20	20			D-57	V	
95/3/11	KABUL	KABUL		15				D-58	W	
95/3/11	KABUL	KABUL		100				D-58		
95/3/11	GHAZNI			15	6	9			X	281, 295
95/3/18	KABUL	CHARASIAB		100				D-58	Y	
95/3/mid	NIMROZ 138	WHOLE PROV.		0				D-59	Z	
95/3/mid	FARAH 429	WHOLE PROV.		0				D-59	Z	

[A] Letter is for author of work; # is p. Authors: alphabetical order:D= Anthony Davis, How The T Became A Military Force, in Fundamentalism Reborn? Af and the T, William Maley, ed.,'98, Hurst and Co, Lond; M=Kamal Matinuddin, The T Phenomenon, Af 1994-1997 ...afterword covering major events since 1997, 1999, Oxford U. Pr.

[B] A # without a letter: footnote in this book. A letter: Table Note in the Timeline. A 'P' after a 1-3 digit # indicates a page # in this book.

[C] "Settled population by civil division (urban and rural) and gender in 2005-06, figures in thousands" The total for the country given in this source is 22,098k & Kabul is 3,072k. The pop. for K is probably a million higher than in '01 under T.[A door to door census carried out by Central Statistics Office of T in 99-'00 showed 1.78E6. See footnote 64] The other prov's are understated because they lack the nomadic pop. Pop's of Badakshan, Takhar & Samangan in '00 of 0.923, 0.845 & 0.595 E6—accdng to Landscan—with tot in-country pop. 25.810 E6 [see footnote B & C, p14]; and 805.5, 827.5 & 327.7 respectively & total pop 22.098 according to 2005-6 est. "A survey conducted by the T in 1999/2000 arrived at a population figure of 23 million." [See footnote 186-C]

[D] ABBREVIATIONS: A: All; Number in ALL column is the higher of two numbers if there are two & is increased by 20% if original source said "more than" or "over". It is also assumed that if data comes from M & casualties are only given for T, that this is actually the sum of the casualties on both sides. If casualties are NS= Not Stated for both side, it is assumed to be close to zero. Af.: Afghanistan; BR: B. Rabbani; C or c :Civilian; cas: casualties; e: Estimated/ASA; G or g: Government of M et al; H:Hekmatyar; K:Thous. or Kabul – context dependent; M: Massoud; NC:No Casualties; NS:Not Stated in source; O: Opponents of T; T:Taliban

[E] M-61 gives the following details :Location given: Toba Achakzai, 15 km N of Spin Boldak, [Probably Toba plateau or Toba hills area of Achakzai tribe. The tribe's territory straddles Af/Pak border.] Arms cashe had "3,000 tons of arms and ammunition..." His source, in his note 77, p279, is "Interview Mullah Shahabuddin, Consul General of [T] Af in Peshawar."M-61 says 4-5 T killed and gives date as 5/94. However, Zaeef p 65 [see footnote 137-E] says "The founding meeting of what became known as 'the *Taliban*' was held in the late autumn of 1994" & Spin Boldak event was later, May date must be error.

[F] 25 miles E of Kandahar City– but W of Kandahar Airport – this was the rescue, by "Around 200 students who had been studying in the *deeni madadaris* [Madrassas in Urdu of Baluchistan]" of 30 truck convoy from Pak. to Central Asia – organized by Pak. Gov. & incl some senior Pak. officials, numbers on loss of life are from the Frontier Post 4&6 Nov., respectively.

[G] "2000 T from...madaris in & around city" fought for 3 days – Naqib, Rabbani's military commander, defected to T with 20k troops, 120 tanks, aircraft, etc. "The fact that Kandahar was close to the Pakistani border and had a reasonably good...road from Queta helped in getting reinforcments from...Af students studying in religious schools in Baluchistan."p69

[H] Early Nov. 2.5-3k T took city/cost 1.5 E6$, in bribes, got tanks planes etc. If source says "more than" x or "over" x – add 20% -- so here 60=50+20%. Also assume the expression 'some' in the context of loss of several armored vehicles Mar. 8/95 = 20, "scores" = 60; 'hundreds' = 400, 'several hundred' =500; 'heavy' = 600 [which fits story where heavy is assoc. with 150+ killed at 95/1/18-2/2 see footnote] However, at 2/10/95 "heavy fighting" is associated with 300 killed –[see footnote]; 95/4/mid "...probably the heaviest fighting in Afghan civil war since the spring 1989 battle for Jalalabad" is associated with "hundreds of cas on both sides"[see footnote , p 269]; 8/24/96 "Both g troops and the T claimed causing heavy losses to their foes."—but the highest figure for actual number killed on all sides – incl. c's-- is 22 [see footnote p 269] – or contextual—see comments at each usage. "Dozens" = 36

[I] A. The Observer,"...War The West Forgot", David Orr, P. 22, 2267 wds, Dateline: K, "...schools in the Afghan capital have been closed for more than two years... The graveyards of K are full of tattered green flags. More than 20,000 people are estimated to have died in the fighting that has raged between rival Islamic groups for 2 1/2 years. This year alone, 8,000 Kabulis have been killed.... The Red Cross estimates more people are dying here than in any other war in the world, yet the country's plight has been all but forgotten -- particularly by the United Nations, which pulled out in January.... Both g and opposition sides fire unguided missiles into residential neighborhoods, but it is H's forces whose rocket launchers are trained on the most populous central districts and which account for the greatest number of civilian casualties... The Red Cross estimates that up to half K's population - now shrunk to less than a million from two million during the Soviet occupation - have been forced from their homes by the fighting, many into derelict schools, mosques and apartment buildings. But K is a besieged city. The approach roads are controlled by Hekmatyar and his allies who, since spring, have enforced a food blockade, allowing in only a trickle of highly taxed goods....There is no electricity in K and fuel, even firewood, is tremendously expensive.'Spiralling inflation and price rises caused by the opposition blockade have forced people to sell most of their possessions,' says Steve Masty of CARE, ...working in the capital. 'In the months to come, when it gets really cold...Some say 100,000 will flee the city. I think the number will be much higher, maybe as many as half a million.' " B. 11/26/94, AFP, Rocket attack on K kills one person, Dateline: Islamabad, "...H and Dostam ...fighting since January in a bid to to oust Afghan President BR. More than 1,000 people have been killed...in battles for control of K during the last two months alone, according to...[ICRC]." C. 7/17/94, The Observer, 'Death Grip Of The Nine Warlords', Arthur Kent, p. 14, 2.4k wds,"In K, 5,000 people have been killed since January and 20,000 in the past two years, with many more casualties in other parts of the country." [5k may refer to jan-june data- ASA] D. Note that [C] says 20k in past 2 yrs while [A] says more than 20k in 2 1/2 years. Story at 4/95 also says more than 20k—see footnote 226.

[J] "joined the T with scarcely a shot fired" – incl. now separate Daykundi – then, part of Uruzgan 391.0 Daykundi +297.2 Uruzgan=688.2

[K] City has ~1/3 pop. of prov. "taken without any fighting" – together with Zabul & Uruzgan

[L] 1. 1/24 AFP noted as taken by T—no mention of fighting. First mention of fighting in Helm.. AFP 3/9; D "the fighting was bitter with cas "running into the hundreds" = 300 [less than simple 'hundreds', see above.] & 'cas' includes wounded [DOD/NATO usage "declared dead, wounded, injured, diseased, detained, captured or missing" _____& ratio of killed to wounded in these situations is 1:3 2. [based on rocket attack on K by M: "At least 76 people were killed ... 225 wounded by three rockets fired ...by anti-T forces into crowded residential areas of...K. At least 10 c's were killed yesterday and 10 wounded when a rocket hit the suburb ...northern Kabul, ...the deadliest strikes on Kabul in two years, which killed 66...and wounded 215...But the opposition alliance denied responsibility. One rocket...killing 11...and wounding 30. (76+10+66+11) /(225+10+215+30)=.3395. This is more reliable than ratio for landmines since with the latter, victims are often alone while in the city with a rocket attack or in a military situation, there'll usually be people to help..] 3. See footnote 227-B for k:w in fighting between Shiite groups in K 1,200 or more Shiites have been wounded and an estimated 350 to 400 killed." 9/24/94, AFP, Truce halts bloodshed in southwest K, 467 wds, Terence White "Iranian ambassador Ghulam Reza Hadoddi was said to be carrying a message from Tehran for Wahdat leader Abdul Ali Mazari, who started a simultaneous fight with Harakat and a rival Wahdat leader 11 days ago.

[M] M-70-71 On 1/19 the M governor of the prov. defected to T & "Ghazni fell to the T without much fighting." However, H counterattacked & as a result of bombing by M in support of the T "H is reported to have lost hundreds of his fighters outside the city" UPI 1/18/95, Afghan relief convoy released, Anwar Iqbal, Islamabad, "[~ 600 T]...entered the province of Ghazni to help Gov. Qari Baba. Ghazni [6th prov. to come under T influence]...", AFP 2/2/95, Pro-Rabbani forces claim battlefield success south of K, Terence White, K, 2/2, ...BR forces] have inflicted heavy losses on...Hezb-i-... in heavy fighting south of here...claimed...Defence Ministry spokesman Abdullah... [&]...more than 150 Hezb-i-... fighters were killed ...near Ghazni, the capital of the prov..."

[N] Anwar Iqbal, Official Radio K reported 22 deaths in K ...killed by rockets fired by H's forces.

[O] Only "hezbi's" killed, No T casualties mentioned

[P] UPI 2/10/95, Afghan students defeat opposition forces, Anwar Iqbal, Dateline: Islamabad, 2/10 "Both rebel and Afghan g sources said Wardak's provincial capital, Maidan Shahar, fell to T on Friday afternoon after heavy fighting. More than 300 people have died in the battle for Maidan Shahar, which began five days ago. The T entered Wardak earlier this month and demanded that H's forces leave .... Their refusal led to a war between H's forces and about 6k T, ...H personally commanded his troops ...and initially succeeded in dispersing the T earlier this week. However, the T re-grouped and launched a fresh attack that led to the city's fall."

[Q] T drove out their Hezbi opponents, no casualties noted .

[R] H runs – leaves weapons – no fight

[S] D – no mention in book; M-79 says T took control without fighting – but gives no date. UPI 2/15/95, 'Army of students enters K', Anwar Iqbal, Datel: Islamab, 2/15, "The militants also captured the province of Khost -- their eighth in fewer than six months, according to reports from the bordering Pakistani district of Waziristan... Reports said a group of 400 T from Waziristan entered Khost...and...captured at least four major military bases of H. [Other Mujad Commndrs also fled]... as a large number of local tribesmen and soldiers started joining the small T force."

[T] D & M. don't mention; UPI, 2/19/95, Afghan student army captures provinces, Anwar Iqbal, 663 words, Datel: Islamabad, 2/19, "...T said it captured two provinces. The T now control 10[which 10?] of the country's 30 provinces... T and mujahideen sources in Peshawar, Pakistan, said Gardez, the capital of Paktia province fell to the T Sunday afternoon, several hours after the militia captured the neighboring province of Paktika. ...Commanders loyal to mujahideen leader Jalaluddin Haqqani, ran Paktia while a pro-g alliance ruled Paktika before the T took the provinces. However, sources in H's Hezb-i-...said Paktia was not yet fully under T control and that the militia was facing stiff resistance in some areas...T first appeared on the scene in September with a pledge to fight the mujahideen, who they held responsible for the destruction of Af. "

[U] M attacking Wahdat after Ramadan "several hundred casualties". Assume 500 o/w 1/4th killed

[V] Several armored vehicles & some men. T attacked by M and part of Wahdat

[W] "scores of casualties " incl. civ. victims of rocket attacks on city center. Assume 60 of which 15 killed. Rocket attack was retaliation by T & part of Wahdat for M's attack with tanks, helicopters, planes. # casualties not stated. Assume 100 killed – as this was a major push-back

[X] Sheikh Mazari, killed on his way in T controlled helic. from K to Kandahar. see CH. 10 DID THE TALIBAN THROW SHEIKH ABDUL ALI MAZARI OUT OF A HELICOPTER?

[Y] Casualties not stated – T pushed back to Maidanshahr. As this was a major pb , ASA estim. ~400 – like other major pb's

[Z] No casualties or fighting mentioned on the way to Herat.

DATE	LOCATION			NUMBER					SOURCE CODE	TABLE NOTE	
	PROVINCE		TOWN/	TALIB.	KILLED					SEE ALSO	
YY/MM/DD	POPUL'T'N [K]		DISTRICT	FORCE[K]	A	T	O	C			
95/4/mid	HERAT		SHINDAD	≤6k	200	100	100		D-59	A	
95/4/28-9	FARAH		WHOLE PROV.		200	200	NS		D-60	B	
95/8/23-6	HELMAND		~WHOLE PROV.		100				D-61	C	
95/8/late	HELMAND		GIRISHK		60	NS	60		D-61	D	
95/9/3-6	HELMAND		WHOLE PROV.		0	NS	NS	NS			
"	NIMROZ		WHOLE PROV.		0	NS	NS	NS			
"	FARAH		WHOLE PROV.		0	NS	NS	NS			
"	HERAT	1545	WHOLE PROV.		50	NS	50		D-61-2	E	
95/9/7	KABUL		KABUL		1			1	UPI	F	197
95/10/mid	KABUL		CHARASIAB		0	NS			D-63	G	
FIRST 12 MONTHS	TOTAL				1839						
95/10/25	KABUL		CHARASIAB		0	-90-	NS		D-63	H	
95/11/10-11	KABUL		KABUL		40			40	D-64	I	
95/11/27	KABUL		KABUL		37			37	REUTER	J	
95/11/28+	KABUL		KABUL+		500	500	NS		D-64	K	
96/1/1-31	KABUL		KABUL		44			44	D-64	L	
96/5/10	KABUL		KABUL+	7-8k	30	30	NS		D-65	M	
96/6/26	KABUL		KABUL		64			64	D-65	N	
96/8/22	PAKTIA		ALI KHEL		0	NS	NS		" AFP	O	
96/8/23	PAKTIA		SPENA SHIGA	1k	0	NS	NS		AFP	P	

DATE	LOCATION			NUMBER					SOURCE CODE	TABLE NOTE	
	PROVINCE		TOWN/	TALIB.	KILLED					SEE ALSO	
YY/MM/DD	POPUL'T'N [K]		DISTRICT	FORCE[K]	A	T	O	C			
96/8/24	PAKTIA		PAKSTN B'RD'R		22	5-6	5-6	0-10	AP UPI	O	
96/9/7	LOGAR		LOGARVALLEY+		20	20	NS		AP	R	
96/9/1-12	NANGARHAR	1262	JALALABAD	8-10k	70			4	D-66,AP	S	
96/9/13	LAGHMAN	378	WHOLE PROV.		0	NS	NS	NS	D-66		
96/9/13	KUNAR	508	WHOLE PROV.		0	NS	NS	NS	D-66	T	
96/9/24	KABUL		SAROBI	8-10k	20	NS	20		D-67	U	
96/9/24	KABUL		LATABAND PASS		40			40	D-67	V	
96/9/26-7	KABUL	2,000e	KABUL		304	150	150	4	D-68-9, AFP,+	W	298+
96/10/04	KABUL		KABUL		0				NYT	X	
96/10/07	PANJSHIR		GULBAHAR		9	9	NS	NS	NYT	Y	
96/10/09			SALANG		120		NS	NS	UPI	Z	
96/10/10			SALANG		200	THE TIMES, AFP, REUT.;AP,WP				AA	
96/10/11	KABUL		12 M N. of K		10				AP	BB	

[A] Air base. "hundreds of cas on both sides " "unchallenged g airpower played a decisive role" "...probably the heaviest fighting in Afghan civil war since the spring 1989 battle for Jalalabad" [mujahidin had "perhaps as many as 3,000 cas" during this battle. P. 7, "Phased Withdrawal, Conflict Resolution and State Reconstruction"Dr A. Marshall, Def. Acad. of the U K 6/06 e:400 cas/side, 1/4 killed.

[B] From a rept from M side – says nothing about M casualties. Gives only # T killed – not casualties. Did they count dead bodies not carried away or given a timely burial by their comrades?

[C] This was big push-back – D. doesn't state casualties– so est. 100 T killed –like other big p-b's.

[D] Commander Nasir Ahmed of Shindad was killed along with scores of troops – after blundering into large scale & well prepared T ambush. Nothing about T casualties reported in this incident.

[E] Pickup truck mounted T rout Ismail Kahn with pickup truck mounted/towable [check this out] ZU-2 anti-aircraft cannons & BM-21 multibarrelled rocket launchers. Only fatalities mentioned is a group that arrived in darkness in Herat & didn't know they weresupposed to flee – & killed by T .—assume 50 " only real military action in the city itself" No mention of T or other cas – all info from M's personal secr, Dr. Abdullah. It's reasonable that cas for major p-b's by either side sh'ld be comparable – not 0 for winning side & very low – as in this case - for losing side. Adjustments should be made in total, based on this .

[F] ~5k supporters of Pres. Rabbani attacked Pakistan Embassy & set it on fire.

[G] Taliban retake CHARASIAB

[H] "...near suicidal assault..." T killed in mine field – & lost 2 tanks & some trucks – but advance toward Kabul – made gains but beaten back by M. [included in 500 at 11/28+ don't add this in.]

[I] Above "clashes triggered vicious rocketing of K" by T.[D's interv. with g. commndrs 10&11/'95]

[J] A. This story was found while looking for corrob of the claimed 500 killed at D-64, next line. Such corrob not yet found – but meanwhile a more careful search of LN with words killed or casualties should be run – at least in this time frame. B. The Australian, 11/27/95, K Rocked As T Air Raid Kills 37, Marc Lavine, 519 words, "...T jets dropped nine bombs in largely residential areas in or near the centre of the besieged city around 10am. Independent confirmation of responsibility for the raid was not immediately available but the T ...has admitted it carried out some previous air attacks on the city. The jets dumped a 1000kg bomb on a central suburb, killing 12 people instantly and obliterating a string of houses, witnesses said. Another 500kg charge, smaller cluster bombs and 250kg explosives fell on other areas, leaving more devastation, witnesses said....A single 500kg parachute bomb landed on five homes in the central [Qala Fatah Ulla Khan] residential zone, claiming at least seven lives ""Two cluster bombs hit the Afghan supreme court building and the road outside killing a further seven people, ...witnesses said."I was waiting for my bus when the bombs started to fall," office worker Mahmoud, 35, said outside the shattered courtroom." Five other explosives were dropped on other areas of Kabul, but four hit a mountainside causing no casualties. The fifth killed a girl in the east of the city." C. The Independent (Lond.)11/27/95, 37 die as rebel jets bomb besieged Kabul, Peter Greste, Reuters, P 13, 328 words "...heaviest air raid on the besieged Afghan capital in more than a year. [NOTE: this means that any heavier air raids were the work of non T forces] At least nine bombs were dropped by SU-22 planes [This is a supersonic, variable swept wing fighter bomber with a one person crew] , At least 12 people died when one bomb destroyed three homes and severely damaged four others in the western suburb of Wazirabad. Neighbours said the device was a 1,100lb parachute bomb that exploded in the air. A similar bomb killed seven people when it destroyed a three-storey mud-brick building in the central district of Qalai Fatullah. ... Two smaller parachute bombs exploded above the Supreme Court compound in Qalae Zaman Khan, east of the city, killing seven people. The air raid followed two nights of heavy fighting between the T and g forces. D. From the descr., targ was g bldgs like supreme ct – not mt. sides or civilians -- unpredicatble winds & high flying to avoid anti-aircraft guns led 7 bombs to miss targets that were aimed at . There is no mention in these stories of M's use of planes to attack T.

[K] Total for autumn offensives around Kabul – includes 90 killed by mines.

[L] 167 wounded ; "287 rockets were fired into K[by T] ... "Precisely the random terror attacks employed by H between 1992 and 1995—long gone was the T's moral ascendancy when their leaders vowed they would never rocket c populations" See footnote 226 in which ICRC says 20k killed in K "mostly c's" in 2 yrs & NYT says 2500 killed in 6 month period in intra-mujahid fighting. If T kept up rate for same 24 month period they'd have killed ~1.1k. The mujahidin were killing ~840 /month —for 24 months – according to ICRC.

[M] "T casualties were claimed to be heavy " as result of a M offensive but situation did not change much – e.g. T's control of Charasiab. Should be less than "heaviest fighting of the war – at Shindand air base previous yr – which resulted in a major p-back. Also , it says "claimed to be" which means probably less than you'd think from the word "heavy" like reports at 8/24/96 where both sides claimed "heavy losses for their fores but total was 22, max. – assume 120 T cas.

[N] 138 wounded; 300 T rockets fired re inauguration of H in Kabul –cite AP same day. A. KABUL, 6/ 27 (AFP) - The death toll following the most murderous rocket and shell attack on the besieged Afghan capital in more than a year has risen to at least 64, hospital staff and witnesses said Thur... More than 138 civilians were wounded when at least 80 shells struck the battered city [D says 300 shells] in a series of heavy barrages which continued for most of the day on Wednesday, they said. "There were far more rockets coming in on Wed... than in recent months and more innocent people died or were injured than over the last three months combined," a hospital surgeon said. B. AP 6/30/96; K. Gannon, Dateline: K, During 1994 and 1995 the peak of the battle between H and the g 25k people died in K, most of them c's and many of those children, humanitarian workers estimate. In Macroyan alone, hundreds of people were killed."

[O] Take base at Ali Khel from H – on rd from Pak. to Saroobi & then K. "captured late... [8/21]after day-long fighting." T also said they "had seized two tanks and a sizeable quantity of arms during their "successful" attack on Ali Khel." "A Hezb-i... official here confirmed clashes had occurred between the two sides over the past three weeks in Paktia, but denied the T claim. No "serious fighting" had taken place in the area, the Isl...d-based Hezb official, Ghairat Baheer, told AFP. "T are making tall claims to boost sagging morale in their camp," he added."

[P] AFP Islambad, Heavy fighting was raging in Spena Shiga which is located close to the headquarters of H's Hezb-i... party, a T spokesm, Maulvi Ahmed Jan, quoted by the Afghan Islamic Press (AIP) ...said. The T militia captured a big ammunition depot of...Prime Minister ...H's party Friday and launched a major offensive in eastern Paktia prov., Afghan sources said. He said the attack on H's base came after the T over run his party's post in Jaji area and sezied a huge quatity of arms and ammunition. The T spokesm...said at least 400 trucks would be required to load the weapons seized from the Hezb depot."

[Q] AP 8/24/96 [T]..."captured a key Afghan g outpost near the Pakistani border in two days of fighting that killed 10 Pakistani villagers. Spinashagar was a critical supply post for the eastern city of Jalalabad and was packed with weapons and ammunitions, according to an Afghan g official in K... Afghan g jets bombed T positions in Paktia province. There were no reports of casualties." UPI 8/24/96, Pakistanis die in Afghan fighting, Anwar Iqbal "reports from Af gave no definite figure. Both g troops and the T claimed causing heavy losses to their foes." AFP, 8/2496 24:12 GMT, Afghan T overrun important Hezb-i... base in eastern Paktia " Five men from both sides were killed and more than a dozen injured in Friday's fighting in Paktia, an independent mujahedeen information service, the Afghan Islamic Press (AIP), said. Other sources put the toll at 12 dead, adding that mortar shells and rockets also landed on the Pakistan border in Parachinar during the fighting, but caused no casualties." NOTE: HEAVY in this case means a total of 10-12 killed on both sides combined AFP 8/25/96 25:12 GMT ."Spena Shiga fell without much resistance," ...a spokesman for the [PM]... said...because...only defended by ..."local mujahedeen" belonging to H's Hezb-i, not the premier's main fighting force.'

[R] 9/7/96 'G Forces Overrun Strategic Post in Pre-Dawn Assault', Zaheeruddin Abdullah Datel: I, G troops launched a blistering pre-dawn assault Sat..., capturing 15 posts belonging to T rebels[incl]..., a strategic mountain outpost overlooking the T stronghold of Maidan Shahr... eastern Logar prov.... M spokesm Amrullah. .. said 20 rebels were killed in the onslaught and more than 30 injured...no reports of g cas.

[S] D cites AP 9/12/95 K Gannon, Peshawar, P. ~ 70 killed in battle for J., incl. 4 c's T said. "When we arrived in J... g soldiers were demoralized and barely put up a fight," T said. About 2,500 T troops are in J... and there were reports that another 500 Islamic students in P. slipped across the border to join [T]...

[T] Incl Nuristan, 125.7k & Kunar 381.9 which were split from Kunar in '03, see footnote D, p 14.

[U] "scores of fleeing g troops cut down" assume scores is 80 and "cut down" is casualties

[V] "The g suffered more heavy casualties in an unsuccessful bid to hold the pass" assume 'more heavy' is connected w prev. 60 killed – so similar # is implied here, assume 160 cas. & 40 killed.

[W] 9/26/96, AFP,Terence White,1437 w, Datel: K, 9/25 "...aid workers reporting hundreds of casualties in fighting in the city's eastern suburbs. Af g radio claimed that K forces had repulsed the attacks. About 150 T soldiers were killed in the fighting, the radio said in a broadcast monitored in Islamabad. It mentioned no g losses.; 9/28/96, [Sat.]The Age (Melbourne), 'Taliban army seizes control of Kabul', Mark Baker, P. 11, 474 words, Islamabad, Friday. The International Committee of the Red Cross, still staffing hospitals in Kabul, said several hundred troops from both sides had been killed. [At footnote it was determined that "several"would mean 5 so several hundred = 500. But story also says: "Hundreds more casualties were crowding into city hospitals after an extraordinary campaign in which the T swept into the capital ..." if ratio not- killed:killed cas is 3:1[note] then it should say 1000+ – but maybe many cas were treated at scene by T medics. Assume 300 killed, same on each side; 4 hanged:Najib+3

D concludes: "To suggest that semiliterate T commanders whose military experience had never extended beyond the hit and run attacks of guerilla warfare could have risen to this level of planning and execution defies belief" ASA-response :but the sr T leadership had fought together for decade during USSR/Russian occup & younger T fought together since '94. They also suffered major setbacks –eg: pushed out of K, pb from Herat & later, massacred in Mazar. They're not semiliterate – they're very literate but not in D's texts – they learn quckly, work together without normal army organization & don't worry about food – among people who support them.

[X] "Walled In, Shrouded and Angry in Afghanistan, John F. Burns , P. A-3; 1251 wds, K, Oct. 3, " To describe this as a "reign of terror," as ...Amnesty International did in a report earlier this week, may be an exaggeration. Although the secretive T make it impossible to be sure, there is no evidence yet that they have killed or even seriously wounded anybody in K since Friday[a week before]. On that day they ...seized[& executed]...Najibullah, and his brother..." ALSO SEE APPENDIX 18

[Y] "Afghan Driven From K Makes Stand in North", John F. Burns,P A-8; 892 Wds, Gulbahar,10/08/96 "But here in the Panjshir they have already taken relatively heavy casualties. Hospitals in [nearby]... Charikar and in K have reported receiving dozens of wounded T and many others appear to have been killed."

[Z] "T suffers heavy losses on Salang",239wds, K, "...T...suffered heavy cas Wed. in fighting with forces [of]...Dostum on the Salang hwy ...witnesses said....T sent 12 tanks and armored vehicles as reinf. to the troubled area in which fighting broke out Tues. One witness said ["I counted over 30 jeeps carrying" AFP]about 150 bodies of dead and wounded T ["arriving in" AFP] Jabul Seraj...north of K. [Assume 50 k]

[AA] A. The Australian. 10/10,Thur."Loyal forces halt Taliban advance" P 9, 539 words, KABUL: Forces loyal to...M, have cut off a large force...T...in...Salang Pass and inflicted heavy casualties, Western aid workers said yesterday...M's counter-attack had forced the T to suspend its attempt to advance into...Panjshir V...from the village of Golbahar... "There are no T left in Golb..." one aid worker said. A colleague in ...Jabal os-Siraj, where the road to Golb. forks from the main highway up to the Salang Pass, had counted 39 dead T... being brought down the highway during a single hour late on Tuesday. He said the T had lost at least 100 dead and suffered many more wounded as ...M's men shelled concentrations of T...and reinforcements heading for the Salang Pass...[ASA assume 120 killed, add 70 to # at 10/09. done] B. AP Taliban Fighters Reinforce Besieged Frontline Positions Anwar Faruqi,588 words, Dateline: K, Hundreds of T..., in tanks and on trucks, rushed toward the frontline north of K Thursday in an effort to halt a major counterattack by soldiers loyal to the deposed g. After a ferocious overnight battle that lasted into Thurs. morning, the T ...regained territory lost earlier to former g troops, said foreign reporters and witnesses. The T fought back against former g troops who had pushed them out of the mouth of the Panjshir Valley and for a time had them pinned down near Charikar, 70 kilometers (40 miles) north of the Afghan capital, said witnesses and aid groups operating in the area. There were no immediate reports of casualties, but a group aligned to the deposed government said that at least 200 T were killed in the recent fighting, a claim that could not be independently confirmed. [ASA add 80 to at A, above – incl. g killed done] C. The Herald (Glasgow)10/10/96, New rulers' bid to control all A resisted by ex-army chief in fierce fighting;T beaten back at pass, Michael Battye; P. 14, 468 w, K, Wed, "There are no T left in Golbahar. They've all been switched to the Salang," one aid worker was told by witnesses today.They said the T had suffered some 270 casualties, many of them from landmines, since they began their attempt to break into the Panjsher on Sat[oct 6] . D AFP oct 11, 1276 w., Terence White &Marc Lavine "...an observer said."They are used to being welcomed in rural areas and had not dug in ...in their newly seized territory, ...M has taken advantage of the situation, launching scores of attacks ...to keep the T ...occupied while he prepares to free his men form the Panjshir ...He probably is in no position to launch a conventional attack against the T in K right now, but he had to strike at them before they got too settled into positions and while public opinion is still hostile to them." E. Wash. Post, 10/11, Fri, , Kenneth J. Cooper, Pg. A31,571 w, Dateline: New Delhi, 10/10 [since 10/9] . Khalili said 300 T ...k and 180 capt. He offered no count of...[M's] cas... T... said at least four were k and 47 capt. today.[already incl in 9-10][note diff in k/c ratios]

[BB] A. 10/11/AP, Anwar Faruqi, 863 w, K, "Witnesses said T ...were ambushed just 20 km...N of K, , although the fighting appeared to be limited to small arms and heavy machine gun fire. It appeared to be more of the same hit-and-run attacks being staged by former g. troops. [#]...of casualties was not immediately known, but rival groups say the T have suffered heavy losses. The T has denied it. [assume 10 killed total]

96/10/12	KABUL	KABUL		20			AP	A	
96/10/13	KABUL	KABUL		20			AP	B	
96/10/15	KABUL	KABUL		32			DAILY TELEGRAPH	C	
94/10-96/10	TOTAL 12,180			3,671				D	
JAN 1 – DEC 31, 2000									
00/03/03	KABUL	SHOMALI PLAINS		NS					
00/03/03	KUNDUZ	SHER KHAN BANDAR		NS				E	
00/03/11	PARWAN	SALANG PASS		60	60	NS		F	
00/05/15	*TOTAL*			*10,000*				G	
00/05/27	KABUL	KABUL		0				H	
00/07/02	KABUL			0				I	
00/07/11	KABUL	KABUL		0				J	
00/07/24	BADAKHSHAN	BORDER		3			3 AFP	K	
00/07/28-9	BAGHLAN	NAHRIN		76	13	13	50 AFP/AP	L	
00/07/30	TAKHAR	KHARAMOUL		5			AP	M	
00/07/31	BAGHLAN	NAHREEN		10			10 AFP	N	
00/08/03	BALKH	KESHENDEH		NS			AP	O	
00/08/03-4	TAKHAR	ISHKAMISH		36	NS	36	AFP	P	
00/08/05	HERAT	KOTAL-E-SUBZAK		12			12	SDA,AP	O
00/08/05	NS	SALANG PASS		77	77	NS	NS	AP	R
00/08/05	NS	SALANG PASS			*[60]*			AFP	S
00/08/06	NS	SALANG PASS			*16*			AP	T
00/08/07	TAKHAR	BANGI			*[16]*			AP	U
00/08/09	TAKHAR	TALOQAN			*[HEAVY]*			AP	V
00/08/12	TAKHAR	TALOQAN			*[150*	*15]*	12	XINHUA	W
00/08/16	TAKHAR	TALOQAN		6			6	AFP	X
00/08/20	TAKHAR	TALOQAN			*[16]*			AP	Y
00/09/04	TAKHAR	TALOQAN		8	*[5]*		8	AP	Z
00/09/06-8	TAKHAR	TALOQAN		800	500	300	NS	AP	AA

[A] Anwar Faruqi, : 474 w, Dateline: K, "Civilian casualties filled hospitals in the capital..after a day of successful raids by troops controlled by[M]Heavy machine gun fire and sporadic tank fire could be heard [assume 20 killed]

[B] "Former G Troops Pound T Positions", Anwar Faruqi, 459 w, K, "In K, hospital officials say they are receiving about 30 wounded a day, many of them civilians caught in the crossfire." [Assume additional 20 killed]

[C] The Ottawa Citizen, Tues, 'T lose key strongholds near K...', Alex Spillius; The Daily Telegraph, p. A6, K, A journalist arriving from Kandahar, ...said 465 wounded and 32 dead T...had been flown in over the weekend. The figures were confirmed by an aid agency. [most T dead buried near where they died [add 32 to 10/12-13]

[D] A. Sum is –unadj for undercounintg nomads, etc. on p 1 of this table, see footnote . B. TOTAL IS 3,671 =1835.5/yr [So, 1st 12 month= 1839 is almost exactly= 2nd 12 month period =1832- despite very different circumstances, locations, etc. Estim for 7 yrs 17.7k war related killings in T period[see footnote V p 271] C. Does this undercount deaths – as with Iraq body count figs? Ask M. Zaeef. D. 7 prov's, with tot. pop.= 2,826k, were taken without a fight. E. The 8 prov's of Kand, Helm. Far, Her, Gha, Paktia, Log & Nan [990+782+1040+468+429+ 1545+332+1262=6,848k] taken with a tot of 1,128 lives lost. F. So 15 provs, with tot pop. of 9,674k were taken with est. 1,128 lives lost G. Comp. with 20K killed in K alone in fighting between factions there according to ICRC in 2 yrs to mid/94.[see footnote, p. 1,this table]. After T chased H from Charas. 2/13/95, leaving M in a posit. to attack & beat Mazari, kill rate dropped sharply. H. K & Wardak, with 2,000k & 506k, resp=2,506k took another 1,752 lives. [I. See footnote 718-B3 for comparison with civilan landmine deaths in same period—from left over Soviet/Russian period ordnance.] J. American Rev. War? ~6.8k 'patriots" died in battle; 8-12k died of starv. or disease while prisoners of war, most in British prison ships in NY. At least 4K Brit Army & 1.2K Navy killed in battle or died of wounds. 1.8k Germans killed in combat= 13.8k killed + ≥8k in pris. ≥21.8k + 10k French, 5k Span., .5kDutch =29.3k; & many tens of k who died of disease. War was 1775-81. Col pop ~3E6, See Scars of Independence America's Violent Birth, Holger Hoock, May '17; *The Toll of Independence*, H. H. Peckham, U. Chic. P, '74, 37.3k battle dead, all sides, all theaters http://necrometrics.com/wars18c.htm

[E] NYT, Af: T's New Battles, Barry Bearak -- Fierce combat has broken out again between the T and opposition forces in the Shomali Plains north of K. There has also been fighting between the two near the border with Tajikistan. The T, which controls about 90 percent of the country, say they have captured the town of Sher Khan Bandar along a key supply route.

[F] NYT/AP, Af: T Retreat Reported -- The northern-based opposition said it had repulsed a major offensive by the ruling T Islamic militia and had killed at least 60 soldiers. The T attacked opposition positions in the Salang Pass, 50 miles north of K..., a spokesman for the opposition said. After three hours of fierce fighting, the T retreated, he added. No opposition casualty figures were given.

[G] The New Yorker, 'Across The Divide;What do the Afghan people think of the T?', William T. Vollmann, Letter From Afghanistan; Pg. 5, 10,667 words "Still, by 1998, the T had conquered [~90%] of Af. Despite their frequent attempts to complete the takeover-which are said to have caused as many as forty thousand casualties..."

[H] NYT, Af.: Arms Blast - Celia W. Dugger - An ammunition depot at a T military base in K exploded close to a residential area, but no casualties were reported. Officials accused ...[M's] forces, but an [they]...denied...[it].

[I] Afghan Factions Resume Heavy Fighting, K, Af--Heavy fighting erupted between rival Af forces north of K ... witnesses said. The ruling T and an opposition alliance accused each other of starting the fighting, in which they exchanged heavy artillery barrages on two main roads that stretch to the Shomali plains north of the capital. Each side said it had repulsed the other's attack.

[J] The Australian, An explosion shook Pak's emb... in the Af capital yesterday, damaging it but causing no cas. The blast coincided with heavier fighting between the T and opposition guerillas north of K.

[K] 'Three Afghanis killed as huge heroin seizure made on Tajik border', 204 words, Dateline: Dushanbe, 'Russian border guards killed three drug smugglers and seized more than 140 kilogrammes (300 pounds) of heroin overnight on the Tajik-Afgahn border, a spokesman said Monday.The Russian forces seized the drugs, the biggest haul this year, from five armed Afghani smugglers some 240 kilometres (150 miles) southeast of the tajik capital Dushanbe,[going SE, the Badakhshan prov border is only ~162 km by air- but could be 250+ by road] border guard spokesman Colonel Alexander Kondratiev said.Three of the men were killed in a shootout while the other two managed to flee. Two other armed men opened fire on the Russian border forces, but there were no casualties on the Russian side, Kondratiev said. So far this year more than 700 kilogrammes (1,500 pounds) of heroin have been seized in this former Soviet Central Asian republic, almost equally the total seizures for 1999. Taliban-ruled Afghanistan is one of the world's largest producers of opium and heroin.Tajikistan is a principal trafficking route for the drugs produced in Afghanistan, with which it shares a 1,500-kilometre (950-mile) border. The drugs are then transported through Russia into Europe, officials say.Some 11,000 Russian border guards oversee the border under an agreement between Russia and Tajikistan.

[L] a. AFP, 7/28, "Taliban capture key northern town in new Afghan fighting', Mohammad Bashir, 530 wds, Dateline: K, ... T... captured a key town in northern Baghlan province after fierce fighting with opposition forces Friday, T...here said. T...seized Nahreen district after day-long fighting with the forces of opposition commander M....The Pakistan-based AIP said at least 25 troops from both sides were killed while many more were wounded in the fighting which erupted at dawn. [T and M supporters earlier this month held two rounds of heavy fighting around the strategic Bagram airbase 50 kilometers north of here. Both sides suffered hundreds of casualties. PUT THIS IN ITS APPRPRIATE DATE WITH ARTICLE FROM THAT DATE IF THERE IS ONE.]

b. AP, 7/29, T forces capture northern district', Amir Shah, : 283 Wds, Dateline: K,T ..., backed by fighter planes and heavy artillery, captured a strategic district in northern Baghlan province Sat... after fierce fighting, an opposition spokesman said. At least 50 civilians were killed in the T attack Sat..., opposition spokesman Abdullah..., told [AP]... by... telephone.He did not give any casualty figures for the opposition forces or T....no immediate comment from the T.... hundreds of residents fled the area during two days of blistering attacks.

[M] 'Af T attack northern Takhar province: opposition', 234 words, Dateline: Islamabad, 'Afghanistan's ruling T... attacked opposition positions in the northern province of Takhar on Sunday but failed to make any advances, an opposition spokesman said. In a pre-dawn attack, the T... captured a post in Kharamqul district, ...Mohammed Abil, a spokesman of the ...opposition alliance, told [AP]...he said. "At least five T were killed when their vehicle was hit by a rocket." No comment was available from the T, who captured the Nahrin district in neighboring Baghlan province on Saturday. Also on Sunday, fighting raged near Burka district in Baghlan province, Abil said

[N] Af sides trade allegations as fighting slows', K, Nahreen district in Baghlan...were quiet after the T... captured them late last week. But he said T jets had heavily bombed the city, causing "a lot of civil. cas." Khaksar said ...opposition's allegations of civil. Cas. were designed to cover up "the defeat of their own failed attacks," But he admitted that both sides used heavy artillery in the battle for Nahreen.The opposition spokesman said a pro-T commander, Ghulam Kalakani, had defected to the M side in Nahreen together with his 45 armed men.

[O] 'T advance in northern Af province', Amir Shah,: 262 words, Dateline: Kabul, ...heavy fighting Thursday in Keshendeh district of Balkh province, ...opposition spokesman Ustad Atta Mohammed said. Both sides were using heavy artillery and tanks, he said.[CASUALTIES OT STATED]

[P] a. 'Afghan T overrun key northern town, dozens killed: report' Af's T overran... Ishkamish in fierce fighting Thursday, killing dozens of opposition troops..., the resistance and reports said. b. AP/NYT,08/04 Af: T Gain -- The T... overran most of Ishkamish...inflicting heavy casualties on ... M's opposition forces, according to spokesmen for both sides. [SO HEAVY CASUALTIES = DOZENS KILLED IN THIS CASE .]

[Q] a. SDA –[Swiss News Agency], Reuters, 'Af: Seven deminers killed in an ambush', Islamabad, 'According to the T in power Sunday, the workers were killed by opposition fighters who also set fire to two vehicles of the organization.The seven men were traveling from Badghis to Herat province when they were attacked, said Sunday the Afghan Islamic Press agency (AIP) based in Pakistan. They were members of the Organisation for Demining and Afghan Reconstruction (OMAR). Their attackers also captured four soldiers of the T movement who went there, adds the AIP. The agency quoted the governor of Herat province, Mullah Khairullah Khairkhwa. The latter said the attackers belonged to an opposition group based in Iran... OMAR is one of the groups with the help of the [UN]..., dedicated to mine clearance in Af...[automatic transl from French] b. AP, Amir Shah, 470 Words, Dateline: Kabul, Gunmen shot and killed 12 people, including seven Afghans working for the United Nations' mine clearing agency, in western Herat province, an aid worker said Sunday...near Kotal-e-Subzak early Saturday on the road between Badghis province and Herat, an official of the organization told [AP].... Five other victims were local Afghans, said the official, Mohibullah...The locals had apparently gotten a ride from the aid workers.The gunmen later set the victims' bodies on fire, he said. Officials of the T ...and the opposition traded accusations over who carried out the killings. "The killing is the work of opposition soldiers, who also arrested several of our men accompanying aid workers," said Kheirullah Kheirkwah, the T governor of Herat. "The vehicles belonging to the T were also burned." The opposition rejected the charge, saying that the area where the incident occurred is controlled by the T. "It is a great tragedy," said Abdullah, an opposition spokesman in the northern Takhar province, who also uses one name. "We condemn the killing and reject the T allegations." One other aid worker, who was seriously injured in the incident, was being treated at a hospital in Herat, Kheirkwah said. A special U.N. flight brought the bodies to the southern city of Jalalabad early Sunday, Mohibullah said.

[R] 'Af opposition claims advances, says 70 T killed', 478 wds, Dateline: Islamabad, Af opposition fighters claimed Saturday to have seized territory from... T in clashes that killed 70 T ...and advanced toward the strategic Salang Pass..., Mohammed Abil, an opposition spokesman, told [AP]... by telephone from northern Takhar province...but he gave no details of the opposition losses. "Intense fighting is still raging in the area," he said.... T..., denied suffering heavy casualties, saying that they repulsed the opposition attack and the front line remained unchanged. Fierce fighting also broke out overnight in Takhar province,...Abil said. [&] [a]t least seven T soldiers were killed in that fighting, Abil said, adding that there were no casualties in the opposition ranks.

[S] Af. opposition gains ground in stepped up fighting: Kabul, Fighting intensified in northern Af Sat... as opposition forces launched an attack, killing 60 T ... and gaining territory in Salang area, opposition officials said. Spokesman Mohammad Habeel said forces loyal to Ahmad Shah Masood mounted an offensive against the ruling Taliban Islamic militia's positions in the Hindukush range, 130 kilometers ... north of Kl. "Our people have advanced five kilometers from Shawol to Golaie Panj" along the main highway that links K with the rest of T-held northern Afghanistan, Habeel said. He said "30 Taliban soldiers were captured and 12 others surrendered." Masood's Salang commander Basir Salangi had counted a total of 60 bodies of T... in the latest fighting, he said.

[T] 'Afghan opposition shoots down Taliban plane, heavy fighting in north', 315 words, Islamabad, Also on Sunday, there was heavy fighting near Salang Pass, only 100 kilometers (60 miles) north of Kabul, Abil said. The Taliban captured the strategic pass that connects Kabul to the northern areas of the country two months ago. The opposition is trying to win it back. Abil said at least 16 Taliban soldiers were killed in fighting near Salang, but he refused to give the opposition casualties' figure." SO HEAVY FIGTING = 16 T OR 60 IN NOTE ABOVE.

[U] 'Af T capture another northern town', Islamabad,'... T...captured [Bangi]..., in the opposition-held northern Takhar province, cutting them off from a major supply route, an opposition spokesman [Mohammed Abil] said... [&] the T... last week, captured the northern towns of Burka, Nahrin and Ishkamish. Earlier Sunday, the T also captured Siah Aab, a small village, near Bangi. At least 16 T soldiers were killed in the battle for Siah Aab...

[V] Artillery duels rage in northern Afghanistan, Amir Shah,: 329 Words: K, ... the T reached the outskirts of Taloqan..., said Mohammed Younus Qanooni, an opposition spokesman contacted by satellite telephone. Qanooni said the opposition troops rallied, driving the T back to positions 12 miles from the town... Opposition officials in Taloqan say that most of the city's residents have fled the relentless fighting and accompanying bombing raids by T jets.The opposition claims the T have suffered heavy casualties, although there is no way to confirm the claim because of the remoteness of the area. There was no immediate comment from the Taliban.

[W] 'Five T Commanders among 150 Killed: Opposition', 219 words, Dateline: Islamabad, The Af opposition has claimed that five commanders were among 150 Taliban fighters who were killed in the recent fighting in... Takhar.... [&]the opposition alliance lost 15 men and 12 civilians were killed in T aerial bombardment at Taloqn...The 15-hour T offensive, one of the most intense operations this year, was launched on Taloqan on Thursday. Arab and other foreign fighters [&~5k...] T soldiers participated in the operation, said the statement.

[X] 'Af opposition claims territorial gains'dateline: K, 'The Afghan anti-T alliance Wednesday claimed their fighters had gained territory in the key province of Samangan.Abdullah (eds: one name), spokesman for the opposition key commander M, said the areas of Gordara and Dara-i-Zendan in Samangan were captured in a dawn attack. Dara-i-Zendan is adjacent to Samangan's provincial centre of Aibak and six kilometers (3 miles) from the main northern highway connecting Baghlan province with Balkh on the Uzbekistan border, the spokesman said. "It is also cutting off the T supply route to the districts of Khuram, Sarbagh and Royee in Samangan," he said. Both sides suffered casualties, he said, without giving details. Abdullah said the Taliban militia, which holds most of the country, launched counter-attacks which were "unsuccessful." He said the opposition's major military base of Taloqan ...was attacked by T jets on Tuesday, killing six civlians and wounding another 12.

[Y] Opposition: Af factions fight for northern city, : 318 words, Dateline: Islamabad , Af's ruling T ...launched a new assault at... Taloqan early Sunday, but failed to make any gains after several hours of heavy fighting, an opposition spokesman said. The T attacked Taloqan...from three sides, Mohammed Abil, a spokesman of the anti-T northern alliance told [AP] by telephone from the war-ravaged area."But our forces are fighting back hard and have not allowed the T to advance," he said. No comment from the T was immediately available. Heavy artillery guns boomed ...as the two sides pounded each others' positions, Abil said. At least 16 T fighters were killed when they tried to capture an opposition post, he said. He gave no figure for the opposition's casualties.

[Z] 'Af T attack northern city: opposition', 364 words, Dateline: Islamabad, Heavy fighting raged outside ...Taloqan ...an opposition spokesman said. Backed by artillery and air power, the T attacked Taloqan ... from three directions, opposition spokesman Mohammed Abil [AP] by telephone."But our forces are bravely holding on to their positions...," he said... Several T were killed, Abil said, without giving opposition casualties. No indep... confirmation could be made because of the remoteness of the region. Abil said the fighter planes belonging to the T bombed the city three times, killing at least eight civilians and injuring many more.Thousands of people have already fled Taloqan to escape fighting, Abil said. "We will defend the city till the last drop of our blood," he said.

[AA] a. The Toronto Star, 80,000 Flee As T Seize City, 408 words, Russia's Interfax news agency reported yesterday at least 800 soldiers were killed in the battle for Taloqan, Takhar's capital, which the T captured Wednesday.The T lost 500 soldiers and the opposition about 300, Interfax reported...The warring factions have not given casualty figures. It was not possible to confirm independently... b. Sep 7, The Guardian,Lond, T seize opposition base in Af, Rory McCarthy Islamabad, Pg. 17 The fall of Taloqan will strengthen the T's demand for international diplomatic recognition, particularly during the current UN summit in[NY]. "The Islamic Emirate of Af once again requests the Af seat at the[UN]," the T's foreign ministry said in a statement last night. c. 'Afghan's Taliban rulers claim more gains in north as thousands flee war- hit region', Amir Shah, 1233 wds, Dateline: Kabul, Sohail Shaheen, a spokesman of the T Embassy in... Pak., said... the T were consolidating positions in the newly won areas and have started disarming people. "But our soldiers are not entering houses," he said. The T's leader Mullah MO has asked fighters not to displace the civilian population, he said. "People are already suffering

00/09/08	TAKHAR	TALOQAN						AFP	A	
00/09/09	TAKHAR	FARKHAR		4			4	AFP	B	
00/09/10	KABUL	N OF KABUL		15	[8+??]	0		AP	C	
00/09/13	KABUL	KABUL		0				AFP	D	
00/09/19	TAKHAR	IMAM SAHIB		0					E	
00/09/19	KABUL	KABUL		0					F	
00/09/20	TAKHAR	IMAM SAHIB		150	HEAVY				G	
00/09/23	TAKHAR	AI KHANUM		0					H	
00/09/26	KABUL	KABUL		4		4			I	

00/09/30	TAKHAR	NAMAKAAB							J	
00/09/30	TAKHAR	HODZHAGAR		*[575*	*400*	*175]*	NS		K	
00/10/13	TAKHAR	TALOQAN							L	
00/10/14	TAKHAR	NAMAKAAB		0					M	
00/10/14	TAKHAR	KALAFGAN		0						
00/10/16	KANDAHAR	KANDAHAR		0					N	
00/10/19	TAKHAR	CHAL		20		20			O	
00/10/22	KUNDUZ			0					P	
00/10/25	KUNDUZ	IMAM SAHEB +		41	5	36			O	
00/11/22	KABUL	KABUL		0					R	
00/12/29	KABUL 2,000e	KABUL		0					S	
00/12/30	PARWAN	BAZARAK		0					T	
00/12/30	BAMIYAN	YAKAWLANG		0						
YR 2000	TOTAL			1327					U	
10/'94-10/'01 TOTAL 7 YR		TALIBAN PERIOD		17662					V	

because of the drought. We want to protect them, not increase their sufferings." Af has been hit by its worst drought in 30 years, which has destroyed crops..., killed thousands of cattle and forced large-scale migrations.

[A] Af opposition prepares counter-attack: M, The T captured M's second major base after a two-month military campaign during which they initially overran the key areas of Nahreen, Burka, Ishkamish and Bangi around Takhar.M said his fighters pulled out of Taloqan only as a "tactical retreat for avoiding civilian casualties" and were ready to push the T soldiers out as soon as his plans for the counter-offensive were finalized.T Information Minister Qudratullah Jamal on Thur. urged M's supporters to give up their "futile resistance" and surrender. He also said tens of thousands of Taloqan residents, who fled the fighting, could return to their homes and enjoy the militia's "services". M described the offer as false and said people still remembered what he called T's "barbarism" when they first captured the town briefly in 1998. "These people have the experience of T's torture, arrests and pillage still fresh in their minds," M said. "The people don't trust the T."[There are no contemporaneous reports of such torture, pillage,barbarism etc. during the months the T held Taloqan 08/12/98-10/14/98. Since the initial report of the T taking Taloqan was from "aid sources" these same sources could have reported such atrocities : 8/12/98 The Australian, Taliban tighten noose on opposition bases, John Zubrzycki, Pg. 8, 468 words, * Islamabad "The hardline Islamic militia yesterday captured the key north-eastern town of Taloqan, a base of ousted K g strongman M, independent sources told AFP. Aid sources said alliance troops loyal to M pulled out of the town after a dawn Taliban attack broke defensive lines outside the city. 10/23/98 Taliban rounded up opponents before fleeing town, Jean-Claude Chapon, 664 words, Dateline: Taloqan, Oct 23, The T militia rounded up a number of civilians in... Taloqan before fleeing advancing opposition forces last weekend, residents said. Raids were carried out over several weeks in the Takhar provincial capital.... "They arrested a lot of people, especially officials, educated people and among the families of opposition fighters," said an ethnic Tajik source, speaking on condition of anonymity. "Most of the ordinary people were left alone. For them, rule by the T's Islamic law did not change much." The T's arrival did not cause much hostility, the source added."

[B] Afghan Taliban resume attacks: opposition, K, Af's ruling T militia Saturday launched new attacks in a bid to capture more territory in northeastern Takhar province after taking the main city of Taloqan four days ago, The two attacks focused on Hazar Bagh to the north and some villages close to Ishkamish to the southwest of Taloqan, which the T fighters captured on Wednesday."They had no gains in both attacks and retreated, suffering casualties," Habeel told AFP [&] four displaced children have died due to starvation and lack of medicines.

[C] AP, Amir Shah, K a. "We urge the opposition to stop fighting and lay down their weapons for peace," Taliban commander Mullah Abdul Mannan told [AP] at the Old Road front, 30 miles north of the capital Kabul, where the sides exchanged artillery fire overnight. Early Sunday, the Taliban tried to advance toward Ahandara, 9 miles north of Taloqan, but were beaten back after several hours of fighting, the opposition said. There was no details of casualties, and the T did not confirm the fighting. Mohammed Abil, a spokesman of the anti-Taliban alliance, said opposition fighters destroyed several Taliban posts overnight in a guerrilla attack north of Kabul. "At least eight T were killed and several wounded," he said by telephone from the northern province of Takhar. "All our fighters came back safely." Mannan denied any losses, saying the two sides pounded each other only with artillery fire. [b. another story, same reprter: "...Abil, a spokesman of the anti-T alliance, said the T attacked the strategic Salang Pass... early Sun. But they were beaten back, he said. At least 28 Taliban were killed or wounded, he said by telephone from the northern province of Takhar. Several opposition soldiers were also injured, but he refused to give details. No comment was available from the T regarding fighting near the Salang Pass.

[D] Three rockets [fired from adjoining villages] slammed into the Af capital's airport early Wed but caused no damage or casualties, officials said.The rockets, which were fired just after midnight, mainly targetted the Soviet-era jet fighters at the airport, a T soldier said. The rocket attack at the Kabul airport is the first in more than a year since the Taliban flushed out opposition supporters from the Shamali plain 20 kilometers north of the capital.

[E] AP, T, opposition battle for control of two northern towns, Amir Zia, Islamabad, Af's ruling T and the opposition battled throughout the day Tues. for two strategic northern towns near the border with Tajikistan. By Tues. night, both sides claimed control of the towns, Imam Sahib and Dashat-e-Archi, [30km] apart. The conflicting claims could not immediately be reconciled. Sohail Shaheen, spokesman for the T embassy in Islamabad, said the T had taken both towns..."Opposition forces were highly demoralized after four of their commanders in the region joined our ranks," Shaheen said. "They gave in without much resistance ... It's a major gain for us."

[F] AFP, Powerful blast in T army base shakes K, K, A powerful pre-dawn blast in the ruling T militia's central army base shook the Af capital K Tuesday but caused no casualties, T officials said .The explosion occured after a fire broke out in an arms cache close to the office of the corp commander, Qudratullah, a T guard said. The huge military complex is located opposite the T-run Radio Shariat building.Five civilian workers at the army base have been detained for questioning. "We have held these people. But we are not sure whether or not they are the right culprits," the guard said. Residents and other witnesses said the initial blast was followed by a series of strong and mild secondary explosions which continued for about half an hour. They said that nobody inside the base or in the nearby residential quarters was hurt. The blast came only a couple of days after three rockets were fired at the T-run K civilian-military airport from a short distance.

[G] AP, Af opposition battle for towns on Tajik border, Amir Shah, K, Af's ruling T and the opposition clashed for control of several towns near the northern border with Tajikistan, and both sides claimed the upper hand Wednesday. The T said they entered Imam Sahib without any resistance Tuesday, and now hold the town, which is just south of the Tajik border... But the opposition claimed it abandoned the town in order to set up an ambush against T troops. The T forces came under attack shortly after entering Imam Sahib, suffered heavy casualties, and then retreated, said opposition spokesman Mohammed Abil. Heavy fighting was reported in and around another town in the region, Hazarbagh, where T jets staged multiple bombing raids, the opposition said. The T have captured about half of the town, but the opposition clung to the remaining half, opposition spokesman Mohammed Ashraf said.[See rept for 9/30 which includes casualty estimate for past 1.5 months]

[H] AFP, T consolidate hold on newly-won territory, KAB., Skirmishes continued Sat. in...[NE] Af as the ruling T militia consolidated recent gains against ...[O]in two provinces on the Tajikistan border. T mouthpiece Radio Shariat said the religious fighters Fri. captured the Ai Khanum supply base and crossing point on the main Oxus river north of Takhar province, severing a key route for soldiers of ...M. M receives most of his military and food shipments from Tajikistan through the Ai Khanum makeshift bridge, the station said. But a spokesman for M, Mohammad Habeel, denied the fall of Ai Khanum, saying T troops had yet to cross the Kokcha river, a tributary of the Oxus which runs through Takhar prov. The T on Friday pushed M loyalists completely out from the northern province of Kunduz by overrunning the districts of Dasht-i-Archi and Imam Saheb.The official station said the ruling militia soldiers were consolidating their positions and taking care of government and private properties in the newly-won territories. Habeel said T jets had raided opposition hilltops to the east of Taloqan, Takhar's provincial headquarters, and the nearby Farkhar area. But the strikes caused no damage or casualties, he added.

[I] AFP Afghan Taliban hang another pair over recent explosions, : 301 words, Dateline: Kabul, Afghanistan's ruling Taliban Tuesday hanged two more men accused of being involved in a string of recent bomb blasts in the capital, officials and witnesses said. Taliban officials said the men -- Ahmad Zaki and Gul Ahmad -- had confessed to being behind two explosions in Kabul before their arrest last month. Information minister Qudratullah Jamal said the pair had been hired by the opposition military commander M. "They had come from the opposition with the task to create panic and fear among the residents by acts of explosion," he said. M provided them with explosives and 4,000 dollars, Jamal said, adding that another eight people had been arrested. Witnesses said the two men, who appeared to be in their late twenties, were hanged Tuesday from two military cranes inside the city's sports stadium, watched by thousands of residents and Taliban soliders. Their bodies were later strung up for public display from the cranes at the Ariana roundabout near the presidential palace where the T three days ago hanged another two men convicted of carrying out blasts. Kabul city has been shaken by a series of bomb blasts over the past two months, causing damage to buildings but no casualties. Taliban officials said the convicts were part of the network which also carried out a rocket attack against Kabul airport this month. The authorities earlier said that 20 men were under detention in connection with the airport attack. The opposition has denied any link with the K explosions, arguing they were a result of internal feuding among the T.

[J] AP,"Afghan T capture strategic area: opposition", Amir Shah, 327 wds, Datel: Kab, Af's T...captured a strategic northern area in Takhar province, ... [O]... spokesman said Sat.With the fall of Namakaab on Fri, the supply route of the ...[O] in Farkhar district has been sealed from the neighboring Badakshan province, Mohammed Abil, a senior...[O] spokesman, told [AP]... from the besieged region...The T are now barely 30[km] ...from Farkhar, Abil said. Sporadic artillery fire was exchanged between the two sides early Sat as the T appeared to be preparing for the last push toward Farkhar, he said. He gave no figure of casualties."We lost Namakaab because some of our commanders switched their loyalties and joined the T ranks along with their men," Abil said. Six ...[O] commanders and 200 fighters joined the T, the T-controlled...newspaper Shariat reported Saturday. The United Nations say that nearly 70,000 people have fled to neighboring Badakshan province from Takhar to escape fighting...

[K] AFP, 'T, opposition clash near Tajik border: exiled Af govt', Datel: Dushanbe, Af's T militia mounted a new offensive against opposition forces near the Tajik border, a spokesman for the deposed Af g... AFP on Sat.T units attacked positions held by ...[O] near the town of Hodzhagar, in the north of Af, the g's military attache M...Registani added. Fatalities were reported in the wake of the latest offensive which came as the [T]...continued to push towards the Amu Daria river which forms the border with Tajikistan. However,...[Registani] did not say how many troops had died or been wounded on either side. He added that 700 ...[O]had been killed or wounded [175 k e-ASA] in the past month and a half, ...[&] 1,600 cas [400 k e ASA] in T ranks during the same period of time. About 300 of the T cas, he added, were Pak. troops fighting alongside the... [T]...

[L] AFP,' More than 2,000 Af's flee fighting in past five days: UN', Af refugees have fled fighting in the northeast of the country over the past five days, crossing into Pak at the main Torkham border point, a UN refugee agency spokesman said on Friday. Between October 1-12, a total of 3,783 mainly ethnic-Tajik Afghans had crossed the frontier, including 2,127 children and 943 women, said Kris Janowski, a spokesman for the ...(UNHCR) in Geneva. Janowski added that 130 other refugees has walked 600 kilometers (375 miles) in 22 days across the Hindu Kush mountain range, arriving "exhausted, traumatized, and in a very poor state" in Chitral, northwestern Pak. "They spoke of many casualties in the battle for control of Taloqan," a stronghold of the Northern Alliance in Af taken by the hardline Islamic T movement on September 6, the spokesman said.

[M] a. AFP, Af opposition gains ground in Takhar: spokesman, Datel: K, The Af opposition said Sat. their troops had taken key territory in fighting with the ruling T... in ...province of Takhar. Mohammad Habeel, a spokesman for anti-T military commander M, said the opposition seized the area of Namakaab and five adjoining pieces of high ground around the provincial capital of Taloqan. He said M loyalists made these gains after repelling a T dawn assault...T jets bombarded M positions in the Kalafgan district of Takhar on Sat., but there were no immediate reports of casualties, the spokesman said. A T official was not immediately for comment. b. AP,Af factions battle in north, opposition claims gains, Dateline: Islamabad, "Af's anti-T opposition captured a mountain region in the north after heavy overnight fighting, an opposition spokesman said... no immediate detail of casualties because of the remoteness of the area, [he]... said. But several Taliban soldiers were taken prisoner..."

[N] AFP, T police headquarters blast injures four: report, DATEL: ISLAMABAD, 10/16, An explosion rocked the police headquarters in Kand., southern Af., injuring four people, the Af Islamic Press said Mon.. T ...said only one person was injured, the Pak.-based agency said, adding that other sources in Kand. said the blast on Sun. wounded four people. A T official said the explosion was caused by an electric short-circuit, the agency reported. Last year a massive explosion occurred at Kand. near the residence of the T's supreme leader Mulla Mohammad Omar, who escaped but several other people were killed. Sund's explosion followed a blast the previous day at the communications ministry compound in the Af. capital Kab. which casued no casualties. T...blamed the explosion on ...[O]headed by [M]. The [T]...this month publicly hanged in Kab four people accused of masterminding a series of bomb blasts in the capital over the past few months. ...[O] denied any hand in the blasts.

[O] XINHUA ,' T Claims Foiling [O]'s Offensive in Takhar', Dateline: Islamabad, The Af T ...claimed to have foiled two offensives of the...[O] in northern Af province of Takhar, inflicting heavy casualties on ...M's forces, according to a report reaching here on Thursday. The report said that the ...[O] launched offensive against remote areas in Takhar province but the attack was beaten back by the T. Four opposition troops were arrested and the retreating alliance forces left behind several[*assume 5*] bodies in the battlefield, the report said. It said another attack of the opposition on Chal district was also repulsed. Fifteen opposition troops were killed and 25 arrested.

[P] AFP, Shells hit Tajikistan during clashes over border in Afghanistan, DATELINE: DUSHANBE, Oct 22 [Seven tank and two missile] shells landed in Tajikistan [without causing any casualties] during fighting between Taliban forces and opposition troops across the border in northeast Afghanistan, Russian border guards reported Sunday. Saturday's fighting took place inside Afghanistan, according to Tajik border guards posted about five to 10 kilometres... away, Russian border guard spokesman Colonel Alexander Kondratiyev told AFP.

[Q] AFP, Taliban claim capture of key districts near Tajkistan border: report, Dateline: Islamabad, Afghanistan's ruling T Wednesday wrested some key districts in northern Kunduz province near the Tajikistan border from the opposition, the Afghan Islamic Press said. Quoting Taliban officials, the Pakistan-based agency said the districts of Imam Saheb and Dasht Archi were captured after heavy fighting. "Dozens of opposition troops were killed in the fighting" Taliban governor of neighbouring Takhar province, Qari Ahmadullah, told the agency. Ahmadullah, who did not mention any T casualties, said many enemy soldiers had been taken prisoner. The report could not be indepenndently confirmed.. "T did launch attacks, but they were beaten back by our forces," Habeel told the agencyHabeel, however, said that five T soldiers had been taken prisoner and several others killed in the fighting.

[R] AFP, 'Bomb blast shakes Afghan capital' A powerful bomb exploded near the information ministry building here on Wednesday but caused no c's, officials of the... T...said. The device, planted near the ...wall of the complex, went off before dawn and shattered windows in the ministry..., Mawlawi Yar Mohammad security chief at the ministry said. He blamed supporters of [O]... commander M for the blast: "The ...[O] resort to these things to discredit T security." Officials said investigations were underway but so far no one had been arrested. The T, which controls most of the country, last month publicly hanged four people accused of masterminding a series of bomb blasts in K over the past few months. The... [O] denied involvement in the blasts.

[S] AFP, Bomb explosion rocks Afghan capital: report, A bomb explosion rocked Af's capital K early Fri... [going off] in a drain near the Khorasan Hotel in the centre of the city, the Pak-based private agency said. "[It]...caused no damage or casualties," the T's amb. to Pak. Mulla Abdul Salam Zaief, told AIP.

AP, "Report: Wars rage in more than a third of nations" Pauline Jelinek, The center's chief researcher, Ret. Army Col. Daniel Smith, says over 1,000 casualties have occurred in Afg. War this year.,

[T] AFP, 12/30/00 "T jets attack opposition stronghold, 278 wds Datel: Kab, caused no c's, an opposition spokesman. anti-T. groups had made a series of attacks against T & gained some territory around Yakawlang district.

[U] Where is Jan Feb data? Total is prel. No C's in Proquest ME newsstand or London Tims for these months using only #'s in green. 575 at 9/30 is ASA est.; 800 at 9/06-8 is stated value. Other items in red appear to duplicate #'s in other stories. Heavy c's[est 150 D] at 8/09 are in 800 tot. at 9/06-08; But Heavy c's at 9/20 [est 150D] aren't & are added even tho this brings tot for 1.5 months above est at 9/30.

[V] (1327+3671) /3*7=11,662; +6000[for 2 massacres in '97& '98]= 17,662= best est. tot. extra violent deaths in 7 yr T period – excl. landmines in non-conflict areas. [See footnote 718 B.3b on civ. landmine deaths] LN [taleban or Taliban & casualties & Date = 2000] (322) 10 Jan2017 18:54:50, All Engl news 322 hits for yr '00 finished #154- NOT FINISHED. NLI canceled LN sub & HU denied access as non-affiliate as per contract with LN

INDEX

UNDER DEVELOPMENT

FOR PAGES IN THIS INDEX HIGHER THAN 267, SUBTRACT 4

$

$1 Trillion, 287
$10M, 287
$1200/ha, 16
$200M/day, 287
$30, 16, 208, 218, 219, 225, 232, 233
$30/kg, 16, 233
$600, 218, 219, 225
$70B/yr, 287

1

1150CE, 180
1186 war, 8
1979, 201, 214
1996, 20, 21, 23, 24, 36, 139, 201, 214, 219, 229
1997, 25, 29, 141, 145, 187, 201, 204, 210, 211, 214, 219, 232, 233, 249
1999, 13, 16, 36, 142, 143, 201, 207, 218, 219, 249, 265, 266

2

24 ct. gold, 224

3

3 R's, 34

6

60 Minutes, 2, 160
600, 42, 203, 219, 225, 226, 232, 233

7

7 Laws of Noah, 22
7 LAWS OF NOAH, 284

9

9/11, 2, 3, 6, 7, 8, 11, 15, 16, 22, 28, 29, 30, 44, 46, 137, 140, 141, 176, 212, 216, 218, 220, 225, 229, 232, 234, 285
9/11 attacks, 7, 148, 150, 157, 238
9/11/01, 199
99.9%., 223

A

A Different Kind of War, 216
A Sign Forever, 184, 288
A song to Asaf, 44
AAP, 24, 25, 249
Aaron, 287
Abbottabad, 166, 167
ABDELRAZIK, 285
Abdul Hakeem Mujahid, 44
Abdul Qahir, 24
Abdul Salam Zaeef, 27, 28, 39, 47, 122, 132, 167, 287
ABDUL SHUKOOR SATARZAI, 284
Abdul Wahed, 37
ABDULLAH, 209
Abe Mor, 8
aberration, 223
abomination, 9
Abraham, 48, 120, 180, 181, 190
ABRAHAM, 284
absurdity, 150
Abu Bakr, 20
Abu Dawood, 20
abuse of women, 230
academic, 18, 144, 204
ACADEMIC, 3
academics, 178
ACBAR, 198, 253
accusation, 221
accusations, 21, 189, 235, 236
accuse, 21, 221, 229
accused, 6, 7, 19, 20, 22, 23, 24, 46, 156, 183, 191, 195, 212, 229, 230, 234, 249
acid throwing, 3
across the world, 159, 234
Adam, 18, 49
Adar, 185, 225
Addicted, 160
Addiction, 18
addictive, 9
ADL, 11
Adler, 1, 184, 185, 189, 195, 197, 211, 212, 213, 221, 225, 228, 231, 233, 234, 235, 236
ADLER, 197, 284
administrative skills, 211
adulterers, 22, 211, 212, 223, 230
adultery, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 212, 229, 230, 249
ADULTERY, 2, 20, 173, 176
aerial reconnaissance, 12, 15
affection, 22
Afghan Art and Culture, 35
Afghan Historical Society, 215
Afghan Jews, 8, 12
Afghan Relics, 36
Afghan society, 227
Afghan Taliban, 76, 95, 102, 130, 162, 166, 167, 218, 262
Afghanistan Desk, 15, 198
Afghanistan Research Group, 43
Afghanistan's art treasures, 37
AFP, 8, 19, 21, 24, 25, 37, 45, 46, 47, 48, 142, 209, 249
afraid, 22, 26, 178, 188, 202, 203, 224, 235, 236
Africa, 48
against the basics of Islam, 162
Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief, 253
aggrieved status, 49
agrarian society, 22
Ahmad Shah, 24
Ahmed Rashid, 4, 16, 46, 147, 148, 149, 154, 186, 187, 195, 208, 216, 217, 218, 221, 223, 225, 226, 228, 232, 233, 234, 237
AHMED RASHID, 4, 250, 285
Ahmed Sha Massoud, 207
Ahmed Sha Masud, 196
AHMEDZI, 284
AI, 15, 23, 249
AIC, 214
aid and abe, 184
air war, 5
Aisha, 20
Akedus Yitschok, 202
AKIVA, 284
Al Buraq Wall', 11
Al Capone, 26, 238
Al Qaeda, 196, 227
al Qaida, 184
al teileich rachil be-amecha, 222
al-`Imarah al-Islamiyah, 253
Alauddin, 19
Albert Einstein College of Medicine, 178
alcohol, 9, 208, 234
alcoholic beverages, 199
alcoholism, 234
ALEXANDER THE GREAT, 284
Alfred W. McCoy, 208
al-Jazeera, 156
Allah, 153, 190, 239, 243, 246
allegation, 208
Alleged adulterers, 147
Alliance Israélite Universelle, 34
allies, 11, 209, 215
Allies, 221
ally, 182, 222
Almighty, 42, 44, 202, 203
al-Qaeda, 156
Al-Qaeda, 45
Al-Qaida, 200
altercation, 140, 191
Amanpour, 33
ambassador, 48, 160, 198, 215
Ambassador, 3, 221, 225, 228, 229
ambushed, 13
America, 39, 191, 202, 203, 215, 230
American, 21, 26, 29, 36, 40, 48, 50, 173, 182, 189, 195, 210, 221
American Civil War, 156
American Embassy, 40
Americans, 12, 203, 230, 238
Amīr al-Mu'minīn Mullā Muḥammad 'Umar (Mujāhid)., 149
Amir –Ul-Momenin, 12
AMIR-AL-MOMINEEN, 284
Amir-ul Mumineen, 253
Amirul-Mohimeen, 24
Amnesty International, 15, 23, 139, 141, 219, 249
amputations, 141, 142
Amr Bil Maruf, 149
An Enemy We Created, 156
analysis, 16, 18, 141, 173, 217, 221, 232
anarchy, 153
anchorman, 206
ancient, 36, 47, 235
ANCIENT CITY, 284
and he kissed him, 181
anger, 218, 220, 225
Anne Wu, 237
anticipatory hoarding, 16, 230, 234
Anti-Defamation League, 11, 196
anti-Israeli, 11
anti-Jewish, 7, 11
anti-narcotics, 15
anti-religious, 20
antisocial, 9
anti-Taliban, 4, 19, 20, 142, 145, 214
AP, 21, 24, 45, 46, 206, 209, 249
apology, 188, 287
apparent contraction, 7
apparent contradictions, 7, 23, 224
appeal, 44, 47, 208
Arab, 12, 35, 45, 196, 203
Arabia, 15, 179
Arabic, 11, 12, 43, 149, 188, 190, 234, 239, 240, 243, 246, 253
ARAMAIC/GREEK, 284
archaic, 145
ARCHBISHOP, 284
archeological, 11
archeologist, 36
Argentina, 39
arguing, 33
Ariel Sharon, 32, 238
Arlacchi, 38, 39, 174
Army Public School and Degree College, 162
Army's official history of the war, 216
Arnaud De Borchgrave, 253
arrest, 28, 33, 164, 167, 208, 251, 287
arrogance, 235
ART, 2, 13, 35
ARYEH, 3, 231
Aryeh Leib, 224
Aryn Baker, 229
As Thou Goest By The Way, 6
ASHOKA, 284
Asian Survey, 211, 241
ask good questions, 229
asking questions, 288
asking the right questions, 6
assassinated, 207
astronomer, 88
atmosphere, 223
atrocity stories, 235, 236
attachment to God, 224
attack, 6, 11, 32, 44, 46, 48, 140, 182, 188, 196, 203, 207, 221
Attack on Bin Laden and Al Qaeda, 159
attacked by bandits, 138
ATTACKING, 4, 172, 182
attacks on the US, 184
attacks on women, 223

attentive, 192, 193
Australian Associated Press, 24
authenticity, 224

author's qualifications, 288
Auto Rapid Transit, 288
autodidact, 178, 288
Avroham Avinu, 180, 202
Ayatollah Jannati, 11
Azam, 238

B

baby, 143
BABYLON, 180, 284
backward-looking, 145
Bactrian gold, 36
bad guys, 238
Badakhshan, 13, 38, 39, 41, 42, 43, 199, 218, 221
Badhakshan, 13
BAGDAD, 284
Baghdis, 215
Bait-ul-Mal (National treasury), 241
bakesh shalom ve-ridfuhu, 222, 223
Balkh, 13, 38, 219, 223
BALKH, 284
Baluchistan, 217
Bamiyan, 35, 42, 45, 46, 47, 48, 50, 222
Bamyan, 35, 37, 45, 156, 223
BAMYAN, 284, 285
ban, 9, 15, 16, 18, 23, 42, 44, 47, 49, 141, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 212, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 223, 225, 227, 234, 265
BAN, 3
banditry, 16, 220
Bangladesh, 39
BANGLADESH, 284
bank opium, 220
Barnet Rubin, 195
Barnett Rubin, 3, 6, 144, 176, 186, 188, 189, 195, 209, 216, 221, 222, 225, 232, 233, 265, 285
Barney, 211, 221
Barsamian, 178
baseless hatred, 231
bases, 182
basis of civilization, 138
Basmachi movement, 116
battle tank, 24, 249
Bauer, 142, 213
baying crowd, 154, 155
baying for the blood, 152
BBC, 25, 41, 44, 47, 185, 208, 211, 249
Bearak, 204, 205, 206
beaten and embarrassed in public, 24
beating her husband to death with a hammer as he slept, 19, 185, 212
beauty parlor, 149, 150
Beck, 159
Beers, 42, 209
before the ban, 16, 208, 220, 225, 232, 233
beleaguered good guys, 155
Belgium, 15, 18
belief, 21, 27, 143, 177, 190, 236
beliefs, 26, 199, 203
believers, 202
Bellah, 177
ben Laden, 186, 223, 238
Beneath the Veil, 148, 155
benevolent, modern nations of the world, 235
BENJAMIN OF TUDELA, 284
Berntsen, 159
Berrigan, 185
Bes Midrash, 9
Beverly Hills, 191, 239
biases, 143
Bible, 7, 33, 180, 288
Bible schools, 33
bibles, 203
Biblical, 7, 8, 180, 181, 190
Bielfeldt, 33
big mess, 238
bigotry, 230, 238
bilateral ties, 44
billions of dollars, 18, 195
bin Laden, 7, 11, 21, 22, 26, 29, 40, 48, 137, 156, 200, 202, 203, 219, 238
Bin Laden, 12, 159, 195, 196
BIN LADEN, 2, 26
Bin Laden's, 46, 47, 167
biophysicist, 224
Bireshis, 202
Blacks, 230
Blanchard, 209
Blank, 183
blasphemy, 19
blind leading the blind, 238
BLIND MEN, 4, 180
Blind Men and the Elephant, 180
blinding the wise, 238
blood, 6, 140, 182, 188, 222
blood of thy neighbour, 138, 222
bloodthirsty, 22, 238
Bloomberg News, 186
Bne Braq, 194, 238
bodies, 20, 141, 146, 214
Bommer, 3, 229
Book of Education, 138
book reading, 288
book store, 192
Boston, 19, 214, 224
BOSTON TEA PARTY, 284
Boucher, 42, 47, 243
bound hands, 185
BOWE BERGDAHL, 2, 167, 285
bowed, 181
BOWING SEVEN TIMES BUT NOT EIGHT, 181
boycott, 40
boys' school, 162, 165
BOYS' SCHOOL, 285
Bradshaw, 239
brainwashing, 9
breaking into their home, 22
Brembeck, 237
Brennan Center for Justice, 187
Brian Lehrer, 189, 195, 196
bribe, 221
bribery, 27
bribes, 221
bribing, 33, 37
Bridas, 29, 30
briefed, 228
brightness of the firmament, 287
Brill online reference works, 149
brilliance, 173
BrillOnline, 9
BRITISH RAJ, 284
British reporter, 152, 155
broad and deep support, 234
Bronx, 23, 192, 195, 231
Bronx Science, 192
Brown, 42, 160
brutal, 159, 185
brutal regime, 146
brutal Taliban, 157
BUDDHA, 4
BUDDHISM, 284
Buddhist, 35, 36, 37, 44, 47, 48, 49, 50, 148, 183, 237, 243, 245, 253
BUDDHIST, 2, 13, 35, 173, 240, 243
Buddhist Priest, 183
Buddhist principals of peace building, 48
Buddhist statue, 36
buggery, 24, 25, 249
Bulgheroni, 30
bull dozed, 191
bulldozer, 191
bullet wounds, 66
bullying, 27, 221
bumper crops, 197, 217, 218, 219, 225, 228, 232, 233
bunk, 221, 223
burka, 18, 140
burka mesh swatch symbol,, 146
burkas, 20
Burke, 19
Burkhalter, 143, 146
Burma, 201, 205
burning houses, 211
Burns, 21
burqa, 150, 151, 154
Bush, 29, 44, 185, 186, 202, 219, 230
Bush Administration, 29
Bush and the Burqa, 157
business, 9, 177, 203
businessman, 188
butchered, 188
buyers, 16

C

C^{14} dating, 35
Caliph, 20
CALIPH, 284
Callahan, 15, 18, 196, 197, 212, 219
CALLAHAN, 3, 197, 198, 199, 200, 285
Cambridge University, 217
camera, 238
Cameron Todd Willingham, 26
campaign, 9, 223, 232
campaigning, 222
Canada, 15, 18, 39, 40, 145
cannabis, 201, 253
capital city, 38, 46, 50, 230
capitalization, 202
caravans, 220
carcinogenic, 9
Cardozo, 214, 229
CARE, 210
Carla Power, 210
Carlos DeLuna, 26
Carr Center for Human Rights, 37
carrot and stick, 199
Caspian Basin, 182
Caspian Oil, 29
CASTRATED, 250
Catholic, 177, 178
Cause Unveiled, 6, 147
Cautain, 18
censorship, 236
Censorship, 6
Center for Afghanistan Studies, 210
Center for Media and Communication Studies, 229
Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation, 237
Center on International Cooperation, 189, 195, 211, 266
Central Asia, 30, 182, 198, 217, 225
CENTRAL ASIA, 284
Central Asian States, 201
central government, 31
cereals, 33
certification, 41
CHAMAN, PAKISTAN, 284
Charlie Rose, 243
Chasidish, 188
Che, 217
Chechnya, 182
cheered, 154
chemical spraying, 198
Cherie Blair, 140
Chief of Staff, 3, 229
CHIEF RABBIS OF BRIT. EMP, 284
children, 5, 7, 19, 22, 26, 27, 33, 34, 47, 48, 140, 143, 150, 151, 153, 156, 177, 206, 207, 209, 238, 240, 243, 244, 245, 246, 265, 266
CHILDREN, 250, 285
children are dying, 47, 48
China, 39, 182
CHINA, 284, 285
Chipaux, 13
Chofetz Chaim, 223, 224
CHOFETZ CHAIM, 284
choice of education, 179
Chomsky, 186
chopping off their hands, 196
Choshen Mishpat, 9, 138
Chris Johnson, 31
Christian, 18, 33, 182, 193, 253
CHRISTIAN, 33, 46, 51, 52
Christian Science Monitor, 182
Christianity, 33, 158, 203
CHRISTIANITY, 284
Christians & Jews., 181
Christine McCarthy McMorris, 157
Christopher Thomas, 156
Church, 186
CIA, 2, 50, 159, 185, 188, 189, 208, 212
cigarettes, 9, 153
civil idolatry, 177
Civil Idolatry, 33
civil religion, 177
Civil Religion in America, 177
CIVIL SERVANTS, 284
civil strife, 201
civil unrest, 253
civil war, 38, 40, 90, 94, 102, 106, 127, 128, 162, 219, 259, 261
Civil War, 241
Civilian Victims, 5
clandestine laboratories, 201

Clarification, 146
classes, 209
Cleaner hands, 182
clear, hold and build, 227
cleave unto Him, 224
Cleveland, 214
climate of fear, 229
Clinton, 44, 140, 147
CLOAK OF MUHAMMAD, 284
CNN, 33, 246
CNN transcript, 148
coalition, 201, 227
cocaine, 41
cognoscenti, 16, 144
collaborators with the Russians, 20
collapse, 218, 219, 220, 221, 225, 232, 233
college, 20, 177, 187
college educated, 20
Collier, 23, 183
COLLIER, 285
Colombia, 18, 41
Columbia Security, 191
Columbia University, 185, 192, 196
combatants and civilians, 156
commentaries, 9
commerce and diplomacy, 237
commerce with the outside world, 28, 29
commotion, 191
Communication Systems, 6
communications failure, 49
communism, 33
communist, 36
communities, 22, 33, 49, 177, 198, 205, 213, 265
community of nations, 15, 43, 234, 237
competitive, 238
complex truths, 222
compulsory public education, 34
Compulsory Schooling, 34
CONCLUSIONS, 3, 34, 172, 177
condemning, 186, 221
Condoleezza Rice, 158, 212
CONFUCIUS, 284
confused, 46, 225, 228, 232, 233
CONFUSED, 285
confusion, 208, 225
congratulate, 193
congregants, 188
congregations, 8
Congress, 29, 44, 142, 143, 209, 234
Congressional Research Service, 3, 18
Congressional Research Service, 209
Congressman Engel, 199
consensus, 15, 196, 198, 200, 212, 219, 221, 234
consenting adults, 24, 25
consequences, 230, 253
constitution, 31, 177, 246, 247
Construction and Development, 210
consultation, 188
consumers, 208
contractor, 30
contradiction, 16, 177, 215
contradictions, 7
CONTRADICTIONS, 2, 11
contradicts, 48, 233
contrast and compare, 187
controversial, 187
conventional thinking, 30
CONVERSION OF JEWS, 284
convert to Islam, 8
convincing, 220, 223
cooperate, 234
Coordinator of Middle East Area Studies, 210
corner, 204, 220
correspondent, 216, 234
corroboratable, 232
corrupt, 178, 182, 203, 220, 234
corrupted, 221
corrupting the society, 21
cosmopolitan, 22, 230
council, 39, 208, 266
Council on Foreign Relations, 195
Count de Montebello, 46
Counter-Narcotics, 18
country brief, 199
COUNTRY BRIEF, 201
countryside, 20, 210
courage, 193
court, 22, 24, 26, 46, 141, 142, 188, 212, 225, 230, 231, 249
Court in Heaven, 26
Court of Allah, 27
court of justice, 237
court of law, 230, 287
courts, 26, 221, 227
courts of Human Beings, 26
courts of justice, 5, 237
Courts Of Justice, 6
COURTS OF JUSTICE', 284
cover, 3, 4, 29, 80, 83, 101, 149, 166, 167, 183, 229, 231, 247, 253, 254, 267
cowards, 203
Cox, 184
crazy, 185
creation of Pakistan, 238
crime, 19, 22, 24, 25, 26, 153, 184, 215, 249
Crime, 18, 40
crimes, 22, 184
criminals, 26, 195, 196
criticize, 179, 182
criticizing Israel, 238
cross border traders, 220
Crossette, 15, 23, 37, 38, 39, 40, 47, 182, 186, 198, 200, 210
CROSSETTE, 285
cruise missile strike, 215
cruise missiles, 48
crying, 143
cultivate, 16, 197
cultivation, 16, 18, 38, 39, 40, 42, 197, 200, 201, 204, 205, 207, 208, 216, 217, 218, 219, 222, 225, 241, 248, 253
CULTIVATION, 3, 4, 201
cultivation of narcotics, 253
cultural monuments of the world, 46
cultural property, 37, 45
culturally different, 156
culture minister, 37
cultured world, 35
Cunningham, 235, 236
Cuomo, 36
cup of water, 188
curriculum, 144, 187
cut off the fingers, 139, 211
CYRUS THE GREAT, 284

D

Dadulah, 37, 223
Dadullah, 156, 211
Dædalus, 177
Daily Press Briefing, 47
dam re'im, 211
dangerous neighborhoods, 188
DANIEL, 284
Dari, 50, 213
Darqad, 38, 207
Darul Ulam Deoband, 179, 238
DARUL ULAM DEOBAND, 284, 285
data base, 23, 41
daughter, 143, 144, 224
daven, 224
David G. Hirsch, 253
David Macdonald., 207
davidmansfield, 18, 205
DEA, 4, 15, 190, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 218, 285
dealers, 36, 197, 218, 221, 225
Dean, 193
death, 19, 21, 22, 23, 24, 141, 185, 204, 212, 223, 230
death penalty, 19, 22
death sentence, 175, 181
debts, 218, 220, 221, 225
DEBUNKING, 285
decapitated, 188
decapitation, 22
decide, 235
decimation, 200, 201
Decree #19, 253
DEFAMATIONS, 2, 20, 137
defend themselves, 189, 231, 234
defense, 46, 191
defense of stone, 46
delegation, 47, 240
demand, 204, 220
democracy, 33
Democracy For New York City, 192
demonize the Taliban, 234
demonstrable nonsense, 235
demonstrably innocent, 26
demonstration, 155
DENEUFVILLE, 36
Deobandi, 199
Deputy Sec. of Defense for Policy, 184
derisive language, 193
descendants, 8, 50, 191, 202, 239
Descent into chaos, 225
Descent into Chaos, 217
DESCENT INTO CHAOS, 285
desecration of God before, 27
desires life, 224
despair, 203
despise, 8
destitution, 151, 266
destroy all the statues, 42
destruction, 13, 35, 36, 37, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 204, 205, 206, 266
Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 155, 207, 208
devastated, 218, 219, 220, 225
development specialist, 190
devoid of factual support, 236
DFNYC, 192
Dhammapada, 48
dictates, 178
Dietary law, 9
diplomatic space, 49
dire need, 8
direct witness of the Taliban rule, 190
dirty, 221, 229, 230
dirty work, 221
Disabled sportsmen, 153
disagree, 235
disappear', 27
discrepancy, 19, 159
discrimination against women, 40
Disease, 208
disgrace to Islam, 11
disinformation, 232
dismemberment, 205
divinity, 177
DNA, 167
do good, 181, 222, 224, 229, 287
do the right thing, 238
doctor, 73, 75, 79, 140, 167, 254, 261
doctors, 19, 140, 214, 249, 265, 266
Doctors Without Borders, 215
DOCTORS WITHOUT BORDERS, 285
doing good, 167, 181
Don't curse God, 6
Donors Assessment Mission To Afghanistan', 18
Dostom, 219, 223
Dostum, 13, 30
dots, 181
double-crossed, 13
doubts, 165, 211
dress code, 185, 214
drive up prices, 197
drive up the price of opium, 41
DRONE, 285
drone attacks, 162, 164
drought, 15, 45, 47, 201, 204, 205, 219, 265
droughts, 151
drowning, 138
drowning in the sea, 138
Drug Control Program, 18, 38, 201
Drug Enforcement Administration, 3, 198, 200
DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION, 200
drug stockpiles, 41
DRUG TRAFFICKING, 201
drunkenness, 9
DURAND LINE, 284
dust, 46, 47
duty, 156, 193

E

earrings, 140
earth, 202, 203, 211
EARTHQUAKE, 285
earthquakes, 151
East African Embassies, 238

eating a pigs nose in public, 27
Economic and Social Council, 31, 266
economic infrastructure, 201
economically powerful, 47
Economist, 205
Edmonton Journal, 243
education, 18, 59, 61, 63, 118, 140, 148, 149, 165, 166, 177, 178, 179, 209, 210, 213, 241, 255, 257, 265, 266, 267, 288
EDUCATION, 3, 34, 209, 250, 253, 265
educational, 177, 266
effective government, 219
effective system of governance, 30
effectively, 46, 148, 149, 177, 207
egregious errors, 4
Egypt, 179, 184, 186
Egyptian, 8
EHSAN AFGHAN, 284
Ehsanullah Ehsan, 54, 162
Eid al-Adha, 48
Eikonoklastes, 177
EISENHOWER, 284
elderly pious people, 241
elders, 15, 198, 205, 206, 212, 219, 221, 234
ELEPHANT, 4, 180
elite schools, 178
Ellsberg, 186
email addresses, 192
embarrassed in public, 24
embassy, 26, 210
embassy bombings, 26
emeralds, 13
emigration, 146
eminent domain, 8
emissaries, 15, 18
Emmy Award, 150
emotional trauma, 142
empathetic, 196, 288
empire, 203
encouragement, 187, 188
Encyclopedia Judaica, 225
Encyclopedia of Women & Islamic Cultures, 149
enemies, 13, 38, 155, 205, 223
enemies of the Taliban, 41, 66, 159, 173
enemy, 13, 49, 189, 196, 219, 227
enemy of Islam, 161
enemy's ox, 49
Energy, 29
Energy Security, 29
enforce, 197
English, 12, 19, 20, 22, 41, 141, 153, 155, 183, 187, 194, 213, 214, 217, 218, 219, 234, 244, 245, 249, 253
English instructor, 187
English speaking, 20
entertainment, 150
entitled to you opinion, 236
Environment, 6
eradicated opium, 184, 193, 196
ERETZ YISRAEL, 284
errors, 3, 185, 221, 228
Esau, 181
essay, 187
Ethical Culture, 23, 182, 183
Ethical Culture in Riverdale, 238
Ethics of the Fathers, 287
ethnic, 13, 15, 50, 141, 145, 146, 219, 234
ethnic groups, 50, 219
ethnic tensions, 15
Etiology, 208
Europe, 13, 38, 106, 201, 230
European, 15, 47, 200, 207, 229
European Commission, 15
European envoys, 47
evacuation, 39
evangelical groups, 33
evidence, 11, 19, 22, 26, 30, 38, 184, 188, 211, 219, 221, 230, 231
evil, 44, 189, 190, 203, 222, 224, 239
exaggerating, 143
example, 8, 19, 36, 182, 209, 213, 229, 235, 265
example for all, 138
excessive taxation, 16
excuse, 197, 203, 223
executed, 18, 19, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 33, 142, 159, 183, 185, 211, 212, 213, 230, 245, 249
EXECUTED FOR ADULTERY, 284
EXECUTING, 2, 158
execution, 19, 21, 23, 24, 25, 142, 185, 212, 249
EXECUTION, 250, 251, 252, 284, 285
execution ground, 150, 153
executions, 15, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 142, 158, 184, 196, 205, 211, 212, 219, 223, 230, 234
EXECUTIONS, 2, 20, 23, 173, 176
exonerate, 287
exonerating the innocent, 27
expatriate's, 214
expelled, 44, 193
expertise, 143, 173
experts, 142, 144, 172, 185, 209, 211, 225
experts on Afghanistan, 144
explanations, 43, 223
EXPLORER, 284
explosives, 37
extensive persecution, 229
extradition, 195
extrajudicial, 144
EXTRA-LEGAL, 285
extreme danger, 192
extremely high standard of evidence, 22
extremism, 225
eyeopening, 236
eyes, 6, 26, 35, 48, 140, 178, 182, 187, 236
eyes of the people, 26

F

face, 25, 142, 149, 153, 205, 206, 236, 240, 243
faces, 20, 24, 25, 35, 149, 151, 205, 208, 211, 249
faces blackened, 24, 205, 249
faces blackened by engine oil, 24, 249
faces of the two statues, 35
facial skeleton, 66
fact checking, 211
FACTIVA™, 41
facts, 43, 203, 217, 221, 222, 236
failed and puppet state, 13
FAILED AND PUPPET STATE, 1
failed state, 8, 12, 30, 219, 234
Failed State, 8, 198, 221
FAILED STATE, 2, 8, 241
failed state in Afghanistan, 8
fair, 46, 220
fair and impartial court, 46
fairly, 220
Faizabad, 41, 213
fake, 42, 193
false accusations, 221, 235, 287
false accustions, 88, 103
family, 22, 188, 214
family and community based sense of obligations, 31
family oriented society, 22
Far East Economic Review, 216, 234
Far Eastern Economic Review, 207
fare card, 188
farmers, 15, 16, 195, 197, 198, 199, 205, 206, 207, 208, 217, 219, 220, 221, 225, 232, 253
FARMGATE, 4
Farrell, 204, 205, 218, 219
Farsi, 141, 213, 244, 245
fascinating, 193
fault, 19, 159, 177, 221
Fazalur Rehman, 24
FAZLULLAH, 285
FBI, 15, 184, 215, 243, 287
FBI, Counter-Terrorism, 215
fear, 236
federal government, 178
Federal News Service, 42
Feith, 184, 238
felony, 184
female, 20, 36, 148, 149, 152, 209, 254, 265, 266
feminist, 144, 146, 147, 148, 192, 212
Feminist broadcaster, 183
Feminist Majority Foundation, 143, 144, 146, 157, 212, 239
Feminist Majority Foundations, 238
feminist movement, 147
Feminist Wire, 146
Ferghana Valley, 116
festival of sacrifice, 48
fiction, 150, 152
Field Commander, 159
fighters, 36, 42, 210, 227
film, 148, 150, 151, 153, 155, 156, 157, 159, 185
Film, 159, 212
film footage, 159, 185
Final Crusade, 189
finance Taliban terrorist, 40
financed, 33
financial compensation, 19
financial inducements, 117
financing, 29, 173
Finbarr Barry Flood, 35, 42, 43
FINDINGS, 3, 172
finger prints, 188
fingernail, 3, 140
fingernails, 140, 144, 211
fingers chopped off, 139
first aid skills, 224
First Feminist War, 157
first five years in Afghanistan, 234
first secretary, 11
flagship institution, 178
flogging, 22, 184, 196
floggings, 141, 142, 196, 212, 219, 223, 230, 234
FLOOD, 284
floods, 151
fog of war, 6
food, 151, 197, 220
footage, 151, 155, 159, 185
football, 151, 153, 154, 247
football stadium, 151, 154
for its own sake, 288
forbidden, 151, 214, 234
force, 40, 139, 197
foreboding, 151
foreign correspondent, 15, 25
foreign visitors, 243
foreigners, 227
forgive, 49, 152
formal education, 151
formula of success, 227
fortune, 219
forum, 49, 235, 236
Forward, 7
Foster, 29
foundation, 46
four reliable male witnesses, 22, 212, 230
Fourth Freedom Forum, 237
Fox News, 8
Frahi, 18, 40, 41, 183
France, 24, 39, 145, 207, 209
FRANCE, 250, 251, 252, 284
Francesca, Ersilia, 9
Frankfurt, 253
Franscesc Vendrell, 38
Freckleton, 18
free, 6, 33, 177, 183, 193, 221, 223, 236
free food, 33
free speech, 6, 183, 193, 236, 253
freedom of religion, 177
Freedom Of Religion Or Belief, 33
Freedom of Speech, 6
freedoms of religion, press, speech,

assembly and business, 177
French scholar, 145
Friday afternoon public entertainment, 21
friend, 187, 202, 203, 211, 221, 223, 225, 228
friend of the believers, 202
friends, 8
frightening, 33
fundamental value, 257
Fundamentalism, 217
fundamentalist, 36, 201
fundamentalists, 139, 159, 185
funder, 288
funding, 179, 206

G

GAIN, 4, 172, 182
Gains, 182
Gall, 215
gambling, 9
gangsters, 188
GANGSTERS, 284
Gannon, 8, 21, 25, 35, 36, 45, 204, 205, 206, 253
Gatto, 34
gay rights, 192
Gaza, 191
Gazan, 8
Gebert, 18
Gemilus Chasadim – "Camel Kindness, 231
Gen 22:2, 202
Gen. 12:1, 202
Gender Apartheid, 146
Genesis, 189
Genetic Legacy of the Mongols, 50
GENIZA, 284
genocide, 156
geographic, 13, 219, 234
geographic divides, 219
geopolitical influence, 49
Geopolitics, 29
George Soros., 235
George W. Bush, 15, 183, 187
George Washington, 141, 177
GERMAN, 284
German Foreign Minister, 216
Germany, 15, 18
getting away with murder, 27
Ghazni, 36, 180
gift blinds the wise, 238
gift doth blind the eyes of the wise, and pervert the words of the righteous, 178
gift giving, 238
GILBERT BURNHAM, 285
GINCO, 285
ginning up the public, 157
GIORDANO BRUNO, 284
girls, 18, 40, 139, 140, 143, 144, 185, 209, 210, 211, 212, 223, 265, 266
GIRLS, 2, 3, 6, 34, 139, 141, 173, 209, 265, 284
GIRLS SCHOOL, 285
girls' education, 161, 165
GITMO, 285
Global Center On Cooperative Security, 237
global drug trade, 208
global media, 46
global problem, 253
God, 6, 8, 9, 27, 42, 44, 177, 195, 202, 203, 215, 223, 224, 235
God's law, 195
God's will, 202
Goldenberg, 20, 188
Gonzalez Palau, 29
good guys, 238
good intentions, 235
good people, 192
Goodman, 186, 238
Google, 195, 207, 217, 218, 225
Google Images, 195
Google preview edition, 217, 225
Goreed, 8
gouging, 16
Goutierre, 210
governance, 4, 30, 223, 227
government, 8, 26, 28, 29, 30, 36, 42, 44, 47, 49, 151, 178, 179, 189, 195, 198, 201, 203, 205, 207, 209, 210, 219, 225, 227, 235, 238, 240, 241, 242, 244, 246, 248
Governor of Kandahar, 25
grant support, 178
grape vines, 199
grapevine, 9
grateful, 184, 235
gratitude, 8
great work, 190
GREG BANKOFF, 208
grievance, 196
Griffin, 216
GROWING, 1, 4, 8, 241
GUANTANAMO, 2, 167, 285
Guardian, 25, 45, 159, 202, 203, 210, 249
guile, 224
guilty, 6, 26, 28, 33, 76, 88, 103, 110, 143, 155, 175, 221, 230, 231, 234, 249, 254, 287
guilty person, 143
Gulf States, 149
Gutkin, 7

H

H'orasan, 8
hacked, 46, 189
hackers, 11
Hadith, 20
Hafizi Azimullah, 210
Haji Bashir, 208
HaKaras HaTov, 8
Hakim Sanai, 180, 284
Halacha 14, 22
Halliday, 139
Halpern, 215
Halverson, 18
hammer, 19, 153, 185, 212
handcuffs, 188
hang, 148
hanging, 28
HANGING, 250, 252, 284
hangings, 141
Hanifi, 216
harassed, 185
harboring a fugitive, 184
harboring terrorists, 238
harboring" terrorists, 184
hardworking, 221
harm's way, 138
Harper's Magazine, 183, 186, 187
harrowing regime, 21
Harry Reid, 140
harsh, 193, 221, 223
harsh measures, 193
Harshly imposed, 217, 219, 225
Harun Amin, 11, 285
Harvard Kennedy School, 37
harvest, 16, 205, 225
harvesting, 16
Hatch-Dupree, 35, 36, 37, 45
HATE, 3, 137, 189, 229
hate mongers, 12
hate speech, 229, 230, 231
HATE SPEECH, 20, 284
hated, 221, 231
hateth, 49
Hayden, 186
Hazara, 46, 50, 141, 145, 146, 211, 222
Hazaras, 4, 37, 50, 145, 211, 222, 223
headaches, 227
headman, 206
heads up, 159
headscarf, 20
health care, 18, 19, 265, 266
heart, 179, 210, 215, 236
heartache, 214
Heaven, 18, 26, 27, 221, 238
Heavenly Court, 27
heavy weapons, 241
heinous crimes, 6
Heisler, 213
HEJIRA, 284
HEKMATYAR, 284
HELICOPTER, 2, 58, 113, 284
Hell, 195
Helmand, 16, 24, 40, 196, 197
Helms, 6, 26
Herald Sun, 46
Herat, 11, 22, 25, 30, 46, 47, 215, 230, 246, 249, 265
HERAT, 53, 250, 252, 266, 284
heroin, 16, 38, 41, 106, 160, 195, 201, 205, 206, 207, 208, 216, 219, 234
Heroin, 16, 160, 200
HEROIN, 41
heroin labs, 41
Herold, 5
HIDDEN IN PLAIN SIGHT, 3, 20, 189, 229
Hidden Mitzvah, 6
high heels, 140
HIGH ON HEROIN, 219
highly effective, 217, 225
Hikmatyar, 211
Hillel, 287
HILLEL, 284
Hilton Hotel, 239
HINDU, 215
Hindu temples, 48
Hindus, 48, 238
Hirsh, 186, 238
History, 215, 216
Hitler, 239
hits, 189, 230
hoard, 16, 220
hoarding, 220
Hodu to Cush, 225
HODU TO CUSH, 284
Holbrooke, 3, 221, 222, 225, 228, 229
HOLLYWOOD, 146
Hollywood Women, 6
holocaust denier, 184
Holtzman, 183, 187
holy, 11, 209
HOLY LAND, 284
Holy One, 222
holy sites, 11
home, 12, 13, 20, 44, 140, 143, 144, 209, 210, 212, 215, 218, 219, 221, 223, 266
homes, 150, 191, 209, 266
homosexual, 24, 249
homosexuality, 147, 249
honest, 206, 221, 223, 236
honor, 183, 202
horrific, 239, 242
horror stories, 139
horrors almost beyond words, 235
hostage, 203
hostile and misleading, 45
House of Searching Study, 9
Howard Zinn, 191
HRW, 185
human, 7, 23, 40, 139, 140, 143, 145, 231, 235, 236, 266
human nature, 236
human relations, 235
Human Rights, 3, 19, 37, 139, 141, 142, 143, 185, 212, 213, 214, 219, 235, 266
human rights violations, 235, 236
Human Rights Watch, 139
humanitarian aid, 47, 199, 203, 209
humility, 202, 242
Hungarians, 230
Hungary, 229
hunger, 15
hungry, 151
Hunt, 36
husband, 19, 22, 143, 144, 185, 212, 213
Hutchinson, 200
HYPERINFLATION, 4, 285
hypocrisy, 208

I

I is for Infidel, 35
I know all that I need to know about the Taliban, 183
I like my job, 187
Iacopino, 142, 143, 213
iconoclastic, 35
ID, 188, 193
ideas, 236
ideological ally of OBL, 156
idol smasher, 48
Idolatry, 48
idols, 6, 42, 48
if God is not with us, 202
ignorance, 235
Igrot Moshe, 138
ihrām, 20
illicit opium, 39, 200, 201
illiterate, 28, 29, 30
image of God, 180
Imam, 11, 185, 186
Imam Abu-Namous, 11
IMF, 2, 90, 92, 93, 96, 99, 100, 102, 109, 125, 126, 127, 129, 130, 248, 261, 263, 264, 284, 285
impasse, 195
impeccable behaviour, 156
imprisoned, 149, 150, 190, 215
improper speech, 231
inaugural addresses, 203
incest, 5, 22, 249

incidents, 165, 211, 249
income, 13, 16, 195, 197, 200, 201, 218, 225
inconsistent, 7, 249
increase joy, 225
independent judiciary, 31
Inderfurth, 145
India, 48, 155, 238
indicted, 26, 184, 287
indigenous support, 219
individualist Human Rights, 31
Indonesia, 185
Inebriety, 208
infidels, 202
influence thought, 235, 236
information, 41, 159, 173, 184, 185, 187, 213, 225, 229, 232, 265
informative, 216, 287, 288
injection, 234
innocence, 23, 231
INNOCENTS ABROAD, 284
insecurity, 220
insider, 204, 220
insightful, 21, 288
Institute of Islamic and Arabic Science, 11
institutions, 178, 193, 236, 266
insulate, 178
insulated, 179
insurance, 30
Insurgency, 18, 156
insurgents, 227
integrity, 7, 8, 44, 173
intel, 193, 201
intelligence chief, 198
Intelligence Division, 198, 200
intelligence services, 219
intentional killing of innocent people, 162
international community, 15, 42, 153, 197, 202, 253
International Community, 196
international diplomatic corps, 46
international humanitarian law, 40
International Journal of Drug Policy, 18, 204, 205, 207, 218
International Law, 199
international markets, 200
International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, 42
international recognition, 30, 220
international sympathy, 217, 219, 225
internet, 11, 211, 225
INTERPOL, 201
interpretations, 196
interview, 25, 29, 38, 47, 48, 192, 202, 203, 207, 210, 219, 232, 233
intoxicants, 9
intoxicating, 9
invaded, 201
invest, 221
investment, 30
inviolate territory, 28
iPod™, 288
Iran, 41, 46, 141, 186, 234
IRANIAN REVOLUTION, 284
Iraq, 182, 190, 191, 238
IRAQ, 284, 285
Iraqis, 238
IRNA, 47, 208
ironic, 234
Islam, 11, 12, 20, 35, 42, 48, 158, 178, 202, 203, 217
Islamabad, 18, 40, 47, 155, 207, 208, 253
ISLAMABAD, 28, 33, 284, 285
Islamic, 11, 13, 24, 35, 36, 37, 42, 44, 45, 47, 139, 140, 159, 185, 195, 199, 201, 203, 207, 225, 231, 234, 237, 249, 265, 285
ISLAMIC EMIRATE, 3
Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, 42
Islamic Law, 195, 199
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, 175, 287
Islamic Program of the Taliban, 30
Islamic Republic of Iran, 11
Islamic society, 195
Islamic State of Afghanistan, 11, 42, 201, 207, 285
Islamist movements, 196
Ismail Khan, 52, 67
isolate, 48
Israel, 7, 11, 18, 35, 44, 45, 179, 182, 185, 195, 196, 215, 224, 227
Issak, 7
issues, 7, 44, 144, 185, 202, 234
Ivy League University, 187

J

Jackbooted skin head, 191
JACOB & ESAU, 284
JAFSAR, 250
jail, 188, 205, 206
jailed, 26, 197, 206
JALABAD', 284
Jalalabad, 206, 213
JALALABAD, 41, 210
Jalil Ahmad, 37
jama, 142, 213
JAMA, 142, 143, 213
Jamaica, 39
Jamal J. Elias, 48
James Carroll, 198
James Miller, 148
Jamila, 155
Japan, 47, 49, 87, 123, 126, 156, 183, 218, 287
Japan Daily Press, 49
Japanese, 47, 50
Jason Burke, 152, 153, 154
Jauzjan, 24, 249
Jawbreaker, 159, 185, 212
Jay Leno, 146, 147
Jenin, 238
Jerusalem, 7, 11, 33, 44, 140, 145, 193, 194, 195, 208, 212, 215, 287, 288
Jerusalem Post, 7
Jesuit, 178, 187
Jewish, 6, 8, 9, 11, 15, 22, 32, 33, 34, 177, 178, 179, 185, 188, 189, 193, 195, 196, 213, 215, 223, 238, 239, 288
Jewish American, 288
Jewish children, 34
Jewish community, 8, 22
Jewish Encyclopedia, 8
JEWISH LAW, 284
Jewish missionaries, 33
Jewish way of learning, 288
Jews, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 18, 33, 35, 45, 137, 178, 183, 192, 196, 215, 227, 230, 232
JEWS, 2, 3, 229, 245
JEWS IN AFGHANISTAN, 284
Jihad, 12, 217
jihad against Jews and crusaders, 12, 238
jihadi supporters, 27
Jimadi-ul-Ula, 253
Jina, 238
Jitney Systems, 288
John F. Burns, 21, 36
JOHN F. BURNS, 250, 284
John Milton, 177
Jolyon Leslie, 31
Jonathan Feinstein, 195
JONATHAN STEELE, 250, 284
Jorgenson, 34
Joschka Fischer, 216
journalist, 45, 172, 190, 221
journalists, 143, 159
joy, 151
Joyce M. Davis, 243
judge, 22, 266
Judge all people favorably, 231
JUDGE PEOPLE FAVORABLY, 284
judge them favorably, 287
judgment, 178, 221, 222
judicial executions, 15, 230
judicial procedure, 19, 21
judicial procedures, 19
judicial process, 221
judicial punishments, 22, 144, 158, 232
judicial review, 19
Judy Benjamin, 147
Judy Swallow, 6
just means, 181
just weights and measures, 6
justice, 3, 5, 28, 78, 99, 121, 122, 135, 142, 152, 153, 154, 163, 174, 186, 194, 204, 221, 237, 241, 249, 287

K

Kabul, 3, 7, 8, 19, 20, 21, 22, 25, 30, 35, 36, 41, 42, 43, 44, 46, 48, 50, 139, 141, 142, 144, 145, 158, 195, 207, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 222, 229, 230, 249, 265, 266
KABUL, 2, 3, 4, 7, 18, 19, 21, 24, 34, 36, 37, 45, 61, 63, 65, 91, 92, 95, 98, 142, 161, 173, 207, 209, 210, 211, 217, 218, 245, 249, 250, 251, 252, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 284, 285
Kabulese women, 146
kadosh baruch hu, 222
KAFKAESQUE, 285
Kalashnikov, 142, 150, 154, 240
Kamal Matinuddin, 241
kamikaze, 6
Kandahar, 12, 21, 22, 24, 25, 30, 42, 196, 199, 210, 215, 218, 219, 220, 249, 265, 266
KANDAHAR, 4, 215, 250, 251, 252, 284
KARZAI, 285
Kashmiri, 155
Kaufman, 208, 209
keep all these commandments, 224
Kenjitsu Nakagaki, 48
kept silent, 178
Khalilzad, 227
Khalqis, 179
Khan, 30, 206, 249
KHOEI, 285
Khost, 210
Khvajeh Baha Od Din, 207
Kiddushin, 9
kidnapped, 22
killing people, 193, 211
killings, 15, 160, 197, 211, 222
kind, 8, 16, 21, 24, 25, 48, 173, 177, 185, 216, 220, 223, 224, 225, 230
kindness, 9, 199, 209, 224, 231
Kindness Cars, 288
KING SOLOMON, 284
Kiruvans, 288
Kletsky, 224
knees, 159, 185
Knight Ridder Newspapers, 243
Kofi Annan, 38
Komarow, 204, 205, 206
Kondaki, 208
Koran, 206, 209
kosher, 88, 188, 288
Kotal Morcha, 24, 249
Kroft, 160
Kublai Khan, 6, 284
Kucinich, 186
Kuehn, 156

L

LA Times, 182
lab destructions, 200
labor, 16, 211
L'Action Humanitaire, 145
Laghman, 40, 155
Lakewood, 189, 224
lament, 44
Lamentations, 44
LAND OF ISRAEL, 284
landmines, 153, 240
Landmines, 141
Languages, 6
Lao Tze, 237
lapis lazuli, 13
last two, 7, 202
Laura Bush, 140
LAU-TZE, 284
law, 9, 22, 25, 26, 27, 33, 40, 139, 184, 201, 203, 212, 213, 221, 234
law and order, 156, 241

Law School, 193
lawful, 8
laws, 6, 24, 208, 236
Le Monde, 13
leaders, 6, 12, 23, 27, 42, 46, 47, 50, 172, 178, 208, 223
leaks, 16, 220
leashes, 185
left out any mention, 24
legitimate government, 43, 195, 196
legitimate Moslem government, 182
lenient, 25, 204
let the guilty party go free, 26
Levine, 185
Lewalski,, 177
Lexis Nexis, 185, 208
LexisNexis, 21, 23, 25, 40, 41, 142, 151, 152, 249
LEXIS-NEXIS, 159
Library of Congress, 234
licenses to schools, 209
Liebman, 26
lies, 36, 222
life sentence, 208
limb of a living creature, 6
Lincoln Chafee, 42
Linschoten, 156
Lintner, 207
lips, 224
Lisa Wynn, 149
liver damage, 234
lives of many are at stake, 229
loans, 218, 225
Loay Bagh, 206
LOC, 253
local, 7, 13, 16, 23, 37, 38, 106, 196, 199, 204, 205, 206, 207, 210, 215, 227, 266
LOND. TIMES, 284
London, 25, 36, 139, 148, 154, 208, 219, 245, 253
London Review of Books, 166
London School of Economics and Political Science, 139
long and peaceful life, 229
looked the other way, 178
loopholes, 8
LOSE, 4, 172, 182
Losses, 182
lost tribes of Israel, 185
love, 48, 183, 193, 236
love for truth, 193
loving peace, 287
loving people, 287
Luck, 183
lucrative, 45, 208
Luke Harding, 45
lunch, 188
Lynn L Amowitz, 146

M

MacMakin, 33
Maddow, 186, 238
MADRASAH, 284
MADRASSA, 285
madrassas, 37, 196
MADRASSES, 2, 9
maiming, 24, 25, 139, 140, 144, 184, 185, 212, 223
MAIMING, 2, 139, 173, 284
maimings, 139, 183, 196, 212, 219, 223, 230, 234
Maiwandi, 28, 183, 222, 225, 227
makeup, 149, 211
make-up, 140
Make-up, 149
making things, 16
making things up, 143
Malala Yousafzai, 161, 163, 165
MALALA YOUSAFZAI, 2, 161, 179, 285
Malaysia, 39
male paramours, 223
Mali, 39
Malinowski, 215
malnutrition, 47
man-days, 16
manipulating the media, 20
Manos, 142, 213
Mansfield, 16, 18
Mao, 217
Map, 4
maps, 4, 12, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 192, 193, 213, 216, 221, 222, 225, 228
marbeh b'simcha, 225
MARCO POLO, 284
MARCUS N ADLER, 284
Margolin, 215
MARK TWAIN'S, 284
market, 16, 140, 204, 206, 209, 220, 225, 234
Martin Kramer, 157
martyr, 66
Marx, 210, 217
MASHADI JEWS, 284
massacre, 37, 145, 156, 223
massacres, 13, 211, 223
MASSOUD, 2, 3, 4, 89, 98, 104, 114, 284, 285
Mastermind, 156
master's degree, 214
Masud, 30
material wellbeing, 181
materialists, 99, 181
Mavis Leno, 146, 147
Mazar, 13, 30, 145, 211, 222, 223
MAZARI, 2, 4, 58, 113, 284
Mazar-i-Sharif, 13, 145
Mecca, 48, 246
MEDIA, 2, 9, 160
media generated expectation, 19
media hysteria, 189, 288
media offensive, 253
medical, 142, 178, 208, 266
medical doctor, 88
medical emergency, 224
medical journal, 142
medically indicated substitute for alcohol, 234
medicine, 214
Medico-Legal, 208
Meet the Press, 158
Meeting House, 192
Melachim uMilchamot, 22
Melbourne, 46
mellifluous pen, 223
memory, 143, 213
menstruating, 149
mercenaries, 221, 227
Mercury News Washington Bureau, 243
mercy, 153, 202, 203, 215, 246
Mercy, 222
Messenger of Allah, 20
Metropolitan Museum of Art, 46
Michael Barry, 145
Michael Griffin, 216
microphone, 153, 207, 239, 244
midat ha-rahamim, 222
middat ha-din, 222
Middle East, 38, 210, 217
Middle East Institute, 38
Middle East J, 216
Middle East Journal, 38
middle of a battle, 222
Midianites, 224
Midrash, 44
Midrash Rabbah, 202
Migdol Bavel, 6
might makes right, 46
Militant Islam, 217
Militants, 210
military, 8, 16, 24, 193, 197, 202, 234, 235, 249, 265
Military, 29, 156, 196
military man, 193
militia, 24, 37, 48, 145, 207, 239, 240
Militia, 214
Ministries of Information, 42
Ministry of Promotion of Virtue and Suppression of Vice, 42
minyan, 224
miraculous, 13, 15, 46
Mishneh Brura, 224
Mishneh Torah, 22
misinformation, 208
misinforming, 232
misled millions, 234
misogynists, 18, 137, 140
misogyny, 21, 173, 238
mission, 11, 30
missionaries, 33, 34, 253
MISSIONARIES, 2, 33
mistake, 147, 223, 226, 228, 232, 234, 237
mistaken, 30, 46, 225, 231, 233
mistakes, 221, 222, 223, 228
misunderstood, 190, 229
Mitchell, 183, 186, 187
mitzvah, 8
mitzvahs, 224
MOCKERY OF JUSTICE, 285
Modern Orthodox', 178
modern times, 205, 217, 220, 225
modernity, 145
modesty, 173, 202
Mohammad Masoom] Afghani, 37, 48
Mohammad Omar, 12, 24, 207, 208, 266
MOHAMMED GUL, 46
Mohammed Omar, 37, 45
Molnar, 229
moment of certainty, 203
money, 15, 47, 140, 178, 179, 201, 208, 220, 221, 227
MONEY PRINTED FOR THEM IN RUSSIA, 284
MONGOL, 284
Mongolia, 49, 287
MONGOLIAN, 4
Mongols, 50
monolith, 238
monopoly, 177, 238
Monterey, 210
monthly periodical, 234
moral legitimacy, 182
morally, 182
morally toxic environment, 208
morally uplifting, 288
Morphine, 201
Morphsuit, 149
Mortality Survey 2010, 150
MOSADDEGH, 284
Moscow, 224
MOSES IN EGYPT/SINAI/TORAH, 284
Moshe Feinstein, 138
Moskovski, 42
Moslem calendar, 253
Moslem Cleric, 193
Moslem website, 190, 288
MOSLEM WEBSITE, 285
Moslem Women, 191
Moslems, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 30, 50, 182, 234
Mosque, 11, 185, 188, 253
mosques, 15, 36, 198, 212, 219
most effective drug control action, 205, 217, 220, 225
most important cause of all., 208
most well informed people in the world, 233
mother, 19, 22, 143, 187
motivation, 70, 181
movie theaters, 21
Ms, 20
Mt. of Olives in Jerusalem, 7
Muhammad, 20, 42, 149, 206, 253
MUHAMMAD IBN BATTUTA, 284
MUJAHEDEEN, 284
mujahedin, 155
Mujahid, 12, 210, 227
Mulla Muhammad Omar, 149
Mullah Dadullah, 12, 156
Mullah Mohammad Omar, 39, 162, 287
Mullah Muhammad Umar Mujahid, 253
Mullah Muhammad Umar Mujahid., 253
Mullah Omar, 3, 29, 35, 37, 39, 45, 47, 65, 76, 98, 99, 107, 109, 110, 113, 119, 121, 125, 129, 130, 134, 162, 165, 166, 167, 171, 176, 190, 202, 215, 223, 242, 253, 287
MULLAH OMAR, 3
Mulvihill, 232, 233
murder, 5, 19, 22, 26, 27, 142, 144, 159, 209, 211, 212, 213, 232
MURDER, 3, 211
murdered, 13, 141, 144, 212, 213, 215, 221, 225, 230, 235
murderer, 19, 141, 142, 152, 153
murderers, 235
murdering, 19, 196, 223
MURDERING, 2, 6, 141, 209

museum, 35, 36, 37
music, 158, 212
MUSIC, 2, 158
MUSLIM SCHOLARS, 284
Muslim state, 179
Muslims, 36, 48, 189, 202, 203, 229
my country is vast, 202
My Life With The Taliban, 39, 121, 122, 287

N

Naby, 210
Nadler, 186, 187
Nai As Munkar, 149
nail, 139, 140, 144, 185, 211, 212, 223
nail polish, 149
NAIL POLISH, 2, 139, 173
nail varnish, 139
Nail Yale, 140
Najibullah, 20, 28, 36, 157, 241
NAJIBULLAH, 2, 250, 284
Namibia, 39
Nancy Hatch Dupree, 36, 45, 198
Nangarhar, 40, 206, 213, 219
NANGARHAR, 252, 284
Narcotic Drugs, 208, 219
narcotics, 16, 39, 40, 41, 195, 208, 253
Narcotics, 42, 195, 197, 201, 207, 209
Nasreen Ghufran, 241
National Security, 159, 202, 210, 215
National Security Advisor, 159
National Security Council, 202
nationalism, 33
NATO, 29, 221
Natural Gas, 29
natural monopoly, 177
Naval Postgraduate School, 210
Nazirite, 9
Nebraska /Omaha, 253
NEBUCHADNEZZAR, 284
Neier, 186, 223, 231, 233, 234, 235
NEIER, 3, 231
Netherlands, 15, 39
Neuborne, 187
Nevasky, 238
New Delhi, 155
New York, 8, 44, 188, 210, 211, 242, 244, 248, 266
New York City, 44, 188
New York Review of Books, 195
New York Times, 15, 22, 37, 160, 198, 206, 210, 215, 217
New York University, 186, 187, 211, 266
news, 11, 16, 19, 21, 24, 25, 40, 41, 42, 47, 142, 156, 188, 189, 202, 206, 216, 217, 265
newspapers, 188, 249
Newsweek, 210
nice, 224, 231
NIMROD, 284
Nisha Varia, 139, 185, 223
no response, 185, 186, 192, 212, 233
Noam Chomsky, 178
Nobel, 18, 141
Nobel Peace Prize, 161, 194
Nobel Prize, 18
non-Afghan influences, 45
non-decisive, 227
Non-Jew, 6
nonsense, 21, 41, 230, 232, 233, 235, 236
Noorzai, 208
Nora Boustany, 243
northeastern tribal areas, 197
Northern Alliance, 11, 12, 13, 29, 36, 38, 39, 43, 46, 139, 140, 155, 156, 160, 184, 196, 201, 207, 211, 212, 218, 219, 221, 225, 228
NORTHERN ALLIANCE, 2, 4, 80, 116, 251, 284
Norway, 40
nose cut off, 3, 229, 231
not afraid, 192
Not interested, 192
not pointing a finger at others, 238
notes on the subject, 228
notorious criminals, 28
novel, 148, 288
number of hits, 189
nuptial canopy, 44
NUZHAT KHATOON, 285
NY, 23, 44, 211, 231, 266
Nyberg, 235
NYC, 1, 4, 34, 41, 48, 139, 188, 192, 195, 198, 208, 212, 237, 253
NYU, 187, 195

O

oath, 143
Obama's, 3, 6, 176
OBL, 11, 12, 26, 27, 28, 32, 35, 47, 88, 156, 174, 176, 182, 194, 216, 229, 230, 238, 245, 253, 284
obscene, 24
Observer, 19, 140
obviously horrible people, 188
occupation of Jerusalem, 11
Occupy union square, 237, 238
Occupy Union Square, 192
Occupy Wall Street, 192
occupying Kabul, 156
office, 11, 40, 44, 159, 185, 188, 206, 215
officials, 16, 36, 37, 40, 44, 48, 197, 208, 209
Ohav Shalom, 287
Oifen goniff brent dos hittel, 110, 143
Oil, 30, 217
oily sinecure, 182
Olam ha Emes, 223
oligarchs, 182
olive branch, 15, 49, 197
Omar, 11, 25, 28, 29, 30, 37, 145, 156, 184, 202, 203, 204, 206, 214, 215, 231, 249
Omid Marzban, 156
ONDCP, 42
Only love-and-compassion dispels hate, 48, 183
open and positive, 192
Open Society, 3, 231, 233, 234, 235
OPEN SOCIETY INSTITUTE,, 3
opiates, 16, 200, 234
opinion, 35, 45, 189, 210, 236
opium, 193
Opium, 9, 12, 16, 18, 40, 41, 186, 195, 196, 201, 204, 205, 285
OPIUM, 1, 2, 3, 4, 8, 197, 201, 241
opium poppy ban, 13, 18, 38, 45, 46, 49, 216, 217, 219, 223, 231, 232, 233, 234
opium poppy eradication, 37, 39, 216
opium poppy farmer, 219, 232
opium poppy growing, 13, 16, 38, 41, 160, 184, 185, 187, 196, 204, 218, 219, 221, 223, 225, 227, 232, 234, 265
oppress, 236
oppression, 12, 48, 222
OPPRESSION, 2, 18, 159, 176
oppression of women, 146, 155
optics, 288
Orah Hayyim, 138
ordinary enemies, 49
Ordinary hatred, 49
ordinary people, 48
Orphanhood, 150
Orthodox, 21, 24, 178, 188, 193, 196, 288
Orthodox Jewish Scholar, 196, 288
Osama, 11, 21, 22, 156, 186, 202, 203, 238
Osama Bin Laden, 154
OSI, 186, 223, 233
ostracism, 6
ostracize, 48
other people's values, 177
Outstanding Investigative Journalism – Long Form', 150
overproduction, 218, 225
overwhelming majority, 20
Ows, 237, 238
Oxford, 241
Oxford U. Press, 156

P

pain, 203
Pakistan, 6, 8, 15, 24, 33, 37, 40, 41, 48, 139, 145, 179, 182, 197, 208, 210, 215, 217, 225, 231, 240, 244, 245, 253
PAKISTAN/DIVISON OF INDIA /CIVIL WAR, 284
Pakistan's nuclear proliferation program, 182
Pakistani, 40, 52, 83, 99, 108, 120, 121, 123, 126, 134, 135, 155, 161, 162, 163, 164, 166, 167, 175, 179, 197, 219, 227, 257, 262, 285
Pakistani boys' school, 161
Pakistan's proxy, 145
Pakitani military, 167
Palermo, 41
Palestine, 12
PALESTINE, 284
PALESTINIAN, 284
Palestinian National Authority, 11
Palestinians, 11, 12, 192, 196
Panj, 42
parade around, 153
Parchamis, 179
parents, 33, 177, 210
parents can chose, 238
pariah nation of the world, 219
participant, 232
participate, 235, 236
partnership, 227
Pashtu, 50, 202
Pashtun, 50, 141, 183, 211, 213, 244, 245
Pashtuns, 141, 185, 215
PASHTUNS, 251, 284
Pathology, 208
patient, 27
peace, 38, 44, 48, 49, 141, 182, 192, 222, 224, 238
Peace, 9, 48, 49, 50, 60, 61, 88, 99, 110, 113, 133, 139, 141, 147, 161, 165, 175, 181, 192, 194, 213, 228, 233, 234, 237, 247, 258, 259, 287, 288
peace and security, 147
peace in Israel, 182
Peace in the World, 9
Peace Islands Institute, 48
Peacebuilding, 146
pearls, 224
peer review, 142
peer reviewed, 204, 213, 214
penalty area, 151, 152
penguingroup, 222, 227
per capita per year, 219, 230
perfidious, 45
perfume, 140
Perkei Avos, 179, 191
perpetual war, 182
persecution, 230
PERSECUTION, 2, 33, 46, 51, 52
persecutions, 33
PERSIAN, 284
person days, 16
Personal Reader™, 177, 288
person-years, 22, 230
Peshawar, 6, 198, 215, 253
Petzet, 35
Pezzullo, 159
PHILADELPHIA, 284
Philippe de Montebello, 46
philosophical extremism, 156
PHOTO, 4, 195, 285
photographer, 195
photographs, 140
PHR, 141, 143, 145
physical abuse, 144, 209, 210, 212
Physicians, 19, 141, 143, 214
Physicians for Human Rights, 19, 145, 146
pickup truck, 24, 150, 249
pièce de résistance, 150, 151
piece of paper, 192
piety, 149
pig's nose, 27
pigs nose, 195
Pino Arlacchi, 237
pipeline, 29, 30, 210

PLAIN DEALER REPORTER, 214
planted, 218, 220, 225
playing, 158, 212
PLAYING, 2, 158
pleasures, 9
plowed the fields, 197, 206
ploy, 199
plural, 152, 240
PNA, 11
Poet, 189
poisoned, 223
Police, 188
POLICE, 251, 285
police informant, 26
policemen, 32
polish, 3, 139, 140, 144, 185, 211, 212, 223
political act, 48
political instrument, 45
political opportunist, 202
political processes, 238
political recognition, 217, 219, 225
politics, 208
poor, 22, 33
POPPY, 1, 3, 4, 8, 241
poppy planting season, 207, 218, 220, 225
Population Based Assessment of Women's Mental Health, 213
Post, 215
Poupko, 224
poverty, 147, 151, 244
power elites, 177
Pragmatic Publishings, 189
prayer, 224, 244
prayers, 9, 179, 213, 228, 234, 238
praying, 149, 244
pre-9/11, 232
precise thinking, 9
precursor chemicals, 201
predatory, 25
predictable, 218, 220
PRE-ISLAMIC, 2, 13, 35, 173, 243
pre-Islamic art, 13, 35, 36, 37, 42
PRE-PERSIAN PERIOD, 284
PRESIDENT, 3, 176, 231, 284
President Obama, 3, 6, 176, 221
President of the United States, 15
President Rabbani, 12
presidential palace, 36
press officer, 159
prestige, 202, 203
price, 16, 41, 143, 186, 187, 197, 199, 200, 204, 209, 216, 218, 219, 220, 221, 223, 225, 228, 232, 233, 234
price collapse, 225
prices, 15, 16, 204, 208, 218, 219, 220, 223, 225, 228, 233, 234
PRICES, 4
Prime Minister, 140
PRINTING MONEY IN RUSSIA, 2, 4, 89, 284
prison, 205, 207, 211, 215, 249
prisoners, 145
PRIVATE, 3, 187
Problematic Points, 146
PROBLEMATIC POINTS, 212
processing plants, 253
PRODUCTION, 4, 201
professed enemy, 227
professional peace activist women, 192
Professor, 139, 144, 184, 186, 188, 192, 195, 209, 216, 223, 225, 232, 234, 235
profit, 15, 16, 197, 204
Profits, 200
PROHIBITED, 250, 285
Prohibition, 18, 205
promiscuity, 5
promise of God, 202
promises, 202
propaganda, 6, 45
propaganda cartoon, 157
propagandist, 4
propagandistic, 232
prosecution, 287
proselytize, 33, 288
prostitution, 21, 22
protected, 35, 46, 47, 202
province, 4, 12, 13, 38, 41, 42, 46, 50, 156, 187, 206, 213, 215, 218, 219, 221, 223, 249, 266
Psalm 79, 44
psychological effect, 234
psychological toll, 146
PUBLIC, 159, 183
public attitude, 232
public cause, 208
public domain, 159, 234
PUBLIC EXECUTION, 159
public health, 214
PUBLIC HUMILIATION, 250
public intellectuals, 159, 172
public judicial proceeding, 26
public law, 9
public mind, 139
public opinion, 223
public records, 232
public school system, 238
public schools, 177
Public Schools, 34
public square, 27
public-address system, 206
published, 18, 21, 23, 30, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 50, 137, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 193, 203, 204, 205, 208, 213, 216, 217, 219, 221, 223, 232, 234
publisher, 188
punctuation, 202
pundits, 198
punishments, 15, 23, 159, 196, 204, 205, 249
puppet, 12, 13, 18, 137, 182, 219
puppets, 12, 221, 234
PUREISLAM WEBSITE, 285
Purim, 9
purpose of prayer, 224
pursue it, 222, 224
pursuing peace, 287
pushed out of the helicopter, 66
Pushto tribes, 8

Q

Qalamuddin, 209
Quaker, 192
QUAKERS, 284
Qudratullah Jamal,, 37
quest, 222
question, 12, 16, 39, 44, 159, 185, 190, 206, 212, 214, 221, 224, 225, 231, 233, 234
questions, 6, 10, 11, 188, 203, 213, 224, 229, 234
Quran, 22, 202

R

R. Eleazar ha-Kappar, 9
Rabani, 145
Rabbani, 30, 139, 199
RABBANI, 250, 284
Rabbi, 179, 187, 188, 224
Rabbi Dovid Soloveichick, 179
Rabbi Moshe ben Maimon, 22, 284
RABBI YEHOSHUA BEN PERACHIA, 284
rabbis, 32, 224
Rabbis, 181
Racai Iskander, 192, 237
Rachel Corrie, 191
Rachel Corrie], 238
radical/leftist, 192
Radin, 224
radio, 8, 25, 45, 140, 186, 202, 207, 208, 216, 249
RADIO, 3
Raitberger, 139
Rasekh, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 212, 213, 214, 221
RASEKH, 284, 285
Rashi, 8
Rashid, 13, 16, 30, 143, 186, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 232, 233, 234
RASHID, 3, 6, 176
rate of judicial executions, 15, 237
Ratner, 186, 187
rats, 229, 230
raw opium, 219, 225
RAWA, 18, 19, 142, 151, 153, 154, 155, 185
REACTION, 3, 172
reactionary, 145
read, 42, 185, 193, 199, 208, 216, 227, 229, 235, 266
real good, 208, 233
reality, 11, 19, 26, 27, 44, 159, 177, 223, 225
REALITY, 2, 10
Reaping the Whirl-wind, 216
reason not to speak too loudly, 229
recognize the Taliban, 140, 147
recognize their government, 48
recognizing good, 8
RECOMMENDATIONS, 34, 172, 177
reconciliation, 49, 227
recorded, 143, 186
Recorded live, 238
RED MOSQUE, 285
reduction, 40, 42, 200, 201, 204, 205, 218, 220, 223, 234
refiners, 197
refugee, 238
refutation, 140
refutations, 140
relations between individuals, 235
Religion In The News, 157
religious, 7, 8, 9, 11, 13, 15, 20, 21, 26, 33, 42, 43, 47, 173, 177, 178, 179, 182, 183, 189, 217, 219, 223, 229, 234
RELIGIOUS, 3, 229
religious belief, 27
religious community, 181
religious contexts, 9
Religious Jew, 229
religious Moslems, 196, 199
religious Muslim scholars, 229
religious oppression, 20
religious people, 155, 181, 217, 238
religious program, 178
religious values, 33
reluctant to speak in public, 229
Remains of the day, 215
remember, 8, 144, 159, 215
reporter, 21, 22, 36, 45, 230, 232, 249
reprehensible, 196
Repression, 210
research, 10, 11, 23, 33, 229, 232
researched, 33, 190
resentment, 48
resistance, 15, 197
responsibility, 37, 39, 46, 49, 64, 99, 128, 151, 253, 288
restrict the entry, 40
restrictions on women, 151
Resurgence, 217
retaliate, 48
Reuters, 24, 25, 139, 209
revenue, 209, 220
Revolutionary Association of Women of Afghanistan, 19
REVOLUTIONISTS, 284
reward, 3, 43, 163, 167, 215, 287
REWARD FOR HIS ARREST, 285
Rewards For Justice, 287
REWARDS FOR JUSTICE, 3, 285, 286, 287
RFJ website, 287
Rice Christians, 33
Richter, 3, 233, 235
right to be heard, 235, 236
righteousness, 202
rights, 19, 23, 40, 50, 139, 140, 143, 145, 210, 213, 231, 235, 236, 266
rings, 140
Ritual purification, 238
Riverdale, 23, 182
Roads, 186
robbed, 220
robbing, 22
Robert Burns, 189
rocketed, 211
Rogue State, 221
Rohde, 232, 233
ROHDE, 285
Rolling Stone Magazine, 186
Roman Catholic, 34, 178
Roman Catholic Priests, 193
roof over their head, 8
Roosevelt's "four freedoms", 237
Rope and a Prayer, 231, 233

Rosh Chodesh, 185, 224
Rosh Kollel, 188
Roth, 185
routinely violated, 178
Royal Netherlands Institute of Southeast Asian and Caribbean Studies, 208
rubble pile, 191
Rubin, 39, 54, 67, 81, 83, 86, 89, 110, 113, 115, 121, 122, 123, 129, 132, 140, 144, 149, 165, 173, 174, 186, 195, 196, 211, 216, 217, 221, 222, 223, 225, 227, 231, 232, 233, 234, 238, 243, 264, 266, 287, 288
RUBIN, 3, 173, 211
rule, 198, 210, 212, 223
rule of law, 31
Rule of Law, 146
rules of evidence, 26, 287
RUMI-BALKHI, 284
rural, 210, 213, 232, 265, 266
Russia, 29, 182
RUSSIAN, 284
Russian Empire, 116
Russian Federation, 39
Russian Imperial, 116
Russian speaking, 20
Russians, 26, 182, 199
Rutherford Place, 192
Ryder, 18

S

S. AFRICA, 285
SAADIA, 284
sacredly, 177
sacrifice, 144, 203
sacrifice by Abraham,, 48
safeguard, 178
safety, 37, 48, 188
sages, 87, 88, 180, 190, 231, 238
sages of Islam, 238
Saira Shah, 148, 150
Salaam, 213, 215, 228
SALANG PASS, 2, 3, 80, 116, 136, 284
SALARIES, 250, 284
salutations, 202, 203
Samad, 145, 214
Samangan, 13
Samuel, 88, 103, 284
San Jose Mercury News, 243
sanctions, 13, 29, 39, 43, 44, 45, 46, 48, 219, 221, 234
sanctions based on lies, 46
SANCTIONS REGIME, 285
sanctity, 32
sanctuary, 28
Sanhedrin, 138, 181
satellite phone, 287
Saudi Arabia, 11, 15, 25, 149, 184, 193, 215, 219, 230, 242, 247
save someone's, 138
Saxe, 180
Sayed Rahmatullah Hashimi, 47, 148
scamming the public, 188
scholars, 11, 24, 25, 26, 50, 195, 221, 223, 225, 229
school, 25, 33, 143, 144, 177, 178, 193, 209, 210, 212, 213, 214, 223, 266
SCHOOL, 2, 3, 6, 141, 209, 211
SCHOOL TEACHER, 285
schoolchildren, 136, 162
schooling, 145
schools, 9, 33, 34, 144, 148, 177, 178, 179, 209, 210, 212, 226, 238, 241, 242, 247, 265, 266, 284
Schools, 209
SCHOOLS, 4, 209, 250, 284
schoolteacher, 212
Schrettner, 18, 197, 198, 199
Schwartz, 227
scientific, 173, 208
scientific competence, 173
SCIENTIFIC UNDERSTANDING, 284
scientist, 188
scorched, 211
Scottish, 189
Screamed, 192
screaming, 152, 153, 192
seat, 12, 13, 221, 234
seat of Afghanistan, 221, 234
secret, 148, 149, 151, 155, 184
secret information, 184
Secret pictures, 150
secretary of state, 202
Secretary of State, 209
secular, 7, 178
secular regimes, 34
secularists, 20, 179
security, 39, 153, 188, 193, 197, 227, 247
SECURITY CHIEF, 284
see good, 224
seek peace, and pursue it.", 222
Sefer, 7, 22, 28, 138, 180, 181, 201, 288
Sefer ha Chinuch, 138
Sefer Shoftim, 22
Sefer Torah, 7, 181
Seidler, 208
self-perpetuating acts, 231
seminaries, 178
Semple, 37, 46
Senate Armed Services Committee, 8
Senate Committee On Foreign Relations, 147
Senate Democratic Leader, 140
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 143
senior officials, 40, 202
Senior Professor of Political Science, 192
September 11, 29, 32, 195, 204
Servant of Islam, 253
Seven Laws of Noah, 5
Seventy Languages, 6
sexes must be separated, 148
Seymour Hersh, 166
Shabbes, 192, 224
SHAHPUR AHMEDZI, 250
SHAHR-I SOKHTA, 284
Shahrivar, 212
Shalom, 196, 213, 225, 228, 235, 236, 287
shame, 203, 205
SHARI'AH, 253
Sharia Law, 159, 195
SHARIA LAW, 284
Sharia Law., 159
Shariat, 24, 207, 208, 216, 249
Sharif, 211, 223
Sharon Waxman, 6, 147
Shechem, 22
sheliach tsibor, 224
Shia Muslim minority, 46
shield, 191
Shiite, 37, 46, 48, 50, 230
Shiite Iran, 11
SHIITES, 46, 51, 52, 284
Shimon bar Yochai, 181
shlug, 188
shoot, 141, 202
shooting, 144, 151, 153, 211
shootings, 141
shopkeepers, 41
Shoshana Poupko, 224
shot, 19, 144, 151, 154, 155, 159, 185, 223
shout me down, 191
show the evidence, 238
shows of force, 15
shrines of unbelievers, 42
shul, 188
Shulchan Aruch, 138
shura, 208
Shurobod, 42
significant, 7, 16, 40, 199, 200, 201, 204, 220, 232
Silk Road, 217
sin offering, 9
SINAI, 284
sincere, 221
sink hole, 227
SINS OF OMISSION, 2, 137, 160
sister, 187
SKINHEAD, 285
skyrocketed, 197, 200
Slander leads to bloodshed, 138
slaughter, 224
slave, 22
sloppy work, 19
slumped, 217, 218, 225
slush funds, 208
small arms, 241
Smith, 214
smokes cigars, 179, 238
smoking, 9
smuggling, 39, 41, 44, 201, 207
snorted, 234
snow job, 147
soccer field, 154
soccer game, 152
social chaos, 15
social policies, 151
social space for, 50
Socialist, 178
society, 22, 46, 172, 173, 178, 179, 221, 227, 235
society be preserved, 138
society of enduring worth, 46
sociopaths, 227
sodomite, 24
SODOMY, 2, 3, 23, 24, 249
Sohaila Siddiq, MD, 20
soldiers, 24, 36, 37, 211
Sonia Shah, 146
sophisticated adulterers, 230
Soros, 232, 233, 235
SOROS, 3
soul, 9
sources, 7, 11, 24, 43, 50, 187, 189, 204, 205, 207, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 232
South Asia, 179
South Asian Affairs, 145
Southwest Asian, 200
SOVIET ATTACKS, 284
Soviet invasion, 192, 214
SOVIET INVASION, 284
SOVIET TROOPS, 284
Soviet Union, 141, 156, 201, 242, 243, 253
SOVIET UNION, 284
sowing season, 207, 208
speak the truth, 138
speaking, 4, 18, 189, 195, 202, 224, 234
speaking out, 188
SPEAKING OUT, 1, 4
special agent, 199
special envoy, 38
special sanctity, 177
spectators, 141, 142, 153, 154, 249
speculation, 220
speculative, 220
spelling, 50, 202, 235
Spillius, 155
spirit of the law, 26
spiritual & physical, 202
spiritual leader, 202
spokesperson, 145, 208
sports stadium, 142, 150
spritual covenant, 181
stabbing, 142
stability, 220
stadium, 19, 141, 142, 159, 185, 211, 249
stadiums, 158, 159, 185, 211, 212, 223
stand idly by, 138, 222
standing on line, 191
Stanley, 6
stars for ever, 287
State Department, 11, 15, 29, 30, 32, 41, 42, 44, 159, 197, 198, 216, 219, 242, 287
State Dept, 3, 11, 15, 20, 42, 47, 212, 215, 216, 243
State Dept., 3, 11, 20, 42, 47, 212, 215, 243
State Dept. spokesman, 47
State of Israel, 179
STATE OF ISRAEL, 284
state sponsored, 179
state sponsors" of terrorism, 184
states, 24, 29, 40, 205, 213, 218, 235, 236, 265
STATUES, 2, 13, 35, 173, 240, 243, 284, 285
steal, 5
stealing the children, 34
stealing the children, 33
STEELE, 210
Steinbaum, 198
stepson, 21
Steve Adler, 232, 237
Steve) Adler, 195
Stewart, 183
sticklers, 22, 221
sticky gold, 232

STINGER MISSILE, 284
Stockholm, 210, 265
STOCKPILE, 41
stockpiled opium, 13
stockpiles, 39, 41, 42, 197, 208, 209
stockpiles of opium, 174, 237
stocks, 15, 16, 197, 209, 218, 220, 225
stone wall, 23, 24
stoned to death, 20, 21, 229, 230
stood 8, 181
Story Tellers, 2, 6, 148, 150, 151, 159
Story Tellers Tale, 148
Storyteller's Daughter, 150
stranger, 8
strategy, 184, 240
straw that broke the camel's back, 48
straw that broke the camel's back, 243, 253
streaming live, 192
street value, 16
strength, 26, 227
strengths, 172
strong, 35, 38, 202, 210, 231
strong drink, 9
students, 143, 144, 177, 187, 191, 210, 213, 223, 224, 265
Students, 192, 193
subhuman, 193
subject matter, 213
subscription, 253
subsidized bread, 238
substantial, 20, 37, 38, 39, 50, 178, 198, 199, 200, 201, 204, 220
subversive', 150
subways, 188
Sudan, 203
SUDAN PRISON, 285
SUEZ CANAL, 284
suffering, 16, 45, 222, 234
suicide, 6, 146, 203
SUICIDE/ MURDER ATTACK, 285
suit, 188
supply, 13, 16, 38, 106, 200, 201, 205, 209, 212
SUPPORTING THE TALIBAN, 285
suppressed interview, 3
Supreme Court, 42, 208
Supreme Court of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, 42
Sura 24. An–Nur, 22
surveyors, 40
surveys, 12, 38, 40
suspicion, 147
Swedish Committee for Afghanistan, 185, 210, 265
Sweeney, 140
Switzerland, 37, 47
symbol of remembrance, 146
synagogue, 7, 8

T

Tables, 4
tactical alliance, 182
Tajikistan, 38, 39, 41, 42, 106, 206
Tajikistan border, 43, 106, 107, 207, 237
taken over, 189
Takhar, 13, 38, 42, 207, 218
taking any money from anyone, 238
Taleban, 139, 202, 203
talebearer, 138, 222
Taliban advisor, 6
TALIBAN AT THE GATES, 284
Taliban decrees, 149
TALIBAN FRONTS, 284
Taliban offices, 40
Taliban officials, 7, 15, 249
Taliban Religious Police, 149
Taliban spokesman, 61, 62, 63, 65, 123, 162, 262
Taliban's goal, 196
talk with customers, 188
talking speed, 203
Talmud, 9, 87, 88, 103, 180, 181, 190, 287
Talmud, Kiddushin 70 a & b, 88
Taloqan, 38
tanks, 15, 197
TAOISM, 284
Tashkent, 198
Tatiana Zerjal, 50
tax evasion, 26
taxation, 16, 197, 200, 220
taxed, 197, 199, 225
taxed farmers, 197
Taylor, 140, 185
teacher, 143, 144, 187, 193, 210, 212, 213, 223, 224, 238
TEACHERS, 2, 6, 141, 209
teach-in, 191
TEACH-IN, 285
Ted Rall, 217
Teguba, 186
Tehran, 41, 47
television, 21, 146, 156
TEMPLE IN JERUSALEM, 284
Temple in Jerusalem, 44, 231
Temple Mount, 11, 32, 238
Temple of Solomon, 11
temptations, 8
Ten Lost Tribes, 8
ten percent, 16
TEN TRIBES, 284
tens of thousands, 221, 230, 232, 235
terrorism, 6, 8, 103, 156, 167, 188, 196, 200, 201, 237, 242, 243, 287, 288
Terrorism, 156, 184, 242
terrorism expert., 188
terrorist movement, 196
terrorists, 39, 184, 196, 215, 229, 235
Teshuvos, 9
Texas, 15, 29, 219, 230
Texas Law, 26
texts, 9
THE AUTHOR, 1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 189, 195, 200, 237, 284, 285
The Community of Nations, 46
the company, 189
The Islamic Emirate, 234
The Mirage of Peace, 31
The Myth of the Taliban / Al-Qaeda Merger in Afghanistan, 156
The Times, 156, 245
The World Food Programme, 151
theft, 36, 37, 43
theft of service, 188
THEY SAY SEVENTY, 158, 181
thieves, 153, 211
Thomas, 197, 198, 199, 210, 235, 236
Thorne, 204, 205, 218
thoughtful, 186, 191, 192, 193, 223, 234, 235
thoughtful comments, 191, 193
threat, 8, 18, 42, 63, 124, 166, 181, 194, 199, 205, 215, 232, 243, 246, 247
three R's, 150
thumb cut off, 139, 185
tickets, 188
Time Magazine, 20, 229, 230
Time magazine article, 238
Tisdel, 222, 227
to love the Lord, your God, 224
To see ourselves as others see us, 189
tobacco, 9, 153
TOKHI, 250
Tom Hays, 208
tongue, 224
Tony Blair, 216
Torah, 5, 6, 7, 9, 22, 28, 34, 48, 89, 167, 178, 180, 181, 186, 189, 190, 191, 197, 198, 199, 213, 221, 224, 230, 235, 236, 237, 238, 287, 288
TORAH, 1, 2, 5
Torah and the Taliban, 235
Torah law, 9
torture, 146, 197, 204
touchline, 154
tour guide, 11
Tower, 6
TOWER OF BAVEL, 284
town, 15, 24, 36, 205, 206, 207
traders, 220
tradition, 6, 35, 202
traditional, 8, 9, 11, 12, 20, 26, 27, 212, 213
traditional approach, 237
traffickers, 41, 201, 225
trafficking, 39, 42, 197, 200, 201, 208, 209, 217, 225
train, 19, 188, 196, 266
train people, 196
transnational, 18
transportation, 220, 238
transportation policy, 288
Treatment, 208
treaty, 195, 200
trees, 211
trial, 22, 27, 33, 158, 195, 211, 221, 230
trials, 147, 230
tribal, 15, 206
tribal leader, 208
trigger, 205, 213
Trio's Tale, 150
trouble, 218, 238
TRUCES, 284
try to be better, 238
Tsadikim, 6, 202
Tucker, 18
Tunisia, 39
turban, 153
Turkestan, 116
Turkey, 191
TURKEY, 284
Turkic, 50
Turkish Cultural Center, 48
Turkmen, 50
Turkmenistan, 29, 210
turn the many to, 287
turnstile, 188
two systems of courts, 26

U

U. N. Regional Coordination Officer, 37
U. NEB, OMAHA, 285
U.S., 3, 4, 5, 13, 44, 172, 187, 201, 209, 214, 221
U.S. FED. COURT, 285
UK, 15, 18, 25, 140
Ukraine, 39
ulama, 240
ulema, 42
ultimate ideal, 235, 236
UN, 11, 12, 13, 15, 16, 18, 33, 37, 38, 39, 40, 44, 45, 47, 48, 187, 189, 193, 195, 197, 199, 201, 205, 208, 217, 218, 219, 221, 225, 232, 233, 234, 237, 265, 285
UN 1267, 253, 285
UN maps, 193
UN Secretary General, 38
UN Special Rapporteur, 33
uncorroborated, 232, 234
UNDCP, 12, 40, 41, 187, 201, 204, 285
undermine the cultural foundations of Islam, 20
understanding, 49, 140, 173, 184, 204, 234
Understanding, 184
understood, 29, 50, 137, 140, 184, 192, 204, 221, 233, 265
UNDP, 31, 50, 86, 94, 102, 124, 126, 127, 129, 130, 284
UNESCO, 37, 47
UNION SQ, 285
Union Square, 4, 192, 195, 237
UNION SQUARE, 1
unique, 204, 229
Unitarian, 186, 192
United Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan, 140
United Kingdom, 39
United Nations, 8, 11, 12, 31, 38, 39, 40, 41, 43, 44, 45, 47, 183, 198, 200, 201, 206, 210, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 246, 248, 266
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, 47
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 183, 198
United States, 5, 11, 38, 106, 140, 142, 143, 160, 195, 196, 200, 202, 203, 217, 219, 225, 226
United States Institute of Peace, 146
university, 177, 191

University of Nebraska, 210
University of Riyadh, 11
unmanned, 161
Unocal, 29
UNOCAL, 210
UNODC, 18, 195, 197, 198, 199, 200
unodc.org, 12, 15, 16, 18, 38, 40, 195, 197, 198, 219, 222, 225, 227
Unveiling The Taleban, 146
Urdu, 245
US occupation, 218
US Senator Carl Levin, 8
US State Department, 11, 41, 215, 285
USA, 7, 18, 19, 206, 212, 265
ushr, 16, 220
USIP, 198
USSR, 67, 91, 115, 156, 250, 284
ustream.tv, 237, 238
Uthman Ghazi, 287
Uzbek, 50
Uzbekistan, 15, 198

V

value, 16, 22, 209, 225
vantran613, 23, 182, 185, 211, 221, 222, 227, 231, 233
Varia, 139, 185
vaults, 36
Veil Of Silence, 20
veil of terror, 150
viability of the family, 22
victims, 23, 48, 142, 152, 153, 155, 249
video, 19, 141, 142, 235, 236, 238
VIDEO, 148
videographer, 192
videos, 192
Videos, 192
VIDEOS, 3, 237, 285
Vietnam', 253
VIETNAM WAR, 284
viewers, 148
village, 15, 197, 205, 206, 207
village councils, 197
vines, 211
Virginia, 11
VIRULENT, 3, 20, 189, 229
Vizārat-i Amr bi-al-Ma'rūf va Nahī 'An al-Munkar, 149
VOA, 183, 202, 203, 215, 265
Voice of America, 3, 29, 30, 183, 202, 287
volleyball, 151, 153
voluntary censorship, 178

W

Waco/David Koresh, 27
wage rate, 16
Wahabiists, 35
wail, 44
walk in all His ways, 224
Walkman™, 288
Walled Garden of Truth, 180, 284
Walsh, 185
Wandemberg, 235, 236
Wankel, 198
WAPHA, 147
WAR OF INDEP, 284
War on Terror, 221
war on terror', 6
war on terrorism, 202
War Resisters League, 185
warfare, 200, 201
WARNER, 202
warning, 22, 207
Warren Hoge, 237
Warsaw, 224
Washington Post, 6, 29, 209, 243, 245
Watanabe, 191, 239
'watch my words', 236
watchful, 236
WBAI, 183
WBUR Radio, 6
weaknesses, 140, 172
wealthy benefactors, 178
weapons, 206, 220
web accessible, 192, 237
Webmaster, 189
website, 11, 15, 18, 19, 141, 143, 189, 195, 200, 230, 235
websites, 11, 12, 215
Wechsler, 183
weddings, 149
weeding, 16
weeping, 44
welcomed, 156
well intended people, 234
Westermeyer, 142, 143
western, 20, 37, 41, 46, 47, 140, 144, 160, 201, 204, 217
Western diplomats, 41
Western Diplomats, 243
western fashions, 20
Western intelligence, 204, 207, 216
western journalists, 144
Western Media, 20
wetlands, 227
wheat, 16, 197, 206
WHIPPING W' CAR RADIO ANTENNA, 250
Wickens, 233
Wiesenthal Center, 11, 196
wife, 140, 188, 224
wild animals, 138
Wilder, 199
wine, 9
Winkler, 18
wipe out opium, 8, 12
wiped out opium, 13, 183, 219, 230, 234
wire service, 21, 23, 24, 25, 145, 146, 204, 214
wise shall shine, 287
witness, 190, 213
witnesses, 21, 22, 26, 56, 74, 98, 133, 142, 144, 155, 173, 175, 259
WNYC, 8, 189, 195, 196, 238, 285
woman, 3, 19, 21, 22, 139, 140, 141, 143, 144, 145, 159, 185, 192, 211, 212, 213, 214, 223, 229, 230, 231, 249
WOMAN, 3
women, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 31, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 153, 154, 155, 156, 185, 188, 190, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 223, 229, 230, 231, 241, 247, 248, 253, 265, 266
WOMEN, 2, 18, 34, 139, 159, 173, 176, 209, 265, 284
women are safe to walk the streets, 153
women hanged, 21
women teachers, 144, 211
Women's Alliance for Peace and Human Rights in Afghanistan, 147
Women's Commission for Refugee Women and Children,, 147
Women's Health, 19, 142, 213, 214
Women's Health and Human Rights in Afghanistan A Population-Based Assessment, 147
Women's National Republican Club, 184
women's rights, 145
wood and stone, 44
work of your hands, 6, 177
World Can't Wait, 185
World Factbook, 50
WORLD WAR II, 284
worship, 6, 35, 37, 42, 48
wrath, 44
wreckers, 235
wrong doing, 234
wrong reasons, 147
Wrongfully Convicted, 26

X

XUANZANG, 284

Y

Y CHROMOSOME, 4
Yaakov, 181
Yakawlang, 156, 211
Yale University, 140, 217
Yangi Qala, 38, 207
Yeshiva, 11, 128, 178, 194, 229, 288
Yeshiva University, 11, 178
Yiddish, 143
Yonkers, 23, 182
York, 15, 22, 29, 37, 44, 46, 160, 186, 192, 195, 198, 206, 207, 209, 210, 211, 215, 216, 217, 219, 226, 266
York Daily Record, 209
young boys, 23, 24, 25, 249
young woman, 191
Youtube, 243

Z

Zabihullah Mujahid, 162
zaeef, 215
Zaeef, 215, 225
ZAEEF, 285
Zarmina, 19, 212
zero, 38, 42, 196, 199
Zieba Shorish-Shamley, 147
Zinn, 186, 192
ZINN, CANADIAN FEDERAL JUDGE, 285
Zohra, 141, 142, 146, 212, 213, 214, 221
Zohra Rasekh, 146, 157
ZOHRA RASEKH, 3, 4, 145, 212, 214
Zuccotti, 192
Zulauf, 197, 198, 200
ZULAUF, 3, 199, 200, 285

א

אברהם אבינו, 180
אדם, 179
אומרים שבעים, 6, 158, 180, 202, 284
אחיו, 181
אֵיבְךָ, 49
אֱמֶת, 181
ארץ ישראל, 180, 284
אֶרֶץ יִשְׂרָאֵל, 180
אַרְצָה, 181

ב

בישובו, 138
בַּקֵּשׁ, 181, 222, 223

ד

דבקות, 224

ה

הלומד, 179
הַשׁחַד, 178

ו

ואמר שמואל במומו פוסל, 88, 103
ובלכתך בדרך, 6
וְדִבַּרְתָּם, אֲחֵדִים, 180
וְהַמַּשְׁכִּילִים, 287
וְיֵרֵץ, 181
וישקהו, 181
וישתחו, 181
וכל הפוסל פסול, 88, 103
וּלְדָבְקָה בּוֹ, 224
וְרָדְפָהוּ, 181, 222, 223

ז

זהר, 287

ח

חבירו, 138
חכם, 179
חָכָם, 180, 181
חפץ, 138

י

ידוע, 138
יציל, 138
יצרה, 138
ירידת הדורות, 181
ישעי, 138

כ

כוונה, 224
כּוֹכָבִים, 287

ל

לא תעמד על-דם רעך, 138, 222
לְאַהֲבָה אֶת, 224
לא-תלך רכיל בעמיך, 138, 222
לֶךְ-לְךָ, 202
לָלֶכֶת בְּכָל דְּרָכָיו, 224
לְעוֹלָם וָעֶד, 287
לשבת, 138
לשמה, 288

מ

מַצְדִּיקֵי הָרַבִּים, 287
מצוה, 138, 224
מְצוּוֹת, 224
מַשְׂכִּילִים, 287

ס

סנהדרין, 138
ספר החינוך, 138
סתירה, 7
סתירות, 7, 224

ע

עֵינַי, 178
עָשׂוּ, 181

פ

פְּעָמִים, 181

צ

צַדִּיקִם, 178

ר

רָקִיעַ, 287

ש

שָׁבַע, 181
שורש, 138
שיציל, 138
שָׁלוֹם, 181, 222, 223
שמואל, 88, 103, 284
שָׂפָה אֶחָת, 180

TIME INDEX & TIME LINE

NAMES OF CONFIRMED ANTI-TALIBAN &/OR ANTI-JEWISH PROPAGANDISTS ARE IN RED; REASONABLY HONEST PROFESSIONALS: GREEN. ASA= THE AUTHOR

YEAR/ M/ D /FOOTNOTE ON PAGE	EVENT	NOTE IN BOOK
~2200 BCE A	7 LAWS OF NOAH	2
~2100 BCE	SHAHR-I SOKHTA, ANCIENT CITY, SW AFGHANISTAN/ E. IRAN	
~1900 BCE A	ABRAHAM VS. NIMROD IN BABYLON -- ON THE VALUE OF FREE SPEECH- "70 LANGUAGES" - IN COMBATTING TYRANNY—LEARNED FROM THEIR STRUGGLE AT THE TOWER OF BAVEL.	4,177F 828
~1700 BCE A	JACOB & ESAU: STRUGGLE BETWEEN SPIRITUAL & MATERIAL	834B
~1400 BCE A	MOSES IN EGYPT/SINAI/TORAH	16
~1000 BCE A	KING SOLOMON'S REIGN BEGINS IN JERUSALEM	20B,C
700 BCE A	EXILE OF TEN TRIBES	
600-300 BCE	RISE OF BUDDHISM	182
6th CENT. BCE	LAU-TZE IN CHINA, FOUNDS TAOISM, CONTEMPOR. OF CONFUCIUS	917
562 BCE A	DANIEL & NEBUCHADNEZZAR [SCIENTIFIC DEATH OF NEBUCH.]	1133
530 BCE	DEATH OF CYRUS THE GREAT [SCIENTIFIC DATE]	
480 BCE A	JEWS IN AFGHANISTAN -- FROM HODU TO CUSH	
479 BCE [d]	CONFUCIUS IN CHINA [BORN 551BCE], FOUNDER OF WHAT BECAME KNOWN AS CONFUCIANISM, CONTEMPORARY OF LAU-TZE	917
330 BCE	ALEXANDER THE GREAT IN AFGHANISTAN	
~250 BCE	ASHOKA & ARAMAIC/GREEK, BUDDHIST INSCRIPT. IN KANDAHAR	
~125BCE B	RABBI YEHOSHUA BEN PERACHIA: JUDGE PEOPLE FAVORABLY	1124
10	HILLEL THE ELDER [DIED 10CE AT AGE OF 120]	1131
50-135	RABBI AKIVA	825
70	DESTRUCTION OF THE TEMPLE IN JERUSALEM	162
100-400	RISE OF CHRISTIANITY	
165-257	SAMUEL OF NEHARDEA -- OR שמואל --TALMUDIC SAGE	388
~600	BAMYAN STATUES & HIGH POINT OF BUDDHISM IN AFGHANISTAN	116
622	RISE OF ISLAM / HEJIRA	
~630	XUANZANG, CHINESE BUDDHIST MONK VISITED BAMIYAN	115
7th-9th CENT.	RISE OF ISLAM IN AFGHANISTAN	
882-942	SAADIA GAON –JEWISH SAGE OF ERA, LIVED IN BAGDAD 921 -942	
~1000	AFGHAN GENIZA -- FOUND IN N. AFGHANIST. - THEN PART OF THE "SILK ROAD ' FROM EUROPE & MIDDLE EAST TO CHINA	15A
1130-1173 C	BENJ. OF TUDELA,~1170:" IN BAGDAD THERE ARE ~40K JEWS … IN SECURITY, PROSPERITY & HONOUR UNDER THE GREAT CALIPH…"	
1150 [DIED]	HAKIM SANAI, AFGH POET, AUTH.*THE WALLED GARDEN OF TRUTH*	827
1135-1204	R.MOSHE BEN MAIMON/MAIMONIDES: IN EGYPT FROM ~1166-1204	67
1186	FORCED CONVERSION OF JEWS – BECAME PASHTUNS	15 C2
1207-1273	RUMI-BALKHI, AFGH'N /PERS'N/ISLAMICSUFIPOET/SCHOL., FLEES BALKH TO TURKEY AS MONGOLS INVADE AFG. LED BY HULAGU KHAN, THEY SACK BAGHDAD IN 1258 & MURDER THE CALIPH.	15 C2
1274 & 1281	KAMIKAZI = *DIVINE WIND* -- FROM THE GREAT STORMS THAT DESTROYED INVADING MONGOL FLEETS OF KUBLAI KHAN.	8
~1273	MARCO POLO IN AFGHANISTAN – ON THE WAY TO KUBLAI KAHN	
13th CENT.	SEFER HA-CHINUCH / BOOK OF MITZVA EDUC., [ANON.] SPAIN	643 B
~1334	MUHAMMAD IBN BATTUTA, MUSLIM EXPLORER: IN AFGHANISTAN	
1563-78	SHULCHAN ARUCH: YOSEF CARO, ISRAEL & MOSHE ISSERLES, PRAGUE	643 A
1600	GIORDANO BRUNO EXECUTED FOR HELIOCENTRIC TEACHING	
1604	KING JAMES I [ENGL.] WRITES STRONG ANTI-TOBACCO PAMPHLET	19-D
1612-1947	BRITISH IN INDIA [EAST INDIA COMPANY - 1858– BRITISH RAJ]	823
1773/12/16	BOSTON TEA PARTY	565
1778	QUAKERS, HANGED BY REVOLUTIONISTS OF PHILADELPHIA, USA	564
1840	MASHADI JEWS FLEE FROM IRAN TO HERAT, AFGHANISTAN	
1866	DARUL ULAM DEOBAND MADRASAH FOUNDED	822
1867-9 D	MARK TWAIN'S INNOCENTS ABROAD AMERICANS VISIT HOLY LAND	
1869/11/17 E	SUEZ CANAL OPENED, AFTER 10 YEARS OF CONSTRUCTION	
1893	DURAND LINE DIVIDES PASHTUNS IN AFGHANISTAN & INDIA	638
1904-7 F	M. N. ADLER, SON CHIEF RAB. BRIT. EMP., TRANSLATES ארץ ישראל = LAND OF ISRAEL AS PALESTINE – WITHOUT A FOOTNOTE	
1916-34	RUSSIA ATTACKS "BASMACHIS" IN MUSLIM CENTRAL ASIA	546
1920-1932	BRITISH WAR/CONTROL IN IRAQ	
1933 [DIED]	THE CHOFETZ CHAIM, MOST WIDELY LOVED & RESPECTED AUTHORITIES ON JEWISH LAW IN THE LAST 200 YRS. BORN ~1838	9
1939-45	WORLD WAR II	
1947	CREATION OF PAKISTAN/DIVISON OF INDIA /CIVIL WAR	823
1948	UN RECOGNITION OF STATE OF ISRAEL	
1953/8/19	US INTERFERES IN IRAN/ MOHAMMAD MOSADDEGH VS. THE SHAH	
1950's-70's	US, FRANCE, GERMAN, USSR INFLUENCE ON AFGHAN SCHOOLS	233
1966	EISENHOWER HWY COMPLETED FROM KANDAHAR TO KABUL	
1966-70's	RABBANI, MASSOUD, HEKMATYAR: IN SCHOOLS RUN BY NON-MOSLEMS	233
1971	BANGLADESH WAR OF INDEP. FROM PAKISTAN.	1-B6
1974	VIETNAM WAR– END MAIN US INVOLVEMENT : 1 MILLION+ DEAD	1-B6
1978/1-'79/2	IRANIAN REVOLUTION	
1979/12	SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN	
1980/3/24	ARCHBISHOP ÓSCAR ROMERO ASSASSINATED CONDUCTNG MASS	861
1980's	TALIBAN FRONTS [ALSO CALLED "MULLAH FRONTS"]	137 E, 718 B
1980's G	TRUCES WITH MASSOUD & HIS ALLIES ON THE SALANG PASS/ SOVIETS BUILD DOUBLE FUEL PIPELINE THROUGH SALANG PASS	365-368
1986	FIRST JIHADI SCHOOL TEXTS IN AFG.PAID BY USAID/U.NEB-OMAHA	113 B
1986/5/23	R. MOSHE FEINSTEIN,[B. 3/3/1895]LEADING AUTHORITY TORAH LAW	643 D
1986/9/26	FIRST US 'STINGER' USED BY ANTI-SOVIET MUJAHEDEEN FORCES	
1987/9/30-1992/4/16	NAJIBULLAH PRESIDENT OF AFGHANISTAN & HIS BROTHER SHAHPUR AHMEDZI , SECURITY CHIEF IN SAME TIME FRAME	
1989/2/15	SOVIET TROOPS LEAVE AFGHANISTAN [starting 1988/5/15-]	
1991/12/25	BREAKUP OF SOVIET UNION	
1989/2- '92/4/16	NAJIBULLAH, AFGHAN PRESIDENT WITHOUT SOVIET TROOPS	
1992/1	RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT ENDS AID TO NAJIBULLAH	
1992/4	KABUL MONEY MARKET LOOTED & CLOSED 24 DAYS—UNDER THE CONTROL OF MASSOUD & DOSTOM VS. HEKMATYAR	446
1992/4/16-27	MUJAHEDEEN TAKE KABUL	446A
1992/4/17	NAJIBULLAH GIVEN SANCTUARY BY UN	86
1992 H	MUJAHEDEEN GOV. USE UNBACKED, RUSSIA-PRINTED MONEY	395-397
1993/2/26	FIRST BOMBING OF WORLD TRADE CENTER , 6 KILLED ,~1000 INJ.	
1993/2/28-4/19	WACO, TEXAS SIEGE, US GOV. VS DAVID KORESH & ASS. 82 DEAD	84C
1994/6/24-5	TALIBAN JOIN TO STOP LOCAL THUGS & ESTABLISH SHARIA LAW	568-7
1994/11/5	TALIBAN RESCUE 30 TRUCK, PAKIST. CONVOY, TAKE KANDAHAR	573-B
1995/2/14	TALIBAN AT THE GATES OF KABUL	235
1995/3/13 I	MAZARI ATROCITY STORY – THROWN FROM HELICOPTER?	
1995/4/19	OKLAHOMA BOMB –RESP. TO WACO SIEGE, 168 DEAD, ~$1E9 DAM.	84C
1995/5/ J	ATROCITY STORY: TALIBAN CUT OFF FINGERS FOR CARD PLAY	644
1995/9/5	TALIBAN TAKE HERAT; CITY WITH LARGE % SHIITES	194
1996/4/4 K	MULLAH OMAR HOLDS CLOAK OF MUHAMMAD IN PUBLIC-DECLARED AMIR-AL-MOMINEEN BY RPT. 1.5K MUSLIM SCHOLARS	572.b
1996/7/10 L	OBL ARRIVES IN NANGARHAR, AFG. BEFORE THIS DATE	
1996/8 [LATE]	MAN & WOMAN EXECUTED FOR ADULTERY IN KANDAHAR	60
1996/8/28	E.AFGH'N PROV'S [INCL.NANGAR.]DECL'RCIV'L WAR NEUTR'LITY, AFP	
1996/9/11-14	…THE TALIBAN…CAPTUR[ED]…THE CITY OF JALABAD' IPS 'AFGHANISTAN: A NEST OF FOREIGN RIVALRIES', DILIP HIRO, LOND., 9/18'96	
1996/9/27	TALIBAN TAKE KABUL	
1996/9/27-8 M,N	TALIBAN HANG NAJIB. & 3 CLOSE AIDES FOR MASS MURDER	APP.18
1996/8-10	KABUL MONEY MKT REMAINS OPEN AS TALIBAN TAKE OVER CITY	454
1996/10/11	RE-FORMATION OF THE NORTHERN ALLIANCE WITH RUSSIAN AID– EXCLUSIVE SCOOP :JOHN F. BURNS+ JONATHAN STEELE	342
1996/10/12	BURNS & STEELE SAY TALIBAN CASTRATE NAJIB.	330,331
1996/12/03-2001 O	MASSOUD FLOODS KABUL WITH COUNTERFEIT MONEY PRINTED IN RUSSIA. TALIBAN CURTAIL IT. COUNTERFTNG CONTINUES TO '01.	P. 89-100
1996/12/18	ONLY TALIBAN EXECUTION IN KABUL /12 MONTHS/ EXC'PT NAJIB. & 3 CLOSE ASSOCIATES HANGED FOR MASS MURDER, 9/27-8	APP. 18
1997/3/2-5/10	ABDUL SHUKOOR SATARZAI: TALIBAN ECON. SURV. UNDP	598D.1
1997/4/28	FIRST RPT: TALIBAN PREVENT BAMIYAN BUDDHA DESTRUCTION	118-B
1997/5/25	PAKISTAN IS FIRST COUNTRY TO RECOGNIZE TALIBAN	
1997/5/27-29	MASSACRE OF ~3000 TALIBAN IN MAZAR-I-SHARIF	672-B
1997/ [LATE]	"…NO INDICATION OF ANY ABUSE OF TEACHERS WORKING IN ANY OF THE HUNDREDS OF GIRLS SCHOOLS…" REPT PUBLISHED 2/'98	p.210-11
1998/1-5?	ZOHRA RASEKH DOES CROOKED 'STUDY' IN KABUL FOR P.H.R .	660
1998/2/23	USAMAH BIN-LADIN, ET AL.: JIHAD AGAINST JEWS & CRUSADERS	26
1998/2/25 P	3 MEN PUNISHED FOR SODOMY WITH YOUNG BOYS – TWO DIE	73
1998/8/5	TALIBAN'S WAR ON WOMEN: ANTI-TALIBAN BOOK & JAMA ART. [NOT PEER REVIEWED] PUB. BY PHYSICIANS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS	657 661
1998/8/7	TRUCK BOMBINGS OF US EMBASSIES IN KENYA AND TANZANIA	
1998/8/8	MASSACRE BY TALIBAN IN MAZAR I SHARIF; ≥2000 KILLED	672
1998/8/20	US CRUISE MISSILES HIT OBL'S AFG.TRAINING CAMPS, ETC. & SUDAN PHARMACEUTICAL MFG; RPTDLY KILL ~ 18 PEOPLE	178, 197,933 APP. 9.1
1998/10/21 Q	HOLLYWOOD GOES AFTER THE TALIBAN	676
1999/1/20	ZOHRA RASEKH / PHR WORK CRITICIZED BY EXPERT IN JAMA	662,663
1999/5	TALIBAN & N. ALLIANCE OPEN AFGHAN MUSEUM-IN-EXILE IN SWITZ.	128-A-C
1999/6/15 R	LAST REPORTED EXECUTION FOR SODOMY UNDER THE TALIBAN	68
1999/9-10/06	TALIBAN 'S 1st BANS ON OPIUM: 1/3 CUT IN POPPY GROWING,ETC.	588B,892
1999/10/15	UN SEC. COUN. RES.1267 SANCTIONS TALIBAN; EFFECTIVE 99/11/14-	459-H
1999/11/16	EXECUTION OF ZARMINA – FIRST WOMAN EXECUTED BY TALIBAN IN KABUL. 2 REPORTS BY JASON BURKE FROM THE STADIUM.	700
2000/1/13	AHMED RASHID: FALSE RPT RE: CLOSING KABUL MONEY MARKET	885
2000/2/21	AHMED RASHID BOOK: TALIBAN, FIRST REVIEW	886

A. DATES ONLY APPROX., BASED ON BOTH TRADITIONAL JEWISH & SCIENTIFIC SOURCES. DIFFERENCES IN JEWISH TRAD. YIELD DIFFERENCES IN PERSIAN & PRE-PERSIAN PERIOD:~150 YRS. TRAD. YR OF THE FLOOD: 2104BCE. BASED ON A SCIENTIFIC UNDERSTANDING OF THE PERSIAN PERIOD,:~2250 BCE. SIMILARLY, THE TRADIT. DATE OF ABRAHAM, NIMROD & DISPERSION AT TOWER OF BABYLON: 1764BCE & EXOD./ TORAH/ SINAI:1312BCE. 7TH LAW: 'DON'T EAT A LIMB OF A LIVING CREATURE', POST FLOOD. LAW: 'COURTS OF JUSTICE' FROM THE TIME OF ADAM. SOURCES FOR JEWISH TRADIT. USUAL VIEW OF THESE DATES IN MIDRASH SEDER OLAM – INCL.: FOUR THOUSAND YEARS OF JEWISH HISTORY AT A GLANCE. R. KEN SPIRO, 2008

B. SEE APPEND. 12 VIRULENT HATE SPEECH HIDDEN IN PLAIN SIGHT, PARTIC. P. 231

C. THE ITINERARY OF BENJAMIN OF TUDELA, CRITICAL TEXT, TRANS. & COM. , MARCUS N ADLER, 1907, BOOK, W. COLOR MAPS _____PDF OF CITED SECTION: _____

D. NOTABLY THE WORDS PALESTINE OR PALESTINIAN AREN'T IN THIS BEST SELLER BOOK.

E. NOTABLY, THE LOND. TIMES, GOES FROM HOLY LAND —BEF. THE SUEZ CANAL--TO PALESTINE, AFTER: FOR WHAT JEWS CALL ERETZ YISRAEL – THE LAND OF ISRAEL- GIVE DETAILS

F. THIS UNFOOTNOTED TRANS. IS IN THE ITINERARY OF BENJAMIN OF TUDELA,. FOR MORE ON THIS, SEE FOOTNOTE , SUPRA & THE AUTHOR'S SEFER אומרים שבעים FOOTNOTE 555.

G. SEE CH. 12: NORTHERN ALLIANCE & THE SALANG PASS & APP. 22 WHAT THE SOVIETS COULD SHIP THROUGH THE SALANG PASS DURING A 15 MONTH TRUCE WITH MASSOUD.

H. SEE CH. 14A: MASSOUD & CO. PRINTING MONEY IN RUSSIA

I. SEE CH. 10: DID THE TALIBAN THROW SHEIKH…MAZARI OUT OF A HELICOPTER? SHOWING THAT THIS ATROCITY NEVER HAPPENED MAY BE A PATH TO PEACE.

J. SEE: CH. 21: MAIMING THE HANDS OF WOMEN AND GIRLS FOR WEARING NAIL POLISH

K. …MULLAH OMAR AND TALIBAN DECISION-MAKING…APRIL, 1996,… HE ACCEPTED THE AMIR AL-MU'MININ TITLE AND HELD THE "CLOAK OF THE PROPHET"…IN FRONT OF A CROWD."

L. 1. SAUDI DISSIDENT WARNS WEST…;ROBERT FISK; THE INDEPENDENT, DATELINE: NANGARHAR PROV. [2. SEVERAL HRS DRIVE FROM JALALABAD, FISK THE MINED LAND OF THE MUJAHEDIN, 7/10/96,] "BIN LADEN REVEALED THAT HE HAD ARRIVED HERE FROM SUDAN ON MAY 18TH, ALONG WITH HIS FIGHTERS"; 3. AP, 7/11/96, KATHY GANNON, , DATELINE: ISLAMABAD, "PAKISTANI INTELLIGENCE SOURCES…SAID [OBL]… ARRIVED [WITH FAMILY &~150 MEN] IN …JALALABAD ON A C-130 TRANSPORT PLANE [~WHEN] HEKMATYAR [BECAME] NEW PRIME MIN… ON JUNE 26." [NO MENTION OF TALIBAN IN 2.2K WORDS/ 3 ARTICLES]

M. SEE CH. 11: WAS THE FORMER PRES. [NAJIBULLAH] …CASTRATED …BY THE TALIBAN?

N. SEE APP. 18: FORMAL PUNISHMENTS IN KABUL UNDER THE TALIBAN FROM 9/27/96-9/27/97

O. SEE CH. 14A: MASSOUD & CO. PRINTING MONEY IN RUSSIA; CH. 14D: THE IMF COMES TO HELP & TO EXPLAIN. SEE CHARTS : MASSOUD & CO. & HYPERINFLATION, PAGES 89, 90 & 92.

P. SEE CH. 4: EXECUTIONS FOR SODOMY; APP. 17: PUNISHMENTS FOR SODOMY…1994-2001

Q. SEE CH. 22B: MURDERING SCHOOL TEACHERS -- WITH HOLLYWOOD AMPLIFICATION

R. SEE APPENDIX 17: PUNISHMENTS FOR SODOMY …UNDER THE TALIBAN 1994 *TO* 2001

DROUGHT PERIOD IN RED, SEE TABLE: P 123, FAO, WHEAT PROD. & FOOTNOTE

PLEASE NOTE: GREEN FOOTNOTES GO TO CORRECT REF. BUT # IN TABLE MAY BE LOW BY 1 OR 2

TORAH AND THE TALIBAN BY A. S. ADLER 285

2000/3	TALIBAN BANNED THE COLLECTION OF TAXES ON HEROIN	588-C
2000/7/27	ISLAMIC EMIRATE – TALIBAN MAG. 1ST ISSUE. INCL. INTERVIEW WITH ACCUSED SPY ABDUL RAHJM ABDUL RAZAAG JANKOO	973-C
2000/7/28 A	COMPLETE BAN ON OPIUM POPPY GROWING ANNOUNCED	891
2000/8/22-25?	KABUL MUSEUM OPENS: PROVINICIAL MULLAHS HIT STATUES	177B.D4
2000/9/28 B	[ELUL 28, 5760] ARIEL SHARON & ~1K POLICE VISIT TEMPLE MT, AGAINST LONG-TIME RABINICAL DECISION NOT TO GO THERE	25 A.4 103
2000/10/7	MULLAH OMAR ON THE PALESTINIANS. PRESS RELEASE	25 A.3
2000/12/early C	SPACH MEMBERS PROPOSE FIXING BUDDHIST STATUES [p45-6]	177B.12c
2000/12/8 D	BARBARA CROSSETTE: FIRST REPORT THAT TALIBAN OPIUM BAN IS SUCCESS – & HUGE STOCKPILES IN TERRITORY OF MASSOUD	131
2000/12/13	MULLAH OMAR MEETS CHINA'S AMBASSADOR TO PAKISTAN	137-F
2000/12/19	UN SANCTIONS: RES 1333: RE. EXPELLING TALIB. AMBASSADORS	139
2001/1/19 E	EXPULSION OF TALIBAN AMBASSADORS	
2001/2/4-5	TALIB. ATTACK GHAZNI BUDDHIST SITE & ART IN KABUL MUSEUM	177E.11g
2001/2/15	OFFICIAL UN PRESS CONFERENCE ON OPIUM POPPY BAN – NO MENTION OF STOCKPILES. BUT SEE FOOTNOTE 131 B	147
2001/2[?]	UNESCO FAUX PAS – REPORTEDLY OFFERS A LARGE SUM TO REPAIR BAMYAN STATUES [?] ALSO SEE FOOTNOTE 936	176,177 177-G
2001/2/26	EDICT TO DESTROY BAMYAN BUDDHAS [SEE CHAPTER 8]	118, 155
2001/2/26	1st BROADCAST: LANGAN BEHIND THE LINES BBC2 –ON TALIBAN	684 C
2001/4	US STATE DPT. REPORTEDLY TOOK DOWN THE TALIBAN WEBSITES	21
2001/4-5 F	DONOR MISSION IN AFGH –MANSFIELD, CALLAHAN, ET AL.	37,46
2001/5/19 G	MICHAEL GRIFFIN: REAPING THE WHIRLWIND– FIRST REV. 5/19/'01	883
2001/6/26	AHMED RASHID & SAIRA SHAH MAKING THINGS UP – "BAYING FOR BLOOD" IN FILM BENEATH THE VEIL, 1st SHOWN. SEE CH. 22C	684 713
2001/8-9? H	EUGEN SORG CATCHES A. S. MASSOUD LYING ABOUT OPIUM	496
2001/9/7	LAST 2 KABUL JEWS –NEWS. ALSO SEE FOOTNOTE 13 ON DISAP. OF KABUL SHUL'S SEFER TORAH & WHERE IT MIGHT BE FOUND .	11, 12
2001/9/9	AHMED SHAH MASSOUD ASSASSINATED	875
2001/9/11	9/11 [23 Elul 5761, SEE 9/28/00] ATTACKS.SEE CH. 6: THE 9/11 COM.	
2001/9/10-11+	BENEATH THE VEIL SHOWN AROUND THE CLOCK IN 40 COUNTRIES [GET MORE DETAIL /SOURCES] ALSO SEE FOOTNOTE 721	685
2001/9/25	MULLAH OMAR TALKS WITH SPOZMAI MAIWANDI, VOICE OF AMERICA	APP.4
2001/10/11	HARUN AMIN, FIRST SEC. OF THE ISLAMIC STATE OF AFGHAN. TO UN, SAYS US TOOK DOWN TALIBAN WEBSITES PREVIOUS APRIL.	21
2001/10-12	18 MILLION PSYOPS WARFARE LEAFLETS DROPPED ON AFGHAN.	774
2001/10/16	ANNUAL OPIUM POPPY SURVEY 2001 UNDCP: EXTREME DROP OF OPIUM IN TALIBAN AREA & SHARP INCR. IN MASSOUD'S PROV.	28.b
2001/11/13	ALL KABUL MONEY MKT SHOPS LOOTED UND'R ANTI-TALIB AUSP.	456
2002/1/2-3	TALIBAN AMB. ZAEEF ARRESTED IN PAKISTAN BY PAKIST. OFFICIALS, TO BE GIVEN TO THE US [P 167, MY LIFE WITH THE TALIBAN]	137-E
2002/2 I	ASA– TEL. CONV: SPOZMAI MAIWANDI, VOA PASHTO EXPERT	88
2002/8/16	DR ZULAUF-US-DEA INTEL. NOT AWARE OF CALLAHAN REPT	APP.3
2002/8/25	ASA REC. JAMES CALLAHAN EMAIL ON 2001 OPIUM STUDY	APP.2
2002/10/7- J 2003/1/2	IMF CREATES NEW AFGHAN CURRENCY, VALUE 1000X OLD CURRENCY TO COUNTER HYPERINFLATION FROM NAJIB. & MASSOUD	438
2003/3/20	START OF WAR IN IRAQ	
2003/3/26	ASA, TALKING RE. TALIBAN, ON LINE FOR ANTI-IRAQ-WAR TEACH-IN, AT COL. U., ALMOST ATTACKED BY JACK-BOOTED SKINHEAD	PAGE 191
2003/4/10	SAYYID ABDUL MAJID AL-KHOEI MURDERED IN IRAQ-- EXPECTED BY U.S. TO DISPLACE THE INDIGENOUS SHIITE LEADERS.	1-B-3-b
2003/7/14	ASA EMAILS DARUL ULAM DEOBAND TALIBAN OUTLINE	
2003/8/29	PRICELESS 22,000 PC BACTRIAN GOLD COLLECTION FOUND INTACT	124
2003/12/26	ASA SENDS FIRST EMAIL OF "TORAH AND THE TALIBAN "	
2004/3/15-17	MICHAEL GRIFFIN'S "REAPING THE WHIRLWIND" ORDERED PULPED	354-B
2004/6/2-2004/7	KARZAI ALLIED POLICE MURDER 5 DOCTORS WITHOUT BORDERS STAFF: H. DE BEIR, DR. E TYNAES, P. KWINT, BESMILLAH, [DRIVER] & F. AHMAD, [INTERPR.] IN AFGH. SINCE EARLY '80'S, LEAVES, PROTESTING KARZAI FAILURE TO INVESTIG.	P.215
2004/9/15	ASA EMAIL: SODOMY & COLLIER TO B. CROSSETTE/NYT	68
2004/9/23	ASA EMAIL: NUZHAT KHATOON, L.O.C., RE: THE ISLAMIC EMIRATE	972
2005/3	ACADEMIC/PROFFESSIONAL RESPONSE TO TALIBAN OPIUM BAN	APP.5
2005/4/7	ASA EMAILS REWARDS FOR JUSTICE: CC TO JAMES MARGOLIN/FBI	1123
2005 [SUMMER]	ASA – PHOTO- SPEAKING OUT ABOUT TALIBAN, UNION SQ. NYC	P.1
2005/9/11	TALIBAN AMB. TO PAK., ZAEEF, RELEASED, HELD W/O CHARGES	137F
2005/10/4 [?]	MEMOIR: TALIBAN FOREIGN MIN. MUTAWAKKIL, 98 P / PUSHTO	
2005/10/8	EARTHQUAKE KILLED >70,000 IN A NEARBY PART OF THE PAKISTANI MOUNTAINS. REGIONAL TALIBAN HELP SURVIVORS	744
2006/3/01	HRW WOMENS RIGHTS/AFGHANISTAN EXPERT CALLS ASA CRAZY	843
2006/3/26	CONDI RICE LIES:~" TALIBAN KILLED PEOPLE FOR PLAYING MUSIC"	CH.23
2006/5/6	ASA & PROF. BARNETT RUBIN, TALKING ON WNYC	864
2006/5/10	ASA'S TORAH AND THE TALIBAN CITED IN ANOTHER BOOK & CATALOGUED IN AN INTERNATIONALLY ACCESSIBLE LIBRARY	848
2006/9/20 K	U.S. FED. CRT CITES THE ISLAMIC EMIRATE IN GITMO CASE. DEFNDT, GINCO.FREED OCT/7/09. NEVER CHARGED FOR ANY CRIME.	973AC
2006/10/11	GILBERT BURNHAM STUDY SHOWS ~600,000 KILLED IN IRAQ WAR	1.B.3.a
2006/10/30	US DRONE HITS MADRASSA KILLS ~80 – INCL. MANY CHILDREN	748
2007/3/27	ASA RECEIVED BARNETT RUBIN EMAIL DEBUNKING RASEKH/ PHR/FMF "TALIBAN MURDER SCHOOL TEACHER" STORY	APP.7 CH. 22A
2007/3/29	WOMEN STUDENTS AT RED MOSQUE SCHOOL ABDUCT MADDAM	752-B
2007/7/5	ASA'S CHAPTER LENGTH VERSION OF THIS BOOK – EARLIEST POSTING FOUND ON THE WEB. [ALSO SEE FOOTNOTE 851]	850
2007/7/10	RED MOSQUE SIEGE: ~300 KILLED BY PAKISTAN GOV. & GIRLS SCHOOL FOR 2000+ STUDENTS BURNED TO THE GROUND	751
2007/7/12	FAZLULLAH OF PAKISTANI TALIBAN, RAGED AGAINST THE RED MOSQUE ATTACK & ...DECLARED WAR ON PAK. GOV.	751
2007/9/24	REC. COMPLETE B/W PHOTOCOPY OF AUG 2000 ISSUE OF TALIBAN PERIODICAL ISLAMIC EMIRATE FROM NUZHAT KHATOON OF LOC	APP. 20
2007/11/10	DAVID ROHDE WAS KIDNAPPED. ESCAPED: 2008/6.	912
2008/7/5	AHMED RASHID'S BOOK DESCENT INTO CHAOS REVIEWED IN NYT	886
2008/9/18	DOUGLAS FEITH, KEY PENTAGON AFGHAN WAR PLANNER, TACITLY TELLS ASA PRE 9/11 TALIBAN NOT SUPPORTING TERRORISM	840
2009/6/4 L	RUSSEL ZINN, CANADIAN FEDERAL JUDGE'S, DECISION [2009 FC 580] CALLS UN 1267+ SANCTIONS REGIME AGAINST INDIVIDUALS A KAFKA-ESQUE MOCKERY OF JUSTICE. ALSO SEE FOOTNOTE 973	86A 160
2009/7/1 M	BOWE BERGDAHL CAPTURED BY TALIBAN	
2009/10	DOCTORS WITHOUT BORDERS RETURNS TO AFGH. AFTER 5+ YRS ABSENT IN RESPONSE TO ASSASSINATION OF 5 STAFF.	P.215
2010/1/8 & 2010/2/10 N	ASA SHOWS AHMED RASHID LYING. B RUBIN, THEN PRES. OBAMA'S AFG. EXPERT, SAYS: RASHID WAS CONFUSED. [SEE P. 225, COL. 2]	885
2010/7/28 O	ASA TEACHES CONTROVERSIAL SUBJECT: THE TALIBAN,FORDHAM U.	P.189
2010/8/02	TIME COVER STORY[8/9 ISSUE]: TALIBAN CUT WOMAN'S NOSE OFF	P.230
2010/8/8	ASA FOUND CH. TORAH AND THE TALIBAN ON MOSLEM WEBSITE OUT OF S. AFRICA – WITH 78 ITEMS ON AFG, T&T WAS #1	847 911
2010/12/16	ASA SAYS THOSE WHO BELIEVE AHMED RASHID -- ARE LIVING IN A FANTASY WORLD – RECORDED AT SOROS EVENT	912
2011/9/25	J. STEELE TACITLY REPUDIATES HIS NAJIBUL. CASTRATION TALE	331
2012/3/29-30 +	ASA SPEAKING RE: TALIBAN. SEE APP. 15: LIST OF VIDEOS:	
2012/7/20	ASA FOUND PUREISLAM WEBSITE BECAME JIHADI	911C
2012/10/9-10 P	MALALA YOUSAFZAI, SHOT IN THE HEAD BY ASSASSIN. SHOOTING CONDEMNED BY LEADING PAKIS. PRO-AFGHAN TALIBAN ACTIVIST	
2013/10/08	MALALA YOUSAFZAI BOOK I AM MALALA PUBLISHED	743
2014/5/31	BOWE BERGDAHL RELEASED BY TALIBAN IN EXCH. FOR 5 TALIBAN LEADERS HELD WITHOUT CHARGES IN 'GITMO' SINCE 2001-2	765
2014/10/10 Q	MALALA YOUSAFZAI WINS NOBEL PEACE PRIZE. OSLO.	
2014/12/15-19	SUICIDE/ MURDER ATTACK ON A PAKISTANI BOYS' SCHOOL. CONDEMNED AS UNISLAMIC BY AFGH. TALIBAN & PAK. AFFILIATE	736-739
2015/10 – 14 YEARS	US & ALLIES HAVE SPENT $2 TRILLION+ ON 14 YEARS OF WAR IN AFGHANISTAN AND NEIGHBORING PAKISTAN, WITH 200K+ KILLED	803 1.B.3a
2015/8/28	BRITISH LIBRARY REJECTS HOSTING TROVE OF TALIBAN DOCS	973
2015/12/23	ASA: FORMAL APPLIC. TO REWARDS FOR JUSTICE FOR $10E6	P.283
2016/1/23-24	PUGWASH ACADEMIC/NONOFFICIAL CONF. IN DOHA, 55 SENIOR PARTICIPANTS, INCL. TALIBAN https://pugwashconferences.files.wordpress.com/2016/01/20160123_final_report_doha2.pdf	
2016/5/25	US DRONE KILLS TALIBAN HEAD, MANSOUR, NEW HEAD: M. H. AKHUNDZADA	1125
2016/8/07	T. SIEZE AUAF FACULTY KEVIN KING & TIMOTHY J WEEKS, YOUTUBE	
2017/7/14	B RUBIN SENDS THISBK & COVER LETTER TO LISA CURTIS, NSC & ALICE WELLS, US STATE	
2017/7/19	MULLAH OMAR, WHO 'DIED >2YRS' B'FORE, STILL HAS $10E6 ARREST REWARD	1121
2017/8/14	REWARD REMOVED WITHOUT PUBLIC NOTICE BEFORE 2PM JERUSALEM TIME	P.287
2017/11/ R	CHRIS KOLENDA & ROBIN RAPHEL IN DOHA FOR INFORMAL TALKS WITH TALIBAN	
2018/5/08	FBI: $1M REWARD FOR INFO LEADING TO SAFE RETURN OF KEVIN KING	
2018/5/30	NO RESPONSE FROM REWARDS FOR JUSTICE AFTER MORE THAN 12 YEARS	P.286
2018/7/28	ALICE WELLS MEETS FACE TO FACE WITH TALIBAN IN DOHA [NYT]	
2018/8/14 S	T WANT SWAP OF HAQQANI MEMBER, OTHERS FOR HOSTAGES KING, WEEKS	
2018/9/07	DEF. SEC. JIM MATTIS MAKES UNANNOUNCED TRIP TO KABUL TACITLY CITING GOOD TALKS WITH TALIBAN BY ALICE WELLS IN JULY.[NYT]	
2018/10/12 T	ZALMAY KHALILZAD MET FACE TO FACE WITH TALIBAN IN DOHA	
2018/10/14	POPE FRANCIS CANONIZED ARCHBISHOP OSCAR ROMERO	861.B2
2018/10/24	T SAY SR FOUNDER MULLAH BARADAR FREED BY PAK. AFTER 8 YRS IN PRIS.	
2018/11/01	TALIBAN APPOINTS EX-G'T'MO PRISONERS TO BE AFGHAN PEACE NEGOTIATORS	265-B
2018/11/09	TALIBAN MEET IN MOSCOW WITH AFGH HIGH PEACE COUNCIL, CHINA & OTHERS	
2018/12/03 U	MANSFIELD REPT ON TALIBAN OPIUM POPPY BAN, NOT YET PUBLISHED	46
2018/12/17	ZALMAY KHALILZAD, UAE, SAUDI & PAK MET WITH TALIBAN IN ABUDABI, VOA	
2018/12/21	US SAID TUES,12/18, TO PULL 1/2 US TROOPS ~7K, FROM AFG.: RFE/RL, AFP, WSJ	
2018/12/21 V	Z.KHALILZAD ANTI-T. TOLONEWS/KABUL, RE: WOMEN PUNISHED IN STADIUMS BY T.	CH. 22c
2019/01/28-30 W	6 DAYS US+T TALKS IN DOHA: INFORM'L AGR'M'NT: U.S. TROOPS LEAVE AFG & T ENSURE AFG TERRITORY NOT BE USED BY 'ISLAMISTS' TO HARM US INTERESTs. US & T TO ESTAB. JOINT TEAMS TO DETAIL US TROOP WITHDRAWAL FROM AFG.	.
2019/02/05	'IN AFGHANISTAN, MY ADMINISTRATION IS HOLDING CONSTRUCTIVE TALKS WITH A NUMBER OF AFGHAN GROUPS, INCLUDING THE TALIBAN.' STATE OF THE UNION.	
2019/02/12	T. NAME 14 MEMBER NEGOT. TEAM: SHER MOHAMMAD ABBAS STANAKZAI, M. ZIAUR RAHMAN MADANI, M. ABDUS SALAM HANAFI, SHK. SHAHABUDDIN DILAWAR, MUL. ABDUL LATEEF MANSOOR, MUL. ABDUL MANAN OMARI, M. AMEER KHAN MUTTAQI, MUL. MOHAMMAD FAZIL MAZLOOM, MUL. KHAIRULLAH KHAIRKHWA, *MUL. MOHAMMAD ANAS HAQQANI*, MUL. NOORULLAH NOORI, M. MOHAMMAD NABI OMARI, MUL. ABDUL HAQ WASEEQ & MAULVI MATIUL HAQ- INCL. BROTH. OF MUL.OMAR[see p 287],SON OF M. YOUNAS KHALIS[286], 5 EX GITMO PRSIONERS [765] & *1 STILL IN PRISN.*	
2019/02/27	'EMERGING FROM 3 SOLID DAYS OF TALKS WITH T IN DOHA. MEETINGS WERE PRODUCTIVE. WE CONTIN. TO TAKE SLOW, STEADY STEPS TOWARD UNDERSTNDNG & EVENTUALLY PEACE.,10:36 PM'	
2019/03/04	QATARI FOR'N MIN. MOHAMMED BIN ABDULRAHMAN AL-THANI AT PRESS CONF. WITH RUS. FOR'N MIN. LAVROV IN DOHA [VOA, 1ST PHOTO OF US-TALIBAN TALKS	
2019/03/12	US & T 'AGREED IN DRAFT' [3/12] ON WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN TROOPS FROM AF. IN RETURN FOR PREVENTING AF. SOIL FROM BEING USED AS A HUB FOR TERRORISM: Z. KHALILZAD, AT END OF 16 DAY TALKS WITH T IN QATAR. VOANEWS	
2019/06/17	T HAD TALKS IN BEIJ. ON PEACE PROC. BEF. 7TH ROUND TALKS W. US IN DOHA. PAK.DAIL.TIM..CITES EXPRT ZOON AHMED KHAN, RES.FEL.TSINGHUA U, BEIJING,	
2019/07/11	T WANTS JAPAN ROLE IN US WITHDRWL FROM AFGH.:MAINICHI INTERV.	
2019/07/31	T EXPECTS PEACE DEAL WITH US NEXT MEETING + PHOTO T NEGOTIATORS	
2019/08/12	US-TALIB. TALKS END WITHOUT A DEAL, BOTH SIDES TO CONSULT – TALIB.	
2019/11/27	SHARON WAXMAN GETS THIS BOOK #526: RE: BENEATH THE VEIL EMMY 679	
2019/11/29	AFTER TRUMP SURPRISE THANKSGIVING VISIT TO US TROOPS IN KABUL & PRIOR PRISONER EXCHANGE : TALKS WITH T BACK ON TRACK	
2020/01/23	'TALKS OVER DATE & VENUE FOR SIGNING THE PEACE DEAL CONTINUED WED. IN QATAR,' SAID MAULAVI QALAMUDDIN, MIN. OF VICE & VIRTUE IN TALIBAN'S GOV.' https://menafn.com/1099591588/Afghanistan-Doha-talks-prolonged-over-US-withdrawal-and-prisoner-release	
2020/2/28	TALIBAN SET TO SIGN שלום AGREEMENT WITH US IN DOHA ויקחו-לי תרומה	
2020/2/29	KHALILZAD & T CO-FOUNDER MULLAH BARADAR SHAKE HANDS AFTER SIGNING	
2020/3/02	PRES. TRUMP & T. LEADER/COFOUNDER MULLAH ABDUL GHANI BARADAR, TALK	
2020/10/22	?	

A. SEE NOTE , INFRA, RE: AL GINCO,; & SEE APP. 20, PAGE FROM THE ISLAMIC EMIRATE

B. NYT, 9/29/'00, SHARON TOUCHES A NERVE, & JERUS. EXPLODES,J.GREENBERG,P.A-11,JERUS.,9/28. RIOTING & VIOLENT POLICE RESP. WAS START:2ND/AL-AQSA/INTIFADA;GOT SHARON ELECTED P.M. ON OCT/11/'97 – 2 MONTHS BEF. 'OFFICIAL' START 1ST INTIFADA, SIMILAR INCIDENT: TEMPLE MT. FAITHFUL WERE SAID TO BE COMING TO TEMPLE MT. TO LAY CORNER STONE FOR 3RD TEMPLE. WASH. POST, OCT/12/'87, ISRAELI POLICE, MOSLEMS CLASH AT TEMPLE MT; JEWISH ACTIVISTS ATTEMPT TO PRAY AT HOLY SITE, G.FRANKEL,P.A21, JERUS.,OCT/11.LEADING RABBIS IN ISRAEL: O.YOSEF, Y.SH.ELYASHIV, Y.Y.KANIEVSKY & A.HAKOHEN KOOK, PROHIBIT JEWS GOING ON TEMPLE MT. VIDEO R. O. YOSEF, Z"TSL, SAYS THIS CLEARLY– ENGL. SUBTITLES .

C. AS REPORTED BY ROBERT KLUIJVER OF SPACH. THIS DIPLOMATIC FAUX PAS WAS A KEY STEP TOWARD DESTRUCTION OF THE BUDDHIST STATUES. SEE P 45-6, FOOTNOTES177 B.12a-i FOR MORE COMPLETE STORY. SUMMARY OF WHAT LED TO DESTRUCTION OF STATUES IS ON P48, NOTE G

D. BARBARA CROSSETTE: HIGHLY RELIABLE – BUT WHY DID SHE SAY STOCKPILES WERE ON TAJIKISTAN BORD'R INSTEAD OF SAYING EXPLICITLY IN TALIBAN'S ENEMY'S TERRITORY?

E. UPI, 1/19/00, "TALIBAN REFUSE TO CAVE TO UN SANCTIONS", AMIR SHAH,ISLAMABAD, 1/19

F SEE COMMUNIC. WITH: J. CALLAHAN [US STATE D'PT] APP. 2 ; DR. ZULAUF [USDEA] APP. 3

G GRIFFIN MADE IMPORTANT EFFORTS TO CHECK FACTS, RE. DEATHS OF SHEIKH MAZARI & NAJIBULLAH—THO' HIS ANALYSIS RE. MAZARI WAS WRONG. SEE FOOT NOTES 283, 354

H. SEE: CHAPTER 16: MASSOUD CAUGHT LYING ABOUT OPIUM?

I. THIS CONV. NOTED IN EMAIL TO MS. MAIWANDI APR.2/'02 AVSHADLER@NETSCAPE.NET, SMAIWAND@VOANEWS.COM. IN EARLIER CONVERSATION, SHE SAID"KOL HA KAVOD" ON MY ANALYSIS.

J. SEE CH. 14D: IMF COMES TO HEL;P. 89, 90 & 92. IMF DOWNPLAYS NEGATIVE ROLL OF ITS CLIENTS & IMPLIES T MUCH AT FAULT FOR HYPERINFLAT'N. IF IMF WERE HONEST, MAYBE THEY COULDN'T WORK IN AFG.

K. CASE OF A.R. A. RAZAK AL GINCO, INCL. FACS. OF 10 P. OF THE ISLAMIC EMIRATE, FROM LIB. /U. NEB, OMAHA, MAG.THAT COULDN'T BE SUBSCRIBED TO DUE TO UN 1267 SANCTIONS.

L. ABDELRAZIK, PLAINTIFF, RET. TO CANAD., 6/27/'09; TAKEN OFF UN 1267 SNCTNS LIST 11/30/11 AFTER 9 YRS —INCL. YRS IN SUDAN PRISON. EXTRA-LEGAL 1267 SNCTNS BARRED BUYING T MONTHLY ISLAMIC EMIRATE;SEE:APP. 20: SAMPLE P. FROM THE ISLAMIC EMIRATE & LETTER TO REWARDS FOR JUSTICE, p. 281

M. SEE CH. 25E THE BOWE BERGDAHL- GUANTANAMO TALIBAN PRISONER EXCH'G

N. SEE APPENDIX 10: AHMED RASHID NOT RELIABLE ON PRE- 9/11/01 TALIBAN

O. UNDERGRAD ENGLISH COURSE . TEACHER WANTED STUDENTS TO WRITE ESSAY ON CONTROVERSIAL SUBJECT. NO OTHER SCHOOL GROUP INVITED ME TO THIS DAY : Oct. 27, 20

P. THE TELEGRAPH (INDIA)10/10/12, GEELANI SLAMS MALALA ATTACK

Q. SEE CH. 25D: MALALAI'S NOBEL PRIZE & PESHAWAR ARMY PUBLIC SCHOOL ATTACK.

R. S.ACKERMAN, DAILY BEAST 8/02/'18; P.JOSHI, FIRSTPOST 10/21/'18 RPT 1ST MTG JUL/'17

S. https://www.voanews.com/a/taliban-demand-swap-of-haqqani-member-others-for-western-hostages/4528031.html

T. WSJ:U.S. SPEC'L REP. FOR AFGH. RECONCIL. Z. KH.; TALIBAN OFFICIAL ,1 OF 4-PERSON DELEG. TO [JULY MTG WITH ALICE WELLS] SAID IT YIELDED "VERY POSITIVE SIGNALS", REUTRS10/13/18

U. CHECKED GOOGLE, WORLDCAT, LOC, HARVARD, INTERNET ARCHIVE, WORLD BANK, UN, ACKU

V. ACTUAL INTERVIEW 12/20/...NAJAFIZADA: MR. AMB., CAN YOU ASSURE AFG WOM'N THAT NO WOM'N WILL EVER BE PUNISHED IN A SPORTS STADIUM AS...[HAPPENED IN] '96-'01? Z K: WELL, THAT WAS DEBAUCHERY... AGAINST HUMAN RIGHTS. [ZK SUPPORT S IDEA T ABUSED WOMEN IN STADIUMS?]

W. T TO DENY AL-QAEDA & ISIS FOOTHOLD ON AFG SOIL, WASH. POST, P. CONSTABLE & K. GANNON , AP

EMAIL SENT TO REWARDS FOR JUSTICE

By ASA

APRIL 7, 2005

[TYPOS HAVE NOT BEEN CORRECTED]

[NO REPLY WAS RECEIVED TO THIS OR THE LETTER ON THE NEXT PAGE AS OF October 27, 2020]

rewardsforjustice/mullah omar
Thursday, April 7, 2005 7:05 AM
From: "as adler" <avshadler@yahoo.com>
To: mail@rewardsforjustice.net, james.margolin@ic.fbi.gov

B"H

April 6 '05

Dear "rewards for justice program",

Below are copies of the pages that I found on your website dealing with Mullah Omar of the Taliban.

He is listed under wanted/captured terrorists, but he is accused of no act of terrorism.

You say "Mullah Omar's Taliban regime in Afghanistan sheltered Osama bin-Laden and his al-Qai'da network in the years prior to the September 11 attacks." But you did not recognize the Taliban regime -- or its courts -- so how can you hold them responsible for harboring bin Laden? Isn't it the US policy that when we want a criminal extradited from a country, we recognize the country and present evidence before their courts? Did we do this in the case of the Taliban government and bin Laden?

Isn't it true that senior UN diplomats, including Lakhdar Brahimi, met face to face with Mullah Omar -- and yet you can't tell what languages -- if any -- he speaks or what he looks like? Was he a ghost when they met with him? Did he speak in tongues?

Did he make any proclamations against the US before the US attacked him? I have not been able to find any. If you have any such proclamations, why don't you post them on your site -- and send me a copy also? Proclamations made after we attacked him are a bit different. Should we expect him to be attacked by us and continue to like us? Generally, attacking people is a good way to turn them into real enemies. Perhaps in your world, it is different.

The US actually has -- or had -- at least one tape-recording of Mullah Omar speaking in one of his native languages -- Pashto -- when he called Spozhmai Maiwandi of the VOA shortly after 9/11/01 and had a 12 minute conversation with her. Were you not able to figure out from this that he speaks Pashto? Did he say anything in that interview, in your opinion, that suggests that he was/ is interested in attacking the US or American citizens? If he did, I did not see it -- at least in those portions of the conversation that have been made public.

I think that you are mistaken in going after Mullah Omar -- both now and in the past. From your own information here bellow *[sic: should be* 'below'*, 10/27/'20]* -- you have no idea who he is or what he is or was about. In your willful ignorance -- what else can you call it -- you are killing a lot of people for nothing and making us odious in the eyes of people throughout the world.

If this is an indication of the quality of your work with regard to real enemies of the US -- like bin Laden -- God help us...

I would be glad to send you what I have written on the subject of the Taliban. It includes sections on the Taliban and women, opium eradication, judicial executions, executions for sodomy (with young boys) and some very obvious mistakes of the 9/11 Commission and the Clinton Administration.

It also includes a letter from James Callahan -- the State Department emissary to Afghanistan in the Spring of 2001 . In the letter, our genuinely seasoned and knowledgeable emissary relates how the supposed "failed state" of Mullah Omar's Taliban eradicated opium growing through consensus of the elders connected with the mosques throughout their domain.

Yet Mullah Omar was not allowed to raise his head -- in the face of American guns -- to run in the elections. To make this peculiar exclusion more tasteful in the eyes of the world, someone murdered 5 members of Doctors Without Borders and then blamed it on the Taliban (see Guardian article below).... Who do you think would do a thing like that? Do you think it might be the same people who murdered Iranian diplomats in Mazar-e-Sharif in the Summer of 1998 and blamed it on the Taliban? (see AFP article below.) .When you think of our "ally", Abdul Rashid Dostum, do the words ethical and lawful come to mind?

Sincerely,

AS (Steve) Adler

PS: I notice that the FBI does not list Mullah Omar as being wanted. Do you think they have it wrong?

****

The text below is from the official RFJ website as of the date the above letter was sent. Blue color is to distinguish it from the text of the author's letter. The original color of the rfj text was black. Type size and line spacing have been altered to fit in the available space. http://www.rewardsforjustice.net/index.cfm

$10 million reward being offered for information leading to the capture of Mullah Omar (more details**)**

WANTED

Mullah Omar

Up to $10 Million Reward

Date of birth: Unknown
Place of birth: Unknown
Height: Tall
Weight: Unknown
Build: Unknown
Hair: Black; with Beard
Eyes: Shrapnel wound to right eye
Complexion: Unknown
Sex: Male
Nationality: Afghani
Occupation: Unknown
Languages: Unknown
Characterisitics: none
Aliases: Unknown
Status: Wanted

Mullah Omar's Taliban regime in Afghanistan sheltered Osama bin-Laden and his al-Qai'da network in the years prior to the September 11 attacks. Although Operation Enduring Freedom removed the Taliban regime from power, Mullah Omar remains at large and represents a continuing threat to America and her allies. The United States Government is offering a reward of up to $10 million for information leading to the capture of Mullah Omar.

LETTER TO REWARDS FOR JUSTICE

[8/24/"15- 7/19/'17]

I read Prof. Barnett Rubin's informative article in the New Yorker of 7/29/15: "What Could Mullah Mohammad Omar's Death Mean for the Taliban Talks?"-- and checked your website, mentioned twice in that piece [1121]. This is what I found:

Wanted
Information that brings to justice...
Mullah Omar
Up to $10 Million Reward
Mullah Omar's Taliban regime in Afghanistan sheltered Osama bin-Laden and his al-Qa'ida network in the years prior to the September 11 attacks.
Although Operation Enduring Freedom removed the Taliban regime from power, Mullah Omar remains at large and represents a continuing threat to America and her allies.

THIS PARTIAL SCREEN SHOT WAS MADE 8/17/15 14:04 JERUSALEM TIME [SAME ON 7/19/'17] [THE MULLAH OMAR PAGE WAS FOUND TO HAVE BEEN REMOVED FROM REWARDS FOR JUSTICE 8/14/'17 2PM JERUSALEM TIME] [A FULL SCREEN SHOT IS SHOWN IN MINIATURE, ABOVE]
https://www.rewardsforjustice.net/english/mullah_omar.html

So Rewards For Justice is still offering a reward for "Information that brings to justice…" a man who is reported to have died more than two years ago.[1122]

Since, according to the FBI, M. Omar was never wanted or indicted for any crime,[1123] what kind of justice does the State Department have in mind? Let us imagine -- to judge them favorably[1124] --that the State Department – is actually interested in justice as most people would understand the word and that State is not a bunch of pragmatic murderers[1125] who wish to kill someone -- Mullah Omar -- who appears to be in their way. Let's assume that even a middle position is not warranted – the position that the State Deptartment put a ten million dollar price on the head of a man that is not guilty -- not so much to kill him, but just to make it more difficult for him to communicate with his associates.[1126]

SCREEN SHOT RFJ 8/17/15. TEXT LAYOUT CHANGES AUTOMATICALLY WITH SIZE OF TEXT ON SCREEN

Let us make the daring assumption that the ten million dollar reward for "information that leads to justice" is just what most decent Americans would think it means -- justice as determined in a responsible court of law with reasonable rules of evidence.

The audio "Voice of America International Public Service Announcement" that is linked to RFJ's Mullah Omar page, supports this idea. It says the reward would be for "information leading to Mullah Omar's arrest or prosecution."[1127] However, there are no particular crimes Mullah Omar stands accused of on the RFJ website. There's nothing that he can be prosecuted for and no law that he is said to have broken – as far as a reason for his arrest.

This being so, we could try him in absentia and prosecute him for the things that he stands accused of in the public mind. We could show that – except for the Buddhist Statues issues[1128] – he's clearly not guilty. The US should then exonerate Mullah Omar, et al, apologize, pay for damages, ask for forgiveness for persecuting them on the basis of false accusations and aim to develop strategies to avoid such things in the future. This would be Justice.

As this book is unique in providing the "information that leads[1129] to Justice" – including exoneration after prosecution - and the reward offered is for "information leading to … arrest or prosecution" – so arrest is not necessary for the granting of a reward, I'd like to claim the $10 million. [1130] Please let me know where I can collect it.

Ohav Shalom v'Rodef Shalom ...[1131]
A. S. Adler,
Jerusalem

PS. When I mentioned to a friend that Mullah Omar isn't wanted for any crimes, he suggested that perhaps he's guilty of leading others to commit crimes. This made me realize something that was not adequately stressed in this book: Mullah Omar actively led millions of people to do good[1132].

וְהַמַּשְׂכִּילִים יַזְהִרוּ כְּזֹהַר הָרָקִיעַ
וּמַצְדִּיקֵי הָרַבִּים כַּכּוֹכָבִים
לְעוֹלָם וָעֶד.

And they that are wise shall shine as the brightness of the firmament; they that turn the many to righteousness, as the stars for ever.[1133]

[1121] _____ The article has 12 links to items mentioned in the text but no link to the RFJ site.

The 1st linked source that supposedly tells us Mullah Omar is dead is introduced: "On July 1st, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, which had long recognized Mullah Omar as its amir, issued a public statement asserting that Mullah Omar was dead and shifting its allegiance to the Islamic State." This statement is quite remarkable— both for what it says & what it omits. In 3k+ words on the seemingly unknowable whereabouts of M. O., there's no mention that US had $10M on his head since '01.[12/14/01, Daily News (NY), "U.S. Will Put Up $10m For Bagging Omar", Richard Sisk,p.8] He does tell us even the Taliban Amb. to Pakistan wasn't able to learn M.O.'s location – citing p. 161-2 of the ambassador's book – but he does not say that on the same pages, the ambassador tells us he was apparently being tracked thru his satellite phone & almost killed by what he strongly suggests was a phone targeted bomb. [A S Zaeef,"My Life With The Taliban"] The strongest 'Mullah Omar is dead' statement appears to be "Isn't making a person to obey a leader who is not in existence the biggest lie…" Statement from the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan's leader Uthman Ghazi: "It's Been Thirteen Years Since We Have Heard From You Mullah Muhammad Omar"

[1122] A. NYT ,7/30/15, 'Mullah Muhammad Omar, Enigmatic Leader of Afghan Taliban, Is Dead", Carlotta Gall. B."Counterterrorism Calendar 2016", pub. by Office of the Dir. of National Intell. p 118, said M.O. died in '13, no reward.
A http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/31/world/asia/mullah-muhammad-omar-taliban-leader-afghanistan-dies.html?_r=0 B https://bookstore.gpo.gov/products/sku/oodnctcterrorism2016-calendar

[1123] See App. 9.7 conv. w'. J.Margolin, FBI. 1st letter to RFJ with cc. to J.M./FBI, Apr. 7/'05, avshadler@yahoo.com

[1124] הוי דן את כל האדם לכף זכות...
'…judge all people favorably'
Talmud, Perkei Avos1:6
R. Yehoshua ben Perachia יהושע בן פרחיה

[1125] like US Military that drone-murdered his 'terrorist" successor, Mullah Akhtar Mohammad Mansour, 5/'16 ~50km inside Pakist., SW of Ahmad Wal – never on RFJ's list or wanted on Counterterrorism2016Calendar - tho he's noted there as Omar's succesor p118&120.
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/05/taliban-leader-killed-drone-strike-160521204920111.html https://pdb.rsarpass.com/881F4732-C85D-45E1-A33A-40041438TACD_w982_r1_s.jpg

[1126] "What does it take to merit a reward? What kind of information are you looking for? Anyone who provides actionable information that will either help us prevent or favorably resolve acts of international terrorism against the U.S. anywhere in the world may potentially be eligible for a reward."8/17/15, 14: Jerus. https://www.rewardsforjustice.net/english/about-rfj/frequently-asked-questions.html

It should be clear that when the US stops attacking Afgh. on the basis of false accusations, the ordinary people of Afgh. & their supporters – incl. the great majority of the Taliban that have been associated with Mullah Omar -- will stop those reciprocative attacks on the US that some choose to call terrorism.

US spent ~$1+ Trillion on the war in Afghanistan -- ~$70B/yr or $200M/day, with an average of ~40 war-related violent deaths/day. [See footnote 803 & 1B.3a]

[1127] http://editorials.voa.gov/audio/2190231.html -- about in the middle of the message.

[1128] But see Chapt. 8 on this & how it may provide an opening for a Japan+Mongolia mediated Peace.

[1129] RFJ has brings; VOA: leading to. [added 10/27/'20]

[1130] Reward to be used to doc. false accusations in Afg., develop strategies to reduce such in future – incl. "Tudela Centers" in Jerusalem to promote intercultural learning from Afg. to NATO. At $1E12 for the war & ≥2.5E5 killed, shortening the war 1 day would save ~40 lives & $2E8. This work probably shortened the war more than this thru its infl. on B. Rubin & others. See footnotes 1-B, 803 & Cover –Pg.1 – Experts/Readers Comment 'D'; Append. 1,7 &10; Timeline 7/14-8/14/'17

[1131] *"Hillel says: Be among the disciples of Aaron, loving peace and pursuing peace, loving people and bringing them close to Torah."* Talmud/ Ethics of the Fathers 1:12

[1132] See footnotes 573, 608 A.2, 777, 971

[1133] Daniel 12:3

About the Author

ב״ה

Some of my friends expressed concern over the title of this book. An older, seasoned publisher felt some people would look at the title and -- without reading further – they'd think, "The Jews are supporting terrorism."[1134] To be clear at the outset, this book doesn't support terrorism. Two of my more learned religious friends – young men in a prestigious Yeshiva in Jerusalem -- thought the title was misleading – that people might think that this book is an authoritative analysis of the Taliban by a Torah Scholar. This book is not such an analysis and, by the standards of the Yeshiva World, I'm not a Torah Scholar [1135]

So, who am I? Two readers of early versions of this work understood what I'm about here. Professor Barnett Rubin, a leading scholar on Afghanistan, said he believes I'm an "Orthodox Jewish Scholar, who ... devoted quite a bit of time in the past few years to trying to gain a very deep and empathetic understanding of the Taliban."[1136] A key member of a Moslem website wrote that I'm a "Jewish American author ... [who] deflates the media hysteria surrounding the 'evil Taliban' with cool, calm research ... [and that I come] from a religiously Jewish perspective."[1137]

Since it is usual in the "About The Author" blurb to say something more than this about the author's qualifications, I will add that I am an autodidact -- not a product of a typical education. From an early age, I have learned by asking questions – which is a key to the traditional Jewish way of learning[1138]. I've also found some valuable answers in diverse fields. In transportation policy, optics, myopia prevention and Torah Interpretation [1139], for example, I've developed solutions to long standing problems that have been recognized by outstanding experts in their respective fields.

The time I used to research and write this book was my own. It was also done לשמה - l'shma – for its own sake -- not for money or academic credits. Beyond making use of public libraries and the libraries of leading universities in NYC & Jerusalem, this work was not dependent on the assistance of any organization or funder. "Torah and the Taliban" is entirely the responsibility of the author – even the typing.

A. S. Adler, 4 Cheshvan, 5781, [Oct. 22/'20], **Jerusalem.**

[1134] See footnotes 850 & 851 which show an early, chapter length version of this book, posted on at least two virulently anti-Jewish websites. Neither of the sites found appears to comment on the substance of the piece that they post.

[1135] Though not a Torah Scholar by the standards of the Yeshivah World, I have written a book of my novel – but kosher – interpretations of the Bible. This work is intended to be insightful, informative & morally uplifting -- not to proselytize. Interested readers are welcome to send for a free PDF of the latest version. [242 p, ~225k words, 70+ illustrations, tables, etc.]

[1136] See footnotes 864 & 865 for transcript & recording of Prof. Rubin's comments – in conversation with the author on a radio program. Also, see footnote 847on how an Orthodox Jewish businessman responded to this recording.

[1137] See footnote 847 and associated comments. Also see footnote 177-F for more on the author's religious perspective.

[1138] See footnotes 903 & 904. For more on the author, send for a pdf of "A Sign Forever" [162 p, 99k words].

[1139] Readers are welcome to send for one-pagers on transportation policy & optics: **A.** Jitney Systems & Auto Rapid Transit -- With Kiruvans™ & Kindness Cars™ As a Path to Peace **B.** The Personal Reader™ Is Designed to do for book reading what the Walkman™ and iPod™ have done for listening. Unlike these devices, the Personal Reader may be used on Shabbes by religious Jews. **C.** Studies of Intermittent Distance Viewing or Near-Work Breaks on the Development of Myopia [TM. Kiruvans, Kindness Cars & Personal Reader are trademarks of A. S. Adler [avshadler@yahoo.com]. Walkman & iPod are trademarks of Sony Corp. & Apple Inc., resp.]. Readers are also welcome to send for the latest version of my Sefer Chidushei Torah – a book of novel but kosher interpretations of the 5 books of Moses [See footnote 1135, supra].